diff options
| author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-05-08 17:45:29 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-05-08 17:45:29 +0000 |
| commit | 83506c85f8d4332b3edfdc8f1fd07aa691415350 (patch) | |
| tree | 316b9630e093bb3b80e5d6e1c304151b5597901e /kernel/bpf/verifier.c | |
| parent | Adding upstream version 5.10.209. (diff) | |
| download | linux-upstream/5.10.216.tar.xz linux-upstream/5.10.216.zip | |
Adding upstream version 5.10.216.upstream/5.10.216
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to '')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 5 |
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index fce2345f6..25f8a8716 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -3941,6 +3941,11 @@ static int check_stack_access_within_bounds( err = check_stack_slot_within_bounds(min_off, state, type); if (!err && max_off > 0) err = -EINVAL; /* out of stack access into non-negative offsets */ + if (!err && access_size < 0) + /* access_size should not be negative (or overflow an int); others checks + * along the way should have prevented such an access. + */ + err = -EFAULT; /* invalid negative access size; integer overflow? */ if (err) { if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { |