diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 353 |
1 files changed, 353 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..bf0596749 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c @@ -0,0 +1,353 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * s390 code for kexec_file_load system call + * + * Copyright IBM Corp. 2018 + * + * Author(s): Philipp Rudo <prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.com> + */ + +#include <linux/elf.h> +#include <linux/errno.h> +#include <linux/kexec.h> +#include <linux/module_signature.h> +#include <linux/verification.h> +#include <linux/vmalloc.h> +#include <asm/boot_data.h> +#include <asm/ipl.h> +#include <asm/setup.h> + +const struct kexec_file_ops * const kexec_file_loaders[] = { + &s390_kexec_elf_ops, + &s390_kexec_image_ops, + NULL, +}; + +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG +int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len) +{ + const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1; + struct module_signature *ms; + unsigned long sig_len; + int ret; + + /* Skip signature verification when not secure IPLed. */ + if (!ipl_secure_flag) + return 0; + + if (marker_len > kernel_len) + return -EKEYREJECTED; + + if (memcmp(kernel + kernel_len - marker_len, MODULE_SIG_STRING, + marker_len)) + return -EKEYREJECTED; + kernel_len -= marker_len; + + ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len - sizeof(*ms); + kernel_len -= sizeof(*ms); + + sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len); + if (sig_len >= kernel_len) + return -EKEYREJECTED; + kernel_len -= sig_len; + + if (ms->id_type != PKEY_ID_PKCS7) + return -EKEYREJECTED; + + if (ms->algo != 0 || + ms->hash != 0 || + ms->signer_len != 0 || + ms->key_id_len != 0 || + ms->__pad[0] != 0 || + ms->__pad[1] != 0 || + ms->__pad[2] != 0) { + return -EBADMSG; + } + + ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(kernel, kernel_len, + kernel + kernel_len, sig_len, + VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, + VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE, + NULL, NULL); + if (ret == -ENOKEY && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING)) + ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(kernel, kernel_len, + kernel + kernel_len, sig_len, + VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING, + VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE, + NULL, NULL); + return ret; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */ + +static int kexec_file_update_purgatory(struct kimage *image, + struct s390_load_data *data) +{ + u64 entry, type; + int ret; + + if (image->type == KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH) { + entry = STARTUP_KDUMP_OFFSET; + type = KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH; + } else { + entry = STARTUP_NORMAL_OFFSET; + type = KEXEC_TYPE_DEFAULT; + } + + ret = kexec_purgatory_get_set_symbol(image, "kernel_entry", &entry, + sizeof(entry), false); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = kexec_purgatory_get_set_symbol(image, "kernel_type", &type, + sizeof(type), false); + if (ret) + return ret; + + if (image->type == KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH) { + u64 crash_size; + + ret = kexec_purgatory_get_set_symbol(image, "crash_start", + &crashk_res.start, + sizeof(crashk_res.start), + false); + if (ret) + return ret; + + crash_size = crashk_res.end - crashk_res.start + 1; + ret = kexec_purgatory_get_set_symbol(image, "crash_size", + &crash_size, + sizeof(crash_size), + false); + } + return ret; +} + +static int kexec_file_add_purgatory(struct kimage *image, + struct s390_load_data *data) +{ + struct kexec_buf buf; + int ret; + + buf.image = image; + + data->memsz = ALIGN(data->memsz, PAGE_SIZE); + buf.mem = data->memsz; + if (image->type == KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH) + buf.mem += crashk_res.start; + + ret = kexec_load_purgatory(image, &buf); + if (ret) + return ret; + data->memsz += buf.memsz; + + return kexec_file_update_purgatory(image, data); +} + +static int kexec_file_add_initrd(struct kimage *image, + struct s390_load_data *data) +{ + struct kexec_buf buf; + int ret; + + buf.image = image; + + buf.buffer = image->initrd_buf; + buf.bufsz = image->initrd_buf_len; + + data->memsz = ALIGN(data->memsz, PAGE_SIZE); + buf.mem = data->memsz; + if (image->type == KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH) + buf.mem += crashk_res.start; + buf.memsz = buf.bufsz; + + data->parm->initrd_start = data->memsz; + data->parm->initrd_size = buf.memsz; + data->memsz += buf.memsz; + + ret = kexec_add_buffer(&buf); + if (ret) + return ret; + + return ipl_report_add_component(data->report, &buf, 0, 0); +} + +static int kexec_file_add_ipl_report(struct kimage *image, + struct s390_load_data *data) +{ + __u32 *lc_ipl_parmblock_ptr; + unsigned int len, ncerts; + struct kexec_buf buf; + unsigned long addr; + void *ptr, *end; + int ret; + + buf.image = image; + + data->memsz = ALIGN(data->memsz, PAGE_SIZE); + buf.mem = data->memsz; + + ptr = (void *)ipl_cert_list_addr; + end = ptr + ipl_cert_list_size; + ncerts = 0; + while (ptr < end) { + ncerts++; + len = *(unsigned int *)ptr; + ptr += sizeof(len); + ptr += len; + } + + addr = data->memsz + data->report->size; + addr += ncerts * sizeof(struct ipl_rb_certificate_entry); + ptr = (void *)ipl_cert_list_addr; + while (ptr < end) { + len = *(unsigned int *)ptr; + ptr += sizeof(len); + ipl_report_add_certificate(data->report, ptr, addr, len); + addr += len; + ptr += len; + } + + ret = -ENOMEM; + buf.buffer = ipl_report_finish(data->report); + if (!buf.buffer) + goto out; + buf.bufsz = data->report->size; + buf.memsz = buf.bufsz; + image->arch.ipl_buf = buf.buffer; + + data->memsz += buf.memsz; + + lc_ipl_parmblock_ptr = + data->kernel_buf + offsetof(struct lowcore, ipl_parmblock_ptr); + *lc_ipl_parmblock_ptr = (__u32)buf.mem; + + if (image->type == KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH) + buf.mem += crashk_res.start; + + ret = kexec_add_buffer(&buf); +out: + return ret; +} + +void *kexec_file_add_components(struct kimage *image, + int (*add_kernel)(struct kimage *image, + struct s390_load_data *data)) +{ + struct s390_load_data data = {0}; + int ret; + + data.report = ipl_report_init(&ipl_block); + if (IS_ERR(data.report)) + return data.report; + + ret = add_kernel(image, &data); + if (ret) + goto out; + + if (image->cmdline_buf_len >= ARCH_COMMAND_LINE_SIZE) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + memcpy(data.parm->command_line, image->cmdline_buf, + image->cmdline_buf_len); + + if (image->type == KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH) { + data.parm->oldmem_base = crashk_res.start; + data.parm->oldmem_size = crashk_res.end - crashk_res.start + 1; + } + + if (image->initrd_buf) { + ret = kexec_file_add_initrd(image, &data); + if (ret) + goto out; + } + + ret = kexec_file_add_purgatory(image, &data); + if (ret) + goto out; + + if (data.kernel_mem == 0) { + unsigned long restart_psw = 0x0008000080000000UL; + restart_psw += image->start; + memcpy(data.kernel_buf, &restart_psw, sizeof(restart_psw)); + image->start = 0; + } + + ret = kexec_file_add_ipl_report(image, &data); +out: + ipl_report_free(data.report); + return ERR_PTR(ret); +} + +int arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add(struct purgatory_info *pi, + Elf_Shdr *section, + const Elf_Shdr *relsec, + const Elf_Shdr *symtab) +{ + Elf_Rela *relas; + int i, r_type; + int ret; + + relas = (void *)pi->ehdr + relsec->sh_offset; + + for (i = 0; i < relsec->sh_size / sizeof(*relas); i++) { + const Elf_Sym *sym; /* symbol to relocate */ + unsigned long addr; /* final location after relocation */ + unsigned long val; /* relocated symbol value */ + void *loc; /* tmp location to modify */ + + sym = (void *)pi->ehdr + symtab->sh_offset; + sym += ELF64_R_SYM(relas[i].r_info); + + if (sym->st_shndx == SHN_UNDEF) + return -ENOEXEC; + + if (sym->st_shndx == SHN_COMMON) + return -ENOEXEC; + + if (sym->st_shndx >= pi->ehdr->e_shnum && + sym->st_shndx != SHN_ABS) + return -ENOEXEC; + + loc = pi->purgatory_buf; + loc += section->sh_offset; + loc += relas[i].r_offset; + + val = sym->st_value; + if (sym->st_shndx != SHN_ABS) + val += pi->sechdrs[sym->st_shndx].sh_addr; + val += relas[i].r_addend; + + addr = section->sh_addr + relas[i].r_offset; + + r_type = ELF64_R_TYPE(relas[i].r_info); + ret = arch_kexec_do_relocs(r_type, loc, val, addr); + if (ret) { + pr_err("Unknown rela relocation: %d\n", r_type); + return -ENOEXEC; + } + } + return 0; +} + +int arch_kexec_kernel_image_probe(struct kimage *image, void *buf, + unsigned long buf_len) +{ + /* A kernel must be at least large enough to contain head.S. During + * load memory in head.S will be accessed, e.g. to register the next + * command line. If the next kernel were smaller the current kernel + * will panic at load. + */ + if (buf_len < HEAD_END) + return -ENOEXEC; + + return kexec_image_probe_default(image, buf, buf_len); +} + +int arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image) +{ + vfree(image->arch.ipl_buf); + image->arch.ipl_buf = NULL; + + return kexec_image_post_load_cleanup_default(image); +} |