From 25505898530a333011f4fd5cbc841ad6b26c089c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Baumann Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2024 16:40:04 +0200 Subject: Adding upstream version 1:9.2p1. Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann --- krl.c | 1447 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 1447 insertions(+) create mode 100644 krl.c (limited to 'krl.c') diff --git a/krl.c b/krl.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..473a9d7 --- /dev/null +++ b/krl.c @@ -0,0 +1,1447 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.54 2022/04/28 02:53:31 djm Exp $ */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "authfile.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "digest.h" +#include "bitmap.h" +#include "utf8.h" + +#include "krl.h" + +/* #define DEBUG_KRL */ +#ifdef DEBUG_KRL +# define KRL_DBG(x) debug3_f x +#else +# define KRL_DBG(x) +#endif + +/* + * Trees of revoked serial numbers, key IDs and keys. This allows + * quick searching, querying and producing lists in canonical order. + */ + +/* Tree of serial numbers. XXX make smarter: really need a real sparse bitmap */ +struct revoked_serial { + u_int64_t lo, hi; + RB_ENTRY(revoked_serial) tree_entry; +}; +static int serial_cmp(struct revoked_serial *a, struct revoked_serial *b); +RB_HEAD(revoked_serial_tree, revoked_serial); +RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_serial_tree, revoked_serial, tree_entry, serial_cmp) + +/* Tree of key IDs */ +struct revoked_key_id { + char *key_id; + RB_ENTRY(revoked_key_id) tree_entry; +}; +static int key_id_cmp(struct revoked_key_id *a, struct revoked_key_id *b); +RB_HEAD(revoked_key_id_tree, revoked_key_id); +RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_key_id_tree, revoked_key_id, tree_entry, key_id_cmp) + +/* Tree of blobs (used for keys and fingerprints) */ +struct revoked_blob { + u_char *blob; + size_t len; + RB_ENTRY(revoked_blob) tree_entry; +}; +static int blob_cmp(struct revoked_blob *a, struct revoked_blob *b); +RB_HEAD(revoked_blob_tree, revoked_blob); +RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_blob_tree, revoked_blob, tree_entry, blob_cmp) + +/* Tracks revoked certs for a single CA */ +struct revoked_certs { + struct sshkey *ca_key; + struct revoked_serial_tree revoked_serials; + struct revoked_key_id_tree revoked_key_ids; + TAILQ_ENTRY(revoked_certs) entry; +}; +TAILQ_HEAD(revoked_certs_list, revoked_certs); + +struct ssh_krl { + u_int64_t krl_version; + u_int64_t generated_date; + u_int64_t flags; + char *comment; + struct revoked_blob_tree revoked_keys; + struct revoked_blob_tree revoked_sha1s; + struct revoked_blob_tree revoked_sha256s; + struct revoked_certs_list revoked_certs; +}; + +/* Return equal if a and b overlap */ +static int +serial_cmp(struct revoked_serial *a, struct revoked_serial *b) +{ + if (a->hi >= b->lo && a->lo <= b->hi) + return 0; + return a->lo < b->lo ? -1 : 1; +} + +static int +key_id_cmp(struct revoked_key_id *a, struct revoked_key_id *b) +{ + return strcmp(a->key_id, b->key_id); +} + +static int +blob_cmp(struct revoked_blob *a, struct revoked_blob *b) +{ + int r; + + if (a->len != b->len) { + if ((r = memcmp(a->blob, b->blob, MINIMUM(a->len, b->len))) != 0) + return r; + return a->len > b->len ? 1 : -1; + } else + return memcmp(a->blob, b->blob, a->len); +} + +struct ssh_krl * +ssh_krl_init(void) +{ + struct ssh_krl *krl; + + if ((krl = calloc(1, sizeof(*krl))) == NULL) + return NULL; + RB_INIT(&krl->revoked_keys); + RB_INIT(&krl->revoked_sha1s); + RB_INIT(&krl->revoked_sha256s); + TAILQ_INIT(&krl->revoked_certs); + return krl; +} + +static void +revoked_certs_free(struct revoked_certs *rc) +{ + struct revoked_serial *rs, *trs; + struct revoked_key_id *rki, *trki; + + RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rs, revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, trs) { + RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs); + free(rs); + } + RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rki, revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, trki) { + RB_REMOVE(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, rki); + free(rki->key_id); + free(rki); + } + sshkey_free(rc->ca_key); +} + +void +ssh_krl_free(struct ssh_krl *krl) +{ + struct revoked_blob *rb, *trb; + struct revoked_certs *rc, *trc; + + if (krl == NULL) + return; + + free(krl->comment); + RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, trb) { + RB_REMOVE(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, rb); + free(rb->blob); + free(rb); + } + RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, trb) { + RB_REMOVE(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, rb); + free(rb->blob); + free(rb); + } + RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, trb) { + RB_REMOVE(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, rb); + free(rb->blob); + free(rb); + } + TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry, trc) { + TAILQ_REMOVE(&krl->revoked_certs, rc, entry); + revoked_certs_free(rc); + } +} + +void +ssh_krl_set_version(struct ssh_krl *krl, u_int64_t version) +{ + krl->krl_version = version; +} + +int +ssh_krl_set_comment(struct ssh_krl *krl, const char *comment) +{ + free(krl->comment); + if ((krl->comment = strdup(comment)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Find the revoked_certs struct for a CA key. If allow_create is set then + * create a new one in the tree if one did not exist already. + */ +static int +revoked_certs_for_ca_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key, + struct revoked_certs **rcp, int allow_create) +{ + struct revoked_certs *rc; + int r; + + *rcp = NULL; + TAILQ_FOREACH(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry) { + if ((ca_key == NULL && rc->ca_key == NULL) || + sshkey_equal(rc->ca_key, ca_key)) { + *rcp = rc; + return 0; + } + } + if (!allow_create) + return 0; + /* If this CA doesn't exist in the list then add it now */ + if ((rc = calloc(1, sizeof(*rc))) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if (ca_key == NULL) + rc->ca_key = NULL; + else if ((r = sshkey_from_private(ca_key, &rc->ca_key)) != 0) { + free(rc); + return r; + } + RB_INIT(&rc->revoked_serials); + RB_INIT(&rc->revoked_key_ids); + TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&krl->revoked_certs, rc, entry); + KRL_DBG(("new CA %s", ca_key == NULL ? "*" : sshkey_type(ca_key))); + *rcp = rc; + return 0; +} + +static int +insert_serial_range(struct revoked_serial_tree *rt, u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi) +{ + struct revoked_serial rs, *ers, *crs, *irs; + + KRL_DBG(("insert %llu:%llu", lo, hi)); + memset(&rs, 0, sizeof(rs)); + rs.lo = lo; + rs.hi = hi; + ers = RB_NFIND(revoked_serial_tree, rt, &rs); + if (ers == NULL || serial_cmp(ers, &rs) != 0) { + /* No entry matches. Just insert */ + if ((irs = malloc(sizeof(rs))) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + memcpy(irs, &rs, sizeof(*irs)); + ers = RB_INSERT(revoked_serial_tree, rt, irs); + if (ers != NULL) { + KRL_DBG(("bad: ers != NULL")); + /* Shouldn't happen */ + free(irs); + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + ers = irs; + } else { + KRL_DBG(("overlap found %llu:%llu", ers->lo, ers->hi)); + /* + * The inserted entry overlaps an existing one. Grow the + * existing entry. + */ + if (ers->lo > lo) + ers->lo = lo; + if (ers->hi < hi) + ers->hi = hi; + } + + /* + * The inserted or revised range might overlap or abut adjacent ones; + * coalesce as necessary. + */ + + /* Check predecessors */ + while ((crs = RB_PREV(revoked_serial_tree, rt, ers)) != NULL) { + KRL_DBG(("pred %llu:%llu", crs->lo, crs->hi)); + if (ers->lo != 0 && crs->hi < ers->lo - 1) + break; + /* This entry overlaps. */ + if (crs->lo < ers->lo) { + ers->lo = crs->lo; + KRL_DBG(("pred extend %llu:%llu", ers->lo, ers->hi)); + } + RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, rt, crs); + free(crs); + } + /* Check successors */ + while ((crs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, rt, ers)) != NULL) { + KRL_DBG(("succ %llu:%llu", crs->lo, crs->hi)); + if (ers->hi != (u_int64_t)-1 && crs->lo > ers->hi + 1) + break; + /* This entry overlaps. */ + if (crs->hi > ers->hi) { + ers->hi = crs->hi; + KRL_DBG(("succ extend %llu:%llu", ers->lo, ers->hi)); + } + RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, rt, crs); + free(crs); + } + KRL_DBG(("done, final %llu:%llu", ers->lo, ers->hi)); + return 0; +} + +int +ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key, + u_int64_t serial) +{ + return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl, ca_key, serial, serial); +} + +int +ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(struct ssh_krl *krl, + const struct sshkey *ca_key, u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi) +{ + struct revoked_certs *rc; + int r; + + if (lo > hi || lo == 0) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, ca_key, &rc, 1)) != 0) + return r; + return insert_serial_range(&rc->revoked_serials, lo, hi); +} + +int +ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key, + const char *key_id) +{ + struct revoked_key_id *rki, *erki; + struct revoked_certs *rc; + int r; + + if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, ca_key, &rc, 1)) != 0) + return r; + + KRL_DBG(("revoke %s", key_id)); + if ((rki = calloc(1, sizeof(*rki))) == NULL || + (rki->key_id = strdup(key_id)) == NULL) { + free(rki); + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + } + erki = RB_INSERT(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, rki); + if (erki != NULL) { + free(rki->key_id); + free(rki); + } + return 0; +} + +/* Convert "key" to a public key blob without any certificate information */ +static int +plain_key_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blob, size_t *blen) +{ + struct sshkey *kcopy; + int r; + + if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &kcopy)) != 0) + return r; + if (sshkey_is_cert(kcopy)) { + if ((r = sshkey_drop_cert(kcopy)) != 0) { + sshkey_free(kcopy); + return r; + } + } + r = sshkey_to_blob(kcopy, blob, blen); + sshkey_free(kcopy); + return r; +} + +/* Revoke a key blob. Ownership of blob is transferred to the tree */ +static int +revoke_blob(struct revoked_blob_tree *rbt, u_char *blob, size_t len) +{ + struct revoked_blob *rb, *erb; + + if ((rb = calloc(1, sizeof(*rb))) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + rb->blob = blob; + rb->len = len; + erb = RB_INSERT(revoked_blob_tree, rbt, rb); + if (erb != NULL) { + free(rb->blob); + free(rb); + } + return 0; +} + +int +ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key) +{ + u_char *blob; + size_t len; + int r; + + debug3_f("revoke type %s", sshkey_type(key)); + if ((r = plain_key_blob(key, &blob, &len)) != 0) + return r; + return revoke_blob(&krl->revoked_keys, blob, len); +} + +static int +revoke_by_hash(struct revoked_blob_tree *target, const u_char *p, size_t len) +{ + u_char *blob; + int r; + + /* need to copy hash, as revoke_blob steals ownership */ + if ((blob = malloc(len)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + memcpy(blob, p, len); + if ((r = revoke_blob(target, blob, len)) != 0) { + free(blob); + return r; + } + return 0; +} + +int +ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(struct ssh_krl *krl, const u_char *p, size_t len) +{ + debug3_f("revoke by sha1"); + if (len != 20) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + return revoke_by_hash(&krl->revoked_sha1s, p, len); +} + +int +ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(struct ssh_krl *krl, const u_char *p, size_t len) +{ + debug3_f("revoke by sha256"); + if (len != 32) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + return revoke_by_hash(&krl->revoked_sha256s, p, len); +} + +int +ssh_krl_revoke_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key) +{ + /* XXX replace with SHA256? */ + if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) + return ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(krl, key); + + if (key->cert->serial == 0) { + return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl, + key->cert->signature_key, + key->cert->key_id); + } else { + return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl, + key->cert->signature_key, + key->cert->serial); + } +} + +/* + * Select the most compact section type to emit next in a KRL based on + * the current section type, the run length of contiguous revoked serial + * numbers and the gaps from the last and to the next revoked serial. + * Applies a mostly-accurate bit cost model to select the section type + * that will minimise the size of the resultant KRL. + */ +static int +choose_next_state(int current_state, u_int64_t contig, int final, + u_int64_t last_gap, u_int64_t next_gap, int *force_new_section) +{ + int new_state; + u_int64_t cost, cost_list, cost_range, cost_bitmap, cost_bitmap_restart; + + /* + * Avoid unsigned overflows. + * The limits are high enough to avoid confusing the calculations. + */ + contig = MINIMUM(contig, 1ULL<<31); + last_gap = MINIMUM(last_gap, 1ULL<<31); + next_gap = MINIMUM(next_gap, 1ULL<<31); + + /* + * Calculate the cost to switch from the current state to candidates. + * NB. range sections only ever contain a single range, so their + * switching cost is independent of the current_state. + */ + cost_list = cost_bitmap = cost_bitmap_restart = 0; + cost_range = 8; + switch (current_state) { + case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: + cost_bitmap_restart = cost_bitmap = 8 + 64; + break; + case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: + cost_list = 8; + cost_bitmap_restart = 8 + 64; + break; + case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: + case 0: + cost_bitmap_restart = cost_bitmap = 8 + 64; + cost_list = 8; + } + + /* Estimate base cost in bits of each section type */ + cost_list += 64 * contig + (final ? 0 : 8+64); + cost_range += (2 * 64) + (final ? 0 : 8+64); + cost_bitmap += last_gap + contig + (final ? 0 : MINIMUM(next_gap, 8+64)); + cost_bitmap_restart += contig + (final ? 0 : MINIMUM(next_gap, 8+64)); + + /* Convert to byte costs for actual comparison */ + cost_list = (cost_list + 7) / 8; + cost_bitmap = (cost_bitmap + 7) / 8; + cost_bitmap_restart = (cost_bitmap_restart + 7) / 8; + cost_range = (cost_range + 7) / 8; + + /* Now pick the best choice */ + *force_new_section = 0; + new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP; + cost = cost_bitmap; + if (cost_range < cost) { + new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE; + cost = cost_range; + } + if (cost_list < cost) { + new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST; + cost = cost_list; + } + if (cost_bitmap_restart < cost) { + new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP; + *force_new_section = 1; + cost = cost_bitmap_restart; + } + KRL_DBG(("contig %llu last_gap %llu next_gap %llu final %d, costs:" + "list %llu range %llu bitmap %llu new bitmap %llu, " + "selected 0x%02x%s", (long long unsigned)contig, + (long long unsigned)last_gap, (long long unsigned)next_gap, final, + (long long unsigned)cost_list, (long long unsigned)cost_range, + (long long unsigned)cost_bitmap, + (long long unsigned)cost_bitmap_restart, new_state, + *force_new_section ? " restart" : "")); + return new_state; +} + +static int +put_bitmap(struct sshbuf *buf, struct bitmap *bitmap) +{ + size_t len; + u_char *blob; + int r; + + len = bitmap_nbytes(bitmap); + if ((blob = malloc(len)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if (bitmap_to_string(bitmap, blob, len) != 0) { + free(blob); + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + r = sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(buf, blob, len); + free(blob); + return r; +} + +/* Generate a KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES KRL section */ +static int +revoked_certs_generate(struct revoked_certs *rc, struct sshbuf *buf) +{ + int final, force_new_sect, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + u_int64_t i, contig, gap, last = 0, bitmap_start = 0; + struct revoked_serial *rs, *nrs; + struct revoked_key_id *rki; + int next_state, state = 0; + struct sshbuf *sect; + struct bitmap *bitmap = NULL; + + if ((sect = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + + /* Store the header: optional CA scope key, reserved */ + if (rc->ca_key == NULL) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0)) != 0) + goto out; + } else { + if ((r = sshkey_puts(rc->ca_key, buf)) != 0) + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* Store the revoked serials. */ + for (rs = RB_MIN(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials); + rs != NULL; + rs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs)) { + KRL_DBG(("serial %llu:%llu state 0x%02x", + (long long unsigned)rs->lo, (long long unsigned)rs->hi, + state)); + + /* Check contiguous length and gap to next section (if any) */ + nrs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs); + final = nrs == NULL; + gap = nrs == NULL ? 0 : nrs->lo - rs->hi; + contig = 1 + (rs->hi - rs->lo); + + /* Choose next state based on these */ + next_state = choose_next_state(state, contig, final, + state == 0 ? 0 : rs->lo - last, gap, &force_new_sect); + + /* + * If the current section is a range section or has a different + * type to the next section, then finish it off now. + */ + if (state != 0 && (force_new_sect || next_state != state || + state == KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE)) { + KRL_DBG(("finish state 0x%02x", state)); + switch (state) { + case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: + case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: + break; + case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: + if ((r = put_bitmap(sect, bitmap)) != 0) + goto out; + bitmap_free(bitmap); + bitmap = NULL; + break; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, state)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) + goto out; + sshbuf_reset(sect); + } + + /* If we are starting a new section then prepare it now */ + if (next_state != state || force_new_sect) { + KRL_DBG(("start state 0x%02x", + next_state)); + state = next_state; + sshbuf_reset(sect); + switch (state) { + case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: + case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: + break; + case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: + if ((bitmap = bitmap_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + bitmap_start = rs->lo; + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, + bitmap_start)) != 0) + goto out; + break; + } + } + + /* Perform section-specific processing */ + switch (state) { + case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: + for (i = 0; i < contig; i++) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, rs->lo + i)) != 0) + goto out; + } + break; + case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, rs->lo)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, rs->hi)) != 0) + goto out; + break; + case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: + if (rs->lo - bitmap_start > INT_MAX) { + error_f("insane bitmap gap"); + goto out; + } + for (i = 0; i < contig; i++) { + if (bitmap_set_bit(bitmap, + rs->lo + i - bitmap_start) != 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + } + break; + } + last = rs->hi; + } + /* Flush the remaining section, if any */ + if (state != 0) { + KRL_DBG(("serial final flush for state 0x%02x", state)); + switch (state) { + case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: + case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: + break; + case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: + if ((r = put_bitmap(sect, bitmap)) != 0) + goto out; + bitmap_free(bitmap); + bitmap = NULL; + break; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, state)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) + goto out; + } + KRL_DBG(("serial done ")); + + /* Now output a section for any revocations by key ID */ + sshbuf_reset(sect); + RB_FOREACH(rki, revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids) { + KRL_DBG(("key ID %s", rki->key_id)); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sect, rki->key_id)) != 0) + goto out; + } + if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) + goto out; + } + r = 0; + out: + bitmap_free(bitmap); + sshbuf_free(sect); + return r; +} + +int +ssh_krl_to_blob(struct ssh_krl *krl, struct sshbuf *buf, + struct sshkey **sign_keys, u_int nsign_keys) +{ + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + struct revoked_certs *rc; + struct revoked_blob *rb; + struct sshbuf *sect; + u_char *sblob = NULL; + size_t slen, i; + + if (krl->generated_date == 0) + krl->generated_date = time(NULL); + + if ((sect = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + + /* Store the header */ + if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, KRL_MAGIC, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(buf, KRL_FORMAT_VERSION)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(buf, krl->krl_version)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(buf, krl->generated_date)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(buf, krl->flags)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buf, krl->comment)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* Store sections for revoked certificates */ + TAILQ_FOREACH(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry) { + sshbuf_reset(sect); + if ((r = revoked_certs_generate(rc, sect)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) + goto out; + } + + /* Finally, output sections for revocations by public key/hash */ + sshbuf_reset(sect); + RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys) { + KRL_DBG(("key len %zu ", rb->len)); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(sect, rb->blob, rb->len)) != 0) + goto out; + } + if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) + goto out; + } + sshbuf_reset(sect); + RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s) { + KRL_DBG(("hash len %zu ", rb->len)); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(sect, rb->blob, rb->len)) != 0) + goto out; + } + if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, + KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) + goto out; + } + sshbuf_reset(sect); + RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s) { + KRL_DBG(("hash len %zu ", rb->len)); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(sect, rb->blob, rb->len)) != 0) + goto out; + } + if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, + KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA256)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) + goto out; + } + + for (i = 0; i < nsign_keys; i++) { + KRL_DBG(("sig key %s", sshkey_ssh_name(sign_keys[i]))); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE)) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_puts(sign_keys[i], buf)) != 0) + goto out; + /* XXX support sk-* keys */ + if ((r = sshkey_sign(sign_keys[i], &sblob, &slen, + sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf), NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0)) != 0) + goto out; + KRL_DBG(("signature sig len %zu", slen)); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, sblob, slen)) != 0) + goto out; + } + + r = 0; + out: + free(sblob); + sshbuf_free(sect); + return r; +} + +static void +format_timestamp(u_int64_t timestamp, char *ts, size_t nts) +{ + time_t t; + struct tm *tm; + + t = timestamp; + tm = localtime(&t); + if (tm == NULL) + strlcpy(ts, "", nts); + else { + *ts = '\0'; + strftime(ts, nts, "%Y%m%dT%H%M%S", tm); + } +} + +static int +parse_revoked_certs(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl *krl) +{ + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + u_char type; + const u_char *blob; + size_t blen, nbits; + struct sshbuf *subsect = NULL; + u_int64_t serial, serial_lo, serial_hi; + struct bitmap *bitmap = NULL; + char *key_id = NULL; + struct sshkey *ca_key = NULL; + + if ((subsect = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + + /* Header: key, reserved */ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, &blob, &blen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_skip_string(buf)) != 0) + goto out; + if (blen != 0 && (r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &ca_key)) != 0) + goto out; + + while (sshbuf_len(buf) > 0) { + sshbuf_free(subsect); + subsect = NULL; + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(buf, &type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_froms(buf, &subsect)) != 0) + goto out; + KRL_DBG(("subsection type 0x%02x", type)); + /* sshbuf_dump(subsect, stderr); */ + + switch (type) { + case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: + while (sshbuf_len(subsect) > 0) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl, + ca_key, serial)) != 0) + goto out; + } + break; + case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial_lo)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial_hi)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl, + ca_key, serial_lo, serial_hi)) != 0) + goto out; + break; + case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: + if ((bitmap = bitmap_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial_lo)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct(subsect, + &blob, &blen)) != 0) + goto out; + if (bitmap_from_string(bitmap, blob, blen) != 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + nbits = bitmap_nbits(bitmap); + for (serial = 0; serial < (u_int64_t)nbits; serial++) { + if (serial > 0 && serial_lo + serial == 0) { + error_f("bitmap wraps u64"); + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + if (!bitmap_test_bit(bitmap, serial)) + continue; + if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl, + ca_key, serial_lo + serial)) != 0) + goto out; + } + bitmap_free(bitmap); + bitmap = NULL; + break; + case KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID: + while (sshbuf_len(subsect) > 0) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(subsect, + &key_id, NULL)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl, + ca_key, key_id)) != 0) + goto out; + free(key_id); + key_id = NULL; + } + break; + default: + error("Unsupported KRL certificate section %u", type); + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + if (sshbuf_len(subsect) > 0) { + error("KRL certificate section contains unparsed data"); + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + } + + r = 0; + out: + if (bitmap != NULL) + bitmap_free(bitmap); + free(key_id); + sshkey_free(ca_key); + sshbuf_free(subsect); + return r; +} + +static int +blob_section(struct sshbuf *sect, struct revoked_blob_tree *target_tree, + size_t expected_len) +{ + u_char *rdata = NULL; + size_t rlen = 0; + int r; + + while (sshbuf_len(sect) > 0) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(sect, &rdata, &rlen)) != 0) + return r; + if (expected_len != 0 && rlen != expected_len) { + error_f("bad length"); + free(rdata); + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + } + if ((r = revoke_blob(target_tree, rdata, rlen)) != 0) { + free(rdata); + return r; + } + } + return 0; +} + +/* Attempt to parse a KRL, checking its signature (if any) with sign_ca_keys. */ +int +ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp, + const struct sshkey **sign_ca_keys, size_t nsign_ca_keys) +{ + struct sshbuf *copy = NULL, *sect = NULL; + struct ssh_krl *krl = NULL; + char timestamp[64]; + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, sig_seen; + struct sshkey *key = NULL, **ca_used = NULL, **tmp_ca_used; + u_char type; + const u_char *blob; + size_t i, j, sig_off, sects_off, blen, nca_used; + u_int format_version; + + nca_used = 0; + *krlp = NULL; + if (sshbuf_len(buf) < sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1 || + memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(buf), KRL_MAGIC, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1) != 0) { + debug3_f("not a KRL"); + return SSH_ERR_KRL_BAD_MAGIC; + } + + /* Take a copy of the KRL buffer so we can verify its signature later */ + if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(buf)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(copy, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1)) != 0) + goto out; + + if ((krl = ssh_krl_init()) == NULL) { + error_f("alloc failed"); + goto out; + } + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(copy, &format_version)) != 0) + goto out; + if (format_version != KRL_FORMAT_VERSION) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(copy, &krl->krl_version)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u64(copy, &krl->generated_date)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u64(copy, &krl->flags)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_skip_string(copy)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(copy, &krl->comment, NULL)) != 0) + goto out; + + format_timestamp(krl->generated_date, timestamp, sizeof(timestamp)); + debug("KRL version %llu generated at %s%s%s", + (long long unsigned)krl->krl_version, timestamp, + *krl->comment ? ": " : "", krl->comment); + + /* + * 1st pass: verify signatures, if any. This is done to avoid + * detailed parsing of data whose provenance is unverified. + */ + sig_seen = 0; + if (sshbuf_len(buf) < sshbuf_len(copy)) { + /* Shouldn't happen */ + r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto out; + } + sects_off = sshbuf_len(buf) - sshbuf_len(copy); + while (sshbuf_len(copy) > 0) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(copy, &type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(copy, &blob, &blen)) != 0) + goto out; + KRL_DBG(("first pass, section 0x%02x", type)); + if (type != KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE) { + if (sig_seen) { + error("KRL contains non-signature section " + "after signature"); + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + /* Not interested for now. */ + continue; + } + sig_seen = 1; + /* First string component is the signing key */ + if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &key)) != 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + if (sshbuf_len(buf) < sshbuf_len(copy)) { + /* Shouldn't happen */ + r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto out; + } + sig_off = sshbuf_len(buf) - sshbuf_len(copy); + /* Second string component is the signature itself */ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(copy, &blob, &blen)) != 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + /* Check signature over entire KRL up to this point */ + if ((r = sshkey_verify(key, blob, blen, + sshbuf_ptr(buf), sig_off, NULL, 0, NULL)) != 0) + goto out; + /* Check if this key has already signed this KRL */ + for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) { + if (sshkey_equal(ca_used[i], key)) { + error("KRL signed more than once with " + "the same key"); + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + } + /* Record keys used to sign the KRL */ + tmp_ca_used = recallocarray(ca_used, nca_used, nca_used + 1, + sizeof(*ca_used)); + if (tmp_ca_used == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + ca_used = tmp_ca_used; + ca_used[nca_used++] = key; + key = NULL; + } + + if (sshbuf_len(copy) != 0) { + /* Shouldn't happen */ + r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto out; + } + + /* + * 2nd pass: parse and load the KRL, skipping the header to the point + * where the section start. + */ + sshbuf_free(copy); + if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(buf)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(copy, sects_off)) != 0) + goto out; + while (sshbuf_len(copy) > 0) { + sshbuf_free(sect); + sect = NULL; + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(copy, &type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_froms(copy, §)) != 0) + goto out; + KRL_DBG(("second pass, section 0x%02x", type)); + + switch (type) { + case KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES: + if ((r = parse_revoked_certs(sect, krl)) != 0) + goto out; + break; + case KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY: + if ((r = blob_section(sect, + &krl->revoked_keys, 0)) != 0) + goto out; + break; + case KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1: + if ((r = blob_section(sect, + &krl->revoked_sha1s, 20)) != 0) + goto out; + break; + case KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA256: + if ((r = blob_section(sect, + &krl->revoked_sha256s, 32)) != 0) + goto out; + break; + case KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE: + /* Handled above, but still need to stay in synch */ + sshbuf_free(sect); + sect = NULL; + if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(copy)) != 0) + goto out; + break; + default: + error("Unsupported KRL section %u", type); + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + if (sect != NULL && sshbuf_len(sect) > 0) { + error("KRL section contains unparsed data"); + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + } + + /* Check that the key(s) used to sign the KRL weren't revoked */ + sig_seen = 0; + for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) { + if (ssh_krl_check_key(krl, ca_used[i]) == 0) + sig_seen = 1; + else { + sshkey_free(ca_used[i]); + ca_used[i] = NULL; + } + } + if (nca_used && !sig_seen) { + error("All keys used to sign KRL were revoked"); + r = SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; + goto out; + } + + /* If we have CA keys, then verify that one was used to sign the KRL */ + if (sig_seen && nsign_ca_keys != 0) { + sig_seen = 0; + for (i = 0; !sig_seen && i < nsign_ca_keys; i++) { + for (j = 0; j < nca_used; j++) { + if (ca_used[j] == NULL) + continue; + if (sshkey_equal(ca_used[j], sign_ca_keys[i])) { + sig_seen = 1; + break; + } + } + } + if (!sig_seen) { + r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; + error("KRL not signed with any trusted key"); + goto out; + } + } + + *krlp = krl; + r = 0; + out: + if (r != 0) + ssh_krl_free(krl); + for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) + sshkey_free(ca_used[i]); + free(ca_used); + sshkey_free(key); + sshbuf_free(copy); + sshbuf_free(sect); + return r; +} + +/* Checks certificate serial number and key ID revocation */ +static int +is_cert_revoked(const struct sshkey *key, struct revoked_certs *rc) +{ + struct revoked_serial rs, *ers; + struct revoked_key_id rki, *erki; + + /* Check revocation by cert key ID */ + memset(&rki, 0, sizeof(rki)); + rki.key_id = key->cert->key_id; + erki = RB_FIND(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, &rki); + if (erki != NULL) { + KRL_DBG(("revoked by key ID")); + return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; + } + + /* + * Zero serials numbers are ignored (it's the default when the + * CA doesn't specify one). + */ + if (key->cert->serial == 0) + return 0; + + memset(&rs, 0, sizeof(rs)); + rs.lo = rs.hi = key->cert->serial; + ers = RB_FIND(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, &rs); + if (ers != NULL) { + KRL_DBG(("revoked serial %llu matched %llu:%llu", + key->cert->serial, ers->lo, ers->hi)); + return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; + } + return 0; +} + +/* Checks whether a given key/cert is revoked. Does not check its CA */ +static int +is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key) +{ + struct revoked_blob rb, *erb; + struct revoked_certs *rc; + int r; + + /* Check explicitly revoked hashes first */ + memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb)); + if ((r = sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, + &rb.blob, &rb.len)) != 0) + return r; + erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, &rb); + free(rb.blob); + if (erb != NULL) { + KRL_DBG(("revoked by key SHA1")); + return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; + } + memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb)); + if ((r = sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, + &rb.blob, &rb.len)) != 0) + return r; + erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, &rb); + free(rb.blob); + if (erb != NULL) { + KRL_DBG(("revoked by key SHA256")); + return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; + } + + /* Next, explicit keys */ + memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb)); + if ((r = plain_key_blob(key, &rb.blob, &rb.len)) != 0) + return r; + erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, &rb); + free(rb.blob); + if (erb != NULL) { + KRL_DBG(("revoked by explicit key")); + return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; + } + + if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) + return 0; + + /* Check cert revocation for the specified CA */ + if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, key->cert->signature_key, + &rc, 0)) != 0) + return r; + if (rc != NULL) { + if ((r = is_cert_revoked(key, rc)) != 0) + return r; + } + /* Check cert revocation for the wildcard CA */ + if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, NULL, &rc, 0)) != 0) + return r; + if (rc != NULL) { + if ((r = is_cert_revoked(key, rc)) != 0) + return r; + } + + KRL_DBG(("%llu no match", key->cert->serial)); + return 0; +} + +int +ssh_krl_check_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key) +{ + int r; + + KRL_DBG(("checking key")); + if ((r = is_key_revoked(krl, key)) != 0) + return r; + if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) { + debug2_f("checking CA key"); + if ((r = is_key_revoked(krl, key->cert->signature_key)) != 0) + return r; + } + KRL_DBG(("key okay")); + return 0; +} + +int +ssh_krl_file_contains_key(const char *path, const struct sshkey *key) +{ + struct sshbuf *krlbuf = NULL; + struct ssh_krl *krl = NULL; + int oerrno = 0, r; + + if (path == NULL) + return 0; + if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(path, &krlbuf)) != 0) { + oerrno = errno; + goto out; + } + if ((r = ssh_krl_from_blob(krlbuf, &krl, NULL, 0)) != 0) + goto out; + debug2_f("checking KRL %s", path); + r = ssh_krl_check_key(krl, key); + out: + sshbuf_free(krlbuf); + ssh_krl_free(krl); + if (r != 0) + errno = oerrno; + return r; +} + +int +krl_dump(struct ssh_krl *krl, FILE *f) +{ + struct sshkey *key = NULL; + struct revoked_blob *rb; + struct revoked_certs *rc; + struct revoked_serial *rs; + struct revoked_key_id *rki; + int r, ret = 0; + char *fp, timestamp[64]; + + /* Try to print in a KRL spec-compatible format */ + format_timestamp(krl->generated_date, timestamp, sizeof(timestamp)); + fprintf(f, "# KRL version %llu\n", + (unsigned long long)krl->krl_version); + fprintf(f, "# Generated at %s\n", timestamp); + if (krl->comment != NULL && *krl->comment != '\0') { + r = INT_MAX; + asmprintf(&fp, INT_MAX, &r, "%s", krl->comment); + fprintf(f, "# Comment: %s\n", fp); + free(fp); + } + fputc('\n', f); + + RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys) { + if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(rb->blob, rb->len, &key)) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + error_r(r, "parse KRL key"); + continue; + } + if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT, + SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + error("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); + continue; + } + fprintf(f, "hash: %s # %s\n", fp, sshkey_ssh_name(key)); + free(fp); + free(key); + } + RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s) { + fp = tohex(rb->blob, rb->len); + fprintf(f, "hash: SHA256:%s\n", fp); + free(fp); + } + RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s) { + /* + * There is not KRL spec keyword for raw SHA1 hashes, so + * print them as comments. + */ + fp = tohex(rb->blob, rb->len); + fprintf(f, "# hash SHA1:%s\n", fp); + free(fp); + } + + TAILQ_FOREACH(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry) { + fputc('\n', f); + if (rc->ca_key == NULL) + fprintf(f, "# Wildcard CA\n"); + else { + if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(rc->ca_key, + SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + error("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); + continue; + } + fprintf(f, "# CA key %s %s\n", + sshkey_ssh_name(rc->ca_key), fp); + free(fp); + } + RB_FOREACH(rs, revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials) { + if (rs->lo == rs->hi) { + fprintf(f, "serial: %llu\n", + (unsigned long long)rs->lo); + } else { + fprintf(f, "serial: %llu-%llu\n", + (unsigned long long)rs->lo, + (unsigned long long)rs->hi); + } + } + RB_FOREACH(rki, revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids) { + /* + * We don't want key IDs with embedded newlines to + * mess up the display. + */ + r = INT_MAX; + asmprintf(&fp, INT_MAX, &r, "%s", rki->key_id); + fprintf(f, "id: %s\n", fp); + free(fp); + } + } + return ret; +} -- cgit v1.2.3