Adding upstream version 13.4.upstream/13.4upstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 235 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-info.c b/contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-info.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..83dc604
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-info.c
@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
+/*
+ * pgp-info.c
+ *	  Provide info about PGP data.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Marko Kreen
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *	  notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *	  notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *	  documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-info.c
+ */
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include "mbuf.h"
+#include "pgp.h"
+#include "px.h"
+
+static int
+read_pubkey_keyid(PullFilter *pkt, uint8 *keyid_buf)
+{
+	int			res;
+	PGP_PubKey *pk = NULL;
+
+	res = _pgp_read_public_key(pkt, &pk);
+	if (res < 0)
+		goto err;
+
+	/* skip secret key part, if it exists */
+	res = pgp_skip_packet(pkt);
+	if (res < 0)
+		goto err;
+
+	/* is it encryption key */
+	switch (pk->algo)
+	{
+		case PGP_PUB_ELG_ENCRYPT:
+		case PGP_PUB_RSA_ENCRYPT:
+		case PGP_PUB_RSA_ENCRYPT_SIGN:
+			memcpy(keyid_buf, pk->key_id, 8);
+			res = 1;
+			break;
+		default:
+			res = 0;
+	}
+
+err:
+	pgp_key_free(pk);
+	return res;
+}
+
+static int
+read_pubenc_keyid(PullFilter *pkt, uint8 *keyid_buf)
+{
+	uint8		ver;
+	int			res;
+
+	GETBYTE(pkt, ver);
+	if (ver != 3)
+		return -1;
+
+	res = pullf_read_fixed(pkt, 8, keyid_buf);
+	if (res < 0)
+		return res;
+
+	return pgp_skip_packet(pkt);
+}
+
+static const char hextbl[] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
+
+static int
+print_key(uint8 *keyid, char *dst)
+{
+	int			i;
+	unsigned	c;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+	{
+		c = keyid[i];
+		*dst++ = hextbl[(c >> 4) & 0x0F];
+		*dst++ = hextbl[c & 0x0F];
+	}
+	*dst = 0;
+	return 8 * 2;
+}
+
+static const uint8 any_key[] =
+{0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
+
+/*
+ * dst should have room for 17 bytes
+ */
+int
+pgp_get_keyid(MBuf *pgp_data, char *dst)
+{
+	int			res;
+	PullFilter *src;
+	PullFilter *pkt = NULL;
+	int			len;
+	uint8		tag;
+	int			got_pub_key = 0,
+				got_symenc_key = 0,
+				got_pubenc_key = 0;
+	int			got_data = 0;
+	uint8		keyid_buf[8];
+	int			got_main_key = 0;
+
+
+	res = pullf_create_mbuf_reader(&src, pgp_data);
+	if (res < 0)
+		return res;
+
+	while (1)
+	{
+		res = pgp_parse_pkt_hdr(src, &tag, &len, 0);
+		if (res <= 0)
+			break;
+		res = pgp_create_pkt_reader(&pkt, src, len, res, NULL);
+		if (res < 0)
+			break;
+
+		switch (tag)
+		{
+			case PGP_PKT_SECRET_KEY:
+			case PGP_PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
+				/* main key is for signing, so ignore it */
+				if (!got_main_key)
+				{
+					got_main_key = 1;
+					res = pgp_skip_packet(pkt);
+				}
+				else
+					res = PXE_PGP_MULTIPLE_KEYS;
+				break;
+			case PGP_PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY:
+			case PGP_PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY:
+				res = read_pubkey_keyid(pkt, keyid_buf);
+				if (res < 0)
+					break;
+				if (res > 0)
+					got_pub_key++;
+				break;
+			case PGP_PKT_PUBENCRYPTED_SESSKEY:
+				got_pubenc_key++;
+				res = read_pubenc_keyid(pkt, keyid_buf);
+				break;
+			case PGP_PKT_SYMENCRYPTED_DATA:
+			case PGP_PKT_SYMENCRYPTED_DATA_MDC:
+				/* don't skip it, just stop */
+				got_data = 1;
+				break;
+			case PGP_PKT_SYMENCRYPTED_SESSKEY:
+				got_symenc_key++;
+				/* fall through */
+			case PGP_PKT_SIGNATURE:
+			case PGP_PKT_MARKER:
+			case PGP_PKT_TRUST:
+			case PGP_PKT_USER_ID:
+			case PGP_PKT_USER_ATTR:
+			case PGP_PKT_PRIV_61:
+				res = pgp_skip_packet(pkt);
+				break;
+			default:
+				res = PXE_PGP_CORRUPT_DATA;
+		}
+
+		if (pkt)
+			pullf_free(pkt);
+		pkt = NULL;
+
+		if (res < 0 || got_data)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	pullf_free(src);
+	if (pkt)
+		pullf_free(pkt);
+
+	if (res < 0)
+		return res;
+
+	/* now check sanity */
+	if (got_pub_key && got_pubenc_key)
+		res = PXE_PGP_CORRUPT_DATA;
+
+	if (got_pub_key > 1)
+		res = PXE_PGP_MULTIPLE_KEYS;
+
+	if (got_pubenc_key > 1)
+		res = PXE_PGP_MULTIPLE_KEYS;
+
+	/*
+	 * if still ok, look what we got
+	 */
+	if (res >= 0)
+	{
+		if (got_pubenc_key || got_pub_key)
+		{
+			if (memcmp(keyid_buf, any_key, 8) == 0)
+			{
+				memcpy(dst, "ANYKEY", 7);
+				res = 6;
+			}
+			else
+				res = print_key(keyid_buf, dst);
+		}
+		else if (got_symenc_key)
+		{
+			memcpy(dst, "SYMKEY", 7);
+			res = 6;
+		}
+		else
+			res = PXE_PGP_NO_USABLE_KEY;
+	}
+
+	return res;
+}