diff options
Diffstat (limited to '')
| -rw-r--r-- | third_party/heimdal/kadmin/server.c | 885 |
1 files changed, 885 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/third_party/heimdal/kadmin/server.c b/third_party/heimdal/kadmin/server.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..52f2020 --- /dev/null +++ b/third_party/heimdal/kadmin/server.c @@ -0,0 +1,885 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2005 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan + * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "kadmin_locl.h" +#include <krb5-private.h> + +static kadm5_ret_t check_aliases(kadm5_server_context *, + kadm5_principal_ent_rec *, + kadm5_principal_ent_rec *); + +static kadm5_ret_t +kadmind_dispatch(void *kadm_handlep, krb5_boolean initial, + krb5_data *in, krb5_data *out, int readonly) +{ + kadm5_ret_t ret = 0; + kadm5_ret_t ret_sp = 0; + int32_t cmd, mask, kvno, tmp; + kadm5_server_context *contextp = kadm_handlep; + char client[128], name[128], name2[128]; + const char *op = ""; + krb5_principal princ = NULL, princ2 = NULL; + kadm5_principal_ent_rec ent, ent_prev; + char *password = NULL, *expression; + krb5_keyblock *new_keys; + krb5_key_salt_tuple *ks_tuple = NULL; + int keepold = FALSE; + int n_ks_tuple = 0; + int n_keys; + char **princs; + int n_princs; + int keys_ok = 0; + krb5_storage *rsp; /* response goes here */ + krb5_storage *sp; + int len; + + memset(&ent, 0, sizeof(ent)); + memset(&ent_prev, 0, sizeof(ent_prev)); + krb5_data_zero(out); + + rsp = krb5_storage_emem(); + if (rsp == NULL) + return krb5_enomem(contextp->context); + + sp = krb5_storage_from_data(in); + if (sp == NULL) { + krb5_storage_free(rsp); + return krb5_enomem(contextp->context); + } + + ret = krb5_unparse_name_fixed(contextp->context, contextp->caller, + client, sizeof(client)); + if (ret == 0) + ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &cmd); + if (ret) + goto fail; + + switch(cmd){ + case kadm_get:{ + op = "GET"; + ret = krb5_ret_principal(sp, &princ); + if(ret) + goto fail; + ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &mask); + if (ret) + goto fail; + + mask |= KADM5_PRINCIPAL; + krb5_unparse_name_fixed(contextp->context, princ, name, sizeof(name)); + krb5_warnx(contextp->context, "%s: %s %s", client, op, name); + + /* If the caller doesn't have KADM5_PRIV_GET, we're done. */ + ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(contextp, KADM5_PRIV_GET, princ); + if (ret) + goto fail; + + /* Then check to see if it is ok to return keys */ + if ((mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) != 0) { + ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(contextp, KADM5_PRIV_GET_KEYS, + princ); + if (ret == 0) { + keys_ok = 1; + } else if ((mask == (KADM5_PRINCIPAL|KADM5_KEY_DATA)) || + (mask == (KADM5_PRINCIPAL|KADM5_KVNO|KADM5_KEY_DATA))) { + /* + * Requests for keys will get bogus keys, which is useful if + * the client just wants to see what (kvno, enctype)s the + * principal has keys for, but terrible if the client wants to + * write the keys into a keytab or modify the principal and + * write the bogus keys back to the server. + * + * We use a heuristic to detect which case we're handling here. + * If the client only asks for the flags in the above + * condition, then it's very likely a kadmin ext_keytab, + * add_enctype, or other request that should not see bogus + * keys. We deny them. + * + * The kadmin get command can be coaxed into making a request + * with the same mask. But the default long and terse output + * modes request other things too, so in all likelihood this + * heuristic will not hurt any kadmin get uses. + */ + goto fail; + } + } + + ret = kadm5_get_principal(kadm_handlep, princ, &ent, mask); + ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, ret); + if (ret == 0) { + if (ret_sp == 0 && keys_ok) + ret_sp = kadm5_store_principal_ent(rsp, &ent); + else if (ret_sp == 0) + ret_sp = kadm5_store_principal_ent_nokeys(rsp, &ent); + } + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handlep, &ent); + break; + } + case kadm_delete:{ + op = "DELETE"; + if (readonly) { + ret = KADM5_READ_ONLY; + goto fail; + } + ret = krb5_ret_principal(sp, &princ); + if (ret == 0) + ret = krb5_unparse_name_fixed(contextp->context, princ, name, sizeof(name)); + if (ret == 0) { + ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(contextp, KADM5_PRIV_DELETE, princ); + krb5_warnx(contextp->context, "%s: %s %s (%s)", client, op, name, + ret == 0 ? "granted" : "denied"); + } + + /* + * There's no need to check that the caller has permission to + * delete the victim principal's aliases. + */ + if (ret == 0) + ret = kadm5_delete_principal(kadm_handlep, princ); + ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, ret); + break; + } + case kadm_create:{ + op = "CREATE"; + if (readonly) { + ret = KADM5_READ_ONLY; + goto fail; + } + ret = kadm5_ret_principal_ent(sp, &ent); + if(ret) + goto fail; + ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &mask); + if(ret){ + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handlep, &ent); + goto fail; + } + ret = krb5_ret_string(sp, &password); + if(ret){ + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handlep, &ent); + goto fail; + } + krb5_unparse_name_fixed(contextp->context, ent.principal, + name, sizeof(name)); + krb5_warnx(contextp->context, "%s: %s %s", client, op, name); + ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(contextp, KADM5_PRIV_ADD, + ent.principal); + if(ret){ + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handlep, &ent); + goto fail; + } + if ((mask & KADM5_TL_DATA)) { + /* + * Also check that the caller can create the aliases, if the + * new principal has any. + */ + ret = check_aliases(contextp, &ent, NULL); + if (ret) { + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handlep, &ent); + goto fail; + } + } + ret = kadm5_create_principal(kadm_handlep, &ent, + mask, password); + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handlep, &ent); + ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, ret); + break; + } + case kadm_modify:{ + op = "MODIFY"; + if (readonly) { + ret = KADM5_READ_ONLY; + goto fail; + } + ret = kadm5_ret_principal_ent(sp, &ent); + if(ret) + goto fail; + ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &mask); + if(ret){ + kadm5_free_principal_ent(contextp, &ent); + goto fail; + } + krb5_unparse_name_fixed(contextp->context, ent.principal, + name, sizeof(name)); + krb5_warnx(contextp->context, "%s: %s %s", client, op, name); + ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(contextp, KADM5_PRIV_MODIFY, + ent.principal); + if(ret){ + kadm5_free_principal_ent(contextp, &ent); + goto fail; + } + if ((mask & KADM5_TL_DATA)) { + /* + * Also check that the caller can create aliases that are in + * the new entry but not the old one. There's no need to + * check that the caller can delete aliases it wants to + * drop. See also handling of rename. + */ + ret = kadm5_get_principal(kadm_handlep, ent.principal, &ent_prev, mask); + if (ret) { + kadm5_free_principal_ent(contextp, &ent); + goto fail; + } + ret = check_aliases(contextp, &ent, &ent_prev); + kadm5_free_principal_ent(contextp, &ent_prev); + if (ret) { + kadm5_free_principal_ent(contextp, &ent); + goto fail; + } + } + ret = kadm5_modify_principal(kadm_handlep, &ent, mask); + kadm5_free_principal_ent(kadm_handlep, &ent); + ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, ret); + break; + } + case kadm_prune:{ + op = "PRUNE"; + if (readonly) { + ret = KADM5_READ_ONLY; + goto fail; + } + ret = krb5_ret_principal(sp, &princ); + if (ret) + goto fail; + ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &kvno); + if (ret == HEIM_ERR_EOF) { + kvno = 0; + } else if (ret) { + goto fail; + } + krb5_unparse_name_fixed(contextp->context, princ, name, sizeof(name)); + krb5_warnx(contextp->context, "%s: %s %s", client, op, name); + ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(contextp, KADM5_PRIV_CPW, princ); + if (ret) + goto fail; + + ret = kadm5_prune_principal(kadm_handlep, princ, kvno); + ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, ret); + break; + } + case kadm_rename:{ + op = "RENAME"; + if (readonly) { + ret = KADM5_READ_ONLY; + goto fail; + } + ret = krb5_ret_principal(sp, &princ); + if(ret) + goto fail; + ret = krb5_ret_principal(sp, &princ2); + if (ret) + goto fail; + + krb5_unparse_name_fixed(contextp->context, princ, name, sizeof(name)); + krb5_unparse_name_fixed(contextp->context, princ2, + name2, sizeof(name2)); + krb5_warnx(contextp->context, "%s: %s %s -> %s", + client, op, name, name2); + ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(contextp, + KADM5_PRIV_ADD, + princ2); + if (ret == 0) { + /* + * Also require modify for the principal. For backwards + * compatibility, allow delete permission on the old name to + * cure lack of modify permission on the old name. + */ + ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(contextp, + KADM5_PRIV_MODIFY, + princ); + if (ret) { + ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(contextp, + KADM5_PRIV_DELETE, + princ); + } + } + if (ret) + goto fail; + + ret = kadm5_rename_principal(kadm_handlep, princ, princ2); + ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(sp, ret); + break; + } + case kadm_chpass:{ + krb5_boolean is_self_cpw, allow_self_cpw; + + op = "CHPASS"; + if (readonly) { + ret = KADM5_READ_ONLY; + goto fail; + } + ret = krb5_ret_principal(sp, &princ); + if (ret == 0) + ret = krb5_ret_string(sp, &password); + if (ret == 0) + ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &keepold); + if (ret == HEIM_ERR_EOF) + ret = 0; + if (ret == 0) { + ret = krb5_unparse_name_fixed(contextp->context, princ, name, sizeof(name)); + if (ret == 0) + krb5_warnx(contextp->context, "%s: %s %s", client, op, name); + } + if (ret) + goto fail; + + /* + * Change password requests are subject to ACLs unless the principal is + * changing their own password and the initial ticket flag is set, and + * the allow_self_change_password configuration option is TRUE. + */ + is_self_cpw = + krb5_principal_compare(contextp->context, contextp->caller, princ); + allow_self_cpw = + krb5_config_get_bool_default(contextp->context, NULL, TRUE, + "kadmin", "allow_self_change_password", NULL); + if (!(is_self_cpw && initial && allow_self_cpw)) { + ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(contextp, KADM5_PRIV_CPW, princ); + if (ret) + goto fail; + } + + ret = kadm5_chpass_principal_3(kadm_handlep, princ, keepold, 0, NULL, + password); + ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, ret); + break; + } + case kadm_chpass_with_key:{ + int i; + krb5_key_data *key_data; + int n_key_data; + + op = "CHPASS_WITH_KEY"; + if (readonly) { + ret = KADM5_READ_ONLY; + goto fail; + } + ret = krb5_ret_principal(sp, &princ); + if (ret == 0) + ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &n_key_data); + if (ret == 0) { + ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &keepold); + if (ret == HEIM_ERR_EOF) + ret = 0; + } + if (ret) + goto fail; + + /* n_key_data will be squeezed into an int16_t below. */ + if (n_key_data < 0 || n_key_data >= 1 << 16 || + (size_t)n_key_data > UINT_MAX/sizeof(*key_data)) { + ret = ERANGE; + goto fail; + } + + key_data = malloc (n_key_data * sizeof(*key_data)); + if (key_data == NULL && n_key_data != 0) { + ret = krb5_enomem(contextp->context); + goto fail; + } + + for (i = 0; i < n_key_data; ++i) { + ret = kadm5_ret_key_data (sp, &key_data[i]); + if (ret) { + int16_t dummy = i; + + kadm5_free_key_data (contextp, &dummy, key_data); + free (key_data); + goto fail; + } + } + + /* + * The change is only allowed if the user is on the CPW ACL, + * this it to force password quality check on the user. + */ + + ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(contextp, KADM5_PRIV_CPW, princ); + ret_sp = krb5_unparse_name_fixed(contextp->context, princ, name, sizeof(name)); + if (ret_sp == 0) + krb5_warnx(contextp->context, "%s: %s %s (%s)", client, op, name, + ret ? "denied" : "granted"); + if(ret) { + int16_t dummy = n_key_data; + + kadm5_free_key_data (contextp, &dummy, key_data); + free (key_data); + goto fail; + } + ret = kadm5_chpass_principal_with_key_3(kadm_handlep, princ, keepold, + n_key_data, key_data); + { + int16_t dummy = n_key_data; + kadm5_free_key_data (contextp, &dummy, key_data); + } + free (key_data); + ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, ret); + break; + } + case kadm_randkey:{ + size_t i; + + op = "RANDKEY"; + if (readonly) { + ret = KADM5_READ_ONLY; + goto fail; + } + ret = krb5_ret_principal(sp, &princ); + if (ret) + goto fail; + krb5_unparse_name_fixed(contextp->context, princ, name, sizeof(name)); + krb5_warnx(contextp->context, "%s: %s %s", client, op, name); + /* + * The change is allowed if at least one of: + * a) it's for the principal him/herself and this was an initial ticket + * b) the user is on the CPW ACL. + */ + + if (initial + && krb5_principal_compare (contextp->context, contextp->caller, + princ)) + ret = 0; + else + ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(contextp, KADM5_PRIV_CPW, princ); + + if (ret) + goto fail; + + /* + * See comments in kadm5_c_randkey_principal() regarding the + * protocol. + */ + ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &keepold); + if (ret != 0 && ret != HEIM_ERR_EOF) + goto fail; + + ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &n_ks_tuple); + if (ret == HEIM_ERR_EOF) { + const char *enctypes; + size_t n; + + enctypes = krb5_config_get_string(contextp->context, NULL, + "realms", + krb5_principal_get_realm(contextp->context, + princ), + "supported_enctypes", NULL); + if (enctypes == NULL || enctypes[0] == '\0') + enctypes = "aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96"; + ret = krb5_string_to_keysalts2(contextp->context, enctypes, + &n, &ks_tuple); + n_ks_tuple = n; + } + if (ret != 0) + goto fail; + + if (n_ks_tuple < 0) { + ret = EOVERFLOW; + goto fail; + } + free(ks_tuple); + if ((ks_tuple = calloc(n_ks_tuple, sizeof (*ks_tuple))) == NULL) { + ret = errno; + goto fail; + } + + for (i = 0; i < n_ks_tuple; i++) { + ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &ks_tuple[i].ks_enctype); + if (ret != 0) { + free(ks_tuple); + goto fail; + } + ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &ks_tuple[i].ks_salttype); + if (ret != 0) { + free(ks_tuple); + goto fail; + } + } + ret = kadm5_randkey_principal_3(kadm_handlep, princ, keepold, + n_ks_tuple, ks_tuple, &new_keys, + &n_keys); + free(ks_tuple); + + ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, ret); + if (ret == 0 && ret_sp == 0){ + ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, n_keys); + for (i = 0; i < n_keys; i++){ + if (ret_sp == 0) + ret_sp = krb5_store_keyblock(rsp, new_keys[i]); + krb5_free_keyblock_contents(contextp->context, &new_keys[i]); + } + free(new_keys); + } + break; + } + case kadm_get_privs:{ + uint32_t privs; + ret = kadm5_get_privs(kadm_handlep, &privs); + if (ret == 0) + ret_sp = krb5_store_uint32(sp, privs); + break; + } + case kadm_get_princs:{ + op = "LIST"; + ret = krb5_ret_int32(sp, &tmp); + if(ret) + goto fail; + if(tmp){ + ret = krb5_ret_string(sp, &expression); + if(ret) + goto fail; + }else + expression = NULL; + krb5_warnx(contextp->context, "%s: %s %s", client, op, + expression ? expression : "*"); + ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(contextp, KADM5_PRIV_LIST, NULL); + if(ret){ + free(expression); + goto fail; + } + ret = kadm5_get_principals(kadm_handlep, expression, &princs, &n_princs); + free(expression); + ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(rsp, ret); + if (ret == 0) { + int i; + + ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(sp, n_princs); + for (i = 0; ret_sp == 0 && i < n_princs; i++) + ret_sp = krb5_store_string(sp, princs[i]); + kadm5_free_name_list(kadm_handlep, princs, &n_princs); + } + break; + } + default: + krb5_warnx(contextp->context, "%s: UNKNOWN OP %d", client, cmd); + ret_sp = krb5_store_int32(sp, KADM5_FAILURE); + break; + } + +fail: + if (password != NULL) { + len = strlen(password); + memset_s(password, len, 0, len); + free(password); + } + krb5_storage_to_data(rsp, out); + krb5_storage_free(rsp); + krb5_storage_free(sp); + krb5_free_principal(contextp->context, princ); + krb5_free_principal(contextp->context, princ2); + if (ret) + krb5_warn(contextp->context, ret, "%s", op); + if (out->length == 0) + krb5_warn(contextp->context, ret, "%s: reply failed", op); + else if (ret_sp) + krb5_warn(contextp->context, ret, "%s: reply incomplete", op); + if (ret_sp) + return ret_sp; + return 0; +} + +struct iter_aliases_ctx { + HDB_Ext_Aliases aliases; + krb5_tl_data *tl; + int alias_idx; + int done; +}; + +static kadm5_ret_t +iter_aliases(kadm5_principal_ent_rec *from, + struct iter_aliases_ctx *ctx, + krb5_principal *out) +{ + HDB_extension ext; + kadm5_ret_t ret; + size_t size; + + *out = NULL; + + if (ctx->done > 0) + return 0; + if (from == NULL) { + ctx->done = 1; + return 0; + } + + if (ctx->done == 0) { + if (ctx->alias_idx < ctx->aliases.aliases.len) { + *out = &ctx->aliases.aliases.val[ctx->alias_idx++]; + return 0; + } + /* Out of aliases in this TL, step to next TL */ + ctx->tl = ctx->tl->tl_data_next; + } else if (ctx->done < 0) { + /* Setup iteration context */ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); + ctx->done = 0; + ctx->aliases.aliases.val = NULL; + ctx->aliases.aliases.len = 0; + ctx->tl = from->tl_data; + } + + free_HDB_Ext_Aliases(&ctx->aliases); + ctx->alias_idx = 0; + + /* Find TL with aliases */ + for (; ctx->tl != NULL; ctx->tl = ctx->tl->tl_data_next) { + if (ctx->tl->tl_data_type != KRB5_TL_EXTENSION) + continue; + + ret = decode_HDB_extension(ctx->tl->tl_data_contents, + ctx->tl->tl_data_length, + &ext, &size); + if (ret) + return ret; + if (ext.data.element == choice_HDB_extension_data_aliases && + ext.data.u.aliases.aliases.len > 0) { + ctx->aliases = ext.data.u.aliases; + break; + } + free_HDB_extension(&ext); + } + + if (ctx->tl != NULL && ctx->aliases.aliases.len > 0) { + *out = &ctx->aliases.aliases.val[ctx->alias_idx++]; + return 0; + } + + ctx->done = 1; + return 0; +} + +static kadm5_ret_t +check_aliases(kadm5_server_context *contextp, + kadm5_principal_ent_rec *add_princ, + kadm5_principal_ent_rec *del_princ) +{ + kadm5_ret_t ret; + struct iter_aliases_ctx iter; + struct iter_aliases_ctx iter_del; + krb5_principal new_name, old_name; + int match; + + /* + * Yeah, this is O(N^2). Gathering and sorting all the aliases + * would be a bit of a pain; if we ever have principals with enough + * aliases for this to be a problem, we can fix it then. + */ + for (iter.done = -1; iter.done != 1;) { + match = 0; + ret = iter_aliases(add_princ, &iter, &new_name); + if (ret) + return ret; + if (iter.done == 1) + break; + for (iter_del.done = -1; iter_del.done != 1;) { + ret = iter_aliases(del_princ, &iter_del, &old_name); + if (ret) + return ret; + if (iter_del.done == 1) + break; + if (!krb5_principal_compare(contextp->context, new_name, old_name)) + continue; + free_HDB_Ext_Aliases(&iter_del.aliases); + match = 1; + break; + } + if (match) + continue; + ret = _kadm5_acl_check_permission(contextp, KADM5_PRIV_ADD, new_name); + if (ret) { + free_HDB_Ext_Aliases(&iter.aliases); + return ret; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +static void +v5_loop (krb5_context contextp, + krb5_auth_context ac, + krb5_boolean initial, + void *kadm_handlep, + krb5_socket_t fd, + int readonly) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_data in, out; + + for (;;) { + doing_useful_work = 0; + if(term_flag) + exit(0); + ret = krb5_read_priv_message(contextp, ac, &fd, &in); + if(ret == HEIM_ERR_EOF) + exit(0); + if(ret) + krb5_err(contextp, 1, ret, "krb5_read_priv_message"); + doing_useful_work = 1; + ret = kadmind_dispatch(kadm_handlep, initial, &in, &out, readonly); + if (ret) + krb5_err(contextp, 1, ret, "kadmind_dispatch"); + krb5_data_free(&in); + ret = krb5_write_priv_message(contextp, ac, &fd, &out); + krb5_data_free(&out); + if(ret) + krb5_err(contextp, 1, ret, "krb5_write_priv_message"); + } +} + +static krb5_boolean +match_appl_version(const void *data, const char *appl_version) +{ + unsigned minor; + if(sscanf(appl_version, "KADM0.%u", &minor) != 1) + return 0; + /*XXX*/ + *(unsigned*)(intptr_t)data = minor; + return 1; +} + +static void +handle_v5(krb5_context contextp, + krb5_keytab keytab, + krb5_socket_t fd, + int readonly) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_ticket *ticket; + char *server_name; + char *client; + void *kadm_handlep; + krb5_boolean initial; + krb5_auth_context ac = NULL; + unsigned kadm_version = 1; + kadm5_config_params realm_params; + + ret = krb5_recvauth_match_version(contextp, &ac, &fd, + match_appl_version, &kadm_version, + NULL, KRB5_RECVAUTH_IGNORE_VERSION, + keytab, &ticket); + if (ret) { + krb5_err(contextp, 1, ret, "krb5_recvauth"); + return; + } + ret = krb5_unparse_name(contextp, ticket->server, &server_name); + if (ret) { + krb5_err(contextp, 1, ret, "krb5_unparse_name"); + krb5_free_ticket(contextp, ticket); + return; + } + if (strncmp(server_name, KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, + strlen(KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE)) != 0) { + krb5_errx(contextp, 1, "ticket for strange principal (%s)", server_name); + krb5_free_ticket(contextp, ticket); + free(server_name); + return; + } + free(server_name); + + memset(&realm_params, 0, sizeof(realm_params)); + + if(kadm_version == 1) { + krb5_data params; + ret = krb5_read_priv_message(contextp, ac, &fd, ¶ms); + if (ret) { + krb5_err(contextp, 1, ret, "krb5_read_priv_message"); + krb5_free_ticket(contextp, ticket); + return; + } + ret = _kadm5_unmarshal_params(contextp, ¶ms, &realm_params); + if (ret) { + krb5_err(contextp, 1, ret, + "Could not read or parse kadm5 parameters"); + krb5_free_ticket(contextp, ticket); + return; + } + } + + initial = ticket->ticket.flags.initial; + ret = krb5_unparse_name(contextp, ticket->client, &client); + krb5_free_ticket(contextp, ticket); + if (ret) { + krb5_err(contextp, 1, ret, "krb5_unparse_name"); + return; + } + ret = kadm5_s_init_with_password_ctx(contextp, + client, + NULL, + KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE, + &realm_params, + 0, 0, + &kadm_handlep); + if (ret) { + krb5_err(contextp, 1, ret, "kadm5_init_with_password_ctx"); + return; + } + v5_loop(contextp, ac, initial, kadm_handlep, fd, readonly); +} + +krb5_error_code +kadmind_loop(krb5_context contextp, + krb5_keytab keytab, + krb5_socket_t sock, + int readonly) +{ + u_char buf[sizeof(KRB5_SENDAUTH_VERSION) + 4]; + ssize_t n; + unsigned long len; + + n = krb5_net_read(contextp, &sock, buf, 4); + if(n == 0) + exit(0); + if(n < 0) + krb5_err(contextp, 1, errno, "read"); + _krb5_get_int(buf, &len, 4); + + if (len == sizeof(KRB5_SENDAUTH_VERSION)) { + + n = krb5_net_read(contextp, &sock, buf + 4, len); + if (n < 0) + krb5_err (contextp, 1, errno, "reading sendauth version"); + if (n == 0) + krb5_errx (contextp, 1, "EOF reading sendauth version"); + + if(memcmp(buf + 4, KRB5_SENDAUTH_VERSION, len) == 0) { + handle_v5(contextp, keytab, sock, readonly); + return 0; + } + len += 4; + } else + len = 4; + + handle_mit(contextp, buf, len, sock, readonly); + + return 0; +} + |