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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-05-05 17:47:29 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-05-05 17:47:29 +0000
commit4f5791ebd03eaec1c7da0865a383175b05102712 (patch)
tree8ce7b00f7a76baa386372422adebbe64510812d4 /source3/passdb/secrets.c
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadsamba-4f5791ebd03eaec1c7da0865a383175b05102712.tar.xz
samba-4f5791ebd03eaec1c7da0865a383175b05102712.zip
Adding upstream version 2:4.17.12+dfsg.upstream/2%4.17.12+dfsgupstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'source3/passdb/secrets.c')
-rw-r--r--source3/passdb/secrets.c573
1 files changed, 573 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/source3/passdb/secrets.c b/source3/passdb/secrets.c
new file mode 100644
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/source3/passdb/secrets.c
@@ -0,0 +1,573 @@
+/*
+ Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+ Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-2001
+ Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2002
+ Copyright (C) Rafal Szczesniak 2002
+ Copyright (C) Tim Potter 2001
+
+ This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+ (at your option) any later version.
+
+ This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+/* the Samba secrets database stores any generated, private information
+ such as the local SID and machine trust password */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "system/filesys.h"
+#include "../libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_secrets.h"
+#include "secrets.h"
+#include "dbwrap/dbwrap.h"
+#include "dbwrap/dbwrap_open.h"
+#include "../libcli/security/security.h"
+#include "util_tdb.h"
+#include "auth/credentials/credentials.h"
+
+#undef DBGC_CLASS
+#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_PASSDB
+
+static struct db_context *db_ctx;
+
+/* open up the secrets database with specified private_dir path */
+bool secrets_init_path(const char *private_dir)
+{
+ char *fname = NULL;
+ TALLOC_CTX *frame;
+
+ if (db_ctx != NULL) {
+ return True;
+ }
+
+ if (private_dir == NULL) {
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ frame = talloc_stackframe();
+ fname = talloc_asprintf(frame, "%s/secrets.tdb", private_dir);
+ if (fname == NULL) {
+ TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ db_ctx = db_open(NULL, fname, 0,
+ TDB_DEFAULT, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0600,
+ DBWRAP_LOCK_ORDER_1, DBWRAP_FLAG_NONE);
+
+ if (db_ctx == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(0,("Failed to open %s\n", fname));
+ TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+ return True;
+}
+
+/* open up the secrets database */
+bool secrets_init(void)
+{
+ return secrets_init_path(lp_private_dir());
+}
+
+struct db_context *secrets_db_ctx(void)
+{
+ if (!secrets_init()) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return db_ctx;
+}
+
+/*
+ * close secrets.tdb
+ */
+void secrets_shutdown(void)
+{
+ TALLOC_FREE(db_ctx);
+}
+
+/* read a entry from the secrets database - the caller must free the result
+ if size is non-null then the size of the entry is put in there
+ */
+void *secrets_fetch(const char *key, size_t *size)
+{
+ TDB_DATA dbuf;
+ void *result;
+ NTSTATUS status;
+
+ if (!secrets_init()) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ status = dbwrap_fetch(db_ctx, talloc_tos(), string_tdb_data(key),
+ &dbuf);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ result = smb_memdup(dbuf.dptr, dbuf.dsize);
+ if (result == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ TALLOC_FREE(dbuf.dptr);
+
+ if (size) {
+ *size = dbuf.dsize;
+ }
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+/* store a secrets entry
+ */
+bool secrets_store(const char *key, const void *data, size_t size)
+{
+ NTSTATUS status;
+
+ if (!secrets_init()) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ status = dbwrap_trans_store(db_ctx, string_tdb_data(key),
+ make_tdb_data((const uint8_t *)data, size),
+ TDB_REPLACE);
+ return NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status);
+}
+
+bool secrets_store_creds(struct cli_credentials *creds)
+{
+ const char *p = NULL;
+ bool ok;
+
+ p = cli_credentials_get_username(creds);
+ if (p == NULL) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ ok = secrets_store(SECRETS_AUTH_USER, p, strlen(p) + 1);
+ if (!ok) {
+ DBG_ERR("Failed storing auth user name\n");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+
+ p = cli_credentials_get_domain(creds);
+ if (p == NULL) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ ok = secrets_store(SECRETS_AUTH_DOMAIN, p, strlen(p) + 1);
+ if (!ok) {
+ DBG_ERR("Failed storing auth domain name\n");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+
+ p = cli_credentials_get_password(creds);
+ if (p == NULL) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ ok = secrets_store(SECRETS_AUTH_PASSWORD, p, strlen(p) + 1);
+ if (!ok) {
+ DBG_ERR("Failed storing auth password\n");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+
+/* delete a secets database entry
+ */
+bool secrets_delete_entry(const char *key)
+{
+ NTSTATUS status;
+ if (!secrets_init()) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ status = dbwrap_trans_delete(db_ctx, string_tdb_data(key));
+
+ return NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Deletes the key if it exists.
+ */
+bool secrets_delete(const char *key)
+{
+ bool exists;
+
+ if (!secrets_init()) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ exists = dbwrap_exists(db_ctx, string_tdb_data(key));
+ if (!exists) {
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return secrets_delete_entry(key);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Form a key for fetching a trusted domain password
+ *
+ * @param domain trusted domain name
+ *
+ * @return stored password's key
+ **/
+static char *trustdom_keystr(const char *domain)
+{
+ char *keystr;
+
+ keystr = talloc_asprintf_strupper_m(talloc_tos(), "%s/%s",
+ SECRETS_DOMTRUST_ACCT_PASS,
+ domain);
+ SMB_ASSERT(keystr != NULL);
+ return keystr;
+}
+
+/************************************************************************
+ Routine to get account password to trusted domain
+************************************************************************/
+
+bool secrets_fetch_trusted_domain_password(const char *domain, char** pwd,
+ struct dom_sid *sid, time_t *pass_last_set_time)
+{
+ struct TRUSTED_DOM_PASS pass;
+ enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
+
+ /* unpacking structures */
+ DATA_BLOB blob;
+
+ /* fetching trusted domain password structure */
+ if (!(blob.data = (uint8_t *)secrets_fetch(trustdom_keystr(domain),
+ &blob.length))) {
+ DEBUG(5, ("secrets_fetch failed!\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ /* unpack trusted domain password */
+ ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob, talloc_tos(), &pass,
+ (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_TRUSTED_DOM_PASS);
+
+ SAFE_FREE(blob.data);
+
+ if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+
+ /* the trust's password */
+ if (pwd) {
+ *pwd = SMB_STRDUP(pass.pass);
+ if (!*pwd) {
+ return False;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* last change time */
+ if (pass_last_set_time) *pass_last_set_time = pass.mod_time;
+
+ /* domain sid */
+ if (sid != NULL) sid_copy(sid, &pass.domain_sid);
+
+ return True;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Routine to store the password for trusted domain
+ *
+ * @param domain remote domain name
+ * @param pwd plain text password of trust relationship
+ * @param sid remote domain sid
+ *
+ * @return true if succeeded
+ **/
+
+bool secrets_store_trusted_domain_password(const char* domain, const char* pwd,
+ const struct dom_sid *sid)
+{
+ bool ret;
+
+ /* packing structures */
+ DATA_BLOB blob;
+ enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
+ struct TRUSTED_DOM_PASS pass;
+ ZERO_STRUCT(pass);
+
+ pass.uni_name = domain;
+ pass.uni_name_len = strlen(domain)+1;
+
+ /* last change time */
+ pass.mod_time = time(NULL);
+
+ /* password of the trust */
+ pass.pass_len = strlen(pwd);
+ pass.pass = pwd;
+
+ /* domain sid */
+ sid_copy(&pass.domain_sid, sid);
+
+ ndr_err = ndr_push_struct_blob(&blob, talloc_tos(), &pass,
+ (ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_TRUSTED_DOM_PASS);
+ if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ ret = secrets_store(trustdom_keystr(domain), blob.data, blob.length);
+
+ data_blob_free(&blob);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/************************************************************************
+ Routine to delete the password for trusted domain
+************************************************************************/
+
+bool trusted_domain_password_delete(const char *domain)
+{
+ return secrets_delete_entry(trustdom_keystr(domain));
+}
+
+bool secrets_store_ldap_pw(const char* dn, char* pw)
+{
+ char *key = NULL;
+ bool ret;
+
+ if (asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_LDAP_BIND_PW, dn) < 0) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("secrets_store_ldap_pw: asprintf failed!\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ ret = secrets_store(key, pw, strlen(pw)+1);
+
+ SAFE_FREE(key);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************
+ Find the ldap password.
+******************************************************************/
+
+bool fetch_ldap_pw(char **dn, char** pw)
+{
+ char *key = NULL;
+ size_t size = 0;
+
+ *dn = smb_xstrdup(lp_ldap_admin_dn());
+
+ if (asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_LDAP_BIND_PW, *dn) < 0) {
+ SAFE_FREE(*dn);
+ DEBUG(0, ("fetch_ldap_pw: asprintf failed!\n"));
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ *pw=(char *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
+ SAFE_FREE(key);
+
+ if ((size != 0) && ((*pw)[size-1] != '\0')) {
+ DBG_ERR("Non 0-terminated password for dn %s\n", *dn);
+ SAFE_FREE(*pw);
+ SAFE_FREE(*dn);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (!size) {
+ /* Upgrade 2.2 style entry */
+ char *p;
+ char* old_style_key = SMB_STRDUP(*dn);
+ char *data;
+ fstring old_style_pw;
+
+ if (!old_style_key) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("fetch_ldap_pw: strdup failed!\n"));
+ SAFE_FREE(*pw);
+ SAFE_FREE(*dn);
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ for (p=old_style_key; *p; p++)
+ if (*p == ',') *p = '/';
+
+ data=(char *)secrets_fetch(old_style_key, &size);
+ if ((data == NULL) || (size < sizeof(old_style_pw))) {
+ DEBUG(0,("fetch_ldap_pw: neither ldap secret retrieved!\n"));
+ SAFE_FREE(old_style_key);
+ SAFE_FREE(*pw);
+ SAFE_FREE(*dn);
+ SAFE_FREE(data);
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ size = MIN(size, sizeof(fstring)-1);
+ strncpy(old_style_pw, data, size);
+ old_style_pw[size] = 0;
+
+ SAFE_FREE(data);
+
+ if (!secrets_store_ldap_pw(*dn, old_style_pw)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("fetch_ldap_pw: ldap secret could not be upgraded!\n"));
+ SAFE_FREE(old_style_key);
+ SAFE_FREE(*pw);
+ SAFE_FREE(*dn);
+ return False;
+ }
+ if (!secrets_delete_entry(old_style_key)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("fetch_ldap_pw: old ldap secret could not be deleted!\n"));
+ }
+
+ SAFE_FREE(old_style_key);
+
+ *pw = smb_xstrdup(old_style_pw);
+ }
+
+ return True;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ Store a complete AFS keyfile into secrets.tdb.
+*******************************************************************************/
+
+bool secrets_store_afs_keyfile(const char *cell, const struct afs_keyfile *keyfile)
+{
+ fstring key;
+
+ if ((cell == NULL) || (keyfile == NULL))
+ return False;
+
+ if (ntohl(keyfile->nkeys) > SECRETS_AFS_MAXKEYS)
+ return False;
+
+ slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_AFS_KEYFILE, cell);
+ return secrets_store(key, keyfile, sizeof(struct afs_keyfile));
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ Fetch the current (highest) AFS key from secrets.tdb
+*******************************************************************************/
+bool secrets_fetch_afs_key(const char *cell, struct afs_key *result)
+{
+ fstring key;
+ struct afs_keyfile *keyfile;
+ size_t size = 0;
+ uint32_t i;
+
+ slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_AFS_KEYFILE, cell);
+
+ keyfile = (struct afs_keyfile *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
+
+ if (keyfile == NULL)
+ return False;
+
+ if (size != sizeof(struct afs_keyfile)) {
+ SAFE_FREE(keyfile);
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ i = ntohl(keyfile->nkeys);
+
+ if (i > SECRETS_AFS_MAXKEYS) {
+ SAFE_FREE(keyfile);
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ *result = keyfile->entry[i-1];
+
+ result->kvno = ntohl(result->kvno);
+
+ SAFE_FREE(keyfile);
+
+ return True;
+}
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ When kerberos is not available, choose between anonymous or
+ authenticated connections.
+
+ We need to use an authenticated connection if DCs have the
+ RestrictAnonymous registry entry set > 0, or the "Additional
+ restrictions for anonymous connections" set in the win2k Local
+ Security Policy.
+
+ Caller to free() result in domain, username, password
+*******************************************************************************/
+void secrets_fetch_ipc_userpass(char **username, char **domain, char **password)
+{
+ *username = (char *)secrets_fetch(SECRETS_AUTH_USER, NULL);
+ *domain = (char *)secrets_fetch(SECRETS_AUTH_DOMAIN, NULL);
+ *password = (char *)secrets_fetch(SECRETS_AUTH_PASSWORD, NULL);
+
+ if (*username && **username) {
+
+ if (!*domain || !**domain)
+ *domain = smb_xstrdup(lp_workgroup());
+
+ if (!*password || !**password)
+ *password = smb_xstrdup("");
+
+ DEBUG(3, ("IPC$ connections done by user %s\\%s\n",
+ *domain, *username));
+
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(3, ("IPC$ connections done anonymously\n"));
+ *username = smb_xstrdup("");
+ *domain = smb_xstrdup("");
+ *password = smb_xstrdup("");
+ }
+}
+
+bool secrets_store_generic(const char *owner, const char *key, const char *secret)
+{
+ char *tdbkey = NULL;
+ bool ret;
+
+ if (asprintf(&tdbkey, "SECRETS/GENERIC/%s/%s", owner, key) < 0) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("asprintf failed!\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ ret = secrets_store(tdbkey, secret, strlen(secret)+1);
+
+ SAFE_FREE(tdbkey);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************
+ Find the ldap password.
+******************************************************************/
+
+char *secrets_fetch_generic(const char *owner, const char *key)
+{
+ char *secret = NULL;
+ char *tdbkey = NULL;
+
+ if (( ! owner) || ( ! key)) {
+ DEBUG(1, ("Invalid Parameters"));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (asprintf(&tdbkey, "SECRETS/GENERIC/%s/%s", owner, key) < 0) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("Out of memory!\n"));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ secret = (char *)secrets_fetch(tdbkey, NULL);
+ SAFE_FREE(tdbkey);
+
+ return secret;
+}
+