From 5e45211a64149b3c659b90ff2de6fa982a5a93ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Baumann Date: Sat, 4 May 2024 14:17:33 +0200 Subject: Adding upstream version 15.5. Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann --- doc/src/sgml/html/perm-functions.html | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+) create mode 100644 doc/src/sgml/html/perm-functions.html (limited to 'doc/src/sgml/html/perm-functions.html') diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/html/perm-functions.html b/doc/src/sgml/html/perm-functions.html new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4cb60f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/src/sgml/html/perm-functions.html @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ + +22.6. Function Security
22.6. Function Security
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22.6. Function Security

+ Functions, triggers and row-level security policies allow users to insert + code into the backend server that other users might execute + unintentionally. Hence, these mechanisms permit users to “Trojan + horse” others with relative ease. The strongest protection is tight + control over who can define objects. Where that is infeasible, write + queries referring only to objects having trusted owners. Remove + from search_path any schemas that permit untrusted users + to create objects. +

+ Functions run inside the backend + server process with the operating system permissions of the + database server daemon. If the programming language + used for the function allows unchecked memory accesses, it is + possible to change the server's internal data structures. + Hence, among many other things, such functions can circumvent any + system access controls. Function languages that allow such access + are considered “untrusted”, and + PostgreSQL allows only superusers to + create functions written in those languages. +

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22.5. Predefined Roles Home Chapter 23. Managing Databases
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