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Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity/ima/Kconfig')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 316 |
1 files changed, 316 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d0d3ff58d --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig @@ -0,0 +1,316 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +# IBM Integrity Measurement Architecture +# +config IMA + bool "Integrity Measurement Architecture(IMA)" + select SECURITYFS + select CRYPTO + select CRYPTO_HMAC + select CRYPTO_SHA1 + select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO + select TCG_TPM if HAS_IOMEM + select TCG_TIS if TCG_TPM && X86 + select TCG_CRB if TCG_TPM && ACPI + select TCG_IBMVTPM if TCG_TPM && PPC_PSERIES + select INTEGRITY_AUDIT if AUDIT + help + The Trusted Computing Group(TCG) runtime Integrity + Measurement Architecture(IMA) maintains a list of hash + values of executables and other sensitive system files, + as they are read or executed. If an attacker manages + to change the contents of an important system file + being measured, we can tell. + + If your system has a TPM chip, then IMA also maintains + an aggregate integrity value over this list inside the + TPM hardware, so that the TPM can prove to a third party + whether or not critical system files have been modified. + Read <https://www.usenix.org/events/sec04/tech/sailer.html> + to learn more about IMA. + If unsure, say N. + +if IMA + +config IMA_KEXEC + bool "Enable carrying the IMA measurement list across a soft boot" + depends on TCG_TPM && HAVE_IMA_KEXEC + default n + help + TPM PCRs are only reset on a hard reboot. In order to validate + a TPM's quote after a soft boot, the IMA measurement list of the + running kernel must be saved and restored on boot. + + Depending on the IMA policy, the measurement list can grow to + be very large. + +config IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX + int + range 8 14 + default 10 + help + IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX determines the TPM PCR register index + that IMA uses to maintain the integrity aggregate of the + measurement list. If unsure, use the default 10. + +config IMA_LSM_RULES + bool + depends on AUDIT && (SECURITY_SELINUX || SECURITY_SMACK || SECURITY_APPARMOR) + default y + help + Disabling this option will disregard LSM based policy rules. + +choice + prompt "Default template" + default IMA_NG_TEMPLATE + help + Select the default IMA measurement template. + + The original 'ima' measurement list template contains a + hash, defined as 20 bytes, and a null terminated pathname, + limited to 255 characters. The 'ima-ng' measurement list + template permits both larger hash digests and longer + pathnames. The configured default template can be replaced + by specifying "ima_template=" on the boot command line. + + config IMA_NG_TEMPLATE + bool "ima-ng (default)" + config IMA_SIG_TEMPLATE + bool "ima-sig" +endchoice + +config IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE + string + default "ima-ng" if IMA_NG_TEMPLATE + default "ima-sig" if IMA_SIG_TEMPLATE + +choice + prompt "Default integrity hash algorithm" + default IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA1 + help + Select the default hash algorithm used for the measurement + list, integrity appraisal and audit log. The compiled default + hash algorithm can be overwritten using the kernel command + line 'ima_hash=' option. + + config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA1 + bool "SHA1 (default)" + depends on CRYPTO_SHA1=y + + config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA256 + bool "SHA256" + depends on CRYPTO_SHA256=y + + config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA512 + bool "SHA512" + depends on CRYPTO_SHA512=y + + config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_WP512 + bool "WP512" + depends on CRYPTO_WP512=y + + config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SM3 + bool "SM3" + depends on CRYPTO_SM3=y +endchoice + +config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH + string + default "sha1" if IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA1 + default "sha256" if IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA256 + default "sha512" if IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA512 + default "wp512" if IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_WP512 + default "sm3" if IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SM3 + +config IMA_WRITE_POLICY + bool "Enable multiple writes to the IMA policy" + default n + help + IMA policy can now be updated multiple times. The new rules get + appended to the original policy. Have in mind that the rules are + scanned in FIFO order so be careful when you design and add new ones. + + If unsure, say N. + +config IMA_READ_POLICY + bool "Enable reading back the current IMA policy" + default y if IMA_WRITE_POLICY + default n if !IMA_WRITE_POLICY + help + It is often useful to be able to read back the IMA policy. It is + even more important after introducing CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY. + This option allows the root user to see the current policy rules. + +config IMA_APPRAISE + bool "Appraise integrity measurements" + default n + help + This option enables local measurement integrity appraisal. + It requires the system to be labeled with a security extended + attribute containing the file hash measurement. To protect + the security extended attributes from offline attack, enable + and configure EVM. + + For more information on integrity appraisal refer to: + <http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net> + If unsure, say N. + +config IMA_ARCH_POLICY + bool "Enable loading an IMA architecture specific policy" + depends on (KEXEC_SIG && IMA) || IMA_APPRAISE \ + && INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS + default n + help + This option enables loading an IMA architecture specific policy + based on run time secure boot flags. + +config IMA_APPRAISE_BUILD_POLICY + bool "IMA build time configured policy rules" + depends on IMA_APPRAISE && INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS + default n + help + This option defines an IMA appraisal policy at build time, which + is enforced at run time without having to specify a builtin + policy name on the boot command line. The build time appraisal + policy rules persist after loading a custom policy. + + Depending on the rules configured, this policy may require kernel + modules, firmware, the kexec kernel image, and/or the IMA policy + to be signed. Unsigned files might prevent the system from + booting or applications from working properly. + +config IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_FIRMWARE_SIGS + bool "Appraise firmware signatures" + depends on IMA_APPRAISE_BUILD_POLICY + default n + help + This option defines a policy requiring all firmware to be signed, + including the regulatory.db. If both this option and + CFG80211_REQUIRE_SIGNED_REGDB are enabled, then both signature + verification methods are necessary. + +config IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_KEXEC_SIGS + bool "Appraise kexec kernel image signatures" + depends on IMA_APPRAISE_BUILD_POLICY + default n + help + Enabling this rule will require all kexec'ed kernel images to + be signed and verified by a public key on the trusted IMA + keyring. + + Kernel image signatures can not be verified by the original + kexec_load syscall. Enabling this rule will prevent its + usage. + +config IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_MODULE_SIGS + bool "Appraise kernel modules signatures" + depends on IMA_APPRAISE_BUILD_POLICY + default n + help + Enabling this rule will require all kernel modules to be signed + and verified by a public key on the trusted IMA keyring. + + Kernel module signatures can only be verified by IMA-appraisal, + via the finit_module syscall. Enabling this rule will prevent + the usage of the init_module syscall. + +config IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_POLICY_SIGS + bool "Appraise IMA policy signature" + depends on IMA_APPRAISE_BUILD_POLICY + default n + help + Enabling this rule will require the IMA policy to be signed and + and verified by a key on the trusted IMA keyring. + +config IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM + bool "ima_appraise boot parameter" + depends on IMA_APPRAISE + default y + help + This option enables the different "ima_appraise=" modes + (eg. fix, log) from the boot command line. + +config IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG + bool "Support module-style signatures for appraisal" + depends on IMA_APPRAISE + depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS + select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER + select MODULE_SIG_FORMAT + default n + help + Adds support for signatures appended to files. The format of the + appended signature is the same used for signed kernel modules. + The modsig keyword can be used in the IMA policy to allow a hook + to accept such signatures. + +config IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY + bool "Permit keys validly signed by a built-in or secondary CA cert (EXPERIMENTAL)" + depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING + depends on SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING + depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS + select INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING + default n + help + Keys may be added to the IMA or IMA blacklist keyrings, if the + key is validly signed by a CA cert in the system built-in or + secondary trusted keyrings. + + Intermediate keys between those the kernel has compiled in and the + IMA keys to be added may be added to the system secondary keyring, + provided they are validly signed by a key already resident in the + built-in or secondary trusted keyrings. + +config IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING + bool "Create IMA machine owner blacklist keyrings (EXPERIMENTAL)" + depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING + depends on INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING + default n + help + This option creates an IMA blacklist keyring, which contains all + revoked IMA keys. It is consulted before any other keyring. If + the search is successful the requested operation is rejected and + an error is returned to the caller. + +config IMA_LOAD_X509 + bool "Load X509 certificate onto the '.ima' trusted keyring" + depends on INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING + default n + help + File signature verification is based on the public keys + loaded on the .ima trusted keyring. These public keys are + X509 certificates signed by a trusted key on the + .system keyring. This option enables X509 certificate + loading from the kernel onto the '.ima' trusted keyring. + +config IMA_X509_PATH + string "IMA X509 certificate path" + depends on IMA_LOAD_X509 + default "/etc/keys/x509_ima.der" + help + This option defines IMA X509 certificate path. + +config IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT + bool "Require signed user-space initialization" + depends on IMA_LOAD_X509 + default n + help + This option requires user-space init to be signed. + +config IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS + bool + depends on ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE=y + default y + +config IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS + bool + depends on IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS + depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING + default y + +config IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT + bool + depends on IMA_ARCH_POLICY + help + This option is selected by architectures to enable secure and/or + trusted boot based on IMA runtime policies. + +endif |