Adding upstream version 2:4.17.12+dfsg.upstream/2%4.17.12+dfsgupstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 1210 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/source4/auth/ntlm/auth_sam.c b/source4/auth/ntlm/auth_sam.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0d50431
--- /dev/null
+++ b/source4/auth/ntlm/auth_sam.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1210 @@
+/* 
+   Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+   Password and authentication handling
+   Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2001-2009
+   Copyright (C) Gerald Carter                             2003
+   Copyright (C) Stefan Metzmacher                         2005-2010
+   
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+   
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+   
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "system/time.h"
+#include <ldb.h>
+#include "libcli/ldap/ldap_ndr.h"
+#include "libcli/security/security.h"
+#include "auth/auth.h"
+#include "../libcli/auth/ntlm_check.h"
+#include "auth/ntlm/auth_proto.h"
+#include "auth/auth_sam.h"
+#include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
+#include "dsdb/common/util.h"
+#include "param/param.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_irpc_c.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_winbind_c.h"
+#include "lib/messaging/irpc.h"
+#include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
+#include "libds/common/roles.h"
+#include "lib/util/tevent_ntstatus.h"
+#include "system/kerberos.h"
+#include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h"
+#include "kdc/db-glue.h"
+
+#undef DBGC_CLASS
+#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_AUTH
+
+NTSTATUS auth_sam_init(void);
+
+extern const char *user_attrs[];
+extern const char *domain_ref_attrs[];
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ Do a specific test for an smb password being correct, given a smb_password and
+ the lanman and NT responses.
+****************************************************************************/
+static NTSTATUS authsam_password_ok(struct auth4_context *auth_context,
+				    TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				    const struct samr_Password *nt_pwd,
+				    struct smb_krb5_context *smb_krb5_context,
+				    const DATA_BLOB *stored_aes_256_key,
+				    const krb5_data *salt,
+				    const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info, 
+				    DATA_BLOB *user_sess_key, 
+				    DATA_BLOB *lm_sess_key)
+{
+	NTSTATUS status;
+
+	switch (user_info->password_state) {
+	case AUTH_PASSWORD_PLAIN: 
+	{
+		const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info_temp;	
+
+		if (nt_pwd == NULL && stored_aes_256_key != NULL && user_info->password.plaintext != NULL) {
+			bool pw_equal;
+			int krb5_ret;
+			DATA_BLOB supplied_aes_256_key;
+			krb5_keyblock key;
+			krb5_data cleartext_data = {
+				.data = user_info->password.plaintext,
+				.length = strlen(user_info->password.plaintext)
+			};
+
+			*lm_sess_key = data_blob_null;
+			*user_sess_key = data_blob_null;
+
+			krb5_ret = smb_krb5_create_key_from_string(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+								   NULL,
+								   salt,
+								   &cleartext_data,
+								   ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
+								   &key);
+			if (krb5_ret) {
+				DBG_ERR("generation of a aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 key for password comparison failed: %s",
+					smb_get_krb5_error_message(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+								   krb5_ret, mem_ctx));
+				return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+			}
+
+			supplied_aes_256_key = data_blob_const(KRB5_KEY_DATA(&key),
+							       KRB5_KEY_LENGTH(&key));
+
+			pw_equal = data_blob_equal_const_time(&supplied_aes_256_key,
+							      stored_aes_256_key);
+
+			krb5_free_keyblock_contents(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context, &key);
+			if (!pw_equal) {
+				return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+			}
+			return NT_STATUS_OK;
+		}
+
+		status = encrypt_user_info(mem_ctx, auth_context, 
+					   AUTH_PASSWORD_HASH, 
+					   user_info, &user_info_temp);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+			DEBUG(1, ("Failed to convert plaintext password to password HASH: %s\n", nt_errstr(status)));
+			return status;
+		}
+		user_info = user_info_temp;
+
+		FALL_THROUGH;
+	}
+	case AUTH_PASSWORD_HASH:
+		*lm_sess_key = data_blob(NULL, 0);
+		*user_sess_key = data_blob(NULL, 0);
+		status = hash_password_check(mem_ctx, 
+					     false,
+					     NULL,
+					     user_info->password.hash.nt,
+					     user_info->mapped.account_name,
+					     NULL, nt_pwd);
+		NT_STATUS_NOT_OK_RETURN(status);
+		break;
+		
+	case AUTH_PASSWORD_RESPONSE:
+		status = ntlm_password_check(mem_ctx, 
+					     false,
+					     lpcfg_ntlm_auth(auth_context->lp_ctx),
+					     user_info->logon_parameters, 
+					     &auth_context->challenge.data, 
+					     &user_info->password.response.lanman, 
+					     &user_info->password.response.nt,
+					     user_info->mapped.account_name,
+					     user_info->client.account_name, 
+					     user_info->client.domain_name, 
+					     NULL, nt_pwd,
+					     user_sess_key, lm_sess_key);
+		NT_STATUS_NOT_OK_RETURN(status);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+static void auth_sam_trigger_zero_password(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					   struct imessaging_context *msg_ctx,
+					   struct tevent_context *event_ctx,
+					   struct netr_SendToSamBase *send_to_sam)
+{
+	struct dcerpc_binding_handle *irpc_handle;
+	struct winbind_SendToSam r;
+	struct tevent_req *req;
+	TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx;
+
+	tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx);
+	if (tmp_ctx == NULL) {
+		return;
+	}
+
+	irpc_handle = irpc_binding_handle_by_name(tmp_ctx, msg_ctx,
+						  "winbind_server",
+						  &ndr_table_winbind);
+	if (irpc_handle == NULL) {
+		DEBUG(1,(__location__ ": Unable to get binding handle for winbind\n"));
+		TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	r.in.message = *send_to_sam;
+
+	/*
+	 * This seem to rely on the current IRPC implementation,
+	 * which delivers the message in the _send function.
+	 *
+	 * TODO: we need a ONE_WAY IRPC handle and register
+	 * a callback and wait for it to be triggered!
+	 */
+	req = dcerpc_winbind_SendToSam_r_send(tmp_ctx,
+					      event_ctx,
+					      irpc_handle,
+					      &r);
+
+	/* we aren't interested in a reply */
+	talloc_free(req);
+	TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+
+}
+
+/*
+  send a message to the drepl server telling it to initiate a
+  REPL_SECRET getncchanges extended op to fetch the users secrets
+ */
+static void auth_sam_trigger_repl_secret(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+					 struct imessaging_context *msg_ctx,
+					 struct tevent_context *event_ctx,
+					 struct ldb_dn *user_dn)
+{
+	struct dcerpc_binding_handle *irpc_handle;
+	struct drepl_trigger_repl_secret r;
+	struct tevent_req *req;
+	TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx;
+
+	tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx);
+	if (tmp_ctx == NULL) {
+		return;
+	}
+
+	irpc_handle = irpc_binding_handle_by_name(tmp_ctx, msg_ctx,
+						  "dreplsrv",
+						  &ndr_table_irpc);
+	if (irpc_handle == NULL) {
+		DEBUG(1,(__location__ ": Unable to get binding handle for dreplsrv\n"));
+		TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	r.in.user_dn = ldb_dn_get_linearized(user_dn);
+
+	/*
+	 * This seem to rely on the current IRPC implementation,
+	 * which delivers the message in the _send function.
+	 *
+	 * TODO: we need a ONE_WAY IRPC handle and register
+	 * a callback and wait for it to be triggered!
+	 */
+	req = dcerpc_drepl_trigger_repl_secret_r_send(tmp_ctx,
+						      event_ctx,
+						      irpc_handle,
+						      &r);
+
+	/* we aren't interested in a reply */
+	talloc_free(req);
+	TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+}
+
+static const struct samr_Password *hide_invalid_nthash(const struct samr_Password *in)
+{
+	/*
+	 * This is the result of:
+	 *
+	 * E_md4hash("", zero_string_hash.hash);
+	 */
+	static const struct samr_Password zero_string_hash = {
+		.hash = {
+			0x31, 0xd6, 0xcf, 0xe0, 0xd1, 0x6a, 0xe9, 0x31,
+			0xb7, 0x3c, 0x59, 0xd7, 0xe0, 0xc0, 0x89, 0xc0,
+		}
+	};
+
+	if (in == NULL) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Skip over any all-zero hashes in the history.  No known software
+	 * stores these but just to be sure
+	 */
+	if (all_zero(in->hash, sizeof(in->hash))) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * This looks odd, but the password_hash module in the past has written
+	 * this in the rare situation where (somehow) we didn't have an old NT
+	 * hash (one of the old LM-only set paths)
+	 *
+	 * mem_equal_const_time() is used to avoid a timing attack
+	 * when comparing secret data in the server with this constant
+	 * value.
+	 */
+	if (mem_equal_const_time(in->hash, zero_string_hash.hash, 16)) {
+		in = NULL;
+	}
+
+	return in;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check that a password is OK, and update badPwdCount if required.
+ */
+
+static NTSTATUS authsam_password_check_and_record(struct auth4_context *auth_context,
+						  TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+						  struct ldb_dn *domain_dn,
+						  struct ldb_message *msg,
+						  const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info,
+						  DATA_BLOB *user_sess_key,
+						  DATA_BLOB *lm_sess_key,
+						  bool *authoritative)
+{
+	NTSTATUS nt_status;
+	NTSTATUS auth_status;
+	TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx;
+	int i, ret;
+	int history_len = 0;
+	struct ldb_context *sam_ctx = auth_context->sam_ctx;
+	const char * const attrs[] = { "pwdHistoryLength", NULL };
+	struct ldb_message *dom_msg;
+	struct samr_Password *nt_pwd;
+	DATA_BLOB _aes_256_key = data_blob_null;
+	DATA_BLOB *aes_256_key = NULL;
+	krb5_data _salt = { .data = NULL, .length = 0 };
+	krb5_data *salt = NULL;
+	DATA_BLOB salt_data = data_blob_null;
+	struct smb_krb5_context *smb_krb5_context = NULL;
+	const struct ldb_val *sc_val;
+	uint32_t userAccountControl = 0;
+	uint32_t current_kvno = 0;
+	bool am_rodc;
+
+	tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx);
+	if (tmp_ctx == NULL) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * This call does more than what it appears to do, it also
+	 * checks for the account lockout.
+	 *
+	 * It is done here so that all parts of Samba that read the
+	 * password refuse to even operate on it if the account is
+	 * locked out, to avoid mistakes like CVE-2013-4496.
+	 */
+	nt_status = samdb_result_passwords(tmp_ctx, auth_context->lp_ctx,
+					   msg, &nt_pwd);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+		TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+		return nt_status;
+	}
+
+	userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
+						       "userAccountControl",
+						       0);
+
+	sc_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "supplementalCredentials");
+
+	if (nt_pwd == NULL && sc_val == NULL) {
+		if (samdb_rodc(auth_context->sam_ctx, &am_rodc) == LDB_SUCCESS && am_rodc) {
+			/*
+			 * we don't have passwords for this
+			 * account. We are an RODC, and this account
+			 * may be one for which we either are denied
+			 * REPL_SECRET replication or we haven't yet
+			 * done the replication. We return
+			 * NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED which tells the
+			 * auth code to try the next authentication
+			 * mechanism. We also send a message to our
+			 * drepl server to tell it to try and
+			 * replicate the secrets for this account.
+			 *
+			 * TODO: Should we only trigger this is detected
+			 * there's a chance that the password might be
+			 * replicated, we should be able to detect this
+			 * based on msDS-NeverRevealGroup.
+			 */
+			auth_sam_trigger_repl_secret(auth_context,
+						     auth_context->msg_ctx,
+						     auth_context->event_ctx,
+						     msg->dn);
+			TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+			return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If we don't have an NT password, pull a kerberos key
+	 * instead for plaintext.
+	 */
+	if (nt_pwd == NULL &&
+	    sc_val != NULL &&
+	    user_info->password_state == AUTH_PASSWORD_PLAIN)
+	{
+		krb5_error_code krb5_ret;
+
+		krb5_ret = smb_krb5_init_context(tmp_ctx,
+						 auth_context->lp_ctx,
+						 &smb_krb5_context);
+		if (krb5_ret != 0) {
+			DBG_ERR("Failed to setup krb5_context: %s!",
+				error_message(krb5_ret));
+			return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Get the current salt from the record
+		 */
+
+		krb5_ret = dsdb_extract_aes_256_key(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+						    tmp_ctx,
+						    msg,
+						    userAccountControl,
+						    NULL, /* kvno */
+						    &current_kvno, /* kvno_out */
+						    &_aes_256_key,
+						    &salt_data);
+		if (krb5_ret == 0) {
+			aes_256_key = &_aes_256_key;
+
+			_salt.data = (char *)salt_data.data;
+			_salt.length = salt_data.length;
+			salt = &_salt;
+		}
+	}
+
+	auth_status = authsam_password_ok(auth_context,
+					  tmp_ctx,
+					  nt_pwd,
+					  smb_krb5_context,
+					  aes_256_key,
+					  salt,
+					  user_info,
+					  user_sess_key, lm_sess_key);
+
+	if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(auth_status)) {
+		if (user_sess_key->data) {
+			talloc_steal(mem_ctx, user_sess_key->data);
+		}
+		if (lm_sess_key->data) {
+			talloc_steal(mem_ctx, lm_sess_key->data);
+		}
+		TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+	}
+	*user_sess_key = data_blob_null;
+	*lm_sess_key = data_blob_null;
+
+	if (!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(auth_status, NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD)) {
+		TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+		return auth_status;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * We only continue if this was a wrong password
+	 * and we'll always return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD
+	 * no matter what error happens.
+	 */
+
+	/* pull the domain password property attributes */
+	ret = dsdb_search_one(sam_ctx, tmp_ctx, &dom_msg, domain_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
+			      attrs, 0, "objectClass=domain");
+	if (ret == LDB_SUCCESS) {
+		history_len = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(dom_msg, "pwdHistoryLength", 0);
+	} else if (ret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
+		DEBUG(3,("Couldn't find domain %s: %s!\n",
+			 ldb_dn_get_linearized(domain_dn),
+			 ldb_errstring(sam_ctx)));
+	} else {
+		DEBUG(3,("error finding domain %s: %s!\n",
+			 ldb_dn_get_linearized(domain_dn),
+			 ldb_errstring(sam_ctx)));
+	}
+
+	for (i = 1; i < MIN(history_len, 3); i++) {
+		const struct samr_Password *nt_history_pwd = NULL;
+		NTTIME pwdLastSet;
+		struct timeval tv_now;
+		NTTIME now;
+		int allowed_period_mins;
+		NTTIME allowed_period;
+
+		/* Reset these variables back to starting as empty */
+		aes_256_key = NULL;
+		salt = NULL;
+
+		/*
+		 * Obtain the i'th old password from the NT password
+		 * history for this user.
+		 *
+		 * We avoid issues with salts (which are not
+		 * recorded for historical AES256 keys) by using the
+		 * ntPwdHistory in preference.
+		 */
+		nt_status = samdb_result_passwords_from_history(tmp_ctx,
+							auth_context->lp_ctx,
+							msg, i,
+							NULL,
+							&nt_history_pwd);
+
+		/*
+		 * Belts and braces: note that
+		 * samdb_result_passwords_from_history() currently
+		 * does not fail for missing attributes, it only sets
+		 * nt_history_pwd = NULL, so "break" and fall down to
+		 * the bad password count upate if this happens
+		 */
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+			break;
+		}
+
+		nt_history_pwd = hide_invalid_nthash(nt_history_pwd);
+
+		/*
+		 * We don't have an NT hash from the
+		 * ntPwdHistory, but we can still perform the
+		 * password check with the AES256
+		 * key.
+		 *
+		 * However, this is the second preference as
+		 * it will fail if the account was renamed
+		 * prior to a password change (as we won't
+		 * have the correct salt available to
+		 * calculate the AES256 key).
+		 */
+
+		if (nt_history_pwd == NULL && sc_val != NULL &&
+		    user_info->password_state == AUTH_PASSWORD_PLAIN &&
+		    current_kvno >= i)
+		{
+			krb5_error_code krb5_ret;
+			const uint32_t request_kvno = current_kvno - i;
+
+			/*
+			 * Confirm we have a krb5_context set up
+			 */
+			if (smb_krb5_context == NULL) {
+				/*
+				 * We get here if we had a unicodePwd
+				 * for the current password, no
+				 * ntPwdHistory, a valid previous
+				 * Kerberos history AND are processing
+				 * a simple bind.
+				 *
+				 * This really is a corner case so
+				 * favour cleaner code over trying to
+				 * allow for an old password.  It is
+				 * more likely this is just a new
+				 * account.
+				 *
+				 * "break" out of the loop and fall down
+				 * to the bad password update
+				 */
+				break;
+			}
+
+			/*
+			 * Get the current salt from the record
+			 */
+
+			krb5_ret = dsdb_extract_aes_256_key(smb_krb5_context->krb5_context,
+							    tmp_ctx,
+							    msg,
+							    userAccountControl,
+							    &request_kvno, /* kvno */
+							    NULL, /* kvno_out */
+							    &_aes_256_key,
+							    &salt_data);
+			if (krb5_ret != 0) {
+				break;
+			}
+
+			aes_256_key = &_aes_256_key;
+
+			_salt.data = (char *)salt_data.data;
+			_salt.length = salt_data.length;
+			salt = &_salt;
+
+		} else if (nt_history_pwd == NULL) {
+			/*
+			 * If we don't find element 'i' in the
+			 * ntPwdHistory and can not fall back to the
+			 * kerberos hash, we won't find 'i+1' ...
+			 */
+			break;
+		}
+
+		auth_status = authsam_password_ok(auth_context, tmp_ctx,
+						  nt_history_pwd,
+						  smb_krb5_context,
+						  aes_256_key,
+						  salt,
+						  user_info,
+						  user_sess_key,
+						  lm_sess_key);
+
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(auth_status)) {
+			/*
+			 * If this was not a correct password, try the next
+			 * one from the history
+			 */
+			*user_sess_key = data_blob_null;
+			*lm_sess_key = data_blob_null;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (i != 1) {
+			/*
+			 * The authentication was OK, but not against
+			 * the previous password, which is stored at index 1.
+			 *
+			 * We just return the original wrong password.
+			 * This skips the update of the bad pwd count,
+			 * because this is almost certainly user error
+			 * (or automatic login on a computer using a cached
+			 * password from before the password change),
+			 * not an attack.
+			 */
+			TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+			return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+		}
+
+		if (user_info->flags & USER_INFO_INTERACTIVE_LOGON) {
+			/*
+			 * The authentication was OK against the previous password,
+			 * but it's not a NTLM network authentication,
+			 * LDAP simple bind or something similar.
+			 *
+			 * We just return the original wrong password.
+			 * This skips the update of the bad pwd count,
+			 * because this is almost certainly user error
+			 * (or automatic login on a computer using a cached
+			 * password from before the password change),
+			 * not an attack.
+			 */
+			TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+			return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * If the password was OK, it's a NTLM network authentication
+		 * and it was the previous password.
+		 *
+		 * Now we see if it is within the grace period,
+		 * so that we don't break cached sessions on other computers
+		 * before the user can lock and unlock their other screens
+		 * (resetting their cached password).
+		 *
+		 * See http://support.microsoft.com/kb/906305
+		 * OldPasswordAllowedPeriod ("old password allowed period")
+		 * is specified in minutes. The default is 60.
+		 */
+		allowed_period_mins = lpcfg_old_password_allowed_period(auth_context->lp_ctx);
+		/*
+		 * NTTIME uses 100ns units
+		 */
+		allowed_period = (NTTIME) allowed_period_mins *
+				 60 * 1000*1000*10;
+		pwdLastSet = samdb_result_nttime(msg, "pwdLastSet", 0);
+		tv_now = timeval_current();
+		now = timeval_to_nttime(&tv_now);
+
+		if (now < pwdLastSet) {
+			/*
+			 * time jump?
+			 *
+			 * We just return the original wrong password.
+			 * This skips the update of the bad pwd count,
+			 * because this is almost certainly user error
+			 * (or automatic login on a computer using a cached
+			 * password from before the password change),
+			 * not an attack.
+			 */
+			TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+			return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+		}
+
+		if ((now - pwdLastSet) >= allowed_period) {
+			/*
+			 * The allowed period is over.
+			 *
+			 * We just return the original wrong password.
+			 * This skips the update of the bad pwd count,
+			 * because this is almost certainly user error
+			 * (or automatic login on a computer using a cached
+			 * password from before the password change),
+			 * not an attack.
+			 */
+			TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+			return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * We finally allow the authentication with the
+		 * previous password within the allowed period.
+		 */
+		if (user_sess_key->data) {
+			talloc_steal(mem_ctx, user_sess_key->data);
+		}
+		if (lm_sess_key->data) {
+			talloc_steal(mem_ctx, lm_sess_key->data);
+		}
+
+		TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+		return auth_status;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If we are not in the allowed period or match an old password,
+	 * we didn't return early. Now update the badPwdCount et al.
+	 */
+	nt_status = authsam_update_bad_pwd_count(auth_context->sam_ctx,
+						 msg, domain_dn);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+		/*
+		 * We need to return the original
+		 * NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD error, so there isn't
+		 * anything more we can do than write something into
+		 * the log
+		 */
+		DEBUG(0, ("Failed to note bad password for user [%s]: %s\n",
+			  user_info->mapped.account_name,
+			  nt_errstr(nt_status)));
+	}
+
+	if (samdb_rodc(auth_context->sam_ctx, &am_rodc) == LDB_SUCCESS && am_rodc) {
+		*authoritative = false;
+	}
+
+	TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+
+	if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+		nt_status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+	}
+	return nt_status;
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS authsam_authenticate(struct auth4_context *auth_context,
+				     TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct ldb_context *sam_ctx,
+				     struct ldb_dn *domain_dn,
+				     struct ldb_message *msg,
+				     const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info,
+				     DATA_BLOB *user_sess_key, DATA_BLOB *lm_sess_key,
+				     bool *authoritative)
+{
+	NTSTATUS nt_status;
+	bool interactive = (user_info->password_state == AUTH_PASSWORD_HASH);
+	uint32_t acct_flags = samdb_result_acct_flags(msg, NULL);
+	struct netr_SendToSamBase *send_to_sam = NULL;
+	TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx);
+	if (!tmp_ctx) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	/* You can only do an interactive login to normal accounts */
+	if (user_info->flags & USER_INFO_INTERACTIVE_LOGON) {
+		if (!(acct_flags & ACB_NORMAL)) {
+			TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER;
+		}
+		if (acct_flags & ACB_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED) {
+			if (acct_flags & ACB_DISABLED) {
+				DEBUG(2,("authsam_authenticate: Account for user '%s' "
+					 "was disabled.\n",
+					 user_info->mapped.account_name));
+				TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+				return NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_DISABLED;
+			}
+			DEBUG(2,("authsam_authenticate: Account for user '%s' "
+				 "requires interactive smartcard logon.\n",
+				 user_info->mapped.account_name));
+			TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+			return NT_STATUS_SMARTCARD_LOGON_REQUIRED;
+		}
+	}
+
+	nt_status = authsam_password_check_and_record(auth_context, tmp_ctx,
+						      domain_dn, msg,
+						      user_info,
+						      user_sess_key, lm_sess_key,
+						      authoritative);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+		TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+		return nt_status;
+	}
+
+	nt_status = authsam_account_ok(tmp_ctx, auth_context->sam_ctx,
+				       user_info->logon_parameters,
+				       domain_dn,
+				       msg,
+				       user_info->workstation_name,
+				       user_info->mapped.account_name,
+				       false, false);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+		TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+		return nt_status;
+	}
+
+	nt_status = authsam_logon_success_accounting(auth_context->sam_ctx,
+						     msg, domain_dn,
+						     interactive,
+						     tmp_ctx,
+						     &send_to_sam);
+
+	if (send_to_sam != NULL) {
+		auth_sam_trigger_zero_password(tmp_ctx,
+					       auth_context->msg_ctx,
+					       auth_context->event_ctx,
+					       send_to_sam);
+	}
+
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+		TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+		return nt_status;
+	}
+
+	if (user_sess_key && user_sess_key->data) {
+		talloc_steal(mem_ctx, user_sess_key->data);
+	}
+	if (lm_sess_key && lm_sess_key->data) {
+		talloc_steal(mem_ctx, lm_sess_key->data);
+	}
+
+	TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+	return nt_status;
+}
+
+
+
+static NTSTATUS authsam_check_password_internals(struct auth_method_context *ctx,
+						 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+						 const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info, 
+						 struct auth_user_info_dc **user_info_dc,
+						 bool *authoritative)
+{
+	NTSTATUS nt_status;
+	int result;
+	const char *account_name = user_info->mapped.account_name;
+	struct ldb_message *msg;
+	struct ldb_dn *domain_dn;
+	DATA_BLOB user_sess_key, lm_sess_key;
+	TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx;
+	const char *p = NULL;
+
+	if (ctx->auth_ctx->sam_ctx == NULL) {
+		DEBUG(0, ("No SAM available, cannot log in users\n"));
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_SYSTEM_SERVICE;
+	}
+
+	if (!account_name || !*account_name) {
+		/* 'not for me' */
+		return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
+	}
+
+	tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx);
+	if (!tmp_ctx) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+	}
+
+	domain_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(ctx->auth_ctx->sam_ctx);
+	if (domain_dn == NULL) {
+		talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+		return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_DOMAIN;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If we have not already mapped this user, then now is a good
+	 * time to do so, before we look it up.  We used to do this
+	 * earlier, but in a multi-forest environment we want to do
+	 * this mapping at the final domain.
+	 *
+	 * However, on the flip side we may have already mapped the
+	 * user if this was an LDAP simple bind, in which case we
+	 * really, really want to get back to exactly the same account
+	 * we got the DN for.
+	 */
+	if (!user_info->cracknames_called) {
+		p = strchr_m(account_name, '@');
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * This is slightly nicer than double-indenting the
+		 * block below
+		 */
+		p = NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (p != NULL) {
+		const char *nt4_domain = NULL;
+		const char *nt4_account = NULL;
+		bool is_my_domain = false;
+
+		nt_status = crack_name_to_nt4_name(mem_ctx,
+						   ctx->auth_ctx->sam_ctx,
+						   /*
+						    * DRSUAPI_DS_NAME_FORMAT_UPN_FOR_LOGON ?
+						    */
+						   DRSUAPI_DS_NAME_FORMAT_USER_PRINCIPAL,
+						   account_name,
+						   &nt4_domain, &nt4_account);
+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+			talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER;
+		}
+
+		is_my_domain = lpcfg_is_mydomain(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx, nt4_domain);
+		if (!is_my_domain) {
+			/*
+			 * This is a user within our forest,
+			 * but in a different domain,
+			 * we're not authoritative
+			 */
+			talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+			return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Let's use the NT4 account name for the lookup.
+		 */
+		account_name = nt4_account;
+	}
+
+	nt_status = authsam_search_account(tmp_ctx, ctx->auth_ctx->sam_ctx, account_name, domain_dn, &msg);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+		talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+		return nt_status;
+	}
+
+	nt_status = authsam_make_user_info_dc(tmp_ctx, ctx->auth_ctx->sam_ctx,
+					     lpcfg_netbios_name(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx),
+					     lpcfg_sam_name(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx),
+					     lpcfg_sam_dnsname(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx),
+					     domain_dn,
+					     msg,
+					     data_blob_null, data_blob_null,
+					     user_info_dc);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+		talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+		return nt_status;
+	}
+
+	result = dsdb_is_protected_user(ctx->auth_ctx->sam_ctx,
+					(*user_info_dc)->sids,
+					(*user_info_dc)->num_sids);
+	/*
+	 * We also consider an error result (a negative value) as denying the
+	 * authentication.
+	 */
+	if (result != 0) {
+		talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+		return NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_RESTRICTION;
+	}
+
+	nt_status = authsam_authenticate(ctx->auth_ctx, tmp_ctx, ctx->auth_ctx->sam_ctx, domain_dn, msg, user_info,
+					 &user_sess_key, &lm_sess_key, authoritative);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+		talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+		return nt_status;
+	}
+
+	(*user_info_dc)->user_session_key = data_blob_talloc(*user_info_dc,
+							     user_sess_key.data,
+							     user_sess_key.length);
+	if (user_sess_key.data) {
+		if ((*user_info_dc)->user_session_key.data == NULL) {
+			TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+	}
+
+	(*user_info_dc)->lm_session_key = data_blob_talloc(*user_info_dc,
+							   lm_sess_key.data,
+							   lm_sess_key.length);
+	if (lm_sess_key.data) {
+		if ((*user_info_dc)->lm_session_key.data == NULL) {
+			TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx);
+			return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+		}
+	}
+
+	talloc_steal(mem_ctx, *user_info_dc);
+	talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+struct authsam_check_password_state {
+	struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc;
+	bool authoritative;
+};
+
+static struct tevent_req *authsam_check_password_send(
+	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+	struct tevent_context *ev,
+	struct auth_method_context *ctx,
+	const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info)
+{
+	struct tevent_req *req = NULL;
+	struct authsam_check_password_state *state = NULL;
+	NTSTATUS status;
+
+	req = tevent_req_create(
+		mem_ctx, &state, struct authsam_check_password_state);
+	if (req == NULL) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * authsam_check_password_internals() sets this to false in
+	 * the rodc case, otherwise it leaves it untouched. Default to
+	 * "we're authoritative".
+	 */
+	state->authoritative = true;
+
+	status = authsam_check_password_internals(
+		ctx,
+		state,
+		user_info,
+		&state->user_info_dc,
+		&state->authoritative);
+	if (tevent_req_nterror(req, status)) {
+		return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
+	}
+
+	tevent_req_done(req);
+	return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS authsam_check_password_recv(
+	struct tevent_req *req,
+	TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+	struct auth_user_info_dc **interim_info,
+	bool *authoritative)
+{
+	struct authsam_check_password_state *state = tevent_req_data(
+		req, struct authsam_check_password_state);
+	NTSTATUS status;
+
+	*authoritative = state->authoritative;
+
+	if (tevent_req_is_nterror(req, &status)) {
+		tevent_req_received(req);
+		return status;
+	}
+	*interim_info = talloc_move(mem_ctx, &state->user_info_dc);
+	tevent_req_received(req);
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS authsam_ignoredomain_want_check(struct auth_method_context *ctx,
+						TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+						const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info)
+{
+	if (!user_info->mapped.account_name || !*user_info->mapped.account_name) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
+	}
+
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+/****************************************************************************
+Check SAM security (above) but with a few extra checks.
+****************************************************************************/
+static NTSTATUS authsam_want_check(struct auth_method_context *ctx,
+				   TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+				   const struct auth_usersupplied_info *user_info)
+{
+	const char *effective_domain = user_info->mapped.domain_name;
+	bool is_local_name = false;
+	bool is_my_domain = false;
+	const char *p = NULL;
+	struct dsdb_trust_routing_table *trt = NULL;
+	const struct lsa_TrustDomainInfoInfoEx *tdo = NULL;
+	NTSTATUS status;
+
+	if (!user_info->mapped.account_name || !*user_info->mapped.account_name) {
+		return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
+	}
+
+	if (effective_domain == NULL) {
+		effective_domain = "";
+	}
+
+	is_local_name = lpcfg_is_myname(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx,
+					effective_domain);
+
+	/* check whether or not we service this domain/workgroup name */
+	switch (lpcfg_server_role(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx)) {
+	case ROLE_STANDALONE:
+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+
+	case ROLE_DOMAIN_MEMBER:
+		if (is_local_name) {
+			return NT_STATUS_OK;
+		}
+
+		DBG_DEBUG("%s is not one of my local names (DOMAIN_MEMBER)\n",
+			  effective_domain);
+		return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
+
+	case ROLE_ACTIVE_DIRECTORY_DC:
+		/* handled later */
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		DBG_ERR("lpcfg_server_role() has an undefined value\n");
+		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_SERVER_STATE;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Now we handle the AD DC case...
+	 */
+
+	is_my_domain = lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx,
+						   effective_domain);
+	if (is_my_domain) {
+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+	}
+
+	if (user_info->cracknames_called) {
+		/*
+		 * The caller already did a cracknames call.
+		 */
+		DBG_DEBUG("%s is not own domain name (DC)\n",
+			  effective_domain);
+		return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
+	}
+
+	if (!strequal(effective_domain, "")) {
+		DBG_DEBUG("%s is not own domain name (DC)\n",
+			  effective_domain);
+		return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
+	}
+
+	p = strchr_m(user_info->mapped.account_name, '@');
+	if (p == NULL) {
+		/*
+		 * An empty to domain name should be handled
+		 * as the local domain name.
+		 */
+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+	}
+
+	effective_domain = p + 1;
+	is_my_domain = lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(ctx->auth_ctx->lp_ctx,
+						   effective_domain);
+	if (is_my_domain) {
+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+	}
+
+	if (strequal(effective_domain, "")) {
+		DBG_DEBUG("authsam_check_password: upn without realm (DC)\n");
+		return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * as last option we check the routing table if the
+	 * domain is within our forest.
+	 */
+	status = dsdb_trust_routing_table_load(ctx->auth_ctx->sam_ctx,
+					       mem_ctx, &trt);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		DBG_ERR("authsam_check_password: dsdb_trust_routing_table_load() %s\n",
+			 nt_errstr(status));
+		return status;
+	}
+
+	tdo = dsdb_trust_routing_by_name(trt, effective_domain);
+	if (tdo == NULL) {
+		DBG_DEBUG("%s is not a known TLN (DC)\n",
+			  effective_domain);
+		TALLOC_FREE(trt);
+		return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
+	}
+
+	if (!(tdo->trust_attributes & LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_WITHIN_FOREST)) {
+		DBG_DEBUG("%s is not a TLN in our forest (DC)\n",
+			  effective_domain);
+		TALLOC_FREE(trt);
+		return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * This principal is within our forest.
+	 * we'll later do a crack_name_to_nt4_name()
+	 * to check if it's in our domain.
+	 */
+	TALLOC_FREE(trt);
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+static const struct auth_operations sam_ignoredomain_ops = {
+	.name		           = "sam_ignoredomain",
+	.want_check	           = authsam_ignoredomain_want_check,
+	.check_password_send	   = authsam_check_password_send,
+	.check_password_recv	   = authsam_check_password_recv,
+};
+
+static const struct auth_operations sam_ops = {
+	.name		           = "sam",
+	.want_check	           = authsam_want_check,
+	.check_password_send	   = authsam_check_password_send,
+	.check_password_recv	   = authsam_check_password_recv,
+};
+
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS auth4_sam_init(TALLOC_CTX *);
+_PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS auth4_sam_init(TALLOC_CTX *ctx)
+{
+	NTSTATUS ret;
+
+	ret = auth_register(ctx, &sam_ops);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
+		DEBUG(0,("Failed to register 'sam' auth backend!\n"));
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	ret = auth_register(ctx, &sam_ignoredomain_ops);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) {
+		DEBUG(0,("Failed to register 'sam_ignoredomain' auth backend!\n"));
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}