diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'source4/torture/smb2/acls.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | source4/torture/smb2/acls.c | 3340 |
1 files changed, 3340 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/source4/torture/smb2/acls.c b/source4/torture/smb2/acls.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5a892d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/source4/torture/smb2/acls.c @@ -0,0 +1,3340 @@ +/* + Unix SMB/CIFS implementation. + + test security descriptor operations for SMB2 + + Copyright (C) Zack Kirsch 2009 + + This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or + (at your option) any later version. + + This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + GNU General Public License for more details. + + You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. +*/ + +#include "includes.h" +#include "lib/cmdline/cmdline.h" +#include "libcli/smb2/smb2.h" +#include "libcli/smb2/smb2_calls.h" +#include "libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h" +#include "torture/torture.h" +#include "libcli/resolve/resolve.h" +#include "torture/util.h" +#include "torture/smb2/proto.h" +#include "libcli/security/security.h" +#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_security.h" +#include "lib/param/param.h" + +#define CHECK_STATUS(status, correct) do { \ + if (!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, correct)) { \ + torture_result(tctx, TORTURE_FAIL, "(%s) Incorrect status %s - should be %s\n", \ + __location__, nt_errstr(status), nt_errstr(correct)); \ + ret = false; \ + goto done; \ + }} while (0) + +#define BASEDIR "smb2-testsd" + +#define CHECK_ACCESS_IGNORE SEC_STD_SYNCHRONIZE + +#define CHECK_ACCESS_FLAGS(_fh, flags) do { \ + union smb_fileinfo _q; \ + _q.access_information.level = RAW_FILEINFO_ACCESS_INFORMATION; \ + _q.access_information.in.file.handle = (_fh); \ + status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &_q); \ + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); \ + /* Handle a Vista bug where SEC_STD_SYNCHRONIZE doesn't come back. */ \ + if ((((flags) & CHECK_ACCESS_IGNORE) == CHECK_ACCESS_IGNORE) && \ + ((_q.access_information.out.access_flags & CHECK_ACCESS_IGNORE) != CHECK_ACCESS_IGNORE)) { \ + torture_comment(tctx, "SKIPPING (Vista bug): (%s) Incorrect access_flags 0x%08x - should be 0x%08x\n", \ + __location__, _q.access_information.out.access_flags, (flags)); \ + } \ + if ((_q.access_information.out.access_flags & ~CHECK_ACCESS_IGNORE) != \ + (((flags) & ~CHECK_ACCESS_IGNORE))) { \ + torture_result(tctx, TORTURE_FAIL, "(%s) Incorrect access_flags 0x%08x - should be 0x%08x\n", \ + __location__, _q.access_information.out.access_flags, (flags)); \ + ret = false; \ + goto done; \ + } \ +} while (0) + +#define FAIL_UNLESS(__cond) \ + do { \ + if (__cond) {} else { \ + torture_result(tctx, TORTURE_FAIL, "%s) condition violated: %s\n", \ + __location__, #__cond); \ + ret = false; goto done; \ + } \ + } while(0) + +#define CHECK_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR(_sd1, _sd2) do { \ + if (!security_descriptor_equal(_sd1, _sd2)) { \ + torture_warning(tctx, "security descriptors don't match!\n"); \ + torture_warning(tctx, "got:\n"); \ + NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(security_descriptor, _sd1); \ + torture_warning(tctx, "expected:\n"); \ + NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(security_descriptor, _sd2); \ + torture_result(tctx, TORTURE_FAIL, \ + "%s: security descriptors don't match!\n", \ + __location__); \ + ret = false; \ + } \ +} while (0) + +/* + test the behaviour of the well known SID_CREATOR_OWNER sid, and some generic + mapping bits + Note: This test was copied from raw/acls.c. +*/ +static bool test_creator_sid(struct torture_context *tctx, struct smb2_tree *tree) +{ + NTSTATUS status; + struct smb2_create io; + const char *fname = BASEDIR "\\creator.txt"; + bool ret = true; + struct smb2_handle handle = {{0}}; + union smb_fileinfo q; + union smb_setfileinfo set; + struct security_descriptor *sd, *sd_orig, *sd2; + const char *owner_sid; + + if (!smb2_util_setup_dir(tctx, tree, BASEDIR)) + return false; + + torture_comment(tctx, "TESTING SID_CREATOR_OWNER\n"); + + ZERO_STRUCT(io); + io.level = RAW_OPEN_SMB2; + io.in.create_flags = 0; + io.in.desired_access = SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL | SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC | SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER; + io.in.create_options = 0; + io.in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL; + io.in.share_access = NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_DELETE | + NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_READ | + NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_WRITE; + io.in.alloc_size = 0; + io.in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN_IF; + io.in.impersonation_level = NTCREATEX_IMPERSONATION_ANONYMOUS; + io.in.security_flags = 0; + io.in.fname = fname; + + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + handle = io.out.file.handle; + + torture_comment(tctx, "get the original sd\n"); + q.query_secdesc.level = RAW_FILEINFO_SEC_DESC; + q.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle; + q.query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL | SECINFO_OWNER; + status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + sd_orig = q.query_secdesc.out.sd; + + owner_sid = dom_sid_string(tctx, sd_orig->owner_sid); + + torture_comment(tctx, "set a sec desc allowing no write by CREATOR_OWNER\n"); + sd = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx, + 0, NULL, NULL, + SID_CREATOR_OWNER, + SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED, + SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_READ | SEC_STD_ALL, + 0, + NULL); + + set.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC; + set.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle; + set.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL; + set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd; + + status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + + torture_comment(tctx, "try open for write\n"); + io.in.desired_access = SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA; + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED); + + torture_comment(tctx, "try open for read\n"); + io.in.desired_access = SEC_FILE_READ_DATA; + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED); + + torture_comment(tctx, "try open for generic write\n"); + io.in.desired_access = SEC_GENERIC_WRITE; + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED); + + torture_comment(tctx, "try open for generic read\n"); + io.in.desired_access = SEC_GENERIC_READ; + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED); + + torture_comment(tctx, "set a sec desc allowing no write by owner\n"); + sd = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx, + 0, owner_sid, NULL, + owner_sid, + SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED, + SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_READ | SEC_STD_ALL, + 0, + NULL); + + set.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC; + set.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle; + set.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL; + set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd; + status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + + torture_comment(tctx, "check that sd has been mapped correctly\n"); + status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + CHECK_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR(q.query_secdesc.out.sd, sd); + + torture_comment(tctx, "try open for write\n"); + io.in.desired_access = SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA; + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED); + + torture_comment(tctx, "try open for read\n"); + io.in.desired_access = SEC_FILE_READ_DATA; + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + CHECK_ACCESS_FLAGS(io.out.file.handle, + SEC_FILE_READ_DATA); + smb2_util_close(tree, io.out.file.handle); + + torture_comment(tctx, "try open for generic write\n"); + io.in.desired_access = SEC_GENERIC_WRITE; + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED); + + torture_comment(tctx, "try open for generic read\n"); + io.in.desired_access = SEC_GENERIC_READ; + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + CHECK_ACCESS_FLAGS(io.out.file.handle, + SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_READ); + smb2_util_close(tree, io.out.file.handle); + + torture_comment(tctx, "set a sec desc allowing generic read by owner\n"); + sd = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx, + 0, NULL, NULL, + owner_sid, + SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED, + SEC_GENERIC_READ | SEC_STD_ALL, + 0, + NULL); + + set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd; + status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + + torture_comment(tctx, "check that generic read has been mapped correctly\n"); + sd2 = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx, + 0, owner_sid, NULL, + owner_sid, + SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED, + SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_READ | SEC_STD_ALL, + 0, + NULL); + + status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + CHECK_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR(q.query_secdesc.out.sd, sd2); + + torture_comment(tctx, "try open for write\n"); + io.in.desired_access = SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA; + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED); + + torture_comment(tctx, "try open for read\n"); + io.in.desired_access = SEC_FILE_READ_DATA; + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + CHECK_ACCESS_FLAGS(io.out.file.handle, + SEC_FILE_READ_DATA); + smb2_util_close(tree, io.out.file.handle); + + torture_comment(tctx, "try open for generic write\n"); + io.in.desired_access = SEC_GENERIC_WRITE; + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED); + + torture_comment(tctx, "try open for generic read\n"); + io.in.desired_access = SEC_GENERIC_READ; + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + CHECK_ACCESS_FLAGS(io.out.file.handle, SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_READ); + smb2_util_close(tree, io.out.file.handle); + + + torture_comment(tctx, "put back original sd\n"); + set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd_orig; + status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + + +done: + smb2_util_close(tree, handle); + smb2_deltree(tree, BASEDIR); + smb2_tdis(tree); + smb2_logoff(tree->session); + return ret; +} + + +/* + test the mapping of the SEC_GENERIC_xx bits to SEC_STD_xx and + SEC_FILE_xx bits + Note: This test was copied from raw/acls.c. +*/ +static bool test_generic_bits(struct torture_context *tctx, struct smb2_tree *tree) +{ + NTSTATUS status; + struct smb2_create io; + const char *fname = BASEDIR "\\generic.txt"; + bool ret = true; + struct smb2_handle handle = {{0}}; + int i; + union smb_fileinfo q; + union smb_setfileinfo set; + struct security_descriptor *sd, *sd_orig, *sd2; + const char *owner_sid; + const struct { + uint32_t gen_bits; + uint32_t specific_bits; + } file_mappings[] = { + { 0, 0 }, + { SEC_GENERIC_READ, SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_READ }, + { SEC_GENERIC_WRITE, SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_WRITE }, + { SEC_GENERIC_EXECUTE, SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_EXECUTE }, + { SEC_GENERIC_ALL, SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_ALL }, + { SEC_FILE_READ_DATA, SEC_FILE_READ_DATA }, + { SEC_FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTE, SEC_FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTE } + }; + const struct { + uint32_t gen_bits; + uint32_t specific_bits; + } dir_mappings[] = { + { 0, 0 }, + { SEC_GENERIC_READ, SEC_RIGHTS_DIR_READ }, + { SEC_GENERIC_WRITE, SEC_RIGHTS_DIR_WRITE }, + { SEC_GENERIC_EXECUTE, SEC_RIGHTS_DIR_EXECUTE }, + { SEC_GENERIC_ALL, SEC_RIGHTS_DIR_ALL } + }; + bool has_restore_privilege = false; + bool has_take_ownership_privilege = false; + + if (!smb2_util_setup_dir(tctx, tree, BASEDIR)) + return false; + + torture_comment(tctx, "TESTING FILE GENERIC BITS\n"); + + ZERO_STRUCT(io); + io.level = RAW_OPEN_SMB2; + io.in.create_flags = 0; + io.in.desired_access = + SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL | + SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC | + SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER; + io.in.create_options = 0; + io.in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL; + io.in.share_access = + NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_READ | + NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_WRITE; + io.in.alloc_size = 0; + io.in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN_IF; + io.in.impersonation_level = NTCREATEX_IMPERSONATION_ANONYMOUS; + io.in.security_flags = 0; + io.in.fname = fname; + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + handle = io.out.file.handle; + + torture_comment(tctx, "get the original sd\n"); + q.query_secdesc.level = RAW_FILEINFO_SEC_DESC; + q.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle; + q.query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL | SECINFO_OWNER; + status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + sd_orig = q.query_secdesc.out.sd; + + owner_sid = dom_sid_string(tctx, sd_orig->owner_sid); + +/* + * XXX: The smblsa calls use SMB as their transport - need to get rid of + * dependency. + */ +/* + status = smblsa_sid_check_privilege(cli, + owner_sid, + sec_privilege_name(SEC_PRIV_RESTORE)); + has_restore_privilege = NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { + torture_warning(tctx, "smblsa_sid_check_privilege - %s\n", nt_errstr(status)); + } + torture_comment(tctx, "SEC_PRIV_RESTORE - %s\n", has_restore_privilege?"Yes":"No"); + + status = smblsa_sid_check_privilege(cli, + owner_sid, + sec_privilege_name(SEC_PRIV_TAKE_OWNERSHIP)); + has_take_ownership_privilege = NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { + torture_warning(tctx, "smblsa_sid_check_privilege - %s\n", nt_errstr(status)); + } + torture_comment(tctx, "SEC_PRIV_TAKE_OWNERSHIP - %s\n", has_take_ownership_privilege?"Yes":"No"); +*/ + + for (i=0;i<ARRAY_SIZE(file_mappings);i++) { + uint32_t expected_mask = + SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC | + SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL | + SEC_FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTE | + SEC_STD_DELETE; + uint32_t expected_mask_anon = SEC_FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTE; + + if (has_restore_privilege) { + expected_mask_anon |= SEC_STD_DELETE; + } + + torture_comment(tctx, "Testing generic bits 0x%08x\n", + file_mappings[i].gen_bits); + sd = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx, + 0, owner_sid, NULL, + owner_sid, + SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED, + file_mappings[i].gen_bits, + 0, + NULL); + + set.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC; + set.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle; + set.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL | SECINFO_OWNER; + set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd; + + status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + + sd2 = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx, + 0, owner_sid, NULL, + owner_sid, + SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED, + file_mappings[i].specific_bits, + 0, + NULL); + + status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + CHECK_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR(q.query_secdesc.out.sd, sd2); + + io.in.desired_access = SEC_FLAG_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED; + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + CHECK_ACCESS_FLAGS(io.out.file.handle, + expected_mask | file_mappings[i].specific_bits); + smb2_util_close(tree, io.out.file.handle); + + if (!has_take_ownership_privilege) { + continue; + } + + torture_comment(tctx, "Testing generic bits 0x%08x (anonymous)\n", + file_mappings[i].gen_bits); + sd = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx, + 0, SID_NT_ANONYMOUS, NULL, + owner_sid, + SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED, + file_mappings[i].gen_bits, + 0, + NULL); + + set.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC; + set.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle; + set.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL | SECINFO_OWNER; + set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd; + + status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + + sd2 = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx, + 0, SID_NT_ANONYMOUS, NULL, + owner_sid, + SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED, + file_mappings[i].specific_bits, + 0, + NULL); + + status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + CHECK_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR(q.query_secdesc.out.sd, sd2); + + io.in.desired_access = SEC_FLAG_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED; + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + CHECK_ACCESS_FLAGS(io.out.file.handle, + expected_mask_anon | file_mappings[i].specific_bits); + smb2_util_close(tree, io.out.file.handle); + } + + torture_comment(tctx, "put back original sd\n"); + set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd_orig; + status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + + smb2_util_close(tree, handle); + smb2_util_unlink(tree, fname); + + + torture_comment(tctx, "TESTING DIR GENERIC BITS\n"); + + ZERO_STRUCT(io); + io.level = RAW_OPEN_SMB2; + io.in.create_flags = 0; + io.in.desired_access = + SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL | + SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC | + SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER; + io.in.create_options = NTCREATEX_OPTIONS_DIRECTORY; + io.in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY; + io.in.share_access = + NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_READ | + NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_WRITE; + io.in.alloc_size = 0; + io.in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN_IF; + io.in.impersonation_level = NTCREATEX_IMPERSONATION_ANONYMOUS; + io.in.security_flags = 0; + io.in.fname = fname; + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + handle = io.out.file.handle; + + torture_comment(tctx, "get the original sd\n"); + q.query_secdesc.level = RAW_FILEINFO_SEC_DESC; + q.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle; + q.query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL | SECINFO_OWNER; + status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + sd_orig = q.query_secdesc.out.sd; + + owner_sid = dom_sid_string(tctx, sd_orig->owner_sid); + +/* + * XXX: The smblsa calls use SMB as their transport - need to get rid of + * dependency. + */ +/* + status = smblsa_sid_check_privilege(cli, + owner_sid, + sec_privilege_name(SEC_PRIV_RESTORE)); + has_restore_privilege = NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { + torture_warning(tctx, "smblsa_sid_check_privilege - %s\n", nt_errstr(status)); + } + torture_comment(tctx, "SEC_PRIV_RESTORE - %s\n", has_restore_privilege?"Yes":"No"); + + status = smblsa_sid_check_privilege(cli, + owner_sid, + sec_privilege_name(SEC_PRIV_TAKE_OWNERSHIP)); + has_take_ownership_privilege = NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { + torture_warning(tctx, "smblsa_sid_check_privilege - %s\n", nt_errstr(status)); + } + torture_comment(tctx, "SEC_PRIV_TAKE_OWNERSHIP - %s\n", has_take_ownership_privilege?"Yes":"No"); + +*/ + for (i=0;i<ARRAY_SIZE(dir_mappings);i++) { + uint32_t expected_mask = + SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC | + SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL | + SEC_FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTE | + SEC_STD_DELETE; + uint32_t expected_mask_anon = SEC_FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTE; + + if (has_restore_privilege) { + expected_mask_anon |= SEC_STD_DELETE; + } + + torture_comment(tctx, "Testing generic bits 0x%08x\n", + file_mappings[i].gen_bits); + sd = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx, + 0, owner_sid, NULL, + owner_sid, + SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED, + dir_mappings[i].gen_bits, + 0, + NULL); + + set.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC; + set.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle; + set.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL | SECINFO_OWNER; + set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd; + + status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + + sd2 = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx, + 0, owner_sid, NULL, + owner_sid, + SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED, + dir_mappings[i].specific_bits, + 0, + NULL); + + status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + CHECK_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR(q.query_secdesc.out.sd, sd2); + + io.in.desired_access = SEC_FLAG_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED; + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + CHECK_ACCESS_FLAGS(io.out.file.handle, + expected_mask | dir_mappings[i].specific_bits); + smb2_util_close(tree, io.out.file.handle); + + if (!has_take_ownership_privilege) { + continue; + } + + torture_comment(tctx, "Testing generic bits 0x%08x (anonymous)\n", + file_mappings[i].gen_bits); + sd = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx, + 0, SID_NT_ANONYMOUS, NULL, + owner_sid, + SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED, + file_mappings[i].gen_bits, + 0, + NULL); + + set.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC; + set.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle; + set.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL | SECINFO_OWNER; + set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd; + + status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + + sd2 = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx, + 0, SID_NT_ANONYMOUS, NULL, + owner_sid, + SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED, + file_mappings[i].specific_bits, + 0, + NULL); + + status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + CHECK_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR(q.query_secdesc.out.sd, sd2); + + io.in.desired_access = SEC_FLAG_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED; + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + CHECK_ACCESS_FLAGS(io.out.file.handle, + expected_mask_anon | dir_mappings[i].specific_bits); + smb2_util_close(tree, io.out.file.handle); + } + + torture_comment(tctx, "put back original sd\n"); + set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd_orig; + status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + + smb2_util_close(tree, handle); + smb2_util_unlink(tree, fname); + +done: + smb2_util_close(tree, handle); + smb2_deltree(tree, BASEDIR); + smb2_tdis(tree); + smb2_logoff(tree->session); + return ret; +} + + +/* + see what access bits the owner of a file always gets + Note: This test was copied from raw/acls.c. +*/ +static bool test_owner_bits(struct torture_context *tctx, struct smb2_tree *tree) +{ + NTSTATUS status; + struct smb2_create io; + const char *fname = BASEDIR "\\test_owner_bits.txt"; + bool ret = true; + struct smb2_handle handle = {{0}}; + int i; + union smb_fileinfo q; + union smb_setfileinfo set; + struct security_descriptor *sd, *sd_orig; + const char *owner_sid; + uint32_t expected_bits; + + if (!smb2_util_setup_dir(tctx, tree, BASEDIR)) + return false; + + torture_comment(tctx, "TESTING FILE OWNER BITS\n"); + + ZERO_STRUCT(io); + io.level = RAW_OPEN_SMB2; + io.in.create_flags = 0; + io.in.desired_access = + SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL | + SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC | + SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER; + io.in.create_options = 0; + io.in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL; + io.in.share_access = + NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_READ | + NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_WRITE; + io.in.alloc_size = 0; + io.in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN_IF; + io.in.impersonation_level = NTCREATEX_IMPERSONATION_ANONYMOUS; + io.in.security_flags = 0; + io.in.fname = fname; + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + handle = io.out.file.handle; + + torture_comment(tctx, "get the original sd\n"); + q.query_secdesc.level = RAW_FILEINFO_SEC_DESC; + q.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle; + q.query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL | SECINFO_OWNER; + status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + sd_orig = q.query_secdesc.out.sd; + + owner_sid = dom_sid_string(tctx, sd_orig->owner_sid); + +/* + * XXX: The smblsa calls use SMB as their transport - need to get rid of + * dependency. + */ +/* + status = smblsa_sid_check_privilege(cli, + owner_sid, + sec_privilege_name(SEC_PRIV_RESTORE)); + has_restore_privilege = NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { + torture_warning(tctx, "smblsa_sid_check_privilege - %s\n", nt_errstr(status)); + } + torture_comment(tctx, "SEC_PRIV_RESTORE - %s\n", has_restore_privilege?"Yes":"No"); + + status = smblsa_sid_check_privilege(cli, + owner_sid, + sec_privilege_name(SEC_PRIV_TAKE_OWNERSHIP)); + has_take_ownership_privilege = NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { + torture_warning(tctx, "smblsa_sid_check_privilege - %s\n", nt_errstr(status)); + } + torture_comment(tctx, "SEC_PRIV_TAKE_OWNERSHIP - %s\n", has_take_ownership_privilege?"Yes":"No"); +*/ + + sd = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx, + 0, NULL, NULL, + owner_sid, + SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED, + SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA, + 0, + NULL); + + set.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC; + set.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle; + set.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL; + set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd; + + status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + + expected_bits = SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA | SEC_FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTE; + + for (i=0;i<16;i++) { + uint32_t bit = (1<<i); + io.in.desired_access = bit; + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io); + if (expected_bits & bit) { + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { + torture_warning(tctx, "failed with access mask 0x%08x of expected 0x%08x\n", + bit, expected_bits); + } + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + CHECK_ACCESS_FLAGS(io.out.file.handle, bit); + smb2_util_close(tree, io.out.file.handle); + } else { + if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { + torture_warning(tctx, "open succeeded with access mask 0x%08x of " + "expected 0x%08x - should fail\n", + bit, expected_bits); + } + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED); + } + } + + torture_comment(tctx, "put back original sd\n"); + set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd_orig; + status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + +done: + smb2_util_close(tree, handle); + smb2_util_unlink(tree, fname); + smb2_deltree(tree, BASEDIR); + smb2_tdis(tree); + smb2_logoff(tree->session); + return ret; +} + + + +/* + test the inheritance of ACL flags onto new files and directories + Note: This test was copied from raw/acls.c. +*/ +static bool test_inheritance(struct torture_context *tctx, struct smb2_tree *tree) +{ + NTSTATUS status; + struct smb2_create io; + const char *dname = BASEDIR "\\inheritance"; + const char *fname1 = BASEDIR "\\inheritance\\testfile"; + const char *fname2 = BASEDIR "\\inheritance\\testdir"; + bool ret = true; + struct smb2_handle handle = {{0}}; + struct smb2_handle handle2 = {{0}}; + int i; + union smb_fileinfo q; + union smb_setfileinfo set; + struct security_descriptor *sd, *sd2, *sd_orig=NULL, *sd_def1, *sd_def2; + const char *owner_sid; + const struct dom_sid *creator_owner; + const struct { + uint32_t parent_flags; + uint32_t file_flags; + uint32_t dir_flags; + } test_flags[] = { + { + 0, + 0, + 0 + }, + { + SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT, + 0, + SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT | + SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY, + }, + { + SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT, + 0, + SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT, + }, + { + SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT | + SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT, + 0, + SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT | + SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT, + }, + { + SEC_ACE_FLAG_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT, + 0, + 0, + }, + { + SEC_ACE_FLAG_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT | + SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT, + 0, + 0, + }, + { + SEC_ACE_FLAG_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT | + SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT, + 0, + 0, + }, + { + SEC_ACE_FLAG_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT | + SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT | + SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT, + 0, + 0, + }, + { + SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY, + 0, + 0, + }, + { + SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY | + SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT, + 0, + SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT | + SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY, + }, + { + SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY | + SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT, + 0, + SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT, + }, + { + SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY | + SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT | + SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT, + 0, + SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT | + SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT, + }, + { + SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY | + SEC_ACE_FLAG_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT, + 0, + 0, + }, + { + SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY | + SEC_ACE_FLAG_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT | + SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT, + 0, + 0, + }, + { + SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY | + SEC_ACE_FLAG_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT | + SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT, + 0, + 0, + }, + { + SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY | + SEC_ACE_FLAG_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT | + SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT | + SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT, + 0, + 0, + } + }; + + if (!smb2_util_setup_dir(tctx, tree, BASEDIR)) + return false; + + torture_comment(tctx, "TESTING ACL INHERITANCE\n"); + + ZERO_STRUCT(io); + io.level = RAW_OPEN_SMB2; + io.in.create_flags = 0; + io.in.desired_access = SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_ALL; + io.in.create_options = NTCREATEX_OPTIONS_DIRECTORY; + io.in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY; + io.in.share_access = 0; + io.in.alloc_size = 0; + io.in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_CREATE; + io.in.impersonation_level = NTCREATEX_IMPERSONATION_ANONYMOUS; + io.in.security_flags = 0; + io.in.fname = dname; + + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + handle = io.out.file.handle; + + torture_comment(tctx, "get the original sd\n"); + q.query_secdesc.level = RAW_FILEINFO_SEC_DESC; + q.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle; + q.query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL | SECINFO_OWNER; + status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + sd_orig = q.query_secdesc.out.sd; + + owner_sid = dom_sid_string(tctx, sd_orig->owner_sid); + + torture_comment(tctx, "owner_sid is %s\n", owner_sid); + + /* + * The Windows Default ACL for a new file, when there is no ACL to be + * inherited: FullControl for the owner and SYSTEM. + */ + sd_def1 = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx, + 0, owner_sid, NULL, + owner_sid, + SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED, + SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_ALL, + 0, + SID_NT_SYSTEM, + SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED, + SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_ALL, + 0, + NULL); + + /* + * Use this in the case the system being tested does not add an ACE for + * the SYSTEM SID. + */ + sd_def2 = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx, + 0, owner_sid, NULL, + owner_sid, + SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED, + SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_ALL, + 0, + NULL); + + creator_owner = dom_sid_parse_talloc(tctx, SID_CREATOR_OWNER); + + for (i=0;i<ARRAY_SIZE(test_flags);i++) { + sd = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx, + 0, NULL, NULL, + SID_CREATOR_OWNER, + SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED, + SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA, + test_flags[i].parent_flags, + SID_WORLD, + SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED, + SEC_FILE_ALL | SEC_STD_ALL, + 0, + NULL); + set.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC; + set.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle; + set.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL; + set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd; + status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + + io.in.fname = fname1; + io.in.create_options = 0; + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + handle2 = io.out.file.handle; + + q.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle2; + status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + + smb2_util_close(tree, handle2); + smb2_util_unlink(tree, fname1); + + if (!(test_flags[i].parent_flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT)) { + if (!security_descriptor_equal(q.query_secdesc.out.sd, sd_def1) && + !security_descriptor_equal(q.query_secdesc.out.sd, sd_def2)) { + torture_warning(tctx, "Expected default sd:\n"); + NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(security_descriptor, sd_def1); + torture_warning(tctx, "at %d - got:\n", i); + NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(security_descriptor, q.query_secdesc.out.sd); + } + goto check_dir; + } + + if (q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl == NULL || + q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl->num_aces != 1 || + q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl->aces[0].access_mask != SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA || + !dom_sid_equal(&q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl->aces[0].trustee, + sd_orig->owner_sid)) { + torture_warning(tctx, "Bad sd in child file at %d\n", i); + NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(security_descriptor, q.query_secdesc.out.sd); + ret = false; + goto check_dir; + } + + if (q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl->aces[0].flags != + test_flags[i].file_flags) { + torture_warning(tctx, "incorrect file_flags 0x%x - expected 0x%x for parent 0x%x with (i=%d)\n", + q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl->aces[0].flags, + test_flags[i].file_flags, + test_flags[i].parent_flags, + i); + ret = false; + } + + check_dir: + io.in.fname = fname2; + io.in.create_options = NTCREATEX_OPTIONS_DIRECTORY; + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + handle2 = io.out.file.handle; + + q.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle2; + status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + + smb2_util_close(tree, handle2); + smb2_util_rmdir(tree, fname2); + + if (!(test_flags[i].parent_flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT) && + (!(test_flags[i].parent_flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT) || + (test_flags[i].parent_flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT))) { + if (!security_descriptor_equal(q.query_secdesc.out.sd, sd_def1) && + !security_descriptor_equal(q.query_secdesc.out.sd, sd_def2)) { + torture_warning(tctx, "Expected default sd for dir at %d:\n", i); + NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(security_descriptor, sd_def1); + torture_warning(tctx, "got:\n"); + NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(security_descriptor, q.query_secdesc.out.sd); + } + continue; + } + + if ((test_flags[i].parent_flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT) && + (test_flags[i].parent_flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT)) { + if (q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl == NULL || + q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl->num_aces != 1 || + q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl->aces[0].access_mask != SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA || + !dom_sid_equal(&q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl->aces[0].trustee, + sd_orig->owner_sid) || + q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl->aces[0].flags != test_flags[i].dir_flags) { + torture_warning(tctx, "(CI & NP) Bad sd in child dir - expected 0x%x for parent 0x%x (i=%d)\n", + test_flags[i].dir_flags, + test_flags[i].parent_flags, i); + NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(security_descriptor, q.query_secdesc.out.sd); + torture_warning(tctx, "FYI, here is the parent sd:\n"); + NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(security_descriptor, sd); + ret = false; + continue; + } + } else if (test_flags[i].parent_flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT) { + if (q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl == NULL || + q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl->num_aces != 2 || + q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl->aces[0].access_mask != SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA || + !dom_sid_equal(&q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl->aces[0].trustee, + sd_orig->owner_sid) || + q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl->aces[1].access_mask != SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA || + !dom_sid_equal(&q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl->aces[1].trustee, + creator_owner) || + q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl->aces[0].flags != 0 || + q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl->aces[1].flags != + (test_flags[i].dir_flags | SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY)) { + torture_warning(tctx, "(CI) Bad sd in child dir - expected 0x%x for parent 0x%x (i=%d)\n", + test_flags[i].dir_flags, + test_flags[i].parent_flags, i); + NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(security_descriptor, q.query_secdesc.out.sd); + torture_warning(tctx, "FYI, here is the parent sd:\n"); + NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(security_descriptor, sd); + ret = false; + continue; + } + } else { + if (q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl == NULL || + q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl->num_aces != 1 || + q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl->aces[0].access_mask != SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA || + !dom_sid_equal(&q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl->aces[0].trustee, + creator_owner) || + q.query_secdesc.out.sd->dacl->aces[0].flags != test_flags[i].dir_flags) { + torture_warning(tctx, "(0) Bad sd in child dir - expected 0x%x for parent 0x%x (i=%d)\n", + test_flags[i].dir_flags, + test_flags[i].parent_flags, i); + NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(security_descriptor, q.query_secdesc.out.sd); + torture_warning(tctx, "FYI, here is the parent sd:\n"); + NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(security_descriptor, sd); + ret = false; + continue; + } + } + } + + torture_comment(tctx, "Testing access checks on inherited create with %s\n", fname1); + sd = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx, + 0, NULL, NULL, + owner_sid, + SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED, + SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA | SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC, + SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT, + SID_WORLD, + SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED, + SEC_FILE_ALL | SEC_STD_ALL, + 0, + NULL); + set.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC; + set.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle; + set.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL; + set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd; + status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + + /* Check DACL we just set. */ + torture_comment(tctx, "checking new sd\n"); + q.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle; + q.query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL; + status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + CHECK_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR(q.query_secdesc.out.sd, sd); + + io.in.fname = fname1; + io.in.create_options = 0; + io.in.desired_access = SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_ALL; + io.in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_CREATE; + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + handle2 = io.out.file.handle; + CHECK_ACCESS_FLAGS(handle2, SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_ALL); + + q.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle2; + q.query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL | SECINFO_OWNER; + status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + smb2_util_close(tree, handle2); + + sd2 = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx, + 0, owner_sid, NULL, + owner_sid, + SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED, + SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA | SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC, + 0, + NULL); + CHECK_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR(q.query_secdesc.out.sd, sd2); + + io.in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN; + io.in.desired_access = SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_ALL; + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io); + if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { + torture_warning(tctx, "failed: w2k3 ACL bug (allowed open when ACL should deny)\n"); + ret = false; + handle2 = io.out.file.handle; + CHECK_ACCESS_FLAGS(handle2, SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_ALL); + smb2_util_close(tree, handle2); + } else { + if (torture_setting_bool(tctx, "hide_on_access_denied", + false)) { + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND); + } else { + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED); + } + } + + torture_comment(tctx, "trying without execute\n"); + io.in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN; + io.in.desired_access = SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_ALL & ~SEC_FILE_EXECUTE; + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io); + if (torture_setting_bool(tctx, "hide_on_access_denied", false)) { + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND); + } else { + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED); + } + + torture_comment(tctx, "and with full permissions again\n"); + io.in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN; + io.in.desired_access = SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_ALL; + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io); + if (torture_setting_bool(tctx, "hide_on_access_denied", false)) { + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND); + } else { + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED); + } + + io.in.desired_access = SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA; + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + handle2 = io.out.file.handle; + CHECK_ACCESS_FLAGS(handle2, SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA); + smb2_util_close(tree, handle2); + + torture_comment(tctx, "put back original sd\n"); + set.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC; + set.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle; + set.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL; + set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd_orig; + status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + + smb2_util_close(tree, handle); + + io.in.desired_access = SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_ALL; + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io); + if (torture_setting_bool(tctx, "hide_on_access_denied", false)) { + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND); + } else { + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED); + } + + io.in.desired_access = SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA; + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + handle2 = io.out.file.handle; + CHECK_ACCESS_FLAGS(handle2, SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA); + smb2_util_close(tree, handle2); + + smb2_util_unlink(tree, fname1); + smb2_util_rmdir(tree, dname); + +done: + if (sd_orig != NULL) { + set.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC; + set.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle; + set.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL; + set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd_orig; + status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set); + } + + smb2_util_close(tree, handle); + smb2_deltree(tree, BASEDIR); + smb2_tdis(tree); + smb2_logoff(tree->session); + return ret; +} + +static bool test_inheritance_flags(struct torture_context *tctx, + struct smb2_tree *tree) +{ + NTSTATUS status; + struct smb2_create io; + const char *dname = BASEDIR "\\inheritance"; + const char *fname1 = BASEDIR "\\inheritance\\testfile"; + bool ret = true; + struct smb2_handle handle = {{0}}; + struct smb2_handle handle2 = {{0}}; + int i, j; + union smb_fileinfo q; + union smb_setfileinfo set; + struct security_descriptor *sd, *sd2, *sd_orig=NULL; + const char *owner_sid; + struct { + uint32_t parent_set_sd_type; /* 3 options */ + uint32_t parent_set_ace_inherit; /* 1 option */ + uint32_t parent_get_sd_type; + uint32_t parent_get_ace_inherit; + uint32_t child_get_sd_type; + uint32_t child_get_ace_inherit; + } tflags[16] = {{0}}; /* 2^4 */ + + for (i = 0; i < 15; i++) { + torture_comment(tctx, "i=%d:", i); + + if (i & 1) { + tflags[i].parent_set_sd_type |= + SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED; + torture_comment(tctx, "AUTO_INHERITED, "); + } + if (i & 2) { + tflags[i].parent_set_sd_type |= + SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERIT_REQ; + torture_comment(tctx, "AUTO_INHERIT_REQ, "); + } + if (i & 4) { + tflags[i].parent_set_sd_type |= + SEC_DESC_DACL_PROTECTED; + torture_comment(tctx, "PROTECTED, "); + tflags[i].parent_get_sd_type |= + SEC_DESC_DACL_PROTECTED; + } + if (i & 8) { + tflags[i].parent_set_ace_inherit |= + SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE; + torture_comment(tctx, "INHERITED, "); + tflags[i].parent_get_ace_inherit |= + SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE; + } + + if ((tflags[i].parent_set_sd_type & + (SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED | SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERIT_REQ)) == + (SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED | SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERIT_REQ)) { + tflags[i].parent_get_sd_type |= + SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED; + tflags[i].child_get_sd_type |= + SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED; + tflags[i].child_get_ace_inherit |= + SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE; + torture_comment(tctx, " ... parent is AUTO INHERITED"); + } + + if (tflags[i].parent_set_ace_inherit & + SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE) { + tflags[i].parent_get_ace_inherit = + SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE; + torture_comment(tctx, " ... parent ACE is INHERITED"); + } + + torture_comment(tctx, "\n"); + } + + if (!smb2_util_setup_dir(tctx, tree, BASEDIR)) + return false; + + torture_comment(tctx, "TESTING ACL INHERITANCE FLAGS\n"); + + ZERO_STRUCT(io); + io.level = RAW_OPEN_SMB2; + io.in.create_flags = 0; + io.in.desired_access = SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_ALL; + io.in.create_options = NTCREATEX_OPTIONS_DIRECTORY; + io.in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY; + io.in.share_access = NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_MASK; + io.in.alloc_size = 0; + io.in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_CREATE; + io.in.impersonation_level = NTCREATEX_IMPERSONATION_ANONYMOUS; + io.in.security_flags = 0; + io.in.fname = dname; + + torture_comment(tctx, "creating initial directory %s\n", dname); + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + handle = io.out.file.handle; + + torture_comment(tctx, "getting original sd\n"); + q.query_secdesc.level = RAW_FILEINFO_SEC_DESC; + q.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle; + q.query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL | SECINFO_OWNER; + status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + sd_orig = q.query_secdesc.out.sd; + + owner_sid = dom_sid_string(tctx, sd_orig->owner_sid); + torture_comment(tctx, "owner_sid is %s\n", owner_sid); + + for (i=0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tflags); i++) { + torture_comment(tctx, "setting a new sd on directory, pass #%d\n", i); + + sd = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx, + tflags[i].parent_set_sd_type, + NULL, NULL, + owner_sid, + SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED, + SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA | SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC, + SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT | + SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT | + tflags[i].parent_set_ace_inherit, + SID_WORLD, + SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED, + SEC_FILE_ALL | SEC_STD_ALL, + 0, + NULL); + set.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC; + set.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle; + set.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL; + set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd; + status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + + /* + * Check DACL we just set, except change the bits to what they + * should be. + */ + torture_comment(tctx, " checking new sd\n"); + + /* REQ bit should always be false. */ + sd->type &= ~SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERIT_REQ; + + if ((tflags[i].parent_get_sd_type & SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED) == 0) + sd->type &= ~SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED; + + q.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle; + q.query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL; + status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + CHECK_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR(q.query_secdesc.out.sd, sd); + + /* Create file. */ + torture_comment(tctx, " creating file %s\n", fname1); + io.in.fname = fname1; + io.in.create_options = 0; + io.in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL; + io.in.desired_access = SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_ALL; + io.in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_CREATE; + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + handle2 = io.out.file.handle; + CHECK_ACCESS_FLAGS(handle2, SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_ALL); + + q.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle2; + q.query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL | SECINFO_OWNER; + status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + + torture_comment(tctx, " checking sd on file %s\n", fname1); + sd2 = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx, + tflags[i].child_get_sd_type, + owner_sid, NULL, + owner_sid, + SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED, + SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA | SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC, + tflags[i].child_get_ace_inherit, + NULL); + CHECK_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR(q.query_secdesc.out.sd, sd2); + + /* + * Set new sd on file ... prove that the bits have nothing to + * do with the parents bits when manually setting an ACL. The + * _AUTO_INHERITED bit comes directly from the ACL set. + */ + for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(tflags); j++) { + torture_comment(tctx, " setting new file sd, pass #%d\n", j); + + /* Change sd type. */ + sd2->type &= ~(SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED | + SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERIT_REQ | + SEC_DESC_DACL_PROTECTED); + sd2->type |= tflags[j].parent_set_sd_type; + + sd2->dacl->aces[0].flags &= + ~SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE; + sd2->dacl->aces[0].flags |= + tflags[j].parent_set_ace_inherit; + + set.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC; + set.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle2; + set.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL; + set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd2; + status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + + /* Check DACL we just set. */ + sd2->type &= ~SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERIT_REQ; + if ((tflags[j].parent_get_sd_type & SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED) == 0) + sd2->type &= ~SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED; + + q.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle2; + q.query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL | SECINFO_OWNER; + status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + + CHECK_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR(q.query_secdesc.out.sd, sd2); + } + + smb2_util_close(tree, handle2); + smb2_util_unlink(tree, fname1); + } + +done: + smb2_util_close(tree, handle); + smb2_deltree(tree, BASEDIR); + smb2_tdis(tree); + smb2_logoff(tree->session); + return ret; +} + +/* + * This is basically a copy of test_inheritance_flags() with an additional twist + * to change the owner of the testfile, verifying that the security descriptor + * flags are not altered. + */ +static bool test_sd_flags_vs_chown(struct torture_context *tctx, + struct smb2_tree *tree) +{ + NTSTATUS status; + struct smb2_create io; + const char *dname = BASEDIR "\\inheritance"; + const char *fname1 = BASEDIR "\\inheritance\\testfile"; + bool ret = true; + struct smb2_handle handle = {{0}}; + struct smb2_handle handle2 = {{0}}; + int i, j; + union smb_fileinfo q; + union smb_setfileinfo set; + struct security_descriptor *sd, *sd2, *sd_orig=NULL; + struct security_descriptor *owner_sd = NULL; + const char *owner_sid_string = NULL; + struct dom_sid *owner_sid = NULL; + struct dom_sid world_sid = global_sid_World; + struct { + uint32_t parent_set_sd_type; /* 3 options */ + uint32_t parent_set_ace_inherit; /* 1 option */ + uint32_t parent_get_sd_type; + uint32_t parent_get_ace_inherit; + uint32_t child_get_sd_type; + uint32_t child_get_ace_inherit; + } tflags[16] = {{0}}; /* 2^4 */ + + owner_sd = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx, + 0, + SID_WORLD, + NULL, + NULL); + torture_assert_not_null_goto(tctx, owner_sd, ret, done, + "security_descriptor_dacl_create failed\n"); + + for (i = 0; i < 15; i++) { + torture_comment(tctx, "i=%d:", i); + + if (i & 1) { + tflags[i].parent_set_sd_type |= + SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED; + torture_comment(tctx, "AUTO_INHERITED, "); + } + if (i & 2) { + tflags[i].parent_set_sd_type |= + SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERIT_REQ; + torture_comment(tctx, "AUTO_INHERIT_REQ, "); + } + if (i & 4) { + tflags[i].parent_set_sd_type |= + SEC_DESC_DACL_PROTECTED; + torture_comment(tctx, "PROTECTED, "); + tflags[i].parent_get_sd_type |= + SEC_DESC_DACL_PROTECTED; + } + if (i & 8) { + tflags[i].parent_set_ace_inherit |= + SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE; + torture_comment(tctx, "INHERITED, "); + tflags[i].parent_get_ace_inherit |= + SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE; + } + + if ((tflags[i].parent_set_sd_type & + (SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED | SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERIT_REQ)) == + (SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED | SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERIT_REQ)) { + tflags[i].parent_get_sd_type |= + SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED; + tflags[i].child_get_sd_type |= + SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED; + tflags[i].child_get_ace_inherit |= + SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE; + torture_comment(tctx, " ... parent is AUTO INHERITED"); + } + + if (tflags[i].parent_set_ace_inherit & + SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE) { + tflags[i].parent_get_ace_inherit = + SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE; + torture_comment(tctx, " ... parent ACE is INHERITED"); + } + + torture_comment(tctx, "\n"); + } + + if (!smb2_util_setup_dir(tctx, tree, BASEDIR)) + return false; + + torture_comment(tctx, "TESTING ACL INHERITANCE FLAGS\n"); + + ZERO_STRUCT(io); + io.level = RAW_OPEN_SMB2; + io.in.create_flags = 0; + io.in.desired_access = SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_ALL; + io.in.create_options = NTCREATEX_OPTIONS_DIRECTORY; + io.in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY; + io.in.share_access = NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_MASK; + io.in.alloc_size = 0; + io.in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_CREATE; + io.in.impersonation_level = NTCREATEX_IMPERSONATION_ANONYMOUS; + io.in.security_flags = 0; + io.in.fname = dname; + + torture_comment(tctx, "creating initial directory %s\n", dname); + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + handle = io.out.file.handle; + + torture_comment(tctx, "getting original sd\n"); + q.query_secdesc.level = RAW_FILEINFO_SEC_DESC; + q.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle; + q.query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL | SECINFO_OWNER; + status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + sd_orig = q.query_secdesc.out.sd; + + owner_sid = sd_orig->owner_sid; + owner_sid_string = dom_sid_string(tctx, sd_orig->owner_sid); + torture_comment(tctx, "owner_sid is %s\n", owner_sid_string); + + for (i=0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tflags); i++) { + torture_comment(tctx, "setting a new sd on directory, pass #%d\n", i); + + sd = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx, + tflags[i].parent_set_sd_type, + NULL, NULL, + owner_sid_string, + SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED, + SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA | SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC, + SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT | + SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT | + tflags[i].parent_set_ace_inherit, + SID_WORLD, + SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED, + SEC_FILE_ALL | SEC_STD_ALL, + 0, + NULL); + set.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC; + set.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle; + set.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL; + set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd; + status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + + /* + * Check DACL we just set, except change the bits to what they + * should be. + */ + torture_comment(tctx, " checking new sd\n"); + + /* REQ bit should always be false. */ + sd->type &= ~SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERIT_REQ; + + if ((tflags[i].parent_get_sd_type & SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED) == 0) + sd->type &= ~SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED; + + q.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle; + q.query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL; + status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + CHECK_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR(q.query_secdesc.out.sd, sd); + + /* Create file. */ + torture_comment(tctx, " creating file %s\n", fname1); + io.in.fname = fname1; + io.in.create_options = 0; + io.in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL; + io.in.desired_access = SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_ALL; + io.in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_CREATE; + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + handle2 = io.out.file.handle; + CHECK_ACCESS_FLAGS(handle2, SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_ALL); + + q.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle2; + q.query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL | SECINFO_OWNER; + status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + + torture_comment(tctx, " checking sd on file %s\n", fname1); + sd2 = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx, + tflags[i].child_get_sd_type, + owner_sid_string, NULL, + owner_sid_string, + SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED, + SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA | SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC, + tflags[i].child_get_ace_inherit, + NULL); + CHECK_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR(q.query_secdesc.out.sd, sd2); + + /* + * Set new sd on file ... prove that the bits have nothing to + * do with the parents bits when manually setting an ACL. The + * _AUTO_INHERITED bit comes directly from the ACL set. + */ + for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(tflags); j++) { + torture_comment(tctx, " setting new file sd, pass #%d\n", j); + + /* Change sd type. */ + sd2->type &= ~(SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED | + SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERIT_REQ | + SEC_DESC_DACL_PROTECTED); + sd2->type |= tflags[j].parent_set_sd_type; + + sd2->dacl->aces[0].flags &= + ~SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERITED_ACE; + sd2->dacl->aces[0].flags |= + tflags[j].parent_set_ace_inherit; + + set.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC; + set.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle2; + set.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL; + set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd2; + status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + + /* Check DACL we just set. */ + sd2->type &= ~SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERIT_REQ; + if ((tflags[j].parent_get_sd_type & SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED) == 0) + sd2->type &= ~SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED; + + q.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle2; + q.query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL | SECINFO_OWNER; + status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + + CHECK_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR(q.query_secdesc.out.sd, sd2); + + /* + * Check that changing ownder doesn't affect SD flags. + * + * Do this by first changing ownder to world and then + * back to the original ownder. Afterwards compare SD, + * should be the same. + */ + owner_sd->owner_sid = &world_sid; + set.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC; + set.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle2; + set.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_OWNER; + set.set_secdesc.in.sd = owner_sd; + status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + + owner_sd->owner_sid = owner_sid; + set.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC; + set.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle2; + set.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_OWNER; + set.set_secdesc.in.sd = owner_sd; + status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + + q.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle2; + q.query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL | SECINFO_OWNER; + status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + + CHECK_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR(q.query_secdesc.out.sd, sd2); + torture_assert_goto(tctx, ret, ret, done, "CHECK_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR failed\n"); + } + + smb2_util_close(tree, handle2); + smb2_util_unlink(tree, fname1); + } + +done: + smb2_util_close(tree, handle); + smb2_deltree(tree, BASEDIR); + smb2_tdis(tree); + smb2_logoff(tree->session); + return ret; +} + +/* + test dynamic acl inheritance + Note: This test was copied from raw/acls.c. +*/ +static bool test_inheritance_dynamic(struct torture_context *tctx, + struct smb2_tree *tree) +{ + NTSTATUS status; + struct smb2_create io; + const char *dname = BASEDIR "\\inheritance"; + const char *fname1 = BASEDIR "\\inheritance\\testfile"; + bool ret = true; + struct smb2_handle handle = {{0}}; + struct smb2_handle handle2 = {{0}}; + union smb_fileinfo q; + union smb_setfileinfo set; + struct security_descriptor *sd, *sd_orig=NULL; + const char *owner_sid; + + torture_comment(tctx, "TESTING DYNAMIC ACL INHERITANCE\n"); + + if (!smb2_util_setup_dir(tctx, tree, BASEDIR)) + return false; + + ZERO_STRUCT(io); + io.level = RAW_OPEN_SMB2; + io.in.create_flags = 0; + io.in.desired_access = SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_ALL; + io.in.create_options = NTCREATEX_OPTIONS_DIRECTORY; + io.in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY; + io.in.share_access = 0; + io.in.alloc_size = 0; + io.in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_CREATE; + io.in.impersonation_level = NTCREATEX_IMPERSONATION_ANONYMOUS; + io.in.security_flags = 0; + io.in.fname = dname; + + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + handle = io.out.file.handle; + + torture_comment(tctx, "get the original sd\n"); + q.query_secdesc.level = RAW_FILEINFO_SEC_DESC; + q.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle; + q.query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL | SECINFO_OWNER; + status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + sd_orig = q.query_secdesc.out.sd; + + owner_sid = dom_sid_string(tctx, sd_orig->owner_sid); + + torture_comment(tctx, "owner_sid is %s\n", owner_sid); + + sd = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx, + 0, NULL, NULL, + owner_sid, + SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED, + SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA | SEC_STD_DELETE | SEC_FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTE, + SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT, + NULL); + sd->type |= SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED | SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERIT_REQ; + + set.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC; + set.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle; + set.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL; + set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd; + status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + + torture_comment(tctx, "create a file with an inherited acl\n"); + io.in.fname = fname1; + io.in.create_options = 0; + io.in.desired_access = SEC_FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTE; + io.in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_CREATE; + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + handle2 = io.out.file.handle; + smb2_util_close(tree, handle2); + + torture_comment(tctx, "try and access file with base rights - should be OK\n"); + io.in.desired_access = SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA; + io.in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN; + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + handle2 = io.out.file.handle; + smb2_util_close(tree, handle2); + + torture_comment(tctx, "try and access file with extra rights - should be denied\n"); + io.in.desired_access = SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA | SEC_FILE_EXECUTE; + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED); + + torture_comment(tctx, "update parent sd\n"); + sd = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx, + 0, NULL, NULL, + owner_sid, + SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED, + SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA | SEC_STD_DELETE | SEC_FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTE | SEC_FILE_EXECUTE, + SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT, + NULL); + sd->type |= SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED | SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERIT_REQ; + + set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd; + status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + + torture_comment(tctx, "try and access file with base rights - should be OK\n"); + io.in.desired_access = SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA; + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + handle2 = io.out.file.handle; + smb2_util_close(tree, handle2); + + + torture_comment(tctx, "try and access now - should be OK if dynamic inheritance works\n"); + io.in.desired_access = SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA | SEC_FILE_EXECUTE; + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io); + if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED)) { + torture_comment(tctx, "Server does not have dynamic inheritance\n"); + } + if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_OK)) { + torture_comment(tctx, "Server does have dynamic inheritance\n"); + } + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED); + + smb2_util_unlink(tree, fname1); + +done: + torture_comment(tctx, "put back original sd\n"); + set.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC; + set.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle; + set.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL; + set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd_orig; + status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set); + + smb2_util_close(tree, handle); + smb2_util_rmdir(tree, dname); + smb2_deltree(tree, BASEDIR); + smb2_tdis(tree); + smb2_logoff(tree->session); + + return ret; +} + +#define CHECK_STATUS_FOR_BIT_ACTION(status, bits, action) do { \ + if (!(bits & desired_64)) {\ + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED); \ + action; \ + } else { \ + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); \ + } \ +} while (0) + +#define CHECK_STATUS_FOR_BIT(status, bits, access) do { \ + if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { \ + if (!(granted & access)) {\ + ret = false; \ + torture_result(tctx, TORTURE_FAIL, "(%s) %s but flags 0x%08X are not granted! granted[0x%08X] desired[0x%08X]\n", \ + __location__, nt_errstr(status), access, granted, desired); \ + goto done; \ + } \ + } else { \ + if (granted & access) {\ + ret = false; \ + torture_result(tctx, TORTURE_FAIL, "(%s) %s but flags 0x%08X are granted! granted[0x%08X] desired[0x%08X]\n", \ + __location__, nt_errstr(status), access, granted, desired); \ + goto done; \ + } \ + } \ + CHECK_STATUS_FOR_BIT_ACTION(status, bits, do {} while (0)); \ +} while (0) + +#if 0 +/* test what access mask is needed for getting and setting security_descriptors */ +/* Note: This test was copied from raw/acls.c. */ +static bool test_sd_get_set(struct torture_context *tctx, struct smb2_tree *tree) +{ + NTSTATUS status; + bool ret = true; + struct smb2_create io; + union smb_fileinfo fi; + union smb_setfileinfo si; + struct security_descriptor *sd; + struct security_descriptor *sd_owner = NULL; + struct security_descriptor *sd_group = NULL; + struct security_descriptor *sd_dacl = NULL; + struct security_descriptor *sd_sacl = NULL; + struct smb2_handle handle; + const char *fname = BASEDIR "\\sd_get_set.txt"; + uint64_t desired_64; + uint32_t desired = 0, granted; + int i = 0; +#define NO_BITS_HACK (((uint64_t)1)<<32) + uint64_t open_bits = + SEC_MASK_GENERIC | + SEC_FLAG_SYSTEM_SECURITY | + SEC_FLAG_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED | + SEC_STD_ALL | + SEC_FILE_ALL | + NO_BITS_HACK; + uint64_t get_owner_bits = SEC_MASK_GENERIC | SEC_FLAG_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED | SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL; + uint64_t set_owner_bits = SEC_GENERIC_ALL | SEC_FLAG_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED | SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER; + uint64_t get_group_bits = SEC_MASK_GENERIC | SEC_FLAG_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED | SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL; + uint64_t set_group_bits = SEC_GENERIC_ALL | SEC_FLAG_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED | SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER; + uint64_t get_dacl_bits = SEC_MASK_GENERIC | SEC_FLAG_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED | SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL; + uint64_t set_dacl_bits = SEC_GENERIC_ALL | SEC_FLAG_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED | SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC; + uint64_t get_sacl_bits = SEC_FLAG_SYSTEM_SECURITY; + uint64_t set_sacl_bits = SEC_FLAG_SYSTEM_SECURITY; + + if (!smb2_util_setup_dir(tctx, tree, BASEDIR)) + return false; + + torture_comment(tctx, "TESTING ACCESS MASKS FOR SD GET/SET\n"); + + /* first create a file with full access for everyone */ + sd = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx, + 0, SID_NT_ANONYMOUS, SID_BUILTIN_USERS, + SID_WORLD, + SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED, + SEC_GENERIC_ALL, + 0, + NULL); + sd->type |= SEC_DESC_SACL_PRESENT; + sd->sacl = NULL; + ZERO_STRUCT(io); + io.level = RAW_OPEN_SMB2; + io.in.create_flags = 0; + io.in.desired_access = SEC_GENERIC_ALL; + io.in.create_options = 0; + io.in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL; + io.in.share_access = NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_READ | NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_WRITE; + io.in.alloc_size = 0; + io.in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OVERWRITE_IF; + io.in.impersonation_level = NTCREATEX_IMPERSONATION_ANONYMOUS; + io.in.security_flags = 0; + io.in.fname = fname; + io.in.sec_desc = sd; + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + handle = io.out.file.handle; + + status = smb2_util_close(tree, handle); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + + /* + * now try each access_mask bit and no bit at all in a loop + * and see what's allowed + * NOTE: if i == 32 it means access_mask = 0 (see NO_BITS_HACK above) + */ + for (i=0; i <= 32; i++) { + desired_64 = ((uint64_t)1) << i; + desired = (uint32_t)desired_64; + + /* first open the file with the desired access */ + io.level = RAW_OPEN_SMB2; + io.in.desired_access = desired; + io.in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN; + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io); + CHECK_STATUS_FOR_BIT_ACTION(status, open_bits, goto next); + handle = io.out.file.handle; + + /* then check what access was granted */ + fi.access_information.level = RAW_FILEINFO_ACCESS_INFORMATION; + fi.access_information.in.file.handle = handle; + status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &fi); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + granted = fi.access_information.out.access_flags; + + /* test the owner */ + ZERO_STRUCT(fi); + fi.query_secdesc.level = RAW_FILEINFO_SEC_DESC; + fi.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle; + fi.query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_OWNER; + status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &fi); + CHECK_STATUS_FOR_BIT(status, get_owner_bits, SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL); + if (fi.query_secdesc.out.sd) { + sd_owner = fi.query_secdesc.out.sd; + } else if (!sd_owner) { + sd_owner = sd; + } + si.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC; + si.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle; + si.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_OWNER; + si.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd_owner; + status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &si); + CHECK_STATUS_FOR_BIT(status, set_owner_bits, SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER); + + /* test the group */ + ZERO_STRUCT(fi); + fi.query_secdesc.level = RAW_FILEINFO_SEC_DESC; + fi.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle; + fi.query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_GROUP; + status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &fi); + CHECK_STATUS_FOR_BIT(status, get_group_bits, SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL); + if (fi.query_secdesc.out.sd) { + sd_group = fi.query_secdesc.out.sd; + } else if (!sd_group) { + sd_group = sd; + } + si.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC; + si.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle; + si.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_GROUP; + si.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd_group; + status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &si); + CHECK_STATUS_FOR_BIT(status, set_group_bits, SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER); + + /* test the DACL */ + ZERO_STRUCT(fi); + fi.query_secdesc.level = RAW_FILEINFO_SEC_DESC; + fi.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle; + fi.query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL; + status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &fi); + CHECK_STATUS_FOR_BIT(status, get_dacl_bits, SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL); + if (fi.query_secdesc.out.sd) { + sd_dacl = fi.query_secdesc.out.sd; + } else if (!sd_dacl) { + sd_dacl = sd; + } + si.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC; + si.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle; + si.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL; + si.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd_dacl; + status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &si); + CHECK_STATUS_FOR_BIT(status, set_dacl_bits, SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC); + + /* test the SACL */ + ZERO_STRUCT(fi); + fi.query_secdesc.level = RAW_FILEINFO_SEC_DESC; + fi.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle; + fi.query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_SACL; + status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &fi); + CHECK_STATUS_FOR_BIT(status, get_sacl_bits, SEC_FLAG_SYSTEM_SECURITY); + if (fi.query_secdesc.out.sd) { + sd_sacl = fi.query_secdesc.out.sd; + } else if (!sd_sacl) { + sd_sacl = sd; + } + si.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC; + si.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle; + si.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_SACL; + si.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd_sacl; + status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &si); + CHECK_STATUS_FOR_BIT(status, set_sacl_bits, SEC_FLAG_SYSTEM_SECURITY); + + /* close the handle */ + status = smb2_util_close(tree, handle); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); +next: + continue; + } + +done: + smb2_util_close(tree, handle); + smb2_util_unlink(tree, fname); + smb2_deltree(tree, BASEDIR); + smb2_tdis(tree); + smb2_logoff(tree->session); + + return ret; +} +#endif + +static bool test_access_based(struct torture_context *tctx, + struct smb2_tree *tree) +{ + struct smb2_tree *tree1 = NULL; + NTSTATUS status; + struct smb2_create io; + const char *fname = BASEDIR "\\testfile"; + bool ret = true; + struct smb2_handle fhandle, dhandle; + union smb_fileinfo q; + union smb_setfileinfo set; + struct security_descriptor *sd, *sd_orig=NULL; + const char *owner_sid; + uint32_t flags = 0; + /* + * Can't test without SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL as we + * own the file and implicitly have SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL. + */ + uint32_t access_masks[] = { + /* Full READ access. */ + SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL|FILE_READ_DATA| + FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES|FILE_READ_EA, + + /* Missing FILE_READ_EA. */ + SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL|FILE_READ_DATA| + FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES, + + /* Missing FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES. */ + SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL|FILE_READ_DATA| + FILE_READ_EA, + + /* Missing FILE_READ_DATA. */ + SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL| + FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES|FILE_READ_EA, + }; + unsigned int i; + unsigned int count; + struct smb2_find f; + union smb_search_data *d; + + ZERO_STRUCT(fhandle); + ZERO_STRUCT(dhandle); + + if (!torture_smb2_con_share(tctx, "hideunread", &tree1)) { + torture_result(tctx, TORTURE_FAIL, "(%s) Unable to connect " + "to share 'hideunread'\n", + __location__); + ret = false; + goto done; + } + + flags = smb2cli_tcon_flags(tree1->smbXcli); + + smb2_util_unlink(tree1, fname); + smb2_deltree(tree1, BASEDIR); + + torture_comment(tctx, "TESTING ACCESS BASED ENUMERATION\n"); + + if ((flags & SMB2_SHAREFLAG_ACCESS_BASED_DIRECTORY_ENUM)==0) { + torture_result(tctx, TORTURE_FAIL, "(%s) No access enumeration " + "on share 'hideunread'\n", + __location__); + ret = false; + goto done; + } + + if (!smb2_util_setup_dir(tctx, tree1, BASEDIR)) { + torture_result(tctx, TORTURE_FAIL, "(%s) Unable to setup %s\n", + __location__, BASEDIR); + ret = false; + goto done; + } + + /* Get a handle to the BASEDIR directory. */ + status = torture_smb2_testdir(tree1, BASEDIR, &dhandle); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + smb2_util_close(tree1, dhandle); + ZERO_STRUCT(dhandle); + + ZERO_STRUCT(io); + io.level = RAW_OPEN_SMB2; + io.in.create_flags = 0; + io.in.desired_access = SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_ALL; + io.in.create_options = 0; + io.in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL; + io.in.share_access = 0; + io.in.alloc_size = 0; + io.in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_CREATE; + io.in.impersonation_level = NTCREATEX_IMPERSONATION_ANONYMOUS; + io.in.security_flags = 0; + io.in.fname = fname; + + status = smb2_create(tree1, tctx, &io); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + fhandle = io.out.file.handle; + + torture_comment(tctx, "get the original sd\n"); + q.query_secdesc.level = RAW_FILEINFO_SEC_DESC; + q.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = fhandle; + q.query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL | SECINFO_OWNER; + status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree1, tctx, &q); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + sd_orig = q.query_secdesc.out.sd; + + owner_sid = dom_sid_string(tctx, sd_orig->owner_sid); + + torture_comment(tctx, "owner_sid is %s\n", owner_sid); + + /* Setup for the search. */ + ZERO_STRUCT(f); + f.in.pattern = "*"; + f.in.continue_flags = SMB2_CONTINUE_FLAG_REOPEN; + f.in.max_response_size = 0x1000; + f.in.level = SMB2_FIND_DIRECTORY_INFO; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(access_masks); i++) { + + sd = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx, + 0, NULL, NULL, + owner_sid, + SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED, + access_masks[i]|SEC_STD_SYNCHRONIZE, + 0, + NULL); + + set.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC; + set.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = fhandle; + set.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL; + set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd; + status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree1, &set); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + + /* Now see if we can see the file in a directory listing. */ + + /* Re-open dhandle. */ + status = torture_smb2_testdir(tree1, BASEDIR, &dhandle); + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + f.in.file.handle = dhandle; + + count = 0; + d = NULL; + status = smb2_find_level(tree1, tree1, &f, &count, &d); + TALLOC_FREE(d); + + CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK); + + smb2_util_close(tree1, dhandle); + ZERO_STRUCT(dhandle); + + if (i == 0) { + /* We should see the first sd. */ + if (count != 3) { + torture_result(tctx, TORTURE_FAIL, + "(%s) Normal SD - Unable " + "to see file %s\n", + __location__, + BASEDIR); + ret = false; + goto done; + } + } else { + /* But no others. */ + if (count != 2) { + torture_result(tctx, TORTURE_FAIL, + "(%s) SD 0x%x - can " + "see file %s\n", + __location__, + access_masks[i], + BASEDIR); + ret = false; + goto done; + } + } + } + +done: + + if (tree1) { + smb2_util_close(tree1, fhandle); + smb2_util_close(tree1, dhandle); + smb2_util_unlink(tree1, fname); + smb2_deltree(tree1, BASEDIR); + smb2_tdis(tree1); + smb2_logoff(tree1->session); + } + smb2_tdis(tree); + smb2_logoff(tree->session); + return ret; +} + +/* + * test Owner Rights, S-1-3-4 + */ +static bool test_owner_rights(struct torture_context *tctx, + struct smb2_tree *tree) +{ + const char *fname = BASEDIR "\\owner_right.txt"; + struct smb2_create cr; + struct smb2_handle handle = {{0}}; + union smb_fileinfo gi; + union smb_setfileinfo si; + struct security_descriptor *sd_orig = NULL; + struct security_descriptor *sd = NULL; + const char *owner_sid = NULL; + NTSTATUS mxac_status; + NTSTATUS status; + bool ret = true; + + smb2_deltree(tree, BASEDIR); + + ret = smb2_util_setup_dir(tctx, tree, BASEDIR); + torture_assert_goto(tctx, ret, ret, done, + "smb2_util_setup_dir failed\n"); + + torture_comment(tctx, "TESTING OWNER RIGHTS\n"); + + cr = (struct smb2_create) { + .in.desired_access = SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL | + SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC |SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER, + .in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, + .in.share_access = NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_MASK, + .in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN_IF, + .in.impersonation_level = NTCREATEX_IMPERSONATION_ANONYMOUS, + .in.fname = fname, + }; + + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &cr); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done, + "smb2_create failed\n"); + handle = cr.out.file.handle; + + torture_comment(tctx, "get the original sd\n"); + + gi = (union smb_fileinfo) { + .query_secdesc.level = RAW_FILEINFO_SEC_DESC, + .query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle, + .query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL|SECINFO_OWNER, + }; + + status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &gi); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done, + "smb2_getinfo_file failed\n"); + + sd_orig = gi.query_secdesc.out.sd; + owner_sid = dom_sid_string(tctx, sd_orig->owner_sid); + + /* + * Add a 2 element ACL + * SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_READ for the owner, + * SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA for SID_OWNER_RIGHTS. + * + * Proves that the owner and SID_OWNER_RIGHTS + * ACE entries are additive. + */ + sd = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx, 0, NULL, NULL, + owner_sid, + SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED, + SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_READ, + 0, + SID_OWNER_RIGHTS, + SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED, + SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA, + 0, + NULL); + torture_assert_not_null_goto(tctx, sd, ret, done, + "SD create failed\n"); + + si = (union smb_setfileinfo) { + .set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC, + .set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle, + .set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL, + .set_secdesc.in.sd = sd, + }; + + status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &si); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done, + "smb2_setinfo_file failed\n"); + + status = smb2_util_close(tree, handle); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done, + "smb2_util_close failed\n"); + ZERO_STRUCT(handle); + + cr = (struct smb2_create) { + .in.desired_access = SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL, + .in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, + .in.share_access = NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_MASK, + .in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN_IF, + .in.impersonation_level = NTCREATEX_IMPERSONATION_ANONYMOUS, + .in.query_maximal_access = true, + .in.fname = fname, + }; + + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &cr); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done, + "smb2_setinfo_file failed\n"); + handle = cr.out.file.handle; + + mxac_status = NT_STATUS(cr.out.maximal_access_status); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, mxac_status, ret, done, + "smb2_setinfo_file failed\n"); + + /* + * For some reasons Windows 2016 doesn't set SEC_STD_DELETE but we + * do. Mask it out so the test passes against Samba and Windows. + */ + torture_assert_int_equal_goto(tctx, + cr.out.maximal_access & ~SEC_STD_DELETE, + SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_READ | + SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA, + ret, done, + "Wrong maximum access\n"); + + status = smb2_util_close(tree, handle); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done, + "smb2_util_close failed\n"); + ZERO_STRUCT(handle); + +done: + if (!smb2_util_handle_empty(handle)) { + smb2_util_close(tree, handle); + } + smb2_deltree(tree, BASEDIR); + return ret; +} + +/* + * test Owner Rights with a leading DENY ACE, S-1-3-4 + */ +static bool test_owner_rights_deny(struct torture_context *tctx, + struct smb2_tree *tree) +{ + const char *fname = BASEDIR "\\owner_right_deny.txt"; + struct smb2_create cr; + struct smb2_handle handle = {{0}}; + union smb_fileinfo gi; + union smb_setfileinfo si; + struct security_descriptor *sd_orig = NULL; + struct security_descriptor *sd = NULL; + const char *owner_sid = NULL; + NTSTATUS mxac_status; + NTSTATUS status; + bool ret = true; + + smb2_deltree(tree, BASEDIR); + + ret = smb2_util_setup_dir(tctx, tree, BASEDIR); + torture_assert_goto(tctx, ret, ret, done, + "smb2_util_setup_dir failed\n"); + + torture_comment(tctx, "TESTING OWNER RIGHTS DENY\n"); + + cr = (struct smb2_create) { + .in.desired_access = SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL | + SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC |SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER, + .in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, + .in.share_access = NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_MASK, + .in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN_IF, + .in.impersonation_level = NTCREATEX_IMPERSONATION_ANONYMOUS, + .in.fname = fname, + }; + + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &cr); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done, + "smb2_create failed\n"); + handle = cr.out.file.handle; + + torture_comment(tctx, "get the original sd\n"); + + gi = (union smb_fileinfo) { + .query_secdesc.level = RAW_FILEINFO_SEC_DESC, + .query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle, + .query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL|SECINFO_OWNER, + }; + + status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &gi); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done, + "smb2_getinfo_file failed\n"); + + sd_orig = gi.query_secdesc.out.sd; + owner_sid = dom_sid_string(tctx, sd_orig->owner_sid); + + /* + * Add a 2 element ACL + * DENY SEC_FILE_DATA_READ for SID_OWNER_RIGHTS + * SEC_FILE_READ_DATA for the owner. + * + * Proves that the owner and SID_OWNER_RIGHTS + * ACE entries are additive. + */ + sd = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx, 0, NULL, NULL, + SID_OWNER_RIGHTS, + SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_DENIED, + SEC_FILE_READ_DATA, + 0, + owner_sid, + SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED, + SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_READ, + 0, + NULL); + torture_assert_not_null_goto(tctx, sd, ret, done, + "SD create failed\n"); + + si = (union smb_setfileinfo) { + .set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC, + .set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle, + .set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL, + .set_secdesc.in.sd = sd, + }; + + status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &si); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done, + "smb2_setinfo_file failed\n"); + + status = smb2_util_close(tree, handle); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done, + "smb2_util_close failed\n"); + ZERO_STRUCT(handle); + + cr = (struct smb2_create) { + .in.desired_access = SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL, + .in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, + .in.share_access = NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_MASK, + .in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN_IF, + .in.impersonation_level = NTCREATEX_IMPERSONATION_ANONYMOUS, + .in.query_maximal_access = true, + .in.fname = fname, + }; + + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &cr); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done, + "smb2_setinfo_file failed\n"); + handle = cr.out.file.handle; + + mxac_status = NT_STATUS(cr.out.maximal_access_status); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, mxac_status, ret, done, + "smb2_setinfo_file failed\n"); + + /* + * For some reasons Windows 2016 doesn't set SEC_STD_DELETE but we + * do. Mask it out so the test passes against Samba and Windows. + */ + torture_assert_int_equal_goto(tctx, + cr.out.maximal_access & ~SEC_STD_DELETE, + SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_READ & ~SEC_FILE_READ_DATA, + ret, done, + "Wrong maximum access\n"); + + status = smb2_util_close(tree, handle); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done, + "smb2_util_close failed\n"); + ZERO_STRUCT(handle); + +done: + if (!smb2_util_handle_empty(handle)) { + smb2_util_close(tree, handle); + } + smb2_deltree(tree, BASEDIR); + return ret; +} + +/* + * test Owner Rights with a trailing DENY ACE, S-1-3-4 + */ +static bool test_owner_rights_deny1(struct torture_context *tctx, + struct smb2_tree *tree) +{ + const char *fname = BASEDIR "\\owner_right_deny1.txt"; + struct smb2_create cr; + struct smb2_handle handle = {{0}}; + union smb_fileinfo gi; + union smb_setfileinfo si; + struct security_descriptor *sd_orig = NULL; + struct security_descriptor *sd = NULL; + const char *owner_sid = NULL; + NTSTATUS mxac_status; + NTSTATUS status; + bool ret = true; + + smb2_deltree(tree, BASEDIR); + + ret = smb2_util_setup_dir(tctx, tree, BASEDIR); + torture_assert_goto(tctx, ret, ret, done, + "smb2_util_setup_dir failed\n"); + + torture_comment(tctx, "TESTING OWNER RIGHTS DENY1\n"); + + cr = (struct smb2_create) { + .in.desired_access = SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL | + SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC |SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER, + .in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, + .in.share_access = NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_MASK, + .in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN_IF, + .in.impersonation_level = NTCREATEX_IMPERSONATION_ANONYMOUS, + .in.fname = fname, + }; + + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &cr); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done, + "smb2_create failed\n"); + handle = cr.out.file.handle; + + torture_comment(tctx, "get the original sd\n"); + + gi = (union smb_fileinfo) { + .query_secdesc.level = RAW_FILEINFO_SEC_DESC, + .query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle, + .query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL|SECINFO_OWNER, + }; + + status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &gi); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done, + "smb2_getinfo_file failed\n"); + + sd_orig = gi.query_secdesc.out.sd; + owner_sid = dom_sid_string(tctx, sd_orig->owner_sid); + + /* + * Add a 3 element ACL + * + * SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_READ allow for owner. + * SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA allow for SID-OWNER-RIGHTS. + * SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA|SEC_FILE_READ_DATA) deny for SID-OWNER-RIGHTS. + * + * Shows on Windows that trailing DENY entries don't + * override granted permissions in max access calculations. + */ + sd = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx, 0, NULL, NULL, + owner_sid, + SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED, + SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_READ, + 0, + SID_OWNER_RIGHTS, + SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED, + SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA, + 0, + SID_OWNER_RIGHTS, + SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_DENIED, + (SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA| + SEC_FILE_READ_DATA), + 0, + NULL); + torture_assert_not_null_goto(tctx, sd, ret, done, + "SD create failed\n"); + + si = (union smb_setfileinfo) { + .set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC, + .set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle, + .set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL, + .set_secdesc.in.sd = sd, + }; + + status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &si); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done, + "smb2_setinfo_file failed\n"); + + status = smb2_util_close(tree, handle); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done, + "smb2_util_close failed\n"); + ZERO_STRUCT(handle); + + cr = (struct smb2_create) { + .in.desired_access = SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL, + .in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, + .in.share_access = NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_MASK, + .in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN_IF, + .in.impersonation_level = NTCREATEX_IMPERSONATION_ANONYMOUS, + .in.query_maximal_access = true, + .in.fname = fname, + }; + + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &cr); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done, + "smb2_setinfo_file failed\n"); + handle = cr.out.file.handle; + + mxac_status = NT_STATUS(cr.out.maximal_access_status); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, mxac_status, ret, done, + "smb2_setinfo_file failed\n"); + + /* + * For some reasons Windows 2016 doesn't set SEC_STD_DELETE but we + * do. Mask it out so the test passes against Samba and Windows. + */ + torture_assert_int_equal_goto(tctx, + cr.out.maximal_access & ~SEC_STD_DELETE, + SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_READ | SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA, + ret, done, + "Wrong maximum access\n"); + + status = smb2_util_close(tree, handle); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done, + "smb2_util_close failed\n"); + ZERO_STRUCT(handle); + +done: + if (!smb2_util_handle_empty(handle)) { + smb2_util_close(tree, handle); + } + smb2_deltree(tree, BASEDIR); + return ret; +} + +/* + * test that shows that a DENY ACE doesn't remove rights granted + * by a previous ALLOW ACE. + */ +static bool test_deny1(struct torture_context *tctx, + struct smb2_tree *tree) +{ + const char *fname = BASEDIR "\\test_deny1.txt"; + struct smb2_create cr; + struct smb2_handle handle = {{0}}; + union smb_fileinfo gi; + union smb_setfileinfo si; + struct security_descriptor *sd_orig = NULL; + struct security_descriptor *sd = NULL; + const char *owner_sid = NULL; + NTSTATUS mxac_status; + NTSTATUS status; + bool ret = true; + + smb2_deltree(tree, BASEDIR); + + ret = smb2_util_setup_dir(tctx, tree, BASEDIR); + torture_assert_goto(tctx, ret, ret, done, + "smb2_util_setup_dir failed\n"); + + cr = (struct smb2_create) { + .in.desired_access = SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL | + SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC |SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER, + .in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, + .in.share_access = NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_MASK, + .in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN_IF, + .in.impersonation_level = NTCREATEX_IMPERSONATION_ANONYMOUS, + .in.fname = fname, + }; + + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &cr); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done, + "smb2_create failed\n"); + handle = cr.out.file.handle; + + torture_comment(tctx, "get the original sd\n"); + + gi = (union smb_fileinfo) { + .query_secdesc.level = RAW_FILEINFO_SEC_DESC, + .query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle, + .query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL|SECINFO_OWNER, + }; + + status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &gi); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done, + "smb2_getinfo_file failed\n"); + + sd_orig = gi.query_secdesc.out.sd; + owner_sid = dom_sid_string(tctx, sd_orig->owner_sid); + + /* + * Add a 2 element ACL + * + * SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_READ|SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA allow for owner. + * SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA deny for owner + * + * Shows on Windows that trailing DENY entries don't + * override granted permissions. + */ + sd = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx, 0, NULL, NULL, + owner_sid, + SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED, + SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_READ|SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA, + 0, + owner_sid, + SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_DENIED, + SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA, + 0, + NULL); + torture_assert_not_null_goto(tctx, sd, ret, done, + "SD create failed\n"); + + si = (union smb_setfileinfo) { + .set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC, + .set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle, + .set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL, + .set_secdesc.in.sd = sd, + }; + + status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &si); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done, + "smb2_setinfo_file failed\n"); + + status = smb2_util_close(tree, handle); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done, + "smb2_util_close failed\n"); + ZERO_STRUCT(handle); + + cr = (struct smb2_create) { + .in.desired_access = SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL | SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA, + .in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, + .in.share_access = NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_MASK, + .in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN_IF, + .in.impersonation_level = NTCREATEX_IMPERSONATION_ANONYMOUS, + .in.query_maximal_access = true, + .in.fname = fname, + }; + + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &cr); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done, + "smb2_create failed\n"); + handle = cr.out.file.handle; + + mxac_status = NT_STATUS(cr.out.maximal_access_status); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, mxac_status, ret, done, + "Wrong maximum access status\n"); + + /* + * For some reasons Windows 2016 doesn't set SEC_STD_DELETE but we + * do. Mask it out so the test passes against Samba and Windows. + * SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC comes from being the owner. + */ + torture_assert_int_equal_goto(tctx, + cr.out.maximal_access & ~SEC_STD_DELETE, + SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_READ | + SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA | + SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC, + ret, done, + "Wrong maximum access\n"); + + status = smb2_util_close(tree, handle); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done, + "smb2_util_close failed\n"); + ZERO_STRUCT(handle); + +done: + if (!smb2_util_handle_empty(handle)) { + smb2_util_close(tree, handle); + } + smb2_deltree(tree, BASEDIR); + return ret; +} + +/* + * test SEC_FLAG_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED with not-granted access + * + * When access_mask contains SEC_FLAG_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED, the server must still + * proces other bits from access_mask. Eg if access_mask contains a right that + * the requester doesn't have, the function must validate that against the + * effective permissions. + */ +static bool test_mxac_not_granted(struct torture_context *tctx, + struct smb2_tree *tree) +{ + const char *fname = BASEDIR "\\test_mxac_not_granted.txt"; + struct smb2_create cr; + struct smb2_handle handle = {{0}}; + union smb_fileinfo gi; + union smb_setfileinfo si; + struct security_descriptor *sd_orig = NULL; + struct security_descriptor *sd = NULL; + const char *owner_sid = NULL; + NTSTATUS status; + bool ret = true; + + smb2_deltree(tree, BASEDIR); + + ret = smb2_util_setup_dir(tctx, tree, BASEDIR); + torture_assert_goto(tctx, ret, ret, done, + "smb2_util_setup_dir failed\n"); + + torture_comment(tctx, "TESTING OWNER RIGHTS DENY\n"); + + cr = (struct smb2_create) { + .in.desired_access = SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL | + SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC |SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER, + .in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, + .in.share_access = NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_MASK, + .in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN_IF, + .in.impersonation_level = NTCREATEX_IMPERSONATION_ANONYMOUS, + .in.fname = fname, + }; + + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &cr); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done, + "smb2_create failed\n"); + handle = cr.out.file.handle; + + torture_comment(tctx, "get the original sd\n"); + + gi = (union smb_fileinfo) { + .query_secdesc.level = RAW_FILEINFO_SEC_DESC, + .query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle, + .query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL|SECINFO_OWNER, + }; + + status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &gi); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done, + "smb2_getinfo_file failed\n"); + + sd_orig = gi.query_secdesc.out.sd; + owner_sid = dom_sid_string(tctx, sd_orig->owner_sid); + + sd = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx, 0, NULL, NULL, + owner_sid, + SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED, + SEC_FILE_READ_DATA, + 0, + NULL); + torture_assert_not_null_goto(tctx, sd, ret, done, + "SD create failed\n"); + + si = (union smb_setfileinfo) { + .set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC, + .set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle, + .set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL, + .set_secdesc.in.sd = sd, + }; + + status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &si); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done, + "smb2_setinfo_file failed\n"); + + status = smb2_util_close(tree, handle); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done, + "smb2_util_close failed\n"); + ZERO_STRUCT(handle); + + cr = (struct smb2_create) { + .in.desired_access = SEC_FLAG_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED | + SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA, + .in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, + .in.share_access = NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_MASK, + .in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN_IF, + .in.impersonation_level = NTCREATEX_IMPERSONATION_ANONYMOUS, + .in.fname = fname, + }; + + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &cr); + torture_assert_ntstatus_equal_goto(tctx, status, + NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED, + ret, done, + "Wrong smb2_create result\n"); + +done: + if (!smb2_util_handle_empty(handle)) { + smb2_util_close(tree, handle); + } + smb2_deltree(tree, BASEDIR); + return ret; +} + +static bool test_overwrite_read_only_file(struct torture_context *tctx, + struct smb2_tree *tree) +{ + NTSTATUS status; + struct smb2_create c; + const char *fname = BASEDIR "\\test_overwrite_read_only_file.txt"; + struct smb2_handle handle = {{0}}; + union smb_fileinfo q; + union smb_setfileinfo set; + struct security_descriptor *sd = NULL, *sd_orig = NULL; + const char *owner_sid = NULL; + int i; + bool ret = true; + + struct tcase { + int disposition; + const char *disposition_string; + NTSTATUS expected_status; + } tcases[] = { +#define TCASE(d, s) { \ + .disposition = d, \ + .disposition_string = #d, \ + .expected_status = s, \ + } + TCASE(NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN, NT_STATUS_OK), + TCASE(NTCREATEX_DISP_SUPERSEDE, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED), + TCASE(NTCREATEX_DISP_OVERWRITE, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED), + TCASE(NTCREATEX_DISP_OVERWRITE_IF, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED), + }; +#undef TCASE + + ret = smb2_util_setup_dir(tctx, tree, BASEDIR); + torture_assert_goto(tctx, ret, ret, done, "smb2_util_setup_dir not ok"); + + c = (struct smb2_create) { + .in.desired_access = SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL | + SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC | + SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER, + .in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, + .in.share_access = NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_READ | + NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_WRITE, + .in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN_IF, + .in.impersonation_level = NTCREATEX_IMPERSONATION_ANONYMOUS, + .in.fname = fname, + }; + + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &c); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done, + "smb2_create failed\n"); + handle = c.out.file.handle; + + torture_comment(tctx, "get the original sd\n"); + + ZERO_STRUCT(q); + q.query_secdesc.level = RAW_FILEINFO_SEC_DESC; + q.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle; + q.query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL | SECINFO_OWNER; + + status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done, + "smb2_getinfo_file failed\n"); + sd_orig = q.query_secdesc.out.sd; + + owner_sid = dom_sid_string(tctx, sd_orig->owner_sid); + + sd = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx, + 0, NULL, NULL, + owner_sid, + SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED, + SEC_FILE_READ_DATA, + 0, + NULL); + + ZERO_STRUCT(set); + set.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC; + set.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle; + set.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL; + set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd; + + status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done, + "smb2_setinfo_file failed\n"); + + smb2_util_close(tree, handle); + ZERO_STRUCT(handle); + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tcases); i++) { + torture_comment(tctx, "Verify open with %s dispostion\n", + tcases[i].disposition_string); + + c = (struct smb2_create) { + .in.create_disposition = tcases[i].disposition, + .in.desired_access = SEC_FILE_READ_DATA, + .in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, + .in.share_access = NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_MASK, + .in.impersonation_level = NTCREATEX_IMPERSONATION_ANONYMOUS, + .in.fname = fname, + }; + + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &c); + smb2_util_close(tree, c.out.file.handle); + torture_assert_ntstatus_equal_goto( + tctx, status, tcases[i].expected_status, ret, done, + "smb2_create failed\n"); + }; + + torture_comment(tctx, "put back original sd\n"); + + c = (struct smb2_create) { + .in.desired_access = SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC, + .in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, + .in.share_access = NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_MASK, + .in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN_IF, + .in.impersonation_level = NTCREATEX_IMPERSONATION_ANONYMOUS, + .in.fname = fname, + }; + + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &c); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done, + "smb2_create failed\n"); + handle = c.out.file.handle; + + ZERO_STRUCT(set); + set.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC; + set.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle; + set.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL; + set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd_orig; + + status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done, + "smb2_setinfo_file failed\n"); + + smb2_util_close(tree, handle); + ZERO_STRUCT(handle); + +done: + smb2_util_close(tree, handle); + smb2_util_unlink(tree, fname); + smb2_deltree(tree, BASEDIR); + return ret; +} + +/* + basic testing of SMB2 ACLs +*/ +struct torture_suite *torture_smb2_acls_init(TALLOC_CTX *ctx) +{ + struct torture_suite *suite = torture_suite_create(ctx, "acls"); + + torture_suite_add_1smb2_test(suite, "CREATOR", test_creator_sid); + torture_suite_add_1smb2_test(suite, "GENERIC", test_generic_bits); + torture_suite_add_1smb2_test(suite, "OWNER", test_owner_bits); + torture_suite_add_1smb2_test(suite, "INHERITANCE", test_inheritance); + torture_suite_add_1smb2_test(suite, "INHERITFLAGS", test_inheritance_flags); + torture_suite_add_1smb2_test(suite, "SDFLAGSVSCHOWN", test_sd_flags_vs_chown); + torture_suite_add_1smb2_test(suite, "DYNAMIC", test_inheritance_dynamic); +#if 0 + /* XXX This test does not work against XP or Vista. */ + torture_suite_add_1smb2_test(suite, "GETSET", test_sd_get_set); +#endif + torture_suite_add_1smb2_test(suite, "ACCESSBASED", test_access_based); + torture_suite_add_1smb2_test(suite, "OWNER-RIGHTS", test_owner_rights); + torture_suite_add_1smb2_test(suite, "OWNER-RIGHTS-DENY", + test_owner_rights_deny); + torture_suite_add_1smb2_test(suite, "OWNER-RIGHTS-DENY1", + test_owner_rights_deny1); + torture_suite_add_1smb2_test(suite, "DENY1", + test_deny1); + torture_suite_add_1smb2_test(suite, "MXAC-NOT-GRANTED", + test_mxac_not_granted); + torture_suite_add_1smb2_test(suite, "OVERWRITE_READ_ONLY_FILE", test_overwrite_read_only_file); + + suite->description = talloc_strdup(suite, "SMB2-ACLS tests"); + + return suite; +} + +static bool test_acls_non_canonical_flags(struct torture_context *tctx, + struct smb2_tree *tree) +{ + const char *fname = BASEDIR "\\test_acls_non_canonical_flags.txt"; + struct smb2_create cr; + struct smb2_handle testdirh = {{0}}; + struct smb2_handle handle = {{0}}; + union smb_fileinfo gi; + union smb_setfileinfo si; + struct security_descriptor *sd_orig = NULL; + struct security_descriptor *sd = NULL; + NTSTATUS status; + bool ret = true; + + smb2_deltree(tree, BASEDIR); + + status = torture_smb2_testdir(tree, BASEDIR, &testdirh); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done, + "torture_smb2_testdir failed\n"); + + sd = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx, + SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED + | SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERIT_REQ, + NULL, + NULL, + SID_WORLD, + SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED, + SEC_RIGHTS_DIR_ALL, + SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT + | SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT, + NULL); + torture_assert_not_null_goto(tctx, sd, ret, done, + "SD create failed\n"); + + si = (union smb_setfileinfo) { + .set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC, + .set_secdesc.in.file.handle = testdirh, + .set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL, + .set_secdesc.in.sd = sd, + }; + + status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &si); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done, + "smb2_setinfo_file failed\n"); + + gi = (union smb_fileinfo) { + .query_secdesc.level = RAW_FILEINFO_SEC_DESC, + .query_secdesc.in.file.handle = testdirh, + .query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL, + }; + + status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &gi); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done, + "smb2_getinfo_file failed\n"); + + cr = (struct smb2_create) { + .in.desired_access = SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL | + SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC, + .in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, + .in.share_access = NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_MASK, + .in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN_IF, + .in.impersonation_level = NTCREATEX_IMPERSONATION_ANONYMOUS, + .in.fname = fname, + }; + + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &cr); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done, + "smb2_create failed\n"); + handle = cr.out.file.handle; + + torture_comment(tctx, "get the original sd\n"); + + gi = (union smb_fileinfo) { + .query_secdesc.level = RAW_FILEINFO_SEC_DESC, + .query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle, + .query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL, + }; + + status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &gi); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done, + "smb2_getinfo_file failed\n"); + + sd_orig = gi.query_secdesc.out.sd; + + torture_assert_goto(tctx, sd_orig->type & SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED, + ret, done, "Missing SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED\n"); + + /* + * SD with SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED but without + * SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED_REQ, so the resulting SD should not have + * SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED on a Windows box. + * + * But as we're testing against a share with + * + * "acl flag inherited canonicalization = no" + * + * the resulting SD should have acl flag inherited canonicalization set. + */ + sd = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx, + SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED, + NULL, + NULL, + SID_WORLD, + SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED, + SEC_FILE_ALL, + 0, + NULL); + torture_assert_not_null_goto(tctx, sd, ret, done, + "SD create failed\n"); + + si = (union smb_setfileinfo) { + .set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC, + .set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle, + .set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL, + .set_secdesc.in.sd = sd, + }; + + status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &si); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done, + "smb2_setinfo_file failed\n"); + + status = smb2_util_close(tree, handle); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done, + "smb2_util_close failed\n"); + ZERO_STRUCT(handle); + + cr = (struct smb2_create) { + .in.desired_access = SEC_FLAG_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED , + .in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, + .in.share_access = NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_MASK, + .in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN, + .in.impersonation_level = NTCREATEX_IMPERSONATION_ANONYMOUS, + .in.fname = fname, + }; + + status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &cr); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done, + "smb2_create failed\n"); + handle = cr.out.file.handle; + + gi = (union smb_fileinfo) { + .query_secdesc.level = RAW_FILEINFO_SEC_DESC, + .query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle, + .query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL, + }; + + status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &gi); + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done, + "smb2_getinfo_file failed\n"); + + sd_orig = gi.query_secdesc.out.sd; + torture_assert_goto(tctx, sd_orig->type & SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED, + ret, done, "Missing SEC_DESC_DACL_AUTO_INHERITED\n"); + +done: + if (!smb2_util_handle_empty(handle)) { + smb2_util_close(tree, testdirh); + } + if (!smb2_util_handle_empty(handle)) { + smb2_util_close(tree, handle); + } + smb2_deltree(tree, BASEDIR); + return ret; +} + +struct torture_suite *torture_smb2_acls_non_canonical_init(TALLOC_CTX *ctx) +{ + struct torture_suite *suite = torture_suite_create(ctx, "acls_non_canonical"); + + torture_suite_add_1smb2_test(suite, "flags", test_acls_non_canonical_flags); + return suite; +} |