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-rw-r--r--contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-mpi-internal.c304
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diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-mpi-internal.c b/contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-mpi-internal.c
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+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-mpi-internal.c
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+/*
+ * pgp-mpi-internal.c
+ * OpenPGP MPI functions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Marko Kreen
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-mpi-internal.c
+ */
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include "imath.h"
+#include "pgp.h"
+#include "px.h"
+
+static mpz_t *
+mp_new(void)
+{
+ mpz_t *mp = mp_int_alloc();
+
+ mp_int_init_size(mp, 256);
+ return mp;
+}
+
+static void
+mp_clear_free(mpz_t *a)
+{
+ if (!a)
+ return;
+ /* fixme: no clear? */
+ mp_int_free(a);
+}
+
+
+static int
+mp_px_rand(uint32 bits, mpz_t *res)
+{
+ unsigned bytes = (bits + 7) / 8;
+ int last_bits = bits & 7;
+ uint8 *buf;
+
+ buf = palloc(bytes);
+ if (!pg_strong_random(buf, bytes))
+ {
+ pfree(buf);
+ return PXE_NO_RANDOM;
+ }
+
+ /* clear unnecessary bits and set last bit to one */
+ if (last_bits)
+ {
+ buf[0] >>= 8 - last_bits;
+ buf[0] |= 1 << (last_bits - 1);
+ }
+ else
+ buf[0] |= 1 << 7;
+
+ mp_int_read_unsigned(res, buf, bytes);
+
+ pfree(buf);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+mp_modmul(mpz_t *a, mpz_t *b, mpz_t *p, mpz_t *res)
+{
+ mpz_t *tmp = mp_new();
+
+ mp_int_mul(a, b, tmp);
+ mp_int_mod(tmp, p, res);
+ mp_clear_free(tmp);
+}
+
+static mpz_t *
+mpi_to_bn(PGP_MPI *n)
+{
+ mpz_t *bn = mp_new();
+
+ mp_int_read_unsigned(bn, n->data, n->bytes);
+
+ if (!bn)
+ return NULL;
+ if (mp_int_count_bits(bn) != n->bits)
+ {
+ px_debug("mpi_to_bn: bignum conversion failed: mpi=%d, bn=%d",
+ n->bits, mp_int_count_bits(bn));
+ mp_clear_free(bn);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return bn;
+}
+
+static PGP_MPI *
+bn_to_mpi(mpz_t *bn)
+{
+ int res;
+ PGP_MPI *n;
+ int bytes;
+
+ res = pgp_mpi_alloc(mp_int_count_bits(bn), &n);
+ if (res < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ bytes = (mp_int_count_bits(bn) + 7) / 8;
+ if (bytes != n->bytes)
+ {
+ px_debug("bn_to_mpi: bignum conversion failed: bn=%d, mpi=%d",
+ bytes, n->bytes);
+ pgp_mpi_free(n);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ mp_int_to_unsigned(bn, n->data, n->bytes);
+ return n;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Decide the number of bits in the random component k
+ *
+ * It should be in the same range as p for signing (which
+ * is deprecated), but can be much smaller for encrypting.
+ *
+ * Until I research it further, I just mimic gpg behaviour.
+ * It has a special mapping table, for values <= 5120,
+ * above that it uses 'arbitrary high number'. Following
+ * algorithm hovers 10-70 bits above gpg values. And for
+ * larger p, it uses gpg's algorithm.
+ *
+ * The point is - if k gets large, encryption will be
+ * really slow. It does not matter for decryption.
+ */
+static int
+decide_k_bits(int p_bits)
+{
+ if (p_bits <= 5120)
+ return p_bits / 10 + 160;
+ else
+ return (p_bits / 8 + 200) * 3 / 2;
+}
+
+int
+pgp_elgamal_encrypt(PGP_PubKey *pk, PGP_MPI *_m,
+ PGP_MPI **c1_p, PGP_MPI **c2_p)
+{
+ int res = PXE_PGP_MATH_FAILED;
+ int k_bits;
+ mpz_t *m = mpi_to_bn(_m);
+ mpz_t *p = mpi_to_bn(pk->pub.elg.p);
+ mpz_t *g = mpi_to_bn(pk->pub.elg.g);
+ mpz_t *y = mpi_to_bn(pk->pub.elg.y);
+ mpz_t *k = mp_new();
+ mpz_t *yk = mp_new();
+ mpz_t *c1 = mp_new();
+ mpz_t *c2 = mp_new();
+
+ if (!m || !p || !g || !y || !k || !yk || !c1 || !c2)
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * generate k
+ */
+ k_bits = decide_k_bits(mp_int_count_bits(p));
+ res = mp_px_rand(k_bits, k);
+ if (res < 0)
+ return res;
+
+ /*
+ * c1 = g^k c2 = m * y^k
+ */
+ mp_int_exptmod(g, k, p, c1);
+ mp_int_exptmod(y, k, p, yk);
+ mp_modmul(m, yk, p, c2);
+
+ /* result */
+ *c1_p = bn_to_mpi(c1);
+ *c2_p = bn_to_mpi(c2);
+ if (*c1_p && *c2_p)
+ res = 0;
+err:
+ mp_clear_free(c2);
+ mp_clear_free(c1);
+ mp_clear_free(yk);
+ mp_clear_free(k);
+ mp_clear_free(y);
+ mp_clear_free(g);
+ mp_clear_free(p);
+ mp_clear_free(m);
+ return res;
+}
+
+int
+pgp_elgamal_decrypt(PGP_PubKey *pk, PGP_MPI *_c1, PGP_MPI *_c2,
+ PGP_MPI **msg_p)
+{
+ int res = PXE_PGP_MATH_FAILED;
+ mpz_t *c1 = mpi_to_bn(_c1);
+ mpz_t *c2 = mpi_to_bn(_c2);
+ mpz_t *p = mpi_to_bn(pk->pub.elg.p);
+ mpz_t *x = mpi_to_bn(pk->sec.elg.x);
+ mpz_t *c1x = mp_new();
+ mpz_t *div = mp_new();
+ mpz_t *m = mp_new();
+
+ if (!c1 || !c2 || !p || !x || !c1x || !div || !m)
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * m = c2 / (c1^x)
+ */
+ mp_int_exptmod(c1, x, p, c1x);
+ mp_int_invmod(c1x, p, div);
+ mp_modmul(c2, div, p, m);
+
+ /* result */
+ *msg_p = bn_to_mpi(m);
+ if (*msg_p)
+ res = 0;
+err:
+ mp_clear_free(m);
+ mp_clear_free(div);
+ mp_clear_free(c1x);
+ mp_clear_free(x);
+ mp_clear_free(p);
+ mp_clear_free(c2);
+ mp_clear_free(c1);
+ return res;
+}
+
+int
+pgp_rsa_encrypt(PGP_PubKey *pk, PGP_MPI *_m, PGP_MPI **c_p)
+{
+ int res = PXE_PGP_MATH_FAILED;
+ mpz_t *m = mpi_to_bn(_m);
+ mpz_t *e = mpi_to_bn(pk->pub.rsa.e);
+ mpz_t *n = mpi_to_bn(pk->pub.rsa.n);
+ mpz_t *c = mp_new();
+
+ if (!m || !e || !n || !c)
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * c = m ^ e
+ */
+ mp_int_exptmod(m, e, n, c);
+
+ *c_p = bn_to_mpi(c);
+ if (*c_p)
+ res = 0;
+err:
+ mp_clear_free(c);
+ mp_clear_free(n);
+ mp_clear_free(e);
+ mp_clear_free(m);
+ return res;
+}
+
+int
+pgp_rsa_decrypt(PGP_PubKey *pk, PGP_MPI *_c, PGP_MPI **m_p)
+{
+ int res = PXE_PGP_MATH_FAILED;
+ mpz_t *c = mpi_to_bn(_c);
+ mpz_t *d = mpi_to_bn(pk->sec.rsa.d);
+ mpz_t *n = mpi_to_bn(pk->pub.rsa.n);
+ mpz_t *m = mp_new();
+
+ if (!m || !d || !n || !c)
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * m = c ^ d
+ */
+ mp_int_exptmod(c, d, n, m);
+
+ *m_p = bn_to_mpi(m);
+ if (*m_p)
+ res = 0;
+err:
+ mp_clear_free(m);
+ mp_clear_free(n);
+ mp_clear_free(d);
+ mp_clear_free(c);
+ return res;
+}