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| author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-05-08 17:45:30 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-05-08 17:45:30 +0000 |
| commit | 01db417e0aee3e51df4f5f3775535fd1fb15e329 (patch) | |
| tree | 12d419efb27541c39ef63831e0d899339ecfef4f /arch/x86/Kconfig | |
| parent | Adding debian version 5.10.209-2. (diff) | |
| download | linux-01db417e0aee3e51df4f5f3775535fd1fb15e329.tar.xz linux-01db417e0aee3e51df4f5f3775535fd1fb15e329.zip | |
Merging upstream version 5.10.216.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/Kconfig')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/Kconfig | 29 |
1 files changed, 19 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 6dc670e36..0c802ade8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ config X86 select ACPI_LEGACY_TABLES_LOOKUP if ACPI select ACPI_SYSTEM_POWER_STATES_SUPPORT if ACPI select ARCH_32BIT_OFF_T if X86_32 + select ARCH_CONFIGURES_CPU_MITIGATIONS select ARCH_CLOCKSOURCE_INIT select ARCH_HAS_ACPI_TABLE_UPGRADE if ACPI select ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT @@ -352,10 +353,6 @@ config X86_64_SMP def_bool y depends on X86_64 && SMP -config X86_32_LAZY_GS - def_bool y - depends on X86_32 && !STACKPROTECTOR - config ARCH_SUPPORTS_UPROBES def_bool y @@ -378,7 +375,8 @@ config CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR default $(success,$(srctree)/scripts/gcc-x86_32-has-stack-protector.sh $(CC)) help We have to make sure stack protector is unconditionally disabled if - the compiler produces broken code. + the compiler produces broken code or if it does not let us control + the segment on 32-bit kernels. menu "Processor type and features" @@ -2411,17 +2409,17 @@ config CC_HAS_SLS config CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK def_bool $(cc-option,-mfunction-return=thunk-extern) -menuconfig SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS - bool "Mitigations for speculative execution vulnerabilities" +menuconfig CPU_MITIGATIONS + bool "Mitigations for CPU vulnerabilities" default y help - Say Y here to enable options which enable mitigations for - speculative execution hardware vulnerabilities. + Say Y here to enable options which enable mitigations for hardware + vulnerabilities (usually related to speculative execution). If you say N, all mitigations will be disabled. You really should know what you are doing to say so. -if SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS +if CPU_MITIGATIONS config PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION bool "Remove the kernel mapping in user mode" @@ -2511,6 +2509,17 @@ config GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION If in doubt, say N. +config MITIGATION_RFDS + bool "RFDS Mitigation" + depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL + default y + help + Enable mitigation for Register File Data Sampling (RFDS) by default. + RFDS is a hardware vulnerability which affects Intel Atom CPUs. It + allows unprivileged speculative access to stale data previously + stored in floating point, vector and integer registers. + See also <file:Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst> + endif config ARCH_HAS_ADD_PAGES |