Adding upstream version 13.4.upstream/13.4upstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

19 files changed, 15816 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..efc5ef7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+#-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+#
+# Makefile--
+#    Makefile for libpq subsystem (backend half of libpq interface)
+#
+# IDENTIFICATION
+#    src/backend/libpq/Makefile
+#
+#-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+subdir = src/backend/libpq
+top_builddir = ../../..
+include $(top_builddir)/src/Makefile.global
+
+# be-fsstubs is here for historical reasons, probably belongs elsewhere
+
+OBJS = \
+	auth-scram.o \
+	auth.o \
+	be-fsstubs.o \
+	be-secure-common.o \
+	be-secure.o \
+	crypt.o \
+	hba.o \
+	ifaddr.o \
+	pqcomm.o \
+	pqformat.o \
+	pqmq.o \
+	pqsignal.o
+
+ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
+OBJS += be-secure-openssl.o
+endif
+
+ifeq ($(with_gssapi),yes)
+OBJS += be-gssapi-common.o be-secure-gssapi.o
+endif
+
+include $(top_srcdir)/src/backend/common.mk
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/README.SSL b/src/backend/libpq/README.SSL
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d84a434
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/README.SSL
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+src/backend/libpq/README.SSL
+
+SSL
+===
+
+>From the servers perspective:
+
+
+  Receives StartupPacket
+           |
+           |
+ (Is SSL_NEGOTIATE_CODE?) -----------  Normal startup
+           |                  No
+           |
+           | Yes
+           |
+           |
+ (Server compiled with USE_SSL?) ------- Send 'N'
+           |                       No        |
+           |                                 |
+           | Yes                         Normal startup
+           |
+           |
+        Send 'S'
+           |
+           |
+      Establish SSL
+           |
+           |
+      Normal startup
+
+
+
+
+
+>From the clients perspective (v6.6 client _with_ SSL):
+
+
+      Connect
+         |
+         |
+  Send packet with SSL_NEGOTIATE_CODE
+         |
+         |
+  Receive single char  ------- 'S' -------- Establish SSL
+         |                                       |
+         | '<else>'                              |
+         |                                  Normal startup
+         |
+         |
+   Is it 'E' for error  ------------------- Retry connection
+         |                  Yes             without SSL
+         | No
+         |
+   Is it 'N' for normal ------------------- Normal startup
+         |                  Yes
+         |
+   Fail with unknown
+
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+Ephemeral DH
+============
+
+Since the server static private key ($DataDir/server.key) will
+normally be stored unencrypted so that the database backend can
+restart automatically, it is important that we select an algorithm
+that continues to provide confidentiality even if the attacker has the
+server's private key.  Ephemeral DH (EDH) keys provide this and more
+(Perfect Forward Secrecy aka PFS).
+
+N.B., the static private key should still be protected to the largest
+extent possible, to minimize the risk of impersonations.
+
+Another benefit of EDH is that it allows the backend and clients to
+use DSA keys.  DSA keys can only provide digital signatures, not
+encryption, and are often acceptable in jurisdictions where RSA keys
+are unacceptable.
+
+The downside to EDH is that it makes it impossible to use ssldump(1)
+if there's a problem establishing an SSL session.  In this case you'll
+need to temporarily disable EDH (see initialize_dh()).
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/auth-scram.c b/src/backend/libpq/auth-scram.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5214d32
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/auth-scram.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1415 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * auth-scram.c
+ *	  Server-side implementation of the SASL SCRAM-SHA-256 mechanism.
+ *
+ * See the following RFCs for more details:
+ * - RFC 5802: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5802
+ * - RFC 5803: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5803
+ * - RFC 7677: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7677
+ *
+ * Here are some differences:
+ *
+ * - Username from the authentication exchange is not used. The client
+ *	 should send an empty string as the username.
+ *
+ * - If the password isn't valid UTF-8, or contains characters prohibited
+ *	 by the SASLprep profile, we skip the SASLprep pre-processing and use
+ *	 the raw bytes in calculating the hash.
+ *
+ * - If channel binding is used, the channel binding type is always
+ *	 "tls-server-end-point".  The spec says the default is "tls-unique"
+ *	 (RFC 5802, section 6.1. Default Channel Binding), but there are some
+ *	 problems with that.  Firstly, not all SSL libraries provide an API to
+ *	 get the TLS Finished message, required to use "tls-unique".  Secondly,
+ *	 "tls-unique" is not specified for TLS v1.3, and as of this writing,
+ *	 it's not clear if there will be a replacement.  We could support both
+ *	 "tls-server-end-point" and "tls-unique", but for our use case,
+ *	 "tls-unique" doesn't really have any advantages.  The main advantage
+ *	 of "tls-unique" would be that it works even if the server doesn't
+ *	 have a certificate, but PostgreSQL requires a server certificate
+ *	 whenever SSL is used, anyway.
+ *
+ *
+ * The password stored in pg_authid consists of the iteration count, salt,
+ * StoredKey and ServerKey.
+ *
+ * SASLprep usage
+ * --------------
+ *
+ * One notable difference to the SCRAM specification is that while the
+ * specification dictates that the password is in UTF-8, and prohibits
+ * certain characters, we are more lenient.  If the password isn't a valid
+ * UTF-8 string, or contains prohibited characters, the raw bytes are used
+ * to calculate the hash instead, without SASLprep processing.  This is
+ * because PostgreSQL supports other encodings too, and the encoding being
+ * used during authentication is undefined (client_encoding isn't set until
+ * after authentication).  In effect, we try to interpret the password as
+ * UTF-8 and apply SASLprep processing, but if it looks invalid, we assume
+ * that it's in some other encoding.
+ *
+ * In the worst case, we misinterpret a password that's in a different
+ * encoding as being Unicode, because it happens to consists entirely of
+ * valid UTF-8 bytes, and we apply Unicode normalization to it.  As long
+ * as we do that consistently, that will not lead to failed logins.
+ * Fortunately, the UTF-8 byte sequences that are ignored by SASLprep
+ * don't correspond to any commonly used characters in any of the other
+ * supported encodings, so it should not lead to any significant loss in
+ * entropy, even if the normalization is incorrectly applied to a
+ * non-UTF-8 password.
+ *
+ * Error handling
+ * --------------
+ *
+ * Don't reveal user information to an unauthenticated client.  We don't
+ * want an attacker to be able to probe whether a particular username is
+ * valid.  In SCRAM, the server has to read the salt and iteration count
+ * from the user's stored secret, and send it to the client.  To avoid
+ * revealing whether a user exists, when the client tries to authenticate
+ * with a username that doesn't exist, or doesn't have a valid SCRAM
+ * secret in pg_authid, we create a fake salt and iteration count
+ * on-the-fly, and proceed with the authentication with that.  In the end,
+ * we'll reject the attempt, as if an incorrect password was given.  When
+ * we are performing a "mock" authentication, the 'doomed' flag in
+ * scram_state is set.
+ *
+ * In the error messages, avoid printing strings from the client, unless
+ * you check that they are pure ASCII.  We don't want an unauthenticated
+ * attacker to be able to spam the logs with characters that are not valid
+ * to the encoding being used, whatever that is.  We cannot avoid that in
+ * general, after logging in, but let's do what we can here.
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * src/backend/libpq/auth-scram.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "access/xlog.h"
+#include "catalog/pg_authid.h"
+#include "catalog/pg_control.h"
+#include "common/base64.h"
+#include "common/saslprep.h"
+#include "common/scram-common.h"
+#include "common/sha2.h"
+#include "libpq/auth.h"
+#include "libpq/crypt.h"
+#include "libpq/scram.h"
+#include "miscadmin.h"
+#include "utils/builtins.h"
+#include "utils/timestamp.h"
+
+/*
+ * Status data for a SCRAM authentication exchange.  This should be kept
+ * internal to this file.
+ */
+typedef enum
+{
+	SCRAM_AUTH_INIT,
+	SCRAM_AUTH_SALT_SENT,
+	SCRAM_AUTH_FINISHED
+} scram_state_enum;
+
+typedef struct
+{
+	scram_state_enum state;
+
+	const char *username;		/* username from startup packet */
+
+	Port	   *port;
+	bool		channel_binding_in_use;
+
+	int			iterations;
+	char	   *salt;			/* base64-encoded */
+	uint8		StoredKey[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
+	uint8		ServerKey[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
+
+	/* Fields of the first message from client */
+	char		cbind_flag;
+	char	   *client_first_message_bare;
+	char	   *client_username;
+	char	   *client_nonce;
+
+	/* Fields from the last message from client */
+	char	   *client_final_message_without_proof;
+	char	   *client_final_nonce;
+	char		ClientProof[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
+
+	/* Fields generated in the server */
+	char	   *server_first_message;
+	char	   *server_nonce;
+
+	/*
+	 * If something goes wrong during the authentication, or we are performing
+	 * a "mock" authentication (see comments at top of file), the 'doomed'
+	 * flag is set.  A reason for the failure, for the server log, is put in
+	 * 'logdetail'.
+	 */
+	bool		doomed;
+	char	   *logdetail;
+} scram_state;
+
+static void read_client_first_message(scram_state *state, const char *input);
+static void read_client_final_message(scram_state *state, const char *input);
+static char *build_server_first_message(scram_state *state);
+static char *build_server_final_message(scram_state *state);
+static bool verify_client_proof(scram_state *state);
+static bool verify_final_nonce(scram_state *state);
+static void mock_scram_secret(const char *username, int *iterations,
+							  char **salt, uint8 *stored_key, uint8 *server_key);
+static bool is_scram_printable(char *p);
+static char *sanitize_char(char c);
+static char *sanitize_str(const char *s);
+static char *scram_mock_salt(const char *username);
+
+/*
+ * pg_be_scram_get_mechanisms
+ *
+ * Get a list of SASL mechanisms that this module supports.
+ *
+ * For the convenience of building the FE/BE packet that lists the
+ * mechanisms, the names are appended to the given StringInfo buffer,
+ * separated by '\0' bytes.
+ */
+void
+pg_be_scram_get_mechanisms(Port *port, StringInfo buf)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Advertise the mechanisms in decreasing order of importance.  So the
+	 * channel-binding variants go first, if they are supported.  Channel
+	 * binding is only supported with SSL, and only if the SSL implementation
+	 * has a function to get the certificate's hash.
+	 */
+#ifdef HAVE_BE_TLS_GET_CERTIFICATE_HASH
+	if (port->ssl_in_use)
+	{
+		appendStringInfoString(buf, SCRAM_SHA_256_PLUS_NAME);
+		appendStringInfoChar(buf, '\0');
+	}
+#endif
+	appendStringInfoString(buf, SCRAM_SHA_256_NAME);
+	appendStringInfoChar(buf, '\0');
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_be_scram_init
+ *
+ * Initialize a new SCRAM authentication exchange status tracker.  This
+ * needs to be called before doing any exchange.  It will be filled later
+ * after the beginning of the exchange with authentication information.
+ *
+ * 'selected_mech' identifies the SASL mechanism that the client selected.
+ * It should be one of the mechanisms that we support, as returned by
+ * pg_be_scram_get_mechanisms().
+ *
+ * 'shadow_pass' is the role's stored secret, from pg_authid.rolpassword.
+ * The username was provided by the client in the startup message, and is
+ * available in port->user_name.  If 'shadow_pass' is NULL, we still perform
+ * an authentication exchange, but it will fail, as if an incorrect password
+ * was given.
+ */
+void *
+pg_be_scram_init(Port *port,
+				 const char *selected_mech,
+				 const char *shadow_pass)
+{
+	scram_state *state;
+	bool		got_secret;
+
+	state = (scram_state *) palloc0(sizeof(scram_state));
+	state->port = port;
+	state->state = SCRAM_AUTH_INIT;
+
+	/*
+	 * Parse the selected mechanism.
+	 *
+	 * Note that if we don't support channel binding, either because the SSL
+	 * implementation doesn't support it or we're not using SSL at all, we
+	 * would not have advertised the PLUS variant in the first place.  If the
+	 * client nevertheless tries to select it, it's a protocol violation like
+	 * selecting any other SASL mechanism we don't support.
+	 */
+#ifdef HAVE_BE_TLS_GET_CERTIFICATE_HASH
+	if (strcmp(selected_mech, SCRAM_SHA_256_PLUS_NAME) == 0 && port->ssl_in_use)
+		state->channel_binding_in_use = true;
+	else
+#endif
+	if (strcmp(selected_mech, SCRAM_SHA_256_NAME) == 0)
+		state->channel_binding_in_use = false;
+	else
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+				 errmsg("client selected an invalid SASL authentication mechanism")));
+
+	/*
+	 * Parse the stored secret.
+	 */
+	if (shadow_pass)
+	{
+		int			password_type = get_password_type(shadow_pass);
+
+		if (password_type == PASSWORD_TYPE_SCRAM_SHA_256)
+		{
+			if (parse_scram_secret(shadow_pass, &state->iterations, &state->salt,
+								   state->StoredKey, state->ServerKey))
+				got_secret = true;
+			else
+			{
+				/*
+				 * The password looked like a SCRAM secret, but could not be
+				 * parsed.
+				 */
+				ereport(LOG,
+						(errmsg("invalid SCRAM secret for user \"%s\"",
+								state->port->user_name)));
+				got_secret = false;
+			}
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			/*
+			 * The user doesn't have SCRAM secret. (You cannot do SCRAM
+			 * authentication with an MD5 hash.)
+			 */
+			state->logdetail = psprintf(_("User \"%s\" does not have a valid SCRAM secret."),
+										state->port->user_name);
+			got_secret = false;
+		}
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		/*
+		 * The caller requested us to perform a dummy authentication.  This is
+		 * considered normal, since the caller requested it, so don't set log
+		 * detail.
+		 */
+		got_secret = false;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If the user did not have a valid SCRAM secret, we still go through the
+	 * motions with a mock one, and fail as if the client supplied an
+	 * incorrect password.  This is to avoid revealing information to an
+	 * attacker.
+	 */
+	if (!got_secret)
+	{
+		mock_scram_secret(state->port->user_name, &state->iterations,
+						  &state->salt, state->StoredKey, state->ServerKey);
+		state->doomed = true;
+	}
+
+	return state;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Continue a SCRAM authentication exchange.
+ *
+ * 'input' is the SCRAM payload sent by the client.  On the first call,
+ * 'input' contains the "Initial Client Response" that the client sent as
+ * part of the SASLInitialResponse message, or NULL if no Initial Client
+ * Response was given.  (The SASL specification distinguishes between an
+ * empty response and non-existing one.)  On subsequent calls, 'input'
+ * cannot be NULL.  For convenience in this function, the caller must
+ * ensure that there is a null terminator at input[inputlen].
+ *
+ * The next message to send to client is saved in 'output', for a length
+ * of 'outputlen'.  In the case of an error, optionally store a palloc'd
+ * string at *logdetail that will be sent to the postmaster log (but not
+ * the client).
+ */
+int
+pg_be_scram_exchange(void *opaq, const char *input, int inputlen,
+					 char **output, int *outputlen, char **logdetail)
+{
+	scram_state *state = (scram_state *) opaq;
+	int			result;
+
+	*output = NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the client didn't include an "Initial Client Response" in the
+	 * SASLInitialResponse message, send an empty challenge, to which the
+	 * client will respond with the same data that usually comes in the
+	 * Initial Client Response.
+	 */
+	if (input == NULL)
+	{
+		Assert(state->state == SCRAM_AUTH_INIT);
+
+		*output = pstrdup("");
+		*outputlen = 0;
+		return SASL_EXCHANGE_CONTINUE;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Check that the input length agrees with the string length of the input.
+	 * We can ignore inputlen after this.
+	 */
+	if (inputlen == 0)
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+				 errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
+				 errdetail("The message is empty.")));
+	if (inputlen != strlen(input))
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+				 errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
+				 errdetail("Message length does not match input length.")));
+
+	switch (state->state)
+	{
+		case SCRAM_AUTH_INIT:
+
+			/*
+			 * Initialization phase.  Receive the first message from client
+			 * and be sure that it parsed correctly.  Then send the challenge
+			 * to the client.
+			 */
+			read_client_first_message(state, input);
+
+			/* prepare message to send challenge */
+			*output = build_server_first_message(state);
+
+			state->state = SCRAM_AUTH_SALT_SENT;
+			result = SASL_EXCHANGE_CONTINUE;
+			break;
+
+		case SCRAM_AUTH_SALT_SENT:
+
+			/*
+			 * Final phase for the server.  Receive the response to the
+			 * challenge previously sent, verify, and let the client know that
+			 * everything went well (or not).
+			 */
+			read_client_final_message(state, input);
+
+			if (!verify_final_nonce(state))
+				ereport(ERROR,
+						(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+						 errmsg("invalid SCRAM response"),
+						 errdetail("Nonce does not match.")));
+
+			/*
+			 * Now check the final nonce and the client proof.
+			 *
+			 * If we performed a "mock" authentication that we knew would fail
+			 * from the get go, this is where we fail.
+			 *
+			 * The SCRAM specification includes an error code,
+			 * "invalid-proof", for authentication failure, but it also allows
+			 * erroring out in an application-specific way.  We choose to do
+			 * the latter, so that the error message for invalid password is
+			 * the same for all authentication methods.  The caller will call
+			 * ereport(), when we return SASL_EXCHANGE_FAILURE with no output.
+			 *
+			 * NB: the order of these checks is intentional.  We calculate the
+			 * client proof even in a mock authentication, even though it's
+			 * bound to fail, to thwart timing attacks to determine if a role
+			 * with the given name exists or not.
+			 */
+			if (!verify_client_proof(state) || state->doomed)
+			{
+				result = SASL_EXCHANGE_FAILURE;
+				break;
+			}
+
+			/* Build final message for client */
+			*output = build_server_final_message(state);
+
+			/* Success! */
+			result = SASL_EXCHANGE_SUCCESS;
+			state->state = SCRAM_AUTH_FINISHED;
+			break;
+
+		default:
+			elog(ERROR, "invalid SCRAM exchange state");
+			result = SASL_EXCHANGE_FAILURE;
+	}
+
+	if (result == SASL_EXCHANGE_FAILURE && state->logdetail && logdetail)
+		*logdetail = state->logdetail;
+
+	if (*output)
+		*outputlen = strlen(*output);
+
+	return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Construct a SCRAM secret, for storing in pg_authid.rolpassword.
+ *
+ * The result is palloc'd, so caller is responsible for freeing it.
+ */
+char *
+pg_be_scram_build_secret(const char *password)
+{
+	char	   *prep_password;
+	pg_saslprep_rc rc;
+	char		saltbuf[SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN];
+	char	   *result;
+
+	/*
+	 * Normalize the password with SASLprep.  If that doesn't work, because
+	 * the password isn't valid UTF-8 or contains prohibited characters, just
+	 * proceed with the original password.  (See comments at top of file.)
+	 */
+	rc = pg_saslprep(password, &prep_password);
+	if (rc == SASLPREP_SUCCESS)
+		password = (const char *) prep_password;
+
+	/* Generate random salt */
+	if (!pg_strong_random(saltbuf, SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN))
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_INTERNAL_ERROR),
+				 errmsg("could not generate random salt")));
+
+	result = scram_build_secret(saltbuf, SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN,
+								SCRAM_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS, password);
+
+	if (prep_password)
+		pfree(prep_password);
+
+	return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify a plaintext password against a SCRAM secret.  This is used when
+ * performing plaintext password authentication for a user that has a SCRAM
+ * secret stored in pg_authid.
+ */
+bool
+scram_verify_plain_password(const char *username, const char *password,
+							const char *secret)
+{
+	char	   *encoded_salt;
+	char	   *salt;
+	int			saltlen;
+	int			iterations;
+	uint8		salted_password[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
+	uint8		stored_key[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
+	uint8		server_key[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
+	uint8		computed_key[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
+	char	   *prep_password;
+	pg_saslprep_rc rc;
+
+	if (!parse_scram_secret(secret, &iterations, &encoded_salt,
+							stored_key, server_key))
+	{
+		/*
+		 * The password looked like a SCRAM secret, but could not be parsed.
+		 */
+		ereport(LOG,
+				(errmsg("invalid SCRAM secret for user \"%s\"", username)));
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	saltlen = pg_b64_dec_len(strlen(encoded_salt));
+	salt = palloc(saltlen);
+	saltlen = pg_b64_decode(encoded_salt, strlen(encoded_salt), salt,
+							saltlen);
+	if (saltlen < 0)
+	{
+		ereport(LOG,
+				(errmsg("invalid SCRAM secret for user \"%s\"", username)));
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	/* Normalize the password */
+	rc = pg_saslprep(password, &prep_password);
+	if (rc == SASLPREP_SUCCESS)
+		password = prep_password;
+
+	/* Compute Server Key based on the user-supplied plaintext password */
+	scram_SaltedPassword(password, salt, saltlen, iterations, salted_password);
+	scram_ServerKey(salted_password, computed_key);
+
+	if (prep_password)
+		pfree(prep_password);
+
+	/*
+	 * Compare the secret's Server Key with the one computed from the
+	 * user-supplied password.
+	 */
+	return memcmp(computed_key, server_key, SCRAM_KEY_LEN) == 0;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Parse and validate format of given SCRAM secret.
+ *
+ * On success, the iteration count, salt, stored key, and server key are
+ * extracted from the secret, and returned to the caller.  For 'stored_key'
+ * and 'server_key', the caller must pass pre-allocated buffers of size
+ * SCRAM_KEY_LEN.  Salt is returned as a base64-encoded, null-terminated
+ * string.  The buffer for the salt is palloc'd by this function.
+ *
+ * Returns true if the SCRAM secret has been parsed, and false otherwise.
+ */
+bool
+parse_scram_secret(const char *secret, int *iterations, char **salt,
+				   uint8 *stored_key, uint8 *server_key)
+{
+	char	   *v;
+	char	   *p;
+	char	   *scheme_str;
+	char	   *salt_str;
+	char	   *iterations_str;
+	char	   *storedkey_str;
+	char	   *serverkey_str;
+	int			decoded_len;
+	char	   *decoded_salt_buf;
+	char	   *decoded_stored_buf;
+	char	   *decoded_server_buf;
+
+	/*
+	 * The secret is of form:
+	 *
+	 * SCRAM-SHA-256$<iterations>:<salt>$<storedkey>:<serverkey>
+	 */
+	v = pstrdup(secret);
+	if ((scheme_str = strtok(v, "$")) == NULL)
+		goto invalid_secret;
+	if ((iterations_str = strtok(NULL, ":")) == NULL)
+		goto invalid_secret;
+	if ((salt_str = strtok(NULL, "$")) == NULL)
+		goto invalid_secret;
+	if ((storedkey_str = strtok(NULL, ":")) == NULL)
+		goto invalid_secret;
+	if ((serverkey_str = strtok(NULL, "")) == NULL)
+		goto invalid_secret;
+
+	/* Parse the fields */
+	if (strcmp(scheme_str, "SCRAM-SHA-256") != 0)
+		goto invalid_secret;
+
+	errno = 0;
+	*iterations = strtol(iterations_str, &p, 10);
+	if (*p || errno != 0)
+		goto invalid_secret;
+
+	/*
+	 * Verify that the salt is in Base64-encoded format, by decoding it,
+	 * although we return the encoded version to the caller.
+	 */
+	decoded_len = pg_b64_dec_len(strlen(salt_str));
+	decoded_salt_buf = palloc(decoded_len);
+	decoded_len = pg_b64_decode(salt_str, strlen(salt_str),
+								decoded_salt_buf, decoded_len);
+	if (decoded_len < 0)
+		goto invalid_secret;
+	*salt = pstrdup(salt_str);
+
+	/*
+	 * Decode StoredKey and ServerKey.
+	 */
+	decoded_len = pg_b64_dec_len(strlen(storedkey_str));
+	decoded_stored_buf = palloc(decoded_len);
+	decoded_len = pg_b64_decode(storedkey_str, strlen(storedkey_str),
+								decoded_stored_buf, decoded_len);
+	if (decoded_len != SCRAM_KEY_LEN)
+		goto invalid_secret;
+	memcpy(stored_key, decoded_stored_buf, SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
+
+	decoded_len = pg_b64_dec_len(strlen(serverkey_str));
+	decoded_server_buf = palloc(decoded_len);
+	decoded_len = pg_b64_decode(serverkey_str, strlen(serverkey_str),
+								decoded_server_buf, decoded_len);
+	if (decoded_len != SCRAM_KEY_LEN)
+		goto invalid_secret;
+	memcpy(server_key, decoded_server_buf, SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
+
+	return true;
+
+invalid_secret:
+	*salt = NULL;
+	return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate plausible SCRAM secret parameters for mock authentication.
+ *
+ * In a normal authentication, these are extracted from the secret
+ * stored in the server.  This function generates values that look
+ * realistic, for when there is no stored secret.
+ *
+ * Like in parse_scram_secret(), for 'stored_key' and 'server_key', the
+ * caller must pass pre-allocated buffers of size SCRAM_KEY_LEN, and
+ * the buffer for the salt is palloc'd by this function.
+ */
+static void
+mock_scram_secret(const char *username, int *iterations, char **salt,
+				  uint8 *stored_key, uint8 *server_key)
+{
+	char	   *raw_salt;
+	char	   *encoded_salt;
+	int			encoded_len;
+
+	/* Generate deterministic salt */
+	raw_salt = scram_mock_salt(username);
+
+	encoded_len = pg_b64_enc_len(SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN);
+	/* don't forget the zero-terminator */
+	encoded_salt = (char *) palloc(encoded_len + 1);
+	encoded_len = pg_b64_encode(raw_salt, SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN, encoded_salt,
+								encoded_len);
+
+	/*
+	 * Note that we cannot reveal any information to an attacker here so the
+	 * error message needs to remain generic.  This should never fail anyway
+	 * as the salt generated for mock authentication uses the cluster's nonce
+	 * value.
+	 */
+	if (encoded_len < 0)
+		elog(ERROR, "could not encode salt");
+	encoded_salt[encoded_len] = '\0';
+
+	*salt = encoded_salt;
+	*iterations = SCRAM_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS;
+
+	/* StoredKey and ServerKey are not used in a doomed authentication */
+	memset(stored_key, 0, SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
+	memset(server_key, 0, SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read the value in a given SCRAM exchange message for given attribute.
+ */
+static char *
+read_attr_value(char **input, char attr)
+{
+	char	   *begin = *input;
+	char	   *end;
+
+	if (*begin != attr)
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+				 errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
+				 errdetail("Expected attribute \"%c\" but found \"%s\".",
+						   attr, sanitize_char(*begin))));
+	begin++;
+
+	if (*begin != '=')
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+				 errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
+				 errdetail("Expected character \"=\" for attribute \"%c\".", attr)));
+	begin++;
+
+	end = begin;
+	while (*end && *end != ',')
+		end++;
+
+	if (*end)
+	{
+		*end = '\0';
+		*input = end + 1;
+	}
+	else
+		*input = end;
+
+	return begin;
+}
+
+static bool
+is_scram_printable(char *p)
+{
+	/*------
+	 * Printable characters, as defined by SCRAM spec: (RFC 5802)
+	 *
+	 *	printable		= %x21-2B / %x2D-7E
+	 *					  ;; Printable ASCII except ",".
+	 *					  ;; Note that any "printable" is also
+	 *					  ;; a valid "value".
+	 *------
+	 */
+	for (; *p; p++)
+	{
+		if (*p < 0x21 || *p > 0x7E || *p == 0x2C /* comma */ )
+			return false;
+	}
+	return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert an arbitrary byte to printable form.  For error messages.
+ *
+ * If it's a printable ASCII character, print it as a single character.
+ * otherwise, print it in hex.
+ *
+ * The returned pointer points to a static buffer.
+ */
+static char *
+sanitize_char(char c)
+{
+	static char buf[5];
+
+	if (c >= 0x21 && c <= 0x7E)
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "'%c'", c);
+	else
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "0x%02x", (unsigned char) c);
+	return buf;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert an arbitrary string to printable form, for error messages.
+ *
+ * Anything that's not a printable ASCII character is replaced with
+ * '?', and the string is truncated at 30 characters.
+ *
+ * The returned pointer points to a static buffer.
+ */
+static char *
+sanitize_str(const char *s)
+{
+	static char buf[30 + 1];
+	int			i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++)
+	{
+		char		c = s[i];
+
+		if (c == '\0')
+			break;
+
+		if (c >= 0x21 && c <= 0x7E)
+			buf[i] = c;
+		else
+			buf[i] = '?';
+	}
+	buf[i] = '\0';
+	return buf;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read the next attribute and value in a SCRAM exchange message.
+ *
+ * The attribute character is set in *attr_p, the attribute value is the
+ * return value.
+ */
+static char *
+read_any_attr(char **input, char *attr_p)
+{
+	char	   *begin = *input;
+	char	   *end;
+	char		attr = *begin;
+
+	if (attr == '\0')
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+				 errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
+				 errdetail("Attribute expected, but found end of string.")));
+
+	/*------
+	 * attr-val		   = ALPHA "=" value
+	 *					 ;; Generic syntax of any attribute sent
+	 *					 ;; by server or client
+	 *------
+	 */
+	if (!((attr >= 'A' && attr <= 'Z') ||
+		  (attr >= 'a' && attr <= 'z')))
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+				 errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
+				 errdetail("Attribute expected, but found invalid character \"%s\".",
+						   sanitize_char(attr))));
+	if (attr_p)
+		*attr_p = attr;
+	begin++;
+
+	if (*begin != '=')
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+				 errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
+				 errdetail("Expected character \"=\" for attribute \"%c\".", attr)));
+	begin++;
+
+	end = begin;
+	while (*end && *end != ',')
+		end++;
+
+	if (*end)
+	{
+		*end = '\0';
+		*input = end + 1;
+	}
+	else
+		*input = end;
+
+	return begin;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read and parse the first message from client in the context of a SCRAM
+ * authentication exchange message.
+ *
+ * At this stage, any errors will be reported directly with ereport(ERROR).
+ */
+static void
+read_client_first_message(scram_state *state, const char *input)
+{
+	char	   *p = pstrdup(input);
+	char	   *channel_binding_type;
+
+
+	/*------
+	 * The syntax for the client-first-message is: (RFC 5802)
+	 *
+	 * saslname		   = 1*(value-safe-char / "=2C" / "=3D")
+	 *					 ;; Conforms to <value>.
+	 *
+	 * authzid		   = "a=" saslname
+	 *					 ;; Protocol specific.
+	 *
+	 * cb-name		   = 1*(ALPHA / DIGIT / "." / "-")
+	 *					  ;; See RFC 5056, Section 7.
+	 *					  ;; E.g., "tls-server-end-point" or
+	 *					  ;; "tls-unique".
+	 *
+	 * gs2-cbind-flag  = ("p=" cb-name) / "n" / "y"
+	 *					 ;; "n" -> client doesn't support channel binding.
+	 *					 ;; "y" -> client does support channel binding
+	 *					 ;;		   but thinks the server does not.
+	 *					 ;; "p" -> client requires channel binding.
+	 *					 ;; The selected channel binding follows "p=".
+	 *
+	 * gs2-header	   = gs2-cbind-flag "," [ authzid ] ","
+	 *					 ;; GS2 header for SCRAM
+	 *					 ;; (the actual GS2 header includes an optional
+	 *					 ;; flag to indicate that the GSS mechanism is not
+	 *					 ;; "standard", but since SCRAM is "standard", we
+	 *					 ;; don't include that flag).
+	 *
+	 * username		   = "n=" saslname
+	 *					 ;; Usernames are prepared using SASLprep.
+	 *
+	 * reserved-mext  = "m=" 1*(value-char)
+	 *					 ;; Reserved for signaling mandatory extensions.
+	 *					 ;; The exact syntax will be defined in
+	 *					 ;; the future.
+	 *
+	 * nonce		   = "r=" c-nonce [s-nonce]
+	 *					 ;; Second part provided by server.
+	 *
+	 * c-nonce		   = printable
+	 *
+	 * client-first-message-bare =
+	 *					 [reserved-mext ","]
+	 *					 username "," nonce ["," extensions]
+	 *
+	 * client-first-message =
+	 *					 gs2-header client-first-message-bare
+	 *
+	 * For example:
+	 * n,,n=user,r=fyko+d2lbbFgONRv9qkxdawL
+	 *
+	 * The "n,," in the beginning means that the client doesn't support
+	 * channel binding, and no authzid is given.  "n=user" is the username.
+	 * However, in PostgreSQL the username is sent in the startup packet, and
+	 * the username in the SCRAM exchange is ignored.  libpq always sends it
+	 * as an empty string.  The last part, "r=fyko+d2lbbFgONRv9qkxdawL" is
+	 * the client nonce.
+	 *------
+	 */
+
+	/*
+	 * Read gs2-cbind-flag.  (For details see also RFC 5802 Section 6 "Channel
+	 * Binding".)
+	 */
+	state->cbind_flag = *p;
+	switch (*p)
+	{
+		case 'n':
+
+			/*
+			 * The client does not support channel binding or has simply
+			 * decided to not use it.  In that case just let it go.
+			 */
+			if (state->channel_binding_in_use)
+				ereport(ERROR,
+						(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+						 errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
+						 errdetail("The client selected SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS, but the SCRAM message does not include channel binding data.")));
+
+			p++;
+			if (*p != ',')
+				ereport(ERROR,
+						(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+						 errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
+						 errdetail("Comma expected, but found character \"%s\".",
+								   sanitize_char(*p))));
+			p++;
+			break;
+		case 'y':
+
+			/*
+			 * The client supports channel binding and thinks that the server
+			 * does not.  In this case, the server must fail authentication if
+			 * it supports channel binding.
+			 */
+			if (state->channel_binding_in_use)
+				ereport(ERROR,
+						(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+						 errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
+						 errdetail("The client selected SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS, but the SCRAM message does not include channel binding data.")));
+
+#ifdef HAVE_BE_TLS_GET_CERTIFICATE_HASH
+			if (state->port->ssl_in_use)
+				ereport(ERROR,
+						(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
+						 errmsg("SCRAM channel binding negotiation error"),
+						 errdetail("The client supports SCRAM channel binding but thinks the server does not.  "
+								   "However, this server does support channel binding.")));
+#endif
+			p++;
+			if (*p != ',')
+				ereport(ERROR,
+						(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+						 errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
+						 errdetail("Comma expected, but found character \"%s\".",
+								   sanitize_char(*p))));
+			p++;
+			break;
+		case 'p':
+
+			/*
+			 * The client requires channel binding.  Channel binding type
+			 * follows, e.g., "p=tls-server-end-point".
+			 */
+			if (!state->channel_binding_in_use)
+				ereport(ERROR,
+						(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+						 errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
+						 errdetail("The client selected SCRAM-SHA-256 without channel binding, but the SCRAM message includes channel binding data.")));
+
+			channel_binding_type = read_attr_value(&p, 'p');
+
+			/*
+			 * The only channel binding type we support is
+			 * tls-server-end-point.
+			 */
+			if (strcmp(channel_binding_type, "tls-server-end-point") != 0)
+				ereport(ERROR,
+						(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+						 errmsg("unsupported SCRAM channel-binding type \"%s\"",
+								sanitize_str(channel_binding_type))));
+			break;
+		default:
+			ereport(ERROR,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+					 errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
+					 errdetail("Unexpected channel-binding flag \"%s\".",
+							   sanitize_char(*p))));
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Forbid optional authzid (authorization identity).  We don't support it.
+	 */
+	if (*p == 'a')
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
+				 errmsg("client uses authorization identity, but it is not supported")));
+	if (*p != ',')
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+				 errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
+				 errdetail("Unexpected attribute \"%s\" in client-first-message.",
+						   sanitize_char(*p))));
+	p++;
+
+	state->client_first_message_bare = pstrdup(p);
+
+	/*
+	 * Any mandatory extensions would go here.  We don't support any.
+	 *
+	 * RFC 5802 specifies error code "e=extensions-not-supported" for this,
+	 * but it can only be sent in the server-final message.  We prefer to fail
+	 * immediately (which the RFC also allows).
+	 */
+	if (*p == 'm')
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
+				 errmsg("client requires an unsupported SCRAM extension")));
+
+	/*
+	 * Read username.  Note: this is ignored.  We use the username from the
+	 * startup message instead, still it is kept around if provided as it
+	 * proves to be useful for debugging purposes.
+	 */
+	state->client_username = read_attr_value(&p, 'n');
+
+	/* read nonce and check that it is made of only printable characters */
+	state->client_nonce = read_attr_value(&p, 'r');
+	if (!is_scram_printable(state->client_nonce))
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+				 errmsg("non-printable characters in SCRAM nonce")));
+
+	/*
+	 * There can be any number of optional extensions after this.  We don't
+	 * support any extensions, so ignore them.
+	 */
+	while (*p != '\0')
+		read_any_attr(&p, NULL);
+
+	/* success! */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify the final nonce contained in the last message received from
+ * client in an exchange.
+ */
+static bool
+verify_final_nonce(scram_state *state)
+{
+	int			client_nonce_len = strlen(state->client_nonce);
+	int			server_nonce_len = strlen(state->server_nonce);
+	int			final_nonce_len = strlen(state->client_final_nonce);
+
+	if (final_nonce_len != client_nonce_len + server_nonce_len)
+		return false;
+	if (memcmp(state->client_final_nonce, state->client_nonce, client_nonce_len) != 0)
+		return false;
+	if (memcmp(state->client_final_nonce + client_nonce_len, state->server_nonce, server_nonce_len) != 0)
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify the client proof contained in the last message received from
+ * client in an exchange.
+ */
+static bool
+verify_client_proof(scram_state *state)
+{
+	uint8		ClientSignature[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
+	uint8		ClientKey[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
+	uint8		client_StoredKey[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
+	scram_HMAC_ctx ctx;
+	int			i;
+
+	/* calculate ClientSignature */
+	scram_HMAC_init(&ctx, state->StoredKey, SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
+	scram_HMAC_update(&ctx,
+					  state->client_first_message_bare,
+					  strlen(state->client_first_message_bare));
+	scram_HMAC_update(&ctx, ",", 1);
+	scram_HMAC_update(&ctx,
+					  state->server_first_message,
+					  strlen(state->server_first_message));
+	scram_HMAC_update(&ctx, ",", 1);
+	scram_HMAC_update(&ctx,
+					  state->client_final_message_without_proof,
+					  strlen(state->client_final_message_without_proof));
+	scram_HMAC_final(ClientSignature, &ctx);
+
+	/* Extract the ClientKey that the client calculated from the proof */
+	for (i = 0; i < SCRAM_KEY_LEN; i++)
+		ClientKey[i] = state->ClientProof[i] ^ ClientSignature[i];
+
+	/* Hash it one more time, and compare with StoredKey */
+	scram_H(ClientKey, SCRAM_KEY_LEN, client_StoredKey);
+
+	if (memcmp(client_StoredKey, state->StoredKey, SCRAM_KEY_LEN) != 0)
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Build the first server-side message sent to the client in a SCRAM
+ * communication exchange.
+ */
+static char *
+build_server_first_message(scram_state *state)
+{
+	/*------
+	 * The syntax for the server-first-message is: (RFC 5802)
+	 *
+	 * server-first-message =
+	 *					 [reserved-mext ","] nonce "," salt ","
+	 *					 iteration-count ["," extensions]
+	 *
+	 * nonce		   = "r=" c-nonce [s-nonce]
+	 *					 ;; Second part provided by server.
+	 *
+	 * c-nonce		   = printable
+	 *
+	 * s-nonce		   = printable
+	 *
+	 * salt			   = "s=" base64
+	 *
+	 * iteration-count = "i=" posit-number
+	 *					 ;; A positive number.
+	 *
+	 * Example:
+	 *
+	 * r=fyko+d2lbbFgONRv9qkxdawL3rfcNHYJY1ZVvWVs7j,s=QSXCR+Q6sek8bf92,i=4096
+	 *------
+	 */
+
+	/*
+	 * Per the spec, the nonce may consist of any printable ASCII characters.
+	 * For convenience, however, we don't use the whole range available,
+	 * rather, we generate some random bytes, and base64 encode them.
+	 */
+	char		raw_nonce[SCRAM_RAW_NONCE_LEN];
+	int			encoded_len;
+
+	if (!pg_strong_random(raw_nonce, SCRAM_RAW_NONCE_LEN))
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_INTERNAL_ERROR),
+				 errmsg("could not generate random nonce")));
+
+	encoded_len = pg_b64_enc_len(SCRAM_RAW_NONCE_LEN);
+	/* don't forget the zero-terminator */
+	state->server_nonce = palloc(encoded_len + 1);
+	encoded_len = pg_b64_encode(raw_nonce, SCRAM_RAW_NONCE_LEN,
+								state->server_nonce, encoded_len);
+	if (encoded_len < 0)
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_INTERNAL_ERROR),
+				 errmsg("could not encode random nonce")));
+	state->server_nonce[encoded_len] = '\0';
+
+	state->server_first_message =
+		psprintf("r=%s%s,s=%s,i=%u",
+				 state->client_nonce, state->server_nonce,
+				 state->salt, state->iterations);
+
+	return pstrdup(state->server_first_message);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Read and parse the final message received from client.
+ */
+static void
+read_client_final_message(scram_state *state, const char *input)
+{
+	char		attr;
+	char	   *channel_binding;
+	char	   *value;
+	char	   *begin,
+			   *proof;
+	char	   *p;
+	char	   *client_proof;
+	int			client_proof_len;
+
+	begin = p = pstrdup(input);
+
+	/*------
+	 * The syntax for the server-first-message is: (RFC 5802)
+	 *
+	 * gs2-header	   = gs2-cbind-flag "," [ authzid ] ","
+	 *					 ;; GS2 header for SCRAM
+	 *					 ;; (the actual GS2 header includes an optional
+	 *					 ;; flag to indicate that the GSS mechanism is not
+	 *					 ;; "standard", but since SCRAM is "standard", we
+	 *					 ;; don't include that flag).
+	 *
+	 * cbind-input	 = gs2-header [ cbind-data ]
+	 *					 ;; cbind-data MUST be present for
+	 *					 ;; gs2-cbind-flag of "p" and MUST be absent
+	 *					 ;; for "y" or "n".
+	 *
+	 * channel-binding = "c=" base64
+	 *					 ;; base64 encoding of cbind-input.
+	 *
+	 * proof		   = "p=" base64
+	 *
+	 * client-final-message-without-proof =
+	 *					 channel-binding "," nonce [","
+	 *					 extensions]
+	 *
+	 * client-final-message =
+	 *					 client-final-message-without-proof "," proof
+	 *------
+	 */
+
+	/*
+	 * Read channel binding.  This repeats the channel-binding flags and is
+	 * then followed by the actual binding data depending on the type.
+	 */
+	channel_binding = read_attr_value(&p, 'c');
+	if (state->channel_binding_in_use)
+	{
+#ifdef HAVE_BE_TLS_GET_CERTIFICATE_HASH
+		const char *cbind_data = NULL;
+		size_t		cbind_data_len = 0;
+		size_t		cbind_header_len;
+		char	   *cbind_input;
+		size_t		cbind_input_len;
+		char	   *b64_message;
+		int			b64_message_len;
+
+		Assert(state->cbind_flag == 'p');
+
+		/* Fetch hash data of server's SSL certificate */
+		cbind_data = be_tls_get_certificate_hash(state->port,
+												 &cbind_data_len);
+
+		/* should not happen */
+		if (cbind_data == NULL || cbind_data_len == 0)
+			elog(ERROR, "could not get server certificate hash");
+
+		cbind_header_len = strlen("p=tls-server-end-point,,");	/* p=type,, */
+		cbind_input_len = cbind_header_len + cbind_data_len;
+		cbind_input = palloc(cbind_input_len);
+		snprintf(cbind_input, cbind_input_len, "p=tls-server-end-point,,");
+		memcpy(cbind_input + cbind_header_len, cbind_data, cbind_data_len);
+
+		b64_message_len = pg_b64_enc_len(cbind_input_len);
+		/* don't forget the zero-terminator */
+		b64_message = palloc(b64_message_len + 1);
+		b64_message_len = pg_b64_encode(cbind_input, cbind_input_len,
+										b64_message, b64_message_len);
+		if (b64_message_len < 0)
+			elog(ERROR, "could not encode channel binding data");
+		b64_message[b64_message_len] = '\0';
+
+		/*
+		 * Compare the value sent by the client with the value expected by the
+		 * server.
+		 */
+		if (strcmp(channel_binding, b64_message) != 0)
+			ereport(ERROR,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
+					 errmsg("SCRAM channel binding check failed")));
+#else
+		/* shouldn't happen, because we checked this earlier already */
+		elog(ERROR, "channel binding not supported by this build");
+#endif
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		/*
+		 * If we are not using channel binding, the binding data is expected
+		 * to always be "biws", which is "n,," base64-encoded, or "eSws",
+		 * which is "y,,".  We also have to check whether the flag is the same
+		 * one that the client originally sent.
+		 */
+		if (!(strcmp(channel_binding, "biws") == 0 && state->cbind_flag == 'n') &&
+			!(strcmp(channel_binding, "eSws") == 0 && state->cbind_flag == 'y'))
+			ereport(ERROR,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+					 errmsg("unexpected SCRAM channel-binding attribute in client-final-message")));
+	}
+
+	state->client_final_nonce = read_attr_value(&p, 'r');
+
+	/* ignore optional extensions, read until we find "p" attribute */
+	do
+	{
+		proof = p - 1;
+		value = read_any_attr(&p, &attr);
+	} while (attr != 'p');
+
+	client_proof_len = pg_b64_dec_len(strlen(value));
+	client_proof = palloc(client_proof_len);
+	if (pg_b64_decode(value, strlen(value), client_proof,
+					  client_proof_len) != SCRAM_KEY_LEN)
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+				 errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
+				 errdetail("Malformed proof in client-final-message.")));
+	memcpy(state->ClientProof, client_proof, SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
+	pfree(client_proof);
+
+	if (*p != '\0')
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+				 errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
+				 errdetail("Garbage found at the end of client-final-message.")));
+
+	state->client_final_message_without_proof = palloc(proof - begin + 1);
+	memcpy(state->client_final_message_without_proof, input, proof - begin);
+	state->client_final_message_without_proof[proof - begin] = '\0';
+}
+
+/*
+ * Build the final server-side message of an exchange.
+ */
+static char *
+build_server_final_message(scram_state *state)
+{
+	uint8		ServerSignature[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
+	char	   *server_signature_base64;
+	int			siglen;
+	scram_HMAC_ctx ctx;
+
+	/* calculate ServerSignature */
+	scram_HMAC_init(&ctx, state->ServerKey, SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
+	scram_HMAC_update(&ctx,
+					  state->client_first_message_bare,
+					  strlen(state->client_first_message_bare));
+	scram_HMAC_update(&ctx, ",", 1);
+	scram_HMAC_update(&ctx,
+					  state->server_first_message,
+					  strlen(state->server_first_message));
+	scram_HMAC_update(&ctx, ",", 1);
+	scram_HMAC_update(&ctx,
+					  state->client_final_message_without_proof,
+					  strlen(state->client_final_message_without_proof));
+	scram_HMAC_final(ServerSignature, &ctx);
+
+	siglen = pg_b64_enc_len(SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
+	/* don't forget the zero-terminator */
+	server_signature_base64 = palloc(siglen + 1);
+	siglen = pg_b64_encode((const char *) ServerSignature,
+						   SCRAM_KEY_LEN, server_signature_base64,
+						   siglen);
+	if (siglen < 0)
+		elog(ERROR, "could not encode server signature");
+	server_signature_base64[siglen] = '\0';
+
+	/*------
+	 * The syntax for the server-final-message is: (RFC 5802)
+	 *
+	 * verifier		   = "v=" base64
+	 *					 ;; base-64 encoded ServerSignature.
+	 *
+	 * server-final-message = (server-error / verifier)
+	 *					 ["," extensions]
+	 *
+	 *------
+	 */
+	return psprintf("v=%s", server_signature_base64);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Deterministically generate salt for mock authentication, using a SHA256
+ * hash based on the username and a cluster-level secret key.  Returns a
+ * pointer to a static buffer of size SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN.
+ */
+static char *
+scram_mock_salt(const char *username)
+{
+	pg_sha256_ctx ctx;
+	static uint8 sha_digest[PG_SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+	char	   *mock_auth_nonce = GetMockAuthenticationNonce();
+
+	/*
+	 * Generate salt using a SHA256 hash of the username and the cluster's
+	 * mock authentication nonce.  (This works as long as the salt length is
+	 * not larger the SHA256 digest length. If the salt is smaller, the caller
+	 * will just ignore the extra data.)
+	 */
+	StaticAssertStmt(PG_SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH >= SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN,
+					 "salt length greater than SHA256 digest length");
+
+	pg_sha256_init(&ctx);
+	pg_sha256_update(&ctx, (uint8 *) username, strlen(username));
+	pg_sha256_update(&ctx, (uint8 *) mock_auth_nonce, MOCK_AUTH_NONCE_LEN);
+	pg_sha256_final(&ctx, sha_digest);
+
+	return (char *) sha_digest;
+}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a533786
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3397 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * auth.c
+ *	  Routines to handle network authentication
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ *	  src/backend/libpq/auth.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
+#include <sys/select.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "commands/user.h"
+#include "common/ip.h"
+#include "common/md5.h"
+#include "common/scram-common.h"
+#include "libpq/auth.h"
+#include "libpq/crypt.h"
+#include "libpq/libpq.h"
+#include "libpq/pqformat.h"
+#include "libpq/scram.h"
+#include "miscadmin.h"
+#include "port/pg_bswap.h"
+#include "replication/walsender.h"
+#include "storage/ipc.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+#include "utils/timestamp.h"
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Global authentication functions
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+static void sendAuthRequest(Port *port, AuthRequest areq, const char *extradata,
+							int extralen);
+static void auth_failed(Port *port, int status, char *logdetail);
+static char *recv_password_packet(Port *port);
+
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Password-based authentication methods (password, md5, and scram-sha-256)
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+static int	CheckPasswordAuth(Port *port, char **logdetail);
+static int	CheckPWChallengeAuth(Port *port, char **logdetail);
+
+static int	CheckMD5Auth(Port *port, char *shadow_pass, char **logdetail);
+static int	CheckSCRAMAuth(Port *port, char *shadow_pass, char **logdetail);
+
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Ident authentication
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+/* Max size of username ident server can return (per RFC 1413) */
+#define IDENT_USERNAME_MAX 512
+
+/* Standard TCP port number for Ident service.  Assigned by IANA */
+#define IDENT_PORT 113
+
+static int	ident_inet(hbaPort *port);
+
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Peer authentication
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+static int	auth_peer(hbaPort *port);
+
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------
+ * PAM authentication
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+#ifdef HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H
+#include <pam/pam_appl.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H
+#include <security/pam_appl.h>
+#endif
+
+#define PGSQL_PAM_SERVICE "postgresql"	/* Service name passed to PAM */
+
+static int	CheckPAMAuth(Port *port, const char *user, const char *password);
+static int	pam_passwd_conv_proc(int num_msg, const struct pam_message **msg,
+								 struct pam_response **resp, void *appdata_ptr);
+
+static struct pam_conv pam_passw_conv = {
+	&pam_passwd_conv_proc,
+	NULL
+};
+
+static const char *pam_passwd = NULL;	/* Workaround for Solaris 2.6
+										 * brokenness */
+static Port *pam_port_cludge;	/* Workaround for passing "Port *port" into
+								 * pam_passwd_conv_proc */
+static bool pam_no_password;	/* For detecting no-password-given */
+#endif							/* USE_PAM */
+
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------
+ * BSD authentication
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifdef USE_BSD_AUTH
+#include <bsd_auth.h>
+
+static int	CheckBSDAuth(Port *port, char *user);
+#endif							/* USE_BSD_AUTH */
+
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------
+ * LDAP authentication
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifdef USE_LDAP
+#ifndef WIN32
+/* We use a deprecated function to keep the codepath the same as win32. */
+#define LDAP_DEPRECATED 1
+#include <ldap.h>
+#else
+#include <winldap.h>
+
+/* Correct header from the Platform SDK */
+typedef
+ULONG		(*__ldap_start_tls_sA) (IN PLDAP ExternalHandle,
+									OUT PULONG ServerReturnValue,
+									OUT LDAPMessage **result,
+									IN PLDAPControlA * ServerControls,
+									IN PLDAPControlA * ClientControls
+);
+#endif
+
+static int	CheckLDAPAuth(Port *port);
+
+/* LDAP_OPT_DIAGNOSTIC_MESSAGE is the newer spelling */
+#ifndef LDAP_OPT_DIAGNOSTIC_MESSAGE
+#define LDAP_OPT_DIAGNOSTIC_MESSAGE LDAP_OPT_ERROR_STRING
+#endif
+
+#endif							/* USE_LDAP */
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Cert authentication
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifdef USE_SSL
+static int	CheckCertAuth(Port *port);
+#endif
+
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Kerberos and GSSAPI GUCs
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+char	   *pg_krb_server_keyfile;
+bool		pg_krb_caseins_users;
+
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------
+ * GSSAPI Authentication
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
+#include "libpq/be-gssapi-common.h"
+
+static int	pg_GSS_checkauth(Port *port);
+static int	pg_GSS_recvauth(Port *port);
+#endif							/* ENABLE_GSS */
+
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------
+ * SSPI Authentication
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifdef ENABLE_SSPI
+typedef SECURITY_STATUS
+			(WINAPI * QUERY_SECURITY_CONTEXT_TOKEN_FN) (PCtxtHandle, void **);
+static int	pg_SSPI_recvauth(Port *port);
+static int	pg_SSPI_make_upn(char *accountname,
+							 size_t accountnamesize,
+							 char *domainname,
+							 size_t domainnamesize,
+							 bool update_accountname);
+#endif
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------
+ * RADIUS Authentication
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+static int	CheckRADIUSAuth(Port *port);
+static int	PerformRadiusTransaction(const char *server, const char *secret, const char *portstr, const char *identifier, const char *user_name, const char *passwd);
+
+
+/*
+ * Maximum accepted size of GSS and SSPI authentication tokens.
+ *
+ * Kerberos tickets are usually quite small, but the TGTs issued by Windows
+ * domain controllers include an authorization field known as the Privilege
+ * Attribute Certificate (PAC), which contains the user's Windows permissions
+ * (group memberships etc.). The PAC is copied into all tickets obtained on
+ * the basis of this TGT (even those issued by Unix realms which the Windows
+ * realm trusts), and can be several kB in size. The maximum token size
+ * accepted by Windows systems is determined by the MaxAuthToken Windows
+ * registry setting. Microsoft recommends that it is not set higher than
+ * 65535 bytes, so that seems like a reasonable limit for us as well.
+ */
+#define PG_MAX_AUTH_TOKEN_LENGTH	65535
+
+/*
+ * Maximum accepted size of SASL messages.
+ *
+ * The messages that the server or libpq generate are much smaller than this,
+ * but have some headroom.
+ */
+#define PG_MAX_SASL_MESSAGE_LENGTH	1024
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Global authentication functions
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This hook allows plugins to get control following client authentication,
+ * but before the user has been informed about the results.  It could be used
+ * to record login events, insert a delay after failed authentication, etc.
+ */
+ClientAuthentication_hook_type ClientAuthentication_hook = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * Tell the user the authentication failed, but not (much about) why.
+ *
+ * There is a tradeoff here between security concerns and making life
+ * unnecessarily difficult for legitimate users.  We would not, for example,
+ * want to report the password we were expecting to receive...
+ * But it seems useful to report the username and authorization method
+ * in use, and these are items that must be presumed known to an attacker
+ * anyway.
+ * Note that many sorts of failure report additional information in the
+ * postmaster log, which we hope is only readable by good guys.  In
+ * particular, if logdetail isn't NULL, we send that string to the log.
+ */
+static void
+auth_failed(Port *port, int status, char *logdetail)
+{
+	const char *errstr;
+	char	   *cdetail;
+	int			errcode_return = ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION;
+
+	/*
+	 * If we failed due to EOF from client, just quit; there's no point in
+	 * trying to send a message to the client, and not much point in logging
+	 * the failure in the postmaster log.  (Logging the failure might be
+	 * desirable, were it not for the fact that libpq closes the connection
+	 * unceremoniously if challenged for a password when it hasn't got one to
+	 * send.  We'll get a useless log entry for every psql connection under
+	 * password auth, even if it's perfectly successful, if we log STATUS_EOF
+	 * events.)
+	 */
+	if (status == STATUS_EOF)
+		proc_exit(0);
+
+	switch (port->hba->auth_method)
+	{
+		case uaReject:
+		case uaImplicitReject:
+			errstr = gettext_noop("authentication failed for user \"%s\": host rejected");
+			break;
+		case uaTrust:
+			errstr = gettext_noop("\"trust\" authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
+			break;
+		case uaIdent:
+			errstr = gettext_noop("Ident authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
+			break;
+		case uaPeer:
+			errstr = gettext_noop("Peer authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
+			break;
+		case uaPassword:
+		case uaMD5:
+		case uaSCRAM:
+			errstr = gettext_noop("password authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
+			/* We use it to indicate if a .pgpass password failed. */
+			errcode_return = ERRCODE_INVALID_PASSWORD;
+			break;
+		case uaGSS:
+			errstr = gettext_noop("GSSAPI authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
+			break;
+		case uaSSPI:
+			errstr = gettext_noop("SSPI authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
+			break;
+		case uaPAM:
+			errstr = gettext_noop("PAM authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
+			break;
+		case uaBSD:
+			errstr = gettext_noop("BSD authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
+			break;
+		case uaLDAP:
+			errstr = gettext_noop("LDAP authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
+			break;
+		case uaCert:
+			errstr = gettext_noop("certificate authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
+			break;
+		case uaRADIUS:
+			errstr = gettext_noop("RADIUS authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
+			break;
+		default:
+			errstr = gettext_noop("authentication failed for user \"%s\": invalid authentication method");
+			break;
+	}
+
+	cdetail = psprintf(_("Connection matched pg_hba.conf line %d: \"%s\""),
+					   port->hba->linenumber, port->hba->rawline);
+	if (logdetail)
+		logdetail = psprintf("%s\n%s", logdetail, cdetail);
+	else
+		logdetail = cdetail;
+
+	ereport(FATAL,
+			(errcode(errcode_return),
+			 errmsg(errstr, port->user_name),
+			 logdetail ? errdetail_log("%s", logdetail) : 0));
+
+	/* doesn't return */
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Client authentication starts here.  If there is an error, this
+ * function does not return and the backend process is terminated.
+ */
+void
+ClientAuthentication(Port *port)
+{
+	int			status = STATUS_ERROR;
+	char	   *logdetail = NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Get the authentication method to use for this frontend/database
+	 * combination.  Note: we do not parse the file at this point; this has
+	 * already been done elsewhere.  hba.c dropped an error message into the
+	 * server logfile if parsing the hba config file failed.
+	 */
+	hba_getauthmethod(port);
+
+	CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS();
+
+	/*
+	 * This is the first point where we have access to the hba record for the
+	 * current connection, so perform any verifications based on the hba
+	 * options field that should be done *before* the authentication here.
+	 */
+	if (port->hba->clientcert != clientCertOff)
+	{
+		/* If we haven't loaded a root certificate store, fail */
+		if (!secure_loaded_verify_locations())
+			ereport(FATAL,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+					 errmsg("client certificates can only be checked if a root certificate store is available")));
+
+		/*
+		 * If we loaded a root certificate store, and if a certificate is
+		 * present on the client, then it has been verified against our root
+		 * certificate store, and the connection would have been aborted
+		 * already if it didn't verify ok.
+		 */
+		if (!port->peer_cert_valid)
+			ereport(FATAL,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
+					 errmsg("connection requires a valid client certificate")));
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Now proceed to do the actual authentication check
+	 */
+	switch (port->hba->auth_method)
+	{
+		case uaReject:
+
+			/*
+			 * An explicit "reject" entry in pg_hba.conf.  This report exposes
+			 * the fact that there's an explicit reject entry, which is
+			 * perhaps not so desirable from a security standpoint; but the
+			 * message for an implicit reject could confuse the DBA a lot when
+			 * the true situation is a match to an explicit reject.  And we
+			 * don't want to change the message for an implicit reject.  As
+			 * noted below, the additional information shown here doesn't
+			 * expose anything not known to an attacker.
+			 */
+			{
+				char		hostinfo[NI_MAXHOST];
+				const char *encryption_state;
+
+				pg_getnameinfo_all(&port->raddr.addr, port->raddr.salen,
+								   hostinfo, sizeof(hostinfo),
+								   NULL, 0,
+								   NI_NUMERICHOST);
+
+				encryption_state =
+#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
+					(port->gss && port->gss->enc) ? _("GSS encryption") :
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_SSL
+					port->ssl_in_use ? _("SSL on") :
+#endif
+					_("SSL off");
+
+				if (am_walsender)
+					ereport(FATAL,
+							(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
+					/* translator: last %s describes encryption state */
+							 errmsg("pg_hba.conf rejects replication connection for host \"%s\", user \"%s\", %s",
+									hostinfo, port->user_name,
+									encryption_state)));
+				else
+					ereport(FATAL,
+							(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
+					/* translator: last %s describes encryption state */
+							 errmsg("pg_hba.conf rejects connection for host \"%s\", user \"%s\", database \"%s\", %s",
+									hostinfo, port->user_name,
+									port->database_name,
+									encryption_state)));
+				break;
+			}
+
+		case uaImplicitReject:
+
+			/*
+			 * No matching entry, so tell the user we fell through.
+			 *
+			 * NOTE: the extra info reported here is not a security breach,
+			 * because all that info is known at the frontend and must be
+			 * assumed known to bad guys.  We're merely helping out the less
+			 * clueful good guys.
+			 */
+			{
+				char		hostinfo[NI_MAXHOST];
+				const char *encryption_state;
+
+				pg_getnameinfo_all(&port->raddr.addr, port->raddr.salen,
+								   hostinfo, sizeof(hostinfo),
+								   NULL, 0,
+								   NI_NUMERICHOST);
+
+				encryption_state =
+#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
+					(port->gss && port->gss->enc) ? _("GSS encryption") :
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_SSL
+					port->ssl_in_use ? _("SSL on") :
+#endif
+					_("SSL off");
+
+#define HOSTNAME_LOOKUP_DETAIL(port) \
+				(port->remote_hostname ? \
+				 (port->remote_hostname_resolv == +1 ? \
+				  errdetail_log("Client IP address resolved to \"%s\", forward lookup matches.", \
+								port->remote_hostname) : \
+				  port->remote_hostname_resolv == 0 ? \
+				  errdetail_log("Client IP address resolved to \"%s\", forward lookup not checked.", \
+								port->remote_hostname) : \
+				  port->remote_hostname_resolv == -1 ? \
+				  errdetail_log("Client IP address resolved to \"%s\", forward lookup does not match.", \
+								port->remote_hostname) : \
+				  port->remote_hostname_resolv == -2 ? \
+				  errdetail_log("Could not translate client host name \"%s\" to IP address: %s.", \
+								port->remote_hostname, \
+								gai_strerror(port->remote_hostname_errcode)) : \
+				  0) \
+				 : (port->remote_hostname_resolv == -2 ? \
+					errdetail_log("Could not resolve client IP address to a host name: %s.", \
+								  gai_strerror(port->remote_hostname_errcode)) : \
+					0))
+
+				if (am_walsender)
+					ereport(FATAL,
+							(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
+					/* translator: last %s describes encryption state */
+							 errmsg("no pg_hba.conf entry for replication connection from host \"%s\", user \"%s\", %s",
+									hostinfo, port->user_name,
+									encryption_state),
+							 HOSTNAME_LOOKUP_DETAIL(port)));
+				else
+					ereport(FATAL,
+							(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
+					/* translator: last %s describes encryption state */
+							 errmsg("no pg_hba.conf entry for host \"%s\", user \"%s\", database \"%s\", %s",
+									hostinfo, port->user_name,
+									port->database_name,
+									encryption_state),
+							 HOSTNAME_LOOKUP_DETAIL(port)));
+				break;
+			}
+
+		case uaGSS:
+#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
+			/* We might or might not have the gss workspace already */
+			if (port->gss == NULL)
+				port->gss = (pg_gssinfo *)
+					MemoryContextAllocZero(TopMemoryContext,
+										   sizeof(pg_gssinfo));
+			port->gss->auth = true;
+
+			/*
+			 * If GSS state was set up while enabling encryption, we can just
+			 * check the client's principal.  Otherwise, ask for it.
+			 */
+			if (port->gss->enc)
+				status = pg_GSS_checkauth(port);
+			else
+			{
+				sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_GSS, NULL, 0);
+				status = pg_GSS_recvauth(port);
+			}
+#else
+			Assert(false);
+#endif
+			break;
+
+		case uaSSPI:
+#ifdef ENABLE_SSPI
+			if (port->gss == NULL)
+				port->gss = (pg_gssinfo *)
+					MemoryContextAllocZero(TopMemoryContext,
+										   sizeof(pg_gssinfo));
+			sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_SSPI, NULL, 0);
+			status = pg_SSPI_recvauth(port);
+#else
+			Assert(false);
+#endif
+			break;
+
+		case uaPeer:
+			status = auth_peer(port);
+			break;
+
+		case uaIdent:
+			status = ident_inet(port);
+			break;
+
+		case uaMD5:
+		case uaSCRAM:
+			status = CheckPWChallengeAuth(port, &logdetail);
+			break;
+
+		case uaPassword:
+			status = CheckPasswordAuth(port, &logdetail);
+			break;
+
+		case uaPAM:
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+			status = CheckPAMAuth(port, port->user_name, "");
+#else
+			Assert(false);
+#endif							/* USE_PAM */
+			break;
+
+		case uaBSD:
+#ifdef USE_BSD_AUTH
+			status = CheckBSDAuth(port, port->user_name);
+#else
+			Assert(false);
+#endif							/* USE_BSD_AUTH */
+			break;
+
+		case uaLDAP:
+#ifdef USE_LDAP
+			status = CheckLDAPAuth(port);
+#else
+			Assert(false);
+#endif
+			break;
+		case uaRADIUS:
+			status = CheckRADIUSAuth(port);
+			break;
+		case uaCert:
+			/* uaCert will be treated as if clientcert=verify-full (uaTrust) */
+		case uaTrust:
+			status = STATUS_OK;
+			break;
+	}
+
+	if ((status == STATUS_OK && port->hba->clientcert == clientCertFull)
+		|| port->hba->auth_method == uaCert)
+	{
+		/*
+		 * Make sure we only check the certificate if we use the cert method
+		 * or verify-full option.
+		 */
+#ifdef USE_SSL
+		status = CheckCertAuth(port);
+#else
+		Assert(false);
+#endif
+	}
+
+	if (ClientAuthentication_hook)
+		(*ClientAuthentication_hook) (port, status);
+
+	if (status == STATUS_OK)
+		sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_OK, NULL, 0);
+	else
+		auth_failed(port, status, logdetail);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Send an authentication request packet to the frontend.
+ */
+static void
+sendAuthRequest(Port *port, AuthRequest areq, const char *extradata, int extralen)
+{
+	StringInfoData buf;
+
+	CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS();
+
+	pq_beginmessage(&buf, 'R');
+	pq_sendint32(&buf, (int32) areq);
+	if (extralen > 0)
+		pq_sendbytes(&buf, extradata, extralen);
+
+	pq_endmessage(&buf);
+
+	/*
+	 * Flush message so client will see it, except for AUTH_REQ_OK and
+	 * AUTH_REQ_SASL_FIN, which need not be sent until we are ready for
+	 * queries.
+	 */
+	if (areq != AUTH_REQ_OK && areq != AUTH_REQ_SASL_FIN)
+		pq_flush();
+
+	CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Collect password response packet from frontend.
+ *
+ * Returns NULL if couldn't get password, else palloc'd string.
+ */
+static char *
+recv_password_packet(Port *port)
+{
+	StringInfoData buf;
+
+	pq_startmsgread();
+	if (PG_PROTOCOL_MAJOR(port->proto) >= 3)
+	{
+		/* Expect 'p' message type */
+		int			mtype;
+
+		mtype = pq_getbyte();
+		if (mtype != 'p')
+		{
+			/*
+			 * If the client just disconnects without offering a password,
+			 * don't make a log entry.  This is legal per protocol spec and in
+			 * fact commonly done by psql, so complaining just clutters the
+			 * log.
+			 */
+			if (mtype != EOF)
+				ereport(ERROR,
+						(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+						 errmsg("expected password response, got message type %d",
+								mtype)));
+			return NULL;		/* EOF or bad message type */
+		}
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		/* For pre-3.0 clients, avoid log entry if they just disconnect */
+		if (pq_peekbyte() == EOF)
+			return NULL;		/* EOF */
+	}
+
+	initStringInfo(&buf);
+	if (pq_getmessage(&buf, 1000))	/* receive password */
+	{
+		/* EOF - pq_getmessage already logged a suitable message */
+		pfree(buf.data);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Apply sanity check: password packet length should agree with length of
+	 * contained string.  Note it is safe to use strlen here because
+	 * StringInfo is guaranteed to have an appended '\0'.
+	 */
+	if (strlen(buf.data) + 1 != buf.len)
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+				 errmsg("invalid password packet size")));
+
+	/*
+	 * Don't allow an empty password. Libpq treats an empty password the same
+	 * as no password at all, and won't even try to authenticate. But other
+	 * clients might, so allowing it would be confusing.
+	 *
+	 * Note that this only catches an empty password sent by the client in
+	 * plaintext. There's also a check in CREATE/ALTER USER that prevents an
+	 * empty string from being stored as a user's password in the first place.
+	 * We rely on that for MD5 and SCRAM authentication, but we still need
+	 * this check here, to prevent an empty password from being used with
+	 * authentication methods that check the password against an external
+	 * system, like PAM, LDAP and RADIUS.
+	 */
+	if (buf.len == 1)
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PASSWORD),
+				 errmsg("empty password returned by client")));
+
+	/* Do not echo password to logs, for security. */
+	elog(DEBUG5, "received password packet");
+
+	/*
+	 * Return the received string.  Note we do not attempt to do any
+	 * character-set conversion on it; since we don't yet know the client's
+	 * encoding, there wouldn't be much point.
+	 */
+	return buf.data;
+}
+
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Password-based authentication mechanisms
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Plaintext password authentication.
+ */
+static int
+CheckPasswordAuth(Port *port, char **logdetail)
+{
+	char	   *passwd;
+	int			result;
+	char	   *shadow_pass;
+
+	sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD, NULL, 0);
+
+	passwd = recv_password_packet(port);
+	if (passwd == NULL)
+		return STATUS_EOF;		/* client wouldn't send password */
+
+	shadow_pass = get_role_password(port->user_name, logdetail);
+	if (shadow_pass)
+	{
+		result = plain_crypt_verify(port->user_name, shadow_pass, passwd,
+									logdetail);
+	}
+	else
+		result = STATUS_ERROR;
+
+	if (shadow_pass)
+		pfree(shadow_pass);
+	pfree(passwd);
+
+	return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * MD5 and SCRAM authentication.
+ */
+static int
+CheckPWChallengeAuth(Port *port, char **logdetail)
+{
+	int			auth_result;
+	char	   *shadow_pass;
+	PasswordType pwtype;
+
+	Assert(port->hba->auth_method == uaSCRAM ||
+		   port->hba->auth_method == uaMD5);
+
+	/* First look up the user's password. */
+	shadow_pass = get_role_password(port->user_name, logdetail);
+
+	/*
+	 * If the user does not exist, or has no password or it's expired, we
+	 * still go through the motions of authentication, to avoid revealing to
+	 * the client that the user didn't exist.  If 'md5' is allowed, we choose
+	 * whether to use 'md5' or 'scram-sha-256' authentication based on current
+	 * password_encryption setting.  The idea is that most genuine users
+	 * probably have a password of that type, and if we pretend that this user
+	 * had a password of that type, too, it "blends in" best.
+	 */
+	if (!shadow_pass)
+		pwtype = Password_encryption;
+	else
+		pwtype = get_password_type(shadow_pass);
+
+	/*
+	 * If 'md5' authentication is allowed, decide whether to perform 'md5' or
+	 * 'scram-sha-256' authentication based on the type of password the user
+	 * has.  If it's an MD5 hash, we must do MD5 authentication, and if it's a
+	 * SCRAM secret, we must do SCRAM authentication.
+	 *
+	 * If MD5 authentication is not allowed, always use SCRAM.  If the user
+	 * had an MD5 password, CheckSCRAMAuth() will fail.
+	 */
+	if (port->hba->auth_method == uaMD5 && pwtype == PASSWORD_TYPE_MD5)
+		auth_result = CheckMD5Auth(port, shadow_pass, logdetail);
+	else
+		auth_result = CheckSCRAMAuth(port, shadow_pass, logdetail);
+
+	if (shadow_pass)
+		pfree(shadow_pass);
+
+	/*
+	 * If get_role_password() returned error, return error, even if the
+	 * authentication succeeded.
+	 */
+	if (!shadow_pass)
+	{
+		Assert(auth_result != STATUS_OK);
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+	return auth_result;
+}
+
+static int
+CheckMD5Auth(Port *port, char *shadow_pass, char **logdetail)
+{
+	char		md5Salt[4];		/* Password salt */
+	char	   *passwd;
+	int			result;
+
+	if (Db_user_namespace)
+		ereport(FATAL,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
+				 errmsg("MD5 authentication is not supported when \"db_user_namespace\" is enabled")));
+
+	/* include the salt to use for computing the response */
+	if (!pg_strong_random(md5Salt, 4))
+	{
+		ereport(LOG,
+				(errmsg("could not generate random MD5 salt")));
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_MD5, md5Salt, 4);
+
+	passwd = recv_password_packet(port);
+	if (passwd == NULL)
+		return STATUS_EOF;		/* client wouldn't send password */
+
+	if (shadow_pass)
+		result = md5_crypt_verify(port->user_name, shadow_pass, passwd,
+								  md5Salt, 4, logdetail);
+	else
+		result = STATUS_ERROR;
+
+	pfree(passwd);
+
+	return result;
+}
+
+static int
+CheckSCRAMAuth(Port *port, char *shadow_pass, char **logdetail)
+{
+	StringInfoData sasl_mechs;
+	int			mtype;
+	StringInfoData buf;
+	void	   *scram_opaq = NULL;
+	char	   *output = NULL;
+	int			outputlen = 0;
+	const char *input;
+	int			inputlen;
+	int			result;
+	bool		initial;
+
+	/*
+	 * SASL auth is not supported for protocol versions before 3, because it
+	 * relies on the overall message length word to determine the SASL payload
+	 * size in AuthenticationSASLContinue and PasswordMessage messages.  (We
+	 * used to have a hard rule that protocol messages must be parsable
+	 * without relying on the length word, but we hardly care about older
+	 * protocol version anymore.)
+	 */
+	if (PG_PROTOCOL_MAJOR(FrontendProtocol) < 3)
+		ereport(FATAL,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
+				 errmsg("SASL authentication is not supported in protocol version 2")));
+
+	/*
+	 * Send the SASL authentication request to user.  It includes the list of
+	 * authentication mechanisms that are supported.
+	 */
+	initStringInfo(&sasl_mechs);
+
+	pg_be_scram_get_mechanisms(port, &sasl_mechs);
+	/* Put another '\0' to mark that list is finished. */
+	appendStringInfoChar(&sasl_mechs, '\0');
+
+	sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_SASL, sasl_mechs.data, sasl_mechs.len);
+	pfree(sasl_mechs.data);
+
+	/*
+	 * Loop through SASL message exchange.  This exchange can consist of
+	 * multiple messages sent in both directions.  First message is always
+	 * from the client.  All messages from client to server are password
+	 * packets (type 'p').
+	 */
+	initial = true;
+	do
+	{
+		pq_startmsgread();
+		mtype = pq_getbyte();
+		if (mtype != 'p')
+		{
+			/* Only log error if client didn't disconnect. */
+			if (mtype != EOF)
+			{
+				ereport(ERROR,
+						(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+						 errmsg("expected SASL response, got message type %d",
+								mtype)));
+			}
+			else
+				return STATUS_EOF;
+		}
+
+		/* Get the actual SASL message */
+		initStringInfo(&buf);
+		if (pq_getmessage(&buf, PG_MAX_SASL_MESSAGE_LENGTH))
+		{
+			/* EOF - pq_getmessage already logged error */
+			pfree(buf.data);
+			return STATUS_ERROR;
+		}
+
+		elog(DEBUG4, "processing received SASL response of length %d", buf.len);
+
+		/*
+		 * The first SASLInitialResponse message is different from the others.
+		 * It indicates which SASL mechanism the client selected, and contains
+		 * an optional Initial Client Response payload.  The subsequent
+		 * SASLResponse messages contain just the SASL payload.
+		 */
+		if (initial)
+		{
+			const char *selected_mech;
+
+			selected_mech = pq_getmsgrawstring(&buf);
+
+			/*
+			 * Initialize the status tracker for message exchanges.
+			 *
+			 * If the user doesn't exist, or doesn't have a valid password, or
+			 * it's expired, we still go through the motions of SASL
+			 * authentication, but tell the authentication method that the
+			 * authentication is "doomed". That is, it's going to fail, no
+			 * matter what.
+			 *
+			 * This is because we don't want to reveal to an attacker what
+			 * usernames are valid, nor which users have a valid password.
+			 */
+			scram_opaq = pg_be_scram_init(port, selected_mech, shadow_pass);
+
+			inputlen = pq_getmsgint(&buf, 4);
+			if (inputlen == -1)
+				input = NULL;
+			else
+				input = pq_getmsgbytes(&buf, inputlen);
+
+			initial = false;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			inputlen = buf.len;
+			input = pq_getmsgbytes(&buf, buf.len);
+		}
+		pq_getmsgend(&buf);
+
+		/*
+		 * The StringInfo guarantees that there's a \0 byte after the
+		 * response.
+		 */
+		Assert(input == NULL || input[inputlen] == '\0');
+
+		/*
+		 * we pass 'logdetail' as NULL when doing a mock authentication,
+		 * because we should already have a better error message in that case
+		 */
+		result = pg_be_scram_exchange(scram_opaq, input, inputlen,
+									  &output, &outputlen,
+									  logdetail);
+
+		/* input buffer no longer used */
+		pfree(buf.data);
+
+		if (output)
+		{
+			/*
+			 * Negotiation generated data to be sent to the client.
+			 */
+			elog(DEBUG4, "sending SASL challenge of length %u", outputlen);
+
+			if (result == SASL_EXCHANGE_SUCCESS)
+				sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_SASL_FIN, output, outputlen);
+			else
+				sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_SASL_CONT, output, outputlen);
+
+			pfree(output);
+		}
+	} while (result == SASL_EXCHANGE_CONTINUE);
+
+	/* Oops, Something bad happened */
+	if (result != SASL_EXCHANGE_SUCCESS)
+	{
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	return STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------
+ * GSSAPI authentication system
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
+static int
+pg_GSS_recvauth(Port *port)
+{
+	OM_uint32	maj_stat,
+				min_stat,
+				lmin_s,
+				gflags;
+	int			mtype;
+	StringInfoData buf;
+	gss_buffer_desc gbuf;
+
+	/*
+	 * GSS auth is not supported for protocol versions before 3, because it
+	 * relies on the overall message length word to determine the GSS payload
+	 * size in AuthenticationGSSContinue and PasswordMessage messages. (This
+	 * is, in fact, a design error in our GSS support, because protocol
+	 * messages are supposed to be parsable without relying on the length
+	 * word; but it's not worth changing it now.)
+	 */
+	if (PG_PROTOCOL_MAJOR(FrontendProtocol) < 3)
+		ereport(FATAL,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
+				 errmsg("GSSAPI is not supported in protocol version 2")));
+
+	/*
+	 * Use the configured keytab, if there is one.  Unfortunately, Heimdal
+	 * doesn't support the cred store extensions, so use the env var.
+	 */
+	if (pg_krb_server_keyfile != NULL && pg_krb_server_keyfile[0] != '\0')
+	{
+		if (setenv("KRB5_KTNAME", pg_krb_server_keyfile, 1) != 0)
+		{
+			/* The only likely failure cause is OOM, so use that errcode */
+			ereport(FATAL,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
+					 errmsg("could not set environment: %m")));
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * We accept any service principal that's present in our keytab. This
+	 * increases interoperability between kerberos implementations that see
+	 * for example case sensitivity differently, while not really opening up
+	 * any vector of attack.
+	 */
+	port->gss->cred = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Initialize sequence with an empty context
+	 */
+	port->gss->ctx = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
+
+	/*
+	 * Loop through GSSAPI message exchange. This exchange can consist of
+	 * multiple messages sent in both directions. First message is always from
+	 * the client. All messages from client to server are password packets
+	 * (type 'p').
+	 */
+	do
+	{
+		pq_startmsgread();
+
+		CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS();
+
+		mtype = pq_getbyte();
+		if (mtype != 'p')
+		{
+			/* Only log error if client didn't disconnect. */
+			if (mtype != EOF)
+				ereport(ERROR,
+						(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+						 errmsg("expected GSS response, got message type %d",
+								mtype)));
+			return STATUS_ERROR;
+		}
+
+		/* Get the actual GSS token */
+		initStringInfo(&buf);
+		if (pq_getmessage(&buf, PG_MAX_AUTH_TOKEN_LENGTH))
+		{
+			/* EOF - pq_getmessage already logged error */
+			pfree(buf.data);
+			return STATUS_ERROR;
+		}
+
+		/* Map to GSSAPI style buffer */
+		gbuf.length = buf.len;
+		gbuf.value = buf.data;
+
+		elog(DEBUG4, "processing received GSS token of length %u",
+			 (unsigned int) gbuf.length);
+
+		maj_stat = gss_accept_sec_context(&min_stat,
+										  &port->gss->ctx,
+										  port->gss->cred,
+										  &gbuf,
+										  GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS,
+										  &port->gss->name,
+										  NULL,
+										  &port->gss->outbuf,
+										  &gflags,
+										  NULL,
+										  NULL);
+
+		/* gbuf no longer used */
+		pfree(buf.data);
+
+		elog(DEBUG5, "gss_accept_sec_context major: %d, "
+			 "minor: %d, outlen: %u, outflags: %x",
+			 maj_stat, min_stat,
+			 (unsigned int) port->gss->outbuf.length, gflags);
+
+		CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS();
+
+		if (port->gss->outbuf.length != 0)
+		{
+			/*
+			 * Negotiation generated data to be sent to the client.
+			 */
+			elog(DEBUG4, "sending GSS response token of length %u",
+				 (unsigned int) port->gss->outbuf.length);
+
+			sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_GSS_CONT,
+							port->gss->outbuf.value, port->gss->outbuf.length);
+
+			gss_release_buffer(&lmin_s, &port->gss->outbuf);
+		}
+
+		if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE && maj_stat != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
+		{
+			gss_delete_sec_context(&lmin_s, &port->gss->ctx, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+			pg_GSS_error(_("accepting GSS security context failed"),
+						 maj_stat, min_stat);
+			return STATUS_ERROR;
+		}
+
+		if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
+			elog(DEBUG4, "GSS continue needed");
+
+	} while (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
+
+	if (port->gss->cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
+	{
+		/*
+		 * Release service principal credentials
+		 */
+		gss_release_cred(&min_stat, &port->gss->cred);
+	}
+	return pg_GSS_checkauth(port);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether the GSSAPI-authenticated user is allowed to connect as the
+ * claimed username.
+ */
+static int
+pg_GSS_checkauth(Port *port)
+{
+	int			ret;
+	OM_uint32	maj_stat,
+				min_stat,
+				lmin_s;
+	gss_buffer_desc gbuf;
+	char	   *princ;
+
+	/*
+	 * Get the name of the user that authenticated, and compare it to the pg
+	 * username that was specified for the connection.
+	 */
+	maj_stat = gss_display_name(&min_stat, port->gss->name, &gbuf, NULL);
+	if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+	{
+		pg_GSS_error(_("retrieving GSS user name failed"),
+					 maj_stat, min_stat);
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * gbuf.value might not be null-terminated, so turn it into a regular
+	 * null-terminated string.
+	 */
+	princ = palloc(gbuf.length + 1);
+	memcpy(princ, gbuf.value, gbuf.length);
+	princ[gbuf.length] = '\0';
+	gss_release_buffer(&lmin_s, &gbuf);
+
+	/*
+	 * Copy the original name of the authenticated principal into our backend
+	 * memory for display later.
+	 */
+	port->gss->princ = MemoryContextStrdup(TopMemoryContext, princ);
+
+	/*
+	 * Split the username at the realm separator
+	 */
+	if (strchr(princ, '@'))
+	{
+		char	   *cp = strchr(princ, '@');
+
+		/*
+		 * If we are not going to include the realm in the username that is
+		 * passed to the ident map, destructively modify it here to remove the
+		 * realm. Then advance past the separator to check the realm.
+		 */
+		if (!port->hba->include_realm)
+			*cp = '\0';
+		cp++;
+
+		if (port->hba->krb_realm != NULL && strlen(port->hba->krb_realm))
+		{
+			/*
+			 * Match the realm part of the name first
+			 */
+			if (pg_krb_caseins_users)
+				ret = pg_strcasecmp(port->hba->krb_realm, cp);
+			else
+				ret = strcmp(port->hba->krb_realm, cp);
+
+			if (ret)
+			{
+				/* GSS realm does not match */
+				elog(DEBUG2,
+					 "GSSAPI realm (%s) and configured realm (%s) don't match",
+					 cp, port->hba->krb_realm);
+				pfree(princ);
+				return STATUS_ERROR;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	else if (port->hba->krb_realm && strlen(port->hba->krb_realm))
+	{
+		elog(DEBUG2,
+			 "GSSAPI did not return realm but realm matching was requested");
+		pfree(princ);
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	ret = check_usermap(port->hba->usermap, port->user_name, princ,
+						pg_krb_caseins_users);
+
+	pfree(princ);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+#endif							/* ENABLE_GSS */
+
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------
+ * SSPI authentication system
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifdef ENABLE_SSPI
+
+/*
+ * Generate an error for SSPI authentication.  The caller should apply
+ * _() to errmsg to make it translatable.
+ */
+static void
+pg_SSPI_error(int severity, const char *errmsg, SECURITY_STATUS r)
+{
+	char		sysmsg[256];
+
+	if (FormatMessage(FORMAT_MESSAGE_IGNORE_INSERTS |
+					  FORMAT_MESSAGE_FROM_SYSTEM,
+					  NULL, r, 0,
+					  sysmsg, sizeof(sysmsg), NULL) == 0)
+		ereport(severity,
+				(errmsg_internal("%s", errmsg),
+				 errdetail_internal("SSPI error %x", (unsigned int) r)));
+	else
+		ereport(severity,
+				(errmsg_internal("%s", errmsg),
+				 errdetail_internal("%s (%x)", sysmsg, (unsigned int) r)));
+}
+
+static int
+pg_SSPI_recvauth(Port *port)
+{
+	int			mtype;
+	StringInfoData buf;
+	SECURITY_STATUS r;
+	CredHandle	sspicred;
+	CtxtHandle *sspictx = NULL,
+				newctx;
+	TimeStamp	expiry;
+	ULONG		contextattr;
+	SecBufferDesc inbuf;
+	SecBufferDesc outbuf;
+	SecBuffer	OutBuffers[1];
+	SecBuffer	InBuffers[1];
+	HANDLE		token;
+	TOKEN_USER *tokenuser;
+	DWORD		retlen;
+	char		accountname[MAXPGPATH];
+	char		domainname[MAXPGPATH];
+	DWORD		accountnamesize = sizeof(accountname);
+	DWORD		domainnamesize = sizeof(domainname);
+	SID_NAME_USE accountnameuse;
+	HMODULE		secur32;
+
+	QUERY_SECURITY_CONTEXT_TOKEN_FN _QuerySecurityContextToken;
+
+	/*
+	 * SSPI auth is not supported for protocol versions before 3, because it
+	 * relies on the overall message length word to determine the SSPI payload
+	 * size in AuthenticationGSSContinue and PasswordMessage messages. (This
+	 * is, in fact, a design error in our SSPI support, because protocol
+	 * messages are supposed to be parsable without relying on the length
+	 * word; but it's not worth changing it now.)
+	 */
+	if (PG_PROTOCOL_MAJOR(FrontendProtocol) < 3)
+		ereport(FATAL,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
+				 errmsg("SSPI is not supported in protocol version 2")));
+
+	/*
+	 * Acquire a handle to the server credentials.
+	 */
+	r = AcquireCredentialsHandle(NULL,
+								 "negotiate",
+								 SECPKG_CRED_INBOUND,
+								 NULL,
+								 NULL,
+								 NULL,
+								 NULL,
+								 &sspicred,
+								 &expiry);
+	if (r != SEC_E_OK)
+		pg_SSPI_error(ERROR, _("could not acquire SSPI credentials"), r);
+
+	/*
+	 * Loop through SSPI message exchange. This exchange can consist of
+	 * multiple messages sent in both directions. First message is always from
+	 * the client. All messages from client to server are password packets
+	 * (type 'p').
+	 */
+	do
+	{
+		pq_startmsgread();
+		mtype = pq_getbyte();
+		if (mtype != 'p')
+		{
+			if (sspictx != NULL)
+			{
+				DeleteSecurityContext(sspictx);
+				free(sspictx);
+			}
+			FreeCredentialsHandle(&sspicred);
+
+			/* Only log error if client didn't disconnect. */
+			if (mtype != EOF)
+				ereport(ERROR,
+						(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+						 errmsg("expected SSPI response, got message type %d",
+								mtype)));
+			return STATUS_ERROR;
+		}
+
+		/* Get the actual SSPI token */
+		initStringInfo(&buf);
+		if (pq_getmessage(&buf, PG_MAX_AUTH_TOKEN_LENGTH))
+		{
+			/* EOF - pq_getmessage already logged error */
+			pfree(buf.data);
+			if (sspictx != NULL)
+			{
+				DeleteSecurityContext(sspictx);
+				free(sspictx);
+			}
+			FreeCredentialsHandle(&sspicred);
+			return STATUS_ERROR;
+		}
+
+		/* Map to SSPI style buffer */
+		inbuf.ulVersion = SECBUFFER_VERSION;
+		inbuf.cBuffers = 1;
+		inbuf.pBuffers = InBuffers;
+		InBuffers[0].pvBuffer = buf.data;
+		InBuffers[0].cbBuffer = buf.len;
+		InBuffers[0].BufferType = SECBUFFER_TOKEN;
+
+		/* Prepare output buffer */
+		OutBuffers[0].pvBuffer = NULL;
+		OutBuffers[0].BufferType = SECBUFFER_TOKEN;
+		OutBuffers[0].cbBuffer = 0;
+		outbuf.cBuffers = 1;
+		outbuf.pBuffers = OutBuffers;
+		outbuf.ulVersion = SECBUFFER_VERSION;
+
+		elog(DEBUG4, "processing received SSPI token of length %u",
+			 (unsigned int) buf.len);
+
+		r = AcceptSecurityContext(&sspicred,
+								  sspictx,
+								  &inbuf,
+								  ASC_REQ_ALLOCATE_MEMORY,
+								  SECURITY_NETWORK_DREP,
+								  &newctx,
+								  &outbuf,
+								  &contextattr,
+								  NULL);
+
+		/* input buffer no longer used */
+		pfree(buf.data);
+
+		if (outbuf.cBuffers > 0 && outbuf.pBuffers[0].cbBuffer > 0)
+		{
+			/*
+			 * Negotiation generated data to be sent to the client.
+			 */
+			elog(DEBUG4, "sending SSPI response token of length %u",
+				 (unsigned int) outbuf.pBuffers[0].cbBuffer);
+
+			port->gss->outbuf.length = outbuf.pBuffers[0].cbBuffer;
+			port->gss->outbuf.value = outbuf.pBuffers[0].pvBuffer;
+
+			sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_GSS_CONT,
+							port->gss->outbuf.value, port->gss->outbuf.length);
+
+			FreeContextBuffer(outbuf.pBuffers[0].pvBuffer);
+		}
+
+		if (r != SEC_E_OK && r != SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
+		{
+			if (sspictx != NULL)
+			{
+				DeleteSecurityContext(sspictx);
+				free(sspictx);
+			}
+			FreeCredentialsHandle(&sspicred);
+			pg_SSPI_error(ERROR,
+						  _("could not accept SSPI security context"), r);
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Overwrite the current context with the one we just received. If
+		 * sspictx is NULL it was the first loop and we need to allocate a
+		 * buffer for it. On subsequent runs, we can just overwrite the buffer
+		 * contents since the size does not change.
+		 */
+		if (sspictx == NULL)
+		{
+			sspictx = malloc(sizeof(CtxtHandle));
+			if (sspictx == NULL)
+				ereport(ERROR,
+						(errmsg("out of memory")));
+		}
+
+		memcpy(sspictx, &newctx, sizeof(CtxtHandle));
+
+		if (r == SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
+			elog(DEBUG4, "SSPI continue needed");
+
+	} while (r == SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
+
+
+	/*
+	 * Release service principal credentials
+	 */
+	FreeCredentialsHandle(&sspicred);
+
+
+	/*
+	 * SEC_E_OK indicates that authentication is now complete.
+	 *
+	 * Get the name of the user that authenticated, and compare it to the pg
+	 * username that was specified for the connection.
+	 *
+	 * MingW is missing the export for QuerySecurityContextToken in the
+	 * secur32 library, so we have to load it dynamically.
+	 */
+
+	secur32 = LoadLibrary("SECUR32.DLL");
+	if (secur32 == NULL)
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errmsg("could not load library \"%s\": error code %lu",
+						"SECUR32.DLL", GetLastError())));
+
+	_QuerySecurityContextToken = (QUERY_SECURITY_CONTEXT_TOKEN_FN)
+		GetProcAddress(secur32, "QuerySecurityContextToken");
+	if (_QuerySecurityContextToken == NULL)
+	{
+		FreeLibrary(secur32);
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errmsg_internal("could not locate QuerySecurityContextToken in secur32.dll: error code %lu",
+								 GetLastError())));
+	}
+
+	r = (_QuerySecurityContextToken) (sspictx, &token);
+	if (r != SEC_E_OK)
+	{
+		FreeLibrary(secur32);
+		pg_SSPI_error(ERROR,
+					  _("could not get token from SSPI security context"), r);
+	}
+
+	FreeLibrary(secur32);
+
+	/*
+	 * No longer need the security context, everything from here on uses the
+	 * token instead.
+	 */
+	DeleteSecurityContext(sspictx);
+	free(sspictx);
+
+	if (!GetTokenInformation(token, TokenUser, NULL, 0, &retlen) && GetLastError() != 122)
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errmsg_internal("could not get token information buffer size: error code %lu",
+								 GetLastError())));
+
+	tokenuser = malloc(retlen);
+	if (tokenuser == NULL)
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errmsg("out of memory")));
+
+	if (!GetTokenInformation(token, TokenUser, tokenuser, retlen, &retlen))
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errmsg_internal("could not get token information: error code %lu",
+								 GetLastError())));
+
+	CloseHandle(token);
+
+	if (!LookupAccountSid(NULL, tokenuser->User.Sid, accountname, &accountnamesize,
+						  domainname, &domainnamesize, &accountnameuse))
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errmsg_internal("could not look up account SID: error code %lu",
+								 GetLastError())));
+
+	free(tokenuser);
+
+	if (!port->hba->compat_realm)
+	{
+		int			status = pg_SSPI_make_upn(accountname, sizeof(accountname),
+											  domainname, sizeof(domainname),
+											  port->hba->upn_username);
+
+		if (status != STATUS_OK)
+			/* Error already reported from pg_SSPI_make_upn */
+			return status;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Compare realm/domain if requested. In SSPI, always compare case
+	 * insensitive.
+	 */
+	if (port->hba->krb_realm && strlen(port->hba->krb_realm))
+	{
+		if (pg_strcasecmp(port->hba->krb_realm, domainname) != 0)
+		{
+			elog(DEBUG2,
+				 "SSPI domain (%s) and configured domain (%s) don't match",
+				 domainname, port->hba->krb_realm);
+
+			return STATUS_ERROR;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * We have the username (without domain/realm) in accountname, compare to
+	 * the supplied value. In SSPI, always compare case insensitive.
+	 *
+	 * If set to include realm, append it in <username>@<realm> format.
+	 */
+	if (port->hba->include_realm)
+	{
+		char	   *namebuf;
+		int			retval;
+
+		namebuf = psprintf("%s@%s", accountname, domainname);
+		retval = check_usermap(port->hba->usermap, port->user_name, namebuf, true);
+		pfree(namebuf);
+		return retval;
+	}
+	else
+		return check_usermap(port->hba->usermap, port->user_name, accountname, true);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Replaces the domainname with the Kerberos realm name,
+ * and optionally the accountname with the Kerberos user name.
+ */
+static int
+pg_SSPI_make_upn(char *accountname,
+				 size_t accountnamesize,
+				 char *domainname,
+				 size_t domainnamesize,
+				 bool update_accountname)
+{
+	char	   *samname;
+	char	   *upname = NULL;
+	char	   *p = NULL;
+	ULONG		upnamesize = 0;
+	size_t		upnamerealmsize;
+	BOOLEAN		res;
+
+	/*
+	 * Build SAM name (DOMAIN\user), then translate to UPN
+	 * (user@kerberos.realm). The realm name is returned in lower case, but
+	 * that is fine because in SSPI auth, string comparisons are always
+	 * case-insensitive.
+	 */
+
+	samname = psprintf("%s\\%s", domainname, accountname);
+	res = TranslateName(samname, NameSamCompatible, NameUserPrincipal,
+						NULL, &upnamesize);
+
+	if ((!res && GetLastError() != ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER)
+		|| upnamesize == 0)
+	{
+		pfree(samname);
+		ereport(LOG,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_ROLE_SPECIFICATION),
+				 errmsg("could not translate name")));
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	/* upnamesize includes the terminating NUL. */
+	upname = palloc(upnamesize);
+
+	res = TranslateName(samname, NameSamCompatible, NameUserPrincipal,
+						upname, &upnamesize);
+
+	pfree(samname);
+	if (res)
+		p = strchr(upname, '@');
+
+	if (!res || p == NULL)
+	{
+		pfree(upname);
+		ereport(LOG,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_ROLE_SPECIFICATION),
+				 errmsg("could not translate name")));
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	/* Length of realm name after the '@', including the NUL. */
+	upnamerealmsize = upnamesize - (p - upname + 1);
+
+	/* Replace domainname with realm name. */
+	if (upnamerealmsize > domainnamesize)
+	{
+		pfree(upname);
+		ereport(LOG,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_ROLE_SPECIFICATION),
+				 errmsg("realm name too long")));
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	/* Length is now safe. */
+	strcpy(domainname, p + 1);
+
+	/* Replace account name as well (in case UPN != SAM)? */
+	if (update_accountname)
+	{
+		if ((p - upname + 1) > accountnamesize)
+		{
+			pfree(upname);
+			ereport(LOG,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_ROLE_SPECIFICATION),
+					 errmsg("translated account name too long")));
+			return STATUS_ERROR;
+		}
+
+		*p = 0;
+		strcpy(accountname, upname);
+	}
+
+	pfree(upname);
+	return STATUS_OK;
+}
+#endif							/* ENABLE_SSPI */
+
+
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Ident authentication system
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+/*
+ *	Parse the string "*ident_response" as a response from a query to an Ident
+ *	server.  If it's a normal response indicating a user name, return true
+ *	and store the user name at *ident_user. If it's anything else,
+ *	return false.
+ */
+static bool
+interpret_ident_response(const char *ident_response,
+						 char *ident_user)
+{
+	const char *cursor = ident_response;	/* Cursor into *ident_response */
+
+	/*
+	 * Ident's response, in the telnet tradition, should end in crlf (\r\n).
+	 */
+	if (strlen(ident_response) < 2)
+		return false;
+	else if (ident_response[strlen(ident_response) - 2] != '\r')
+		return false;
+	else
+	{
+		while (*cursor != ':' && *cursor != '\r')
+			cursor++;			/* skip port field */
+
+		if (*cursor != ':')
+			return false;
+		else
+		{
+			/* We're positioned to colon before response type field */
+			char		response_type[80];
+			int			i;		/* Index into *response_type */
+
+			cursor++;			/* Go over colon */
+			while (pg_isblank(*cursor))
+				cursor++;		/* skip blanks */
+			i = 0;
+			while (*cursor != ':' && *cursor != '\r' && !pg_isblank(*cursor) &&
+				   i < (int) (sizeof(response_type) - 1))
+				response_type[i++] = *cursor++;
+			response_type[i] = '\0';
+			while (pg_isblank(*cursor))
+				cursor++;		/* skip blanks */
+			if (strcmp(response_type, "USERID") != 0)
+				return false;
+			else
+			{
+				/*
+				 * It's a USERID response.  Good.  "cursor" should be pointing
+				 * to the colon that precedes the operating system type.
+				 */
+				if (*cursor != ':')
+					return false;
+				else
+				{
+					cursor++;	/* Go over colon */
+					/* Skip over operating system field. */
+					while (*cursor != ':' && *cursor != '\r')
+						cursor++;
+					if (*cursor != ':')
+						return false;
+					else
+					{
+						int			i;	/* Index into *ident_user */
+
+						cursor++;	/* Go over colon */
+						while (pg_isblank(*cursor))
+							cursor++;	/* skip blanks */
+						/* Rest of line is user name.  Copy it over. */
+						i = 0;
+						while (*cursor != '\r' && i < IDENT_USERNAME_MAX)
+							ident_user[i++] = *cursor++;
+						ident_user[i] = '\0';
+						return true;
+					}
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+
+/*
+ *	Talk to the ident server on "remote_addr" and find out who
+ *	owns the tcp connection to "local_addr"
+ *	If the username is successfully retrieved, check the usermap.
+ *
+ *	XXX: Using WaitLatchOrSocket() and doing a CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS() if the
+ *	latch was set would improve the responsiveness to timeouts/cancellations.
+ */
+static int
+ident_inet(hbaPort *port)
+{
+	const SockAddr remote_addr = port->raddr;
+	const SockAddr local_addr = port->laddr;
+	char		ident_user[IDENT_USERNAME_MAX + 1];
+	pgsocket	sock_fd = PGINVALID_SOCKET; /* for talking to Ident server */
+	int			rc;				/* Return code from a locally called function */
+	bool		ident_return;
+	char		remote_addr_s[NI_MAXHOST];
+	char		remote_port[NI_MAXSERV];
+	char		local_addr_s[NI_MAXHOST];
+	char		local_port[NI_MAXSERV];
+	char		ident_port[NI_MAXSERV];
+	char		ident_query[80];
+	char		ident_response[80 + IDENT_USERNAME_MAX];
+	struct addrinfo *ident_serv = NULL,
+			   *la = NULL,
+				hints;
+
+	/*
+	 * Might look a little weird to first convert it to text and then back to
+	 * sockaddr, but it's protocol independent.
+	 */
+	pg_getnameinfo_all(&remote_addr.addr, remote_addr.salen,
+					   remote_addr_s, sizeof(remote_addr_s),
+					   remote_port, sizeof(remote_port),
+					   NI_NUMERICHOST | NI_NUMERICSERV);
+	pg_getnameinfo_all(&local_addr.addr, local_addr.salen,
+					   local_addr_s, sizeof(local_addr_s),
+					   local_port, sizeof(local_port),
+					   NI_NUMERICHOST | NI_NUMERICSERV);
+
+	snprintf(ident_port, sizeof(ident_port), "%d", IDENT_PORT);
+	hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
+	hints.ai_family = remote_addr.addr.ss_family;
+	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+	hints.ai_protocol = 0;
+	hints.ai_addrlen = 0;
+	hints.ai_canonname = NULL;
+	hints.ai_addr = NULL;
+	hints.ai_next = NULL;
+	rc = pg_getaddrinfo_all(remote_addr_s, ident_port, &hints, &ident_serv);
+	if (rc || !ident_serv)
+	{
+		/* we don't expect this to happen */
+		ident_return = false;
+		goto ident_inet_done;
+	}
+
+	hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
+	hints.ai_family = local_addr.addr.ss_family;
+	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+	hints.ai_protocol = 0;
+	hints.ai_addrlen = 0;
+	hints.ai_canonname = NULL;
+	hints.ai_addr = NULL;
+	hints.ai_next = NULL;
+	rc = pg_getaddrinfo_all(local_addr_s, NULL, &hints, &la);
+	if (rc || !la)
+	{
+		/* we don't expect this to happen */
+		ident_return = false;
+		goto ident_inet_done;
+	}
+
+	sock_fd = socket(ident_serv->ai_family, ident_serv->ai_socktype,
+					 ident_serv->ai_protocol);
+	if (sock_fd == PGINVALID_SOCKET)
+	{
+		ereport(LOG,
+				(errcode_for_socket_access(),
+				 errmsg("could not create socket for Ident connection: %m")));
+		ident_return = false;
+		goto ident_inet_done;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Bind to the address which the client originally contacted, otherwise
+	 * the ident server won't be able to match up the right connection. This
+	 * is necessary if the PostgreSQL server is running on an IP alias.
+	 */
+	rc = bind(sock_fd, la->ai_addr, la->ai_addrlen);
+	if (rc != 0)
+	{
+		ereport(LOG,
+				(errcode_for_socket_access(),
+				 errmsg("could not bind to local address \"%s\": %m",
+						local_addr_s)));
+		ident_return = false;
+		goto ident_inet_done;
+	}
+
+	rc = connect(sock_fd, ident_serv->ai_addr,
+				 ident_serv->ai_addrlen);
+	if (rc != 0)
+	{
+		ereport(LOG,
+				(errcode_for_socket_access(),
+				 errmsg("could not connect to Ident server at address \"%s\", port %s: %m",
+						remote_addr_s, ident_port)));
+		ident_return = false;
+		goto ident_inet_done;
+	}
+
+	/* The query we send to the Ident server */
+	snprintf(ident_query, sizeof(ident_query), "%s,%s\r\n",
+			 remote_port, local_port);
+
+	/* loop in case send is interrupted */
+	do
+	{
+		CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS();
+
+		rc = send(sock_fd, ident_query, strlen(ident_query), 0);
+	} while (rc < 0 && errno == EINTR);
+
+	if (rc < 0)
+	{
+		ereport(LOG,
+				(errcode_for_socket_access(),
+				 errmsg("could not send query to Ident server at address \"%s\", port %s: %m",
+						remote_addr_s, ident_port)));
+		ident_return = false;
+		goto ident_inet_done;
+	}
+
+	do
+	{
+		CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS();
+
+		rc = recv(sock_fd, ident_response, sizeof(ident_response) - 1, 0);
+	} while (rc < 0 && errno == EINTR);
+
+	if (rc < 0)
+	{
+		ereport(LOG,
+				(errcode_for_socket_access(),
+				 errmsg("could not receive response from Ident server at address \"%s\", port %s: %m",
+						remote_addr_s, ident_port)));
+		ident_return = false;
+		goto ident_inet_done;
+	}
+
+	ident_response[rc] = '\0';
+	ident_return = interpret_ident_response(ident_response, ident_user);
+	if (!ident_return)
+		ereport(LOG,
+				(errmsg("invalidly formatted response from Ident server: \"%s\"",
+						ident_response)));
+
+ident_inet_done:
+	if (sock_fd != PGINVALID_SOCKET)
+		closesocket(sock_fd);
+	if (ident_serv)
+		pg_freeaddrinfo_all(remote_addr.addr.ss_family, ident_serv);
+	if (la)
+		pg_freeaddrinfo_all(local_addr.addr.ss_family, la);
+
+	if (ident_return)
+		/* Success! Check the usermap */
+		return check_usermap(port->hba->usermap, port->user_name, ident_user, false);
+	return STATUS_ERROR;
+}
+
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Peer authentication system
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+/*
+ *	Ask kernel about the credentials of the connecting process,
+ *	determine the symbolic name of the corresponding user, and check
+ *	if valid per the usermap.
+ *
+ *	Iff authorized, return STATUS_OK, otherwise return STATUS_ERROR.
+ */
+static int
+auth_peer(hbaPort *port)
+{
+	uid_t		uid;
+	gid_t		gid;
+#ifndef WIN32
+	struct passwd *pw;
+	char	   *peer_user;
+	int			ret;
+#endif
+
+	if (getpeereid(port->sock, &uid, &gid) != 0)
+	{
+		/* Provide special error message if getpeereid is a stub */
+		if (errno == ENOSYS)
+			ereport(LOG,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
+					 errmsg("peer authentication is not supported on this platform")));
+		else
+			ereport(LOG,
+					(errcode_for_socket_access(),
+					 errmsg("could not get peer credentials: %m")));
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+
+#ifndef WIN32
+	errno = 0;					/* clear errno before call */
+	pw = getpwuid(uid);
+	if (!pw)
+	{
+		int			save_errno = errno;
+
+		ereport(LOG,
+				(errmsg("could not look up local user ID %ld: %s",
+						(long) uid,
+						save_errno ? strerror(save_errno) : _("user does not exist"))));
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	/* Make a copy of static getpw*() result area. */
+	peer_user = pstrdup(pw->pw_name);
+
+	ret = check_usermap(port->hba->usermap, port->user_name, peer_user, false);
+
+	pfree(peer_user);
+
+	return ret;
+#else
+	/* should have failed with ENOSYS above */
+	Assert(false);
+	return STATUS_ERROR;
+#endif
+}
+
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------
+ * PAM authentication system
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+
+/*
+ * PAM conversation function
+ */
+
+static int
+pam_passwd_conv_proc(int num_msg, const struct pam_message **msg,
+					 struct pam_response **resp, void *appdata_ptr)
+{
+	const char *passwd;
+	struct pam_response *reply;
+	int			i;
+
+	if (appdata_ptr)
+		passwd = (char *) appdata_ptr;
+	else
+	{
+		/*
+		 * Workaround for Solaris 2.6 where the PAM library is broken and does
+		 * not pass appdata_ptr to the conversation routine
+		 */
+		passwd = pam_passwd;
+	}
+
+	*resp = NULL;				/* in case of error exit */
+
+	if (num_msg <= 0 || num_msg > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
+		return PAM_CONV_ERR;
+
+	/*
+	 * Explicitly not using palloc here - PAM will free this memory in
+	 * pam_end()
+	 */
+	if ((reply = calloc(num_msg, sizeof(struct pam_response))) == NULL)
+	{
+		ereport(LOG,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
+				 errmsg("out of memory")));
+		return PAM_CONV_ERR;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < num_msg; i++)
+	{
+		switch (msg[i]->msg_style)
+		{
+			case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
+				if (strlen(passwd) == 0)
+				{
+					/*
+					 * Password wasn't passed to PAM the first time around -
+					 * let's go ask the client to send a password, which we
+					 * then stuff into PAM.
+					 */
+					sendAuthRequest(pam_port_cludge, AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD, NULL, 0);
+					passwd = recv_password_packet(pam_port_cludge);
+					if (passwd == NULL)
+					{
+						/*
+						 * Client didn't want to send password.  We
+						 * intentionally do not log anything about this,
+						 * either here or at higher levels.
+						 */
+						pam_no_password = true;
+						goto fail;
+					}
+				}
+				if ((reply[i].resp = strdup(passwd)) == NULL)
+					goto fail;
+				reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+				break;
+			case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
+				ereport(LOG,
+						(errmsg("error from underlying PAM layer: %s",
+								msg[i]->msg)));
+				/* FALL THROUGH */
+			case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
+				/* we don't bother to log TEXT_INFO messages */
+				if ((reply[i].resp = strdup("")) == NULL)
+					goto fail;
+				reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+				break;
+			default:
+				elog(LOG, "unsupported PAM conversation %d/\"%s\"",
+					 msg[i]->msg_style,
+					 msg[i]->msg ? msg[i]->msg : "(none)");
+				goto fail;
+		}
+	}
+
+	*resp = reply;
+	return PAM_SUCCESS;
+
+fail:
+	/* free up whatever we allocated */
+	for (i = 0; i < num_msg; i++)
+	{
+		if (reply[i].resp != NULL)
+			free(reply[i].resp);
+	}
+	free(reply);
+
+	return PAM_CONV_ERR;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Check authentication against PAM.
+ */
+static int
+CheckPAMAuth(Port *port, const char *user, const char *password)
+{
+	int			retval;
+	pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * We can't entirely rely on PAM to pass through appdata --- it appears
+	 * not to work on at least Solaris 2.6.  So use these ugly static
+	 * variables instead.
+	 */
+	pam_passwd = password;
+	pam_port_cludge = port;
+	pam_no_password = false;
+
+	/*
+	 * Set the application data portion of the conversation struct.  This is
+	 * later used inside the PAM conversation to pass the password to the
+	 * authentication module.
+	 */
+	pam_passw_conv.appdata_ptr = unconstify(char *, password);	/* from password above,
+																 * not allocated */
+
+	/* Optionally, one can set the service name in pg_hba.conf */
+	if (port->hba->pamservice && port->hba->pamservice[0] != '\0')
+		retval = pam_start(port->hba->pamservice, "pgsql@",
+						   &pam_passw_conv, &pamh);
+	else
+		retval = pam_start(PGSQL_PAM_SERVICE, "pgsql@",
+						   &pam_passw_conv, &pamh);
+
+	if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
+	{
+		ereport(LOG,
+				(errmsg("could not create PAM authenticator: %s",
+						pam_strerror(pamh, retval))));
+		pam_passwd = NULL;		/* Unset pam_passwd */
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	retval = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_USER, user);
+
+	if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
+	{
+		ereport(LOG,
+				(errmsg("pam_set_item(PAM_USER) failed: %s",
+						pam_strerror(pamh, retval))));
+		pam_passwd = NULL;		/* Unset pam_passwd */
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	if (port->hba->conntype != ctLocal)
+	{
+		char		hostinfo[NI_MAXHOST];
+		int			flags;
+
+		if (port->hba->pam_use_hostname)
+			flags = 0;
+		else
+			flags = NI_NUMERICHOST | NI_NUMERICSERV;
+
+		retval = pg_getnameinfo_all(&port->raddr.addr, port->raddr.salen,
+									hostinfo, sizeof(hostinfo), NULL, 0,
+									flags);
+		if (retval != 0)
+		{
+			ereport(WARNING,
+					(errmsg_internal("pg_getnameinfo_all() failed: %s",
+									 gai_strerror(retval))));
+			return STATUS_ERROR;
+		}
+
+		retval = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_RHOST, hostinfo);
+
+		if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
+		{
+			ereport(LOG,
+					(errmsg("pam_set_item(PAM_RHOST) failed: %s",
+							pam_strerror(pamh, retval))));
+			pam_passwd = NULL;
+			return STATUS_ERROR;
+		}
+	}
+
+	retval = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_CONV, &pam_passw_conv);
+
+	if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
+	{
+		ereport(LOG,
+				(errmsg("pam_set_item(PAM_CONV) failed: %s",
+						pam_strerror(pamh, retval))));
+		pam_passwd = NULL;		/* Unset pam_passwd */
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	retval = pam_authenticate(pamh, 0);
+
+	if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
+	{
+		/* If pam_passwd_conv_proc saw EOF, don't log anything */
+		if (!pam_no_password)
+			ereport(LOG,
+					(errmsg("pam_authenticate failed: %s",
+							pam_strerror(pamh, retval))));
+		pam_passwd = NULL;		/* Unset pam_passwd */
+		return pam_no_password ? STATUS_EOF : STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	retval = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, 0);
+
+	if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
+	{
+		/* If pam_passwd_conv_proc saw EOF, don't log anything */
+		if (!pam_no_password)
+			ereport(LOG,
+					(errmsg("pam_acct_mgmt failed: %s",
+							pam_strerror(pamh, retval))));
+		pam_passwd = NULL;		/* Unset pam_passwd */
+		return pam_no_password ? STATUS_EOF : STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	retval = pam_end(pamh, retval);
+
+	if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
+	{
+		ereport(LOG,
+				(errmsg("could not release PAM authenticator: %s",
+						pam_strerror(pamh, retval))));
+	}
+
+	pam_passwd = NULL;			/* Unset pam_passwd */
+
+	return (retval == PAM_SUCCESS ? STATUS_OK : STATUS_ERROR);
+}
+#endif							/* USE_PAM */
+
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------
+ * BSD authentication system
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifdef USE_BSD_AUTH
+static int
+CheckBSDAuth(Port *port, char *user)
+{
+	char	   *passwd;
+	int			retval;
+
+	/* Send regular password request to client, and get the response */
+	sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD, NULL, 0);
+
+	passwd = recv_password_packet(port);
+	if (passwd == NULL)
+		return STATUS_EOF;
+
+	/*
+	 * Ask the BSD auth system to verify password.  Note that auth_userokay
+	 * will overwrite the password string with zeroes, but it's just a
+	 * temporary string so we don't care.
+	 */
+	retval = auth_userokay(user, NULL, "auth-postgresql", passwd);
+
+	pfree(passwd);
+
+	if (!retval)
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+
+	return STATUS_OK;
+}
+#endif							/* USE_BSD_AUTH */
+
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------
+ * LDAP authentication system
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifdef USE_LDAP
+
+static int	errdetail_for_ldap(LDAP *ldap);
+
+/*
+ * Initialize a connection to the LDAP server, including setting up
+ * TLS if requested.
+ */
+static int
+InitializeLDAPConnection(Port *port, LDAP **ldap)
+{
+	const char *scheme;
+	int			ldapversion = LDAP_VERSION3;
+	int			r;
+
+	scheme = port->hba->ldapscheme;
+	if (scheme == NULL)
+		scheme = "ldap";
+#ifdef WIN32
+	if (strcmp(scheme, "ldaps") == 0)
+		*ldap = ldap_sslinit(port->hba->ldapserver, port->hba->ldapport, 1);
+	else
+		*ldap = ldap_init(port->hba->ldapserver, port->hba->ldapport);
+	if (!*ldap)
+	{
+		ereport(LOG,
+				(errmsg("could not initialize LDAP: error code %d",
+						(int) LdapGetLastError())));
+
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+#else
+#ifdef HAVE_LDAP_INITIALIZE
+
+	/*
+	 * OpenLDAP provides a non-standard extension ldap_initialize() that takes
+	 * a list of URIs, allowing us to request "ldaps" instead of "ldap".  It
+	 * also provides ldap_domain2hostlist() to find LDAP servers automatically
+	 * using DNS SRV.  They were introduced in the same version, so for now we
+	 * don't have an extra configure check for the latter.
+	 */
+	{
+		StringInfoData uris;
+		char	   *hostlist = NULL;
+		char	   *p;
+		bool		append_port;
+
+		/* We'll build a space-separated scheme://hostname:port list here */
+		initStringInfo(&uris);
+
+		/*
+		 * If pg_hba.conf provided no hostnames, we can ask OpenLDAP to try to
+		 * find some by extracting a domain name from the base DN and looking
+		 * up DSN SRV records for _ldap._tcp.<domain>.
+		 */
+		if (!port->hba->ldapserver || port->hba->ldapserver[0] == '\0')
+		{
+			char	   *domain;
+
+			/* ou=blah,dc=foo,dc=bar -> foo.bar */
+			if (ldap_dn2domain(port->hba->ldapbasedn, &domain))
+			{
+				ereport(LOG,
+						(errmsg("could not extract domain name from ldapbasedn")));
+				return STATUS_ERROR;
+			}
+
+			/* Look up a list of LDAP server hosts and port numbers */
+			if (ldap_domain2hostlist(domain, &hostlist))
+			{
+				ereport(LOG,
+						(errmsg("LDAP authentication could not find DNS SRV records for \"%s\"",
+								domain),
+						 (errhint("Set an LDAP server name explicitly."))));
+				ldap_memfree(domain);
+				return STATUS_ERROR;
+			}
+			ldap_memfree(domain);
+
+			/* We have a space-separated list of host:port entries */
+			p = hostlist;
+			append_port = false;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			/* We have a space-separated list of hosts from pg_hba.conf */
+			p = port->hba->ldapserver;
+			append_port = true;
+		}
+
+		/* Convert the list of host[:port] entries to full URIs */
+		do
+		{
+			size_t		size;
+
+			/* Find the span of the next entry */
+			size = strcspn(p, " ");
+
+			/* Append a space separator if this isn't the first URI */
+			if (uris.len > 0)
+				appendStringInfoChar(&uris, ' ');
+
+			/* Append scheme://host:port */
+			appendStringInfoString(&uris, scheme);
+			appendStringInfoString(&uris, "://");
+			appendBinaryStringInfo(&uris, p, size);
+			if (append_port)
+				appendStringInfo(&uris, ":%d", port->hba->ldapport);
+
+			/* Step over this entry and any number of trailing spaces */
+			p += size;
+			while (*p == ' ')
+				++p;
+		} while (*p);
+
+		/* Free memory from OpenLDAP if we looked up SRV records */
+		if (hostlist)
+			ldap_memfree(hostlist);
+
+		/* Finally, try to connect using the URI list */
+		r = ldap_initialize(ldap, uris.data);
+		pfree(uris.data);
+		if (r != LDAP_SUCCESS)
+		{
+			ereport(LOG,
+					(errmsg("could not initialize LDAP: %s",
+							ldap_err2string(r))));
+
+			return STATUS_ERROR;
+		}
+	}
+#else
+	if (strcmp(scheme, "ldaps") == 0)
+	{
+		ereport(LOG,
+				(errmsg("ldaps not supported with this LDAP library")));
+
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+	*ldap = ldap_init(port->hba->ldapserver, port->hba->ldapport);
+	if (!*ldap)
+	{
+		ereport(LOG,
+				(errmsg("could not initialize LDAP: %m")));
+
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+#endif
+#endif
+
+	if ((r = ldap_set_option(*ldap, LDAP_OPT_PROTOCOL_VERSION, &ldapversion)) != LDAP_SUCCESS)
+	{
+		ereport(LOG,
+				(errmsg("could not set LDAP protocol version: %s",
+						ldap_err2string(r)),
+				 errdetail_for_ldap(*ldap)));
+		ldap_unbind(*ldap);
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	if (port->hba->ldaptls)
+	{
+#ifndef WIN32
+		if ((r = ldap_start_tls_s(*ldap, NULL, NULL)) != LDAP_SUCCESS)
+#else
+		static __ldap_start_tls_sA _ldap_start_tls_sA = NULL;
+
+		if (_ldap_start_tls_sA == NULL)
+		{
+			/*
+			 * Need to load this function dynamically because it may not exist
+			 * on Windows, and causes a load error for the whole exe if
+			 * referenced.
+			 */
+			HANDLE		ldaphandle;
+
+			ldaphandle = LoadLibrary("WLDAP32.DLL");
+			if (ldaphandle == NULL)
+			{
+				/*
+				 * should never happen since we import other files from
+				 * wldap32, but check anyway
+				 */
+				ereport(LOG,
+						(errmsg("could not load library \"%s\": error code %lu",
+								"WLDAP32.DLL", GetLastError())));
+				ldap_unbind(*ldap);
+				return STATUS_ERROR;
+			}
+			_ldap_start_tls_sA = (__ldap_start_tls_sA) GetProcAddress(ldaphandle, "ldap_start_tls_sA");
+			if (_ldap_start_tls_sA == NULL)
+			{
+				ereport(LOG,
+						(errmsg("could not load function _ldap_start_tls_sA in wldap32.dll"),
+						 errdetail("LDAP over SSL is not supported on this platform.")));
+				ldap_unbind(*ldap);
+				FreeLibrary(ldaphandle);
+				return STATUS_ERROR;
+			}
+
+			/*
+			 * Leak LDAP handle on purpose, because we need the library to
+			 * stay open. This is ok because it will only ever be leaked once
+			 * per process and is automatically cleaned up on process exit.
+			 */
+		}
+		if ((r = _ldap_start_tls_sA(*ldap, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != LDAP_SUCCESS)
+#endif
+		{
+			ereport(LOG,
+					(errmsg("could not start LDAP TLS session: %s",
+							ldap_err2string(r)),
+					 errdetail_for_ldap(*ldap)));
+			ldap_unbind(*ldap);
+			return STATUS_ERROR;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+/* Placeholders recognized by FormatSearchFilter.  For now just one. */
+#define LPH_USERNAME "$username"
+#define LPH_USERNAME_LEN (sizeof(LPH_USERNAME) - 1)
+
+/* Not all LDAP implementations define this. */
+#ifndef LDAP_NO_ATTRS
+#define LDAP_NO_ATTRS "1.1"
+#endif
+
+/* Not all LDAP implementations define this. */
+#ifndef LDAPS_PORT
+#define LDAPS_PORT 636
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Return a newly allocated C string copied from "pattern" with all
+ * occurrences of the placeholder "$username" replaced with "user_name".
+ */
+static char *
+FormatSearchFilter(const char *pattern, const char *user_name)
+{
+	StringInfoData output;
+
+	initStringInfo(&output);
+	while (*pattern != '\0')
+	{
+		if (strncmp(pattern, LPH_USERNAME, LPH_USERNAME_LEN) == 0)
+		{
+			appendStringInfoString(&output, user_name);
+			pattern += LPH_USERNAME_LEN;
+		}
+		else
+			appendStringInfoChar(&output, *pattern++);
+	}
+
+	return output.data;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform LDAP authentication
+ */
+static int
+CheckLDAPAuth(Port *port)
+{
+	char	   *passwd;
+	LDAP	   *ldap;
+	int			r;
+	char	   *fulluser;
+	const char *server_name;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LDAP_INITIALIZE
+
+	/*
+	 * For OpenLDAP, allow empty hostname if we have a basedn.  We'll look for
+	 * servers with DNS SRV records via OpenLDAP library facilities.
+	 */
+	if ((!port->hba->ldapserver || port->hba->ldapserver[0] == '\0') &&
+		(!port->hba->ldapbasedn || port->hba->ldapbasedn[0] == '\0'))
+	{
+		ereport(LOG,
+				(errmsg("LDAP server not specified, and no ldapbasedn")));
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+#else
+	if (!port->hba->ldapserver || port->hba->ldapserver[0] == '\0')
+	{
+		ereport(LOG,
+				(errmsg("LDAP server not specified")));
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * If we're using SRV records, we don't have a server name so we'll just
+	 * show an empty string in error messages.
+	 */
+	server_name = port->hba->ldapserver ? port->hba->ldapserver : "";
+
+	if (port->hba->ldapport == 0)
+	{
+		if (port->hba->ldapscheme != NULL &&
+			strcmp(port->hba->ldapscheme, "ldaps") == 0)
+			port->hba->ldapport = LDAPS_PORT;
+		else
+			port->hba->ldapport = LDAP_PORT;
+	}
+
+	sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD, NULL, 0);
+
+	passwd = recv_password_packet(port);
+	if (passwd == NULL)
+		return STATUS_EOF;		/* client wouldn't send password */
+
+	if (InitializeLDAPConnection(port, &ldap) == STATUS_ERROR)
+	{
+		/* Error message already sent */
+		pfree(passwd);
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	if (port->hba->ldapbasedn)
+	{
+		/*
+		 * First perform an LDAP search to find the DN for the user we are
+		 * trying to log in as.
+		 */
+		char	   *filter;
+		LDAPMessage *search_message;
+		LDAPMessage *entry;
+		char	   *attributes[] = {LDAP_NO_ATTRS, NULL};
+		char	   *dn;
+		char	   *c;
+		int			count;
+
+		/*
+		 * Disallow any characters that we would otherwise need to escape,
+		 * since they aren't really reasonable in a username anyway. Allowing
+		 * them would make it possible to inject any kind of custom filters in
+		 * the LDAP filter.
+		 */
+		for (c = port->user_name; *c; c++)
+		{
+			if (*c == '*' ||
+				*c == '(' ||
+				*c == ')' ||
+				*c == '\\' ||
+				*c == '/')
+			{
+				ereport(LOG,
+						(errmsg("invalid character in user name for LDAP authentication")));
+				ldap_unbind(ldap);
+				pfree(passwd);
+				return STATUS_ERROR;
+			}
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Bind with a pre-defined username/password (if available) for
+		 * searching. If none is specified, this turns into an anonymous bind.
+		 */
+		r = ldap_simple_bind_s(ldap,
+							   port->hba->ldapbinddn ? port->hba->ldapbinddn : "",
+							   port->hba->ldapbindpasswd ? port->hba->ldapbindpasswd : "");
+		if (r != LDAP_SUCCESS)
+		{
+			ereport(LOG,
+					(errmsg("could not perform initial LDAP bind for ldapbinddn \"%s\" on server \"%s\": %s",
+							port->hba->ldapbinddn ? port->hba->ldapbinddn : "",
+							server_name,
+							ldap_err2string(r)),
+					 errdetail_for_ldap(ldap)));
+			ldap_unbind(ldap);
+			pfree(passwd);
+			return STATUS_ERROR;
+		}
+
+		/* Build a custom filter or a single attribute filter? */
+		if (port->hba->ldapsearchfilter)
+			filter = FormatSearchFilter(port->hba->ldapsearchfilter, port->user_name);
+		else if (port->hba->ldapsearchattribute)
+			filter = psprintf("(%s=%s)", port->hba->ldapsearchattribute, port->user_name);
+		else
+			filter = psprintf("(uid=%s)", port->user_name);
+
+		r = ldap_search_s(ldap,
+						  port->hba->ldapbasedn,
+						  port->hba->ldapscope,
+						  filter,
+						  attributes,
+						  0,
+						  &search_message);
+
+		if (r != LDAP_SUCCESS)
+		{
+			ereport(LOG,
+					(errmsg("could not search LDAP for filter \"%s\" on server \"%s\": %s",
+							filter, server_name, ldap_err2string(r)),
+					 errdetail_for_ldap(ldap)));
+			ldap_unbind(ldap);
+			pfree(passwd);
+			pfree(filter);
+			return STATUS_ERROR;
+		}
+
+		count = ldap_count_entries(ldap, search_message);
+		if (count != 1)
+		{
+			if (count == 0)
+				ereport(LOG,
+						(errmsg("LDAP user \"%s\" does not exist", port->user_name),
+						 errdetail("LDAP search for filter \"%s\" on server \"%s\" returned no entries.",
+								   filter, server_name)));
+			else
+				ereport(LOG,
+						(errmsg("LDAP user \"%s\" is not unique", port->user_name),
+						 errdetail_plural("LDAP search for filter \"%s\" on server \"%s\" returned %d entry.",
+										  "LDAP search for filter \"%s\" on server \"%s\" returned %d entries.",
+										  count,
+										  filter, server_name, count)));
+
+			ldap_unbind(ldap);
+			pfree(passwd);
+			pfree(filter);
+			ldap_msgfree(search_message);
+			return STATUS_ERROR;
+		}
+
+		entry = ldap_first_entry(ldap, search_message);
+		dn = ldap_get_dn(ldap, entry);
+		if (dn == NULL)
+		{
+			int			error;
+
+			(void) ldap_get_option(ldap, LDAP_OPT_ERROR_NUMBER, &error);
+			ereport(LOG,
+					(errmsg("could not get dn for the first entry matching \"%s\" on server \"%s\": %s",
+							filter, server_name,
+							ldap_err2string(error)),
+					 errdetail_for_ldap(ldap)));
+			ldap_unbind(ldap);
+			pfree(passwd);
+			pfree(filter);
+			ldap_msgfree(search_message);
+			return STATUS_ERROR;
+		}
+		fulluser = pstrdup(dn);
+
+		pfree(filter);
+		ldap_memfree(dn);
+		ldap_msgfree(search_message);
+
+		/* Unbind and disconnect from the LDAP server */
+		r = ldap_unbind_s(ldap);
+		if (r != LDAP_SUCCESS)
+		{
+			ereport(LOG,
+					(errmsg("could not unbind after searching for user \"%s\" on server \"%s\"",
+							fulluser, server_name)));
+			pfree(passwd);
+			pfree(fulluser);
+			return STATUS_ERROR;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Need to re-initialize the LDAP connection, so that we can bind to
+		 * it with a different username.
+		 */
+		if (InitializeLDAPConnection(port, &ldap) == STATUS_ERROR)
+		{
+			pfree(passwd);
+			pfree(fulluser);
+
+			/* Error message already sent */
+			return STATUS_ERROR;
+		}
+	}
+	else
+		fulluser = psprintf("%s%s%s",
+							port->hba->ldapprefix ? port->hba->ldapprefix : "",
+							port->user_name,
+							port->hba->ldapsuffix ? port->hba->ldapsuffix : "");
+
+	r = ldap_simple_bind_s(ldap, fulluser, passwd);
+
+	if (r != LDAP_SUCCESS)
+	{
+		ereport(LOG,
+				(errmsg("LDAP login failed for user \"%s\" on server \"%s\": %s",
+						fulluser, server_name, ldap_err2string(r)),
+				 errdetail_for_ldap(ldap)));
+		ldap_unbind(ldap);
+		pfree(passwd);
+		pfree(fulluser);
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	ldap_unbind(ldap);
+	pfree(passwd);
+	pfree(fulluser);
+
+	return STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add a detail error message text to the current error if one can be
+ * constructed from the LDAP 'diagnostic message'.
+ */
+static int
+errdetail_for_ldap(LDAP *ldap)
+{
+	char	   *message;
+	int			rc;
+
+	rc = ldap_get_option(ldap, LDAP_OPT_DIAGNOSTIC_MESSAGE, &message);
+	if (rc == LDAP_SUCCESS && message != NULL)
+	{
+		errdetail("LDAP diagnostics: %s", message);
+		ldap_memfree(message);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#endif							/* USE_LDAP */
+
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------
+ * SSL client certificate authentication
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifdef USE_SSL
+static int
+CheckCertAuth(Port *port)
+{
+	int			status_check_usermap = STATUS_ERROR;
+
+	Assert(port->ssl);
+
+	/* Make sure we have received a username in the certificate */
+	if (port->peer_cn == NULL ||
+		strlen(port->peer_cn) <= 0)
+	{
+		ereport(LOG,
+				(errmsg("certificate authentication failed for user \"%s\": client certificate contains no user name",
+						port->user_name)));
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	/* Just pass the certificate cn to the usermap check */
+	status_check_usermap = check_usermap(port->hba->usermap, port->user_name, port->peer_cn, false);
+	if (status_check_usermap != STATUS_OK)
+	{
+		/*
+		 * If clientcert=verify-full was specified and the authentication
+		 * method is other than uaCert, log the reason for rejecting the
+		 * authentication.
+		 */
+		if (port->hba->clientcert == clientCertFull && port->hba->auth_method != uaCert)
+		{
+			ereport(LOG,
+					(errmsg("certificate validation (clientcert=verify-full) failed for user \"%s\": CN mismatch",
+							port->user_name)));
+		}
+	}
+	return status_check_usermap;
+}
+#endif
+
+
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------
+ * RADIUS authentication
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+/*
+ * RADIUS authentication is described in RFC2865 (and several others).
+ */
+
+#define RADIUS_VECTOR_LENGTH 16
+#define RADIUS_HEADER_LENGTH 20
+#define RADIUS_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH 128
+
+/* Maximum size of a RADIUS packet we will create or accept */
+#define RADIUS_BUFFER_SIZE 1024
+
+typedef struct
+{
+	uint8		attribute;
+	uint8		length;
+	uint8		data[FLEXIBLE_ARRAY_MEMBER];
+} radius_attribute;
+
+typedef struct
+{
+	uint8		code;
+	uint8		id;
+	uint16		length;
+	uint8		vector[RADIUS_VECTOR_LENGTH];
+	/* this is a bit longer than strictly necessary: */
+	char		pad[RADIUS_BUFFER_SIZE - RADIUS_VECTOR_LENGTH];
+} radius_packet;
+
+/* RADIUS packet types */
+#define RADIUS_ACCESS_REQUEST	1
+#define RADIUS_ACCESS_ACCEPT	2
+#define RADIUS_ACCESS_REJECT	3
+
+/* RADIUS attributes */
+#define RADIUS_USER_NAME		1
+#define RADIUS_PASSWORD			2
+#define RADIUS_SERVICE_TYPE		6
+#define RADIUS_NAS_IDENTIFIER	32
+
+/* RADIUS service types */
+#define RADIUS_AUTHENTICATE_ONLY	8
+
+/* Seconds to wait - XXX: should be in a config variable! */
+#define RADIUS_TIMEOUT 3
+
+static void
+radius_add_attribute(radius_packet *packet, uint8 type, const unsigned char *data, int len)
+{
+	radius_attribute *attr;
+
+	if (packet->length + len > RADIUS_BUFFER_SIZE)
+	{
+		/*
+		 * With remotely realistic data, this can never happen. But catch it
+		 * just to make sure we don't overrun a buffer. We'll just skip adding
+		 * the broken attribute, which will in the end cause authentication to
+		 * fail.
+		 */
+		elog(WARNING,
+			 "adding attribute code %d with length %d to radius packet would create oversize packet, ignoring",
+			 type, len);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	attr = (radius_attribute *) ((unsigned char *) packet + packet->length);
+	attr->attribute = type;
+	attr->length = len + 2;		/* total size includes type and length */
+	memcpy(attr->data, data, len);
+	packet->length += attr->length;
+}
+
+static int
+CheckRADIUSAuth(Port *port)
+{
+	char	   *passwd;
+	ListCell   *server,
+			   *secrets,
+			   *radiusports,
+			   *identifiers;
+
+	/* Make sure struct alignment is correct */
+	Assert(offsetof(radius_packet, vector) == 4);
+
+	/* Verify parameters */
+	if (list_length(port->hba->radiusservers) < 1)
+	{
+		ereport(LOG,
+				(errmsg("RADIUS server not specified")));
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	if (list_length(port->hba->radiussecrets) < 1)
+	{
+		ereport(LOG,
+				(errmsg("RADIUS secret not specified")));
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	/* Send regular password request to client, and get the response */
+	sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD, NULL, 0);
+
+	passwd = recv_password_packet(port);
+	if (passwd == NULL)
+		return STATUS_EOF;		/* client wouldn't send password */
+
+	if (strlen(passwd) > RADIUS_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH)
+	{
+		ereport(LOG,
+				(errmsg("RADIUS authentication does not support passwords longer than %d characters", RADIUS_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH)));
+		pfree(passwd);
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Loop over and try each server in order.
+	 */
+	secrets = list_head(port->hba->radiussecrets);
+	radiusports = list_head(port->hba->radiusports);
+	identifiers = list_head(port->hba->radiusidentifiers);
+	foreach(server, port->hba->radiusservers)
+	{
+		int			ret = PerformRadiusTransaction(lfirst(server),
+												   lfirst(secrets),
+												   radiusports ? lfirst(radiusports) : NULL,
+												   identifiers ? lfirst(identifiers) : NULL,
+												   port->user_name,
+												   passwd);
+
+		/*------
+		 * STATUS_OK = Login OK
+		 * STATUS_ERROR = Login not OK, but try next server
+		 * STATUS_EOF = Login not OK, and don't try next server
+		 *------
+		 */
+		if (ret == STATUS_OK)
+		{
+			pfree(passwd);
+			return STATUS_OK;
+		}
+		else if (ret == STATUS_EOF)
+		{
+			pfree(passwd);
+			return STATUS_ERROR;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * secret, port and identifiers either have length 0 (use default),
+		 * length 1 (use the same everywhere) or the same length as servers.
+		 * So if the length is >1, we advance one step. In other cases, we
+		 * don't and will then reuse the correct value.
+		 */
+		if (list_length(port->hba->radiussecrets) > 1)
+			secrets = lnext(port->hba->radiussecrets, secrets);
+		if (list_length(port->hba->radiusports) > 1)
+			radiusports = lnext(port->hba->radiusports, radiusports);
+		if (list_length(port->hba->radiusidentifiers) > 1)
+			identifiers = lnext(port->hba->radiusidentifiers, identifiers);
+	}
+
+	/* No servers left to try, so give up */
+	pfree(passwd);
+	return STATUS_ERROR;
+}
+
+static int
+PerformRadiusTransaction(const char *server, const char *secret, const char *portstr, const char *identifier, const char *user_name, const char *passwd)
+{
+	radius_packet radius_send_pack;
+	radius_packet radius_recv_pack;
+	radius_packet *packet = &radius_send_pack;
+	radius_packet *receivepacket = &radius_recv_pack;
+	char	   *radius_buffer = (char *) &radius_send_pack;
+	char	   *receive_buffer = (char *) &radius_recv_pack;
+	int32		service = pg_hton32(RADIUS_AUTHENTICATE_ONLY);
+	uint8	   *cryptvector;
+	int			encryptedpasswordlen;
+	uint8		encryptedpassword[RADIUS_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH];
+	uint8	   *md5trailer;
+	int			packetlength;
+	pgsocket	sock;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_IPV6
+	struct sockaddr_in6 localaddr;
+	struct sockaddr_in6 remoteaddr;
+#else
+	struct sockaddr_in localaddr;
+	struct sockaddr_in remoteaddr;
+#endif
+	struct addrinfo hint;
+	struct addrinfo *serveraddrs;
+	int			port;
+	ACCEPT_TYPE_ARG3 addrsize;
+	fd_set		fdset;
+	struct timeval endtime;
+	int			i,
+				j,
+				r;
+
+	/* Assign default values */
+	if (portstr == NULL)
+		portstr = "1812";
+	if (identifier == NULL)
+		identifier = "postgresql";
+
+	MemSet(&hint, 0, sizeof(hint));
+	hint.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;
+	hint.ai_family = AF_UNSPEC;
+	port = atoi(portstr);
+
+	r = pg_getaddrinfo_all(server, portstr, &hint, &serveraddrs);
+	if (r || !serveraddrs)
+	{
+		ereport(LOG,
+				(errmsg("could not translate RADIUS server name \"%s\" to address: %s",
+						server, gai_strerror(r))));
+		if (serveraddrs)
+			pg_freeaddrinfo_all(hint.ai_family, serveraddrs);
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+	/* XXX: add support for multiple returned addresses? */
+
+	/* Construct RADIUS packet */
+	packet->code = RADIUS_ACCESS_REQUEST;
+	packet->length = RADIUS_HEADER_LENGTH;
+	if (!pg_strong_random(packet->vector, RADIUS_VECTOR_LENGTH))
+	{
+		ereport(LOG,
+				(errmsg("could not generate random encryption vector")));
+		pg_freeaddrinfo_all(hint.ai_family, serveraddrs);
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+	packet->id = packet->vector[0];
+	radius_add_attribute(packet, RADIUS_SERVICE_TYPE, (const unsigned char *) &service, sizeof(service));
+	radius_add_attribute(packet, RADIUS_USER_NAME, (const unsigned char *) user_name, strlen(user_name));
+	radius_add_attribute(packet, RADIUS_NAS_IDENTIFIER, (const unsigned char *) identifier, strlen(identifier));
+
+	/*
+	 * RADIUS password attributes are calculated as: e[0] = p[0] XOR
+	 * MD5(secret + Request Authenticator) for the first group of 16 octets,
+	 * and then: e[i] = p[i] XOR MD5(secret + e[i-1]) for the following ones
+	 * (if necessary)
+	 */
+	encryptedpasswordlen = ((strlen(passwd) + RADIUS_VECTOR_LENGTH - 1) / RADIUS_VECTOR_LENGTH) * RADIUS_VECTOR_LENGTH;
+	cryptvector = palloc(strlen(secret) + RADIUS_VECTOR_LENGTH);
+	memcpy(cryptvector, secret, strlen(secret));
+
+	/* for the first iteration, we use the Request Authenticator vector */
+	md5trailer = packet->vector;
+	for (i = 0; i < encryptedpasswordlen; i += RADIUS_VECTOR_LENGTH)
+	{
+		memcpy(cryptvector + strlen(secret), md5trailer, RADIUS_VECTOR_LENGTH);
+
+		/*
+		 * .. and for subsequent iterations the result of the previous XOR
+		 * (calculated below)
+		 */
+		md5trailer = encryptedpassword + i;
+
+		if (!pg_md5_binary(cryptvector, strlen(secret) + RADIUS_VECTOR_LENGTH, encryptedpassword + i))
+		{
+			ereport(LOG,
+					(errmsg("could not perform MD5 encryption of password")));
+			pfree(cryptvector);
+			pg_freeaddrinfo_all(hint.ai_family, serveraddrs);
+			return STATUS_ERROR;
+		}
+
+		for (j = i; j < i + RADIUS_VECTOR_LENGTH; j++)
+		{
+			if (j < strlen(passwd))
+				encryptedpassword[j] = passwd[j] ^ encryptedpassword[j];
+			else
+				encryptedpassword[j] = '\0' ^ encryptedpassword[j];
+		}
+	}
+	pfree(cryptvector);
+
+	radius_add_attribute(packet, RADIUS_PASSWORD, encryptedpassword, encryptedpasswordlen);
+
+	/* Length needs to be in network order on the wire */
+	packetlength = packet->length;
+	packet->length = pg_hton16(packet->length);
+
+	sock = socket(serveraddrs[0].ai_family, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
+	if (sock == PGINVALID_SOCKET)
+	{
+		ereport(LOG,
+				(errmsg("could not create RADIUS socket: %m")));
+		pg_freeaddrinfo_all(hint.ai_family, serveraddrs);
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	memset(&localaddr, 0, sizeof(localaddr));
+#ifdef HAVE_IPV6
+	localaddr.sin6_family = serveraddrs[0].ai_family;
+	localaddr.sin6_addr = in6addr_any;
+	if (localaddr.sin6_family == AF_INET6)
+		addrsize = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+	else
+		addrsize = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
+#else
+	localaddr.sin_family = serveraddrs[0].ai_family;
+	localaddr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
+	addrsize = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
+#endif
+
+	if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *) &localaddr, addrsize))
+	{
+		ereport(LOG,
+				(errmsg("could not bind local RADIUS socket: %m")));
+		closesocket(sock);
+		pg_freeaddrinfo_all(hint.ai_family, serveraddrs);
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	if (sendto(sock, radius_buffer, packetlength, 0,
+			   serveraddrs[0].ai_addr, serveraddrs[0].ai_addrlen) < 0)
+	{
+		ereport(LOG,
+				(errmsg("could not send RADIUS packet: %m")));
+		closesocket(sock);
+		pg_freeaddrinfo_all(hint.ai_family, serveraddrs);
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	/* Don't need the server address anymore */
+	pg_freeaddrinfo_all(hint.ai_family, serveraddrs);
+
+	/*
+	 * Figure out at what time we should time out. We can't just use a single
+	 * call to select() with a timeout, since somebody can be sending invalid
+	 * packets to our port thus causing us to retry in a loop and never time
+	 * out.
+	 *
+	 * XXX: Using WaitLatchOrSocket() and doing a CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS() if
+	 * the latch was set would improve the responsiveness to
+	 * timeouts/cancellations.
+	 */
+	gettimeofday(&endtime, NULL);
+	endtime.tv_sec += RADIUS_TIMEOUT;
+
+	while (true)
+	{
+		struct timeval timeout;
+		struct timeval now;
+		int64		timeoutval;
+
+		gettimeofday(&now, NULL);
+		timeoutval = (endtime.tv_sec * 1000000 + endtime.tv_usec) - (now.tv_sec * 1000000 + now.tv_usec);
+		if (timeoutval <= 0)
+		{
+			ereport(LOG,
+					(errmsg("timeout waiting for RADIUS response from %s",
+							server)));
+			closesocket(sock);
+			return STATUS_ERROR;
+		}
+		timeout.tv_sec = timeoutval / 1000000;
+		timeout.tv_usec = timeoutval % 1000000;
+
+		FD_ZERO(&fdset);
+		FD_SET(sock, &fdset);
+
+		r = select(sock + 1, &fdset, NULL, NULL, &timeout);
+		if (r < 0)
+		{
+			if (errno == EINTR)
+				continue;
+
+			/* Anything else is an actual error */
+			ereport(LOG,
+					(errmsg("could not check status on RADIUS socket: %m")));
+			closesocket(sock);
+			return STATUS_ERROR;
+		}
+		if (r == 0)
+		{
+			ereport(LOG,
+					(errmsg("timeout waiting for RADIUS response from %s",
+							server)));
+			closesocket(sock);
+			return STATUS_ERROR;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Attempt to read the response packet, and verify the contents.
+		 *
+		 * Any packet that's not actually a RADIUS packet, or otherwise does
+		 * not validate as an explicit reject, is just ignored and we retry
+		 * for another packet (until we reach the timeout). This is to avoid
+		 * the possibility to denial-of-service the login by flooding the
+		 * server with invalid packets on the port that we're expecting the
+		 * RADIUS response on.
+		 */
+
+		addrsize = sizeof(remoteaddr);
+		packetlength = recvfrom(sock, receive_buffer, RADIUS_BUFFER_SIZE, 0,
+								(struct sockaddr *) &remoteaddr, &addrsize);
+		if (packetlength < 0)
+		{
+			ereport(LOG,
+					(errmsg("could not read RADIUS response: %m")));
+			closesocket(sock);
+			return STATUS_ERROR;
+		}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_IPV6
+		if (remoteaddr.sin6_port != pg_hton16(port))
+#else
+		if (remoteaddr.sin_port != pg_hton16(port))
+#endif
+		{
+#ifdef HAVE_IPV6
+			ereport(LOG,
+					(errmsg("RADIUS response from %s was sent from incorrect port: %d",
+							server, pg_ntoh16(remoteaddr.sin6_port))));
+#else
+			ereport(LOG,
+					(errmsg("RADIUS response from %s was sent from incorrect port: %d",
+							server, pg_ntoh16(remoteaddr.sin_port))));
+#endif
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (packetlength < RADIUS_HEADER_LENGTH)
+		{
+			ereport(LOG,
+					(errmsg("RADIUS response from %s too short: %d", server, packetlength)));
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (packetlength != pg_ntoh16(receivepacket->length))
+		{
+			ereport(LOG,
+					(errmsg("RADIUS response from %s has corrupt length: %d (actual length %d)",
+							server, pg_ntoh16(receivepacket->length), packetlength)));
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (packet->id != receivepacket->id)
+		{
+			ereport(LOG,
+					(errmsg("RADIUS response from %s is to a different request: %d (should be %d)",
+							server, receivepacket->id, packet->id)));
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Verify the response authenticator, which is calculated as
+		 * MD5(Code+ID+Length+RequestAuthenticator+Attributes+Secret)
+		 */
+		cryptvector = palloc(packetlength + strlen(secret));
+
+		memcpy(cryptvector, receivepacket, 4);	/* code+id+length */
+		memcpy(cryptvector + 4, packet->vector, RADIUS_VECTOR_LENGTH);	/* request
+																		 * authenticator, from
+																		 * original packet */
+		if (packetlength > RADIUS_HEADER_LENGTH)	/* there may be no
+													 * attributes at all */
+			memcpy(cryptvector + RADIUS_HEADER_LENGTH, receive_buffer + RADIUS_HEADER_LENGTH, packetlength - RADIUS_HEADER_LENGTH);
+		memcpy(cryptvector + packetlength, secret, strlen(secret));
+
+		if (!pg_md5_binary(cryptvector,
+						   packetlength + strlen(secret),
+						   encryptedpassword))
+		{
+			ereport(LOG,
+					(errmsg("could not perform MD5 encryption of received packet")));
+			pfree(cryptvector);
+			continue;
+		}
+		pfree(cryptvector);
+
+		if (memcmp(receivepacket->vector, encryptedpassword, RADIUS_VECTOR_LENGTH) != 0)
+		{
+			ereport(LOG,
+					(errmsg("RADIUS response from %s has incorrect MD5 signature",
+							server)));
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (receivepacket->code == RADIUS_ACCESS_ACCEPT)
+		{
+			closesocket(sock);
+			return STATUS_OK;
+		}
+		else if (receivepacket->code == RADIUS_ACCESS_REJECT)
+		{
+			closesocket(sock);
+			return STATUS_EOF;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			ereport(LOG,
+					(errmsg("RADIUS response from %s has invalid code (%d) for user \"%s\"",
+							server, receivepacket->code, user_name)));
+			continue;
+		}
+	}							/* while (true) */
+}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-fsstubs.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-fsstubs.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6073540
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-fsstubs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,864 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * be-fsstubs.c
+ *	  Builtin functions for open/close/read/write operations on large objects
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ *	  src/backend/libpq/be-fsstubs.c
+ *
+ * NOTES
+ *	  This should be moved to a more appropriate place.  It is here
+ *	  for lack of a better place.
+ *
+ *	  These functions store LargeObjectDesc structs in a private MemoryContext,
+ *	  which means that large object descriptors hang around until we destroy
+ *	  the context at transaction end.  It'd be possible to prolong the lifetime
+ *	  of the context so that LO FDs are good across transactions (for example,
+ *	  we could release the context only if we see that no FDs remain open).
+ *	  But we'd need additional state in order to do the right thing at the
+ *	  end of an aborted transaction.  FDs opened during an aborted xact would
+ *	  still need to be closed, since they might not be pointing at valid
+ *	  relations at all.  Locking semantics are also an interesting problem
+ *	  if LOs stay open across transactions.  For now, we'll stick with the
+ *	  existing documented semantics of LO FDs: they're only good within a
+ *	  transaction.
+ *
+ *	  As of PostgreSQL 8.0, much of the angst expressed above is no longer
+ *	  relevant, and in fact it'd be pretty easy to allow LO FDs to stay
+ *	  open across transactions.  (Snapshot relevancy would still be an issue.)
+ *	  However backwards compatibility suggests that we should stick to the
+ *	  status quo.
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "libpq/be-fsstubs.h"
+#include "libpq/libpq-fs.h"
+#include "miscadmin.h"
+#include "storage/fd.h"
+#include "storage/large_object.h"
+#include "utils/acl.h"
+#include "utils/builtins.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+/* define this to enable debug logging */
+/* #define FSDB 1 */
+/* chunk size for lo_import/lo_export transfers */
+#define BUFSIZE			8192
+
+/*
+ * LO "FD"s are indexes into the cookies array.
+ *
+ * A non-null entry is a pointer to a LargeObjectDesc allocated in the
+ * LO private memory context "fscxt".  The cookies array itself is also
+ * dynamically allocated in that context.  Its current allocated size is
+ * cookies_size entries, of which any unused entries will be NULL.
+ */
+static LargeObjectDesc **cookies = NULL;
+static int	cookies_size = 0;
+
+static MemoryContext fscxt = NULL;
+
+#define CreateFSContext() \
+	do { \
+		if (fscxt == NULL) \
+			fscxt = AllocSetContextCreate(TopMemoryContext, \
+										  "Filesystem", \
+										  ALLOCSET_DEFAULT_SIZES); \
+	} while (0)
+
+
+static int	newLOfd(LargeObjectDesc *lobjCookie);
+static void deleteLOfd(int fd);
+static Oid	lo_import_internal(text *filename, Oid lobjOid);
+
+
+/*****************************************************************************
+ *	File Interfaces for Large Objects
+ *****************************************************************************/
+
+Datum
+be_lo_open(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+	Oid			lobjId = PG_GETARG_OID(0);
+	int32		mode = PG_GETARG_INT32(1);
+	LargeObjectDesc *lobjDesc;
+	int			fd;
+
+#ifdef FSDB
+	elog(DEBUG4, "lo_open(%u,%d)", lobjId, mode);
+#endif
+
+	CreateFSContext();
+
+	lobjDesc = inv_open(lobjId, mode, fscxt);
+
+	fd = newLOfd(lobjDesc);
+
+	PG_RETURN_INT32(fd);
+}
+
+Datum
+be_lo_close(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+	int32		fd = PG_GETARG_INT32(0);
+
+	if (fd < 0 || fd >= cookies_size || cookies[fd] == NULL)
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_UNDEFINED_OBJECT),
+				 errmsg("invalid large-object descriptor: %d", fd)));
+
+#ifdef FSDB
+	elog(DEBUG4, "lo_close(%d)", fd);
+#endif
+
+	inv_close(cookies[fd]);
+
+	deleteLOfd(fd);
+
+	PG_RETURN_INT32(0);
+}
+
+
+/*****************************************************************************
+ *	Bare Read/Write operations --- these are not fmgr-callable!
+ *
+ *	We assume the large object supports byte oriented reads and seeks so
+ *	that our work is easier.
+ *
+ *****************************************************************************/
+
+int
+lo_read(int fd, char *buf, int len)
+{
+	int			status;
+	LargeObjectDesc *lobj;
+
+	if (fd < 0 || fd >= cookies_size || cookies[fd] == NULL)
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_UNDEFINED_OBJECT),
+				 errmsg("invalid large-object descriptor: %d", fd)));
+	lobj = cookies[fd];
+
+	/*
+	 * Check state.  inv_read() would throw an error anyway, but we want the
+	 * error to be about the FD's state not the underlying privilege; it might
+	 * be that the privilege exists but user forgot to ask for read mode.
+	 */
+	if ((lobj->flags & IFS_RDLOCK) == 0)
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_OBJECT_NOT_IN_PREREQUISITE_STATE),
+				 errmsg("large object descriptor %d was not opened for reading",
+						fd)));
+
+	status = inv_read(lobj, buf, len);
+
+	return status;
+}
+
+int
+lo_write(int fd, const char *buf, int len)
+{
+	int			status;
+	LargeObjectDesc *lobj;
+
+	if (fd < 0 || fd >= cookies_size || cookies[fd] == NULL)
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_UNDEFINED_OBJECT),
+				 errmsg("invalid large-object descriptor: %d", fd)));
+	lobj = cookies[fd];
+
+	/* see comment in lo_read() */
+	if ((lobj->flags & IFS_WRLOCK) == 0)
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_OBJECT_NOT_IN_PREREQUISITE_STATE),
+				 errmsg("large object descriptor %d was not opened for writing",
+						fd)));
+
+	status = inv_write(lobj, buf, len);
+
+	return status;
+}
+
+Datum
+be_lo_lseek(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+	int32		fd = PG_GETARG_INT32(0);
+	int32		offset = PG_GETARG_INT32(1);
+	int32		whence = PG_GETARG_INT32(2);
+	int64		status;
+
+	if (fd < 0 || fd >= cookies_size || cookies[fd] == NULL)
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_UNDEFINED_OBJECT),
+				 errmsg("invalid large-object descriptor: %d", fd)));
+
+	status = inv_seek(cookies[fd], offset, whence);
+
+	/* guard against result overflow */
+	if (status != (int32) status)
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_NUMERIC_VALUE_OUT_OF_RANGE),
+				 errmsg("lo_lseek result out of range for large-object descriptor %d",
+						fd)));
+
+	PG_RETURN_INT32((int32) status);
+}
+
+Datum
+be_lo_lseek64(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+	int32		fd = PG_GETARG_INT32(0);
+	int64		offset = PG_GETARG_INT64(1);
+	int32		whence = PG_GETARG_INT32(2);
+	int64		status;
+
+	if (fd < 0 || fd >= cookies_size || cookies[fd] == NULL)
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_UNDEFINED_OBJECT),
+				 errmsg("invalid large-object descriptor: %d", fd)));
+
+	status = inv_seek(cookies[fd], offset, whence);
+
+	PG_RETURN_INT64(status);
+}
+
+Datum
+be_lo_creat(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+	Oid			lobjId;
+
+	/*
+	 * We don't actually need to store into fscxt, but create it anyway to
+	 * ensure that AtEOXact_LargeObject knows there is state to clean up
+	 */
+	CreateFSContext();
+
+	lobjId = inv_create(InvalidOid);
+
+	PG_RETURN_OID(lobjId);
+}
+
+Datum
+be_lo_create(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+	Oid			lobjId = PG_GETARG_OID(0);
+
+	/*
+	 * We don't actually need to store into fscxt, but create it anyway to
+	 * ensure that AtEOXact_LargeObject knows there is state to clean up
+	 */
+	CreateFSContext();
+
+	lobjId = inv_create(lobjId);
+
+	PG_RETURN_OID(lobjId);
+}
+
+Datum
+be_lo_tell(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+	int32		fd = PG_GETARG_INT32(0);
+	int64		offset;
+
+	if (fd < 0 || fd >= cookies_size || cookies[fd] == NULL)
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_UNDEFINED_OBJECT),
+				 errmsg("invalid large-object descriptor: %d", fd)));
+
+	offset = inv_tell(cookies[fd]);
+
+	/* guard against result overflow */
+	if (offset != (int32) offset)
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_NUMERIC_VALUE_OUT_OF_RANGE),
+				 errmsg("lo_tell result out of range for large-object descriptor %d",
+						fd)));
+
+	PG_RETURN_INT32((int32) offset);
+}
+
+Datum
+be_lo_tell64(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+	int32		fd = PG_GETARG_INT32(0);
+	int64		offset;
+
+	if (fd < 0 || fd >= cookies_size || cookies[fd] == NULL)
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_UNDEFINED_OBJECT),
+				 errmsg("invalid large-object descriptor: %d", fd)));
+
+	offset = inv_tell(cookies[fd]);
+
+	PG_RETURN_INT64(offset);
+}
+
+Datum
+be_lo_unlink(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+	Oid			lobjId = PG_GETARG_OID(0);
+
+	/*
+	 * Must be owner of the large object.  It would be cleaner to check this
+	 * in inv_drop(), but we want to throw the error before not after closing
+	 * relevant FDs.
+	 */
+	if (!lo_compat_privileges &&
+		!pg_largeobject_ownercheck(lobjId, GetUserId()))
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
+				 errmsg("must be owner of large object %u", lobjId)));
+
+	/*
+	 * If there are any open LO FDs referencing that ID, close 'em.
+	 */
+	if (fscxt != NULL)
+	{
+		int			i;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < cookies_size; i++)
+		{
+			if (cookies[i] != NULL && cookies[i]->id == lobjId)
+			{
+				inv_close(cookies[i]);
+				deleteLOfd(i);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * inv_drop does not create a need for end-of-transaction cleanup and
+	 * hence we don't need to have created fscxt.
+	 */
+	PG_RETURN_INT32(inv_drop(lobjId));
+}
+
+/*****************************************************************************
+ *	Read/Write using bytea
+ *****************************************************************************/
+
+Datum
+be_loread(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+	int32		fd = PG_GETARG_INT32(0);
+	int32		len = PG_GETARG_INT32(1);
+	bytea	   *retval;
+	int			totalread;
+
+	if (len < 0)
+		len = 0;
+
+	retval = (bytea *) palloc(VARHDRSZ + len);
+	totalread = lo_read(fd, VARDATA(retval), len);
+	SET_VARSIZE(retval, totalread + VARHDRSZ);
+
+	PG_RETURN_BYTEA_P(retval);
+}
+
+Datum
+be_lowrite(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+	int32		fd = PG_GETARG_INT32(0);
+	bytea	   *wbuf = PG_GETARG_BYTEA_PP(1);
+	int			bytestowrite;
+	int			totalwritten;
+
+	bytestowrite = VARSIZE_ANY_EXHDR(wbuf);
+	totalwritten = lo_write(fd, VARDATA_ANY(wbuf), bytestowrite);
+	PG_RETURN_INT32(totalwritten);
+}
+
+/*****************************************************************************
+ *	 Import/Export of Large Object
+ *****************************************************************************/
+
+/*
+ * lo_import -
+ *	  imports a file as an (inversion) large object.
+ */
+Datum
+be_lo_import(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+	text	   *filename = PG_GETARG_TEXT_PP(0);
+
+	PG_RETURN_OID(lo_import_internal(filename, InvalidOid));
+}
+
+/*
+ * lo_import_with_oid -
+ *	  imports a file as an (inversion) large object specifying oid.
+ */
+Datum
+be_lo_import_with_oid(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+	text	   *filename = PG_GETARG_TEXT_PP(0);
+	Oid			oid = PG_GETARG_OID(1);
+
+	PG_RETURN_OID(lo_import_internal(filename, oid));
+}
+
+static Oid
+lo_import_internal(text *filename, Oid lobjOid)
+{
+	int			fd;
+	int			nbytes,
+				tmp PG_USED_FOR_ASSERTS_ONLY;
+	char		buf[BUFSIZE];
+	char		fnamebuf[MAXPGPATH];
+	LargeObjectDesc *lobj;
+	Oid			oid;
+
+	CreateFSContext();
+
+	/*
+	 * open the file to be read in
+	 */
+	text_to_cstring_buffer(filename, fnamebuf, sizeof(fnamebuf));
+	fd = OpenTransientFile(fnamebuf, O_RDONLY | PG_BINARY);
+	if (fd < 0)
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode_for_file_access(),
+				 errmsg("could not open server file \"%s\": %m",
+						fnamebuf)));
+
+	/*
+	 * create an inversion object
+	 */
+	oid = inv_create(lobjOid);
+
+	/*
+	 * read in from the filesystem and write to the inversion object
+	 */
+	lobj = inv_open(oid, INV_WRITE, fscxt);
+
+	while ((nbytes = read(fd, buf, BUFSIZE)) > 0)
+	{
+		tmp = inv_write(lobj, buf, nbytes);
+		Assert(tmp == nbytes);
+	}
+
+	if (nbytes < 0)
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode_for_file_access(),
+				 errmsg("could not read server file \"%s\": %m",
+						fnamebuf)));
+
+	inv_close(lobj);
+
+	if (CloseTransientFile(fd) != 0)
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode_for_file_access(),
+				 errmsg("could not close file \"%s\": %m",
+						fnamebuf)));
+
+	return oid;
+}
+
+/*
+ * lo_export -
+ *	  exports an (inversion) large object.
+ */
+Datum
+be_lo_export(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+	Oid			lobjId = PG_GETARG_OID(0);
+	text	   *filename = PG_GETARG_TEXT_PP(1);
+	int			fd;
+	int			nbytes,
+				tmp;
+	char		buf[BUFSIZE];
+	char		fnamebuf[MAXPGPATH];
+	LargeObjectDesc *lobj;
+	mode_t		oumask;
+
+	CreateFSContext();
+
+	/*
+	 * open the inversion object (no need to test for failure)
+	 */
+	lobj = inv_open(lobjId, INV_READ, fscxt);
+
+	/*
+	 * open the file to be written to
+	 *
+	 * Note: we reduce backend's normal 077 umask to the slightly friendlier
+	 * 022. This code used to drop it all the way to 0, but creating
+	 * world-writable export files doesn't seem wise.
+	 */
+	text_to_cstring_buffer(filename, fnamebuf, sizeof(fnamebuf));
+	oumask = umask(S_IWGRP | S_IWOTH);
+	PG_TRY();
+	{
+		fd = OpenTransientFilePerm(fnamebuf, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC | PG_BINARY,
+								   S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IROTH);
+	}
+	PG_FINALLY();
+	{
+		umask(oumask);
+	}
+	PG_END_TRY();
+	if (fd < 0)
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode_for_file_access(),
+				 errmsg("could not create server file \"%s\": %m",
+						fnamebuf)));
+
+	/*
+	 * read in from the inversion file and write to the filesystem
+	 */
+	while ((nbytes = inv_read(lobj, buf, BUFSIZE)) > 0)
+	{
+		tmp = write(fd, buf, nbytes);
+		if (tmp != nbytes)
+			ereport(ERROR,
+					(errcode_for_file_access(),
+					 errmsg("could not write server file \"%s\": %m",
+							fnamebuf)));
+	}
+
+	if (CloseTransientFile(fd) != 0)
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode_for_file_access(),
+				 errmsg("could not close file \"%s\": %m",
+						fnamebuf)));
+
+	inv_close(lobj);
+
+	PG_RETURN_INT32(1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * lo_truncate -
+ *	  truncate a large object to a specified length
+ */
+static void
+lo_truncate_internal(int32 fd, int64 len)
+{
+	LargeObjectDesc *lobj;
+
+	if (fd < 0 || fd >= cookies_size || cookies[fd] == NULL)
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_UNDEFINED_OBJECT),
+				 errmsg("invalid large-object descriptor: %d", fd)));
+	lobj = cookies[fd];
+
+	/* see comment in lo_read() */
+	if ((lobj->flags & IFS_WRLOCK) == 0)
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_OBJECT_NOT_IN_PREREQUISITE_STATE),
+				 errmsg("large object descriptor %d was not opened for writing",
+						fd)));
+
+	inv_truncate(lobj, len);
+}
+
+Datum
+be_lo_truncate(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+	int32		fd = PG_GETARG_INT32(0);
+	int32		len = PG_GETARG_INT32(1);
+
+	lo_truncate_internal(fd, len);
+	PG_RETURN_INT32(0);
+}
+
+Datum
+be_lo_truncate64(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+	int32		fd = PG_GETARG_INT32(0);
+	int64		len = PG_GETARG_INT64(1);
+
+	lo_truncate_internal(fd, len);
+	PG_RETURN_INT32(0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * AtEOXact_LargeObject -
+ *		 prepares large objects for transaction commit
+ */
+void
+AtEOXact_LargeObject(bool isCommit)
+{
+	int			i;
+
+	if (fscxt == NULL)
+		return;					/* no LO operations in this xact */
+
+	/*
+	 * Close LO fds and clear cookies array so that LO fds are no longer good.
+	 * On abort we skip the close step.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < cookies_size; i++)
+	{
+		if (cookies[i] != NULL)
+		{
+			if (isCommit)
+				inv_close(cookies[i]);
+			deleteLOfd(i);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Needn't actually pfree since we're about to zap context */
+	cookies = NULL;
+	cookies_size = 0;
+
+	/* Release the LO memory context to prevent permanent memory leaks. */
+	MemoryContextDelete(fscxt);
+	fscxt = NULL;
+
+	/* Give inv_api.c a chance to clean up, too */
+	close_lo_relation(isCommit);
+}
+
+/*
+ * AtEOSubXact_LargeObject
+ *		Take care of large objects at subtransaction commit/abort
+ *
+ * Reassign LOs created/opened during a committing subtransaction
+ * to the parent subtransaction.  On abort, just close them.
+ */
+void
+AtEOSubXact_LargeObject(bool isCommit, SubTransactionId mySubid,
+						SubTransactionId parentSubid)
+{
+	int			i;
+
+	if (fscxt == NULL)			/* no LO operations in this xact */
+		return;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < cookies_size; i++)
+	{
+		LargeObjectDesc *lo = cookies[i];
+
+		if (lo != NULL && lo->subid == mySubid)
+		{
+			if (isCommit)
+				lo->subid = parentSubid;
+			else
+			{
+				/*
+				 * Make sure we do not call inv_close twice if it errors out
+				 * for some reason.  Better a leak than a crash.
+				 */
+				deleteLOfd(i);
+				inv_close(lo);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+/*****************************************************************************
+ *	Support routines for this file
+ *****************************************************************************/
+
+static int
+newLOfd(LargeObjectDesc *lobjCookie)
+{
+	int			i,
+				newsize;
+
+	/* Try to find a free slot */
+	for (i = 0; i < cookies_size; i++)
+	{
+		if (cookies[i] == NULL)
+		{
+			cookies[i] = lobjCookie;
+			return i;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* No free slot, so make the array bigger */
+	if (cookies_size <= 0)
+	{
+		/* First time through, arbitrarily make 64-element array */
+		i = 0;
+		newsize = 64;
+		cookies = (LargeObjectDesc **)
+			MemoryContextAllocZero(fscxt, newsize * sizeof(LargeObjectDesc *));
+		cookies_size = newsize;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		/* Double size of array */
+		i = cookies_size;
+		newsize = cookies_size * 2;
+		cookies = (LargeObjectDesc **)
+			repalloc(cookies, newsize * sizeof(LargeObjectDesc *));
+		MemSet(cookies + cookies_size, 0,
+			   (newsize - cookies_size) * sizeof(LargeObjectDesc *));
+		cookies_size = newsize;
+	}
+
+	Assert(cookies[i] == NULL);
+	cookies[i] = lobjCookie;
+	return i;
+}
+
+static void
+deleteLOfd(int fd)
+{
+	cookies[fd] = NULL;
+}
+
+/*****************************************************************************
+ *	Wrappers oriented toward SQL callers
+ *****************************************************************************/
+
+/*
+ * Read [offset, offset+nbytes) within LO; when nbytes is -1, read to end.
+ */
+static bytea *
+lo_get_fragment_internal(Oid loOid, int64 offset, int32 nbytes)
+{
+	LargeObjectDesc *loDesc;
+	int64		loSize;
+	int64		result_length;
+	int			total_read PG_USED_FOR_ASSERTS_ONLY;
+	bytea	   *result = NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * We don't actually need to store into fscxt, but create it anyway to
+	 * ensure that AtEOXact_LargeObject knows there is state to clean up
+	 */
+	CreateFSContext();
+
+	loDesc = inv_open(loOid, INV_READ, fscxt);
+
+	/*
+	 * Compute number of bytes we'll actually read, accommodating nbytes == -1
+	 * and reads beyond the end of the LO.
+	 */
+	loSize = inv_seek(loDesc, 0, SEEK_END);
+	if (loSize > offset)
+	{
+		if (nbytes >= 0 && nbytes <= loSize - offset)
+			result_length = nbytes; /* request is wholly inside LO */
+		else
+			result_length = loSize - offset;	/* adjust to end of LO */
+	}
+	else
+		result_length = 0;		/* request is wholly outside LO */
+
+	/*
+	 * A result_length calculated from loSize may not fit in a size_t.  Check
+	 * that the size will satisfy this and subsequently-enforced size limits.
+	 */
+	if (result_length > MaxAllocSize - VARHDRSZ)
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_PROGRAM_LIMIT_EXCEEDED),
+				 errmsg("large object read request is too large")));
+
+	result = (bytea *) palloc(VARHDRSZ + result_length);
+
+	inv_seek(loDesc, offset, SEEK_SET);
+	total_read = inv_read(loDesc, VARDATA(result), result_length);
+	Assert(total_read == result_length);
+	SET_VARSIZE(result, result_length + VARHDRSZ);
+
+	inv_close(loDesc);
+
+	return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read entire LO
+ */
+Datum
+be_lo_get(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+	Oid			loOid = PG_GETARG_OID(0);
+	bytea	   *result;
+
+	result = lo_get_fragment_internal(loOid, 0, -1);
+
+	PG_RETURN_BYTEA_P(result);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read range within LO
+ */
+Datum
+be_lo_get_fragment(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+	Oid			loOid = PG_GETARG_OID(0);
+	int64		offset = PG_GETARG_INT64(1);
+	int32		nbytes = PG_GETARG_INT32(2);
+	bytea	   *result;
+
+	if (nbytes < 0)
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
+				 errmsg("requested length cannot be negative")));
+
+	result = lo_get_fragment_internal(loOid, offset, nbytes);
+
+	PG_RETURN_BYTEA_P(result);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create LO with initial contents given by a bytea argument
+ */
+Datum
+be_lo_from_bytea(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+	Oid			loOid = PG_GETARG_OID(0);
+	bytea	   *str = PG_GETARG_BYTEA_PP(1);
+	LargeObjectDesc *loDesc;
+	int			written PG_USED_FOR_ASSERTS_ONLY;
+
+	CreateFSContext();
+
+	loOid = inv_create(loOid);
+	loDesc = inv_open(loOid, INV_WRITE, fscxt);
+	written = inv_write(loDesc, VARDATA_ANY(str), VARSIZE_ANY_EXHDR(str));
+	Assert(written == VARSIZE_ANY_EXHDR(str));
+	inv_close(loDesc);
+
+	PG_RETURN_OID(loOid);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Update range within LO
+ */
+Datum
+be_lo_put(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+	Oid			loOid = PG_GETARG_OID(0);
+	int64		offset = PG_GETARG_INT64(1);
+	bytea	   *str = PG_GETARG_BYTEA_PP(2);
+	LargeObjectDesc *loDesc;
+	int			written PG_USED_FOR_ASSERTS_ONLY;
+
+	CreateFSContext();
+
+	loDesc = inv_open(loOid, INV_WRITE, fscxt);
+
+	/* Permission check */
+	if (!lo_compat_privileges &&
+		pg_largeobject_aclcheck_snapshot(loDesc->id,
+										 GetUserId(),
+										 ACL_UPDATE,
+										 loDesc->snapshot) != ACLCHECK_OK)
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
+				 errmsg("permission denied for large object %u",
+						loDesc->id)));
+
+	inv_seek(loDesc, offset, SEEK_SET);
+	written = inv_write(loDesc, VARDATA_ANY(str), VARSIZE_ANY_EXHDR(str));
+	Assert(written == VARSIZE_ANY_EXHDR(str));
+	inv_close(loDesc);
+
+	PG_RETURN_VOID();
+}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-gssapi-common.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-gssapi-common.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3e2531c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-gssapi-common.c
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * be-gssapi-common.c
+ *     Common code for GSSAPI authentication and encryption
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ *       src/backend/libpq/be-gssapi-common.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include "libpq/be-gssapi-common.h"
+
+/*
+ * Fetch all errors of a specific type and append to "s" (buffer of size len).
+ * If we obtain more than one string, separate them with spaces.
+ * Call once for GSS_CODE and once for MECH_CODE.
+ */
+static void
+pg_GSS_error_int(char *s, size_t len, OM_uint32 stat, int type)
+{
+	gss_buffer_desc gmsg;
+	size_t		i = 0;
+	OM_uint32	lmin_s,
+				msg_ctx = 0;
+
+	do
+	{
+		if (gss_display_status(&lmin_s, stat, type, GSS_C_NO_OID,
+							   &msg_ctx, &gmsg) != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+			break;
+		if (i > 0)
+		{
+			if (i < len)
+				s[i] = ' ';
+			i++;
+		}
+		if (i < len)
+			memcpy(s + i, gmsg.value, Min(len - i, gmsg.length));
+		i += gmsg.length;
+		gss_release_buffer(&lmin_s, &gmsg);
+	}
+	while (msg_ctx);
+
+	/* add nul termination */
+	if (i < len)
+		s[i] = '\0';
+	else
+	{
+		elog(COMMERROR, "incomplete GSS error report");
+		s[len - 1] = '\0';
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Report the GSSAPI error described by maj_stat/min_stat.
+ *
+ * errmsg should be an already-translated primary error message.
+ * The GSSAPI info is appended as errdetail.
+ *
+ * The error is always reported with elevel COMMERROR; we daren't try to
+ * send it to the client, as that'd likely lead to infinite recursion
+ * when elog.c tries to write to the client.
+ *
+ * To avoid memory allocation, total error size is capped (at 128 bytes for
+ * each of major and minor).  No known mechanisms will produce error messages
+ * beyond this cap.
+ */
+void
+pg_GSS_error(const char *errmsg,
+			 OM_uint32 maj_stat, OM_uint32 min_stat)
+{
+	char		msg_major[128],
+				msg_minor[128];
+
+	/* Fetch major status message */
+	pg_GSS_error_int(msg_major, sizeof(msg_major), maj_stat, GSS_C_GSS_CODE);
+
+	/* Fetch mechanism minor status message */
+	pg_GSS_error_int(msg_minor, sizeof(msg_minor), min_stat, GSS_C_MECH_CODE);
+
+	/*
+	 * errmsg_internal, since translation of the first part must be done
+	 * before calling this function anyway.
+	 */
+	ereport(COMMERROR,
+			(errmsg_internal("%s", errmsg),
+			 errdetail_internal("%s: %s", msg_major, msg_minor)));
+}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-common.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-common.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..94cdf4c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-common.c
@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * be-secure-common.c
+ *
+ * common implementation-independent SSL support code
+ *
+ * While be-secure.c contains the interfaces that the rest of the
+ * communications code calls, this file contains support routines that are
+ * used by the library-specific implementations such as be-secure-openssl.c.
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ *	  src/backend/libpq/be-secure-common.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "common/string.h"
+#include "libpq/libpq.h"
+#include "storage/fd.h"
+
+/*
+ * Run ssl_passphrase_command
+ *
+ * prompt will be substituted for %p.  is_server_start determines the loglevel
+ * of error messages.
+ *
+ * The result will be put in buffer buf, which is of size size.  The return
+ * value is the length of the actual result.
+ */
+int
+run_ssl_passphrase_command(const char *prompt, bool is_server_start, char *buf, int size)
+{
+	int			loglevel = is_server_start ? ERROR : LOG;
+	StringInfoData command;
+	char	   *p;
+	FILE	   *fh;
+	int			pclose_rc;
+	size_t		len = 0;
+
+	Assert(prompt);
+	Assert(size > 0);
+	buf[0] = '\0';
+
+	initStringInfo(&command);
+
+	for (p = ssl_passphrase_command; *p; p++)
+	{
+		if (p[0] == '%')
+		{
+			switch (p[1])
+			{
+				case 'p':
+					appendStringInfoString(&command, prompt);
+					p++;
+					break;
+				case '%':
+					appendStringInfoChar(&command, '%');
+					p++;
+					break;
+				default:
+					appendStringInfoChar(&command, p[0]);
+			}
+		}
+		else
+			appendStringInfoChar(&command, p[0]);
+	}
+
+	fh = OpenPipeStream(command.data, "r");
+	if (fh == NULL)
+	{
+		ereport(loglevel,
+				(errcode_for_file_access(),
+				 errmsg("could not execute command \"%s\": %m",
+						command.data)));
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	if (!fgets(buf, size, fh))
+	{
+		if (ferror(fh))
+		{
+			explicit_bzero(buf, size);
+			ereport(loglevel,
+					(errcode_for_file_access(),
+					 errmsg("could not read from command \"%s\": %m",
+							command.data)));
+			goto error;
+		}
+	}
+
+	pclose_rc = ClosePipeStream(fh);
+	if (pclose_rc == -1)
+	{
+		explicit_bzero(buf, size);
+		ereport(loglevel,
+				(errcode_for_file_access(),
+				 errmsg("could not close pipe to external command: %m")));
+		goto error;
+	}
+	else if (pclose_rc != 0)
+	{
+		explicit_bzero(buf, size);
+		ereport(loglevel,
+				(errcode_for_file_access(),
+				 errmsg("command \"%s\" failed",
+						command.data),
+				 errdetail_internal("%s", wait_result_to_str(pclose_rc))));
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	/* strip trailing newline and carriage return */
+	len = pg_strip_crlf(buf);
+
+error:
+	pfree(command.data);
+	return len;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Check permissions for SSL key files.
+ */
+bool
+check_ssl_key_file_permissions(const char *ssl_key_file, bool isServerStart)
+{
+	int			loglevel = isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG;
+	struct stat buf;
+
+	if (stat(ssl_key_file, &buf) != 0)
+	{
+		ereport(loglevel,
+				(errcode_for_file_access(),
+				 errmsg("could not access private key file \"%s\": %m",
+						ssl_key_file)));
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	if (!S_ISREG(buf.st_mode))
+	{
+		ereport(loglevel,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+				 errmsg("private key file \"%s\" is not a regular file",
+						ssl_key_file)));
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Refuse to load key files owned by users other than us or root.
+	 *
+	 * XXX surely we can check this on Windows somehow, too.
+	 */
+#if !defined(WIN32) && !defined(__CYGWIN__)
+	if (buf.st_uid != geteuid() && buf.st_uid != 0)
+	{
+		ereport(loglevel,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+				 errmsg("private key file \"%s\" must be owned by the database user or root",
+						ssl_key_file)));
+		return false;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * Require no public access to key file. If the file is owned by us,
+	 * require mode 0600 or less. If owned by root, require 0640 or less to
+	 * allow read access through our gid, or a supplementary gid that allows
+	 * to read system-wide certificates.
+	 *
+	 * XXX temporarily suppress check when on Windows, because there may not
+	 * be proper support for Unix-y file permissions.  Need to think of a
+	 * reasonable check to apply on Windows.  (See also the data directory
+	 * permission check in postmaster.c)
+	 */
+#if !defined(WIN32) && !defined(__CYGWIN__)
+	if ((buf.st_uid == geteuid() && buf.st_mode & (S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO)) ||
+		(buf.st_uid == 0 && buf.st_mode & (S_IWGRP | S_IXGRP | S_IRWXO)))
+	{
+		ereport(loglevel,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+				 errmsg("private key file \"%s\" has group or world access",
+						ssl_key_file),
+				 errdetail("File must have permissions u=rw (0600) or less if owned by the database user, or permissions u=rw,g=r (0640) or less if owned by root.")));
+		return false;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	return true;
+}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-gssapi.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-gssapi.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..56d310e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-gssapi.c
@@ -0,0 +1,733 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * be-secure-gssapi.c
+ *  GSSAPI encryption support
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 2018-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ *  src/backend/libpq/be-secure-gssapi.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "libpq/auth.h"
+#include "libpq/be-gssapi-common.h"
+#include "libpq/libpq.h"
+#include "libpq/pqformat.h"
+#include "miscadmin.h"
+#include "pgstat.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+
+/*
+ * Handle the encryption/decryption of data using GSSAPI.
+ *
+ * In the encrypted data stream on the wire, we break up the data
+ * into packets where each packet starts with a uint32-size length
+ * word (in network byte order), then encrypted data of that length
+ * immediately following.  Decryption yields the same data stream
+ * that would appear when not using encryption.
+ *
+ * Encrypted data typically ends up being larger than the same data
+ * unencrypted, so we use fixed-size buffers for handling the
+ * encryption/decryption which are larger than PQComm's buffer will
+ * typically be to minimize the times where we have to make multiple
+ * packets (and therefore multiple recv/send calls for a single
+ * read/write call to us).
+ *
+ * NOTE: The client and server have to agree on the max packet size,
+ * because we have to pass an entire packet to GSSAPI at a time and we
+ * don't want the other side to send arbitrarily huge packets as we
+ * would have to allocate memory for them to then pass them to GSSAPI.
+ *
+ * Therefore, these two #define's are effectively part of the protocol
+ * spec and can't ever be changed.
+ */
+#define PQ_GSS_SEND_BUFFER_SIZE 16384
+#define PQ_GSS_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE 16384
+
+/*
+ * Since we manage at most one GSS-encrypted connection per backend,
+ * we can just keep all this state in static variables.  The char *
+ * variables point to buffers that are allocated once and re-used.
+ */
+static char *PqGSSSendBuffer;	/* Encrypted data waiting to be sent */
+static int	PqGSSSendLength;	/* End of data available in PqGSSSendBuffer */
+static int	PqGSSSendNext;		/* Next index to send a byte from
+								 * PqGSSSendBuffer */
+static int	PqGSSSendConsumed;	/* Number of *unencrypted* bytes consumed for
+								 * current contents of PqGSSSendBuffer */
+
+static char *PqGSSRecvBuffer;	/* Received, encrypted data */
+static int	PqGSSRecvLength;	/* End of data available in PqGSSRecvBuffer */
+
+static char *PqGSSResultBuffer; /* Decryption of data in gss_RecvBuffer */
+static int	PqGSSResultLength;	/* End of data available in PqGSSResultBuffer */
+static int	PqGSSResultNext;	/* Next index to read a byte from
+								 * PqGSSResultBuffer */
+
+static uint32 PqGSSMaxPktSize;	/* Maximum size we can encrypt and fit the
+								 * results into our output buffer */
+
+
+/*
+ * Attempt to write len bytes of data from ptr to a GSSAPI-encrypted connection.
+ *
+ * The connection must be already set up for GSSAPI encryption (i.e., GSSAPI
+ * transport negotiation is complete).
+ *
+ * On success, returns the number of data bytes consumed (possibly less than
+ * len).  On failure, returns -1 with errno set appropriately.  For retryable
+ * errors, caller should call again (passing the same data) once the socket
+ * is ready.
+ *
+ * Dealing with fatal errors here is a bit tricky: we can't invoke elog(FATAL)
+ * since it would try to write to the client, probably resulting in infinite
+ * recursion.  Instead, use elog(COMMERROR) to log extra info about the
+ * failure if necessary, and then return an errno indicating connection loss.
+ */
+ssize_t
+be_gssapi_write(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+	OM_uint32	major,
+				minor;
+	gss_buffer_desc input,
+				output;
+	size_t		bytes_sent = 0;
+	size_t		bytes_to_encrypt;
+	size_t		bytes_encrypted;
+	gss_ctx_id_t gctx = port->gss->ctx;
+
+	/*
+	 * When we get a failure, we must not tell the caller we have successfully
+	 * transmitted everything, else it won't retry.  Hence a "success"
+	 * (positive) return value must only count source bytes corresponding to
+	 * fully-transmitted encrypted packets.  The amount of source data
+	 * corresponding to the current partly-transmitted packet is remembered in
+	 * PqGSSSendConsumed.  On a retry, the caller *must* be sending that data
+	 * again, so if it offers a len less than that, something is wrong.
+	 */
+	if (len < PqGSSSendConsumed)
+	{
+		elog(COMMERROR, "GSSAPI caller failed to retransmit all data needing to be retried");
+		errno = ECONNRESET;
+		return -1;
+	}
+	/* Discount whatever source data we already encrypted. */
+	bytes_to_encrypt = len - PqGSSSendConsumed;
+	bytes_encrypted = PqGSSSendConsumed;
+
+	/*
+	 * Loop through encrypting data and sending it out until it's all done or
+	 * secure_raw_write() complains (which would likely mean that the socket
+	 * is non-blocking and the requested send() would block, or there was some
+	 * kind of actual error).
+	 */
+	while (bytes_to_encrypt || PqGSSSendLength)
+	{
+		int			conf_state = 0;
+		uint32		netlen;
+
+		/*
+		 * Check if we have data in the encrypted output buffer that needs to
+		 * be sent (possibly left over from a previous call), and if so, try
+		 * to send it.  If we aren't able to, return that fact back up to the
+		 * caller.
+		 */
+		if (PqGSSSendLength)
+		{
+			ssize_t		ret;
+			ssize_t		amount = PqGSSSendLength - PqGSSSendNext;
+
+			ret = secure_raw_write(port, PqGSSSendBuffer + PqGSSSendNext, amount);
+			if (ret <= 0)
+			{
+				/*
+				 * Report any previously-sent data; if there was none, reflect
+				 * the secure_raw_write result up to our caller.  When there
+				 * was some, we're effectively assuming that any interesting
+				 * failure condition will recur on the next try.
+				 */
+				if (bytes_sent)
+					return bytes_sent;
+				return ret;
+			}
+
+			/*
+			 * Check if this was a partial write, and if so, move forward that
+			 * far in our buffer and try again.
+			 */
+			if (ret != amount)
+			{
+				PqGSSSendNext += ret;
+				continue;
+			}
+
+			/* We've successfully sent whatever data was in that packet. */
+			bytes_sent += PqGSSSendConsumed;
+
+			/* All encrypted data was sent, our buffer is empty now. */
+			PqGSSSendLength = PqGSSSendNext = PqGSSSendConsumed = 0;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Check if there are any bytes left to encrypt.  If not, we're done.
+		 */
+		if (!bytes_to_encrypt)
+			break;
+
+		/*
+		 * Check how much we are being asked to send, if it's too much, then
+		 * we will have to loop and possibly be called multiple times to get
+		 * through all the data.
+		 */
+		if (bytes_to_encrypt > PqGSSMaxPktSize)
+			input.length = PqGSSMaxPktSize;
+		else
+			input.length = bytes_to_encrypt;
+
+		input.value = (char *) ptr + bytes_encrypted;
+
+		output.value = NULL;
+		output.length = 0;
+
+		/* Create the next encrypted packet */
+		major = gss_wrap(&minor, gctx, 1, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT,
+						 &input, &conf_state, &output);
+		if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+		{
+			pg_GSS_error(_("GSSAPI wrap error"), major, minor);
+			errno = ECONNRESET;
+			return -1;
+		}
+		if (conf_state == 0)
+		{
+			ereport(COMMERROR,
+					(errmsg("outgoing GSSAPI message would not use confidentiality")));
+			errno = ECONNRESET;
+			return -1;
+		}
+		if (output.length > PQ_GSS_SEND_BUFFER_SIZE - sizeof(uint32))
+		{
+			ereport(COMMERROR,
+					(errmsg("server tried to send oversize GSSAPI packet (%zu > %zu)",
+							(size_t) output.length,
+							PQ_GSS_SEND_BUFFER_SIZE - sizeof(uint32))));
+			errno = ECONNRESET;
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		bytes_encrypted += input.length;
+		bytes_to_encrypt -= input.length;
+		PqGSSSendConsumed += input.length;
+
+		/* 4 network-order bytes of length, then payload */
+		netlen = htonl(output.length);
+		memcpy(PqGSSSendBuffer + PqGSSSendLength, &netlen, sizeof(uint32));
+		PqGSSSendLength += sizeof(uint32);
+
+		memcpy(PqGSSSendBuffer + PqGSSSendLength, output.value, output.length);
+		PqGSSSendLength += output.length;
+
+		/* Release buffer storage allocated by GSSAPI */
+		gss_release_buffer(&minor, &output);
+	}
+
+	/* If we get here, our counters should all match up. */
+	Assert(bytes_sent == len);
+	Assert(bytes_sent == bytes_encrypted);
+
+	return bytes_sent;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read up to len bytes of data into ptr from a GSSAPI-encrypted connection.
+ *
+ * The connection must be already set up for GSSAPI encryption (i.e., GSSAPI
+ * transport negotiation is complete).
+ *
+ * Returns the number of data bytes read, or on failure, returns -1
+ * with errno set appropriately.  For retryable errors, caller should call
+ * again once the socket is ready.
+ *
+ * We treat fatal errors the same as in be_gssapi_write(), even though the
+ * argument about infinite recursion doesn't apply here.
+ */
+ssize_t
+be_gssapi_read(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+	OM_uint32	major,
+				minor;
+	gss_buffer_desc input,
+				output;
+	ssize_t		ret;
+	size_t		bytes_returned = 0;
+	gss_ctx_id_t gctx = port->gss->ctx;
+
+	/*
+	 * The plan here is to read one incoming encrypted packet into
+	 * PqGSSRecvBuffer, decrypt it into PqGSSResultBuffer, and then dole out
+	 * data from there to the caller.  When we exhaust the current input
+	 * packet, read another.
+	 */
+	while (bytes_returned < len)
+	{
+		int			conf_state = 0;
+
+		/* Check if we have data in our buffer that we can return immediately */
+		if (PqGSSResultNext < PqGSSResultLength)
+		{
+			size_t		bytes_in_buffer = PqGSSResultLength - PqGSSResultNext;
+			size_t		bytes_to_copy = Min(bytes_in_buffer, len - bytes_returned);
+
+			/*
+			 * Copy the data from our result buffer into the caller's buffer,
+			 * at the point where we last left off filling their buffer.
+			 */
+			memcpy((char *) ptr + bytes_returned, PqGSSResultBuffer + PqGSSResultNext, bytes_to_copy);
+			PqGSSResultNext += bytes_to_copy;
+			bytes_returned += bytes_to_copy;
+
+			/*
+			 * At this point, we've either filled the caller's buffer or
+			 * emptied our result buffer.  Either way, return to caller.  In
+			 * the second case, we could try to read another encrypted packet,
+			 * but the odds are good that there isn't one available.  (If this
+			 * isn't true, we chose too small a max packet size.)  In any
+			 * case, there's no harm letting the caller process the data we've
+			 * already returned.
+			 */
+			break;
+		}
+
+		/* Result buffer is empty, so reset buffer pointers */
+		PqGSSResultLength = PqGSSResultNext = 0;
+
+		/*
+		 * Because we chose above to return immediately as soon as we emit
+		 * some data, bytes_returned must be zero at this point.  Therefore
+		 * the failure exits below can just return -1 without worrying about
+		 * whether we already emitted some data.
+		 */
+		Assert(bytes_returned == 0);
+
+		/*
+		 * At this point, our result buffer is empty with more bytes being
+		 * requested to be read.  We are now ready to load the next packet and
+		 * decrypt it (entirely) into our result buffer.
+		 */
+
+		/* Collect the length if we haven't already */
+		if (PqGSSRecvLength < sizeof(uint32))
+		{
+			ret = secure_raw_read(port, PqGSSRecvBuffer + PqGSSRecvLength,
+								  sizeof(uint32) - PqGSSRecvLength);
+
+			/* If ret <= 0, secure_raw_read already set the correct errno */
+			if (ret <= 0)
+				return ret;
+
+			PqGSSRecvLength += ret;
+
+			/* If we still haven't got the length, return to the caller */
+			if (PqGSSRecvLength < sizeof(uint32))
+			{
+				errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+				return -1;
+			}
+		}
+
+		/* Decode the packet length and check for overlength packet */
+		input.length = ntohl(*(uint32 *) PqGSSRecvBuffer);
+
+		if (input.length > PQ_GSS_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE - sizeof(uint32))
+		{
+			ereport(COMMERROR,
+					(errmsg("oversize GSSAPI packet sent by the client (%zu > %zu)",
+							(size_t) input.length,
+							PQ_GSS_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE - sizeof(uint32))));
+			errno = ECONNRESET;
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Read as much of the packet as we are able to on this call into
+		 * wherever we left off from the last time we were called.
+		 */
+		ret = secure_raw_read(port, PqGSSRecvBuffer + PqGSSRecvLength,
+							  input.length - (PqGSSRecvLength - sizeof(uint32)));
+		/* If ret <= 0, secure_raw_read already set the correct errno */
+		if (ret <= 0)
+			return ret;
+
+		PqGSSRecvLength += ret;
+
+		/* If we don't yet have the whole packet, return to the caller */
+		if (PqGSSRecvLength - sizeof(uint32) < input.length)
+		{
+			errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * We now have the full packet and we can perform the decryption and
+		 * refill our result buffer, then loop back up to pass data back to
+		 * the caller.
+		 */
+		output.value = NULL;
+		output.length = 0;
+		input.value = PqGSSRecvBuffer + sizeof(uint32);
+
+		major = gss_unwrap(&minor, gctx, &input, &output, &conf_state, NULL);
+		if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+		{
+			pg_GSS_error(_("GSSAPI unwrap error"), major, minor);
+			errno = ECONNRESET;
+			return -1;
+		}
+		if (conf_state == 0)
+		{
+			ereport(COMMERROR,
+					(errmsg("incoming GSSAPI message did not use confidentiality")));
+			errno = ECONNRESET;
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		memcpy(PqGSSResultBuffer, output.value, output.length);
+		PqGSSResultLength = output.length;
+
+		/* Our receive buffer is now empty, reset it */
+		PqGSSRecvLength = 0;
+
+		/* Release buffer storage allocated by GSSAPI */
+		gss_release_buffer(&minor, &output);
+	}
+
+	return bytes_returned;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read the specified number of bytes off the wire, waiting using
+ * WaitLatchOrSocket if we would block.
+ *
+ * Results are read into PqGSSRecvBuffer.
+ *
+ * Will always return either -1, to indicate a permanent error, or len.
+ */
+static ssize_t
+read_or_wait(Port *port, ssize_t len)
+{
+	ssize_t		ret;
+
+	/*
+	 * Keep going until we either read in everything we were asked to, or we
+	 * error out.
+	 */
+	while (PqGSSRecvLength < len)
+	{
+		ret = secure_raw_read(port, PqGSSRecvBuffer + PqGSSRecvLength, len - PqGSSRecvLength);
+
+		/*
+		 * If we got back an error and it wasn't just
+		 * EWOULDBLOCK/EAGAIN/EINTR, then give up.
+		 */
+		if (ret < 0 &&
+			!(errno == EWOULDBLOCK || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR))
+			return -1;
+
+		/*
+		 * Ok, we got back either a positive value, zero, or a negative result
+		 * indicating we should retry.
+		 *
+		 * If it was zero or negative, then we wait on the socket to be
+		 * readable again.
+		 */
+		if (ret <= 0)
+		{
+			WaitLatchOrSocket(MyLatch,
+							  WL_SOCKET_READABLE | WL_EXIT_ON_PM_DEATH,
+							  port->sock, 0, WAIT_EVENT_GSS_OPEN_SERVER);
+
+			/*
+			 * If we got back zero bytes, and then waited on the socket to be
+			 * readable and got back zero bytes on a second read, then this is
+			 * EOF and the client hung up on us.
+			 *
+			 * If we did get data here, then we can just fall through and
+			 * handle it just as if we got data the first time.
+			 *
+			 * Otherwise loop back to the top and try again.
+			 */
+			if (ret == 0)
+			{
+				ret = secure_raw_read(port, PqGSSRecvBuffer + PqGSSRecvLength, len - PqGSSRecvLength);
+				if (ret == 0)
+					return -1;
+			}
+			if (ret < 0)
+				continue;
+		}
+
+		PqGSSRecvLength += ret;
+	}
+
+	return len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Start up a GSSAPI-encrypted connection.  This performs GSSAPI
+ * authentication; after this function completes, it is safe to call
+ * be_gssapi_read and be_gssapi_write.  Returns -1 and logs on failure;
+ * otherwise, returns 0 and marks the connection as ready for GSSAPI
+ * encryption.
+ *
+ * Note that unlike the be_gssapi_read/be_gssapi_write functions, this
+ * function WILL block on the socket to be ready for read/write (using
+ * WaitLatchOrSocket) as appropriate while establishing the GSSAPI
+ * session.
+ */
+ssize_t
+secure_open_gssapi(Port *port)
+{
+	bool		complete_next = false;
+	OM_uint32	major,
+				minor;
+
+	/*
+	 * Allocate subsidiary Port data for GSSAPI operations.
+	 */
+	port->gss = (pg_gssinfo *)
+		MemoryContextAllocZero(TopMemoryContext, sizeof(pg_gssinfo));
+
+	/*
+	 * Allocate buffers and initialize state variables.  By malloc'ing the
+	 * buffers at this point, we avoid wasting static data space in processes
+	 * that will never use them, and we ensure that the buffers are
+	 * sufficiently aligned for the length-word accesses that we do in some
+	 * places in this file.
+	 */
+	PqGSSSendBuffer = malloc(PQ_GSS_SEND_BUFFER_SIZE);
+	PqGSSRecvBuffer = malloc(PQ_GSS_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE);
+	PqGSSResultBuffer = malloc(PQ_GSS_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE);
+	if (!PqGSSSendBuffer || !PqGSSRecvBuffer || !PqGSSResultBuffer)
+		ereport(FATAL,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
+				 errmsg("out of memory")));
+	PqGSSSendLength = PqGSSSendNext = PqGSSSendConsumed = 0;
+	PqGSSRecvLength = PqGSSResultLength = PqGSSResultNext = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Use the configured keytab, if there is one.  Unfortunately, Heimdal
+	 * doesn't support the cred store extensions, so use the env var.
+	 */
+	if (pg_krb_server_keyfile != NULL && pg_krb_server_keyfile[0] != '\0')
+	{
+		if (setenv("KRB5_KTNAME", pg_krb_server_keyfile, 1) != 0)
+		{
+			/* The only likely failure cause is OOM, so use that errcode */
+			ereport(FATAL,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
+					 errmsg("could not set environment: %m")));
+		}
+	}
+
+	while (true)
+	{
+		ssize_t		ret;
+		gss_buffer_desc input,
+					output = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+
+		/*
+		 * The client always sends first, so try to go ahead and read the
+		 * length and wait on the socket to be readable again if that fails.
+		 */
+		ret = read_or_wait(port, sizeof(uint32));
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return ret;
+
+		/*
+		 * Get the length for this packet from the length header.
+		 */
+		input.length = ntohl(*(uint32 *) PqGSSRecvBuffer);
+
+		/* Done with the length, reset our buffer */
+		PqGSSRecvLength = 0;
+
+		/*
+		 * During initialization, packets are always fully consumed and
+		 * shouldn't ever be over PQ_GSS_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE in length.
+		 *
+		 * Verify on our side that the client doesn't do something funny.
+		 */
+		if (input.length > PQ_GSS_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE)
+		{
+			ereport(COMMERROR,
+					(errmsg("oversize GSSAPI packet sent by the client (%zu > %d)",
+							(size_t) input.length,
+							PQ_GSS_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE)));
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Get the rest of the packet so we can pass it to GSSAPI to accept
+		 * the context.
+		 */
+		ret = read_or_wait(port, input.length);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return ret;
+
+		input.value = PqGSSRecvBuffer;
+
+		/* Process incoming data.  (The client sends first.) */
+		major = gss_accept_sec_context(&minor, &port->gss->ctx,
+									   GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &input,
+									   GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS,
+									   &port->gss->name, NULL, &output, NULL,
+									   NULL, NULL);
+		if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+		{
+			pg_GSS_error(_("could not accept GSSAPI security context"),
+						 major, minor);
+			gss_release_buffer(&minor, &output);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		else if (!(major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED))
+		{
+			/*
+			 * rfc2744 technically permits context negotiation to be complete
+			 * both with and without a packet to be sent.
+			 */
+			complete_next = true;
+		}
+
+		/* Done handling the incoming packet, reset our buffer */
+		PqGSSRecvLength = 0;
+
+		/*
+		 * Check if we have data to send and, if we do, make sure to send it
+		 * all
+		 */
+		if (output.length > 0)
+		{
+			uint32		netlen = htonl(output.length);
+
+			if (output.length > PQ_GSS_SEND_BUFFER_SIZE - sizeof(uint32))
+			{
+				ereport(COMMERROR,
+						(errmsg("server tried to send oversize GSSAPI packet (%zu > %zu)",
+								(size_t) output.length,
+								PQ_GSS_SEND_BUFFER_SIZE - sizeof(uint32))));
+				gss_release_buffer(&minor, &output);
+				return -1;
+			}
+
+			memcpy(PqGSSSendBuffer, (char *) &netlen, sizeof(uint32));
+			PqGSSSendLength += sizeof(uint32);
+
+			memcpy(PqGSSSendBuffer + PqGSSSendLength, output.value, output.length);
+			PqGSSSendLength += output.length;
+
+			/* we don't bother with PqGSSSendConsumed here */
+
+			while (PqGSSSendNext < PqGSSSendLength)
+			{
+				ret = secure_raw_write(port, PqGSSSendBuffer + PqGSSSendNext,
+									   PqGSSSendLength - PqGSSSendNext);
+
+				/*
+				 * If we got back an error and it wasn't just
+				 * EWOULDBLOCK/EAGAIN/EINTR, then give up.
+				 */
+				if (ret < 0 &&
+					!(errno == EWOULDBLOCK || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR))
+				{
+					gss_release_buffer(&minor, &output);
+					return -1;
+				}
+
+				/* Wait and retry if we couldn't write yet */
+				if (ret <= 0)
+				{
+					WaitLatchOrSocket(MyLatch,
+									  WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE | WL_EXIT_ON_PM_DEATH,
+									  port->sock, 0, WAIT_EVENT_GSS_OPEN_SERVER);
+					continue;
+				}
+
+				PqGSSSendNext += ret;
+			}
+
+			/* Done sending the packet, reset our buffer */
+			PqGSSSendLength = PqGSSSendNext = 0;
+
+			gss_release_buffer(&minor, &output);
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * If we got back that the connection is finished being set up, now
+		 * that we've sent the last packet, exit our loop.
+		 */
+		if (complete_next)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Determine the max packet size which will fit in our buffer, after
+	 * accounting for the length.  be_gssapi_write will need this.
+	 */
+	major = gss_wrap_size_limit(&minor, port->gss->ctx, 1, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT,
+								PQ_GSS_SEND_BUFFER_SIZE - sizeof(uint32),
+								&PqGSSMaxPktSize);
+
+	if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+	{
+		pg_GSS_error(_("GSSAPI size check error"), major, minor);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	port->gss->enc = true;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return if GSSAPI authentication was used on this connection.
+ */
+bool
+be_gssapi_get_auth(Port *port)
+{
+	if (!port || !port->gss)
+		return false;
+
+	return port->gss->auth;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return if GSSAPI encryption is enabled and being used on this connection.
+ */
+bool
+be_gssapi_get_enc(Port *port)
+{
+	if (!port || !port->gss)
+		return false;
+
+	return port->gss->enc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the GSSAPI principal used for authentication on this connection
+ * (NULL if we did not perform GSSAPI authentication).
+ */
+const char *
+be_gssapi_get_princ(Port *port)
+{
+	if (!port || !port->gss)
+		return NULL;
+
+	return port->gss->princ;
+}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d1705ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1441 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * be-secure-openssl.c
+ *	  functions for OpenSSL support in the backend.
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ *	  src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_TCP_H
+#include <netinet/tcp.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "common/openssl.h"
+#include "libpq/libpq.h"
+#include "miscadmin.h"
+#include "pgstat.h"
+#include "storage/fd.h"
+#include "storage/latch.h"
+#include "tcop/tcopprot.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+/* default init hook can be overridden by a shared library */
+static void default_openssl_tls_init(SSL_CTX *context, bool isServerStart);
+openssl_tls_init_hook_typ openssl_tls_init_hook = default_openssl_tls_init;
+
+static int	my_sock_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size);
+static int	my_sock_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int size);
+static BIO_METHOD *my_BIO_s_socket(void);
+static int	my_SSL_set_fd(Port *port, int fd);
+
+static DH  *load_dh_file(char *filename, bool isServerStart);
+static DH  *load_dh_buffer(const char *, size_t);
+static int	ssl_external_passwd_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *userdata);
+static int	dummy_ssl_passwd_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *userdata);
+static int	verify_cb(int, X509_STORE_CTX *);
+static void info_cb(const SSL *ssl, int type, int args);
+static bool initialize_dh(SSL_CTX *context, bool isServerStart);
+static bool initialize_ecdh(SSL_CTX *context, bool isServerStart);
+static const char *SSLerrmessage(unsigned long ecode);
+
+static char *X509_NAME_to_cstring(X509_NAME *name);
+
+static SSL_CTX *SSL_context = NULL;
+static bool SSL_initialized = false;
+static bool dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called = false;
+static bool ssl_is_server_start;
+
+static int	ssl_protocol_version_to_openssl(int v);
+static const char *ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v);
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/*						 Public interface						*/
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+int
+be_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+	SSL_CTX    *context;
+	int			ssl_ver_min = -1;
+	int			ssl_ver_max = -1;
+
+	/* This stuff need be done only once. */
+	if (!SSL_initialized)
+	{
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_INIT_SSL
+		OPENSSL_init_ssl(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG, NULL);
+#else
+		OPENSSL_config(NULL);
+		SSL_library_init();
+		SSL_load_error_strings();
+#endif
+		SSL_initialized = true;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Create a new SSL context into which we'll load all the configuration
+	 * settings.  If we fail partway through, we can avoid memory leakage by
+	 * freeing this context; we don't install it as active until the end.
+	 *
+	 * We use SSLv23_method() because it can negotiate use of the highest
+	 * mutually supported protocol version, while alternatives like
+	 * TLSv1_2_method() permit only one specific version.  Note that we don't
+	 * actually allow SSL v2 or v3, only TLS protocols (see below).
+	 */
+	context = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method());
+	if (!context)
+	{
+		ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+				(errmsg("could not create SSL context: %s",
+						SSLerrmessage(ERR_get_error()))));
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Disable OpenSSL's moving-write-buffer sanity check, because it causes
+	 * unnecessary failures in nonblocking send cases.
+	 */
+	SSL_CTX_set_mode(context, SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER);
+
+	/*
+	 * Call init hook (usually to set password callback)
+	 */
+	(*openssl_tls_init_hook) (context, isServerStart);
+
+	/* used by the callback */
+	ssl_is_server_start = isServerStart;
+
+	/*
+	 * Load and verify server's certificate and private key
+	 */
+	if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(context, ssl_cert_file) != 1)
+	{
+		ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+				 errmsg("could not load server certificate file \"%s\": %s",
+						ssl_cert_file, SSLerrmessage(ERR_get_error()))));
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	if (!check_ssl_key_file_permissions(ssl_key_file, isServerStart))
+		goto error;
+
+	/*
+	 * OK, try to load the private key file.
+	 */
+	dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called = false;
+
+	if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(context,
+									ssl_key_file,
+									SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) != 1)
+	{
+		if (dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called)
+			ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+					 errmsg("private key file \"%s\" cannot be reloaded because it requires a passphrase",
+							ssl_key_file)));
+		else
+			ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+					 errmsg("could not load private key file \"%s\": %s",
+							ssl_key_file, SSLerrmessage(ERR_get_error()))));
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	if (SSL_CTX_check_private_key(context) != 1)
+	{
+		ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+				 errmsg("check of private key failed: %s",
+						SSLerrmessage(ERR_get_error()))));
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	if (ssl_min_protocol_version)
+	{
+		ssl_ver_min = ssl_protocol_version_to_openssl(ssl_min_protocol_version);
+
+		if (ssl_ver_min == -1)
+		{
+			ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+			/*- translator: first %s is a GUC option name, second %s is its value */
+					(errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+							"ssl_min_protocol_version",
+							GetConfigOption("ssl_min_protocol_version",
+											false, false))));
+			goto error;
+		}
+
+		if (!SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(context, ssl_ver_min))
+		{
+			ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+					(errmsg("could not set minimum SSL protocol version")));
+			goto error;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (ssl_max_protocol_version)
+	{
+		ssl_ver_max = ssl_protocol_version_to_openssl(ssl_max_protocol_version);
+
+		if (ssl_ver_max == -1)
+		{
+			ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+			/*- translator: first %s is a GUC option name, second %s is its value */
+					(errmsg("\"%s\" setting \"%s\" not supported by this build",
+							"ssl_max_protocol_version",
+							GetConfigOption("ssl_max_protocol_version",
+											false, false))));
+			goto error;
+		}
+
+		if (!SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(context, ssl_ver_max))
+		{
+			ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+					(errmsg("could not set maximum SSL protocol version")));
+			goto error;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Check compatibility of min/max protocols */
+	if (ssl_min_protocol_version &&
+		ssl_max_protocol_version)
+	{
+		/*
+		 * No need to check for invalid values (-1) for each protocol number
+		 * as the code above would have already generated an error.
+		 */
+		if (ssl_ver_min > ssl_ver_max)
+		{
+			ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+					(errmsg("could not set SSL protocol version range"),
+					 errdetail("\"%s\" cannot be higher than \"%s\"",
+							   "ssl_min_protocol_version",
+							   "ssl_max_protocol_version")));
+			goto error;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* disallow SSL session tickets */
+	SSL_CTX_set_options(context, SSL_OP_NO_TICKET);
+
+	/* disallow SSL session caching, too */
+	SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(context, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF);
+
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
+
+	/*
+	 * Disallow SSL renegotiation, option available since 1.1.0h.  This
+	 * concerns only TLSv1.2 and older protocol versions, as TLSv1.3 has no
+	 * support for renegotiation.
+	 */
+	SSL_CTX_set_options(context, SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+#endif
+
+	/* set up ephemeral DH and ECDH keys */
+	if (!initialize_dh(context, isServerStart))
+		goto error;
+	if (!initialize_ecdh(context, isServerStart))
+		goto error;
+
+	/* set up the allowed cipher list */
+	if (SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(context, SSLCipherSuites) != 1)
+	{
+		ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+				 errmsg("could not set the cipher list (no valid ciphers available)")));
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	/* Let server choose order */
+	if (SSLPreferServerCiphers)
+		SSL_CTX_set_options(context, SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE);
+
+	/*
+	 * Load CA store, so we can verify client certificates if needed.
+	 */
+	if (ssl_ca_file[0])
+	{
+		STACK_OF(X509_NAME) * root_cert_list;
+
+		if (SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(context, ssl_ca_file, NULL) != 1 ||
+			(root_cert_list = SSL_load_client_CA_file(ssl_ca_file)) == NULL)
+		{
+			ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+					 errmsg("could not load root certificate file \"%s\": %s",
+							ssl_ca_file, SSLerrmessage(ERR_get_error()))));
+			goto error;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Tell OpenSSL to send the list of root certs we trust to clients in
+		 * CertificateRequests.  This lets a client with a keystore select the
+		 * appropriate client certificate to send to us.  Also, this ensures
+		 * that the SSL context will "own" the root_cert_list and remember to
+		 * free it when no longer needed.
+		 */
+		SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(context, root_cert_list);
+
+		/*
+		 * Always ask for SSL client cert, but don't fail if it's not
+		 * presented.  We might fail such connections later, depending on what
+		 * we find in pg_hba.conf.
+		 */
+		SSL_CTX_set_verify(context,
+						   (SSL_VERIFY_PEER |
+							SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE),
+						   verify_cb);
+	}
+
+	/*----------
+	 * Load the Certificate Revocation List (CRL).
+	 * http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid14_gci803160,00.html
+	 *----------
+	 */
+	if (ssl_crl_file[0])
+	{
+		X509_STORE *cvstore = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(context);
+
+		if (cvstore)
+		{
+			/* Set the flags to check against the complete CRL chain */
+			if (X509_STORE_load_locations(cvstore, ssl_crl_file, NULL) == 1)
+			{
+				X509_STORE_set_flags(cvstore,
+									 X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK | X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL);
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+						(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+						 errmsg("could not load SSL certificate revocation list file \"%s\": %s",
+								ssl_crl_file, SSLerrmessage(ERR_get_error()))));
+				goto error;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Success!  Replace any existing SSL_context.
+	 */
+	if (SSL_context)
+		SSL_CTX_free(SSL_context);
+
+	SSL_context = context;
+
+	/*
+	 * Set flag to remember whether CA store has been loaded into SSL_context.
+	 */
+	if (ssl_ca_file[0])
+		ssl_loaded_verify_locations = true;
+	else
+		ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;
+
+	return 0;
+
+	/* Clean up by releasing working context. */
+error:
+	if (context)
+		SSL_CTX_free(context);
+	return -1;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_destroy(void)
+{
+	if (SSL_context)
+		SSL_CTX_free(SSL_context);
+	SSL_context = NULL;
+	ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_open_server(Port *port)
+{
+	int			r;
+	int			err;
+	int			waitfor;
+	unsigned long ecode;
+	bool		give_proto_hint;
+
+	Assert(!port->ssl);
+	Assert(!port->peer);
+
+	if (!SSL_context)
+	{
+		ereport(COMMERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+				 errmsg("could not initialize SSL connection: SSL context not set up")));
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	if (!(port->ssl = SSL_new(SSL_context)))
+	{
+		ereport(COMMERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+				 errmsg("could not initialize SSL connection: %s",
+						SSLerrmessage(ERR_get_error()))));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (!my_SSL_set_fd(port, port->sock))
+	{
+		ereport(COMMERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+				 errmsg("could not set SSL socket: %s",
+						SSLerrmessage(ERR_get_error()))));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	port->ssl_in_use = true;
+
+aloop:
+
+	/*
+	 * Prepare to call SSL_get_error() by clearing thread's OpenSSL error
+	 * queue.  In general, the current thread's error queue must be empty
+	 * before the TLS/SSL I/O operation is attempted, or SSL_get_error() will
+	 * not work reliably.  An extension may have failed to clear the
+	 * per-thread error queue following another call to an OpenSSL I/O
+	 * routine.
+	 */
+	ERR_clear_error();
+	r = SSL_accept(port->ssl);
+	if (r <= 0)
+	{
+		err = SSL_get_error(port->ssl, r);
+
+		/*
+		 * Other clients of OpenSSL in the backend may fail to call
+		 * ERR_get_error(), but we always do, so as to not cause problems for
+		 * OpenSSL clients that don't call ERR_clear_error() defensively.  Be
+		 * sure that this happens by calling now. SSL_get_error() relies on
+		 * the OpenSSL per-thread error queue being intact, so this is the
+		 * earliest possible point ERR_get_error() may be called.
+		 */
+		ecode = ERR_get_error();
+		switch (err)
+		{
+			case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+			case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+				/* not allowed during connection establishment */
+				Assert(!port->noblock);
+
+				/*
+				 * No need to care about timeouts/interrupts here. At this
+				 * point authentication_timeout still employs
+				 * StartupPacketTimeoutHandler() which directly exits.
+				 */
+				if (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ)
+					waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE | WL_EXIT_ON_PM_DEATH;
+				else
+					waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE | WL_EXIT_ON_PM_DEATH;
+
+				(void) WaitLatchOrSocket(MyLatch, waitfor, port->sock, 0,
+										 WAIT_EVENT_SSL_OPEN_SERVER);
+				goto aloop;
+			case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
+				if (r < 0)
+					ereport(COMMERROR,
+							(errcode_for_socket_access(),
+							 errmsg("could not accept SSL connection: %m")));
+				else
+					ereport(COMMERROR,
+							(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+							 errmsg("could not accept SSL connection: EOF detected")));
+				break;
+			case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
+				switch (ERR_GET_REASON(ecode))
+				{
+						/*
+						 * UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL, WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER, and
+						 * TLSV1_ALERT_PROTOCOL_VERSION have been observed
+						 * when trying to communicate with an old OpenSSL
+						 * library, or when the client and server specify
+						 * disjoint protocol ranges.  NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
+						 * occurs if there's a local misconfiguration (which
+						 * can happen despite our checks, if openssl.cnf
+						 * injects a limit we didn't account for).  It's not
+						 * very clear what would make OpenSSL return the other
+						 * codes listed here, but a hint about protocol
+						 * versions seems like it's appropriate for all.
+						 */
+					case SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE:
+					case SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL:
+					case SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER:
+					case SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL:
+					case SSL_R_UNKNOWN_SSL_VERSION:
+					case SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION:
+					case SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION:
+					case SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER:
+					case SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_PROTOCOL_VERSION:
+#ifdef SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH
+					case SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH:
+					case SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW:
+#endif
+						give_proto_hint = true;
+						break;
+					default:
+						give_proto_hint = false;
+						break;
+				}
+				ereport(COMMERROR,
+						(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+						 errmsg("could not accept SSL connection: %s",
+								SSLerrmessage(ecode)),
+						 give_proto_hint ?
+						 errhint("This may indicate that the client does not support any SSL protocol version between %s and %s.",
+								 ssl_min_protocol_version ?
+								 ssl_protocol_version_to_string(ssl_min_protocol_version) :
+								 MIN_OPENSSL_TLS_VERSION,
+								 ssl_max_protocol_version ?
+								 ssl_protocol_version_to_string(ssl_max_protocol_version) :
+								 MAX_OPENSSL_TLS_VERSION) : 0));
+				break;
+			case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
+				ereport(COMMERROR,
+						(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+						 errmsg("could not accept SSL connection: EOF detected")));
+				break;
+			default:
+				ereport(COMMERROR,
+						(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+						 errmsg("unrecognized SSL error code: %d",
+								err)));
+				break;
+		}
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* Get client certificate, if available. */
+	port->peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(port->ssl);
+
+	/* and extract the Common Name from it. */
+	port->peer_cn = NULL;
+	port->peer_cert_valid = false;
+	if (port->peer != NULL)
+	{
+		int			len;
+
+		len = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_subject_name(port->peer),
+										NID_commonName, NULL, 0);
+		if (len != -1)
+		{
+			char	   *peer_cn;
+
+			peer_cn = MemoryContextAlloc(TopMemoryContext, len + 1);
+			r = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_subject_name(port->peer),
+										  NID_commonName, peer_cn, len + 1);
+			peer_cn[len] = '\0';
+			if (r != len)
+			{
+				/* shouldn't happen */
+				pfree(peer_cn);
+				return -1;
+			}
+
+			/*
+			 * Reject embedded NULLs in certificate common name to prevent
+			 * attacks like CVE-2009-4034.
+			 */
+			if (len != strlen(peer_cn))
+			{
+				ereport(COMMERROR,
+						(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+						 errmsg("SSL certificate's common name contains embedded null")));
+				pfree(peer_cn);
+				return -1;
+			}
+
+			port->peer_cn = peer_cn;
+		}
+		port->peer_cert_valid = true;
+	}
+
+	/* set up debugging/info callback */
+	SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(SSL_context, info_cb);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_close(Port *port)
+{
+	if (port->ssl)
+	{
+		SSL_shutdown(port->ssl);
+		SSL_free(port->ssl);
+		port->ssl = NULL;
+		port->ssl_in_use = false;
+	}
+
+	if (port->peer)
+	{
+		X509_free(port->peer);
+		port->peer = NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (port->peer_cn)
+	{
+		pfree(port->peer_cn);
+		port->peer_cn = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_read(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+	ssize_t		n;
+	int			err;
+	unsigned long ecode;
+
+	errno = 0;
+	ERR_clear_error();
+	n = SSL_read(port->ssl, ptr, len);
+	err = SSL_get_error(port->ssl, n);
+	ecode = (err != SSL_ERROR_NONE || n < 0) ? ERR_get_error() : 0;
+	switch (err)
+	{
+		case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
+			/* a-ok */
+			break;
+		case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+			*waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
+			errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+			n = -1;
+			break;
+		case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+			*waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
+			errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+			n = -1;
+			break;
+		case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
+			/* leave it to caller to ereport the value of errno */
+			if (n != -1)
+			{
+				errno = ECONNRESET;
+				n = -1;
+			}
+			break;
+		case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
+			ereport(COMMERROR,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+					 errmsg("SSL error: %s", SSLerrmessage(ecode))));
+			errno = ECONNRESET;
+			n = -1;
+			break;
+		case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
+			/* connection was cleanly shut down by peer */
+			n = 0;
+			break;
+		default:
+			ereport(COMMERROR,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+					 errmsg("unrecognized SSL error code: %d",
+							err)));
+			errno = ECONNRESET;
+			n = -1;
+			break;
+	}
+
+	return n;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+be_tls_write(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+	ssize_t		n;
+	int			err;
+	unsigned long ecode;
+
+	errno = 0;
+	ERR_clear_error();
+	n = SSL_write(port->ssl, ptr, len);
+	err = SSL_get_error(port->ssl, n);
+	ecode = (err != SSL_ERROR_NONE || n < 0) ? ERR_get_error() : 0;
+	switch (err)
+	{
+		case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
+			/* a-ok */
+			break;
+		case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+			*waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
+			errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+			n = -1;
+			break;
+		case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+			*waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
+			errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+			n = -1;
+			break;
+		case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
+			/* leave it to caller to ereport the value of errno */
+			if (n != -1)
+			{
+				errno = ECONNRESET;
+				n = -1;
+			}
+			break;
+		case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
+			ereport(COMMERROR,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+					 errmsg("SSL error: %s", SSLerrmessage(ecode))));
+			errno = ECONNRESET;
+			n = -1;
+			break;
+		case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
+
+			/*
+			 * the SSL connection was closed, leave it to the caller to
+			 * ereport it
+			 */
+			errno = ECONNRESET;
+			n = -1;
+			break;
+		default:
+			ereport(COMMERROR,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+					 errmsg("unrecognized SSL error code: %d",
+							err)));
+			errno = ECONNRESET;
+			n = -1;
+			break;
+	}
+
+	return n;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/*						Internal functions						*/
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * Private substitute BIO: this does the sending and receiving using send() and
+ * recv() instead. This is so that we can enable and disable interrupts
+ * just while calling recv(). We cannot have interrupts occurring while
+ * the bulk of OpenSSL runs, because it uses malloc() and possibly other
+ * non-reentrant libc facilities. We also need to call send() and recv()
+ * directly so it gets passed through the socket/signals layer on Win32.
+ *
+ * These functions are closely modelled on the standard socket BIO in OpenSSL;
+ * see sock_read() and sock_write() in OpenSSL's crypto/bio/bss_sock.c.
+ * XXX OpenSSL 1.0.1e considers many more errcodes than just EINTR as reasons
+ * to retry; do we need to adopt their logic for that?
+ */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_BIO_GET_DATA
+#define BIO_get_data(bio) (bio->ptr)
+#define BIO_set_data(bio, data) (bio->ptr = data)
+#endif
+
+static BIO_METHOD *my_bio_methods = NULL;
+
+static int
+my_sock_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size)
+{
+	int			res = 0;
+
+	if (buf != NULL)
+	{
+		res = secure_raw_read(((Port *) BIO_get_data(h)), buf, size);
+		BIO_clear_retry_flags(h);
+		if (res <= 0)
+		{
+			/* If we were interrupted, tell caller to retry */
+			if (errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK || errno == EAGAIN)
+			{
+				BIO_set_retry_read(h);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	return res;
+}
+
+static int
+my_sock_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int size)
+{
+	int			res = 0;
+
+	res = secure_raw_write(((Port *) BIO_get_data(h)), buf, size);
+	BIO_clear_retry_flags(h);
+	if (res <= 0)
+	{
+		/* If we were interrupted, tell caller to retry */
+		if (errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK || errno == EAGAIN)
+		{
+			BIO_set_retry_write(h);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return res;
+}
+
+static BIO_METHOD *
+my_BIO_s_socket(void)
+{
+	if (!my_bio_methods)
+	{
+		BIO_METHOD *biom = (BIO_METHOD *) BIO_s_socket();
+#ifdef HAVE_BIO_METH_NEW
+		int			my_bio_index;
+
+		my_bio_index = BIO_get_new_index();
+		if (my_bio_index == -1)
+			return NULL;
+		my_bio_methods = BIO_meth_new(my_bio_index, "PostgreSQL backend socket");
+		if (!my_bio_methods)
+			return NULL;
+		if (!BIO_meth_set_write(my_bio_methods, my_sock_write) ||
+			!BIO_meth_set_read(my_bio_methods, my_sock_read) ||
+			!BIO_meth_set_gets(my_bio_methods, BIO_meth_get_gets(biom)) ||
+			!BIO_meth_set_puts(my_bio_methods, BIO_meth_get_puts(biom)) ||
+			!BIO_meth_set_ctrl(my_bio_methods, BIO_meth_get_ctrl(biom)) ||
+			!BIO_meth_set_create(my_bio_methods, BIO_meth_get_create(biom)) ||
+			!BIO_meth_set_destroy(my_bio_methods, BIO_meth_get_destroy(biom)) ||
+			!BIO_meth_set_callback_ctrl(my_bio_methods, BIO_meth_get_callback_ctrl(biom)))
+		{
+			BIO_meth_free(my_bio_methods);
+			my_bio_methods = NULL;
+			return NULL;
+		}
+#else
+		my_bio_methods = malloc(sizeof(BIO_METHOD));
+		if (!my_bio_methods)
+			return NULL;
+		memcpy(my_bio_methods, biom, sizeof(BIO_METHOD));
+		my_bio_methods->bread = my_sock_read;
+		my_bio_methods->bwrite = my_sock_write;
+#endif
+	}
+	return my_bio_methods;
+}
+
+/* This should exactly match OpenSSL's SSL_set_fd except for using my BIO */
+static int
+my_SSL_set_fd(Port *port, int fd)
+{
+	int			ret = 0;
+	BIO		   *bio;
+	BIO_METHOD *bio_method;
+
+	bio_method = my_BIO_s_socket();
+	if (bio_method == NULL)
+	{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+		goto err;
+	}
+	bio = BIO_new(bio_method);
+
+	if (bio == NULL)
+	{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+		goto err;
+	}
+	BIO_set_data(bio, port);
+
+	BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+	SSL_set_bio(port->ssl, bio, bio);
+	ret = 1;
+err:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ *	Load precomputed DH parameters.
+ *
+ *	To prevent "downgrade" attacks, we perform a number of checks
+ *	to verify that the DBA-generated DH parameters file contains
+ *	what we expect it to contain.
+ */
+static DH  *
+load_dh_file(char *filename, bool isServerStart)
+{
+	FILE	   *fp;
+	DH		   *dh = NULL;
+	int			codes;
+
+	/* attempt to open file.  It's not an error if it doesn't exist. */
+	if ((fp = AllocateFile(filename, "r")) == NULL)
+	{
+		ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+				(errcode_for_file_access(),
+				 errmsg("could not open DH parameters file \"%s\": %m",
+						filename)));
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	dh = PEM_read_DHparams(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+	FreeFile(fp);
+
+	if (dh == NULL)
+	{
+		ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+				 errmsg("could not load DH parameters file: %s",
+						SSLerrmessage(ERR_get_error()))));
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	/* make sure the DH parameters are usable */
+	if (DH_check(dh, &codes) == 0)
+	{
+		ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+				 errmsg("invalid DH parameters: %s",
+						SSLerrmessage(ERR_get_error()))));
+		DH_free(dh);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (codes & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME)
+	{
+		ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+				 errmsg("invalid DH parameters: p is not prime")));
+		DH_free(dh);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if ((codes & DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR) &&
+		(codes & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME))
+	{
+		ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+				 errmsg("invalid DH parameters: neither suitable generator or safe prime")));
+		DH_free(dh);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	return dh;
+}
+
+/*
+ *	Load hardcoded DH parameters.
+ *
+ *	If DH parameters cannot be loaded from a specified file, we can load
+ *	the	hardcoded DH parameters supplied with the backend to prevent
+ *	problems.
+ */
+static DH  *
+load_dh_buffer(const char *buffer, size_t len)
+{
+	BIO		   *bio;
+	DH		   *dh = NULL;
+
+	bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(unconstify(char *, buffer), len);
+	if (bio == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	dh = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+	if (dh == NULL)
+		ereport(DEBUG2,
+				(errmsg_internal("DH load buffer: %s",
+								 SSLerrmessage(ERR_get_error()))));
+	BIO_free(bio);
+
+	return dh;
+}
+
+/*
+ *	Passphrase collection callback using ssl_passphrase_command
+ */
+static int
+ssl_external_passwd_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *userdata)
+{
+	/* same prompt as OpenSSL uses internally */
+	const char *prompt = "Enter PEM pass phrase:";
+
+	Assert(rwflag == 0);
+
+	return run_ssl_passphrase_command(prompt, ssl_is_server_start, buf, size);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Dummy passphrase callback
+ *
+ * If OpenSSL is told to use a passphrase-protected server key, by default
+ * it will issue a prompt on /dev/tty and try to read a key from there.
+ * That's no good during a postmaster SIGHUP cycle, not to mention SSL context
+ * reload in an EXEC_BACKEND postmaster child.  So override it with this dummy
+ * function that just returns an empty passphrase, guaranteeing failure.
+ */
+static int
+dummy_ssl_passwd_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *userdata)
+{
+	/* Set flag to change the error message we'll report */
+	dummy_ssl_passwd_cb_called = true;
+	/* And return empty string */
+	Assert(size > 0);
+	buf[0] = '\0';
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ *	Certificate verification callback
+ *
+ *	This callback allows us to log intermediate problems during
+ *	verification, but for now we'll see if the final error message
+ *	contains enough information.
+ *
+ *	This callback also allows us to override the default acceptance
+ *	criteria (e.g., accepting self-signed or expired certs), but
+ *	for now we accept the default checks.
+ */
+static int
+verify_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+	return ok;
+}
+
+/*
+ *	This callback is used to copy SSL information messages
+ *	into the PostgreSQL log.
+ */
+static void
+info_cb(const SSL *ssl, int type, int args)
+{
+	switch (type)
+	{
+		case SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START:
+			ereport(DEBUG4,
+					(errmsg_internal("SSL: handshake start")));
+			break;
+		case SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE:
+			ereport(DEBUG4,
+					(errmsg_internal("SSL: handshake done")));
+			break;
+		case SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP:
+			ereport(DEBUG4,
+					(errmsg_internal("SSL: accept loop")));
+			break;
+		case SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT:
+			ereport(DEBUG4,
+					(errmsg_internal("SSL: accept exit (%d)", args)));
+			break;
+		case SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP:
+			ereport(DEBUG4,
+					(errmsg_internal("SSL: connect loop")));
+			break;
+		case SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT:
+			ereport(DEBUG4,
+					(errmsg_internal("SSL: connect exit (%d)", args)));
+			break;
+		case SSL_CB_READ_ALERT:
+			ereport(DEBUG4,
+					(errmsg_internal("SSL: read alert (0x%04x)", args)));
+			break;
+		case SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT:
+			ereport(DEBUG4,
+					(errmsg_internal("SSL: write alert (0x%04x)", args)));
+			break;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set DH parameters for generating ephemeral DH keys.  The
+ * DH parameters can take a long time to compute, so they must be
+ * precomputed.
+ *
+ * Since few sites will bother to create a parameter file, we also
+ * provide a fallback to the parameters provided by the OpenSSL
+ * project.
+ *
+ * These values can be static (once loaded or computed) since the
+ * OpenSSL library can efficiently generate random keys from the
+ * information provided.
+ */
+static bool
+initialize_dh(SSL_CTX *context, bool isServerStart)
+{
+	DH		   *dh = NULL;
+
+	SSL_CTX_set_options(context, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE);
+
+	if (ssl_dh_params_file[0])
+		dh = load_dh_file(ssl_dh_params_file, isServerStart);
+	if (!dh)
+		dh = load_dh_buffer(FILE_DH2048, sizeof(FILE_DH2048));
+	if (!dh)
+	{
+		ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+				 errmsg("DH: could not load DH parameters")));
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	if (SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(context, dh) != 1)
+	{
+		ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+				 errmsg("DH: could not set DH parameters: %s",
+						SSLerrmessage(ERR_get_error()))));
+		DH_free(dh);
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	DH_free(dh);
+	return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set ECDH parameters for generating ephemeral Elliptic Curve DH
+ * keys.  This is much simpler than the DH parameters, as we just
+ * need to provide the name of the curve to OpenSSL.
+ */
+static bool
+initialize_ecdh(SSL_CTX *context, bool isServerStart)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+	EC_KEY	   *ecdh;
+	int			nid;
+
+	nid = OBJ_sn2nid(SSLECDHCurve);
+	if (!nid)
+	{
+		ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+				 errmsg("ECDH: unrecognized curve name: %s", SSLECDHCurve)));
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
+	if (!ecdh)
+	{
+		ereport(isServerStart ? FATAL : LOG,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+				 errmsg("ECDH: could not create key")));
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	SSL_CTX_set_options(context, SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE);
+	SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(context, ecdh);
+	EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
+#endif
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Obtain reason string for passed SSL errcode
+ *
+ * ERR_get_error() is used by caller to get errcode to pass here.
+ *
+ * Some caution is needed here since ERR_reason_error_string will
+ * return NULL if it doesn't recognize the error code.  We don't
+ * want to return NULL ever.
+ */
+static const char *
+SSLerrmessage(unsigned long ecode)
+{
+	const char *errreason;
+	static char errbuf[36];
+
+	if (ecode == 0)
+		return _("no SSL error reported");
+	errreason = ERR_reason_error_string(ecode);
+	if (errreason != NULL)
+		return errreason;
+	snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), _("SSL error code %lu"), ecode);
+	return errbuf;
+}
+
+int
+be_tls_get_cipher_bits(Port *port)
+{
+	int			bits;
+
+	if (port->ssl)
+	{
+		SSL_get_cipher_bits(port->ssl, &bits);
+		return bits;
+	}
+	else
+		return 0;
+}
+
+bool
+be_tls_get_compression(Port *port)
+{
+	if (port->ssl)
+		return (SSL_get_current_compression(port->ssl) != NULL);
+	else
+		return false;
+}
+
+const char *
+be_tls_get_version(Port *port)
+{
+	if (port->ssl)
+		return SSL_get_version(port->ssl);
+	else
+		return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *
+be_tls_get_cipher(Port *port)
+{
+	if (port->ssl)
+		return SSL_get_cipher(port->ssl);
+	else
+		return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_subject_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+	if (port->peer)
+		strlcpy(ptr, X509_NAME_to_cstring(X509_get_subject_name(port->peer)), len);
+	else
+		ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_issuer_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+	if (port->peer)
+		strlcpy(ptr, X509_NAME_to_cstring(X509_get_issuer_name(port->peer)), len);
+	else
+		ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peer_serial(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+	if (port->peer)
+	{
+		ASN1_INTEGER *serial;
+		BIGNUM	   *b;
+		char	   *decimal;
+
+		serial = X509_get_serialNumber(port->peer);
+		b = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(serial, NULL);
+		decimal = BN_bn2dec(b);
+
+		BN_free(b);
+		strlcpy(ptr, decimal, len);
+		OPENSSL_free(decimal);
+	}
+	else
+		ptr[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID
+char *
+be_tls_get_certificate_hash(Port *port, size_t *len)
+{
+	X509	   *server_cert;
+	char	   *cert_hash;
+	const EVP_MD *algo_type = NULL;
+	unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];	/* size for SHA-512 */
+	unsigned int hash_size;
+	int			algo_nid;
+
+	*len = 0;
+	server_cert = SSL_get_certificate(port->ssl);
+	if (server_cert == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Get the signature algorithm of the certificate to determine the hash
+	 * algorithm to use for the result.
+	 */
+	if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(X509_get_signature_nid(server_cert),
+							 &algo_nid, NULL))
+		elog(ERROR, "could not determine server certificate signature algorithm");
+
+	/*
+	 * The TLS server's certificate bytes need to be hashed with SHA-256 if
+	 * its signature algorithm is MD5 or SHA-1 as per RFC 5929
+	 * (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5929#section-4.1).  If something else
+	 * is used, the same hash as the signature algorithm is used.
+	 */
+	switch (algo_nid)
+	{
+		case NID_md5:
+		case NID_sha1:
+			algo_type = EVP_sha256();
+			break;
+		default:
+			algo_type = EVP_get_digestbynid(algo_nid);
+			if (algo_type == NULL)
+				elog(ERROR, "could not find digest for NID %s",
+					 OBJ_nid2sn(algo_nid));
+			break;
+	}
+
+	/* generate and save the certificate hash */
+	if (!X509_digest(server_cert, algo_type, hash, &hash_size))
+		elog(ERROR, "could not generate server certificate hash");
+
+	cert_hash = palloc(hash_size);
+	memcpy(cert_hash, hash, hash_size);
+	*len = hash_size;
+
+	return cert_hash;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Convert an X509 subject name to a cstring.
+ *
+ */
+static char *
+X509_NAME_to_cstring(X509_NAME *name)
+{
+	BIO		   *membuf = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+	int			i,
+				nid,
+				count = X509_NAME_entry_count(name);
+	X509_NAME_ENTRY *e;
+	ASN1_STRING *v;
+	const char *field_name;
+	size_t		size;
+	char		nullterm;
+	char	   *sp;
+	char	   *dp;
+	char	   *result;
+
+	(void) BIO_set_close(membuf, BIO_CLOSE);
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
+	{
+		e = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i);
+		nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(e));
+		v = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(e);
+		field_name = OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
+		if (!field_name)
+			field_name = OBJ_nid2ln(nid);
+		BIO_printf(membuf, "/%s=", field_name);
+		ASN1_STRING_print_ex(membuf, v,
+							 ((ASN1_STRFLGS_RFC2253 & ~ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB)
+							  | ASN1_STRFLGS_UTF8_CONVERT));
+	}
+
+	/* ensure null termination of the BIO's content */
+	nullterm = '\0';
+	BIO_write(membuf, &nullterm, 1);
+	size = BIO_get_mem_data(membuf, &sp);
+	dp = pg_any_to_server(sp, size - 1, PG_UTF8);
+
+	result = pstrdup(dp);
+	if (dp != sp)
+		pfree(dp);
+	BIO_free(membuf);
+
+	return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert TLS protocol version GUC enum to OpenSSL values
+ *
+ * This is a straightforward one-to-one mapping, but doing it this way makes
+ * guc.c independent of OpenSSL availability and version.
+ *
+ * If a version is passed that is not supported by the current OpenSSL
+ * version, then we return -1.  If a nonnegative value is returned,
+ * subsequent code can assume it's working with a supported version.
+ *
+ * Note: this is rather similar to libpq's routine in fe-secure-openssl.c,
+ * so make sure to update both routines if changing this one.
+ */
+static int
+ssl_protocol_version_to_openssl(int v)
+{
+	switch (v)
+	{
+		case PG_TLS_ANY:
+			return 0;
+		case PG_TLS1_VERSION:
+			return TLS1_VERSION;
+		case PG_TLS1_1_VERSION:
+#ifdef TLS1_1_VERSION
+			return TLS1_1_VERSION;
+#else
+			break;
+#endif
+		case PG_TLS1_2_VERSION:
+#ifdef TLS1_2_VERSION
+			return TLS1_2_VERSION;
+#else
+			break;
+#endif
+		case PG_TLS1_3_VERSION:
+#ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION
+			return TLS1_3_VERSION;
+#else
+			break;
+#endif
+	}
+
+	return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Likewise provide a mapping to strings.
+ */
+static const char *
+ssl_protocol_version_to_string(int v)
+{
+	switch (v)
+	{
+		case PG_TLS_ANY:
+			return "any";
+		case PG_TLS1_VERSION:
+			return "TLSv1";
+		case PG_TLS1_1_VERSION:
+			return "TLSv1.1";
+		case PG_TLS1_2_VERSION:
+			return "TLSv1.2";
+		case PG_TLS1_3_VERSION:
+			return "TLSv1.3";
+	}
+
+	return "(unrecognized)";
+}
+
+
+static void
+default_openssl_tls_init(SSL_CTX *context, bool isServerStart)
+{
+	if (isServerStart)
+	{
+		if (ssl_passphrase_command[0])
+			SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(context, ssl_external_passwd_cb);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		if (ssl_passphrase_command[0] && ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload)
+			SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(context, ssl_external_passwd_cb);
+		else
+
+			/*
+			 * If reloading and no external command is configured, override
+			 * OpenSSL's default handling of passphrase-protected files,
+			 * because we don't want to prompt for a passphrase in an
+			 * already-running server.
+			 */
+			SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(context, dummy_ssl_passwd_cb);
+	}
+}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..59bc02e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
@@ -0,0 +1,343 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * be-secure.c
+ *	  functions related to setting up a secure connection to the frontend.
+ *	  Secure connections are expected to provide confidentiality,
+ *	  message integrity and endpoint authentication.
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ *	  src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_TCP_H
+#include <netinet/tcp.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "libpq/libpq.h"
+#include "miscadmin.h"
+#include "pgstat.h"
+#include "storage/ipc.h"
+#include "storage/proc.h"
+#include "tcop/tcopprot.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+char	   *ssl_library;
+char	   *ssl_cert_file;
+char	   *ssl_key_file;
+char	   *ssl_ca_file;
+char	   *ssl_crl_file;
+char	   *ssl_dh_params_file;
+char	   *ssl_passphrase_command;
+bool		ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
+
+#ifdef USE_SSL
+bool		ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;
+#endif
+
+/* GUC variable controlling SSL cipher list */
+char	   *SSLCipherSuites = NULL;
+
+/* GUC variable for default ECHD curve. */
+char	   *SSLECDHCurve;
+
+/* GUC variable: if false, prefer client ciphers */
+bool		SSLPreferServerCiphers;
+
+int			ssl_min_protocol_version;
+int			ssl_max_protocol_version;
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/*			 Procedures common to all secure sessions			*/
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ *	Initialize global context.
+ *
+ * If isServerStart is true, report any errors as FATAL (so we don't return).
+ * Otherwise, log errors at LOG level and return -1 to indicate trouble,
+ * preserving the old SSL state if any.  Returns 0 if OK.
+ */
+int
+secure_initialize(bool isServerStart)
+{
+#ifdef USE_SSL
+	return be_tls_init(isServerStart);
+#else
+	return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ *	Destroy global context, if any.
+ */
+void
+secure_destroy(void)
+{
+#ifdef USE_SSL
+	be_tls_destroy();
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Indicate if we have loaded the root CA store to verify certificates
+ */
+bool
+secure_loaded_verify_locations(void)
+{
+#ifdef USE_SSL
+	return ssl_loaded_verify_locations;
+#else
+	return false;
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ *	Attempt to negotiate secure session.
+ */
+int
+secure_open_server(Port *port)
+{
+	int			r = 0;
+
+#ifdef USE_SSL
+	r = be_tls_open_server(port);
+
+	ereport(DEBUG2,
+			(errmsg("SSL connection from \"%s\"",
+					port->peer_cn ? port->peer_cn : "(anonymous)")));
+#endif
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ *	Close secure session.
+ */
+void
+secure_close(Port *port)
+{
+#ifdef USE_SSL
+	if (port->ssl_in_use)
+		be_tls_close(port);
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ *	Read data from a secure connection.
+ */
+ssize_t
+secure_read(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+	ssize_t		n;
+	int			waitfor;
+
+	/* Deal with any already-pending interrupt condition. */
+	ProcessClientReadInterrupt(false);
+
+retry:
+#ifdef USE_SSL
+	waitfor = 0;
+	if (port->ssl_in_use)
+	{
+		n = be_tls_read(port, ptr, len, &waitfor);
+	}
+	else
+#endif
+#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
+	if (port->gss && port->gss->enc)
+	{
+		n = be_gssapi_read(port, ptr, len);
+		waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
+	}
+	else
+#endif
+	{
+		n = secure_raw_read(port, ptr, len);
+		waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
+	}
+
+	/* In blocking mode, wait until the socket is ready */
+	if (n < 0 && !port->noblock && (errno == EWOULDBLOCK || errno == EAGAIN))
+	{
+		WaitEvent	event;
+
+		Assert(waitfor);
+
+		ModifyWaitEvent(FeBeWaitSet, 0, waitfor, NULL);
+
+		WaitEventSetWait(FeBeWaitSet, -1 /* no timeout */ , &event, 1,
+						 WAIT_EVENT_CLIENT_READ);
+
+		/*
+		 * If the postmaster has died, it's not safe to continue running,
+		 * because it is the postmaster's job to kill us if some other backend
+		 * exits uncleanly.  Moreover, we won't run very well in this state;
+		 * helper processes like walwriter and the bgwriter will exit, so
+		 * performance may be poor.  Finally, if we don't exit, pg_ctl will be
+		 * unable to restart the postmaster without manual intervention, so no
+		 * new connections can be accepted.  Exiting clears the deck for a
+		 * postmaster restart.
+		 *
+		 * (Note that we only make this check when we would otherwise sleep on
+		 * our latch.  We might still continue running for a while if the
+		 * postmaster is killed in mid-query, or even through multiple queries
+		 * if we never have to wait for read.  We don't want to burn too many
+		 * cycles checking for this very rare condition, and this should cause
+		 * us to exit quickly in most cases.)
+		 */
+		if (event.events & WL_POSTMASTER_DEATH)
+			ereport(FATAL,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_ADMIN_SHUTDOWN),
+					 errmsg("terminating connection due to unexpected postmaster exit")));
+
+		/* Handle interrupt. */
+		if (event.events & WL_LATCH_SET)
+		{
+			ResetLatch(MyLatch);
+			ProcessClientReadInterrupt(true);
+
+			/*
+			 * We'll retry the read. Most likely it will return immediately
+			 * because there's still no data available, and we'll wait for the
+			 * socket to become ready again.
+			 */
+		}
+		goto retry;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Process interrupts that happened during a successful (or non-blocking,
+	 * or hard-failed) read.
+	 */
+	ProcessClientReadInterrupt(false);
+
+	return n;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+secure_raw_read(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+	ssize_t		n;
+
+	/*
+	 * Try to read from the socket without blocking. If it succeeds we're
+	 * done, otherwise we'll wait for the socket using the latch mechanism.
+	 */
+#ifdef WIN32
+	pgwin32_noblock = true;
+#endif
+	n = recv(port->sock, ptr, len, 0);
+#ifdef WIN32
+	pgwin32_noblock = false;
+#endif
+
+	return n;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ *	Write data to a secure connection.
+ */
+ssize_t
+secure_write(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+	ssize_t		n;
+	int			waitfor;
+
+	/* Deal with any already-pending interrupt condition. */
+	ProcessClientWriteInterrupt(false);
+
+retry:
+	waitfor = 0;
+#ifdef USE_SSL
+	if (port->ssl_in_use)
+	{
+		n = be_tls_write(port, ptr, len, &waitfor);
+	}
+	else
+#endif
+#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
+	if (port->gss && port->gss->enc)
+	{
+		n = be_gssapi_write(port, ptr, len);
+		waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
+	}
+	else
+#endif
+	{
+		n = secure_raw_write(port, ptr, len);
+		waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
+	}
+
+	if (n < 0 && !port->noblock && (errno == EWOULDBLOCK || errno == EAGAIN))
+	{
+		WaitEvent	event;
+
+		Assert(waitfor);
+
+		ModifyWaitEvent(FeBeWaitSet, 0, waitfor, NULL);
+
+		WaitEventSetWait(FeBeWaitSet, -1 /* no timeout */ , &event, 1,
+						 WAIT_EVENT_CLIENT_WRITE);
+
+		/* See comments in secure_read. */
+		if (event.events & WL_POSTMASTER_DEATH)
+			ereport(FATAL,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_ADMIN_SHUTDOWN),
+					 errmsg("terminating connection due to unexpected postmaster exit")));
+
+		/* Handle interrupt. */
+		if (event.events & WL_LATCH_SET)
+		{
+			ResetLatch(MyLatch);
+			ProcessClientWriteInterrupt(true);
+
+			/*
+			 * We'll retry the write. Most likely it will return immediately
+			 * because there's still no buffer space available, and we'll wait
+			 * for the socket to become ready again.
+			 */
+		}
+		goto retry;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Process interrupts that happened during a successful (or non-blocking,
+	 * or hard-failed) write.
+	 */
+	ProcessClientWriteInterrupt(false);
+
+	return n;
+}
+
+ssize_t
+secure_raw_write(Port *port, const void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+	ssize_t		n;
+
+#ifdef WIN32
+	pgwin32_noblock = true;
+#endif
+	n = send(port->sock, ptr, len, 0);
+#ifdef WIN32
+	pgwin32_noblock = false;
+#endif
+
+	return n;
+}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/crypt.c b/src/backend/libpq/crypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..17b91ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/crypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,290 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * crypt.c
+ *	  Functions for dealing with encrypted passwords stored in
+ *	  pg_authid.rolpassword.
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * src/backend/libpq/crypt.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "catalog/pg_authid.h"
+#include "common/md5.h"
+#include "common/scram-common.h"
+#include "libpq/crypt.h"
+#include "libpq/scram.h"
+#include "miscadmin.h"
+#include "utils/builtins.h"
+#include "utils/syscache.h"
+#include "utils/timestamp.h"
+
+
+/*
+ * Fetch stored password for a user, for authentication.
+ *
+ * On error, returns NULL, and stores a palloc'd string describing the reason,
+ * for the postmaster log, in *logdetail.  The error reason should *not* be
+ * sent to the client, to avoid giving away user information!
+ */
+char *
+get_role_password(const char *role, char **logdetail)
+{
+	TimestampTz vuntil = 0;
+	HeapTuple	roleTup;
+	Datum		datum;
+	bool		isnull;
+	char	   *shadow_pass;
+
+	/* Get role info from pg_authid */
+	roleTup = SearchSysCache1(AUTHNAME, PointerGetDatum(role));
+	if (!HeapTupleIsValid(roleTup))
+	{
+		*logdetail = psprintf(_("Role \"%s\" does not exist."),
+							  role);
+		return NULL;			/* no such user */
+	}
+
+	datum = SysCacheGetAttr(AUTHNAME, roleTup,
+							Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword, &isnull);
+	if (isnull)
+	{
+		ReleaseSysCache(roleTup);
+		*logdetail = psprintf(_("User \"%s\" has no password assigned."),
+							  role);
+		return NULL;			/* user has no password */
+	}
+	shadow_pass = TextDatumGetCString(datum);
+
+	datum = SysCacheGetAttr(AUTHNAME, roleTup,
+							Anum_pg_authid_rolvaliduntil, &isnull);
+	if (!isnull)
+		vuntil = DatumGetTimestampTz(datum);
+
+	ReleaseSysCache(roleTup);
+
+	/*
+	 * Password OK, but check to be sure we are not past rolvaliduntil
+	 */
+	if (!isnull && vuntil < GetCurrentTimestamp())
+	{
+		*logdetail = psprintf(_("User \"%s\" has an expired password."),
+							  role);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	return shadow_pass;
+}
+
+/*
+ * What kind of a password type is 'shadow_pass'?
+ */
+PasswordType
+get_password_type(const char *shadow_pass)
+{
+	char	   *encoded_salt;
+	int			iterations;
+	uint8		stored_key[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
+	uint8		server_key[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
+
+	if (strncmp(shadow_pass, "md5", 3) == 0 &&
+		strlen(shadow_pass) == MD5_PASSWD_LEN &&
+		strspn(shadow_pass + 3, MD5_PASSWD_CHARSET) == MD5_PASSWD_LEN - 3)
+		return PASSWORD_TYPE_MD5;
+	if (parse_scram_secret(shadow_pass, &iterations, &encoded_salt,
+						   stored_key, server_key))
+		return PASSWORD_TYPE_SCRAM_SHA_256;
+	return PASSWORD_TYPE_PLAINTEXT;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Given a user-supplied password, convert it into a secret of
+ * 'target_type' kind.
+ *
+ * If the password is already in encrypted form, we cannot reverse the
+ * hash, so it is stored as it is regardless of the requested type.
+ */
+char *
+encrypt_password(PasswordType target_type, const char *role,
+				 const char *password)
+{
+	PasswordType guessed_type = get_password_type(password);
+	char	   *encrypted_password;
+
+	if (guessed_type != PASSWORD_TYPE_PLAINTEXT)
+	{
+		/*
+		 * Cannot convert an already-encrypted password from one format to
+		 * another, so return it as it is.
+		 */
+		return pstrdup(password);
+	}
+
+	switch (target_type)
+	{
+		case PASSWORD_TYPE_MD5:
+			encrypted_password = palloc(MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1);
+
+			if (!pg_md5_encrypt(password, role, strlen(role),
+								encrypted_password))
+				elog(ERROR, "password encryption failed");
+			return encrypted_password;
+
+		case PASSWORD_TYPE_SCRAM_SHA_256:
+			return pg_be_scram_build_secret(password);
+
+		case PASSWORD_TYPE_PLAINTEXT:
+			elog(ERROR, "cannot encrypt password with 'plaintext'");
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * This shouldn't happen, because the above switch statements should
+	 * handle every combination of source and target password types.
+	 */
+	elog(ERROR, "cannot encrypt password to requested type");
+	return NULL;				/* keep compiler quiet */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check MD5 authentication response, and return STATUS_OK or STATUS_ERROR.
+ *
+ * 'shadow_pass' is the user's correct password or password hash, as stored
+ * in pg_authid.rolpassword.
+ * 'client_pass' is the response given by the remote user to the MD5 challenge.
+ * 'md5_salt' is the salt used in the MD5 authentication challenge.
+ *
+ * In the error case, optionally store a palloc'd string at *logdetail
+ * that will be sent to the postmaster log (but not the client).
+ */
+int
+md5_crypt_verify(const char *role, const char *shadow_pass,
+				 const char *client_pass,
+				 const char *md5_salt, int md5_salt_len,
+				 char **logdetail)
+{
+	int			retval;
+	char		crypt_pwd[MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1];
+
+	Assert(md5_salt_len > 0);
+
+	if (get_password_type(shadow_pass) != PASSWORD_TYPE_MD5)
+	{
+		/* incompatible password hash format. */
+		*logdetail = psprintf(_("User \"%s\" has a password that cannot be used with MD5 authentication."),
+							  role);
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Compute the correct answer for the MD5 challenge.
+	 *
+	 * We do not bother setting logdetail for any pg_md5_encrypt failure
+	 * below: the only possible error is out-of-memory, which is unlikely, and
+	 * if it did happen adding a psprintf call would only make things worse.
+	 */
+	/* stored password already encrypted, only do salt */
+	if (!pg_md5_encrypt(shadow_pass + strlen("md5"),
+						md5_salt, md5_salt_len,
+						crypt_pwd))
+	{
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	if (strcmp(client_pass, crypt_pwd) == 0)
+		retval = STATUS_OK;
+	else
+	{
+		*logdetail = psprintf(_("Password does not match for user \"%s\"."),
+							  role);
+		retval = STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	return retval;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check given password for given user, and return STATUS_OK or STATUS_ERROR.
+ *
+ * 'shadow_pass' is the user's correct password hash, as stored in
+ * pg_authid.rolpassword.
+ * 'client_pass' is the password given by the remote user.
+ *
+ * In the error case, optionally store a palloc'd string at *logdetail
+ * that will be sent to the postmaster log (but not the client).
+ */
+int
+plain_crypt_verify(const char *role, const char *shadow_pass,
+				   const char *client_pass,
+				   char **logdetail)
+{
+	char		crypt_client_pass[MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1];
+
+	/*
+	 * Client sent password in plaintext.  If we have an MD5 hash stored, hash
+	 * the password the client sent, and compare the hashes.  Otherwise
+	 * compare the plaintext passwords directly.
+	 */
+	switch (get_password_type(shadow_pass))
+	{
+		case PASSWORD_TYPE_SCRAM_SHA_256:
+			if (scram_verify_plain_password(role,
+											client_pass,
+											shadow_pass))
+			{
+				return STATUS_OK;
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				*logdetail = psprintf(_("Password does not match for user \"%s\"."),
+									  role);
+				return STATUS_ERROR;
+			}
+			break;
+
+		case PASSWORD_TYPE_MD5:
+			if (!pg_md5_encrypt(client_pass,
+								role,
+								strlen(role),
+								crypt_client_pass))
+			{
+				/*
+				 * We do not bother setting logdetail for pg_md5_encrypt
+				 * failure: the only possible error is out-of-memory, which is
+				 * unlikely, and if it did happen adding a psprintf call would
+				 * only make things worse.
+				 */
+				return STATUS_ERROR;
+			}
+			if (strcmp(crypt_client_pass, shadow_pass) == 0)
+				return STATUS_OK;
+			else
+			{
+				*logdetail = psprintf(_("Password does not match for user \"%s\"."),
+									  role);
+				return STATUS_ERROR;
+			}
+			break;
+
+		case PASSWORD_TYPE_PLAINTEXT:
+
+			/*
+			 * We never store passwords in plaintext, so this shouldn't
+			 * happen.
+			 */
+			break;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * This shouldn't happen.  Plain "password" authentication is possible
+	 * with any kind of stored password hash.
+	 */
+	*logdetail = psprintf(_("Password of user \"%s\" is in unrecognized format."),
+						  role);
+	return STATUS_ERROR;
+}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/hba.c b/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..031c460
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3091 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * hba.c
+ *	  Routines to handle host based authentication (that's the scheme
+ *	  wherein you authenticate a user by seeing what IP address the system
+ *	  says he comes from and choosing authentication method based on it).
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ *	  src/backend/libpq/hba.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "access/htup_details.h"
+#include "catalog/pg_collation.h"
+#include "catalog/pg_type.h"
+#include "common/ip.h"
+#include "funcapi.h"
+#include "libpq/ifaddr.h"
+#include "libpq/libpq.h"
+#include "miscadmin.h"
+#include "postmaster/postmaster.h"
+#include "regex/regex.h"
+#include "replication/walsender.h"
+#include "storage/fd.h"
+#include "utils/acl.h"
+#include "utils/builtins.h"
+#include "utils/guc.h"
+#include "utils/lsyscache.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+#include "utils/varlena.h"
+
+#ifdef USE_LDAP
+#ifdef WIN32
+#include <winldap.h>
+#else
+#include <ldap.h>
+#endif
+#endif
+
+
+#define MAX_TOKEN	256
+#define MAX_LINE	8192
+
+/* callback data for check_network_callback */
+typedef struct check_network_data
+{
+	IPCompareMethod method;		/* test method */
+	SockAddr   *raddr;			/* client's actual address */
+	bool		result;			/* set to true if match */
+} check_network_data;
+
+
+#define token_is_keyword(t, k)	(!t->quoted && strcmp(t->string, k) == 0)
+#define token_matches(t, k)  (strcmp(t->string, k) == 0)
+
+/*
+ * A single string token lexed from a config file, together with whether
+ * the token had been quoted.
+ */
+typedef struct HbaToken
+{
+	char	   *string;
+	bool		quoted;
+} HbaToken;
+
+/*
+ * TokenizedLine represents one line lexed from a config file.
+ * Each item in the "fields" list is a sub-list of HbaTokens.
+ * We don't emit a TokenizedLine for empty or all-comment lines,
+ * so "fields" is never NIL (nor are any of its sub-lists).
+ * Exception: if an error occurs during tokenization, we might
+ * have fields == NIL, in which case err_msg != NULL.
+ */
+typedef struct TokenizedLine
+{
+	List	   *fields;			/* List of lists of HbaTokens */
+	int			line_num;		/* Line number */
+	char	   *raw_line;		/* Raw line text */
+	char	   *err_msg;		/* Error message if any */
+} TokenizedLine;
+
+/*
+ * pre-parsed content of HBA config file: list of HbaLine structs.
+ * parsed_hba_context is the memory context where it lives.
+ */
+static List *parsed_hba_lines = NIL;
+static MemoryContext parsed_hba_context = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * pre-parsed content of ident mapping file: list of IdentLine structs.
+ * parsed_ident_context is the memory context where it lives.
+ *
+ * NOTE: the IdentLine structs can contain pre-compiled regular expressions
+ * that live outside the memory context. Before destroying or resetting the
+ * memory context, they need to be explicitly free'd.
+ */
+static List *parsed_ident_lines = NIL;
+static MemoryContext parsed_ident_context = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * The following character array represents the names of the authentication
+ * methods that are supported by PostgreSQL.
+ *
+ * Note: keep this in sync with the UserAuth enum in hba.h.
+ */
+static const char *const UserAuthName[] =
+{
+	"reject",
+	"implicit reject",			/* Not a user-visible option */
+	"trust",
+	"ident",
+	"password",
+	"md5",
+	"scram-sha-256",
+	"gss",
+	"sspi",
+	"pam",
+	"bsd",
+	"ldap",
+	"cert",
+	"radius",
+	"peer"
+};
+
+
+static MemoryContext tokenize_file(const char *filename, FILE *file,
+								   List **tok_lines, int elevel);
+static List *tokenize_inc_file(List *tokens, const char *outer_filename,
+							   const char *inc_filename, int elevel, char **err_msg);
+static bool parse_hba_auth_opt(char *name, char *val, HbaLine *hbaline,
+							   int elevel, char **err_msg);
+static bool verify_option_list_length(List *options, const char *optionname,
+									  List *masters, const char *mastername, int line_num);
+static ArrayType *gethba_options(HbaLine *hba);
+static void fill_hba_line(Tuplestorestate *tuple_store, TupleDesc tupdesc,
+						  int lineno, HbaLine *hba, const char *err_msg);
+static void fill_hba_view(Tuplestorestate *tuple_store, TupleDesc tupdesc);
+
+
+/*
+ * isblank() exists in the ISO C99 spec, but it's not very portable yet,
+ * so provide our own version.
+ */
+bool
+pg_isblank(const char c)
+{
+	return c == ' ' || c == '\t' || c == '\r';
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Grab one token out of the string pointed to by *lineptr.
+ *
+ * Tokens are strings of non-blank
+ * characters bounded by blank characters, commas, beginning of line, and
+ * end of line. Blank means space or tab. Tokens can be delimited by
+ * double quotes (this allows the inclusion of blanks, but not newlines).
+ * Comments (started by an unquoted '#') are skipped.
+ *
+ * The token, if any, is returned at *buf (a buffer of size bufsz), and
+ * *lineptr is advanced past the token.
+ *
+ * Also, we set *initial_quote to indicate whether there was quoting before
+ * the first character.  (We use that to prevent "@x" from being treated
+ * as a file inclusion request.  Note that @"x" should be so treated;
+ * we want to allow that to support embedded spaces in file paths.)
+ *
+ * We set *terminating_comma to indicate whether the token is terminated by a
+ * comma (which is not returned).
+ *
+ * In event of an error, log a message at ereport level elevel, and also
+ * set *err_msg to a string describing the error.  Currently the only
+ * possible error is token too long for buf.
+ *
+ * If successful: store null-terminated token at *buf and return true.
+ * If no more tokens on line: set *buf = '\0' and return false.
+ * If error: fill buf with truncated or misformatted token and return false.
+ */
+static bool
+next_token(char **lineptr, char *buf, int bufsz,
+		   bool *initial_quote, bool *terminating_comma,
+		   int elevel, char **err_msg)
+{
+	int			c;
+	char	   *start_buf = buf;
+	char	   *end_buf = buf + (bufsz - 1);
+	bool		in_quote = false;
+	bool		was_quote = false;
+	bool		saw_quote = false;
+
+	Assert(end_buf > start_buf);
+
+	*initial_quote = false;
+	*terminating_comma = false;
+
+	/* Move over any whitespace and commas preceding the next token */
+	while ((c = (*(*lineptr)++)) != '\0' && (pg_isblank(c) || c == ','))
+		;
+
+	/*
+	 * Build a token in buf of next characters up to EOL, unquoted comma, or
+	 * unquoted whitespace.
+	 */
+	while (c != '\0' &&
+		   (!pg_isblank(c) || in_quote))
+	{
+		/* skip comments to EOL */
+		if (c == '#' && !in_quote)
+		{
+			while ((c = (*(*lineptr)++)) != '\0')
+				;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (buf >= end_buf)
+		{
+			*buf = '\0';
+			ereport(elevel,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+					 errmsg("authentication file token too long, skipping: \"%s\"",
+							start_buf)));
+			*err_msg = "authentication file token too long";
+			/* Discard remainder of line */
+			while ((c = (*(*lineptr)++)) != '\0')
+				;
+			/* Un-eat the '\0', in case we're called again */
+			(*lineptr)--;
+			return false;
+		}
+
+		/* we do not pass back a terminating comma in the token */
+		if (c == ',' && !in_quote)
+		{
+			*terminating_comma = true;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (c != '"' || was_quote)
+			*buf++ = c;
+
+		/* Literal double-quote is two double-quotes */
+		if (in_quote && c == '"')
+			was_quote = !was_quote;
+		else
+			was_quote = false;
+
+		if (c == '"')
+		{
+			in_quote = !in_quote;
+			saw_quote = true;
+			if (buf == start_buf)
+				*initial_quote = true;
+		}
+
+		c = *(*lineptr)++;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Un-eat the char right after the token (critical in case it is '\0',
+	 * else next call will read past end of string).
+	 */
+	(*lineptr)--;
+
+	*buf = '\0';
+
+	return (saw_quote || buf > start_buf);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Construct a palloc'd HbaToken struct, copying the given string.
+ */
+static HbaToken *
+make_hba_token(const char *token, bool quoted)
+{
+	HbaToken   *hbatoken;
+	int			toklen;
+
+	toklen = strlen(token);
+	/* we copy string into same palloc block as the struct */
+	hbatoken = (HbaToken *) palloc(sizeof(HbaToken) + toklen + 1);
+	hbatoken->string = (char *) hbatoken + sizeof(HbaToken);
+	hbatoken->quoted = quoted;
+	memcpy(hbatoken->string, token, toklen + 1);
+
+	return hbatoken;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copy a HbaToken struct into freshly palloc'd memory.
+ */
+static HbaToken *
+copy_hba_token(HbaToken *in)
+{
+	HbaToken   *out = make_hba_token(in->string, in->quoted);
+
+	return out;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Tokenize one HBA field from a line, handling file inclusion and comma lists.
+ *
+ * filename: current file's pathname (needed to resolve relative pathnames)
+ * *lineptr: current line pointer, which will be advanced past field
+ *
+ * In event of an error, log a message at ereport level elevel, and also
+ * set *err_msg to a string describing the error.  Note that the result
+ * may be non-NIL anyway, so *err_msg must be tested to determine whether
+ * there was an error.
+ *
+ * The result is a List of HbaToken structs, one for each token in the field,
+ * or NIL if we reached EOL.
+ */
+static List *
+next_field_expand(const char *filename, char **lineptr,
+				  int elevel, char **err_msg)
+{
+	char		buf[MAX_TOKEN];
+	bool		trailing_comma;
+	bool		initial_quote;
+	List	   *tokens = NIL;
+
+	do
+	{
+		if (!next_token(lineptr, buf, sizeof(buf),
+						&initial_quote, &trailing_comma,
+						elevel, err_msg))
+			break;
+
+		/* Is this referencing a file? */
+		if (!initial_quote && buf[0] == '@' && buf[1] != '\0')
+			tokens = tokenize_inc_file(tokens, filename, buf + 1,
+									   elevel, err_msg);
+		else
+			tokens = lappend(tokens, make_hba_token(buf, initial_quote));
+	} while (trailing_comma && (*err_msg == NULL));
+
+	return tokens;
+}
+
+/*
+ * tokenize_inc_file
+ *		Expand a file included from another file into an hba "field"
+ *
+ * Opens and tokenises a file included from another HBA config file with @,
+ * and returns all values found therein as a flat list of HbaTokens.  If a
+ * @-token is found, recursively expand it.  The newly read tokens are
+ * appended to "tokens" (so that foo,bar,@baz does what you expect).
+ * All new tokens are allocated in caller's memory context.
+ *
+ * In event of an error, log a message at ereport level elevel, and also
+ * set *err_msg to a string describing the error.  Note that the result
+ * may be non-NIL anyway, so *err_msg must be tested to determine whether
+ * there was an error.
+ */
+static List *
+tokenize_inc_file(List *tokens,
+				  const char *outer_filename,
+				  const char *inc_filename,
+				  int elevel,
+				  char **err_msg)
+{
+	char	   *inc_fullname;
+	FILE	   *inc_file;
+	List	   *inc_lines;
+	ListCell   *inc_line;
+	MemoryContext linecxt;
+
+	if (is_absolute_path(inc_filename))
+	{
+		/* absolute path is taken as-is */
+		inc_fullname = pstrdup(inc_filename);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		/* relative path is relative to dir of calling file */
+		inc_fullname = (char *) palloc(strlen(outer_filename) + 1 +
+									   strlen(inc_filename) + 1);
+		strcpy(inc_fullname, outer_filename);
+		get_parent_directory(inc_fullname);
+		join_path_components(inc_fullname, inc_fullname, inc_filename);
+		canonicalize_path(inc_fullname);
+	}
+
+	inc_file = AllocateFile(inc_fullname, "r");
+	if (inc_file == NULL)
+	{
+		int			save_errno = errno;
+
+		ereport(elevel,
+				(errcode_for_file_access(),
+				 errmsg("could not open secondary authentication file \"@%s\" as \"%s\": %m",
+						inc_filename, inc_fullname)));
+		*err_msg = psprintf("could not open secondary authentication file \"@%s\" as \"%s\": %s",
+							inc_filename, inc_fullname, strerror(save_errno));
+		pfree(inc_fullname);
+		return tokens;
+	}
+
+	/* There is possible recursion here if the file contains @ */
+	linecxt = tokenize_file(inc_fullname, inc_file, &inc_lines, elevel);
+
+	FreeFile(inc_file);
+	pfree(inc_fullname);
+
+	/* Copy all tokens found in the file and append to the tokens list */
+	foreach(inc_line, inc_lines)
+	{
+		TokenizedLine *tok_line = (TokenizedLine *) lfirst(inc_line);
+		ListCell   *inc_field;
+
+		/* If any line has an error, propagate that up to caller */
+		if (tok_line->err_msg)
+		{
+			*err_msg = pstrdup(tok_line->err_msg);
+			break;
+		}
+
+		foreach(inc_field, tok_line->fields)
+		{
+			List	   *inc_tokens = lfirst(inc_field);
+			ListCell   *inc_token;
+
+			foreach(inc_token, inc_tokens)
+			{
+				HbaToken   *token = lfirst(inc_token);
+
+				tokens = lappend(tokens, copy_hba_token(token));
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	MemoryContextDelete(linecxt);
+	return tokens;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Tokenize the given file.
+ *
+ * The output is a list of TokenizedLine structs; see struct definition above.
+ *
+ * filename: the absolute path to the target file
+ * file: the already-opened target file
+ * tok_lines: receives output list
+ * elevel: message logging level
+ *
+ * Errors are reported by logging messages at ereport level elevel and by
+ * adding TokenizedLine structs containing non-null err_msg fields to the
+ * output list.
+ *
+ * Return value is a memory context which contains all memory allocated by
+ * this function (it's a child of caller's context).
+ */
+static MemoryContext
+tokenize_file(const char *filename, FILE *file, List **tok_lines, int elevel)
+{
+	int			line_number = 1;
+	MemoryContext linecxt;
+	MemoryContext oldcxt;
+
+	linecxt = AllocSetContextCreate(CurrentMemoryContext,
+									"tokenize_file",
+									ALLOCSET_SMALL_SIZES);
+	oldcxt = MemoryContextSwitchTo(linecxt);
+
+	*tok_lines = NIL;
+
+	while (!feof(file) && !ferror(file))
+	{
+		char		rawline[MAX_LINE];
+		char	   *lineptr;
+		List	   *current_line = NIL;
+		char	   *err_msg = NULL;
+
+		if (!fgets(rawline, sizeof(rawline), file))
+		{
+			int			save_errno = errno;
+
+			if (!ferror(file))
+				break;			/* normal EOF */
+			/* I/O error! */
+			ereport(elevel,
+					(errcode_for_file_access(),
+					 errmsg("could not read file \"%s\": %m", filename)));
+			err_msg = psprintf("could not read file \"%s\": %s",
+							   filename, strerror(save_errno));
+			rawline[0] = '\0';
+		}
+		if (strlen(rawline) == MAX_LINE - 1)
+		{
+			/* Line too long! */
+			ereport(elevel,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+					 errmsg("authentication file line too long"),
+					 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+								line_number, filename)));
+			err_msg = "authentication file line too long";
+		}
+
+		/* Strip trailing linebreak from rawline */
+		lineptr = rawline + strlen(rawline) - 1;
+		while (lineptr >= rawline && (*lineptr == '\n' || *lineptr == '\r'))
+			*lineptr-- = '\0';
+
+		/* Parse fields */
+		lineptr = rawline;
+		while (*lineptr && err_msg == NULL)
+		{
+			List	   *current_field;
+
+			current_field = next_field_expand(filename, &lineptr,
+											  elevel, &err_msg);
+			/* add field to line, unless we are at EOL or comment start */
+			if (current_field != NIL)
+				current_line = lappend(current_line, current_field);
+		}
+
+		/* Reached EOL; emit line to TokenizedLine list unless it's boring */
+		if (current_line != NIL || err_msg != NULL)
+		{
+			TokenizedLine *tok_line;
+
+			tok_line = (TokenizedLine *) palloc(sizeof(TokenizedLine));
+			tok_line->fields = current_line;
+			tok_line->line_num = line_number;
+			tok_line->raw_line = pstrdup(rawline);
+			tok_line->err_msg = err_msg;
+			*tok_lines = lappend(*tok_lines, tok_line);
+		}
+
+		line_number++;
+	}
+
+	MemoryContextSwitchTo(oldcxt);
+
+	return linecxt;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Does user belong to role?
+ *
+ * userid is the OID of the role given as the attempted login identifier.
+ * We check to see if it is a member of the specified role name.
+ */
+static bool
+is_member(Oid userid, const char *role)
+{
+	Oid			roleid;
+
+	if (!OidIsValid(userid))
+		return false;			/* if user not exist, say "no" */
+
+	roleid = get_role_oid(role, true);
+
+	if (!OidIsValid(roleid))
+		return false;			/* if target role not exist, say "no" */
+
+	/*
+	 * See if user is directly or indirectly a member of role. For this
+	 * purpose, a superuser is not considered to be automatically a member of
+	 * the role, so group auth only applies to explicit membership.
+	 */
+	return is_member_of_role_nosuper(userid, roleid);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check HbaToken list for a match to role, allowing group names.
+ */
+static bool
+check_role(const char *role, Oid roleid, List *tokens)
+{
+	ListCell   *cell;
+	HbaToken   *tok;
+
+	foreach(cell, tokens)
+	{
+		tok = lfirst(cell);
+		if (!tok->quoted && tok->string[0] == '+')
+		{
+			if (is_member(roleid, tok->string + 1))
+				return true;
+		}
+		else if (token_matches(tok, role) ||
+				 token_is_keyword(tok, "all"))
+			return true;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check to see if db/role combination matches HbaToken list.
+ */
+static bool
+check_db(const char *dbname, const char *role, Oid roleid, List *tokens)
+{
+	ListCell   *cell;
+	HbaToken   *tok;
+
+	foreach(cell, tokens)
+	{
+		tok = lfirst(cell);
+		if (am_walsender && !am_db_walsender)
+		{
+			/*
+			 * physical replication walsender connections can only match
+			 * replication keyword
+			 */
+			if (token_is_keyword(tok, "replication"))
+				return true;
+		}
+		else if (token_is_keyword(tok, "all"))
+			return true;
+		else if (token_is_keyword(tok, "sameuser"))
+		{
+			if (strcmp(dbname, role) == 0)
+				return true;
+		}
+		else if (token_is_keyword(tok, "samegroup") ||
+				 token_is_keyword(tok, "samerole"))
+		{
+			if (is_member(roleid, dbname))
+				return true;
+		}
+		else if (token_is_keyword(tok, "replication"))
+			continue;			/* never match this if not walsender */
+		else if (token_matches(tok, dbname))
+			return true;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+static bool
+ipv4eq(struct sockaddr_in *a, struct sockaddr_in *b)
+{
+	return (a->sin_addr.s_addr == b->sin_addr.s_addr);
+}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_IPV6
+
+static bool
+ipv6eq(struct sockaddr_in6 *a, struct sockaddr_in6 *b)
+{
+	int			i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+		if (a->sin6_addr.s6_addr[i] != b->sin6_addr.s6_addr[i])
+			return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+#endif							/* HAVE_IPV6 */
+
+/*
+ * Check whether host name matches pattern.
+ */
+static bool
+hostname_match(const char *pattern, const char *actual_hostname)
+{
+	if (pattern[0] == '.')		/* suffix match */
+	{
+		size_t		plen = strlen(pattern);
+		size_t		hlen = strlen(actual_hostname);
+
+		if (hlen < plen)
+			return false;
+
+		return (pg_strcasecmp(pattern, actual_hostname + (hlen - plen)) == 0);
+	}
+	else
+		return (pg_strcasecmp(pattern, actual_hostname) == 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check to see if a connecting IP matches a given host name.
+ */
+static bool
+check_hostname(hbaPort *port, const char *hostname)
+{
+	struct addrinfo *gai_result,
+			   *gai;
+	int			ret;
+	bool		found;
+
+	/* Quick out if remote host name already known bad */
+	if (port->remote_hostname_resolv < 0)
+		return false;
+
+	/* Lookup remote host name if not already done */
+	if (!port->remote_hostname)
+	{
+		char		remote_hostname[NI_MAXHOST];
+
+		ret = pg_getnameinfo_all(&port->raddr.addr, port->raddr.salen,
+								 remote_hostname, sizeof(remote_hostname),
+								 NULL, 0,
+								 NI_NAMEREQD);
+		if (ret != 0)
+		{
+			/* remember failure; don't complain in the postmaster log yet */
+			port->remote_hostname_resolv = -2;
+			port->remote_hostname_errcode = ret;
+			return false;
+		}
+
+		port->remote_hostname = pstrdup(remote_hostname);
+	}
+
+	/* Now see if remote host name matches this pg_hba line */
+	if (!hostname_match(hostname, port->remote_hostname))
+		return false;
+
+	/* If we already verified the forward lookup, we're done */
+	if (port->remote_hostname_resolv == +1)
+		return true;
+
+	/* Lookup IP from host name and check against original IP */
+	ret = getaddrinfo(port->remote_hostname, NULL, NULL, &gai_result);
+	if (ret != 0)
+	{
+		/* remember failure; don't complain in the postmaster log yet */
+		port->remote_hostname_resolv = -2;
+		port->remote_hostname_errcode = ret;
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	found = false;
+	for (gai = gai_result; gai; gai = gai->ai_next)
+	{
+		if (gai->ai_addr->sa_family == port->raddr.addr.ss_family)
+		{
+			if (gai->ai_addr->sa_family == AF_INET)
+			{
+				if (ipv4eq((struct sockaddr_in *) gai->ai_addr,
+						   (struct sockaddr_in *) &port->raddr.addr))
+				{
+					found = true;
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+#ifdef HAVE_IPV6
+			else if (gai->ai_addr->sa_family == AF_INET6)
+			{
+				if (ipv6eq((struct sockaddr_in6 *) gai->ai_addr,
+						   (struct sockaddr_in6 *) &port->raddr.addr))
+				{
+					found = true;
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+#endif
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (gai_result)
+		freeaddrinfo(gai_result);
+
+	if (!found)
+		elog(DEBUG2, "pg_hba.conf host name \"%s\" rejected because address resolution did not return a match with IP address of client",
+			 hostname);
+
+	port->remote_hostname_resolv = found ? +1 : -1;
+
+	return found;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check to see if a connecting IP matches the given address and netmask.
+ */
+static bool
+check_ip(SockAddr *raddr, struct sockaddr *addr, struct sockaddr *mask)
+{
+	if (raddr->addr.ss_family == addr->sa_family &&
+		pg_range_sockaddr(&raddr->addr,
+						  (struct sockaddr_storage *) addr,
+						  (struct sockaddr_storage *) mask))
+		return true;
+	return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_foreach_ifaddr callback: does client addr match this machine interface?
+ */
+static void
+check_network_callback(struct sockaddr *addr, struct sockaddr *netmask,
+					   void *cb_data)
+{
+	check_network_data *cn = (check_network_data *) cb_data;
+	struct sockaddr_storage mask;
+
+	/* Already found a match? */
+	if (cn->result)
+		return;
+
+	if (cn->method == ipCmpSameHost)
+	{
+		/* Make an all-ones netmask of appropriate length for family */
+		pg_sockaddr_cidr_mask(&mask, NULL, addr->sa_family);
+		cn->result = check_ip(cn->raddr, addr, (struct sockaddr *) &mask);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		/* Use the netmask of the interface itself */
+		cn->result = check_ip(cn->raddr, addr, netmask);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Use pg_foreach_ifaddr to check a samehost or samenet match
+ */
+static bool
+check_same_host_or_net(SockAddr *raddr, IPCompareMethod method)
+{
+	check_network_data cn;
+
+	cn.method = method;
+	cn.raddr = raddr;
+	cn.result = false;
+
+	errno = 0;
+	if (pg_foreach_ifaddr(check_network_callback, &cn) < 0)
+	{
+		elog(LOG, "error enumerating network interfaces: %m");
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	return cn.result;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Macros used to check and report on invalid configuration options.
+ * On error: log a message at level elevel, set *err_msg, and exit the function.
+ * These macros are not as general-purpose as they look, because they know
+ * what the calling function's error-exit value is.
+ *
+ * INVALID_AUTH_OPTION = reports when an option is specified for a method where it's
+ *						 not supported.
+ * REQUIRE_AUTH_OPTION = same as INVALID_AUTH_OPTION, except it also checks if the
+ *						 method is actually the one specified. Used as a shortcut when
+ *						 the option is only valid for one authentication method.
+ * MANDATORY_AUTH_ARG  = check if a required option is set for an authentication method,
+ *						 reporting error if it's not.
+ */
+#define INVALID_AUTH_OPTION(optname, validmethods) \
+do { \
+	ereport(elevel, \
+			(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR), \
+			 /* translator: the second %s is a list of auth methods */ \
+			 errmsg("authentication option \"%s\" is only valid for authentication methods %s", \
+					optname, _(validmethods)), \
+			 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"", \
+					line_num, HbaFileName))); \
+	*err_msg = psprintf("authentication option \"%s\" is only valid for authentication methods %s", \
+						optname, validmethods); \
+	return false; \
+} while (0)
+
+#define REQUIRE_AUTH_OPTION(methodval, optname, validmethods) \
+do { \
+	if (hbaline->auth_method != methodval) \
+		INVALID_AUTH_OPTION(optname, validmethods); \
+} while (0)
+
+#define MANDATORY_AUTH_ARG(argvar, argname, authname) \
+do { \
+	if (argvar == NULL) { \
+		ereport(elevel, \
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR), \
+				 errmsg("authentication method \"%s\" requires argument \"%s\" to be set", \
+						authname, argname), \
+				 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"", \
+						line_num, HbaFileName))); \
+		*err_msg = psprintf("authentication method \"%s\" requires argument \"%s\" to be set", \
+							authname, argname); \
+		return NULL; \
+	} \
+} while (0)
+
+/*
+ * Macros for handling pg_ident problems.
+ * Much as above, but currently the message level is hardwired as LOG
+ * and there is no provision for an err_msg string.
+ *
+ * IDENT_FIELD_ABSENT:
+ * Log a message and exit the function if the given ident field ListCell is
+ * not populated.
+ *
+ * IDENT_MULTI_VALUE:
+ * Log a message and exit the function if the given ident token List has more
+ * than one element.
+ */
+#define IDENT_FIELD_ABSENT(field) \
+do { \
+	if (!field) { \
+		ereport(LOG, \
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR), \
+				 errmsg("missing entry in file \"%s\" at end of line %d", \
+						IdentFileName, line_num))); \
+		return NULL; \
+	} \
+} while (0)
+
+#define IDENT_MULTI_VALUE(tokens) \
+do { \
+	if (tokens->length > 1) { \
+		ereport(LOG, \
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR), \
+				 errmsg("multiple values in ident field"), \
+				 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"", \
+							line_num, IdentFileName))); \
+		return NULL; \
+	} \
+} while (0)
+
+
+/*
+ * Parse one tokenised line from the hba config file and store the result in a
+ * HbaLine structure.
+ *
+ * If parsing fails, log a message at ereport level elevel, store an error
+ * string in tok_line->err_msg, and return NULL.  (Some non-error conditions
+ * can also result in such messages.)
+ *
+ * Note: this function leaks memory when an error occurs.  Caller is expected
+ * to have set a memory context that will be reset if this function returns
+ * NULL.
+ */
+static HbaLine *
+parse_hba_line(TokenizedLine *tok_line, int elevel)
+{
+	int			line_num = tok_line->line_num;
+	char	  **err_msg = &tok_line->err_msg;
+	char	   *str;
+	struct addrinfo *gai_result;
+	struct addrinfo hints;
+	int			ret;
+	char	   *cidr_slash;
+	char	   *unsupauth;
+	ListCell   *field;
+	List	   *tokens;
+	ListCell   *tokencell;
+	HbaToken   *token;
+	HbaLine    *parsedline;
+
+	parsedline = palloc0(sizeof(HbaLine));
+	parsedline->linenumber = line_num;
+	parsedline->rawline = pstrdup(tok_line->raw_line);
+
+	/* Check the record type. */
+	Assert(tok_line->fields != NIL);
+	field = list_head(tok_line->fields);
+	tokens = lfirst(field);
+	if (tokens->length > 1)
+	{
+		ereport(elevel,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+				 errmsg("multiple values specified for connection type"),
+				 errhint("Specify exactly one connection type per line."),
+				 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+							line_num, HbaFileName)));
+		*err_msg = "multiple values specified for connection type";
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	token = linitial(tokens);
+	if (strcmp(token->string, "local") == 0)
+	{
+#ifdef HAVE_UNIX_SOCKETS
+		parsedline->conntype = ctLocal;
+#else
+		ereport(elevel,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+				 errmsg("local connections are not supported by this build"),
+				 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+							line_num, HbaFileName)));
+		*err_msg = "local connections are not supported by this build";
+		return NULL;
+#endif
+	}
+	else if (strcmp(token->string, "host") == 0 ||
+			 strcmp(token->string, "hostssl") == 0 ||
+			 strcmp(token->string, "hostnossl") == 0 ||
+			 strcmp(token->string, "hostgssenc") == 0 ||
+			 strcmp(token->string, "hostnogssenc") == 0)
+	{
+
+		if (token->string[4] == 's')	/* "hostssl" */
+		{
+			parsedline->conntype = ctHostSSL;
+			/* Log a warning if SSL support is not active */
+#ifdef USE_SSL
+			if (!EnableSSL)
+			{
+				ereport(elevel,
+						(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+						 errmsg("hostssl record cannot match because SSL is disabled"),
+						 errhint("Set ssl = on in postgresql.conf."),
+						 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+									line_num, HbaFileName)));
+				*err_msg = "hostssl record cannot match because SSL is disabled";
+			}
+#else
+			ereport(elevel,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+					 errmsg("hostssl record cannot match because SSL is not supported by this build"),
+					 errhint("Compile with --with-openssl to use SSL connections."),
+					 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+								line_num, HbaFileName)));
+			*err_msg = "hostssl record cannot match because SSL is not supported by this build";
+#endif
+		}
+		else if (token->string[4] == 'g')	/* "hostgssenc" */
+		{
+			parsedline->conntype = ctHostGSS;
+#ifndef ENABLE_GSS
+			ereport(elevel,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+					 errmsg("hostgssenc record cannot match because GSSAPI is not supported by this build"),
+					 errhint("Compile with --with-gssapi to use GSSAPI connections."),
+					 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+								line_num, HbaFileName)));
+			*err_msg = "hostgssenc record cannot match because GSSAPI is not supported by this build";
+#endif
+		}
+		else if (token->string[4] == 'n' && token->string[6] == 's')
+			parsedline->conntype = ctHostNoSSL;
+		else if (token->string[4] == 'n' && token->string[6] == 'g')
+			parsedline->conntype = ctHostNoGSS;
+		else
+		{
+			/* "host" */
+			parsedline->conntype = ctHost;
+		}
+	}							/* record type */
+	else
+	{
+		ereport(elevel,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+				 errmsg("invalid connection type \"%s\"",
+						token->string),
+				 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+							line_num, HbaFileName)));
+		*err_msg = psprintf("invalid connection type \"%s\"", token->string);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	/* Get the databases. */
+	field = lnext(tok_line->fields, field);
+	if (!field)
+	{
+		ereport(elevel,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+				 errmsg("end-of-line before database specification"),
+				 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+							line_num, HbaFileName)));
+		*err_msg = "end-of-line before database specification";
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	parsedline->databases = NIL;
+	tokens = lfirst(field);
+	foreach(tokencell, tokens)
+	{
+		parsedline->databases = lappend(parsedline->databases,
+										copy_hba_token(lfirst(tokencell)));
+	}
+
+	/* Get the roles. */
+	field = lnext(tok_line->fields, field);
+	if (!field)
+	{
+		ereport(elevel,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+				 errmsg("end-of-line before role specification"),
+				 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+							line_num, HbaFileName)));
+		*err_msg = "end-of-line before role specification";
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	parsedline->roles = NIL;
+	tokens = lfirst(field);
+	foreach(tokencell, tokens)
+	{
+		parsedline->roles = lappend(parsedline->roles,
+									copy_hba_token(lfirst(tokencell)));
+	}
+
+	if (parsedline->conntype != ctLocal)
+	{
+		/* Read the IP address field. (with or without CIDR netmask) */
+		field = lnext(tok_line->fields, field);
+		if (!field)
+		{
+			ereport(elevel,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+					 errmsg("end-of-line before IP address specification"),
+					 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+								line_num, HbaFileName)));
+			*err_msg = "end-of-line before IP address specification";
+			return NULL;
+		}
+		tokens = lfirst(field);
+		if (tokens->length > 1)
+		{
+			ereport(elevel,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+					 errmsg("multiple values specified for host address"),
+					 errhint("Specify one address range per line."),
+					 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+								line_num, HbaFileName)));
+			*err_msg = "multiple values specified for host address";
+			return NULL;
+		}
+		token = linitial(tokens);
+
+		if (token_is_keyword(token, "all"))
+		{
+			parsedline->ip_cmp_method = ipCmpAll;
+		}
+		else if (token_is_keyword(token, "samehost"))
+		{
+			/* Any IP on this host is allowed to connect */
+			parsedline->ip_cmp_method = ipCmpSameHost;
+		}
+		else if (token_is_keyword(token, "samenet"))
+		{
+			/* Any IP on the host's subnets is allowed to connect */
+			parsedline->ip_cmp_method = ipCmpSameNet;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			/* IP and netmask are specified */
+			parsedline->ip_cmp_method = ipCmpMask;
+
+			/* need a modifiable copy of token */
+			str = pstrdup(token->string);
+
+			/* Check if it has a CIDR suffix and if so isolate it */
+			cidr_slash = strchr(str, '/');
+			if (cidr_slash)
+				*cidr_slash = '\0';
+
+			/* Get the IP address either way */
+			hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
+			hints.ai_family = AF_UNSPEC;
+			hints.ai_socktype = 0;
+			hints.ai_protocol = 0;
+			hints.ai_addrlen = 0;
+			hints.ai_canonname = NULL;
+			hints.ai_addr = NULL;
+			hints.ai_next = NULL;
+
+			ret = pg_getaddrinfo_all(str, NULL, &hints, &gai_result);
+			if (ret == 0 && gai_result)
+			{
+				memcpy(&parsedline->addr, gai_result->ai_addr,
+					   gai_result->ai_addrlen);
+				parsedline->addrlen = gai_result->ai_addrlen;
+			}
+			else if (ret == EAI_NONAME)
+				parsedline->hostname = str;
+			else
+			{
+				ereport(elevel,
+						(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+						 errmsg("invalid IP address \"%s\": %s",
+								str, gai_strerror(ret)),
+						 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+									line_num, HbaFileName)));
+				*err_msg = psprintf("invalid IP address \"%s\": %s",
+									str, gai_strerror(ret));
+				if (gai_result)
+					pg_freeaddrinfo_all(hints.ai_family, gai_result);
+				return NULL;
+			}
+
+			pg_freeaddrinfo_all(hints.ai_family, gai_result);
+
+			/* Get the netmask */
+			if (cidr_slash)
+			{
+				if (parsedline->hostname)
+				{
+					ereport(elevel,
+							(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+							 errmsg("specifying both host name and CIDR mask is invalid: \"%s\"",
+									token->string),
+							 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+										line_num, HbaFileName)));
+					*err_msg = psprintf("specifying both host name and CIDR mask is invalid: \"%s\"",
+										token->string);
+					return NULL;
+				}
+
+				if (pg_sockaddr_cidr_mask(&parsedline->mask, cidr_slash + 1,
+										  parsedline->addr.ss_family) < 0)
+				{
+					ereport(elevel,
+							(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+							 errmsg("invalid CIDR mask in address \"%s\"",
+									token->string),
+							 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+										line_num, HbaFileName)));
+					*err_msg = psprintf("invalid CIDR mask in address \"%s\"",
+										token->string);
+					return NULL;
+				}
+				parsedline->masklen = parsedline->addrlen;
+				pfree(str);
+			}
+			else if (!parsedline->hostname)
+			{
+				/* Read the mask field. */
+				pfree(str);
+				field = lnext(tok_line->fields, field);
+				if (!field)
+				{
+					ereport(elevel,
+							(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+							 errmsg("end-of-line before netmask specification"),
+							 errhint("Specify an address range in CIDR notation, or provide a separate netmask."),
+							 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+										line_num, HbaFileName)));
+					*err_msg = "end-of-line before netmask specification";
+					return NULL;
+				}
+				tokens = lfirst(field);
+				if (tokens->length > 1)
+				{
+					ereport(elevel,
+							(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+							 errmsg("multiple values specified for netmask"),
+							 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+										line_num, HbaFileName)));
+					*err_msg = "multiple values specified for netmask";
+					return NULL;
+				}
+				token = linitial(tokens);
+
+				ret = pg_getaddrinfo_all(token->string, NULL,
+										 &hints, &gai_result);
+				if (ret || !gai_result)
+				{
+					ereport(elevel,
+							(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+							 errmsg("invalid IP mask \"%s\": %s",
+									token->string, gai_strerror(ret)),
+							 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+										line_num, HbaFileName)));
+					*err_msg = psprintf("invalid IP mask \"%s\": %s",
+										token->string, gai_strerror(ret));
+					if (gai_result)
+						pg_freeaddrinfo_all(hints.ai_family, gai_result);
+					return NULL;
+				}
+
+				memcpy(&parsedline->mask, gai_result->ai_addr,
+					   gai_result->ai_addrlen);
+				parsedline->masklen = gai_result->ai_addrlen;
+				pg_freeaddrinfo_all(hints.ai_family, gai_result);
+
+				if (parsedline->addr.ss_family != parsedline->mask.ss_family)
+				{
+					ereport(elevel,
+							(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+							 errmsg("IP address and mask do not match"),
+							 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+										line_num, HbaFileName)));
+					*err_msg = "IP address and mask do not match";
+					return NULL;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}							/* != ctLocal */
+
+	/* Get the authentication method */
+	field = lnext(tok_line->fields, field);
+	if (!field)
+	{
+		ereport(elevel,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+				 errmsg("end-of-line before authentication method"),
+				 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+							line_num, HbaFileName)));
+		*err_msg = "end-of-line before authentication method";
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	tokens = lfirst(field);
+	if (tokens->length > 1)
+	{
+		ereport(elevel,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+				 errmsg("multiple values specified for authentication type"),
+				 errhint("Specify exactly one authentication type per line."),
+				 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+							line_num, HbaFileName)));
+		*err_msg = "multiple values specified for authentication type";
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	token = linitial(tokens);
+
+	unsupauth = NULL;
+	if (strcmp(token->string, "trust") == 0)
+		parsedline->auth_method = uaTrust;
+	else if (strcmp(token->string, "ident") == 0)
+		parsedline->auth_method = uaIdent;
+	else if (strcmp(token->string, "peer") == 0)
+		parsedline->auth_method = uaPeer;
+	else if (strcmp(token->string, "password") == 0)
+		parsedline->auth_method = uaPassword;
+	else if (strcmp(token->string, "gss") == 0)
+#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
+		parsedline->auth_method = uaGSS;
+#else
+		unsupauth = "gss";
+#endif
+	else if (strcmp(token->string, "sspi") == 0)
+#ifdef ENABLE_SSPI
+		parsedline->auth_method = uaSSPI;
+#else
+		unsupauth = "sspi";
+#endif
+	else if (strcmp(token->string, "reject") == 0)
+		parsedline->auth_method = uaReject;
+	else if (strcmp(token->string, "md5") == 0)
+	{
+		if (Db_user_namespace)
+		{
+			ereport(elevel,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+					 errmsg("MD5 authentication is not supported when \"db_user_namespace\" is enabled"),
+					 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+								line_num, HbaFileName)));
+			*err_msg = "MD5 authentication is not supported when \"db_user_namespace\" is enabled";
+			return NULL;
+		}
+		parsedline->auth_method = uaMD5;
+	}
+	else if (strcmp(token->string, "scram-sha-256") == 0)
+		parsedline->auth_method = uaSCRAM;
+	else if (strcmp(token->string, "pam") == 0)
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+		parsedline->auth_method = uaPAM;
+#else
+		unsupauth = "pam";
+#endif
+	else if (strcmp(token->string, "bsd") == 0)
+#ifdef USE_BSD_AUTH
+		parsedline->auth_method = uaBSD;
+#else
+		unsupauth = "bsd";
+#endif
+	else if (strcmp(token->string, "ldap") == 0)
+#ifdef USE_LDAP
+		parsedline->auth_method = uaLDAP;
+#else
+		unsupauth = "ldap";
+#endif
+	else if (strcmp(token->string, "cert") == 0)
+#ifdef USE_SSL
+		parsedline->auth_method = uaCert;
+#else
+		unsupauth = "cert";
+#endif
+	else if (strcmp(token->string, "radius") == 0)
+		parsedline->auth_method = uaRADIUS;
+	else
+	{
+		ereport(elevel,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+				 errmsg("invalid authentication method \"%s\"",
+						token->string),
+				 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+							line_num, HbaFileName)));
+		*err_msg = psprintf("invalid authentication method \"%s\"",
+							token->string);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (unsupauth)
+	{
+		ereport(elevel,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+				 errmsg("invalid authentication method \"%s\": not supported by this build",
+						token->string),
+				 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+							line_num, HbaFileName)));
+		*err_msg = psprintf("invalid authentication method \"%s\": not supported by this build",
+							token->string);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * XXX: When using ident on local connections, change it to peer, for
+	 * backwards compatibility.
+	 */
+	if (parsedline->conntype == ctLocal &&
+		parsedline->auth_method == uaIdent)
+		parsedline->auth_method = uaPeer;
+
+	/* Invalid authentication combinations */
+	if (parsedline->conntype == ctLocal &&
+		parsedline->auth_method == uaGSS)
+	{
+		ereport(elevel,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+				 errmsg("gssapi authentication is not supported on local sockets"),
+				 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+							line_num, HbaFileName)));
+		*err_msg = "gssapi authentication is not supported on local sockets";
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (parsedline->conntype != ctLocal &&
+		parsedline->auth_method == uaPeer)
+	{
+		ereport(elevel,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+				 errmsg("peer authentication is only supported on local sockets"),
+				 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+							line_num, HbaFileName)));
+		*err_msg = "peer authentication is only supported on local sockets";
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * SSPI authentication can never be enabled on ctLocal connections,
+	 * because it's only supported on Windows, where ctLocal isn't supported.
+	 */
+
+
+	if (parsedline->conntype != ctHostSSL &&
+		parsedline->auth_method == uaCert)
+	{
+		ereport(elevel,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+				 errmsg("cert authentication is only supported on hostssl connections"),
+				 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+							line_num, HbaFileName)));
+		*err_msg = "cert authentication is only supported on hostssl connections";
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * For GSS and SSPI, set the default value of include_realm to true.
+	 * Having include_realm set to false is dangerous in multi-realm
+	 * situations and is generally considered bad practice.  We keep the
+	 * capability around for backwards compatibility, but we might want to
+	 * remove it at some point in the future.  Users who still need to strip
+	 * the realm off would be better served by using an appropriate regex in a
+	 * pg_ident.conf mapping.
+	 */
+	if (parsedline->auth_method == uaGSS ||
+		parsedline->auth_method == uaSSPI)
+		parsedline->include_realm = true;
+
+	/*
+	 * For SSPI, include_realm defaults to the SAM-compatible domain (aka
+	 * NetBIOS name) and user names instead of the Kerberos principal name for
+	 * compatibility.
+	 */
+	if (parsedline->auth_method == uaSSPI)
+	{
+		parsedline->compat_realm = true;
+		parsedline->upn_username = false;
+	}
+
+	/* Parse remaining arguments */
+	while ((field = lnext(tok_line->fields, field)) != NULL)
+	{
+		tokens = lfirst(field);
+		foreach(tokencell, tokens)
+		{
+			char	   *val;
+
+			token = lfirst(tokencell);
+
+			str = pstrdup(token->string);
+			val = strchr(str, '=');
+			if (val == NULL)
+			{
+				/*
+				 * Got something that's not a name=value pair.
+				 */
+				ereport(elevel,
+						(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+						 errmsg("authentication option not in name=value format: %s", token->string),
+						 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+									line_num, HbaFileName)));
+				*err_msg = psprintf("authentication option not in name=value format: %s",
+									token->string);
+				return NULL;
+			}
+
+			*val++ = '\0';		/* str now holds "name", val holds "value" */
+			if (!parse_hba_auth_opt(str, val, parsedline, elevel, err_msg))
+				/* parse_hba_auth_opt already logged the error message */
+				return NULL;
+			pfree(str);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Check if the selected authentication method has any mandatory arguments
+	 * that are not set.
+	 */
+	if (parsedline->auth_method == uaLDAP)
+	{
+#ifndef HAVE_LDAP_INITIALIZE
+		/* Not mandatory for OpenLDAP, because it can use DNS SRV records */
+		MANDATORY_AUTH_ARG(parsedline->ldapserver, "ldapserver", "ldap");
+#endif
+
+		/*
+		 * LDAP can operate in two modes: either with a direct bind, using
+		 * ldapprefix and ldapsuffix, or using a search+bind, using
+		 * ldapbasedn, ldapbinddn, ldapbindpasswd and one of
+		 * ldapsearchattribute or ldapsearchfilter.  Disallow mixing these
+		 * parameters.
+		 */
+		if (parsedline->ldapprefix || parsedline->ldapsuffix)
+		{
+			if (parsedline->ldapbasedn ||
+				parsedline->ldapbinddn ||
+				parsedline->ldapbindpasswd ||
+				parsedline->ldapsearchattribute ||
+				parsedline->ldapsearchfilter)
+			{
+				ereport(elevel,
+						(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+						 errmsg("cannot use ldapbasedn, ldapbinddn, ldapbindpasswd, ldapsearchattribute, ldapsearchfilter, or ldapurl together with ldapprefix"),
+						 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+									line_num, HbaFileName)));
+				*err_msg = "cannot use ldapbasedn, ldapbinddn, ldapbindpasswd, ldapsearchattribute, ldapsearchfilter, or ldapurl together with ldapprefix";
+				return NULL;
+			}
+		}
+		else if (!parsedline->ldapbasedn)
+		{
+			ereport(elevel,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+					 errmsg("authentication method \"ldap\" requires argument \"ldapbasedn\", \"ldapprefix\", or \"ldapsuffix\" to be set"),
+					 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+								line_num, HbaFileName)));
+			*err_msg = "authentication method \"ldap\" requires argument \"ldapbasedn\", \"ldapprefix\", or \"ldapsuffix\" to be set";
+			return NULL;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * When using search+bind, you can either use a simple attribute
+		 * (defaulting to "uid") or a fully custom search filter.  You can't
+		 * do both.
+		 */
+		if (parsedline->ldapsearchattribute && parsedline->ldapsearchfilter)
+		{
+			ereport(elevel,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+					 errmsg("cannot use ldapsearchattribute together with ldapsearchfilter"),
+					 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+								line_num, HbaFileName)));
+			*err_msg = "cannot use ldapsearchattribute together with ldapsearchfilter";
+			return NULL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (parsedline->auth_method == uaRADIUS)
+	{
+		MANDATORY_AUTH_ARG(parsedline->radiusservers, "radiusservers", "radius");
+		MANDATORY_AUTH_ARG(parsedline->radiussecrets, "radiussecrets", "radius");
+
+		if (list_length(parsedline->radiusservers) < 1)
+		{
+			ereport(LOG,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+					 errmsg("list of RADIUS servers cannot be empty"),
+					 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+								line_num, HbaFileName)));
+			return NULL;
+		}
+
+		if (list_length(parsedline->radiussecrets) < 1)
+		{
+			ereport(LOG,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+					 errmsg("list of RADIUS secrets cannot be empty"),
+					 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+								line_num, HbaFileName)));
+			return NULL;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Verify length of option lists - each can be 0 (except for secrets,
+		 * but that's already checked above), 1 (use the same value
+		 * everywhere) or the same as the number of servers.
+		 */
+		if (!verify_option_list_length(parsedline->radiussecrets,
+									   "RADIUS secrets",
+									   parsedline->radiusservers,
+									   "RADIUS servers",
+									   line_num))
+			return NULL;
+		if (!verify_option_list_length(parsedline->radiusports,
+									   "RADIUS ports",
+									   parsedline->radiusservers,
+									   "RADIUS servers",
+									   line_num))
+			return NULL;
+		if (!verify_option_list_length(parsedline->radiusidentifiers,
+									   "RADIUS identifiers",
+									   parsedline->radiusservers,
+									   "RADIUS servers",
+									   line_num))
+			return NULL;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Enforce any parameters implied by other settings.
+	 */
+	if (parsedline->auth_method == uaCert)
+	{
+		parsedline->clientcert = clientCertCA;
+	}
+
+	return parsedline;
+}
+
+
+static bool
+verify_option_list_length(List *options, const char *optionname, List *masters, const char *mastername, int line_num)
+{
+	if (list_length(options) == 0 ||
+		list_length(options) == 1 ||
+		list_length(options) == list_length(masters))
+		return true;
+
+	ereport(LOG,
+			(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+			 errmsg("the number of %s (%d) must be 1 or the same as the number of %s (%d)",
+					optionname,
+					list_length(options),
+					mastername,
+					list_length(masters)
+					),
+			 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+						line_num, HbaFileName)));
+	return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse one name-value pair as an authentication option into the given
+ * HbaLine.  Return true if we successfully parse the option, false if we
+ * encounter an error.  In the event of an error, also log a message at
+ * ereport level elevel, and store a message string into *err_msg.
+ */
+static bool
+parse_hba_auth_opt(char *name, char *val, HbaLine *hbaline,
+				   int elevel, char **err_msg)
+{
+	int			line_num = hbaline->linenumber;
+
+#ifdef USE_LDAP
+	hbaline->ldapscope = LDAP_SCOPE_SUBTREE;
+#endif
+
+	if (strcmp(name, "map") == 0)
+	{
+		if (hbaline->auth_method != uaIdent &&
+			hbaline->auth_method != uaPeer &&
+			hbaline->auth_method != uaGSS &&
+			hbaline->auth_method != uaSSPI &&
+			hbaline->auth_method != uaCert)
+			INVALID_AUTH_OPTION("map", gettext_noop("ident, peer, gssapi, sspi, and cert"));
+		hbaline->usermap = pstrdup(val);
+	}
+	else if (strcmp(name, "clientcert") == 0)
+	{
+		if (hbaline->conntype != ctHostSSL)
+		{
+			ereport(elevel,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+					 errmsg("clientcert can only be configured for \"hostssl\" rows"),
+					 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+								line_num, HbaFileName)));
+			*err_msg = "clientcert can only be configured for \"hostssl\" rows";
+			return false;
+		}
+		if (strcmp(val, "1") == 0
+			|| strcmp(val, "verify-ca") == 0)
+		{
+			hbaline->clientcert = clientCertCA;
+		}
+		else if (strcmp(val, "verify-full") == 0)
+		{
+			hbaline->clientcert = clientCertFull;
+		}
+		else if (strcmp(val, "0") == 0
+				 || strcmp(val, "no-verify") == 0)
+		{
+			if (hbaline->auth_method == uaCert)
+			{
+				ereport(elevel,
+						(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+						 errmsg("clientcert cannot be set to \"no-verify\" when using \"cert\" authentication"),
+						 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+									line_num, HbaFileName)));
+				*err_msg = "clientcert cannot be set to \"no-verify\" when using \"cert\" authentication";
+				return false;
+			}
+			hbaline->clientcert = clientCertOff;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			ereport(elevel,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+					 errmsg("invalid value for clientcert: \"%s\"", val),
+					 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+								line_num, HbaFileName)));
+			return false;
+		}
+	}
+	else if (strcmp(name, "pamservice") == 0)
+	{
+		REQUIRE_AUTH_OPTION(uaPAM, "pamservice", "pam");
+		hbaline->pamservice = pstrdup(val);
+	}
+	else if (strcmp(name, "pam_use_hostname") == 0)
+	{
+		REQUIRE_AUTH_OPTION(uaPAM, "pam_use_hostname", "pam");
+		if (strcmp(val, "1") == 0)
+			hbaline->pam_use_hostname = true;
+		else
+			hbaline->pam_use_hostname = false;
+
+	}
+	else if (strcmp(name, "ldapurl") == 0)
+	{
+#ifdef LDAP_API_FEATURE_X_OPENLDAP
+		LDAPURLDesc *urldata;
+		int			rc;
+#endif
+
+		REQUIRE_AUTH_OPTION(uaLDAP, "ldapurl", "ldap");
+#ifdef LDAP_API_FEATURE_X_OPENLDAP
+		rc = ldap_url_parse(val, &urldata);
+		if (rc != LDAP_SUCCESS)
+		{
+			ereport(elevel,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+					 errmsg("could not parse LDAP URL \"%s\": %s", val, ldap_err2string(rc))));
+			*err_msg = psprintf("could not parse LDAP URL \"%s\": %s",
+								val, ldap_err2string(rc));
+			return false;
+		}
+
+		if (strcmp(urldata->lud_scheme, "ldap") != 0 &&
+			strcmp(urldata->lud_scheme, "ldaps") != 0)
+		{
+			ereport(elevel,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+					 errmsg("unsupported LDAP URL scheme: %s", urldata->lud_scheme)));
+			*err_msg = psprintf("unsupported LDAP URL scheme: %s",
+								urldata->lud_scheme);
+			ldap_free_urldesc(urldata);
+			return false;
+		}
+
+		if (urldata->lud_scheme)
+			hbaline->ldapscheme = pstrdup(urldata->lud_scheme);
+		if (urldata->lud_host)
+			hbaline->ldapserver = pstrdup(urldata->lud_host);
+		hbaline->ldapport = urldata->lud_port;
+		if (urldata->lud_dn)
+			hbaline->ldapbasedn = pstrdup(urldata->lud_dn);
+
+		if (urldata->lud_attrs)
+			hbaline->ldapsearchattribute = pstrdup(urldata->lud_attrs[0]);	/* only use first one */
+		hbaline->ldapscope = urldata->lud_scope;
+		if (urldata->lud_filter)
+			hbaline->ldapsearchfilter = pstrdup(urldata->lud_filter);
+		ldap_free_urldesc(urldata);
+#else							/* not OpenLDAP */
+		ereport(elevel,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
+				 errmsg("LDAP URLs not supported on this platform")));
+		*err_msg = "LDAP URLs not supported on this platform";
+#endif							/* not OpenLDAP */
+	}
+	else if (strcmp(name, "ldaptls") == 0)
+	{
+		REQUIRE_AUTH_OPTION(uaLDAP, "ldaptls", "ldap");
+		if (strcmp(val, "1") == 0)
+			hbaline->ldaptls = true;
+		else
+			hbaline->ldaptls = false;
+	}
+	else if (strcmp(name, "ldapscheme") == 0)
+	{
+		REQUIRE_AUTH_OPTION(uaLDAP, "ldapscheme", "ldap");
+		if (strcmp(val, "ldap") != 0 && strcmp(val, "ldaps") != 0)
+			ereport(elevel,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+					 errmsg("invalid ldapscheme value: \"%s\"", val),
+					 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+								line_num, HbaFileName)));
+		hbaline->ldapscheme = pstrdup(val);
+	}
+	else if (strcmp(name, "ldapserver") == 0)
+	{
+		REQUIRE_AUTH_OPTION(uaLDAP, "ldapserver", "ldap");
+		hbaline->ldapserver = pstrdup(val);
+	}
+	else if (strcmp(name, "ldapport") == 0)
+	{
+		REQUIRE_AUTH_OPTION(uaLDAP, "ldapport", "ldap");
+		hbaline->ldapport = atoi(val);
+		if (hbaline->ldapport == 0)
+		{
+			ereport(elevel,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+					 errmsg("invalid LDAP port number: \"%s\"", val),
+					 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+								line_num, HbaFileName)));
+			*err_msg = psprintf("invalid LDAP port number: \"%s\"", val);
+			return false;
+		}
+	}
+	else if (strcmp(name, "ldapbinddn") == 0)
+	{
+		REQUIRE_AUTH_OPTION(uaLDAP, "ldapbinddn", "ldap");
+		hbaline->ldapbinddn = pstrdup(val);
+	}
+	else if (strcmp(name, "ldapbindpasswd") == 0)
+	{
+		REQUIRE_AUTH_OPTION(uaLDAP, "ldapbindpasswd", "ldap");
+		hbaline->ldapbindpasswd = pstrdup(val);
+	}
+	else if (strcmp(name, "ldapsearchattribute") == 0)
+	{
+		REQUIRE_AUTH_OPTION(uaLDAP, "ldapsearchattribute", "ldap");
+		hbaline->ldapsearchattribute = pstrdup(val);
+	}
+	else if (strcmp(name, "ldapsearchfilter") == 0)
+	{
+		REQUIRE_AUTH_OPTION(uaLDAP, "ldapsearchfilter", "ldap");
+		hbaline->ldapsearchfilter = pstrdup(val);
+	}
+	else if (strcmp(name, "ldapbasedn") == 0)
+	{
+		REQUIRE_AUTH_OPTION(uaLDAP, "ldapbasedn", "ldap");
+		hbaline->ldapbasedn = pstrdup(val);
+	}
+	else if (strcmp(name, "ldapprefix") == 0)
+	{
+		REQUIRE_AUTH_OPTION(uaLDAP, "ldapprefix", "ldap");
+		hbaline->ldapprefix = pstrdup(val);
+	}
+	else if (strcmp(name, "ldapsuffix") == 0)
+	{
+		REQUIRE_AUTH_OPTION(uaLDAP, "ldapsuffix", "ldap");
+		hbaline->ldapsuffix = pstrdup(val);
+	}
+	else if (strcmp(name, "krb_realm") == 0)
+	{
+		if (hbaline->auth_method != uaGSS &&
+			hbaline->auth_method != uaSSPI)
+			INVALID_AUTH_OPTION("krb_realm", gettext_noop("gssapi and sspi"));
+		hbaline->krb_realm = pstrdup(val);
+	}
+	else if (strcmp(name, "include_realm") == 0)
+	{
+		if (hbaline->auth_method != uaGSS &&
+			hbaline->auth_method != uaSSPI)
+			INVALID_AUTH_OPTION("include_realm", gettext_noop("gssapi and sspi"));
+		if (strcmp(val, "1") == 0)
+			hbaline->include_realm = true;
+		else
+			hbaline->include_realm = false;
+	}
+	else if (strcmp(name, "compat_realm") == 0)
+	{
+		if (hbaline->auth_method != uaSSPI)
+			INVALID_AUTH_OPTION("compat_realm", gettext_noop("sspi"));
+		if (strcmp(val, "1") == 0)
+			hbaline->compat_realm = true;
+		else
+			hbaline->compat_realm = false;
+	}
+	else if (strcmp(name, "upn_username") == 0)
+	{
+		if (hbaline->auth_method != uaSSPI)
+			INVALID_AUTH_OPTION("upn_username", gettext_noop("sspi"));
+		if (strcmp(val, "1") == 0)
+			hbaline->upn_username = true;
+		else
+			hbaline->upn_username = false;
+	}
+	else if (strcmp(name, "radiusservers") == 0)
+	{
+		struct addrinfo *gai_result;
+		struct addrinfo hints;
+		int			ret;
+		List	   *parsed_servers;
+		ListCell   *l;
+		char	   *dupval = pstrdup(val);
+
+		REQUIRE_AUTH_OPTION(uaRADIUS, "radiusservers", "radius");
+
+		if (!SplitGUCList(dupval, ',', &parsed_servers))
+		{
+			/* syntax error in list */
+			ereport(elevel,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+					 errmsg("could not parse RADIUS server list \"%s\"",
+							val),
+					 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+								line_num, HbaFileName)));
+			return false;
+		}
+
+		/* For each entry in the list, translate it */
+		foreach(l, parsed_servers)
+		{
+			MemSet(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+			hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;
+			hints.ai_family = AF_UNSPEC;
+
+			ret = pg_getaddrinfo_all((char *) lfirst(l), NULL, &hints, &gai_result);
+			if (ret || !gai_result)
+			{
+				ereport(elevel,
+						(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+						 errmsg("could not translate RADIUS server name \"%s\" to address: %s",
+								(char *) lfirst(l), gai_strerror(ret)),
+						 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+									line_num, HbaFileName)));
+				if (gai_result)
+					pg_freeaddrinfo_all(hints.ai_family, gai_result);
+
+				list_free(parsed_servers);
+				return false;
+			}
+			pg_freeaddrinfo_all(hints.ai_family, gai_result);
+		}
+
+		/* All entries are OK, so store them */
+		hbaline->radiusservers = parsed_servers;
+		hbaline->radiusservers_s = pstrdup(val);
+	}
+	else if (strcmp(name, "radiusports") == 0)
+	{
+		List	   *parsed_ports;
+		ListCell   *l;
+		char	   *dupval = pstrdup(val);
+
+		REQUIRE_AUTH_OPTION(uaRADIUS, "radiusports", "radius");
+
+		if (!SplitGUCList(dupval, ',', &parsed_ports))
+		{
+			ereport(elevel,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+					 errmsg("could not parse RADIUS port list \"%s\"",
+							val),
+					 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+								line_num, HbaFileName)));
+			*err_msg = psprintf("invalid RADIUS port number: \"%s\"", val);
+			return false;
+		}
+
+		foreach(l, parsed_ports)
+		{
+			if (atoi(lfirst(l)) == 0)
+			{
+				ereport(elevel,
+						(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+						 errmsg("invalid RADIUS port number: \"%s\"", val),
+						 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+									line_num, HbaFileName)));
+
+				return false;
+			}
+		}
+		hbaline->radiusports = parsed_ports;
+		hbaline->radiusports_s = pstrdup(val);
+	}
+	else if (strcmp(name, "radiussecrets") == 0)
+	{
+		List	   *parsed_secrets;
+		char	   *dupval = pstrdup(val);
+
+		REQUIRE_AUTH_OPTION(uaRADIUS, "radiussecrets", "radius");
+
+		if (!SplitGUCList(dupval, ',', &parsed_secrets))
+		{
+			/* syntax error in list */
+			ereport(elevel,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+					 errmsg("could not parse RADIUS secret list \"%s\"",
+							val),
+					 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+								line_num, HbaFileName)));
+			return false;
+		}
+
+		hbaline->radiussecrets = parsed_secrets;
+		hbaline->radiussecrets_s = pstrdup(val);
+	}
+	else if (strcmp(name, "radiusidentifiers") == 0)
+	{
+		List	   *parsed_identifiers;
+		char	   *dupval = pstrdup(val);
+
+		REQUIRE_AUTH_OPTION(uaRADIUS, "radiusidentifiers", "radius");
+
+		if (!SplitGUCList(dupval, ',', &parsed_identifiers))
+		{
+			/* syntax error in list */
+			ereport(elevel,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+					 errmsg("could not parse RADIUS identifiers list \"%s\"",
+							val),
+					 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+								line_num, HbaFileName)));
+			return false;
+		}
+
+		hbaline->radiusidentifiers = parsed_identifiers;
+		hbaline->radiusidentifiers_s = pstrdup(val);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		ereport(elevel,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+				 errmsg("unrecognized authentication option name: \"%s\"",
+						name),
+				 errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+							line_num, HbaFileName)));
+		*err_msg = psprintf("unrecognized authentication option name: \"%s\"",
+							name);
+		return false;
+	}
+	return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ *	Scan the pre-parsed hba file, looking for a match to the port's connection
+ *	request.
+ */
+static void
+check_hba(hbaPort *port)
+{
+	Oid			roleid;
+	ListCell   *line;
+	HbaLine    *hba;
+
+	/* Get the target role's OID.  Note we do not error out for bad role. */
+	roleid = get_role_oid(port->user_name, true);
+
+	foreach(line, parsed_hba_lines)
+	{
+		hba = (HbaLine *) lfirst(line);
+
+		/* Check connection type */
+		if (hba->conntype == ctLocal)
+		{
+			if (!IS_AF_UNIX(port->raddr.addr.ss_family))
+				continue;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			if (IS_AF_UNIX(port->raddr.addr.ss_family))
+				continue;
+
+			/* Check SSL state */
+			if (port->ssl_in_use)
+			{
+				/* Connection is SSL, match both "host" and "hostssl" */
+				if (hba->conntype == ctHostNoSSL)
+					continue;
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				/* Connection is not SSL, match both "host" and "hostnossl" */
+				if (hba->conntype == ctHostSSL)
+					continue;
+			}
+
+			/* Check GSSAPI state */
+#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
+			if (port->gss && port->gss->enc &&
+				hba->conntype == ctHostNoGSS)
+				continue;
+			else if (!(port->gss && port->gss->enc) &&
+					 hba->conntype == ctHostGSS)
+				continue;
+#else
+			if (hba->conntype == ctHostGSS)
+				continue;
+#endif
+
+			/* Check IP address */
+			switch (hba->ip_cmp_method)
+			{
+				case ipCmpMask:
+					if (hba->hostname)
+					{
+						if (!check_hostname(port,
+											hba->hostname))
+							continue;
+					}
+					else
+					{
+						if (!check_ip(&port->raddr,
+									  (struct sockaddr *) &hba->addr,
+									  (struct sockaddr *) &hba->mask))
+							continue;
+					}
+					break;
+				case ipCmpAll:
+					break;
+				case ipCmpSameHost:
+				case ipCmpSameNet:
+					if (!check_same_host_or_net(&port->raddr,
+												hba->ip_cmp_method))
+						continue;
+					break;
+				default:
+					/* shouldn't get here, but deem it no-match if so */
+					continue;
+			}
+		}						/* != ctLocal */
+
+		/* Check database and role */
+		if (!check_db(port->database_name, port->user_name, roleid,
+					  hba->databases))
+			continue;
+
+		if (!check_role(port->user_name, roleid, hba->roles))
+			continue;
+
+		/* Found a record that matched! */
+		port->hba = hba;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/* If no matching entry was found, then implicitly reject. */
+	hba = palloc0(sizeof(HbaLine));
+	hba->auth_method = uaImplicitReject;
+	port->hba = hba;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read the config file and create a List of HbaLine records for the contents.
+ *
+ * The configuration is read into a temporary list, and if any parse error
+ * occurs the old list is kept in place and false is returned.  Only if the
+ * whole file parses OK is the list replaced, and the function returns true.
+ *
+ * On a false result, caller will take care of reporting a FATAL error in case
+ * this is the initial startup.  If it happens on reload, we just keep running
+ * with the old data.
+ */
+bool
+load_hba(void)
+{
+	FILE	   *file;
+	List	   *hba_lines = NIL;
+	ListCell   *line;
+	List	   *new_parsed_lines = NIL;
+	bool		ok = true;
+	MemoryContext linecxt;
+	MemoryContext oldcxt;
+	MemoryContext hbacxt;
+
+	file = AllocateFile(HbaFileName, "r");
+	if (file == NULL)
+	{
+		ereport(LOG,
+				(errcode_for_file_access(),
+				 errmsg("could not open configuration file \"%s\": %m",
+						HbaFileName)));
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	linecxt = tokenize_file(HbaFileName, file, &hba_lines, LOG);
+	FreeFile(file);
+
+	/* Now parse all the lines */
+	Assert(PostmasterContext);
+	hbacxt = AllocSetContextCreate(PostmasterContext,
+								   "hba parser context",
+								   ALLOCSET_SMALL_SIZES);
+	oldcxt = MemoryContextSwitchTo(hbacxt);
+	foreach(line, hba_lines)
+	{
+		TokenizedLine *tok_line = (TokenizedLine *) lfirst(line);
+		HbaLine    *newline;
+
+		/* don't parse lines that already have errors */
+		if (tok_line->err_msg != NULL)
+		{
+			ok = false;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if ((newline = parse_hba_line(tok_line, LOG)) == NULL)
+		{
+			/* Parse error; remember there's trouble */
+			ok = false;
+
+			/*
+			 * Keep parsing the rest of the file so we can report errors on
+			 * more than the first line.  Error has already been logged, no
+			 * need for more chatter here.
+			 */
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		new_parsed_lines = lappend(new_parsed_lines, newline);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * A valid HBA file must have at least one entry; else there's no way to
+	 * connect to the postmaster.  But only complain about this if we didn't
+	 * already have parsing errors.
+	 */
+	if (ok && new_parsed_lines == NIL)
+	{
+		ereport(LOG,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+				 errmsg("configuration file \"%s\" contains no entries",
+						HbaFileName)));
+		ok = false;
+	}
+
+	/* Free tokenizer memory */
+	MemoryContextDelete(linecxt);
+	MemoryContextSwitchTo(oldcxt);
+
+	if (!ok)
+	{
+		/* File contained one or more errors, so bail out */
+		MemoryContextDelete(hbacxt);
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	/* Loaded new file successfully, replace the one we use */
+	if (parsed_hba_context != NULL)
+		MemoryContextDelete(parsed_hba_context);
+	parsed_hba_context = hbacxt;
+	parsed_hba_lines = new_parsed_lines;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This macro specifies the maximum number of authentication options
+ * that are possible with any given authentication method that is supported.
+ * Currently LDAP supports 11, and there are 3 that are not dependent on
+ * the auth method here.  It may not actually be possible to set all of them
+ * at the same time, but we'll set the macro value high enough to be
+ * conservative and avoid warnings from static analysis tools.
+ */
+#define MAX_HBA_OPTIONS 14
+
+/*
+ * Create a text array listing the options specified in the HBA line.
+ * Return NULL if no options are specified.
+ */
+static ArrayType *
+gethba_options(HbaLine *hba)
+{
+	int			noptions;
+	Datum		options[MAX_HBA_OPTIONS];
+
+	noptions = 0;
+
+	if (hba->auth_method == uaGSS || hba->auth_method == uaSSPI)
+	{
+		if (hba->include_realm)
+			options[noptions++] =
+				CStringGetTextDatum("include_realm=true");
+
+		if (hba->krb_realm)
+			options[noptions++] =
+				CStringGetTextDatum(psprintf("krb_realm=%s", hba->krb_realm));
+	}
+
+	if (hba->usermap)
+		options[noptions++] =
+			CStringGetTextDatum(psprintf("map=%s", hba->usermap));
+
+	if (hba->clientcert != clientCertOff)
+		options[noptions++] =
+			CStringGetTextDatum(psprintf("clientcert=%s", (hba->clientcert == clientCertCA) ? "verify-ca" : "verify-full"));
+
+	if (hba->pamservice)
+		options[noptions++] =
+			CStringGetTextDatum(psprintf("pamservice=%s", hba->pamservice));
+
+	if (hba->auth_method == uaLDAP)
+	{
+		if (hba->ldapserver)
+			options[noptions++] =
+				CStringGetTextDatum(psprintf("ldapserver=%s", hba->ldapserver));
+
+		if (hba->ldapport)
+			options[noptions++] =
+				CStringGetTextDatum(psprintf("ldapport=%d", hba->ldapport));
+
+		if (hba->ldaptls)
+			options[noptions++] =
+				CStringGetTextDatum("ldaptls=true");
+
+		if (hba->ldapprefix)
+			options[noptions++] =
+				CStringGetTextDatum(psprintf("ldapprefix=%s", hba->ldapprefix));
+
+		if (hba->ldapsuffix)
+			options[noptions++] =
+				CStringGetTextDatum(psprintf("ldapsuffix=%s", hba->ldapsuffix));
+
+		if (hba->ldapbasedn)
+			options[noptions++] =
+				CStringGetTextDatum(psprintf("ldapbasedn=%s", hba->ldapbasedn));
+
+		if (hba->ldapbinddn)
+			options[noptions++] =
+				CStringGetTextDatum(psprintf("ldapbinddn=%s", hba->ldapbinddn));
+
+		if (hba->ldapbindpasswd)
+			options[noptions++] =
+				CStringGetTextDatum(psprintf("ldapbindpasswd=%s",
+											 hba->ldapbindpasswd));
+
+		if (hba->ldapsearchattribute)
+			options[noptions++] =
+				CStringGetTextDatum(psprintf("ldapsearchattribute=%s",
+											 hba->ldapsearchattribute));
+
+		if (hba->ldapsearchfilter)
+			options[noptions++] =
+				CStringGetTextDatum(psprintf("ldapsearchfilter=%s",
+											 hba->ldapsearchfilter));
+
+		if (hba->ldapscope)
+			options[noptions++] =
+				CStringGetTextDatum(psprintf("ldapscope=%d", hba->ldapscope));
+	}
+
+	if (hba->auth_method == uaRADIUS)
+	{
+		if (hba->radiusservers_s)
+			options[noptions++] =
+				CStringGetTextDatum(psprintf("radiusservers=%s", hba->radiusservers_s));
+
+		if (hba->radiussecrets_s)
+			options[noptions++] =
+				CStringGetTextDatum(psprintf("radiussecrets=%s", hba->radiussecrets_s));
+
+		if (hba->radiusidentifiers_s)
+			options[noptions++] =
+				CStringGetTextDatum(psprintf("radiusidentifiers=%s", hba->radiusidentifiers_s));
+
+		if (hba->radiusports_s)
+			options[noptions++] =
+				CStringGetTextDatum(psprintf("radiusports=%s", hba->radiusports_s));
+	}
+
+	/* If you add more options, consider increasing MAX_HBA_OPTIONS. */
+	Assert(noptions <= MAX_HBA_OPTIONS);
+
+	if (noptions > 0)
+		return construct_array(options, noptions, TEXTOID, -1, false, TYPALIGN_INT);
+	else
+		return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Number of columns in pg_hba_file_rules view */
+#define NUM_PG_HBA_FILE_RULES_ATTS	 9
+
+/*
+ * fill_hba_line: build one row of pg_hba_file_rules view, add it to tuplestore
+ *
+ * tuple_store: where to store data
+ * tupdesc: tuple descriptor for the view
+ * lineno: pg_hba.conf line number (must always be valid)
+ * hba: parsed line data (can be NULL, in which case err_msg should be set)
+ * err_msg: error message (NULL if none)
+ *
+ * Note: leaks memory, but we don't care since this is run in a short-lived
+ * memory context.
+ */
+static void
+fill_hba_line(Tuplestorestate *tuple_store, TupleDesc tupdesc,
+			  int lineno, HbaLine *hba, const char *err_msg)
+{
+	Datum		values[NUM_PG_HBA_FILE_RULES_ATTS];
+	bool		nulls[NUM_PG_HBA_FILE_RULES_ATTS];
+	char		buffer[NI_MAXHOST];
+	HeapTuple	tuple;
+	int			index;
+	ListCell   *lc;
+	const char *typestr;
+	const char *addrstr;
+	const char *maskstr;
+	ArrayType  *options;
+
+	Assert(tupdesc->natts == NUM_PG_HBA_FILE_RULES_ATTS);
+
+	memset(values, 0, sizeof(values));
+	memset(nulls, 0, sizeof(nulls));
+	index = 0;
+
+	/* line_number */
+	values[index++] = Int32GetDatum(lineno);
+
+	if (hba != NULL)
+	{
+		/* type */
+		/* Avoid a default: case so compiler will warn about missing cases */
+		typestr = NULL;
+		switch (hba->conntype)
+		{
+			case ctLocal:
+				typestr = "local";
+				break;
+			case ctHost:
+				typestr = "host";
+				break;
+			case ctHostSSL:
+				typestr = "hostssl";
+				break;
+			case ctHostNoSSL:
+				typestr = "hostnossl";
+				break;
+			case ctHostGSS:
+				typestr = "hostgssenc";
+				break;
+			case ctHostNoGSS:
+				typestr = "hostnogssenc";
+				break;
+		}
+		if (typestr)
+			values[index++] = CStringGetTextDatum(typestr);
+		else
+			nulls[index++] = true;
+
+		/* database */
+		if (hba->databases)
+		{
+			/*
+			 * Flatten HbaToken list to string list.  It might seem that we
+			 * should re-quote any quoted tokens, but that has been rejected
+			 * on the grounds that it makes it harder to compare the array
+			 * elements to other system catalogs.  That makes entries like
+			 * "all" or "samerole" formally ambiguous ... but users who name
+			 * databases/roles that way are inflicting their own pain.
+			 */
+			List	   *names = NIL;
+
+			foreach(lc, hba->databases)
+			{
+				HbaToken   *tok = lfirst(lc);
+
+				names = lappend(names, tok->string);
+			}
+			values[index++] = PointerGetDatum(strlist_to_textarray(names));
+		}
+		else
+			nulls[index++] = true;
+
+		/* user */
+		if (hba->roles)
+		{
+			/* Flatten HbaToken list to string list; see comment above */
+			List	   *roles = NIL;
+
+			foreach(lc, hba->roles)
+			{
+				HbaToken   *tok = lfirst(lc);
+
+				roles = lappend(roles, tok->string);
+			}
+			values[index++] = PointerGetDatum(strlist_to_textarray(roles));
+		}
+		else
+			nulls[index++] = true;
+
+		/* address and netmask */
+		/* Avoid a default: case so compiler will warn about missing cases */
+		addrstr = maskstr = NULL;
+		switch (hba->ip_cmp_method)
+		{
+			case ipCmpMask:
+				if (hba->hostname)
+				{
+					addrstr = hba->hostname;
+				}
+				else
+				{
+					/*
+					 * Note: if pg_getnameinfo_all fails, it'll set buffer to
+					 * "???", which we want to return.
+					 */
+					if (hba->addrlen > 0)
+					{
+						if (pg_getnameinfo_all(&hba->addr, hba->addrlen,
+											   buffer, sizeof(buffer),
+											   NULL, 0,
+											   NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0)
+							clean_ipv6_addr(hba->addr.ss_family, buffer);
+						addrstr = pstrdup(buffer);
+					}
+					if (hba->masklen > 0)
+					{
+						if (pg_getnameinfo_all(&hba->mask, hba->masklen,
+											   buffer, sizeof(buffer),
+											   NULL, 0,
+											   NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0)
+							clean_ipv6_addr(hba->mask.ss_family, buffer);
+						maskstr = pstrdup(buffer);
+					}
+				}
+				break;
+			case ipCmpAll:
+				addrstr = "all";
+				break;
+			case ipCmpSameHost:
+				addrstr = "samehost";
+				break;
+			case ipCmpSameNet:
+				addrstr = "samenet";
+				break;
+		}
+		if (addrstr)
+			values[index++] = CStringGetTextDatum(addrstr);
+		else
+			nulls[index++] = true;
+		if (maskstr)
+			values[index++] = CStringGetTextDatum(maskstr);
+		else
+			nulls[index++] = true;
+
+		/*
+		 * Make sure UserAuthName[] tracks additions to the UserAuth enum
+		 */
+		StaticAssertStmt(lengthof(UserAuthName) == USER_AUTH_LAST + 1,
+						 "UserAuthName[] must match the UserAuth enum");
+
+		/* auth_method */
+		values[index++] = CStringGetTextDatum(UserAuthName[hba->auth_method]);
+
+		/* options */
+		options = gethba_options(hba);
+		if (options)
+			values[index++] = PointerGetDatum(options);
+		else
+			nulls[index++] = true;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		/* no parsing result, so set relevant fields to nulls */
+		memset(&nulls[1], true, (NUM_PG_HBA_FILE_RULES_ATTS - 2) * sizeof(bool));
+	}
+
+	/* error */
+	if (err_msg)
+		values[NUM_PG_HBA_FILE_RULES_ATTS - 1] = CStringGetTextDatum(err_msg);
+	else
+		nulls[NUM_PG_HBA_FILE_RULES_ATTS - 1] = true;
+
+	tuple = heap_form_tuple(tupdesc, values, nulls);
+	tuplestore_puttuple(tuple_store, tuple);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read the pg_hba.conf file and fill the tuplestore with view records.
+ */
+static void
+fill_hba_view(Tuplestorestate *tuple_store, TupleDesc tupdesc)
+{
+	FILE	   *file;
+	List	   *hba_lines = NIL;
+	ListCell   *line;
+	MemoryContext linecxt;
+	MemoryContext hbacxt;
+	MemoryContext oldcxt;
+
+	/*
+	 * In the unlikely event that we can't open pg_hba.conf, we throw an
+	 * error, rather than trying to report it via some sort of view entry.
+	 * (Most other error conditions should result in a message in a view
+	 * entry.)
+	 */
+	file = AllocateFile(HbaFileName, "r");
+	if (file == NULL)
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode_for_file_access(),
+				 errmsg("could not open configuration file \"%s\": %m",
+						HbaFileName)));
+
+	linecxt = tokenize_file(HbaFileName, file, &hba_lines, DEBUG3);
+	FreeFile(file);
+
+	/* Now parse all the lines */
+	hbacxt = AllocSetContextCreate(CurrentMemoryContext,
+								   "hba parser context",
+								   ALLOCSET_SMALL_SIZES);
+	oldcxt = MemoryContextSwitchTo(hbacxt);
+	foreach(line, hba_lines)
+	{
+		TokenizedLine *tok_line = (TokenizedLine *) lfirst(line);
+		HbaLine    *hbaline = NULL;
+
+		/* don't parse lines that already have errors */
+		if (tok_line->err_msg == NULL)
+			hbaline = parse_hba_line(tok_line, DEBUG3);
+
+		fill_hba_line(tuple_store, tupdesc, tok_line->line_num,
+					  hbaline, tok_line->err_msg);
+	}
+
+	/* Free tokenizer memory */
+	MemoryContextDelete(linecxt);
+	/* Free parse_hba_line memory */
+	MemoryContextSwitchTo(oldcxt);
+	MemoryContextDelete(hbacxt);
+}
+
+/*
+ * SQL-accessible SRF to return all the entries in the pg_hba.conf file.
+ */
+Datum
+pg_hba_file_rules(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+{
+	Tuplestorestate *tuple_store;
+	TupleDesc	tupdesc;
+	MemoryContext old_cxt;
+	ReturnSetInfo *rsi;
+
+	/*
+	 * We must use the Materialize mode to be safe against HBA file changes
+	 * while the cursor is open. It's also more efficient than having to look
+	 * up our current position in the parsed list every time.
+	 */
+	rsi = (ReturnSetInfo *) fcinfo->resultinfo;
+
+	/* Check to see if caller supports us returning a tuplestore */
+	if (rsi == NULL || !IsA(rsi, ReturnSetInfo))
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
+				 errmsg("set-valued function called in context that cannot accept a set")));
+	if (!(rsi->allowedModes & SFRM_Materialize))
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
+				 errmsg("materialize mode required, but it is not allowed in this context")));
+
+	rsi->returnMode = SFRM_Materialize;
+
+	/* Build a tuple descriptor for our result type */
+	if (get_call_result_type(fcinfo, NULL, &tupdesc) != TYPEFUNC_COMPOSITE)
+		elog(ERROR, "return type must be a row type");
+
+	/* Build tuplestore to hold the result rows */
+	old_cxt = MemoryContextSwitchTo(rsi->econtext->ecxt_per_query_memory);
+
+	tuple_store =
+		tuplestore_begin_heap(rsi->allowedModes & SFRM_Materialize_Random,
+							  false, work_mem);
+	rsi->setDesc = tupdesc;
+	rsi->setResult = tuple_store;
+
+	MemoryContextSwitchTo(old_cxt);
+
+	/* Fill the tuplestore */
+	fill_hba_view(tuple_store, tupdesc);
+
+	PG_RETURN_NULL();
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Parse one tokenised line from the ident config file and store the result in
+ * an IdentLine structure.
+ *
+ * If parsing fails, log a message and return NULL.
+ *
+ * If ident_user is a regular expression (ie. begins with a slash), it is
+ * compiled and stored in IdentLine structure.
+ *
+ * Note: this function leaks memory when an error occurs.  Caller is expected
+ * to have set a memory context that will be reset if this function returns
+ * NULL.
+ */
+static IdentLine *
+parse_ident_line(TokenizedLine *tok_line)
+{
+	int			line_num = tok_line->line_num;
+	ListCell   *field;
+	List	   *tokens;
+	HbaToken   *token;
+	IdentLine  *parsedline;
+
+	Assert(tok_line->fields != NIL);
+	field = list_head(tok_line->fields);
+
+	parsedline = palloc0(sizeof(IdentLine));
+	parsedline->linenumber = line_num;
+
+	/* Get the map token (must exist) */
+	tokens = lfirst(field);
+	IDENT_MULTI_VALUE(tokens);
+	token = linitial(tokens);
+	parsedline->usermap = pstrdup(token->string);
+
+	/* Get the ident user token */
+	field = lnext(tok_line->fields, field);
+	IDENT_FIELD_ABSENT(field);
+	tokens = lfirst(field);
+	IDENT_MULTI_VALUE(tokens);
+	token = linitial(tokens);
+	parsedline->ident_user = pstrdup(token->string);
+
+	/* Get the PG rolename token */
+	field = lnext(tok_line->fields, field);
+	IDENT_FIELD_ABSENT(field);
+	tokens = lfirst(field);
+	IDENT_MULTI_VALUE(tokens);
+	token = linitial(tokens);
+	parsedline->pg_role = pstrdup(token->string);
+
+	if (parsedline->ident_user[0] == '/')
+	{
+		/*
+		 * When system username starts with a slash, treat it as a regular
+		 * expression. Pre-compile it.
+		 */
+		int			r;
+		pg_wchar   *wstr;
+		int			wlen;
+
+		wstr = palloc((strlen(parsedline->ident_user + 1) + 1) * sizeof(pg_wchar));
+		wlen = pg_mb2wchar_with_len(parsedline->ident_user + 1,
+									wstr, strlen(parsedline->ident_user + 1));
+
+		r = pg_regcomp(&parsedline->re, wstr, wlen, REG_ADVANCED, C_COLLATION_OID);
+		if (r)
+		{
+			char		errstr[100];
+
+			pg_regerror(r, &parsedline->re, errstr, sizeof(errstr));
+			ereport(LOG,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_REGULAR_EXPRESSION),
+					 errmsg("invalid regular expression \"%s\": %s",
+							parsedline->ident_user + 1, errstr)));
+
+			pfree(wstr);
+			return NULL;
+		}
+		pfree(wstr);
+	}
+
+	return parsedline;
+}
+
+/*
+ *	Process one line from the parsed ident config lines.
+ *
+ *	Compare input parsed ident line to the needed map, pg_role and ident_user.
+ *	*found_p and *error_p are set according to our results.
+ */
+static void
+check_ident_usermap(IdentLine *identLine, const char *usermap_name,
+					const char *pg_role, const char *ident_user,
+					bool case_insensitive, bool *found_p, bool *error_p)
+{
+	*found_p = false;
+	*error_p = false;
+
+	if (strcmp(identLine->usermap, usermap_name) != 0)
+		/* Line does not match the map name we're looking for, so just abort */
+		return;
+
+	/* Match? */
+	if (identLine->ident_user[0] == '/')
+	{
+		/*
+		 * When system username starts with a slash, treat it as a regular
+		 * expression. In this case, we process the system username as a
+		 * regular expression that returns exactly one match. This is replaced
+		 * for \1 in the database username string, if present.
+		 */
+		int			r;
+		regmatch_t	matches[2];
+		pg_wchar   *wstr;
+		int			wlen;
+		char	   *ofs;
+		char	   *regexp_pgrole;
+
+		wstr = palloc((strlen(ident_user) + 1) * sizeof(pg_wchar));
+		wlen = pg_mb2wchar_with_len(ident_user, wstr, strlen(ident_user));
+
+		r = pg_regexec(&identLine->re, wstr, wlen, 0, NULL, 2, matches, 0);
+		if (r)
+		{
+			char		errstr[100];
+
+			if (r != REG_NOMATCH)
+			{
+				/* REG_NOMATCH is not an error, everything else is */
+				pg_regerror(r, &identLine->re, errstr, sizeof(errstr));
+				ereport(LOG,
+						(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_REGULAR_EXPRESSION),
+						 errmsg("regular expression match for \"%s\" failed: %s",
+								identLine->ident_user + 1, errstr)));
+				*error_p = true;
+			}
+
+			pfree(wstr);
+			return;
+		}
+		pfree(wstr);
+
+		if ((ofs = strstr(identLine->pg_role, "\\1")) != NULL)
+		{
+			int			offset;
+
+			/* substitution of the first argument requested */
+			if (matches[1].rm_so < 0)
+			{
+				ereport(LOG,
+						(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_REGULAR_EXPRESSION),
+						 errmsg("regular expression \"%s\" has no subexpressions as requested by backreference in \"%s\"",
+								identLine->ident_user + 1, identLine->pg_role)));
+				*error_p = true;
+				return;
+			}
+
+			/*
+			 * length: original length minus length of \1 plus length of match
+			 * plus null terminator
+			 */
+			regexp_pgrole = palloc0(strlen(identLine->pg_role) - 2 + (matches[1].rm_eo - matches[1].rm_so) + 1);
+			offset = ofs - identLine->pg_role;
+			memcpy(regexp_pgrole, identLine->pg_role, offset);
+			memcpy(regexp_pgrole + offset,
+				   ident_user + matches[1].rm_so,
+				   matches[1].rm_eo - matches[1].rm_so);
+			strcat(regexp_pgrole, ofs + 2);
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			/* no substitution, so copy the match */
+			regexp_pgrole = pstrdup(identLine->pg_role);
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * now check if the username actually matched what the user is trying
+		 * to connect as
+		 */
+		if (case_insensitive)
+		{
+			if (pg_strcasecmp(regexp_pgrole, pg_role) == 0)
+				*found_p = true;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			if (strcmp(regexp_pgrole, pg_role) == 0)
+				*found_p = true;
+		}
+		pfree(regexp_pgrole);
+
+		return;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		/* Not regular expression, so make complete match */
+		if (case_insensitive)
+		{
+			if (pg_strcasecmp(identLine->pg_role, pg_role) == 0 &&
+				pg_strcasecmp(identLine->ident_user, ident_user) == 0)
+				*found_p = true;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			if (strcmp(identLine->pg_role, pg_role) == 0 &&
+				strcmp(identLine->ident_user, ident_user) == 0)
+				*found_p = true;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+
+/*
+ *	Scan the (pre-parsed) ident usermap file line by line, looking for a match
+ *
+ *	See if the user with ident username "auth_user" is allowed to act
+ *	as Postgres user "pg_role" according to usermap "usermap_name".
+ *
+ *	Special case: Usermap NULL, equivalent to what was previously called
+ *	"sameuser" or "samerole", means don't look in the usermap file.
+ *	That's an implied map wherein "pg_role" must be identical to
+ *	"auth_user" in order to be authorized.
+ *
+ *	Iff authorized, return STATUS_OK, otherwise return STATUS_ERROR.
+ */
+int
+check_usermap(const char *usermap_name,
+			  const char *pg_role,
+			  const char *auth_user,
+			  bool case_insensitive)
+{
+	bool		found_entry = false,
+				error = false;
+
+	if (usermap_name == NULL || usermap_name[0] == '\0')
+	{
+		if (case_insensitive)
+		{
+			if (pg_strcasecmp(pg_role, auth_user) == 0)
+				return STATUS_OK;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			if (strcmp(pg_role, auth_user) == 0)
+				return STATUS_OK;
+		}
+		ereport(LOG,
+				(errmsg("provided user name (%s) and authenticated user name (%s) do not match",
+						pg_role, auth_user)));
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		ListCell   *line_cell;
+
+		foreach(line_cell, parsed_ident_lines)
+		{
+			check_ident_usermap(lfirst(line_cell), usermap_name,
+								pg_role, auth_user, case_insensitive,
+								&found_entry, &error);
+			if (found_entry || error)
+				break;
+		}
+	}
+	if (!found_entry && !error)
+	{
+		ereport(LOG,
+				(errmsg("no match in usermap \"%s\" for user \"%s\" authenticated as \"%s\"",
+						usermap_name, pg_role, auth_user)));
+	}
+	return found_entry ? STATUS_OK : STATUS_ERROR;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Read the ident config file and create a List of IdentLine records for
+ * the contents.
+ *
+ * This works the same as load_hba(), but for the user config file.
+ */
+bool
+load_ident(void)
+{
+	FILE	   *file;
+	List	   *ident_lines = NIL;
+	ListCell   *line_cell,
+			   *parsed_line_cell;
+	List	   *new_parsed_lines = NIL;
+	bool		ok = true;
+	MemoryContext linecxt;
+	MemoryContext oldcxt;
+	MemoryContext ident_context;
+	IdentLine  *newline;
+
+	file = AllocateFile(IdentFileName, "r");
+	if (file == NULL)
+	{
+		/* not fatal ... we just won't do any special ident maps */
+		ereport(LOG,
+				(errcode_for_file_access(),
+				 errmsg("could not open usermap file \"%s\": %m",
+						IdentFileName)));
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	linecxt = tokenize_file(IdentFileName, file, &ident_lines, LOG);
+	FreeFile(file);
+
+	/* Now parse all the lines */
+	Assert(PostmasterContext);
+	ident_context = AllocSetContextCreate(PostmasterContext,
+										  "ident parser context",
+										  ALLOCSET_SMALL_SIZES);
+	oldcxt = MemoryContextSwitchTo(ident_context);
+	foreach(line_cell, ident_lines)
+	{
+		TokenizedLine *tok_line = (TokenizedLine *) lfirst(line_cell);
+
+		/* don't parse lines that already have errors */
+		if (tok_line->err_msg != NULL)
+		{
+			ok = false;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if ((newline = parse_ident_line(tok_line)) == NULL)
+		{
+			/* Parse error; remember there's trouble */
+			ok = false;
+
+			/*
+			 * Keep parsing the rest of the file so we can report errors on
+			 * more than the first line.  Error has already been logged, no
+			 * need for more chatter here.
+			 */
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		new_parsed_lines = lappend(new_parsed_lines, newline);
+	}
+
+	/* Free tokenizer memory */
+	MemoryContextDelete(linecxt);
+	MemoryContextSwitchTo(oldcxt);
+
+	if (!ok)
+	{
+		/*
+		 * File contained one or more errors, so bail out, first being careful
+		 * to clean up whatever we allocated.  Most stuff will go away via
+		 * MemoryContextDelete, but we have to clean up regexes explicitly.
+		 */
+		foreach(parsed_line_cell, new_parsed_lines)
+		{
+			newline = (IdentLine *) lfirst(parsed_line_cell);
+			if (newline->ident_user[0] == '/')
+				pg_regfree(&newline->re);
+		}
+		MemoryContextDelete(ident_context);
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	/* Loaded new file successfully, replace the one we use */
+	if (parsed_ident_lines != NIL)
+	{
+		foreach(parsed_line_cell, parsed_ident_lines)
+		{
+			newline = (IdentLine *) lfirst(parsed_line_cell);
+			if (newline->ident_user[0] == '/')
+				pg_regfree(&newline->re);
+		}
+	}
+	if (parsed_ident_context != NULL)
+		MemoryContextDelete(parsed_ident_context);
+
+	parsed_ident_context = ident_context;
+	parsed_ident_lines = new_parsed_lines;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+
+
+/*
+ *	Determine what authentication method should be used when accessing database
+ *	"database" from frontend "raddr", user "user".  Return the method and
+ *	an optional argument (stored in fields of *port), and STATUS_OK.
+ *
+ *	If the file does not contain any entry matching the request, we return
+ *	method = uaImplicitReject.
+ */
+void
+hba_getauthmethod(hbaPort *port)
+{
+	check_hba(port);
+}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/ifaddr.c b/src/backend/libpq/ifaddr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..82adecb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/ifaddr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,594 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * ifaddr.c
+ *	  IP netmask calculations, and enumerating network interfaces.
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ *	  src/backend/libpq/ifaddr.c
+ *
+ * This file and the IPV6 implementation were initially provided by
+ * Nigel Kukard <nkukard@lbsd.net>, Linux Based Systems Design
+ * http://www.lbsd.net.
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_TCP_H
+#include <netinet/tcp.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/file.h>
+
+#include "libpq/ifaddr.h"
+#include "port/pg_bswap.h"
+
+static int	range_sockaddr_AF_INET(const struct sockaddr_in *addr,
+								   const struct sockaddr_in *netaddr,
+								   const struct sockaddr_in *netmask);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_IPV6
+static int	range_sockaddr_AF_INET6(const struct sockaddr_in6 *addr,
+									const struct sockaddr_in6 *netaddr,
+									const struct sockaddr_in6 *netmask);
+#endif
+
+
+/*
+ * pg_range_sockaddr - is addr within the subnet specified by netaddr/netmask ?
+ *
+ * Note: caller must already have verified that all three addresses are
+ * in the same address family; and AF_UNIX addresses are not supported.
+ */
+int
+pg_range_sockaddr(const struct sockaddr_storage *addr,
+				  const struct sockaddr_storage *netaddr,
+				  const struct sockaddr_storage *netmask)
+{
+	if (addr->ss_family == AF_INET)
+		return range_sockaddr_AF_INET((const struct sockaddr_in *) addr,
+									  (const struct sockaddr_in *) netaddr,
+									  (const struct sockaddr_in *) netmask);
+#ifdef HAVE_IPV6
+	else if (addr->ss_family == AF_INET6)
+		return range_sockaddr_AF_INET6((const struct sockaddr_in6 *) addr,
+									   (const struct sockaddr_in6 *) netaddr,
+									   (const struct sockaddr_in6 *) netmask);
+#endif
+	else
+		return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+range_sockaddr_AF_INET(const struct sockaddr_in *addr,
+					   const struct sockaddr_in *netaddr,
+					   const struct sockaddr_in *netmask)
+{
+	if (((addr->sin_addr.s_addr ^ netaddr->sin_addr.s_addr) &
+		 netmask->sin_addr.s_addr) == 0)
+		return 1;
+	else
+		return 0;
+}
+
+
+#ifdef HAVE_IPV6
+
+static int
+range_sockaddr_AF_INET6(const struct sockaddr_in6 *addr,
+						const struct sockaddr_in6 *netaddr,
+						const struct sockaddr_in6 *netmask)
+{
+	int			i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+	{
+		if (((addr->sin6_addr.s6_addr[i] ^ netaddr->sin6_addr.s6_addr[i]) &
+			 netmask->sin6_addr.s6_addr[i]) != 0)
+			return 0;
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+#endif							/* HAVE_IPV6 */
+
+/*
+ *	pg_sockaddr_cidr_mask - make a network mask of the appropriate family
+ *	  and required number of significant bits
+ *
+ * numbits can be null, in which case the mask is fully set.
+ *
+ * The resulting mask is placed in *mask, which had better be big enough.
+ *
+ * Return value is 0 if okay, -1 if not.
+ */
+int
+pg_sockaddr_cidr_mask(struct sockaddr_storage *mask, char *numbits, int family)
+{
+	long		bits;
+	char	   *endptr;
+
+	if (numbits == NULL)
+	{
+		bits = (family == AF_INET) ? 32 : 128;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		bits = strtol(numbits, &endptr, 10);
+		if (*numbits == '\0' || *endptr != '\0')
+			return -1;
+	}
+
+	switch (family)
+	{
+		case AF_INET:
+			{
+				struct sockaddr_in mask4;
+				long		maskl;
+
+				if (bits < 0 || bits > 32)
+					return -1;
+				memset(&mask4, 0, sizeof(mask4));
+				/* avoid "x << 32", which is not portable */
+				if (bits > 0)
+					maskl = (0xffffffffUL << (32 - (int) bits))
+						& 0xffffffffUL;
+				else
+					maskl = 0;
+				mask4.sin_addr.s_addr = pg_hton32(maskl);
+				memcpy(mask, &mask4, sizeof(mask4));
+				break;
+			}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_IPV6
+		case AF_INET6:
+			{
+				struct sockaddr_in6 mask6;
+				int			i;
+
+				if (bits < 0 || bits > 128)
+					return -1;
+				memset(&mask6, 0, sizeof(mask6));
+				for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+				{
+					if (bits <= 0)
+						mask6.sin6_addr.s6_addr[i] = 0;
+					else if (bits >= 8)
+						mask6.sin6_addr.s6_addr[i] = 0xff;
+					else
+					{
+						mask6.sin6_addr.s6_addr[i] =
+							(0xff << (8 - (int) bits)) & 0xff;
+					}
+					bits -= 8;
+				}
+				memcpy(mask, &mask6, sizeof(mask6));
+				break;
+			}
+#endif
+		default:
+			return -1;
+	}
+
+	mask->ss_family = family;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Run the callback function for the addr/mask, after making sure the
+ * mask is sane for the addr.
+ */
+static void
+run_ifaddr_callback(PgIfAddrCallback callback, void *cb_data,
+					struct sockaddr *addr, struct sockaddr *mask)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_storage fullmask;
+
+	if (!addr)
+		return;
+
+	/* Check that the mask is valid */
+	if (mask)
+	{
+		if (mask->sa_family != addr->sa_family)
+		{
+			mask = NULL;
+		}
+		else if (mask->sa_family == AF_INET)
+		{
+			if (((struct sockaddr_in *) mask)->sin_addr.s_addr == INADDR_ANY)
+				mask = NULL;
+		}
+#ifdef HAVE_IPV6
+		else if (mask->sa_family == AF_INET6)
+		{
+			if (IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *) mask)->sin6_addr))
+				mask = NULL;
+		}
+#endif
+	}
+
+	/* If mask is invalid, generate our own fully-set mask */
+	if (!mask)
+	{
+		pg_sockaddr_cidr_mask(&fullmask, NULL, addr->sa_family);
+		mask = (struct sockaddr *) &fullmask;
+	}
+
+	(*callback) (addr, mask, cb_data);
+}
+
+#ifdef WIN32
+
+#include <winsock2.h>
+#include <ws2tcpip.h>
+
+/*
+ * Enumerate the system's network interface addresses and call the callback
+ * for each one.  Returns 0 if successful, -1 if trouble.
+ *
+ * This version is for Win32.  Uses the Winsock 2 functions (ie: ws2_32.dll)
+ */
+int
+pg_foreach_ifaddr(PgIfAddrCallback callback, void *cb_data)
+{
+	INTERFACE_INFO *ptr,
+			   *ii = NULL;
+	unsigned long length,
+				i;
+	unsigned long n_ii = 0;
+	SOCKET		sock;
+	int			error;
+
+	sock = WSASocket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+	if (sock == INVALID_SOCKET)
+		return -1;
+
+	while (n_ii < 1024)
+	{
+		n_ii += 64;
+		ptr = realloc(ii, sizeof(INTERFACE_INFO) * n_ii);
+		if (!ptr)
+		{
+			free(ii);
+			closesocket(sock);
+			errno = ENOMEM;
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		ii = ptr;
+		if (WSAIoctl(sock, SIO_GET_INTERFACE_LIST, 0, 0,
+					 ii, n_ii * sizeof(INTERFACE_INFO),
+					 &length, 0, 0) == SOCKET_ERROR)
+		{
+			error = WSAGetLastError();
+			if (error == WSAEFAULT || error == WSAENOBUFS)
+				continue;		/* need to make the buffer bigger */
+			closesocket(sock);
+			free(ii);
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		break;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < length / sizeof(INTERFACE_INFO); ++i)
+		run_ifaddr_callback(callback, cb_data,
+							(struct sockaddr *) &ii[i].iiAddress,
+							(struct sockaddr *) &ii[i].iiNetmask);
+
+	closesocket(sock);
+	free(ii);
+	return 0;
+}
+#elif HAVE_GETIFADDRS			/* && !WIN32 */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H
+#include <ifaddrs.h>
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Enumerate the system's network interface addresses and call the callback
+ * for each one.  Returns 0 if successful, -1 if trouble.
+ *
+ * This version uses the getifaddrs() interface, which is available on
+ * BSDs, AIX, and modern Linux.
+ */
+int
+pg_foreach_ifaddr(PgIfAddrCallback callback, void *cb_data)
+{
+	struct ifaddrs *ifa,
+			   *l;
+
+	if (getifaddrs(&ifa) < 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	for (l = ifa; l; l = l->ifa_next)
+		run_ifaddr_callback(callback, cb_data,
+							l->ifa_addr, l->ifa_netmask);
+
+	freeifaddrs(ifa);
+	return 0;
+}
+#else							/* !HAVE_GETIFADDRS && !WIN32 */
+
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_NET_IF_H
+#include <net/if.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKIO_H
+#include <sys/sockio.h>
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * SIOCGIFCONF does not return IPv6 addresses on Solaris
+ * and HP/UX. So we prefer SIOCGLIFCONF if it's available.
+ *
+ * On HP/UX, however, it *only* returns IPv6 addresses,
+ * and the structs are named slightly differently too.
+ * We'd have to do another call with SIOCGIFCONF to get the
+ * IPv4 addresses as well. We don't currently bother, just
+ * fall back to SIOCGIFCONF on HP/UX.
+ */
+
+#if defined(SIOCGLIFCONF) && !defined(__hpux)
+
+/*
+ * Enumerate the system's network interface addresses and call the callback
+ * for each one.  Returns 0 if successful, -1 if trouble.
+ *
+ * This version uses ioctl(SIOCGLIFCONF).
+ */
+int
+pg_foreach_ifaddr(PgIfAddrCallback callback, void *cb_data)
+{
+	struct lifconf lifc;
+	struct lifreq *lifr,
+				lmask;
+	struct sockaddr *addr,
+			   *mask;
+	char	   *ptr,
+			   *buffer = NULL;
+	size_t		n_buffer = 1024;
+	pgsocket	sock,
+				fd;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_IPV6
+	pgsocket	sock6;
+#endif
+	int			i,
+				total;
+
+	sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
+	if (sock == PGINVALID_SOCKET)
+		return -1;
+
+	while (n_buffer < 1024 * 100)
+	{
+		n_buffer += 1024;
+		ptr = realloc(buffer, n_buffer);
+		if (!ptr)
+		{
+			free(buffer);
+			close(sock);
+			errno = ENOMEM;
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		memset(&lifc, 0, sizeof(lifc));
+		lifc.lifc_family = AF_UNSPEC;
+		lifc.lifc_buf = buffer = ptr;
+		lifc.lifc_len = n_buffer;
+
+		if (ioctl(sock, SIOCGLIFCONF, &lifc) < 0)
+		{
+			if (errno == EINVAL)
+				continue;
+			free(buffer);
+			close(sock);
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Some Unixes try to return as much data as possible, with no
+		 * indication of whether enough space allocated. Don't believe we have
+		 * it all unless there's lots of slop.
+		 */
+		if (lifc.lifc_len < n_buffer - 1024)
+			break;
+	}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_IPV6
+	/* We'll need an IPv6 socket too for the SIOCGLIFNETMASK ioctls */
+	sock6 = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
+	if (sock6 == PGINVALID_SOCKET)
+	{
+		free(buffer);
+		close(sock);
+		return -1;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	total = lifc.lifc_len / sizeof(struct lifreq);
+	lifr = lifc.lifc_req;
+	for (i = 0; i < total; ++i)
+	{
+		addr = (struct sockaddr *) &lifr[i].lifr_addr;
+		memcpy(&lmask, &lifr[i], sizeof(struct lifreq));
+#ifdef HAVE_IPV6
+		fd = (addr->sa_family == AF_INET6) ? sock6 : sock;
+#else
+		fd = sock;
+#endif
+		if (ioctl(fd, SIOCGLIFNETMASK, &lmask) < 0)
+			mask = NULL;
+		else
+			mask = (struct sockaddr *) &lmask.lifr_addr;
+		run_ifaddr_callback(callback, cb_data, addr, mask);
+	}
+
+	free(buffer);
+	close(sock);
+#ifdef HAVE_IPV6
+	close(sock6);
+#endif
+	return 0;
+}
+#elif defined(SIOCGIFCONF)
+
+/*
+ * Remaining Unixes use SIOCGIFCONF. Some only return IPv4 information
+ * here, so this is the least preferred method. Note that there is no
+ * standard way to iterate the struct ifreq returned in the array.
+ * On some OSs the structures are padded large enough for any address,
+ * on others you have to calculate the size of the struct ifreq.
+ */
+
+/* Some OSs have _SIZEOF_ADDR_IFREQ, so just use that */
+#ifndef _SIZEOF_ADDR_IFREQ
+
+/* Calculate based on sockaddr.sa_len */
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_SA_LEN
+#define _SIZEOF_ADDR_IFREQ(ifr) \
+		((ifr).ifr_addr.sa_len > sizeof(struct sockaddr) ? \
+		 (sizeof(struct ifreq) - sizeof(struct sockaddr) + \
+		  (ifr).ifr_addr.sa_len) : sizeof(struct ifreq))
+
+/* Padded ifreq structure, simple */
+#else
+#define _SIZEOF_ADDR_IFREQ(ifr) \
+	sizeof (struct ifreq)
+#endif
+#endif							/* !_SIZEOF_ADDR_IFREQ */
+
+/*
+ * Enumerate the system's network interface addresses and call the callback
+ * for each one.  Returns 0 if successful, -1 if trouble.
+ *
+ * This version uses ioctl(SIOCGIFCONF).
+ */
+int
+pg_foreach_ifaddr(PgIfAddrCallback callback, void *cb_data)
+{
+	struct ifconf ifc;
+	struct ifreq *ifr,
+			   *end,
+				addr,
+				mask;
+	char	   *ptr,
+			   *buffer = NULL;
+	size_t		n_buffer = 1024;
+	pgsocket	sock;
+
+	sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
+	if (sock == PGINVALID_SOCKET)
+		return -1;
+
+	while (n_buffer < 1024 * 100)
+	{
+		n_buffer += 1024;
+		ptr = realloc(buffer, n_buffer);
+		if (!ptr)
+		{
+			free(buffer);
+			close(sock);
+			errno = ENOMEM;
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		memset(&ifc, 0, sizeof(ifc));
+		ifc.ifc_buf = buffer = ptr;
+		ifc.ifc_len = n_buffer;
+
+		if (ioctl(sock, SIOCGIFCONF, &ifc) < 0)
+		{
+			if (errno == EINVAL)
+				continue;
+			free(buffer);
+			close(sock);
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Some Unixes try to return as much data as possible, with no
+		 * indication of whether enough space allocated. Don't believe we have
+		 * it all unless there's lots of slop.
+		 */
+		if (ifc.ifc_len < n_buffer - 1024)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	end = (struct ifreq *) (buffer + ifc.ifc_len);
+	for (ifr = ifc.ifc_req; ifr < end;)
+	{
+		memcpy(&addr, ifr, sizeof(addr));
+		memcpy(&mask, ifr, sizeof(mask));
+		if (ioctl(sock, SIOCGIFADDR, &addr, sizeof(addr)) == 0 &&
+			ioctl(sock, SIOCGIFNETMASK, &mask, sizeof(mask)) == 0)
+			run_ifaddr_callback(callback, cb_data,
+								&addr.ifr_addr, &mask.ifr_addr);
+		ifr = (struct ifreq *) ((char *) ifr + _SIZEOF_ADDR_IFREQ(*ifr));
+	}
+
+	free(buffer);
+	close(sock);
+	return 0;
+}
+#else							/* !defined(SIOCGIFCONF) */
+
+/*
+ * Enumerate the system's network interface addresses and call the callback
+ * for each one.  Returns 0 if successful, -1 if trouble.
+ *
+ * This version is our fallback if there's no known way to get the
+ * interface addresses.  Just return the standard loopback addresses.
+ */
+int
+pg_foreach_ifaddr(PgIfAddrCallback callback, void *cb_data)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_in addr;
+	struct sockaddr_storage mask;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_IPV6
+	struct sockaddr_in6 addr6;
+#endif
+
+	/* addr 127.0.0.1/8 */
+	memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
+	addr.sin_family = AF_INET;
+	addr.sin_addr.s_addr = pg_ntoh32(0x7f000001);
+	memset(&mask, 0, sizeof(mask));
+	pg_sockaddr_cidr_mask(&mask, "8", AF_INET);
+	run_ifaddr_callback(callback, cb_data,
+						(struct sockaddr *) &addr,
+						(struct sockaddr *) &mask);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_IPV6
+	/* addr ::1/128 */
+	memset(&addr6, 0, sizeof(addr6));
+	addr6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
+	addr6.sin6_addr.s6_addr[15] = 1;
+	memset(&mask, 0, sizeof(mask));
+	pg_sockaddr_cidr_mask(&mask, "128", AF_INET6);
+	run_ifaddr_callback(callback, cb_data,
+						(struct sockaddr *) &addr6,
+						(struct sockaddr *) &mask);
+#endif
+
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif							/* !defined(SIOCGIFCONF) */
+
+#endif							/* !HAVE_GETIFADDRS */
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/pg_hba.conf.sample b/src/backend/libpq/pg_hba.conf.sample
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b6de12b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/pg_hba.conf.sample
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+# PostgreSQL Client Authentication Configuration File
+# ===================================================
+#
+# Refer to the "Client Authentication" section in the PostgreSQL
+# documentation for a complete description of this file.  A short
+# synopsis follows.
+#
+# This file controls: which hosts are allowed to connect, how clients
+# are authenticated, which PostgreSQL user names they can use, which
+# databases they can access.  Records take one of these forms:
+#
+# local         DATABASE  USER  METHOD  [OPTIONS]
+# host          DATABASE  USER  ADDRESS  METHOD  [OPTIONS]
+# hostssl       DATABASE  USER  ADDRESS  METHOD  [OPTIONS]
+# hostnossl     DATABASE  USER  ADDRESS  METHOD  [OPTIONS]
+# hostgssenc    DATABASE  USER  ADDRESS  METHOD  [OPTIONS]
+# hostnogssenc  DATABASE  USER  ADDRESS  METHOD  [OPTIONS]
+#
+# (The uppercase items must be replaced by actual values.)
+#
+# The first field is the connection type: "local" is a Unix-domain
+# socket, "host" is either a plain or SSL-encrypted TCP/IP socket,
+# "hostssl" is an SSL-encrypted TCP/IP socket, and "hostnossl" is a
+# non-SSL TCP/IP socket.  Similarly, "hostgssenc" uses a
+# GSSAPI-encrypted TCP/IP socket, while "hostnogssenc" uses a
+# non-GSSAPI socket.
+#
+# DATABASE can be "all", "sameuser", "samerole", "replication", a
+# database name, or a comma-separated list thereof. The "all"
+# keyword does not match "replication". Access to replication
+# must be enabled in a separate record (see example below).
+#
+# USER can be "all", a user name, a group name prefixed with "+", or a
+# comma-separated list thereof.  In both the DATABASE and USER fields
+# you can also write a file name prefixed with "@" to include names
+# from a separate file.
+#
+# ADDRESS specifies the set of hosts the record matches.  It can be a
+# host name, or it is made up of an IP address and a CIDR mask that is
+# an integer (between 0 and 32 (IPv4) or 128 (IPv6) inclusive) that
+# specifies the number of significant bits in the mask.  A host name
+# that starts with a dot (.) matches a suffix of the actual host name.
+# Alternatively, you can write an IP address and netmask in separate
+# columns to specify the set of hosts.  Instead of a CIDR-address, you
+# can write "samehost" to match any of the server's own IP addresses,
+# or "samenet" to match any address in any subnet that the server is
+# directly connected to.
+#
+# METHOD can be "trust", "reject", "md5", "password", "scram-sha-256",
+# "gss", "sspi", "ident", "peer", "pam", "ldap", "radius" or "cert".
+# Note that "password" sends passwords in clear text; "md5" or
+# "scram-sha-256" are preferred since they send encrypted passwords.
+#
+# OPTIONS are a set of options for the authentication in the format
+# NAME=VALUE.  The available options depend on the different
+# authentication methods -- refer to the "Client Authentication"
+# section in the documentation for a list of which options are
+# available for which authentication methods.
+#
+# Database and user names containing spaces, commas, quotes and other
+# special characters must be quoted.  Quoting one of the keywords
+# "all", "sameuser", "samerole" or "replication" makes the name lose
+# its special character, and just match a database or username with
+# that name.
+#
+# This file is read on server startup and when the server receives a
+# SIGHUP signal.  If you edit the file on a running system, you have to
+# SIGHUP the server for the changes to take effect, run "pg_ctl reload",
+# or execute "SELECT pg_reload_conf()".
+#
+# Put your actual configuration here
+# ----------------------------------
+#
+# If you want to allow non-local connections, you need to add more
+# "host" records.  In that case you will also need to make PostgreSQL
+# listen on a non-local interface via the listen_addresses
+# configuration parameter, or via the -i or -h command line switches.
+
+@authcomment@
+
+# TYPE  DATABASE        USER            ADDRESS                 METHOD
+
+@remove-line-for-nolocal@# "local" is for Unix domain socket connections only
+@remove-line-for-nolocal@local   all             all                                     @authmethodlocal@
+# IPv4 local connections:
+host    all             all             127.0.0.1/32            @authmethodhost@
+# IPv6 local connections:
+host    all             all             ::1/128                 @authmethodhost@
+# Allow replication connections from localhost, by a user with the
+# replication privilege.
+@remove-line-for-nolocal@local   replication     all                                     @authmethodlocal@
+host    replication     all             127.0.0.1/32            @authmethodhost@
+host    replication     all             ::1/128                 @authmethodhost@
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/pg_ident.conf.sample b/src/backend/libpq/pg_ident.conf.sample
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a5870e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/pg_ident.conf.sample
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+# PostgreSQL User Name Maps
+# =========================
+#
+# Refer to the PostgreSQL documentation, chapter "Client
+# Authentication" for a complete description.  A short synopsis
+# follows.
+#
+# This file controls PostgreSQL user name mapping.  It maps external
+# user names to their corresponding PostgreSQL user names.  Records
+# are of the form:
+#
+# MAPNAME  SYSTEM-USERNAME  PG-USERNAME
+#
+# (The uppercase quantities must be replaced by actual values.)
+#
+# MAPNAME is the (otherwise freely chosen) map name that was used in
+# pg_hba.conf.  SYSTEM-USERNAME is the detected user name of the
+# client.  PG-USERNAME is the requested PostgreSQL user name.  The
+# existence of a record specifies that SYSTEM-USERNAME may connect as
+# PG-USERNAME.
+#
+# If SYSTEM-USERNAME starts with a slash (/), it will be treated as a
+# regular expression.  Optionally this can contain a capture (a
+# parenthesized subexpression).  The substring matching the capture
+# will be substituted for \1 (backslash-one) if present in
+# PG-USERNAME.
+#
+# Multiple maps may be specified in this file and used by pg_hba.conf.
+#
+# No map names are defined in the default configuration.  If all
+# system user names and PostgreSQL user names are the same, you don't
+# need anything in this file.
+#
+# This file is read on server startup and when the postmaster receives
+# a SIGHUP signal.  If you edit the file on a running system, you have
+# to SIGHUP the postmaster for the changes to take effect.  You can
+# use "pg_ctl reload" to do that.
+
+# Put your actual configuration here
+# ----------------------------------
+
+# MAPNAME       SYSTEM-USERNAME         PG-USERNAME
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c b/src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ee2cd86
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1984 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * pqcomm.c
+ *	  Communication functions between the Frontend and the Backend
+ *
+ * These routines handle the low-level details of communication between
+ * frontend and backend.  They just shove data across the communication
+ * channel, and are ignorant of the semantics of the data --- or would be,
+ * except for major brain damage in the design of the old COPY OUT protocol.
+ * Unfortunately, COPY OUT was designed to commandeer the communication
+ * channel (it just transfers data without wrapping it into messages).
+ * No other messages can be sent while COPY OUT is in progress; and if the
+ * copy is aborted by an ereport(ERROR), we need to close out the copy so that
+ * the frontend gets back into sync.  Therefore, these routines have to be
+ * aware of COPY OUT state.  (New COPY-OUT is message-based and does *not*
+ * set the DoingCopyOut flag.)
+ *
+ * NOTE: generally, it's a bad idea to emit outgoing messages directly with
+ * pq_putbytes(), especially if the message would require multiple calls
+ * to send.  Instead, use the routines in pqformat.c to construct the message
+ * in a buffer and then emit it in one call to pq_putmessage.  This ensures
+ * that the channel will not be clogged by an incomplete message if execution
+ * is aborted by ereport(ERROR) partway through the message.  The only
+ * non-libpq code that should call pq_putbytes directly is old-style COPY OUT.
+ *
+ * At one time, libpq was shared between frontend and backend, but now
+ * the backend's "backend/libpq" is quite separate from "interfaces/libpq".
+ * All that remains is similarities of names to trap the unwary...
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ *	src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+/*------------------------
+ * INTERFACE ROUTINES
+ *
+ * setup/teardown:
+ *		StreamServerPort	- Open postmaster's server port
+ *		StreamConnection	- Create new connection with client
+ *		StreamClose			- Close a client/backend connection
+ *		TouchSocketFiles	- Protect socket files against /tmp cleaners
+ *		pq_init			- initialize libpq at backend startup
+ *		socket_comm_reset	- reset libpq during error recovery
+ *		socket_close		- shutdown libpq at backend exit
+ *
+ * low-level I/O:
+ *		pq_getbytes		- get a known number of bytes from connection
+ *		pq_getstring	- get a null terminated string from connection
+ *		pq_getmessage	- get a message with length word from connection
+ *		pq_getbyte		- get next byte from connection
+ *		pq_peekbyte		- peek at next byte from connection
+ *		pq_putbytes		- send bytes to connection (not flushed until pq_flush)
+ *		pq_flush		- flush pending output
+ *		pq_flush_if_writable - flush pending output if writable without blocking
+ *		pq_getbyte_if_available - get a byte if available without blocking
+ *
+ * message-level I/O (and old-style-COPY-OUT cruft):
+ *		pq_putmessage	- send a normal message (suppressed in COPY OUT mode)
+ *		pq_putmessage_noblock - buffer a normal message (suppressed in COPY OUT)
+ *		pq_startcopyout - inform libpq that a COPY OUT transfer is beginning
+ *		pq_endcopyout	- end a COPY OUT transfer
+ *
+ *------------------------
+ */
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <grp.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/file.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_TCP_H
+#include <netinet/tcp.h>
+#endif
+#include <utime.h>
+#ifdef _MSC_VER					/* mstcpip.h is missing on mingw */
+#include <mstcpip.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "common/ip.h"
+#include "libpq/libpq.h"
+#include "miscadmin.h"
+#include "port/pg_bswap.h"
+#include "storage/ipc.h"
+#include "utils/guc.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+/*
+ * Cope with the various platform-specific ways to spell TCP keepalive socket
+ * options.  This doesn't cover Windows, which as usual does its own thing.
+ */
+#if defined(TCP_KEEPIDLE)
+/* TCP_KEEPIDLE is the name of this option on Linux and *BSD */
+#define PG_TCP_KEEPALIVE_IDLE TCP_KEEPIDLE
+#define PG_TCP_KEEPALIVE_IDLE_STR "TCP_KEEPIDLE"
+#elif defined(TCP_KEEPALIVE_THRESHOLD)
+/* TCP_KEEPALIVE_THRESHOLD is the name of this option on Solaris >= 11 */
+#define PG_TCP_KEEPALIVE_IDLE TCP_KEEPALIVE_THRESHOLD
+#define PG_TCP_KEEPALIVE_IDLE_STR "TCP_KEEPALIVE_THRESHOLD"
+#elif defined(TCP_KEEPALIVE) && defined(__darwin__)
+/* TCP_KEEPALIVE is the name of this option on macOS */
+/* Caution: Solaris has this symbol but it means something different */
+#define PG_TCP_KEEPALIVE_IDLE TCP_KEEPALIVE
+#define PG_TCP_KEEPALIVE_IDLE_STR "TCP_KEEPALIVE"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Configuration options
+ */
+int			Unix_socket_permissions;
+char	   *Unix_socket_group;
+
+/* Where the Unix socket files are (list of palloc'd strings) */
+static List *sock_paths = NIL;
+
+/*
+ * Buffers for low-level I/O.
+ *
+ * The receive buffer is fixed size. Send buffer is usually 8k, but can be
+ * enlarged by pq_putmessage_noblock() if the message doesn't fit otherwise.
+ */
+
+#define PQ_SEND_BUFFER_SIZE 8192
+#define PQ_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE 8192
+
+static char *PqSendBuffer;
+static int	PqSendBufferSize;	/* Size send buffer */
+static int	PqSendPointer;		/* Next index to store a byte in PqSendBuffer */
+static int	PqSendStart;		/* Next index to send a byte in PqSendBuffer */
+
+static char PqRecvBuffer[PQ_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE];
+static int	PqRecvPointer;		/* Next index to read a byte from PqRecvBuffer */
+static int	PqRecvLength;		/* End of data available in PqRecvBuffer */
+
+/*
+ * Message status
+ */
+static bool PqCommBusy;			/* busy sending data to the client */
+static bool PqCommReadingMsg;	/* in the middle of reading a message */
+static bool DoingCopyOut;		/* in old-protocol COPY OUT processing */
+
+
+/* Internal functions */
+static void socket_comm_reset(void);
+static void socket_close(int code, Datum arg);
+static void socket_set_nonblocking(bool nonblocking);
+static int	socket_flush(void);
+static int	socket_flush_if_writable(void);
+static bool socket_is_send_pending(void);
+static int	socket_putmessage(char msgtype, const char *s, size_t len);
+static void socket_putmessage_noblock(char msgtype, const char *s, size_t len);
+static void socket_startcopyout(void);
+static void socket_endcopyout(bool errorAbort);
+static int	internal_putbytes(const char *s, size_t len);
+static int	internal_flush(void);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_UNIX_SOCKETS
+static int	Lock_AF_UNIX(const char *unixSocketDir, const char *unixSocketPath);
+static int	Setup_AF_UNIX(const char *sock_path);
+#endif							/* HAVE_UNIX_SOCKETS */
+
+static const PQcommMethods PqCommSocketMethods = {
+	socket_comm_reset,
+	socket_flush,
+	socket_flush_if_writable,
+	socket_is_send_pending,
+	socket_putmessage,
+	socket_putmessage_noblock,
+	socket_startcopyout,
+	socket_endcopyout
+};
+
+const PQcommMethods *PqCommMethods = &PqCommSocketMethods;
+
+WaitEventSet *FeBeWaitSet;
+
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		pq_init - initialize libpq at backend startup
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+void
+pq_init(void)
+{
+	/* initialize state variables */
+	PqSendBufferSize = PQ_SEND_BUFFER_SIZE;
+	PqSendBuffer = MemoryContextAlloc(TopMemoryContext, PqSendBufferSize);
+	PqSendPointer = PqSendStart = PqRecvPointer = PqRecvLength = 0;
+	PqCommBusy = false;
+	PqCommReadingMsg = false;
+	DoingCopyOut = false;
+
+	/* set up process-exit hook to close the socket */
+	on_proc_exit(socket_close, 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * In backends (as soon as forked) we operate the underlying socket in
+	 * nonblocking mode and use latches to implement blocking semantics if
+	 * needed. That allows us to provide safely interruptible reads and
+	 * writes.
+	 *
+	 * Use COMMERROR on failure, because ERROR would try to send the error to
+	 * the client, which might require changing the mode again, leading to
+	 * infinite recursion.
+	 */
+#ifndef WIN32
+	if (!pg_set_noblock(MyProcPort->sock))
+		ereport(COMMERROR,
+				(errmsg("could not set socket to nonblocking mode: %m")));
+#endif
+
+	FeBeWaitSet = CreateWaitEventSet(TopMemoryContext, 3);
+	AddWaitEventToSet(FeBeWaitSet, WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE, MyProcPort->sock,
+					  NULL, NULL);
+	AddWaitEventToSet(FeBeWaitSet, WL_LATCH_SET, -1, MyLatch, NULL);
+	AddWaitEventToSet(FeBeWaitSet, WL_POSTMASTER_DEATH, -1, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		socket_comm_reset - reset libpq during error recovery
+ *
+ * This is called from error recovery at the outer idle loop.  It's
+ * just to get us out of trouble if we somehow manage to elog() from
+ * inside a pqcomm.c routine (which ideally will never happen, but...)
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+static void
+socket_comm_reset(void)
+{
+	/* Do not throw away pending data, but do reset the busy flag */
+	PqCommBusy = false;
+	/* We can abort any old-style COPY OUT, too */
+	pq_endcopyout(true);
+}
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		socket_close - shutdown libpq at backend exit
+ *
+ * This is the one pg_on_exit_callback in place during BackendInitialize().
+ * That function's unusual signal handling constrains that this callback be
+ * safe to run at any instant.
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+static void
+socket_close(int code, Datum arg)
+{
+	/* Nothing to do in a standalone backend, where MyProcPort is NULL. */
+	if (MyProcPort != NULL)
+	{
+#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
+		/*
+		 * Shutdown GSSAPI layer.  This section does nothing when interrupting
+		 * BackendInitialize(), because pg_GSS_recvauth() makes first use of
+		 * "ctx" and "cred".
+		 *
+		 * Note that we don't bother to free MyProcPort->gss, since we're
+		 * about to exit anyway.
+		 */
+		if (MyProcPort->gss)
+		{
+			OM_uint32	min_s;
+
+			if (MyProcPort->gss->ctx != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
+				gss_delete_sec_context(&min_s, &MyProcPort->gss->ctx, NULL);
+
+			if (MyProcPort->gss->cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
+				gss_release_cred(&min_s, &MyProcPort->gss->cred);
+		}
+#endif							/* ENABLE_GSS */
+
+		/*
+		 * Cleanly shut down SSL layer.  Nowhere else does a postmaster child
+		 * call this, so this is safe when interrupting BackendInitialize().
+		 */
+		secure_close(MyProcPort);
+
+		/*
+		 * Formerly we did an explicit close() here, but it seems better to
+		 * leave the socket open until the process dies.  This allows clients
+		 * to perform a "synchronous close" if they care --- wait till the
+		 * transport layer reports connection closure, and you can be sure the
+		 * backend has exited.
+		 *
+		 * We do set sock to PGINVALID_SOCKET to prevent any further I/O,
+		 * though.
+		 */
+		MyProcPort->sock = PGINVALID_SOCKET;
+	}
+}
+
+
+
+/*
+ * Streams -- wrapper around Unix socket system calls
+ *
+ *
+ *		Stream functions are used for vanilla TCP connection protocol.
+ */
+
+
+/*
+ * StreamServerPort -- open a "listening" port to accept connections.
+ *
+ * family should be AF_UNIX or AF_UNSPEC; portNumber is the port number.
+ * For AF_UNIX ports, hostName should be NULL and unixSocketDir must be
+ * specified.  For TCP ports, hostName is either NULL for all interfaces or
+ * the interface to listen on, and unixSocketDir is ignored (can be NULL).
+ *
+ * Successfully opened sockets are added to the ListenSocket[] array (of
+ * length MaxListen), at the first position that isn't PGINVALID_SOCKET.
+ *
+ * RETURNS: STATUS_OK or STATUS_ERROR
+ */
+
+int
+StreamServerPort(int family, const char *hostName, unsigned short portNumber,
+				 const char *unixSocketDir,
+				 pgsocket ListenSocket[], int MaxListen)
+{
+	pgsocket	fd;
+	int			err;
+	int			maxconn;
+	int			ret;
+	char		portNumberStr[32];
+	const char *familyDesc;
+	char		familyDescBuf[64];
+	const char *addrDesc;
+	char		addrBuf[NI_MAXHOST];
+	char	   *service;
+	struct addrinfo *addrs = NULL,
+			   *addr;
+	struct addrinfo hint;
+	int			listen_index = 0;
+	int			added = 0;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_UNIX_SOCKETS
+	char		unixSocketPath[MAXPGPATH];
+#endif
+#if !defined(WIN32) || defined(IPV6_V6ONLY)
+	int			one = 1;
+#endif
+
+	/* Initialize hint structure */
+	MemSet(&hint, 0, sizeof(hint));
+	hint.ai_family = family;
+	hint.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
+	hint.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_UNIX_SOCKETS
+	if (family == AF_UNIX)
+	{
+		/*
+		 * Create unixSocketPath from portNumber and unixSocketDir and lock
+		 * that file path
+		 */
+		UNIXSOCK_PATH(unixSocketPath, portNumber, unixSocketDir);
+		if (strlen(unixSocketPath) >= UNIXSOCK_PATH_BUFLEN)
+		{
+			ereport(LOG,
+					(errmsg("Unix-domain socket path \"%s\" is too long (maximum %d bytes)",
+							unixSocketPath,
+							(int) (UNIXSOCK_PATH_BUFLEN - 1))));
+			return STATUS_ERROR;
+		}
+		if (Lock_AF_UNIX(unixSocketDir, unixSocketPath) != STATUS_OK)
+			return STATUS_ERROR;
+		service = unixSocketPath;
+	}
+	else
+#endif							/* HAVE_UNIX_SOCKETS */
+	{
+		snprintf(portNumberStr, sizeof(portNumberStr), "%d", portNumber);
+		service = portNumberStr;
+	}
+
+	ret = pg_getaddrinfo_all(hostName, service, &hint, &addrs);
+	if (ret || !addrs)
+	{
+		if (hostName)
+			ereport(LOG,
+					(errmsg("could not translate host name \"%s\", service \"%s\" to address: %s",
+							hostName, service, gai_strerror(ret))));
+		else
+			ereport(LOG,
+					(errmsg("could not translate service \"%s\" to address: %s",
+							service, gai_strerror(ret))));
+		if (addrs)
+			pg_freeaddrinfo_all(hint.ai_family, addrs);
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	for (addr = addrs; addr; addr = addr->ai_next)
+	{
+		if (!IS_AF_UNIX(family) && IS_AF_UNIX(addr->ai_family))
+		{
+			/*
+			 * Only set up a unix domain socket when they really asked for it.
+			 * The service/port is different in that case.
+			 */
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/* See if there is still room to add 1 more socket. */
+		for (; listen_index < MaxListen; listen_index++)
+		{
+			if (ListenSocket[listen_index] == PGINVALID_SOCKET)
+				break;
+		}
+		if (listen_index >= MaxListen)
+		{
+			ereport(LOG,
+					(errmsg("could not bind to all requested addresses: MAXLISTEN (%d) exceeded",
+							MaxListen)));
+			break;
+		}
+
+		/* set up address family name for log messages */
+		switch (addr->ai_family)
+		{
+			case AF_INET:
+				familyDesc = _("IPv4");
+				break;
+#ifdef HAVE_IPV6
+			case AF_INET6:
+				familyDesc = _("IPv6");
+				break;
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UNIX_SOCKETS
+			case AF_UNIX:
+				familyDesc = _("Unix");
+				break;
+#endif
+			default:
+				snprintf(familyDescBuf, sizeof(familyDescBuf),
+						 _("unrecognized address family %d"),
+						 addr->ai_family);
+				familyDesc = familyDescBuf;
+				break;
+		}
+
+		/* set up text form of address for log messages */
+#ifdef HAVE_UNIX_SOCKETS
+		if (addr->ai_family == AF_UNIX)
+			addrDesc = unixSocketPath;
+		else
+#endif
+		{
+			pg_getnameinfo_all((const struct sockaddr_storage *) addr->ai_addr,
+							   addr->ai_addrlen,
+							   addrBuf, sizeof(addrBuf),
+							   NULL, 0,
+							   NI_NUMERICHOST);
+			addrDesc = addrBuf;
+		}
+
+		if ((fd = socket(addr->ai_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == PGINVALID_SOCKET)
+		{
+			ereport(LOG,
+					(errcode_for_socket_access(),
+			/* translator: first %s is IPv4, IPv6, or Unix */
+					 errmsg("could not create %s socket for address \"%s\": %m",
+							familyDesc, addrDesc)));
+			continue;
+		}
+
+#ifndef WIN32
+
+		/*
+		 * Without the SO_REUSEADDR flag, a new postmaster can't be started
+		 * right away after a stop or crash, giving "address already in use"
+		 * error on TCP ports.
+		 *
+		 * On win32, however, this behavior only happens if the
+		 * SO_EXCLUSIVEADDRUSE is set. With SO_REUSEADDR, win32 allows
+		 * multiple servers to listen on the same address, resulting in
+		 * unpredictable behavior. With no flags at all, win32 behaves as Unix
+		 * with SO_REUSEADDR.
+		 */
+		if (!IS_AF_UNIX(addr->ai_family))
+		{
+			if ((setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR,
+							(char *) &one, sizeof(one))) == -1)
+			{
+				ereport(LOG,
+						(errcode_for_socket_access(),
+				/* translator: first %s is IPv4, IPv6, or Unix */
+						 errmsg("setsockopt(SO_REUSEADDR) failed for %s address \"%s\": %m",
+								familyDesc, addrDesc)));
+				closesocket(fd);
+				continue;
+			}
+		}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef IPV6_V6ONLY
+		if (addr->ai_family == AF_INET6)
+		{
+			if (setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_V6ONLY,
+						   (char *) &one, sizeof(one)) == -1)
+			{
+				ereport(LOG,
+						(errcode_for_socket_access(),
+				/* translator: first %s is IPv4, IPv6, or Unix */
+						 errmsg("setsockopt(IPV6_V6ONLY) failed for %s address \"%s\": %m",
+								familyDesc, addrDesc)));
+				closesocket(fd);
+				continue;
+			}
+		}
+#endif
+
+		/*
+		 * Note: This might fail on some OS's, like Linux older than
+		 * 2.4.21-pre3, that don't have the IPV6_V6ONLY socket option, and map
+		 * ipv4 addresses to ipv6.  It will show ::ffff:ipv4 for all ipv4
+		 * connections.
+		 */
+		err = bind(fd, addr->ai_addr, addr->ai_addrlen);
+		if (err < 0)
+		{
+			ereport(LOG,
+					(errcode_for_socket_access(),
+			/* translator: first %s is IPv4, IPv6, or Unix */
+					 errmsg("could not bind %s address \"%s\": %m",
+							familyDesc, addrDesc),
+					 (IS_AF_UNIX(addr->ai_family)) ?
+					 errhint("Is another postmaster already running on port %d?"
+							 " If not, remove socket file \"%s\" and retry.",
+							 (int) portNumber, service) :
+					 errhint("Is another postmaster already running on port %d?"
+							 " If not, wait a few seconds and retry.",
+							 (int) portNumber)));
+			closesocket(fd);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_UNIX_SOCKETS
+		if (addr->ai_family == AF_UNIX)
+		{
+			if (Setup_AF_UNIX(service) != STATUS_OK)
+			{
+				closesocket(fd);
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+#endif
+
+		/*
+		 * Select appropriate accept-queue length limit.  PG_SOMAXCONN is only
+		 * intended to provide a clamp on the request on platforms where an
+		 * overly large request provokes a kernel error (are there any?).
+		 */
+		maxconn = MaxBackends * 2;
+		if (maxconn > PG_SOMAXCONN)
+			maxconn = PG_SOMAXCONN;
+
+		err = listen(fd, maxconn);
+		if (err < 0)
+		{
+			ereport(LOG,
+					(errcode_for_socket_access(),
+			/* translator: first %s is IPv4, IPv6, or Unix */
+					 errmsg("could not listen on %s address \"%s\": %m",
+							familyDesc, addrDesc)));
+			closesocket(fd);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_UNIX_SOCKETS
+		if (addr->ai_family == AF_UNIX)
+			ereport(LOG,
+					(errmsg("listening on Unix socket \"%s\"",
+							addrDesc)));
+		else
+#endif
+			ereport(LOG,
+			/* translator: first %s is IPv4 or IPv6 */
+					(errmsg("listening on %s address \"%s\", port %d",
+							familyDesc, addrDesc, (int) portNumber)));
+
+		ListenSocket[listen_index] = fd;
+		added++;
+	}
+
+	pg_freeaddrinfo_all(hint.ai_family, addrs);
+
+	if (!added)
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+
+	return STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+
+#ifdef HAVE_UNIX_SOCKETS
+
+/*
+ * Lock_AF_UNIX -- configure unix socket file path
+ */
+static int
+Lock_AF_UNIX(const char *unixSocketDir, const char *unixSocketPath)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Grab an interlock file associated with the socket file.
+	 *
+	 * Note: there are two reasons for using a socket lock file, rather than
+	 * trying to interlock directly on the socket itself.  First, it's a lot
+	 * more portable, and second, it lets us remove any pre-existing socket
+	 * file without race conditions.
+	 */
+	CreateSocketLockFile(unixSocketPath, true, unixSocketDir);
+
+	/*
+	 * Once we have the interlock, we can safely delete any pre-existing
+	 * socket file to avoid failure at bind() time.
+	 */
+	(void) unlink(unixSocketPath);
+
+	/*
+	 * Remember socket file pathnames for later maintenance.
+	 */
+	sock_paths = lappend(sock_paths, pstrdup(unixSocketPath));
+
+	return STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Setup_AF_UNIX -- configure unix socket permissions
+ */
+static int
+Setup_AF_UNIX(const char *sock_path)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Fix socket ownership/permission if requested.  Note we must do this
+	 * before we listen() to avoid a window where unwanted connections could
+	 * get accepted.
+	 */
+	Assert(Unix_socket_group);
+	if (Unix_socket_group[0] != '\0')
+	{
+#ifdef WIN32
+		elog(WARNING, "configuration item unix_socket_group is not supported on this platform");
+#else
+		char	   *endptr;
+		unsigned long val;
+		gid_t		gid;
+
+		val = strtoul(Unix_socket_group, &endptr, 10);
+		if (*endptr == '\0')
+		{						/* numeric group id */
+			gid = val;
+		}
+		else
+		{						/* convert group name to id */
+			struct group *gr;
+
+			gr = getgrnam(Unix_socket_group);
+			if (!gr)
+			{
+				ereport(LOG,
+						(errmsg("group \"%s\" does not exist",
+								Unix_socket_group)));
+				return STATUS_ERROR;
+			}
+			gid = gr->gr_gid;
+		}
+		if (chown(sock_path, -1, gid) == -1)
+		{
+			ereport(LOG,
+					(errcode_for_file_access(),
+					 errmsg("could not set group of file \"%s\": %m",
+							sock_path)));
+			return STATUS_ERROR;
+		}
+#endif
+	}
+
+	if (chmod(sock_path, Unix_socket_permissions) == -1)
+	{
+		ereport(LOG,
+				(errcode_for_file_access(),
+				 errmsg("could not set permissions of file \"%s\": %m",
+						sock_path)));
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+	return STATUS_OK;
+}
+#endif							/* HAVE_UNIX_SOCKETS */
+
+
+/*
+ * StreamConnection -- create a new connection with client using
+ *		server port.  Set port->sock to the FD of the new connection.
+ *
+ * ASSUME: that this doesn't need to be non-blocking because
+ *		the Postmaster uses select() to tell when the server master
+ *		socket is ready for accept().
+ *
+ * RETURNS: STATUS_OK or STATUS_ERROR
+ */
+int
+StreamConnection(pgsocket server_fd, Port *port)
+{
+	/* accept connection and fill in the client (remote) address */
+	port->raddr.salen = sizeof(port->raddr.addr);
+	if ((port->sock = accept(server_fd,
+							 (struct sockaddr *) &port->raddr.addr,
+							 &port->raddr.salen)) == PGINVALID_SOCKET)
+	{
+		ereport(LOG,
+				(errcode_for_socket_access(),
+				 errmsg("could not accept new connection: %m")));
+
+		/*
+		 * If accept() fails then postmaster.c will still see the server
+		 * socket as read-ready, and will immediately try again.  To avoid
+		 * uselessly sucking lots of CPU, delay a bit before trying again.
+		 * (The most likely reason for failure is being out of kernel file
+		 * table slots; we can do little except hope some will get freed up.)
+		 */
+		pg_usleep(100000L);		/* wait 0.1 sec */
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	/* fill in the server (local) address */
+	port->laddr.salen = sizeof(port->laddr.addr);
+	if (getsockname(port->sock,
+					(struct sockaddr *) &port->laddr.addr,
+					&port->laddr.salen) < 0)
+	{
+		elog(LOG, "getsockname() failed: %m");
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	/* select NODELAY and KEEPALIVE options if it's a TCP connection */
+	if (!IS_AF_UNIX(port->laddr.addr.ss_family))
+	{
+		int			on;
+#ifdef WIN32
+		int			oldopt;
+		int			optlen;
+		int			newopt;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef	TCP_NODELAY
+		on = 1;
+		if (setsockopt(port->sock, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY,
+					   (char *) &on, sizeof(on)) < 0)
+		{
+			elog(LOG, "setsockopt(%s) failed: %m", "TCP_NODELAY");
+			return STATUS_ERROR;
+		}
+#endif
+		on = 1;
+		if (setsockopt(port->sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE,
+					   (char *) &on, sizeof(on)) < 0)
+		{
+			elog(LOG, "setsockopt(%s) failed: %m", "SO_KEEPALIVE");
+			return STATUS_ERROR;
+		}
+
+#ifdef WIN32
+
+		/*
+		 * This is a Win32 socket optimization.  The OS send buffer should be
+		 * large enough to send the whole Postgres send buffer in one go, or
+		 * performance suffers.  The Postgres send buffer can be enlarged if a
+		 * very large message needs to be sent, but we won't attempt to
+		 * enlarge the OS buffer if that happens, so somewhat arbitrarily
+		 * ensure that the OS buffer is at least PQ_SEND_BUFFER_SIZE * 4.
+		 * (That's 32kB with the current default).
+		 *
+		 * The default OS buffer size used to be 8kB in earlier Windows
+		 * versions, but was raised to 64kB in Windows 2012.  So it shouldn't
+		 * be necessary to change it in later versions anymore.  Changing it
+		 * unnecessarily can even reduce performance, because setting
+		 * SO_SNDBUF in the application disables the "dynamic send buffering"
+		 * feature that was introduced in Windows 7.  So before fiddling with
+		 * SO_SNDBUF, check if the current buffer size is already large enough
+		 * and only increase it if necessary.
+		 *
+		 * See https://support.microsoft.com/kb/823764/EN-US/ and
+		 * https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb736549%28v=vs.85%29.aspx
+		 */
+		optlen = sizeof(oldopt);
+		if (getsockopt(port->sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDBUF, (char *) &oldopt,
+					   &optlen) < 0)
+		{
+			elog(LOG, "getsockopt(%s) failed: %m", "SO_SNDBUF");
+			return STATUS_ERROR;
+		}
+		newopt = PQ_SEND_BUFFER_SIZE * 4;
+		if (oldopt < newopt)
+		{
+			if (setsockopt(port->sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDBUF, (char *) &newopt,
+						   sizeof(newopt)) < 0)
+			{
+				elog(LOG, "setsockopt(%s) failed: %m", "SO_SNDBUF");
+				return STATUS_ERROR;
+			}
+		}
+#endif
+
+		/*
+		 * Also apply the current keepalive parameters.  If we fail to set a
+		 * parameter, don't error out, because these aren't universally
+		 * supported.  (Note: you might think we need to reset the GUC
+		 * variables to 0 in such a case, but it's not necessary because the
+		 * show hooks for these variables report the truth anyway.)
+		 */
+		(void) pq_setkeepalivesidle(tcp_keepalives_idle, port);
+		(void) pq_setkeepalivesinterval(tcp_keepalives_interval, port);
+		(void) pq_setkeepalivescount(tcp_keepalives_count, port);
+		(void) pq_settcpusertimeout(tcp_user_timeout, port);
+	}
+
+	return STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+/*
+ * StreamClose -- close a client/backend connection
+ *
+ * NOTE: this is NOT used to terminate a session; it is just used to release
+ * the file descriptor in a process that should no longer have the socket
+ * open.  (For example, the postmaster calls this after passing ownership
+ * of the connection to a child process.)  It is expected that someone else
+ * still has the socket open.  So, we only want to close the descriptor,
+ * we do NOT want to send anything to the far end.
+ */
+void
+StreamClose(pgsocket sock)
+{
+	closesocket(sock);
+}
+
+/*
+ * TouchSocketFiles -- mark socket files as recently accessed
+ *
+ * This routine should be called every so often to ensure that the socket
+ * files have a recent mod date (ordinary operations on sockets usually won't
+ * change the mod date).  That saves them from being removed by
+ * overenthusiastic /tmp-directory-cleaner daemons.  (Another reason we should
+ * never have put the socket file in /tmp...)
+ */
+void
+TouchSocketFiles(void)
+{
+	ListCell   *l;
+
+	/* Loop through all created sockets... */
+	foreach(l, sock_paths)
+	{
+		char	   *sock_path = (char *) lfirst(l);
+
+		/* Ignore errors; there's no point in complaining */
+		(void) utime(sock_path, NULL);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * RemoveSocketFiles -- unlink socket files at postmaster shutdown
+ */
+void
+RemoveSocketFiles(void)
+{
+	ListCell   *l;
+
+	/* Loop through all created sockets... */
+	foreach(l, sock_paths)
+	{
+		char	   *sock_path = (char *) lfirst(l);
+
+		/* Ignore any error. */
+		(void) unlink(sock_path);
+	}
+	/* Since we're about to exit, no need to reclaim storage */
+	sock_paths = NIL;
+}
+
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ * Low-level I/O routines begin here.
+ *
+ * These routines communicate with a frontend client across a connection
+ * already established by the preceding routines.
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *			  socket_set_nonblocking - set socket blocking/non-blocking
+ *
+ * Sets the socket non-blocking if nonblocking is true, or sets it
+ * blocking otherwise.
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+static void
+socket_set_nonblocking(bool nonblocking)
+{
+	if (MyProcPort == NULL)
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_CONNECTION_DOES_NOT_EXIST),
+				 errmsg("there is no client connection")));
+
+	MyProcPort->noblock = nonblocking;
+}
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		pq_recvbuf - load some bytes into the input buffer
+ *
+ *		returns 0 if OK, EOF if trouble
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+static int
+pq_recvbuf(void)
+{
+	if (PqRecvPointer > 0)
+	{
+		if (PqRecvLength > PqRecvPointer)
+		{
+			/* still some unread data, left-justify it in the buffer */
+			memmove(PqRecvBuffer, PqRecvBuffer + PqRecvPointer,
+					PqRecvLength - PqRecvPointer);
+			PqRecvLength -= PqRecvPointer;
+			PqRecvPointer = 0;
+		}
+		else
+			PqRecvLength = PqRecvPointer = 0;
+	}
+
+	/* Ensure that we're in blocking mode */
+	socket_set_nonblocking(false);
+
+	/* Can fill buffer from PqRecvLength and upwards */
+	for (;;)
+	{
+		int			r;
+
+		r = secure_read(MyProcPort, PqRecvBuffer + PqRecvLength,
+						PQ_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE - PqRecvLength);
+
+		if (r < 0)
+		{
+			if (errno == EINTR)
+				continue;		/* Ok if interrupted */
+
+			/*
+			 * Careful: an ereport() that tries to write to the client would
+			 * cause recursion to here, leading to stack overflow and core
+			 * dump!  This message must go *only* to the postmaster log.
+			 */
+			ereport(COMMERROR,
+					(errcode_for_socket_access(),
+					 errmsg("could not receive data from client: %m")));
+			return EOF;
+		}
+		if (r == 0)
+		{
+			/*
+			 * EOF detected.  We used to write a log message here, but it's
+			 * better to expect the ultimate caller to do that.
+			 */
+			return EOF;
+		}
+		/* r contains number of bytes read, so just incr length */
+		PqRecvLength += r;
+		return 0;
+	}
+}
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		pq_getbyte	- get a single byte from connection, or return EOF
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+int
+pq_getbyte(void)
+{
+	Assert(PqCommReadingMsg);
+
+	while (PqRecvPointer >= PqRecvLength)
+	{
+		if (pq_recvbuf())		/* If nothing in buffer, then recv some */
+			return EOF;			/* Failed to recv data */
+	}
+	return (unsigned char) PqRecvBuffer[PqRecvPointer++];
+}
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		pq_peekbyte		- peek at next byte from connection
+ *
+ *	 Same as pq_getbyte() except we don't advance the pointer.
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+int
+pq_peekbyte(void)
+{
+	Assert(PqCommReadingMsg);
+
+	while (PqRecvPointer >= PqRecvLength)
+	{
+		if (pq_recvbuf())		/* If nothing in buffer, then recv some */
+			return EOF;			/* Failed to recv data */
+	}
+	return (unsigned char) PqRecvBuffer[PqRecvPointer];
+}
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		pq_getbyte_if_available - get a single byte from connection,
+ *			if available
+ *
+ * The received byte is stored in *c. Returns 1 if a byte was read,
+ * 0 if no data was available, or EOF if trouble.
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+int
+pq_getbyte_if_available(unsigned char *c)
+{
+	int			r;
+
+	Assert(PqCommReadingMsg);
+
+	if (PqRecvPointer < PqRecvLength)
+	{
+		*c = PqRecvBuffer[PqRecvPointer++];
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	/* Put the socket into non-blocking mode */
+	socket_set_nonblocking(true);
+
+	r = secure_read(MyProcPort, c, 1);
+	if (r < 0)
+	{
+		/*
+		 * Ok if no data available without blocking or interrupted (though
+		 * EINTR really shouldn't happen with a non-blocking socket). Report
+		 * other errors.
+		 */
+		if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK || errno == EINTR)
+			r = 0;
+		else
+		{
+			/*
+			 * Careful: an ereport() that tries to write to the client would
+			 * cause recursion to here, leading to stack overflow and core
+			 * dump!  This message must go *only* to the postmaster log.
+			 */
+			ereport(COMMERROR,
+					(errcode_for_socket_access(),
+					 errmsg("could not receive data from client: %m")));
+			r = EOF;
+		}
+	}
+	else if (r == 0)
+	{
+		/* EOF detected */
+		r = EOF;
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		pq_getbytes		- get a known number of bytes from connection
+ *
+ *		returns 0 if OK, EOF if trouble
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+int
+pq_getbytes(char *s, size_t len)
+{
+	size_t		amount;
+
+	Assert(PqCommReadingMsg);
+
+	while (len > 0)
+	{
+		while (PqRecvPointer >= PqRecvLength)
+		{
+			if (pq_recvbuf())	/* If nothing in buffer, then recv some */
+				return EOF;		/* Failed to recv data */
+		}
+		amount = PqRecvLength - PqRecvPointer;
+		if (amount > len)
+			amount = len;
+		memcpy(s, PqRecvBuffer + PqRecvPointer, amount);
+		PqRecvPointer += amount;
+		s += amount;
+		len -= amount;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		pq_discardbytes		- throw away a known number of bytes
+ *
+ *		same as pq_getbytes except we do not copy the data to anyplace.
+ *		this is used for resynchronizing after read errors.
+ *
+ *		returns 0 if OK, EOF if trouble
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+static int
+pq_discardbytes(size_t len)
+{
+	size_t		amount;
+
+	Assert(PqCommReadingMsg);
+
+	while (len > 0)
+	{
+		while (PqRecvPointer >= PqRecvLength)
+		{
+			if (pq_recvbuf())	/* If nothing in buffer, then recv some */
+				return EOF;		/* Failed to recv data */
+		}
+		amount = PqRecvLength - PqRecvPointer;
+		if (amount > len)
+			amount = len;
+		PqRecvPointer += amount;
+		len -= amount;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		pq_getstring	- get a null terminated string from connection
+ *
+ *		The return value is placed in an expansible StringInfo, which has
+ *		already been initialized by the caller.
+ *
+ *		This is used only for dealing with old-protocol clients.  The idea
+ *		is to produce a StringInfo that looks the same as we would get from
+ *		pq_getmessage() with a newer client; we will then process it with
+ *		pq_getmsgstring.  Therefore, no character set conversion is done here,
+ *		even though this is presumably useful only for text.
+ *
+ *		returns 0 if OK, EOF if trouble
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+int
+pq_getstring(StringInfo s)
+{
+	int			i;
+
+	Assert(PqCommReadingMsg);
+
+	resetStringInfo(s);
+
+	/* Read until we get the terminating '\0' */
+	for (;;)
+	{
+		while (PqRecvPointer >= PqRecvLength)
+		{
+			if (pq_recvbuf())	/* If nothing in buffer, then recv some */
+				return EOF;		/* Failed to recv data */
+		}
+
+		for (i = PqRecvPointer; i < PqRecvLength; i++)
+		{
+			if (PqRecvBuffer[i] == '\0')
+			{
+				/* include the '\0' in the copy */
+				appendBinaryStringInfo(s, PqRecvBuffer + PqRecvPointer,
+									   i - PqRecvPointer + 1);
+				PqRecvPointer = i + 1;	/* advance past \0 */
+				return 0;
+			}
+		}
+
+		/* If we're here we haven't got the \0 in the buffer yet. */
+		appendBinaryStringInfo(s, PqRecvBuffer + PqRecvPointer,
+							   PqRecvLength - PqRecvPointer);
+		PqRecvPointer = PqRecvLength;
+	}
+}
+
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		pq_startmsgread - begin reading a message from the client.
+ *
+ *		This must be called before any of the pq_get* functions.
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+void
+pq_startmsgread(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * There shouldn't be a read active already, but let's check just to be
+	 * sure.
+	 */
+	if (PqCommReadingMsg)
+		ereport(FATAL,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+				 errmsg("terminating connection because protocol synchronization was lost")));
+
+	PqCommReadingMsg = true;
+}
+
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		pq_endmsgread	- finish reading message.
+ *
+ *		This must be called after reading a V2 protocol message with
+ *		pq_getstring() and friends, to indicate that we have read the whole
+ *		message. In V3 protocol, pq_getmessage() does this implicitly.
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+void
+pq_endmsgread(void)
+{
+	Assert(PqCommReadingMsg);
+
+	PqCommReadingMsg = false;
+}
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		pq_is_reading_msg - are we currently reading a message?
+ *
+ * This is used in error recovery at the outer idle loop to detect if we have
+ * lost protocol sync, and need to terminate the connection. pq_startmsgread()
+ * will check for that too, but it's nicer to detect it earlier.
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+bool
+pq_is_reading_msg(void)
+{
+	return PqCommReadingMsg;
+}
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		pq_getmessage	- get a message with length word from connection
+ *
+ *		The return value is placed in an expansible StringInfo, which has
+ *		already been initialized by the caller.
+ *		Only the message body is placed in the StringInfo; the length word
+ *		is removed.  Also, s->cursor is initialized to zero for convenience
+ *		in scanning the message contents.
+ *
+ *		If maxlen is not zero, it is an upper limit on the length of the
+ *		message we are willing to accept.  We abort the connection (by
+ *		returning EOF) if client tries to send more than that.
+ *
+ *		returns 0 if OK, EOF if trouble
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+int
+pq_getmessage(StringInfo s, int maxlen)
+{
+	int32		len;
+
+	Assert(PqCommReadingMsg);
+
+	resetStringInfo(s);
+
+	/* Read message length word */
+	if (pq_getbytes((char *) &len, 4) == EOF)
+	{
+		ereport(COMMERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+				 errmsg("unexpected EOF within message length word")));
+		return EOF;
+	}
+
+	len = pg_ntoh32(len);
+
+	if (len < 4 ||
+		(maxlen > 0 && len > maxlen))
+	{
+		ereport(COMMERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+				 errmsg("invalid message length")));
+		return EOF;
+	}
+
+	len -= 4;					/* discount length itself */
+
+	if (len > 0)
+	{
+		/*
+		 * Allocate space for message.  If we run out of room (ridiculously
+		 * large message), we will elog(ERROR), but we want to discard the
+		 * message body so as not to lose communication sync.
+		 */
+		PG_TRY();
+		{
+			enlargeStringInfo(s, len);
+		}
+		PG_CATCH();
+		{
+			if (pq_discardbytes(len) == EOF)
+				ereport(COMMERROR,
+						(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+						 errmsg("incomplete message from client")));
+
+			/* we discarded the rest of the message so we're back in sync. */
+			PqCommReadingMsg = false;
+			PG_RE_THROW();
+		}
+		PG_END_TRY();
+
+		/* And grab the message */
+		if (pq_getbytes(s->data, len) == EOF)
+		{
+			ereport(COMMERROR,
+					(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+					 errmsg("incomplete message from client")));
+			return EOF;
+		}
+		s->len = len;
+		/* Place a trailing null per StringInfo convention */
+		s->data[len] = '\0';
+	}
+
+	/* finished reading the message. */
+	PqCommReadingMsg = false;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		pq_putbytes		- send bytes to connection (not flushed until pq_flush)
+ *
+ *		returns 0 if OK, EOF if trouble
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+int
+pq_putbytes(const char *s, size_t len)
+{
+	int			res;
+
+	/* Should only be called by old-style COPY OUT */
+	Assert(DoingCopyOut);
+	/* No-op if reentrant call */
+	if (PqCommBusy)
+		return 0;
+	PqCommBusy = true;
+	res = internal_putbytes(s, len);
+	PqCommBusy = false;
+	return res;
+}
+
+static int
+internal_putbytes(const char *s, size_t len)
+{
+	size_t		amount;
+
+	while (len > 0)
+	{
+		/* If buffer is full, then flush it out */
+		if (PqSendPointer >= PqSendBufferSize)
+		{
+			socket_set_nonblocking(false);
+			if (internal_flush())
+				return EOF;
+		}
+		amount = PqSendBufferSize - PqSendPointer;
+		if (amount > len)
+			amount = len;
+		memcpy(PqSendBuffer + PqSendPointer, s, amount);
+		PqSendPointer += amount;
+		s += amount;
+		len -= amount;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		socket_flush		- flush pending output
+ *
+ *		returns 0 if OK, EOF if trouble
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+static int
+socket_flush(void)
+{
+	int			res;
+
+	/* No-op if reentrant call */
+	if (PqCommBusy)
+		return 0;
+	PqCommBusy = true;
+	socket_set_nonblocking(false);
+	res = internal_flush();
+	PqCommBusy = false;
+	return res;
+}
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		internal_flush - flush pending output
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if OK (meaning everything was sent, or operation would block
+ * and the socket is in non-blocking mode), or EOF if trouble.
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+static int
+internal_flush(void)
+{
+	static int	last_reported_send_errno = 0;
+
+	char	   *bufptr = PqSendBuffer + PqSendStart;
+	char	   *bufend = PqSendBuffer + PqSendPointer;
+
+	while (bufptr < bufend)
+	{
+		int			r;
+
+		r = secure_write(MyProcPort, bufptr, bufend - bufptr);
+
+		if (r <= 0)
+		{
+			if (errno == EINTR)
+				continue;		/* Ok if we were interrupted */
+
+			/*
+			 * Ok if no data writable without blocking, and the socket is in
+			 * non-blocking mode.
+			 */
+			if (errno == EAGAIN ||
+				errno == EWOULDBLOCK)
+			{
+				return 0;
+			}
+
+			/*
+			 * Careful: an ereport() that tries to write to the client would
+			 * cause recursion to here, leading to stack overflow and core
+			 * dump!  This message must go *only* to the postmaster log.
+			 *
+			 * If a client disconnects while we're in the midst of output, we
+			 * might write quite a bit of data before we get to a safe query
+			 * abort point.  So, suppress duplicate log messages.
+			 */
+			if (errno != last_reported_send_errno)
+			{
+				last_reported_send_errno = errno;
+				ereport(COMMERROR,
+						(errcode_for_socket_access(),
+						 errmsg("could not send data to client: %m")));
+			}
+
+			/*
+			 * We drop the buffered data anyway so that processing can
+			 * continue, even though we'll probably quit soon. We also set a
+			 * flag that'll cause the next CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS to terminate
+			 * the connection.
+			 */
+			PqSendStart = PqSendPointer = 0;
+			ClientConnectionLost = 1;
+			InterruptPending = 1;
+			return EOF;
+		}
+
+		last_reported_send_errno = 0;	/* reset after any successful send */
+		bufptr += r;
+		PqSendStart += r;
+	}
+
+	PqSendStart = PqSendPointer = 0;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		pq_flush_if_writable - flush pending output if writable without blocking
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if OK, or EOF if trouble.
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+static int
+socket_flush_if_writable(void)
+{
+	int			res;
+
+	/* Quick exit if nothing to do */
+	if (PqSendPointer == PqSendStart)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* No-op if reentrant call */
+	if (PqCommBusy)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Temporarily put the socket into non-blocking mode */
+	socket_set_nonblocking(true);
+
+	PqCommBusy = true;
+	res = internal_flush();
+	PqCommBusy = false;
+	return res;
+}
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *	socket_is_send_pending	- is there any pending data in the output buffer?
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+static bool
+socket_is_send_pending(void)
+{
+	return (PqSendStart < PqSendPointer);
+}
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ * Message-level I/O routines begin here.
+ *
+ * These routines understand about the old-style COPY OUT protocol.
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		socket_putmessage - send a normal message (suppressed in COPY OUT mode)
+ *
+ *		If msgtype is not '\0', it is a message type code to place before
+ *		the message body.  If msgtype is '\0', then the message has no type
+ *		code (this is only valid in pre-3.0 protocols).
+ *
+ *		len is the length of the message body data at *s.  In protocol 3.0
+ *		and later, a message length word (equal to len+4 because it counts
+ *		itself too) is inserted by this routine.
+ *
+ *		All normal messages are suppressed while old-style COPY OUT is in
+ *		progress.  (In practice only a few notice messages might get emitted
+ *		then; dropping them is annoying, but at least they will still appear
+ *		in the postmaster log.)
+ *
+ *		We also suppress messages generated while pqcomm.c is busy.  This
+ *		avoids any possibility of messages being inserted within other
+ *		messages.  The only known trouble case arises if SIGQUIT occurs
+ *		during a pqcomm.c routine --- quickdie() will try to send a warning
+ *		message, and the most reasonable approach seems to be to drop it.
+ *
+ *		returns 0 if OK, EOF if trouble
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+static int
+socket_putmessage(char msgtype, const char *s, size_t len)
+{
+	if (DoingCopyOut || PqCommBusy)
+		return 0;
+	PqCommBusy = true;
+	if (msgtype)
+		if (internal_putbytes(&msgtype, 1))
+			goto fail;
+	if (PG_PROTOCOL_MAJOR(FrontendProtocol) >= 3)
+	{
+		uint32		n32;
+
+		n32 = pg_hton32((uint32) (len + 4));
+		if (internal_putbytes((char *) &n32, 4))
+			goto fail;
+	}
+	if (internal_putbytes(s, len))
+		goto fail;
+	PqCommBusy = false;
+	return 0;
+
+fail:
+	PqCommBusy = false;
+	return EOF;
+}
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		pq_putmessage_noblock	- like pq_putmessage, but never blocks
+ *
+ *		If the output buffer is too small to hold the message, the buffer
+ *		is enlarged.
+ */
+static void
+socket_putmessage_noblock(char msgtype, const char *s, size_t len)
+{
+	int			res PG_USED_FOR_ASSERTS_ONLY;
+	int			required;
+
+	/*
+	 * Ensure we have enough space in the output buffer for the message header
+	 * as well as the message itself.
+	 */
+	required = PqSendPointer + 1 + 4 + len;
+	if (required > PqSendBufferSize)
+	{
+		PqSendBuffer = repalloc(PqSendBuffer, required);
+		PqSendBufferSize = required;
+	}
+	res = pq_putmessage(msgtype, s, len);
+	Assert(res == 0);			/* should not fail when the message fits in
+								 * buffer */
+}
+
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		socket_startcopyout - inform libpq that an old-style COPY OUT transfer
+ *			is beginning
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+static void
+socket_startcopyout(void)
+{
+	DoingCopyOut = true;
+}
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		socket_endcopyout	- end an old-style COPY OUT transfer
+ *
+ *		If errorAbort is indicated, we are aborting a COPY OUT due to an error,
+ *		and must send a terminator line.  Since a partial data line might have
+ *		been emitted, send a couple of newlines first (the first one could
+ *		get absorbed by a backslash...)  Note that old-style COPY OUT does
+ *		not allow binary transfers, so a textual terminator is always correct.
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+static void
+socket_endcopyout(bool errorAbort)
+{
+	if (!DoingCopyOut)
+		return;
+	if (errorAbort)
+		pq_putbytes("\n\n\\.\n", 5);
+	/* in non-error case, copy.c will have emitted the terminator line */
+	DoingCopyOut = false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Support for TCP Keepalive parameters
+ */
+
+/*
+ * On Windows, we need to set both idle and interval at the same time.
+ * We also cannot reset them to the default (setting to zero will
+ * actually set them to zero, not default), therefore we fallback to
+ * the out-of-the-box default instead.
+ */
+#if defined(WIN32) && defined(SIO_KEEPALIVE_VALS)
+static int
+pq_setkeepaliveswin32(Port *port, int idle, int interval)
+{
+	struct tcp_keepalive ka;
+	DWORD		retsize;
+
+	if (idle <= 0)
+		idle = 2 * 60 * 60;		/* default = 2 hours */
+	if (interval <= 0)
+		interval = 1;			/* default = 1 second */
+
+	ka.onoff = 1;
+	ka.keepalivetime = idle * 1000;
+	ka.keepaliveinterval = interval * 1000;
+
+	if (WSAIoctl(port->sock,
+				 SIO_KEEPALIVE_VALS,
+				 (LPVOID) &ka,
+				 sizeof(ka),
+				 NULL,
+				 0,
+				 &retsize,
+				 NULL,
+				 NULL)
+		!= 0)
+	{
+		elog(LOG, "WSAIoctl(SIO_KEEPALIVE_VALS) failed: %ui",
+			 WSAGetLastError());
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+	if (port->keepalives_idle != idle)
+		port->keepalives_idle = idle;
+	if (port->keepalives_interval != interval)
+		port->keepalives_interval = interval;
+	return STATUS_OK;
+}
+#endif
+
+int
+pq_getkeepalivesidle(Port *port)
+{
+#if defined(PG_TCP_KEEPALIVE_IDLE) || defined(SIO_KEEPALIVE_VALS)
+	if (port == NULL || IS_AF_UNIX(port->laddr.addr.ss_family))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (port->keepalives_idle != 0)
+		return port->keepalives_idle;
+
+	if (port->default_keepalives_idle == 0)
+	{
+#ifndef WIN32
+		ACCEPT_TYPE_ARG3 size = sizeof(port->default_keepalives_idle);
+
+		if (getsockopt(port->sock, IPPROTO_TCP, PG_TCP_KEEPALIVE_IDLE,
+					   (char *) &port->default_keepalives_idle,
+					   &size) < 0)
+		{
+			elog(LOG, "getsockopt(%s) failed: %m", PG_TCP_KEEPALIVE_IDLE_STR);
+			port->default_keepalives_idle = -1; /* don't know */
+		}
+#else							/* WIN32 */
+		/* We can't get the defaults on Windows, so return "don't know" */
+		port->default_keepalives_idle = -1;
+#endif							/* WIN32 */
+	}
+
+	return port->default_keepalives_idle;
+#else
+	return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+int
+pq_setkeepalivesidle(int idle, Port *port)
+{
+	if (port == NULL || IS_AF_UNIX(port->laddr.addr.ss_family))
+		return STATUS_OK;
+
+/* check SIO_KEEPALIVE_VALS here, not just WIN32, as some toolchains lack it */
+#if defined(PG_TCP_KEEPALIVE_IDLE) || defined(SIO_KEEPALIVE_VALS)
+	if (idle == port->keepalives_idle)
+		return STATUS_OK;
+
+#ifndef WIN32
+	if (port->default_keepalives_idle <= 0)
+	{
+		if (pq_getkeepalivesidle(port) < 0)
+		{
+			if (idle == 0)
+				return STATUS_OK;	/* default is set but unknown */
+			else
+				return STATUS_ERROR;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (idle == 0)
+		idle = port->default_keepalives_idle;
+
+	if (setsockopt(port->sock, IPPROTO_TCP, PG_TCP_KEEPALIVE_IDLE,
+				   (char *) &idle, sizeof(idle)) < 0)
+	{
+		elog(LOG, "setsockopt(%s) failed: %m", PG_TCP_KEEPALIVE_IDLE_STR);
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	port->keepalives_idle = idle;
+#else							/* WIN32 */
+	return pq_setkeepaliveswin32(port, idle, port->keepalives_interval);
+#endif
+#else
+	if (idle != 0)
+	{
+		elog(LOG, "setting the keepalive idle time is not supported");
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	return STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+int
+pq_getkeepalivesinterval(Port *port)
+{
+#if defined(TCP_KEEPINTVL) || defined(SIO_KEEPALIVE_VALS)
+	if (port == NULL || IS_AF_UNIX(port->laddr.addr.ss_family))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (port->keepalives_interval != 0)
+		return port->keepalives_interval;
+
+	if (port->default_keepalives_interval == 0)
+	{
+#ifndef WIN32
+		ACCEPT_TYPE_ARG3 size = sizeof(port->default_keepalives_interval);
+
+		if (getsockopt(port->sock, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_KEEPINTVL,
+					   (char *) &port->default_keepalives_interval,
+					   &size) < 0)
+		{
+			elog(LOG, "getsockopt(%s) failed: %m", "TCP_KEEPINTVL");
+			port->default_keepalives_interval = -1; /* don't know */
+		}
+#else
+		/* We can't get the defaults on Windows, so return "don't know" */
+		port->default_keepalives_interval = -1;
+#endif							/* WIN32 */
+	}
+
+	return port->default_keepalives_interval;
+#else
+	return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+int
+pq_setkeepalivesinterval(int interval, Port *port)
+{
+	if (port == NULL || IS_AF_UNIX(port->laddr.addr.ss_family))
+		return STATUS_OK;
+
+#if defined(TCP_KEEPINTVL) || defined(SIO_KEEPALIVE_VALS)
+	if (interval == port->keepalives_interval)
+		return STATUS_OK;
+
+#ifndef WIN32
+	if (port->default_keepalives_interval <= 0)
+	{
+		if (pq_getkeepalivesinterval(port) < 0)
+		{
+			if (interval == 0)
+				return STATUS_OK;	/* default is set but unknown */
+			else
+				return STATUS_ERROR;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (interval == 0)
+		interval = port->default_keepalives_interval;
+
+	if (setsockopt(port->sock, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_KEEPINTVL,
+				   (char *) &interval, sizeof(interval)) < 0)
+	{
+		elog(LOG, "setsockopt(%s) failed: %m", "TCP_KEEPINTVL");
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	port->keepalives_interval = interval;
+#else							/* WIN32 */
+	return pq_setkeepaliveswin32(port, port->keepalives_idle, interval);
+#endif
+#else
+	if (interval != 0)
+	{
+		elog(LOG, "setsockopt(%s) not supported", "TCP_KEEPINTVL");
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	return STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+int
+pq_getkeepalivescount(Port *port)
+{
+#ifdef TCP_KEEPCNT
+	if (port == NULL || IS_AF_UNIX(port->laddr.addr.ss_family))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (port->keepalives_count != 0)
+		return port->keepalives_count;
+
+	if (port->default_keepalives_count == 0)
+	{
+		ACCEPT_TYPE_ARG3 size = sizeof(port->default_keepalives_count);
+
+		if (getsockopt(port->sock, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_KEEPCNT,
+					   (char *) &port->default_keepalives_count,
+					   &size) < 0)
+		{
+			elog(LOG, "getsockopt(%s) failed: %m", "TCP_KEEPCNT");
+			port->default_keepalives_count = -1;	/* don't know */
+		}
+	}
+
+	return port->default_keepalives_count;
+#else
+	return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+int
+pq_setkeepalivescount(int count, Port *port)
+{
+	if (port == NULL || IS_AF_UNIX(port->laddr.addr.ss_family))
+		return STATUS_OK;
+
+#ifdef TCP_KEEPCNT
+	if (count == port->keepalives_count)
+		return STATUS_OK;
+
+	if (port->default_keepalives_count <= 0)
+	{
+		if (pq_getkeepalivescount(port) < 0)
+		{
+			if (count == 0)
+				return STATUS_OK;	/* default is set but unknown */
+			else
+				return STATUS_ERROR;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (count == 0)
+		count = port->default_keepalives_count;
+
+	if (setsockopt(port->sock, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_KEEPCNT,
+				   (char *) &count, sizeof(count)) < 0)
+	{
+		elog(LOG, "setsockopt(%s) failed: %m", "TCP_KEEPCNT");
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	port->keepalives_count = count;
+#else
+	if (count != 0)
+	{
+		elog(LOG, "setsockopt(%s) not supported", "TCP_KEEPCNT");
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	return STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+int
+pq_gettcpusertimeout(Port *port)
+{
+#ifdef TCP_USER_TIMEOUT
+	if (port == NULL || IS_AF_UNIX(port->laddr.addr.ss_family))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (port->tcp_user_timeout != 0)
+		return port->tcp_user_timeout;
+
+	if (port->default_tcp_user_timeout == 0)
+	{
+		ACCEPT_TYPE_ARG3 size = sizeof(port->default_tcp_user_timeout);
+
+		if (getsockopt(port->sock, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_USER_TIMEOUT,
+					   (char *) &port->default_tcp_user_timeout,
+					   &size) < 0)
+		{
+			elog(LOG, "getsockopt(%s) failed: %m", "TCP_USER_TIMEOUT");
+			port->default_tcp_user_timeout = -1;	/* don't know */
+		}
+	}
+
+	return port->default_tcp_user_timeout;
+#else
+	return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+int
+pq_settcpusertimeout(int timeout, Port *port)
+{
+	if (port == NULL || IS_AF_UNIX(port->laddr.addr.ss_family))
+		return STATUS_OK;
+
+#ifdef TCP_USER_TIMEOUT
+	if (timeout == port->tcp_user_timeout)
+		return STATUS_OK;
+
+	if (port->default_tcp_user_timeout <= 0)
+	{
+		if (pq_gettcpusertimeout(port) < 0)
+		{
+			if (timeout == 0)
+				return STATUS_OK;	/* default is set but unknown */
+			else
+				return STATUS_ERROR;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (timeout == 0)
+		timeout = port->default_tcp_user_timeout;
+
+	if (setsockopt(port->sock, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_USER_TIMEOUT,
+				   (char *) &timeout, sizeof(timeout)) < 0)
+	{
+		elog(LOG, "setsockopt(%s) failed: %m", "TCP_USER_TIMEOUT");
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	port->tcp_user_timeout = timeout;
+#else
+	if (timeout != 0)
+	{
+		elog(LOG, "setsockopt(%s) not supported", "TCP_USER_TIMEOUT");
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	return STATUS_OK;
+}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/pqformat.c b/src/backend/libpq/pqformat.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a6f990c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/pqformat.c
@@ -0,0 +1,643 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * pqformat.c
+ *		Routines for formatting and parsing frontend/backend messages
+ *
+ * Outgoing messages are built up in a StringInfo buffer (which is expansible)
+ * and then sent in a single call to pq_putmessage.  This module provides data
+ * formatting/conversion routines that are needed to produce valid messages.
+ * Note in particular the distinction between "raw data" and "text"; raw data
+ * is message protocol characters and binary values that are not subject to
+ * character set conversion, while text is converted by character encoding
+ * rules.
+ *
+ * Incoming messages are similarly read into a StringInfo buffer, via
+ * pq_getmessage, and then parsed and converted from that using the routines
+ * in this module.
+ *
+ * These same routines support reading and writing of external binary formats
+ * (typsend/typreceive routines).  The conversion routines for individual
+ * data types are exactly the same, only initialization and completion
+ * are different.
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ *	src/backend/libpq/pqformat.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+/*
+ * INTERFACE ROUTINES
+ * Message assembly and output:
+ *		pq_beginmessage - initialize StringInfo buffer
+ *		pq_sendbyte		- append a raw byte to a StringInfo buffer
+ *		pq_sendint		- append a binary integer to a StringInfo buffer
+ *		pq_sendint64	- append a binary 8-byte int to a StringInfo buffer
+ *		pq_sendfloat4	- append a float4 to a StringInfo buffer
+ *		pq_sendfloat8	- append a float8 to a StringInfo buffer
+ *		pq_sendbytes	- append raw data to a StringInfo buffer
+ *		pq_sendcountedtext - append a counted text string (with character set conversion)
+ *		pq_sendtext		- append a text string (with conversion)
+ *		pq_sendstring	- append a null-terminated text string (with conversion)
+ *		pq_send_ascii_string - append a null-terminated text string (without conversion)
+ *		pq_endmessage	- send the completed message to the frontend
+ * Note: it is also possible to append data to the StringInfo buffer using
+ * the regular StringInfo routines, but this is discouraged since required
+ * character set conversion may not occur.
+ *
+ * typsend support (construct a bytea value containing external binary data):
+ *		pq_begintypsend - initialize StringInfo buffer
+ *		pq_endtypsend	- return the completed string as a "bytea*"
+ *
+ * Special-case message output:
+ *		pq_puttextmessage - generate a character set-converted message in one step
+ *		pq_putemptymessage - convenience routine for message with empty body
+ *
+ * Message parsing after input:
+ *		pq_getmsgbyte	- get a raw byte from a message buffer
+ *		pq_getmsgint	- get a binary integer from a message buffer
+ *		pq_getmsgint64	- get a binary 8-byte int from a message buffer
+ *		pq_getmsgfloat4 - get a float4 from a message buffer
+ *		pq_getmsgfloat8 - get a float8 from a message buffer
+ *		pq_getmsgbytes	- get raw data from a message buffer
+ *		pq_copymsgbytes - copy raw data from a message buffer
+ *		pq_getmsgtext	- get a counted text string (with conversion)
+ *		pq_getmsgstring - get a null-terminated text string (with conversion)
+ *		pq_getmsgrawstring - get a null-terminated text string - NO conversion
+ *		pq_getmsgend	- verify message fully consumed
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+#include "libpq/libpq.h"
+#include "libpq/pqformat.h"
+#include "mb/pg_wchar.h"
+#include "port/pg_bswap.h"
+
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		pq_beginmessage		- initialize for sending a message
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+void
+pq_beginmessage(StringInfo buf, char msgtype)
+{
+	initStringInfo(buf);
+
+	/*
+	 * We stash the message type into the buffer's cursor field, expecting
+	 * that the pq_sendXXX routines won't touch it.  We could alternatively
+	 * make it the first byte of the buffer contents, but this seems easier.
+	 */
+	buf->cursor = msgtype;
+}
+
+/* --------------------------------
+
+ *		pq_beginmessage_reuse - initialize for sending a message, reuse buffer
+ *
+ * This requires the buffer to be allocated in a sufficiently long-lived
+ * memory context.
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+void
+pq_beginmessage_reuse(StringInfo buf, char msgtype)
+{
+	resetStringInfo(buf);
+
+	/*
+	 * We stash the message type into the buffer's cursor field, expecting
+	 * that the pq_sendXXX routines won't touch it.  We could alternatively
+	 * make it the first byte of the buffer contents, but this seems easier.
+	 */
+	buf->cursor = msgtype;
+}
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		pq_sendbytes	- append raw data to a StringInfo buffer
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+void
+pq_sendbytes(StringInfo buf, const char *data, int datalen)
+{
+	/* use variant that maintains a trailing null-byte, out of caution */
+	appendBinaryStringInfo(buf, data, datalen);
+}
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		pq_sendcountedtext - append a counted text string (with character set conversion)
+ *
+ * The data sent to the frontend by this routine is a 4-byte count field
+ * followed by the string.  The count includes itself or not, as per the
+ * countincludesself flag (pre-3.0 protocol requires it to include itself).
+ * The passed text string need not be null-terminated, and the data sent
+ * to the frontend isn't either.
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+void
+pq_sendcountedtext(StringInfo buf, const char *str, int slen,
+				   bool countincludesself)
+{
+	int			extra = countincludesself ? 4 : 0;
+	char	   *p;
+
+	p = pg_server_to_client(str, slen);
+	if (p != str)				/* actual conversion has been done? */
+	{
+		slen = strlen(p);
+		pq_sendint32(buf, slen + extra);
+		appendBinaryStringInfoNT(buf, p, slen);
+		pfree(p);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		pq_sendint32(buf, slen + extra);
+		appendBinaryStringInfoNT(buf, str, slen);
+	}
+}
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		pq_sendtext		- append a text string (with conversion)
+ *
+ * The passed text string need not be null-terminated, and the data sent
+ * to the frontend isn't either.  Note that this is not actually useful
+ * for direct frontend transmissions, since there'd be no way for the
+ * frontend to determine the string length.  But it is useful for binary
+ * format conversions.
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+void
+pq_sendtext(StringInfo buf, const char *str, int slen)
+{
+	char	   *p;
+
+	p = pg_server_to_client(str, slen);
+	if (p != str)				/* actual conversion has been done? */
+	{
+		slen = strlen(p);
+		appendBinaryStringInfo(buf, p, slen);
+		pfree(p);
+	}
+	else
+		appendBinaryStringInfo(buf, str, slen);
+}
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		pq_sendstring	- append a null-terminated text string (with conversion)
+ *
+ * NB: passed text string must be null-terminated, and so is the data
+ * sent to the frontend.
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+void
+pq_sendstring(StringInfo buf, const char *str)
+{
+	int			slen = strlen(str);
+	char	   *p;
+
+	p = pg_server_to_client(str, slen);
+	if (p != str)				/* actual conversion has been done? */
+	{
+		slen = strlen(p);
+		appendBinaryStringInfoNT(buf, p, slen + 1);
+		pfree(p);
+	}
+	else
+		appendBinaryStringInfoNT(buf, str, slen + 1);
+}
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		pq_send_ascii_string	- append a null-terminated text string (without conversion)
+ *
+ * This function intentionally bypasses encoding conversion, instead just
+ * silently replacing any non-7-bit-ASCII characters with question marks.
+ * It is used only when we are having trouble sending an error message to
+ * the client with normal localization and encoding conversion.  The caller
+ * should already have taken measures to ensure the string is just ASCII;
+ * the extra work here is just to make certain we don't send a badly encoded
+ * string to the client (which might or might not be robust about that).
+ *
+ * NB: passed text string must be null-terminated, and so is the data
+ * sent to the frontend.
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+void
+pq_send_ascii_string(StringInfo buf, const char *str)
+{
+	while (*str)
+	{
+		char		ch = *str++;
+
+		if (IS_HIGHBIT_SET(ch))
+			ch = '?';
+		appendStringInfoCharMacro(buf, ch);
+	}
+	appendStringInfoChar(buf, '\0');
+}
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		pq_sendfloat4	- append a float4 to a StringInfo buffer
+ *
+ * The point of this routine is to localize knowledge of the external binary
+ * representation of float4, which is a component of several datatypes.
+ *
+ * We currently assume that float4 should be byte-swapped in the same way
+ * as int4.  This rule is not perfect but it gives us portability across
+ * most IEEE-float-using architectures.
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+void
+pq_sendfloat4(StringInfo buf, float4 f)
+{
+	union
+	{
+		float4		f;
+		uint32		i;
+	}			swap;
+
+	swap.f = f;
+	pq_sendint32(buf, swap.i);
+}
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		pq_sendfloat8	- append a float8 to a StringInfo buffer
+ *
+ * The point of this routine is to localize knowledge of the external binary
+ * representation of float8, which is a component of several datatypes.
+ *
+ * We currently assume that float8 should be byte-swapped in the same way
+ * as int8.  This rule is not perfect but it gives us portability across
+ * most IEEE-float-using architectures.
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+void
+pq_sendfloat8(StringInfo buf, float8 f)
+{
+	union
+	{
+		float8		f;
+		int64		i;
+	}			swap;
+
+	swap.f = f;
+	pq_sendint64(buf, swap.i);
+}
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		pq_endmessage	- send the completed message to the frontend
+ *
+ * The data buffer is pfree()d, but if the StringInfo was allocated with
+ * makeStringInfo then the caller must still pfree it.
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+void
+pq_endmessage(StringInfo buf)
+{
+	/* msgtype was saved in cursor field */
+	(void) pq_putmessage(buf->cursor, buf->data, buf->len);
+	/* no need to complain about any failure, since pqcomm.c already did */
+	pfree(buf->data);
+	buf->data = NULL;
+}
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		pq_endmessage_reuse	- send the completed message to the frontend
+ *
+ * The data buffer is *not* freed, allowing to reuse the buffer with
+ * pq_beginmessage_reuse.
+ --------------------------------
+ */
+
+void
+pq_endmessage_reuse(StringInfo buf)
+{
+	/* msgtype was saved in cursor field */
+	(void) pq_putmessage(buf->cursor, buf->data, buf->len);
+}
+
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		pq_begintypsend		- initialize for constructing a bytea result
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+void
+pq_begintypsend(StringInfo buf)
+{
+	initStringInfo(buf);
+	/* Reserve four bytes for the bytea length word */
+	appendStringInfoCharMacro(buf, '\0');
+	appendStringInfoCharMacro(buf, '\0');
+	appendStringInfoCharMacro(buf, '\0');
+	appendStringInfoCharMacro(buf, '\0');
+}
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		pq_endtypsend	- finish constructing a bytea result
+ *
+ * The data buffer is returned as the palloc'd bytea value.  (We expect
+ * that it will be suitably aligned for this because it has been palloc'd.)
+ * We assume the StringInfoData is just a local variable in the caller and
+ * need not be pfree'd.
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+bytea *
+pq_endtypsend(StringInfo buf)
+{
+	bytea	   *result = (bytea *) buf->data;
+
+	/* Insert correct length into bytea length word */
+	Assert(buf->len >= VARHDRSZ);
+	SET_VARSIZE(result, buf->len);
+
+	return result;
+}
+
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		pq_puttextmessage - generate a character set-converted message in one step
+ *
+ *		This is the same as the pqcomm.c routine pq_putmessage, except that
+ *		the message body is a null-terminated string to which encoding
+ *		conversion applies.
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+void
+pq_puttextmessage(char msgtype, const char *str)
+{
+	int			slen = strlen(str);
+	char	   *p;
+
+	p = pg_server_to_client(str, slen);
+	if (p != str)				/* actual conversion has been done? */
+	{
+		(void) pq_putmessage(msgtype, p, strlen(p) + 1);
+		pfree(p);
+		return;
+	}
+	(void) pq_putmessage(msgtype, str, slen + 1);
+}
+
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		pq_putemptymessage - convenience routine for message with empty body
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+void
+pq_putemptymessage(char msgtype)
+{
+	(void) pq_putmessage(msgtype, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		pq_getmsgbyte	- get a raw byte from a message buffer
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+int
+pq_getmsgbyte(StringInfo msg)
+{
+	if (msg->cursor >= msg->len)
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+				 errmsg("no data left in message")));
+	return (unsigned char) msg->data[msg->cursor++];
+}
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		pq_getmsgint	- get a binary integer from a message buffer
+ *
+ *		Values are treated as unsigned.
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+unsigned int
+pq_getmsgint(StringInfo msg, int b)
+{
+	unsigned int result;
+	unsigned char n8;
+	uint16		n16;
+	uint32		n32;
+
+	switch (b)
+	{
+		case 1:
+			pq_copymsgbytes(msg, (char *) &n8, 1);
+			result = n8;
+			break;
+		case 2:
+			pq_copymsgbytes(msg, (char *) &n16, 2);
+			result = pg_ntoh16(n16);
+			break;
+		case 4:
+			pq_copymsgbytes(msg, (char *) &n32, 4);
+			result = pg_ntoh32(n32);
+			break;
+		default:
+			elog(ERROR, "unsupported integer size %d", b);
+			result = 0;			/* keep compiler quiet */
+			break;
+	}
+	return result;
+}
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		pq_getmsgint64	- get a binary 8-byte int from a message buffer
+ *
+ * It is tempting to merge this with pq_getmsgint, but we'd have to make the
+ * result int64 for all data widths --- that could be a big performance
+ * hit on machines where int64 isn't efficient.
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+int64
+pq_getmsgint64(StringInfo msg)
+{
+	uint64		n64;
+
+	pq_copymsgbytes(msg, (char *) &n64, sizeof(n64));
+
+	return pg_ntoh64(n64);
+}
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		pq_getmsgfloat4 - get a float4 from a message buffer
+ *
+ * See notes for pq_sendfloat4.
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+float4
+pq_getmsgfloat4(StringInfo msg)
+{
+	union
+	{
+		float4		f;
+		uint32		i;
+	}			swap;
+
+	swap.i = pq_getmsgint(msg, 4);
+	return swap.f;
+}
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		pq_getmsgfloat8 - get a float8 from a message buffer
+ *
+ * See notes for pq_sendfloat8.
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+float8
+pq_getmsgfloat8(StringInfo msg)
+{
+	union
+	{
+		float8		f;
+		int64		i;
+	}			swap;
+
+	swap.i = pq_getmsgint64(msg);
+	return swap.f;
+}
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		pq_getmsgbytes	- get raw data from a message buffer
+ *
+ *		Returns a pointer directly into the message buffer; note this
+ *		may not have any particular alignment.
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+const char *
+pq_getmsgbytes(StringInfo msg, int datalen)
+{
+	const char *result;
+
+	if (datalen < 0 || datalen > (msg->len - msg->cursor))
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+				 errmsg("insufficient data left in message")));
+	result = &msg->data[msg->cursor];
+	msg->cursor += datalen;
+	return result;
+}
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		pq_copymsgbytes - copy raw data from a message buffer
+ *
+ *		Same as above, except data is copied to caller's buffer.
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+void
+pq_copymsgbytes(StringInfo msg, char *buf, int datalen)
+{
+	if (datalen < 0 || datalen > (msg->len - msg->cursor))
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+				 errmsg("insufficient data left in message")));
+	memcpy(buf, &msg->data[msg->cursor], datalen);
+	msg->cursor += datalen;
+}
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		pq_getmsgtext	- get a counted text string (with conversion)
+ *
+ *		Always returns a pointer to a freshly palloc'd result.
+ *		The result has a trailing null, *and* we return its strlen in *nbytes.
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+char *
+pq_getmsgtext(StringInfo msg, int rawbytes, int *nbytes)
+{
+	char	   *str;
+	char	   *p;
+
+	if (rawbytes < 0 || rawbytes > (msg->len - msg->cursor))
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+				 errmsg("insufficient data left in message")));
+	str = &msg->data[msg->cursor];
+	msg->cursor += rawbytes;
+
+	p = pg_client_to_server(str, rawbytes);
+	if (p != str)				/* actual conversion has been done? */
+		*nbytes = strlen(p);
+	else
+	{
+		p = (char *) palloc(rawbytes + 1);
+		memcpy(p, str, rawbytes);
+		p[rawbytes] = '\0';
+		*nbytes = rawbytes;
+	}
+	return p;
+}
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		pq_getmsgstring - get a null-terminated text string (with conversion)
+ *
+ *		May return a pointer directly into the message buffer, or a pointer
+ *		to a palloc'd conversion result.
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+const char *
+pq_getmsgstring(StringInfo msg)
+{
+	char	   *str;
+	int			slen;
+
+	str = &msg->data[msg->cursor];
+
+	/*
+	 * It's safe to use strlen() here because a StringInfo is guaranteed to
+	 * have a trailing null byte.  But check we found a null inside the
+	 * message.
+	 */
+	slen = strlen(str);
+	if (msg->cursor + slen >= msg->len)
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+				 errmsg("invalid string in message")));
+	msg->cursor += slen + 1;
+
+	return pg_client_to_server(str, slen);
+}
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		pq_getmsgrawstring - get a null-terminated text string - NO conversion
+ *
+ *		Returns a pointer directly into the message buffer.
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+const char *
+pq_getmsgrawstring(StringInfo msg)
+{
+	char	   *str;
+	int			slen;
+
+	str = &msg->data[msg->cursor];
+
+	/*
+	 * It's safe to use strlen() here because a StringInfo is guaranteed to
+	 * have a trailing null byte.  But check we found a null inside the
+	 * message.
+	 */
+	slen = strlen(str);
+	if (msg->cursor + slen >= msg->len)
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+				 errmsg("invalid string in message")));
+	msg->cursor += slen + 1;
+
+	return str;
+}
+
+/* --------------------------------
+ *		pq_getmsgend	- verify message fully consumed
+ * --------------------------------
+ */
+void
+pq_getmsgend(StringInfo msg)
+{
+	if (msg->cursor != msg->len)
+		ereport(ERROR,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+				 errmsg("invalid message format")));
+}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/pqmq.c b/src/backend/libpq/pqmq.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..743d24c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/pqmq.c
@@ -0,0 +1,329 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * pqmq.c
+ *	  Use the frontend/backend protocol for communication over a shm_mq
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ *	src/backend/libpq/pqmq.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include "libpq/libpq.h"
+#include "libpq/pqformat.h"
+#include "libpq/pqmq.h"
+#include "miscadmin.h"
+#include "pgstat.h"
+#include "tcop/tcopprot.h"
+#include "utils/builtins.h"
+
+static shm_mq_handle *pq_mq_handle;
+static bool pq_mq_busy = false;
+static pid_t pq_mq_parallel_master_pid = 0;
+static pid_t pq_mq_parallel_master_backend_id = InvalidBackendId;
+
+static void pq_cleanup_redirect_to_shm_mq(dsm_segment *seg, Datum arg);
+static void mq_comm_reset(void);
+static int	mq_flush(void);
+static int	mq_flush_if_writable(void);
+static bool mq_is_send_pending(void);
+static int	mq_putmessage(char msgtype, const char *s, size_t len);
+static void mq_putmessage_noblock(char msgtype, const char *s, size_t len);
+static void mq_startcopyout(void);
+static void mq_endcopyout(bool errorAbort);
+
+static const PQcommMethods PqCommMqMethods = {
+	mq_comm_reset,
+	mq_flush,
+	mq_flush_if_writable,
+	mq_is_send_pending,
+	mq_putmessage,
+	mq_putmessage_noblock,
+	mq_startcopyout,
+	mq_endcopyout
+};
+
+/*
+ * Arrange to redirect frontend/backend protocol messages to a shared-memory
+ * message queue.
+ */
+void
+pq_redirect_to_shm_mq(dsm_segment *seg, shm_mq_handle *mqh)
+{
+	PqCommMethods = &PqCommMqMethods;
+	pq_mq_handle = mqh;
+	whereToSendOutput = DestRemote;
+	FrontendProtocol = PG_PROTOCOL_LATEST;
+	on_dsm_detach(seg, pq_cleanup_redirect_to_shm_mq, (Datum) 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * When the DSM that contains our shm_mq goes away, we need to stop sending
+ * messages to it.
+ */
+static void
+pq_cleanup_redirect_to_shm_mq(dsm_segment *seg, Datum arg)
+{
+	pq_mq_handle = NULL;
+	whereToSendOutput = DestNone;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Arrange to SendProcSignal() to the parallel master each time we transmit
+ * message data via the shm_mq.
+ */
+void
+pq_set_parallel_master(pid_t pid, BackendId backend_id)
+{
+	Assert(PqCommMethods == &PqCommMqMethods);
+	pq_mq_parallel_master_pid = pid;
+	pq_mq_parallel_master_backend_id = backend_id;
+}
+
+static void
+mq_comm_reset(void)
+{
+	/* Nothing to do. */
+}
+
+static int
+mq_flush(void)
+{
+	/* Nothing to do. */
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+mq_flush_if_writable(void)
+{
+	/* Nothing to do. */
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static bool
+mq_is_send_pending(void)
+{
+	/* There's never anything pending. */
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Transmit a libpq protocol message to the shared memory message queue
+ * selected via pq_mq_handle.  We don't include a length word, because the
+ * receiver will know the length of the message from shm_mq_receive().
+ */
+static int
+mq_putmessage(char msgtype, const char *s, size_t len)
+{
+	shm_mq_iovec iov[2];
+	shm_mq_result result;
+
+	/*
+	 * If we're sending a message, and we have to wait because the queue is
+	 * full, and then we get interrupted, and that interrupt results in trying
+	 * to send another message, we respond by detaching the queue.  There's no
+	 * way to return to the original context, but even if there were, just
+	 * queueing the message would amount to indefinitely postponing the
+	 * response to the interrupt.  So we do this instead.
+	 */
+	if (pq_mq_busy)
+	{
+		if (pq_mq_handle != NULL)
+			shm_mq_detach(pq_mq_handle);
+		pq_mq_handle = NULL;
+		return EOF;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If the message queue is already gone, just ignore the message. This
+	 * doesn't necessarily indicate a problem; for example, DEBUG messages can
+	 * be generated late in the shutdown sequence, after all DSMs have already
+	 * been detached.
+	 */
+	if (pq_mq_handle == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	pq_mq_busy = true;
+
+	iov[0].data = &msgtype;
+	iov[0].len = 1;
+	iov[1].data = s;
+	iov[1].len = len;
+
+	Assert(pq_mq_handle != NULL);
+
+	for (;;)
+	{
+		result = shm_mq_sendv(pq_mq_handle, iov, 2, true);
+
+		if (pq_mq_parallel_master_pid != 0)
+			SendProcSignal(pq_mq_parallel_master_pid,
+						   PROCSIG_PARALLEL_MESSAGE,
+						   pq_mq_parallel_master_backend_id);
+
+		if (result != SHM_MQ_WOULD_BLOCK)
+			break;
+
+		(void) WaitLatch(MyLatch, WL_LATCH_SET | WL_EXIT_ON_PM_DEATH, 0,
+						 WAIT_EVENT_MQ_PUT_MESSAGE);
+		ResetLatch(MyLatch);
+		CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS();
+	}
+
+	pq_mq_busy = false;
+
+	Assert(result == SHM_MQ_SUCCESS || result == SHM_MQ_DETACHED);
+	if (result != SHM_MQ_SUCCESS)
+		return EOF;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+mq_putmessage_noblock(char msgtype, const char *s, size_t len)
+{
+	/*
+	 * While the shm_mq machinery does support sending a message in
+	 * non-blocking mode, there's currently no way to try sending beginning to
+	 * send the message that doesn't also commit us to completing the
+	 * transmission.  This could be improved in the future, but for now we
+	 * don't need it.
+	 */
+	elog(ERROR, "not currently supported");
+}
+
+static void
+mq_startcopyout(void)
+{
+	/* Nothing to do. */
+}
+
+static void
+mq_endcopyout(bool errorAbort)
+{
+	/* Nothing to do. */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse an ErrorResponse or NoticeResponse payload and populate an ErrorData
+ * structure with the results.
+ */
+void
+pq_parse_errornotice(StringInfo msg, ErrorData *edata)
+{
+	/* Initialize edata with reasonable defaults. */
+	MemSet(edata, 0, sizeof(ErrorData));
+	edata->elevel = ERROR;
+	edata->assoc_context = CurrentMemoryContext;
+
+	/* Loop over fields and extract each one. */
+	for (;;)
+	{
+		char		code = pq_getmsgbyte(msg);
+		const char *value;
+
+		if (code == '\0')
+		{
+			pq_getmsgend(msg);
+			break;
+		}
+		value = pq_getmsgrawstring(msg);
+
+		switch (code)
+		{
+			case PG_DIAG_SEVERITY:
+				/* ignore, trusting we'll get a nonlocalized version */
+				break;
+			case PG_DIAG_SEVERITY_NONLOCALIZED:
+				if (strcmp(value, "DEBUG") == 0)
+				{
+					/*
+					 * We can't reconstruct the exact DEBUG level, but
+					 * presumably it was >= client_min_messages, so select
+					 * DEBUG1 to ensure we'll pass it on to the client.
+					 */
+					edata->elevel = DEBUG1;
+				}
+				else if (strcmp(value, "LOG") == 0)
+				{
+					/*
+					 * It can't be LOG_SERVER_ONLY, or the worker wouldn't
+					 * have sent it to us; so LOG is the correct value.
+					 */
+					edata->elevel = LOG;
+				}
+				else if (strcmp(value, "INFO") == 0)
+					edata->elevel = INFO;
+				else if (strcmp(value, "NOTICE") == 0)
+					edata->elevel = NOTICE;
+				else if (strcmp(value, "WARNING") == 0)
+					edata->elevel = WARNING;
+				else if (strcmp(value, "ERROR") == 0)
+					edata->elevel = ERROR;
+				else if (strcmp(value, "FATAL") == 0)
+					edata->elevel = FATAL;
+				else if (strcmp(value, "PANIC") == 0)
+					edata->elevel = PANIC;
+				else
+					elog(ERROR, "unrecognized error severity: \"%s\"", value);
+				break;
+			case PG_DIAG_SQLSTATE:
+				if (strlen(value) != 5)
+					elog(ERROR, "invalid SQLSTATE: \"%s\"", value);
+				edata->sqlerrcode = MAKE_SQLSTATE(value[0], value[1], value[2],
+												  value[3], value[4]);
+				break;
+			case PG_DIAG_MESSAGE_PRIMARY:
+				edata->message = pstrdup(value);
+				break;
+			case PG_DIAG_MESSAGE_DETAIL:
+				edata->detail = pstrdup(value);
+				break;
+			case PG_DIAG_MESSAGE_HINT:
+				edata->hint = pstrdup(value);
+				break;
+			case PG_DIAG_STATEMENT_POSITION:
+				edata->cursorpos = pg_strtoint32(value);
+				break;
+			case PG_DIAG_INTERNAL_POSITION:
+				edata->internalpos = pg_strtoint32(value);
+				break;
+			case PG_DIAG_INTERNAL_QUERY:
+				edata->internalquery = pstrdup(value);
+				break;
+			case PG_DIAG_CONTEXT:
+				edata->context = pstrdup(value);
+				break;
+			case PG_DIAG_SCHEMA_NAME:
+				edata->schema_name = pstrdup(value);
+				break;
+			case PG_DIAG_TABLE_NAME:
+				edata->table_name = pstrdup(value);
+				break;
+			case PG_DIAG_COLUMN_NAME:
+				edata->column_name = pstrdup(value);
+				break;
+			case PG_DIAG_DATATYPE_NAME:
+				edata->datatype_name = pstrdup(value);
+				break;
+			case PG_DIAG_CONSTRAINT_NAME:
+				edata->constraint_name = pstrdup(value);
+				break;
+			case PG_DIAG_SOURCE_FILE:
+				edata->filename = pstrdup(value);
+				break;
+			case PG_DIAG_SOURCE_LINE:
+				edata->lineno = pg_strtoint32(value);
+				break;
+			case PG_DIAG_SOURCE_FUNCTION:
+				edata->funcname = pstrdup(value);
+				break;
+			default:
+				elog(ERROR, "unrecognized error field code: %d", (int) code);
+				break;
+		}
+	}
+}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/pqsignal.c b/src/backend/libpq/pqsignal.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9289493
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/pqsignal.c
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * pqsignal.c
+ *	  Backend signal(2) support (see also src/port/pqsignal.c)
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ *	  src/backend/libpq/pqsignal.c
+ *
+ * ------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include "libpq/pqsignal.h"
+
+
+/* Global variables */
+sigset_t	UnBlockSig,
+			BlockSig,
+			StartupBlockSig;
+
+
+/*
+ * Initialize BlockSig, UnBlockSig, and StartupBlockSig.
+ *
+ * BlockSig is the set of signals to block when we are trying to block
+ * signals.  This includes all signals we normally expect to get, but NOT
+ * signals that should never be turned off.
+ *
+ * StartupBlockSig is the set of signals to block during startup packet
+ * collection; it's essentially BlockSig minus SIGTERM, SIGQUIT, SIGALRM.
+ *
+ * UnBlockSig is the set of signals to block when we don't want to block
+ * signals (is this ever nonzero??)
+ */
+void
+pqinitmask(void)
+{
+	sigemptyset(&UnBlockSig);
+
+	/* First set all signals, then clear some. */
+	sigfillset(&BlockSig);
+	sigfillset(&StartupBlockSig);
+
+	/*
+	 * Unmark those signals that should never be blocked. Some of these signal
+	 * names don't exist on all platforms.  Most do, but might as well ifdef
+	 * them all for consistency...
+	 */
+#ifdef SIGTRAP
+	sigdelset(&BlockSig, SIGTRAP);
+	sigdelset(&StartupBlockSig, SIGTRAP);
+#endif
+#ifdef SIGABRT
+	sigdelset(&BlockSig, SIGABRT);
+	sigdelset(&StartupBlockSig, SIGABRT);
+#endif
+#ifdef SIGILL
+	sigdelset(&BlockSig, SIGILL);
+	sigdelset(&StartupBlockSig, SIGILL);
+#endif
+#ifdef SIGFPE
+	sigdelset(&BlockSig, SIGFPE);
+	sigdelset(&StartupBlockSig, SIGFPE);
+#endif
+#ifdef SIGSEGV
+	sigdelset(&BlockSig, SIGSEGV);
+	sigdelset(&StartupBlockSig, SIGSEGV);
+#endif
+#ifdef SIGBUS
+	sigdelset(&BlockSig, SIGBUS);
+	sigdelset(&StartupBlockSig, SIGBUS);
+#endif
+#ifdef SIGSYS
+	sigdelset(&BlockSig, SIGSYS);
+	sigdelset(&StartupBlockSig, SIGSYS);
+#endif
+#ifdef SIGCONT
+	sigdelset(&BlockSig, SIGCONT);
+	sigdelset(&StartupBlockSig, SIGCONT);
+#endif
+
+/* Signals unique to startup */
+#ifdef SIGQUIT
+	sigdelset(&StartupBlockSig, SIGQUIT);
+#endif
+#ifdef SIGTERM
+	sigdelset(&StartupBlockSig, SIGTERM);
+#endif
+#ifdef SIGALRM
+	sigdelset(&StartupBlockSig, SIGALRM);
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set up a postmaster signal handler for signal "signo"
+ *
+ * Returns the previous handler.
+ *
+ * This is used only in the postmaster, which has its own odd approach to
+ * signal handling.  For signals with handlers, we block all signals for the
+ * duration of signal handler execution.  We also do not set the SA_RESTART
+ * flag; this should be safe given the tiny range of code in which the
+ * postmaster ever unblocks signals.
+ *
+ * pqinitmask() must have been invoked previously.
+ *
+ * On Windows, this function is just an alias for pqsignal()
+ * (and note that it's calling the code in src/backend/port/win32/signal.c,
+ * not src/port/pqsignal.c).  On that platform, the postmaster's signal
+ * handlers still have to block signals for themselves.
+ */
+pqsigfunc
+pqsignal_pm(int signo, pqsigfunc func)
+{
+#ifndef WIN32
+	struct sigaction act,
+				oact;
+
+	act.sa_handler = func;
+	if (func == SIG_IGN || func == SIG_DFL)
+	{
+		/* in these cases, act the same as pqsignal() */
+		sigemptyset(&act.sa_mask);
+		act.sa_flags = SA_RESTART;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		act.sa_mask = BlockSig;
+		act.sa_flags = 0;
+	}
+#ifdef SA_NOCLDSTOP
+	if (signo == SIGCHLD)
+		act.sa_flags |= SA_NOCLDSTOP;
+#endif
+	if (sigaction(signo, &act, &oact) < 0)
+		return SIG_ERR;
+	return oact.sa_handler;
+#else							/* WIN32 */
+	return pqsignal(signo, func);
+#endif
+}