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-rw-r--r--source3/utils/smbcacls.c1903
1 files changed, 1903 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/source3/utils/smbcacls.c b/source3/utils/smbcacls.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7ce7d24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/source3/utils/smbcacls.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1903 @@
+/*
+ Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+ ACL get/set utility
+
+ Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 2000
+ Copyright (C) Tim Potter 2000
+ Copyright (C) Jeremy Allison 2000
+ Copyright (C) Jelmer Vernooij 2003
+ Copyright (C) Noel Power <noel.power@suse.com> 2013
+
+ This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+ (at your option) any later version.
+
+ This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "lib/cmdline/cmdline.h"
+#include "rpc_client/cli_pipe.h"
+#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_lsa.h"
+#include "rpc_client/cli_lsarpc.h"
+#include "../libcli/security/security.h"
+#include "libsmb/libsmb.h"
+#include "libsmb/clirap.h"
+#include "passdb/machine_sid.h"
+#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_lsa_c.h"
+#include "util_sd.h"
+
+static char DIRSEP_CHAR = '\\';
+
+static int inheritance = 0;
+static int test_args;
+static int sddl;
+static int query_sec_info = -1;
+static int set_sec_info = -1;
+static bool want_mxac;
+
+static const char *domain_sid = NULL;
+
+enum acl_mode {SMB_ACL_SET, SMB_ACL_DELETE, SMB_ACL_MODIFY, SMB_ACL_ADD };
+enum chown_mode {REQUEST_NONE, REQUEST_CHOWN, REQUEST_CHGRP, REQUEST_INHERIT};
+enum exit_values {EXIT_OK, EXIT_FAILED, EXIT_PARSE_ERROR};
+
+struct cacl_callback_state {
+ struct cli_credentials *creds;
+ struct cli_state *cli;
+ struct security_descriptor *aclsd;
+ struct security_acl *acl_to_add;
+ enum acl_mode mode;
+ char *the_acl;
+ bool acl_no_propagate;
+ bool numeric;
+};
+
+/*
+ * if this dfs link is local to this share then we need to
+ * adjust targetpath. A local dfs link is prepended with
+ * '/$SERVER/$SHARE/path_from_args' The 'full' path is not
+ * suitable for passing to cli_list (and will fail)
+ */
+static NTSTATUS local_cli_resolve_path(TALLOC_CTX* ctx,
+ const char *mountpt,
+ struct cli_credentials *creds,
+ struct cli_state *rootcli,
+ const char *path,
+ struct cli_state **targetcli,
+ char **pp_targetpath)
+{
+ size_t searchlen = 0;
+ char *search = NULL;
+ NTSTATUS status;
+
+ status = cli_resolve_path(ctx,
+ mountpt,
+ creds,
+ rootcli,
+ path,
+ targetcli,
+ pp_targetpath);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ return status;
+ }
+
+ search = talloc_asprintf(ctx, "\\%s\\%s",
+ rootcli->server_domain,
+ rootcli->share);
+ if (search == NULL) {
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ searchlen = strlen(search);
+
+ if (strncmp(*pp_targetpath, search, searchlen) == 0) {
+ *pp_targetpath += searchlen;
+ }
+ return status;
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS cli_lsa_lookup_domain_sid(struct cli_state *cli,
+ struct dom_sid *sid)
+{
+ union lsa_PolicyInformation *info = NULL;
+ struct smbXcli_tcon *orig_tcon = NULL;
+ struct rpc_pipe_client *rpc_pipe = NULL;
+ struct policy_handle handle;
+ NTSTATUS status, result;
+ TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
+
+ if (cli_state_has_tcon(cli)) {
+ orig_tcon = cli_state_save_tcon(cli);
+ if (orig_tcon == NULL) {
+ status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+
+ status = cli_tree_connect(cli, "IPC$", "?????", NULL);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ status = cli_rpc_pipe_open_noauth(cli, &ndr_table_lsarpc, &rpc_pipe);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ goto tdis;
+ }
+
+ status = rpccli_lsa_open_policy(rpc_pipe, frame, True,
+ GENERIC_EXECUTE_ACCESS, &handle);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ goto tdis;
+ }
+
+ status = dcerpc_lsa_QueryInfoPolicy2(rpc_pipe->binding_handle,
+ frame, &handle,
+ LSA_POLICY_INFO_DOMAIN,
+ &info, &result);
+
+ if (any_nt_status_not_ok(status, result, &status)) {
+ goto tdis;
+ }
+
+ *sid = *info->domain.sid;
+
+tdis:
+ TALLOC_FREE(rpc_pipe);
+ cli_tdis(cli);
+done:
+ cli_state_restore_tcon(cli, orig_tcon);
+ TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+ return status;
+}
+
+static struct dom_sid *get_domain_sid(struct cli_state *cli)
+{
+ NTSTATUS status;
+ struct dom_sid_buf buf;
+
+ struct dom_sid *sid = talloc(talloc_tos(), struct dom_sid);
+ if (sid == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("Out of memory\n"));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (domain_sid) {
+ if (!dom_sid_parse(domain_sid, sid)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("failed to parse domain sid\n"));
+ TALLOC_FREE(sid);
+ }
+ } else {
+ status = cli_lsa_lookup_domain_sid(cli, sid);
+
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("failed to lookup domain sid: %s\n", nt_errstr(status)));
+ TALLOC_FREE(sid);
+ }
+
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(2,("Domain SID: %s\n", dom_sid_str_buf(sid, &buf)));
+ return sid;
+}
+
+/* add an ACE to a list of ACEs in a struct security_acl */
+static bool add_ace_with_ctx(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, struct security_acl **the_acl,
+ const struct security_ace *ace)
+
+{
+ struct security_acl *acl = *the_acl;
+
+ if (acl == NULL) {
+ acl = make_sec_acl(ctx, 3, 0, NULL);
+ if (acl == NULL) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (acl->num_aces == UINT32_MAX) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ ADD_TO_ARRAY(
+ acl, struct security_ace, *ace, &acl->aces, &acl->num_aces);
+ *the_acl = acl;
+ return True;
+}
+
+static bool add_ace(struct security_acl **the_acl, struct security_ace *ace)
+{
+ return add_ace_with_ctx(talloc_tos(), the_acl, ace);
+}
+
+/* parse a ascii version of a security descriptor */
+static struct security_descriptor *sec_desc_parse(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, struct cli_state *cli, char *str)
+{
+ const char *p = str;
+ char *tok;
+ struct security_descriptor *ret = NULL;
+ size_t sd_size;
+ struct dom_sid owner_sid = { .num_auths = 0 };
+ bool have_owner = false;
+ struct dom_sid group_sid = { .num_auths = 0 };
+ bool have_group = false;
+ struct security_acl *dacl=NULL;
+ int revision=1;
+
+ while (next_token_talloc(ctx, &p, &tok, "\t,\r\n")) {
+ if (strncmp(tok,"REVISION:", 9) == 0) {
+ revision = strtol(tok+9, NULL, 16);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (strncmp(tok,"OWNER:", 6) == 0) {
+ if (have_owner) {
+ printf("Only specify owner once\n");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (!StringToSid(cli, &owner_sid, tok+6)) {
+ printf("Failed to parse owner sid\n");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ have_owner = true;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (strncmp(tok,"GROUP:", 6) == 0) {
+ if (have_group) {
+ printf("Only specify group once\n");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (!StringToSid(cli, &group_sid, tok+6)) {
+ printf("Failed to parse group sid\n");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ have_group = true;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (strncmp(tok,"ACL:", 4) == 0) {
+ struct security_ace ace;
+ if (!parse_ace(cli, &ace, tok+4)) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if(!add_ace(&dacl, &ace)) {
+ printf("Failed to add ACL %s\n", tok);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ printf("Failed to parse token '%s' in security descriptor,\n", tok);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ ret = make_sec_desc(
+ ctx,
+ revision,
+ SEC_DESC_SELF_RELATIVE,
+ have_owner ? &owner_sid : NULL,
+ have_group ? &group_sid : NULL,
+ NULL,
+ dacl,
+ &sd_size);
+
+done:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*****************************************************
+get fileinfo for filename
+*******************************************************/
+static uint16_t get_fileinfo(struct cli_state *cli, const char *filename)
+{
+ uint16_t fnum = (uint16_t)-1;
+ NTSTATUS status;
+ struct smb_create_returns cr = {0};
+
+ /* The desired access below is the only one I could find that works
+ with NT4, W2KP and Samba */
+
+ status = cli_ntcreate(
+ cli, /* cli */
+ filename, /* fname */
+ 0, /* CreatFlags */
+ READ_CONTROL_ACCESS, /* CreatFlags */
+ 0, /* FileAttributes */
+ FILE_SHARE_READ|
+ FILE_SHARE_WRITE, /* ShareAccess */
+ FILE_OPEN, /* CreateDisposition */
+ 0x0, /* CreateOptions */
+ 0x0, /* SecurityFlags */
+ &fnum, /* pfid */
+ &cr); /* cr */
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ printf("Failed to open %s: %s\n", filename, nt_errstr(status));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ cli_close(cli, fnum);
+ return cr.file_attributes;
+}
+
+/*****************************************************
+get sec desc for filename
+*******************************************************/
+static struct security_descriptor *get_secdesc_with_ctx(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
+ struct cli_state *cli,
+ const char *filename)
+{
+ uint16_t fnum = (uint16_t)-1;
+ struct security_descriptor *sd;
+ NTSTATUS status;
+ uint32_t sec_info;
+ uint32_t desired_access = 0;
+
+ if (query_sec_info == -1) {
+ sec_info = SECINFO_OWNER | SECINFO_GROUP | SECINFO_DACL;
+ } else {
+ sec_info = query_sec_info;
+ }
+
+ if (sec_info & (SECINFO_OWNER | SECINFO_GROUP | SECINFO_DACL)) {
+ desired_access |= SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL;
+ }
+ if (sec_info & SECINFO_SACL) {
+ desired_access |= SEC_FLAG_SYSTEM_SECURITY;
+ }
+
+ if (desired_access == 0) {
+ desired_access |= SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL;
+ }
+
+ status = cli_ntcreate(cli, filename, 0, desired_access,
+ 0, FILE_SHARE_READ|FILE_SHARE_WRITE,
+ FILE_OPEN, 0x0, 0x0, &fnum, NULL);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ printf("Failed to open %s: %s\n", filename, nt_errstr(status));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ status = cli_query_security_descriptor(cli, fnum, sec_info,
+ ctx, &sd);
+
+ cli_close(cli, fnum);
+
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ printf("Failed to get security descriptor: %s\n",
+ nt_errstr(status));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return sd;
+}
+
+static struct security_descriptor *get_secdesc(struct cli_state *cli,
+ const char *filename)
+{
+ return get_secdesc_with_ctx(talloc_tos(), cli, filename);
+}
+/*****************************************************
+set sec desc for filename
+*******************************************************/
+static bool set_secdesc(struct cli_state *cli, const char *filename,
+ struct security_descriptor *sd)
+{
+ uint16_t fnum = (uint16_t)-1;
+ bool result=true;
+ NTSTATUS status;
+ uint32_t desired_access = 0;
+ uint32_t sec_info;
+
+ if (set_sec_info == -1) {
+ sec_info = 0;
+
+ if (sd->dacl || (sd->type & SEC_DESC_DACL_PRESENT)) {
+ sec_info |= SECINFO_DACL;
+ }
+ if (sd->sacl || (sd->type & SEC_DESC_SACL_PRESENT)) {
+ sec_info |= SECINFO_SACL;
+ }
+ if (sd->owner_sid) {
+ sec_info |= SECINFO_OWNER;
+ }
+ if (sd->group_sid) {
+ sec_info |= SECINFO_GROUP;
+ }
+ } else {
+ sec_info = set_sec_info;
+ }
+
+ /* Make the desired_access more specific. */
+ if (sec_info & SECINFO_DACL) {
+ desired_access |= SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC;
+ }
+ if (sec_info & SECINFO_SACL) {
+ desired_access |= SEC_FLAG_SYSTEM_SECURITY;
+ }
+ if (sec_info & (SECINFO_OWNER | SECINFO_GROUP)) {
+ desired_access |= SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER;
+ }
+
+ status = cli_ntcreate(cli, filename, 0,
+ desired_access,
+ 0, FILE_SHARE_READ|FILE_SHARE_WRITE,
+ FILE_OPEN, 0x0, 0x0, &fnum, NULL);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ printf("Failed to open %s: %s\n", filename, nt_errstr(status));
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ status = cli_set_security_descriptor(cli, fnum, sec_info, sd);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ printf("ERROR: security descriptor set failed: %s\n",
+ nt_errstr(status));
+ result=false;
+ }
+
+ cli_close(cli, fnum);
+ return result;
+}
+
+/*****************************************************
+get maximum access for a file
+*******************************************************/
+static int cacl_mxac(struct cli_state *cli, const char *filename)
+{
+ NTSTATUS status;
+ uint32_t mxac;
+
+ status = cli_query_mxac(cli, filename, &mxac);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ printf("Failed to get mxac: %s\n", nt_errstr(status));
+ return EXIT_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ printf("Maximum access: 0x%x\n", mxac);
+
+ return EXIT_OK;
+}
+
+
+/*****************************************************
+dump the acls for a file
+*******************************************************/
+static int cacl_dump(struct cli_state *cli, const char *filename, bool numeric)
+{
+ struct security_descriptor *sd;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (test_args) {
+ return EXIT_OK;
+ }
+
+ sd = get_secdesc(cli, filename);
+ if (sd == NULL) {
+ return EXIT_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ if (sddl) {
+ char *str = sddl_encode(talloc_tos(), sd, get_domain_sid(cli));
+ if (str == NULL) {
+ return EXIT_FAILED;
+ }
+ printf("%s\n", str);
+ TALLOC_FREE(str);
+ } else {
+ sec_desc_print(cli, stdout, sd, numeric);
+ }
+
+ if (want_mxac) {
+ ret = cacl_mxac(cli, filename);
+ if (ret != EXIT_OK) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return EXIT_OK;
+}
+
+/*****************************************************
+Change the ownership or group ownership of a file. Just
+because the NT docs say this can't be done :-). JRA.
+*******************************************************/
+
+static int owner_set(struct cli_state *cli, enum chown_mode change_mode,
+ const char *filename, const char *new_username)
+{
+ struct dom_sid sid;
+ struct security_descriptor *sd;
+ size_t sd_size;
+
+ if (!StringToSid(cli, &sid, new_username))
+ return EXIT_PARSE_ERROR;
+
+ sd = make_sec_desc(talloc_tos(),
+ SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_REVISION_1,
+ SEC_DESC_SELF_RELATIVE,
+ (change_mode == REQUEST_CHOWN) ? &sid : NULL,
+ (change_mode == REQUEST_CHGRP) ? &sid : NULL,
+ NULL, NULL, &sd_size);
+
+ if (!set_secdesc(cli, filename, sd)) {
+ return EXIT_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ return EXIT_OK;
+}
+
+
+/* The MSDN is contradictory over the ordering of ACE entries in an
+ ACL. However NT4 gives a "The information may have been modified
+ by a computer running Windows NT 5.0" if denied ACEs do not appear
+ before allowed ACEs. At
+ http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc781716.aspx the
+ canonical order is specified as "Explicit Deny, Explicit Allow,
+ Inherited ACEs unchanged" */
+
+static int ace_compare(struct security_ace *ace1, struct security_ace *ace2)
+{
+ if (security_ace_equal(ace1, ace2))
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((ace1->flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE) &&
+ !(ace2->flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE))
+ return 1;
+ if (!(ace1->flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE) &&
+ (ace2->flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE))
+ return -1;
+ if ((ace1->flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE) &&
+ (ace2->flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE))
+ return ace1 - ace2;
+
+ if (ace1->type != ace2->type)
+ return ace2->type - ace1->type;
+
+ if (dom_sid_compare(&ace1->trustee, &ace2->trustee))
+ return dom_sid_compare(&ace1->trustee, &ace2->trustee);
+
+ if (ace1->flags != ace2->flags)
+ return ace1->flags - ace2->flags;
+
+ if (ace1->access_mask != ace2->access_mask)
+ return ace1->access_mask - ace2->access_mask;
+
+ if (ace1->size != ace2->size)
+ return ace1->size - ace2->size;
+
+ return memcmp(ace1, ace2, sizeof(struct security_ace));
+}
+
+static void sort_acl(struct security_acl *the_acl)
+{
+ uint32_t i;
+ if (!the_acl) return;
+
+ TYPESAFE_QSORT(the_acl->aces, the_acl->num_aces, ace_compare);
+
+ for (i=1;i<the_acl->num_aces;) {
+ if (security_ace_equal(&the_acl->aces[i-1],
+ &the_acl->aces[i])) {
+ ARRAY_DEL_ELEMENT(
+ the_acl->aces, i, the_acl->num_aces);
+ the_acl->num_aces--;
+ } else {
+ i++;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*****************************************************
+set the ACLs on a file given a security descriptor
+*******************************************************/
+
+static int cacl_set_from_sd(struct cli_state *cli, const char *filename,
+ struct security_descriptor *sd, enum acl_mode mode,
+ bool numeric)
+{
+ struct security_descriptor *old = NULL;
+ uint32_t i, j;
+ size_t sd_size;
+ int result = EXIT_OK;
+
+ if (!sd) return EXIT_PARSE_ERROR;
+ if (test_args) return EXIT_OK;
+
+ if (mode != SMB_ACL_SET) {
+ /*
+ * Do not fetch old ACL when it will be overwritten
+ * completely with a new one.
+ */
+ old = get_secdesc(cli, filename);
+
+ if (!old) {
+ return EXIT_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* the logic here is rather more complex than I would like */
+ switch (mode) {
+ case SMB_ACL_DELETE:
+ for (i=0;sd->dacl && i<sd->dacl->num_aces;i++) {
+ bool found = False;
+
+ for (j=0;old->dacl && j<old->dacl->num_aces;j++) {
+ if (security_ace_equal(&sd->dacl->aces[i],
+ &old->dacl->aces[j])) {
+ uint32_t k;
+ for (k=j; k<old->dacl->num_aces-1;k++) {
+ old->dacl->aces[k] = old->dacl->aces[k+1];
+ }
+ old->dacl->num_aces--;
+ found = True;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!found) {
+ printf("ACL for ACE:");
+ print_ace(cli, stdout, &sd->dacl->aces[i],
+ numeric);
+ printf(" not found\n");
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SMB_ACL_MODIFY:
+ for (i=0;sd->dacl && i<sd->dacl->num_aces;i++) {
+ bool found = False;
+
+ for (j=0;old->dacl && j<old->dacl->num_aces;j++) {
+ if (dom_sid_equal(&sd->dacl->aces[i].trustee,
+ &old->dacl->aces[j].trustee)) {
+ old->dacl->aces[j] = sd->dacl->aces[i];
+ found = True;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!found) {
+ fstring str;
+
+ SidToString(cli, str,
+ &sd->dacl->aces[i].trustee,
+ numeric);
+ printf("ACL for SID %s not found\n", str);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (sd->owner_sid) {
+ old->owner_sid = sd->owner_sid;
+ }
+
+ if (sd->group_sid) {
+ old->group_sid = sd->group_sid;
+ }
+
+ break;
+
+ case SMB_ACL_ADD:
+ for (i=0;sd->dacl && i<sd->dacl->num_aces;i++) {
+ add_ace(&old->dacl, &sd->dacl->aces[i]);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SMB_ACL_SET:
+ old = sd;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Denied ACE entries must come before allowed ones */
+ sort_acl(old->dacl);
+
+ /* Create new security descriptor and set it */
+
+ /* We used to just have "WRITE_DAC_ACCESS" without WRITE_OWNER.
+ But if we're sending an owner, even if it's the same as the one
+ that already exists then W2K3 insists we open with WRITE_OWNER access.
+ I need to check that setting a SD with no owner set works against WNT
+ and W2K. JRA.
+ */
+
+ sd = make_sec_desc(talloc_tos(),old->revision, old->type,
+ old->owner_sid, old->group_sid,
+ NULL, old->dacl, &sd_size);
+
+ if (!set_secdesc(cli, filename, sd)) {
+ result = EXIT_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+/*****************************************************
+set the ACLs on a file given an ascii description
+*******************************************************/
+
+static int cacl_set(struct cli_state *cli, const char *filename,
+ char *the_acl, enum acl_mode mode, bool numeric)
+{
+ struct security_descriptor *sd = NULL;
+
+ if (sddl) {
+ sd = sddl_decode(talloc_tos(), the_acl, get_global_sam_sid());
+ } else {
+ sd = sec_desc_parse(talloc_tos(), cli, the_acl);
+ }
+
+ if (sd == NULL) {
+ return EXIT_PARSE_ERROR;
+ }
+ if (test_args) {
+ return EXIT_OK;
+ }
+ return cacl_set_from_sd(cli, filename, sd, mode, numeric);
+}
+
+/*****************************************************
+set the inherit on a file
+*******************************************************/
+static int inherit(struct cli_state *cli, const char *filename,
+ const char *type)
+{
+ struct security_descriptor *old,*sd;
+ uint32_t oldattr;
+ size_t sd_size;
+ int result = EXIT_OK;
+
+ old = get_secdesc(cli, filename);
+
+ if (!old) {
+ return EXIT_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ oldattr = get_fileinfo(cli,filename);
+
+ if (strcmp(type,"allow")==0) {
+ if ((old->type & SEC_DESC_DACL_PROTECTED) ==
+ SEC_DESC_DACL_PROTECTED) {
+ uint32_t i;
+ char *parentname,*temp;
+ struct security_descriptor *parent;
+ temp = talloc_strdup(talloc_tos(), filename);
+
+ old->type=old->type & (~SEC_DESC_DACL_PROTECTED);
+
+ /* look at parent and copy in all its inheritable ACL's. */
+ string_replace(temp, '\\', '/');
+ if (!parent_dirname(talloc_tos(),temp,&parentname,NULL)) {
+ return EXIT_FAILED;
+ }
+ string_replace(parentname, '/', '\\');
+ parent = get_secdesc(cli,parentname);
+ if (parent == NULL) {
+ return EXIT_FAILED;
+ }
+ for (i=0;i<parent->dacl->num_aces;i++) {
+ struct security_ace *ace=&parent->dacl->aces[i];
+ /* Add inherited flag to all aces */
+ ace->flags=ace->flags|
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE;
+ if ((oldattr & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY) == FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY) {
+ if ((ace->flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT) ==
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT) {
+ add_ace(&old->dacl, ace);
+ }
+ } else {
+ if ((ace->flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT) ==
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT) {
+ /* clear flags for files */
+ ace->flags=0;
+ add_ace(&old->dacl, ace);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ printf("Already set to inheritable permissions.\n");
+ return EXIT_FAILED;
+ }
+ } else if (strcmp(type,"remove")==0) {
+ if ((old->type & SEC_DESC_DACL_PROTECTED) !=
+ SEC_DESC_DACL_PROTECTED) {
+ old->type=old->type | SEC_DESC_DACL_PROTECTED;
+
+ /* remove all inherited ACL's. */
+ if (old->dacl) {
+ int i;
+ struct security_acl *temp=old->dacl;
+ old->dacl=make_sec_acl(talloc_tos(), 3, 0, NULL);
+ for (i=temp->num_aces-1;i>=0;i--) {
+ struct security_ace *ace=&temp->aces[i];
+ /* Remove all ace with INHERITED flag set */
+ if ((ace->flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE) !=
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE) {
+ add_ace(&old->dacl,ace);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ printf("Already set to no inheritable permissions.\n");
+ return EXIT_FAILED;
+ }
+ } else if (strcmp(type,"copy")==0) {
+ if ((old->type & SEC_DESC_DACL_PROTECTED) !=
+ SEC_DESC_DACL_PROTECTED) {
+ old->type=old->type | SEC_DESC_DACL_PROTECTED;
+
+ /*
+ * convert all inherited ACL's to non
+ * inherited ACL's.
+ */
+ if (old->dacl) {
+ uint32_t i;
+ for (i=0;i<old->dacl->num_aces;i++) {
+ struct security_ace *ace=&old->dacl->aces[i];
+ /* Remove INHERITED FLAG from all aces */
+ ace->flags=ace->flags&(~SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE);
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ printf("Already set to no inheritable permissions.\n");
+ return EXIT_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Denied ACE entries must come before allowed ones */
+ sort_acl(old->dacl);
+
+ sd = make_sec_desc(talloc_tos(),old->revision, old->type,
+ old->owner_sid, old->group_sid,
+ NULL, old->dacl, &sd_size);
+
+ if (!set_secdesc(cli, filename, sd)) {
+ result = EXIT_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+/*****************************************************
+ Return a connection to a server.
+*******************************************************/
+static struct cli_state *connect_one(struct cli_credentials *creds,
+ const char *server, const char *share)
+{
+ struct cli_state *c = NULL;
+ NTSTATUS nt_status;
+ uint32_t flags = 0;
+
+ nt_status = cli_full_connection_creds(&c, lp_netbios_name(), server,
+ NULL, 0,
+ share, "?????",
+ creds,
+ flags);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("cli_full_connection failed! (%s)\n", nt_errstr(nt_status)));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return c;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Process resulting combination of mask & fname ensuring
+ * terminated with wildcard
+ */
+static char *build_dirname(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
+ const char *mask, char *dir, char *fname)
+{
+ char *mask2 = NULL;
+ char *p = NULL;
+
+ mask2 = talloc_strdup(ctx, mask);
+ if (!mask2) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ p = strrchr_m(mask2, DIRSEP_CHAR);
+ if (p) {
+ p[1] = 0;
+ } else {
+ mask2[0] = '\0';
+ }
+ mask2 = talloc_asprintf_append(mask2,
+ "%s\\*",
+ fname);
+ return mask2;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the a copy of the ACL flags in ace modified according
+ * to some inheritance rules.
+ * a) SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE is propagated to children
+ * b) SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY is set on container children for OI (only)
+ * c) SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT & SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT are
+ * stripped from flags to be propagated to non-container children
+ * d) SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT & SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT are
+ * stripped from flags to be propagated if the NP flag
+ * SEC_ACE_FLAG_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT is present
+ */
+
+static uint8_t get_flags_to_propagate(bool is_container,
+ struct security_ace *ace)
+{
+ uint8_t newflags = ace->flags;
+ /* OBJECT inheritance */
+ bool acl_objinherit = (ace->flags &
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT) == SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT;
+ /* CONTAINER inheritance */
+ bool acl_cntrinherit = (ace->flags &
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT) ==
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT;
+ /* PROHIBIT inheritance */
+ bool prohibit_inheritance = ((ace->flags &
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT) ==
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT);
+
+ /* Assume we are not propagating the ACE */
+
+ newflags &= ~SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE;
+ /* all children need to have the SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE set */
+ if (acl_cntrinherit || acl_objinherit) {
+ /*
+ * object inherit ( alone ) on a container needs
+ * SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY
+ */
+ if (is_container) {
+ if (acl_objinherit && !acl_cntrinherit) {
+ newflags |= SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY;
+ }
+ /*
+ * this is tricky, the only time we would not
+ * propagate the ace for a container is if
+ * prohibit_inheritance is set and object inheritance
+ * alone is set
+ */
+ if ((prohibit_inheritance
+ && acl_objinherit
+ && !acl_cntrinherit) == false) {
+ newflags |= SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * don't apply object/container inheritance flags to
+ * non dirs
+ */
+ newflags &= ~(SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT
+ | SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT
+ | SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY);
+ /*
+ * only apply ace to file if object inherit
+ */
+ if (acl_objinherit) {
+ newflags |= SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* if NP is specified strip NP and all OI/CI INHERIT flags */
+ if (prohibit_inheritance) {
+ newflags &= ~(SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT
+ | SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT
+ | SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY
+ | SEC_ACE_FLAG_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT);
+ }
+ }
+ return newflags;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function builds a new acl for 'caclfile', first it removes any
+ * existing inheritable ace(s) from the current acl of caclfile, secondly it
+ * applies any inheritable acls of the parent of caclfile ( inheritable acls of
+ * caclfile's parent are passed via acl_to_add member of cbstate )
+ *
+ */
+static NTSTATUS propagate_inherited_aces(char *caclfile,
+ struct cacl_callback_state *cbstate)
+{
+ TALLOC_CTX *aclctx = NULL;
+ NTSTATUS status;
+ int result;
+ int fileattr;
+ struct security_descriptor *old = NULL;
+ bool is_container = false;
+ struct security_acl *acl_to_add = cbstate->acl_to_add;
+ struct security_acl *acl_to_remove = NULL;
+ uint32_t i, j;
+
+ aclctx = talloc_new(NULL);
+ if (aclctx == NULL) {
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+ old = get_secdesc_with_ctx(aclctx, cbstate->cli, caclfile);
+
+ if (!old) {
+ status = NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* inhibit propagation? */
+ if ((old->type & SEC_DESC_DACL_PROTECTED) ==
+ SEC_DESC_DACL_PROTECTED){
+ status = NT_STATUS_OK;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ fileattr = get_fileinfo(cbstate->cli, caclfile);
+ is_container = (fileattr & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY);
+
+ /* find acl(s) that are inherited */
+ for (j = 0; old->dacl && j < old->dacl->num_aces; j++) {
+
+ if (old->dacl->aces[j].flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE) {
+ if (!add_ace_with_ctx(aclctx, &acl_to_remove,
+ &old->dacl->aces[j])) {
+ status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* remove any acl(s) that are inherited */
+ if (acl_to_remove) {
+ for (i = 0; i < acl_to_remove->num_aces; i++) {
+ struct security_ace ace = acl_to_remove->aces[i];
+ for (j = 0; old->dacl && j < old->dacl->num_aces; j++) {
+
+ if (security_ace_equal(&ace,
+ &old->dacl->aces[j])) {
+ uint32_t k;
+ for (k = j; k < old->dacl->num_aces-1;
+ k++) {
+ old->dacl->aces[k] =
+ old->dacl->aces[k+1];
+ }
+ old->dacl->num_aces--;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /* propagate any inheritable ace to be added */
+ if (acl_to_add) {
+ for (i = 0; i < acl_to_add->num_aces; i++) {
+ struct security_ace ace = acl_to_add->aces[i];
+ bool is_objectinherit = (ace.flags &
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT) ==
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT;
+ bool is_inherited;
+ /* don't propagate flags to a file unless OI */
+ if (!is_objectinherit && !is_container) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ /*
+ * adjust flags according to inheritance
+ * rules
+ */
+ ace.flags = get_flags_to_propagate(is_container, &ace);
+ is_inherited = (ace.flags &
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE) ==
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE;
+ /* don't propagate non inherited flags */
+ if (!is_inherited) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (!add_ace_with_ctx(aclctx, &old->dacl, &ace)) {
+ status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ result = cacl_set_from_sd(cbstate->cli, caclfile,
+ old,
+ SMB_ACL_SET, cbstate->numeric);
+ if (result != EXIT_OK) {
+ status = NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ status = NT_STATUS_OK;
+out:
+ TALLOC_FREE(aclctx);
+ return status;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns true if 'ace' contains SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT or
+ * SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT
+ */
+static bool is_inheritable_ace(struct security_ace *ace)
+{
+ uint8_t flags = ace->flags;
+ if (flags & (SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT
+ | SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT)) {
+ return true;
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+/* This method does some basic sanity checking with respect to automatic
+ * inheritance. e.g. it checks if it is possible to do a set, it detects illegal
+ * attempts to set inherited permissions directly. Additionally this method
+ * does some basic initialisation for instance it parses the ACL passed on the
+ * command line.
+ */
+static NTSTATUS prepare_inheritance_propagation(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, char *filename,
+ struct cacl_callback_state *cbstate)
+{
+ NTSTATUS result;
+ char *the_acl = cbstate->the_acl;
+ struct cli_state *cli = cbstate->cli;
+ enum acl_mode mode = cbstate->mode;
+ struct security_descriptor *sd = NULL;
+ struct security_descriptor *old = NULL;
+ uint32_t j;
+ bool propagate = false;
+
+ old = get_secdesc_with_ctx(ctx, cli, filename);
+ if (old == NULL) {
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ /* parse acl passed on the command line */
+ if (sddl) {
+ cbstate->aclsd = sddl_decode(ctx, the_acl,
+ get_global_sam_sid());
+ } else {
+ cbstate->aclsd = sec_desc_parse(ctx, cli, the_acl);
+ }
+
+ if (!cbstate->aclsd) {
+ result = NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ sd = cbstate->aclsd;
+
+ /* set operation if inheritance is enabled doesn't make sense */
+ if (mode == SMB_ACL_SET && ((old->type & SEC_DESC_DACL_PROTECTED) !=
+ SEC_DESC_DACL_PROTECTED)){
+ d_printf("Inheritance enabled at %s, can't apply set operation\n",filename);
+ result = NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
+ goto out;
+
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * search command line acl for any illegal SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE
+ * flags that are set
+ */
+ for (j = 0; sd->dacl && j < sd->dacl->num_aces; j++) {
+ struct security_ace *ace = &sd->dacl->aces[j];
+ if (ace->flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE) {
+ d_printf("Illegal parameter %s\n", the_acl);
+ result = NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (!propagate) {
+ if (is_inheritable_ace(ace)) {
+ propagate = true;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ result = NT_STATUS_OK;
+out:
+ cbstate->acl_no_propagate = !propagate;
+ return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This method builds inheritable ace(s) from filename (which should be
+ * a container) that need propagating to children in order to provide
+ * automatic inheritance. Those inheritable ace(s) are stored in
+ * acl_to_add member of cbstate for later processing
+ * (see propagate_inherited_aces)
+ */
+static NTSTATUS get_inheritable_aces(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, char *filename,
+ struct cacl_callback_state *cbstate)
+{
+ NTSTATUS result;
+ struct cli_state *cli = NULL;
+ struct security_descriptor *sd = NULL;
+ struct security_acl *acl_to_add = NULL;
+ uint32_t j;
+
+ cli = cbstate->cli;
+ sd = get_secdesc_with_ctx(ctx, cli, filename);
+
+ if (sd == NULL) {
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check if any inheritance related flags are used, if not then
+ * nothing to do. At the same time populate acls for inheritance
+ * related ace(s) that need to be added to or deleted from children as
+ * a result of inheritance propagation.
+ */
+
+ for (j = 0; sd->dacl && j < sd->dacl->num_aces; j++) {
+ struct security_ace *ace = &sd->dacl->aces[j];
+ if (is_inheritable_ace(ace)) {
+ bool added = add_ace_with_ctx(ctx, &acl_to_add, ace);
+ if (!added) {
+ result = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ cbstate->acl_to_add = acl_to_add;
+ result = NT_STATUS_OK;
+out:
+ return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Callback handler to handle child elements processed by cli_list, we attempt
+ * to propagate inheritable ace(s) to each child via the function
+ * propagate_inherited_aces. Children that are themselves directories are passed
+ * to cli_list again ( to decend the directory structure )
+ */
+static NTSTATUS cacl_set_cb(struct file_info *f,
+ const char *mask, void *state)
+{
+ struct cacl_callback_state *cbstate =
+ (struct cacl_callback_state *)state;
+ struct cli_state *cli = NULL;
+ struct cli_credentials *creds = NULL;
+
+ TALLOC_CTX *dirctx = NULL;
+ NTSTATUS status;
+ struct cli_state *targetcli = NULL;
+
+ char *dir = NULL;
+ char *dir_end = NULL;
+ char *mask2 = NULL;
+ char *targetpath = NULL;
+ char *caclfile = NULL;
+
+ dirctx = talloc_new(NULL);
+ if (!dirctx) {
+ status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ cli = cbstate->cli;
+ creds = cbstate->creds;
+
+ /* Work out the directory. */
+ dir = talloc_strdup(dirctx, mask);
+ if (!dir) {
+ status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ dir_end = strrchr(dir, DIRSEP_CHAR);
+ if (dir_end != NULL) {
+ *dir_end = '\0';
+ }
+
+ if (!f->name || !f->name[0]) {
+ d_printf("Empty dir name returned. Possible server misconfiguration.\n");
+ status = NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (f->attr & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY) {
+ struct cacl_callback_state dir_cbstate;
+ uint16_t attribute = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY
+ | FILE_ATTRIBUTE_SYSTEM
+ | FILE_ATTRIBUTE_HIDDEN;
+ dir_end = NULL;
+
+ /* ignore special '.' & '..' */
+ if ((f->name == NULL) || ISDOT(f->name) || ISDOTDOT(f->name)) {
+ status = NT_STATUS_OK;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ mask2 = build_dirname(dirctx, mask, dir, f->name);
+ if (mask2 == NULL) {
+ status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* check for dfs */
+ status = local_cli_resolve_path(dirctx, "", creds, cli,
+ mask2, &targetcli, &targetpath);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * prepare path to caclfile, remove any existing wildcard
+ * chars and convert path separators.
+ */
+
+ caclfile = talloc_strdup(dirctx, targetpath);
+ if (!caclfile) {
+ status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ dir_end = strrchr(caclfile, '*');
+ if (dir_end != NULL) {
+ *dir_end = '\0';
+ }
+
+ string_replace(caclfile, '/', '\\');
+ /*
+ * make directory specific copy of cbstate here
+ * (for this directory level) to be available as
+ * the parent cbstate for the children of this directory.
+ * Note: cbstate is overwritten for the current file being
+ * processed.
+ */
+ dir_cbstate = *cbstate;
+ dir_cbstate.cli = targetcli;
+
+ /*
+ * propagate any inherited ace from our parent
+ */
+ status = propagate_inherited_aces(caclfile, &dir_cbstate);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * get inheritable ace(s) for this dir/container
+ * that will be propagated to its children
+ */
+ status = get_inheritable_aces(dirctx, caclfile,
+ &dir_cbstate);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * ensure cacl_set_cb gets called for children
+ * of this directory (targetpath)
+ */
+ status = cli_list(targetcli, targetpath,
+ attribute, cacl_set_cb,
+ (void *)&dir_cbstate);
+
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * build full path to caclfile and replace '/' with '\' so
+ * other utility functions can deal with it
+ */
+
+ targetpath = talloc_asprintf(dirctx, "%s/%s", dir, f->name);
+ if (!targetpath) {
+ status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ string_replace(targetpath, '/', '\\');
+
+ /* attempt to propagate any inherited ace to file caclfile */
+ status = propagate_inherited_aces(targetpath, cbstate);
+
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ status = NT_STATUS_OK;
+out:
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ d_printf("error %s: processing %s\n",
+ nt_errstr(status),
+ targetpath);
+ }
+ TALLOC_FREE(dirctx);
+ return status;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Wrapper around cl_list to decend the directory tree pointed to by 'filename',
+ * helper callback function 'cacl_set_cb' handles the child elements processed
+ * by cli_list.
+ */
+static int inheritance_cacl_set(char *filename,
+ struct cacl_callback_state *cbstate)
+{
+ int result;
+ NTSTATUS ntstatus;
+ int fileattr;
+ char *mask = NULL;
+ struct cli_state *cli = cbstate->cli;
+ TALLOC_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ bool isdirectory = false;
+ uint16_t attribute = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY | FILE_ATTRIBUTE_SYSTEM
+ | FILE_ATTRIBUTE_HIDDEN;
+ char *save_share = NULL;
+ ctx = talloc_init("inherit_set");
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ d_printf("out of memory\n");
+ result = EXIT_FAILED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* ensure we have a filename that starts with '\' */
+ if (!filename || *filename != DIRSEP_CHAR) {
+ /* illegal or no filename */
+ result = EXIT_FAILED;
+ d_printf("illegal or missing name '%s'\n", filename);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+
+ fileattr = get_fileinfo(cli, filename);
+ isdirectory = (fileattr & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY)
+ == FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY;
+
+ /*
+ * if we've got as far as here then we have already evaluated
+ * the args.
+ */
+ if (test_args) {
+ result = EXIT_OK;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ mask = NULL;
+ /* make sure we have a trailing '\*' for directory */
+ if (!isdirectory) {
+ mask = talloc_strdup(ctx, filename);
+ } else if (strlen(filename) > 1) {
+ /*
+ * if the passed file name doesn't have a trailing '\'
+ * append it.
+ */
+ char *name_end = strrchr(filename, DIRSEP_CHAR);
+ if (name_end != filename + strlen(filename) + 1) {
+ mask = talloc_asprintf(ctx, "%s\\*", filename);
+ } else {
+ mask = talloc_strdup(ctx, filename);
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* filename is a single '\', just append '*' */
+ mask = talloc_asprintf_append(mask, "%s*", filename);
+ }
+
+ if (!mask) {
+ result = EXIT_FAILED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * prepare for automatic propagation of the acl passed on the
+ * cmdline.
+ */
+ save_share = talloc_strdup(ctx, cli->share);
+ if (save_share == NULL) {
+ result = EXIT_FAILED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ntstatus = prepare_inheritance_propagation(ctx, filename,
+ cbstate);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ntstatus)) {
+ d_printf("error: %s processing %s\n",
+ nt_errstr(ntstatus), filename);
+ result = EXIT_FAILED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * sec_desc_parse ends up calling a bunch of functions one of which
+ * connects to IPC$ (which overwrites cli->share)
+ * we need a new connection to the share here.
+ * Note: This only is an issue when the share is a msdfs root
+ * because the presence of cli->share gets expanded out
+ * later on by cli_resolve_path (when it is constructing a path)
+ */
+ ntstatus = cli_tree_connect_creds(cli,
+ save_share,
+ "?????",
+ cbstate->creds);
+
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ntstatus)) {
+ d_printf("error: %s processing %s\n",
+ nt_errstr(ntstatus), filename);
+ result = EXIT_FAILED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ result = cacl_set_from_sd(cli, filename, cbstate->aclsd,
+ cbstate->mode, cbstate->numeric);
+
+ /*
+ * strictly speaking it could be considered an error if a file was
+ * specificied with '--propagate-inheritance'. However we really want
+ * to eventually get rid of '--propagate-inheritance' so we will be
+ * more forgiving here and instead just exit early.
+ */
+ if (!isdirectory || (result != EXIT_OK)) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* check if there is actually any need to propagate */
+ if (cbstate->acl_no_propagate) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* get inheritable attributes this parent container (e.g. filename) */
+ ntstatus = get_inheritable_aces(ctx, filename, cbstate);
+ if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ntstatus)) {
+ /* process children */
+ ntstatus = cli_list(cli, mask, attribute,
+ cacl_set_cb,
+ (void *)cbstate);
+ }
+
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ntstatus)) {
+ d_printf("error: %s processing %s\n",
+ nt_errstr(ntstatus), filename);
+ result = EXIT_FAILED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+out:
+ TALLOC_FREE(ctx);
+ return result;
+}
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ main program
+****************************************************************************/
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+ const char **argv_const = discard_const_p(const char *, argv);
+ char *share;
+ int opt;
+ enum acl_mode mode = SMB_ACL_SET;
+ static char *the_acl = NULL;
+ enum chown_mode change_mode = REQUEST_NONE;
+ int result;
+ char *path;
+ char *filename = NULL;
+ poptContext pc;
+ /* numeric is set when the user wants numeric SIDs and ACEs rather
+ than going via LSA calls to resolve them */
+ int numeric = 0;
+ struct cli_state *targetcli = NULL;
+ struct cli_credentials *creds = NULL;
+ char *targetfile = NULL;
+ NTSTATUS status;
+ bool ok;
+
+ struct poptOption long_options[] = {
+ POPT_AUTOHELP
+ {
+ .longName = "delete",
+ .shortName = 'D',
+ .argInfo = POPT_ARG_STRING,
+ .arg = NULL,
+ .val = 'D',
+ .descrip = "Delete an acl",
+ .argDescrip = "ACL",
+ },
+ {
+ .longName = "modify",
+ .shortName = 'M',
+ .argInfo = POPT_ARG_STRING,
+ .arg = NULL,
+ .val = 'M',
+ .descrip = "Modify an acl",
+ .argDescrip = "ACL",
+ },
+ {
+ .longName = "add",
+ .shortName = 'a',
+ .argInfo = POPT_ARG_STRING,
+ .arg = NULL,
+ .val = 'a',
+ .descrip = "Add an acl",
+ .argDescrip = "ACL",
+ },
+ {
+ .longName = "set",
+ .shortName = 'S',
+ .argInfo = POPT_ARG_STRING,
+ .arg = NULL,
+ .val = 'S',
+ .descrip = "Set acls",
+ .argDescrip = "ACLS",
+ },
+ {
+ .longName = "chown",
+ .shortName = 'C',
+ .argInfo = POPT_ARG_STRING,
+ .arg = NULL,
+ .val = 'C',
+ .descrip = "Change ownership of a file",
+ .argDescrip = "USERNAME",
+ },
+ {
+ .longName = "chgrp",
+ .shortName = 'G',
+ .argInfo = POPT_ARG_STRING,
+ .arg = NULL,
+ .val = 'G',
+ .descrip = "Change group ownership of a file",
+ .argDescrip = "GROUPNAME",
+ },
+ {
+ .longName = "inherit",
+ .shortName = 'I',
+ .argInfo = POPT_ARG_STRING,
+ .arg = NULL,
+ .val = 'I',
+ .descrip = "Inherit allow|remove|copy",
+ },
+ {
+ .longName = "propagate-inheritance",
+ .shortName = 0,
+ .argInfo = POPT_ARG_NONE,
+ .arg = &inheritance,
+ .val = 1,
+ .descrip = "Supports propagation of inheritable ACE(s) when used in conjunction with add, delete, set or modify",
+ },
+ {
+ .longName = "numeric",
+ .shortName = 0,
+ .argInfo = POPT_ARG_NONE,
+ .arg = &numeric,
+ .val = 1,
+ .descrip = "Don't resolve sids or masks to names",
+ },
+ {
+ .longName = "sddl",
+ .shortName = 0,
+ .argInfo = POPT_ARG_NONE,
+ .arg = &sddl,
+ .val = 1,
+ .descrip = "Output and input acls in sddl format",
+ },
+ {
+ .longName = "query-security-info",
+ .shortName = 0,
+ .argInfo = POPT_ARG_INT,
+ .arg = &query_sec_info,
+ .val = 1,
+ .descrip = "The security-info flags for queries"
+ },
+ {
+ .longName = "set-security-info",
+ .shortName = 0,
+ .argInfo = POPT_ARG_INT,
+ .arg = &set_sec_info,
+ .val = 1,
+ .descrip = "The security-info flags for modifications"
+ },
+ {
+ .longName = "test-args",
+ .shortName = 't',
+ .argInfo = POPT_ARG_NONE,
+ .arg = &test_args,
+ .val = 1,
+ .descrip = "Test arguments"
+ },
+ {
+ .longName = "domain-sid",
+ .shortName = 0,
+ .argInfo = POPT_ARG_STRING,
+ .arg = &domain_sid,
+ .val = 0,
+ .descrip = "Domain SID for sddl",
+ .argDescrip = "SID"},
+ {
+ .longName = "maximum-access",
+ .shortName = 'x',
+ .argInfo = POPT_ARG_NONE,
+ .arg = NULL,
+ .val = 'x',
+ .descrip = "Query maximum permissions",
+ },
+ POPT_COMMON_SAMBA
+ POPT_COMMON_CONNECTION
+ POPT_COMMON_CREDENTIALS
+ POPT_LEGACY_S3
+ POPT_COMMON_VERSION
+ POPT_TABLEEND
+ };
+
+ struct cli_state *cli;
+ TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
+ const char *owner_username = "";
+ char *server;
+
+ smb_init_locale();
+
+ ok = samba_cmdline_init(frame,
+ SAMBA_CMDLINE_CONFIG_CLIENT,
+ false /* require_smbconf */);
+ if (!ok) {
+ DBG_ERR("Failed to init cmdline parser!\n");
+ TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ /* set default debug level to 1 regardless of what smb.conf sets */
+ lp_set_cmdline("log level", "1");
+
+ setlinebuf(stdout);
+
+ pc = samba_popt_get_context(getprogname(),
+ argc,
+ argv_const,
+ long_options,
+ 0);
+ if (pc == NULL) {
+ DBG_ERR("Failed to setup popt context!\n");
+ TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ poptSetOtherOptionHelp(pc, "//server1/share1 filename\nACLs look like: "
+ "'ACL:user:[ALLOWED|DENIED]/flags/permissions'");
+
+ while ((opt = poptGetNextOpt(pc)) != -1) {
+ switch (opt) {
+ case 'S':
+ the_acl = smb_xstrdup(poptGetOptArg(pc));
+ mode = SMB_ACL_SET;
+ break;
+
+ case 'D':
+ the_acl = smb_xstrdup(poptGetOptArg(pc));
+ mode = SMB_ACL_DELETE;
+ break;
+
+ case 'M':
+ the_acl = smb_xstrdup(poptGetOptArg(pc));
+ mode = SMB_ACL_MODIFY;
+ break;
+
+ case 'a':
+ the_acl = smb_xstrdup(poptGetOptArg(pc));
+ mode = SMB_ACL_ADD;
+ break;
+
+ case 'C':
+ owner_username = poptGetOptArg(pc);
+ change_mode = REQUEST_CHOWN;
+ break;
+
+ case 'G':
+ owner_username = poptGetOptArg(pc);
+ change_mode = REQUEST_CHGRP;
+ break;
+
+ case 'I':
+ owner_username = poptGetOptArg(pc);
+ change_mode = REQUEST_INHERIT;
+ break;
+ case 'm':
+ lp_set_cmdline("client max protocol", poptGetOptArg(pc));
+ break;
+ case 'x':
+ want_mxac = true;
+ break;
+ case POPT_ERROR_BADOPT:
+ fprintf(stderr, "\nInvalid option %s: %s\n\n",
+ poptBadOption(pc, 0), poptStrerror(opt));
+ poptPrintUsage(pc, stderr, 0);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ }
+ if (inheritance && !the_acl) {
+ poptPrintUsage(pc, stderr, 0);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if(!poptPeekArg(pc)) {
+ poptPrintUsage(pc, stderr, 0);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ path = talloc_strdup(frame, poptGetArg(pc));
+ if (!path) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if(!poptPeekArg(pc)) {
+ poptPrintUsage(pc, stderr, 0);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ filename = talloc_strdup(frame, poptGetArg(pc));
+ if (!filename) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ poptFreeContext(pc);
+ samba_cmdline_burn(argc, argv);
+
+ string_replace(path,'/','\\');
+
+ server = talloc_strdup(frame, path+2);
+ if (!server) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ share = strchr_m(server,'\\');
+ if (share == NULL) {
+ printf("Invalid argument\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ *share = 0;
+ share++;
+
+ creds = samba_cmdline_get_creds();
+
+ /* Make connection to server */
+ if (!test_args) {
+ cli = connect_one(creds, server, share);
+ if (!cli) {
+ exit(EXIT_FAILED);
+ }
+ } else {
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ string_replace(filename, '/', '\\');
+ if (filename[0] != '\\') {
+ filename = talloc_asprintf(frame,
+ "\\%s",
+ filename);
+ if (!filename) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ status = local_cli_resolve_path(frame,
+ "",
+ creds,
+ cli,
+ filename,
+ &targetcli,
+ &targetfile);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("cli_resolve_path failed for %s! (%s)\n", filename, nt_errstr(status)));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Perform requested action */
+
+ if (change_mode == REQUEST_INHERIT) {
+ result = inherit(targetcli, targetfile, owner_username);
+ } else if (change_mode != REQUEST_NONE) {
+ result = owner_set(targetcli, change_mode, targetfile, owner_username);
+ } else if (the_acl) {
+ if (inheritance) {
+ struct cacl_callback_state cbstate = {
+ .creds = creds,
+ .cli = targetcli,
+ .mode = mode,
+ .the_acl = the_acl,
+ .numeric = numeric,
+ };
+ result = inheritance_cacl_set(targetfile, &cbstate);
+ } else {
+ result = cacl_set(targetcli,
+ targetfile,
+ the_acl,
+ mode,
+ numeric);
+ }
+ } else {
+ result = cacl_dump(targetcli, targetfile, numeric);
+ }
+
+ TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+
+ return result;
+}