Adding upstream version 5.10.209.upstream/5.10.209

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 588 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3f510c911
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c
@@ -0,0 +1,588 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+//
+// Security related flags and so on.
+//
+// Copyright 2018, Michael Ellerman, IBM Corporation.
+
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/device.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
+#include <linux/prctl.h>
+#include <linux/seq_buf.h>
+
+#include <asm/asm-prototypes.h>
+#include <asm/code-patching.h>
+#include <asm/debugfs.h>
+#include <asm/security_features.h>
+#include <asm/setup.h>
+#include <asm/inst.h>
+
+
+u64 powerpc_security_features __read_mostly = SEC_FTR_DEFAULT;
+
+enum branch_cache_flush_type {
+	BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE	= 0x1,
+	BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_SW	= 0x2,
+	BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_HW	= 0x4,
+};
+static enum branch_cache_flush_type count_cache_flush_type = BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE;
+static enum branch_cache_flush_type link_stack_flush_type = BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE;
+
+bool barrier_nospec_enabled;
+static bool no_nospec;
+static bool btb_flush_enabled;
+#if defined(CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E) || defined(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64)
+static bool no_spectrev2;
+#endif
+
+static void enable_barrier_nospec(bool enable)
+{
+	barrier_nospec_enabled = enable;
+	do_barrier_nospec_fixups(enable);
+}
+
+void setup_barrier_nospec(void)
+{
+	bool enable;
+
+	/*
+	 * It would make sense to check SEC_FTR_SPEC_BAR_ORI31 below as well.
+	 * But there's a good reason not to. The two flags we check below are
+	 * both are enabled by default in the kernel, so if the hcall is not
+	 * functional they will be enabled.
+	 * On a system where the host firmware has been updated (so the ori
+	 * functions as a barrier), but on which the hypervisor (KVM/Qemu) has
+	 * not been updated, we would like to enable the barrier. Dropping the
+	 * check for SEC_FTR_SPEC_BAR_ORI31 achieves that. The only downside is
+	 * we potentially enable the barrier on systems where the host firmware
+	 * is not updated, but that's harmless as it's a no-op.
+	 */
+	enable = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY) &&
+		 security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR);
+
+	if (!no_nospec && !cpu_mitigations_off())
+		enable_barrier_nospec(enable);
+}
+
+static int __init handle_nospectre_v1(char *p)
+{
+	no_nospec = true;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("nospectre_v1", handle_nospectre_v1);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
+static int barrier_nospec_set(void *data, u64 val)
+{
+	switch (val) {
+	case 0:
+	case 1:
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (!!val == !!barrier_nospec_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	enable_barrier_nospec(!!val);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int barrier_nospec_get(void *data, u64 *val)
+{
+	*val = barrier_nospec_enabled ? 1 : 0;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE(fops_barrier_nospec, barrier_nospec_get,
+			 barrier_nospec_set, "%llu\n");
+
+static __init int barrier_nospec_debugfs_init(void)
+{
+	debugfs_create_file_unsafe("barrier_nospec", 0600,
+				   powerpc_debugfs_root, NULL,
+				   &fops_barrier_nospec);
+	return 0;
+}
+device_initcall(barrier_nospec_debugfs_init);
+
+static __init int security_feature_debugfs_init(void)
+{
+	debugfs_create_x64("security_features", 0400, powerpc_debugfs_root,
+			   &powerpc_security_features);
+	return 0;
+}
+device_initcall(security_feature_debugfs_init);
+#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_FS */
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E) || defined(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64)
+static int __init handle_nospectre_v2(char *p)
+{
+	no_spectrev2 = true;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("nospectre_v2", handle_nospectre_v2);
+#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E || CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E
+void setup_spectre_v2(void)
+{
+	if (no_spectrev2 || cpu_mitigations_off())
+		do_btb_flush_fixups();
+	else
+		btb_flush_enabled = true;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64
+ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	bool thread_priv;
+
+	thread_priv = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_THREAD_PRIV);
+
+	if (rfi_flush) {
+		struct seq_buf s;
+		seq_buf_init(&s, buf, PAGE_SIZE - 1);
+
+		seq_buf_printf(&s, "Mitigation: RFI Flush");
+		if (thread_priv)
+			seq_buf_printf(&s, ", L1D private per thread");
+
+		seq_buf_printf(&s, "\n");
+
+		return s.len;
+	}
+
+	if (thread_priv)
+		return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: L1D private per thread\n");
+
+	if (!security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_HV) &&
+	    !security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR))
+		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+
+	return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_l1tf(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return cpu_show_meltdown(dev, attr, buf);
+}
+#endif
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	struct seq_buf s;
+
+	seq_buf_init(&s, buf, PAGE_SIZE - 1);
+
+	if (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR)) {
+		if (barrier_nospec_enabled)
+			seq_buf_printf(&s, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization");
+		else
+			seq_buf_printf(&s, "Vulnerable");
+
+		if (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_SPEC_BAR_ORI31))
+			seq_buf_printf(&s, ", ori31 speculation barrier enabled");
+
+		seq_buf_printf(&s, "\n");
+	} else
+		seq_buf_printf(&s, "Not affected\n");
+
+	return s.len;
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	struct seq_buf s;
+	bool bcs, ccd;
+
+	seq_buf_init(&s, buf, PAGE_SIZE - 1);
+
+	bcs = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BCCTRL_SERIALISED);
+	ccd = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_COUNT_CACHE_DISABLED);
+
+	if (bcs || ccd) {
+		seq_buf_printf(&s, "Mitigation: ");
+
+		if (bcs)
+			seq_buf_printf(&s, "Indirect branch serialisation (kernel only)");
+
+		if (bcs && ccd)
+			seq_buf_printf(&s, ", ");
+
+		if (ccd)
+			seq_buf_printf(&s, "Indirect branch cache disabled");
+
+	} else if (count_cache_flush_type != BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE) {
+		seq_buf_printf(&s, "Mitigation: Software count cache flush");
+
+		if (count_cache_flush_type == BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_HW)
+			seq_buf_printf(&s, " (hardware accelerated)");
+
+	} else if (btb_flush_enabled) {
+		seq_buf_printf(&s, "Mitigation: Branch predictor state flush");
+	} else {
+		seq_buf_printf(&s, "Vulnerable");
+	}
+
+	if (bcs || ccd || count_cache_flush_type != BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE) {
+		if (link_stack_flush_type != BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE)
+			seq_buf_printf(&s, ", Software link stack flush");
+		if (link_stack_flush_type == BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_HW)
+			seq_buf_printf(&s, " (hardware accelerated)");
+	}
+
+	seq_buf_printf(&s, "\n");
+
+	return s.len;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64
+/*
+ * Store-forwarding barrier support.
+ */
+
+static enum stf_barrier_type stf_enabled_flush_types;
+static bool no_stf_barrier;
+bool stf_barrier;
+
+static int __init handle_no_stf_barrier(char *p)
+{
+	pr_info("stf-barrier: disabled on command line.");
+	no_stf_barrier = true;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+early_param("no_stf_barrier", handle_no_stf_barrier);
+
+enum stf_barrier_type stf_barrier_type_get(void)
+{
+	return stf_enabled_flush_types;
+}
+
+/* This is the generic flag used by other architectures */
+static int __init handle_ssbd(char *p)
+{
+	if (!p || strncmp(p, "auto", 5) == 0 || strncmp(p, "on", 2) == 0 ) {
+		/* Until firmware tells us, we have the barrier with auto */
+		return 0;
+	} else if (strncmp(p, "off", 3) == 0) {
+		handle_no_stf_barrier(NULL);
+		return 0;
+	} else
+		return 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("spec_store_bypass_disable", handle_ssbd);
+
+/* This is the generic flag used by other architectures */
+static int __init handle_no_ssbd(char *p)
+{
+	handle_no_stf_barrier(NULL);
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("nospec_store_bypass_disable", handle_no_ssbd);
+
+static void stf_barrier_enable(bool enable)
+{
+	if (enable)
+		do_stf_barrier_fixups(stf_enabled_flush_types);
+	else
+		do_stf_barrier_fixups(STF_BARRIER_NONE);
+
+	stf_barrier = enable;
+}
+
+void setup_stf_barrier(void)
+{
+	enum stf_barrier_type type;
+	bool enable, hv;
+
+	hv = cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_HVMODE);
+
+	/* Default to fallback in case fw-features are not available */
+	if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ARCH_300))
+		type = STF_BARRIER_EIEIO;
+	else if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ARCH_207S))
+		type = STF_BARRIER_SYNC_ORI;
+	else if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ARCH_206))
+		type = STF_BARRIER_FALLBACK;
+	else
+		type = STF_BARRIER_NONE;
+
+	enable = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY) &&
+		(security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR) ||
+		 (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_HV) && hv));
+
+	if (type == STF_BARRIER_FALLBACK) {
+		pr_info("stf-barrier: fallback barrier available\n");
+	} else if (type == STF_BARRIER_SYNC_ORI) {
+		pr_info("stf-barrier: hwsync barrier available\n");
+	} else if (type == STF_BARRIER_EIEIO) {
+		pr_info("stf-barrier: eieio barrier available\n");
+	}
+
+	stf_enabled_flush_types = type;
+
+	if (!no_stf_barrier && !cpu_mitigations_off())
+		stf_barrier_enable(enable);
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	if (stf_barrier && stf_enabled_flush_types != STF_BARRIER_NONE) {
+		const char *type;
+		switch (stf_enabled_flush_types) {
+		case STF_BARRIER_EIEIO:
+			type = "eieio";
+			break;
+		case STF_BARRIER_SYNC_ORI:
+			type = "hwsync";
+			break;
+		case STF_BARRIER_FALLBACK:
+			type = "fallback";
+			break;
+		default:
+			type = "unknown";
+		}
+		return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: Kernel entry/exit barrier (%s)\n", type);
+	}
+
+	if (!security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_HV) &&
+	    !security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR))
+		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+
+	return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+}
+
+static int ssb_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	if (stf_enabled_flush_types == STF_BARRIER_NONE)
+		/*
+		 * We don't have an explicit signal from firmware that we're
+		 * vulnerable or not, we only have certain CPU revisions that
+		 * are known to be vulnerable.
+		 *
+		 * We assume that if we're on another CPU, where the barrier is
+		 * NONE, then we are not vulnerable.
+		 */
+		return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED;
+	else
+		/*
+		 * If we do have a barrier type then we are vulnerable. The
+		 * barrier is not a global or per-process mitigation, so the
+		 * only value we can report here is PR_SPEC_ENABLE, which
+		 * appears as "vulnerable" in /proc.
+		 */
+		return PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
+
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which)
+{
+	switch (which) {
+	case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
+		return ssb_prctl_get(task);
+	default:
+		return -ENODEV;
+	}
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
+static int stf_barrier_set(void *data, u64 val)
+{
+	bool enable;
+
+	if (val == 1)
+		enable = true;
+	else if (val == 0)
+		enable = false;
+	else
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Only do anything if we're changing state */
+	if (enable != stf_barrier)
+		stf_barrier_enable(enable);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int stf_barrier_get(void *data, u64 *val)
+{
+	*val = stf_barrier ? 1 : 0;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE(fops_stf_barrier, stf_barrier_get, stf_barrier_set,
+			 "%llu\n");
+
+static __init int stf_barrier_debugfs_init(void)
+{
+	debugfs_create_file_unsafe("stf_barrier", 0600, powerpc_debugfs_root,
+				   NULL, &fops_stf_barrier);
+	return 0;
+}
+device_initcall(stf_barrier_debugfs_init);
+#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_FS */
+
+static void update_branch_cache_flush(void)
+{
+	u32 *site;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_HV_POSSIBLE
+	site = &patch__call_kvm_flush_link_stack;
+	// This controls the branch from guest_exit_cont to kvm_flush_link_stack
+	if (link_stack_flush_type == BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE) {
+		patch_instruction_site(site, ppc_inst(PPC_INST_NOP));
+	} else {
+		// Could use HW flush, but that could also flush count cache
+		patch_branch_site(site, (u64)&kvm_flush_link_stack, BRANCH_SET_LINK);
+	}
+#endif
+
+	// Patch out the bcctr first, then nop the rest
+	site = &patch__call_flush_branch_caches3;
+	patch_instruction_site(site, ppc_inst(PPC_INST_NOP));
+	site = &patch__call_flush_branch_caches2;
+	patch_instruction_site(site, ppc_inst(PPC_INST_NOP));
+	site = &patch__call_flush_branch_caches1;
+	patch_instruction_site(site, ppc_inst(PPC_INST_NOP));
+
+	// This controls the branch from _switch to flush_branch_caches
+	if (count_cache_flush_type == BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE &&
+	    link_stack_flush_type == BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE) {
+		// Nothing to be done
+
+	} else if (count_cache_flush_type == BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_HW &&
+		   link_stack_flush_type == BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_HW) {
+		// Patch in the bcctr last
+		site = &patch__call_flush_branch_caches1;
+		patch_instruction_site(site, ppc_inst(0x39207fff)); // li r9,0x7fff
+		site = &patch__call_flush_branch_caches2;
+		patch_instruction_site(site, ppc_inst(0x7d2903a6)); // mtctr r9
+		site = &patch__call_flush_branch_caches3;
+		patch_instruction_site(site, ppc_inst(PPC_INST_BCCTR_FLUSH));
+
+	} else {
+		patch_branch_site(site, (u64)&flush_branch_caches, BRANCH_SET_LINK);
+
+		// If we just need to flush the link stack, early return
+		if (count_cache_flush_type == BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE) {
+			patch_instruction_site(&patch__flush_link_stack_return,
+					       ppc_inst(PPC_INST_BLR));
+
+		// If we have flush instruction, early return
+		} else if (count_cache_flush_type == BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_HW) {
+			patch_instruction_site(&patch__flush_count_cache_return,
+					       ppc_inst(PPC_INST_BLR));
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static void toggle_branch_cache_flush(bool enable)
+{
+	if (!enable || !security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FLUSH_COUNT_CACHE)) {
+		if (count_cache_flush_type != BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE)
+			count_cache_flush_type = BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE;
+
+		pr_info("count-cache-flush: flush disabled.\n");
+	} else {
+		if (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BCCTR_FLUSH_ASSIST)) {
+			count_cache_flush_type = BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_HW;
+			pr_info("count-cache-flush: hardware flush enabled.\n");
+		} else {
+			count_cache_flush_type = BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_SW;
+			pr_info("count-cache-flush: software flush enabled.\n");
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!enable || !security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FLUSH_LINK_STACK)) {
+		if (link_stack_flush_type != BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE)
+			link_stack_flush_type = BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE;
+
+		pr_info("link-stack-flush: flush disabled.\n");
+	} else {
+		if (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BCCTR_LINK_FLUSH_ASSIST)) {
+			link_stack_flush_type = BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_HW;
+			pr_info("link-stack-flush: hardware flush enabled.\n");
+		} else {
+			link_stack_flush_type = BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_SW;
+			pr_info("link-stack-flush: software flush enabled.\n");
+		}
+	}
+
+	update_branch_cache_flush();
+}
+
+void setup_count_cache_flush(void)
+{
+	bool enable = true;
+
+	if (no_spectrev2 || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+		if (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BCCTRL_SERIALISED) ||
+		    security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_COUNT_CACHE_DISABLED))
+			pr_warn("Spectre v2 mitigations not fully under software control, can't disable\n");
+
+		enable = false;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * There's no firmware feature flag/hypervisor bit to tell us we need to
+	 * flush the link stack on context switch. So we set it here if we see
+	 * either of the Spectre v2 mitigations that aim to protect userspace.
+	 */
+	if (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_COUNT_CACHE_DISABLED) ||
+	    security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FLUSH_COUNT_CACHE))
+		security_ftr_set(SEC_FTR_FLUSH_LINK_STACK);
+
+	toggle_branch_cache_flush(enable);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
+static int count_cache_flush_set(void *data, u64 val)
+{
+	bool enable;
+
+	if (val == 1)
+		enable = true;
+	else if (val == 0)
+		enable = false;
+	else
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	toggle_branch_cache_flush(enable);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int count_cache_flush_get(void *data, u64 *val)
+{
+	if (count_cache_flush_type == BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE)
+		*val = 0;
+	else
+		*val = 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE(fops_count_cache_flush, count_cache_flush_get,
+			 count_cache_flush_set, "%llu\n");
+
+static __init int count_cache_flush_debugfs_init(void)
+{
+	debugfs_create_file_unsafe("count_cache_flush", 0600,
+				   powerpc_debugfs_root, NULL,
+				   &fops_count_cache_flush);
+	return 0;
+}
+device_initcall(count_cache_flush_debugfs_init);
+#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_FS */
+#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 */