summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c')
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c4162
1 files changed, 4162 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..413a7b9f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,4162 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Test code for seccomp bpf.
+ */
+
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+/*
+ * glibc 2.26 and later have SIGSYS in siginfo_t. Before that,
+ * we need to use the kernel's siginfo.h file and trick glibc
+ * into accepting it.
+ */
+#if !__GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 26)
+# include <asm/siginfo.h>
+# define __have_siginfo_t 1
+# define __have_sigval_t 1
+# define __have_sigevent_t 1
+#endif
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <linux/filter.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <sys/ptrace.h>
+#include <sys/user.h>
+#include <linux/prctl.h>
+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/seccomp.h>
+#include <pthread.h>
+#include <semaphore.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <linux/elf.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+#include <sys/utsname.h>
+#include <sys/fcntl.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <sys/times.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <linux/kcmp.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#include <poll.h>
+
+#include "../kselftest_harness.h"
+#include "../clone3/clone3_selftests.h"
+
+/* Attempt to de-conflict with the selftests tree. */
+#ifndef SKIP
+#define SKIP(s, ...) XFAIL(s, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef PR_SET_PTRACER
+# define PR_SET_PTRACER 0x59616d61
+#endif
+
+#ifndef PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
+#define PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 38
+#define PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 39
+#endif
+
+#ifndef PR_SECCOMP_EXT
+#define PR_SECCOMP_EXT 43
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SECCOMP_EXT_ACT
+#define SECCOMP_EXT_ACT 1
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SECCOMP_EXT_ACT_TSYNC
+#define SECCOMP_EXT_ACT_TSYNC 1
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT
+#define SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT 1
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER
+#define SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER 2
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW
+struct seccomp_data {
+ int nr;
+ __u32 arch;
+ __u64 instruction_pointer;
+ __u64 args[6];
+};
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS
+#define SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS 0x80000000U /* kill the process */
+#define SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD 0x00000000U /* kill the thread */
+#endif
+#ifndef SECCOMP_RET_KILL
+#define SECCOMP_RET_KILL SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD
+#define SECCOMP_RET_TRAP 0x00030000U /* disallow and force a SIGSYS */
+#define SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO 0x00050000U /* returns an errno */
+#define SECCOMP_RET_TRACE 0x7ff00000U /* pass to a tracer or disallow */
+#define SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW 0x7fff0000U /* allow */
+#endif
+#ifndef SECCOMP_RET_LOG
+#define SECCOMP_RET_LOG 0x7ffc0000U /* allow after logging */
+#endif
+
+#ifndef __NR_seccomp
+# if defined(__i386__)
+# define __NR_seccomp 354
+# elif defined(__x86_64__)
+# define __NR_seccomp 317
+# elif defined(__arm__)
+# define __NR_seccomp 383
+# elif defined(__aarch64__)
+# define __NR_seccomp 277
+# elif defined(__riscv)
+# define __NR_seccomp 277
+# elif defined(__csky__)
+# define __NR_seccomp 277
+# elif defined(__hppa__)
+# define __NR_seccomp 338
+# elif defined(__powerpc__)
+# define __NR_seccomp 358
+# elif defined(__s390__)
+# define __NR_seccomp 348
+# elif defined(__xtensa__)
+# define __NR_seccomp 337
+# elif defined(__sh__)
+# define __NR_seccomp 372
+# else
+# warning "seccomp syscall number unknown for this architecture"
+# define __NR_seccomp 0xffff
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT
+#define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT 0
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER
+#define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER 1
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL
+#define SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL 2
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SECCOMP_GET_NOTIF_SIZES
+#define SECCOMP_GET_NOTIF_SIZES 3
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC
+#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC (1UL << 0)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG
+#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG (1UL << 1)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW
+#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW (1UL << 2)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_METADATA
+#define PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_METADATA 0x420d
+
+struct seccomp_metadata {
+ __u64 filter_off; /* Input: which filter */
+ __u64 flags; /* Output: filter's flags */
+};
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER
+#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER (1UL << 3)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF
+#define SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF 0x7fc00000U
+
+#define SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC '!'
+#define SECCOMP_IO(nr) _IO(SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC, nr)
+#define SECCOMP_IOR(nr, type) _IOR(SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC, nr, type)
+#define SECCOMP_IOW(nr, type) _IOW(SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC, nr, type)
+#define SECCOMP_IOWR(nr, type) _IOWR(SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC, nr, type)
+
+/* Flags for seccomp notification fd ioctl. */
+#define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV SECCOMP_IOWR(0, struct seccomp_notif)
+#define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND SECCOMP_IOWR(1, \
+ struct seccomp_notif_resp)
+#define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID SECCOMP_IOW(2, __u64)
+
+struct seccomp_notif {
+ __u64 id;
+ __u32 pid;
+ __u32 flags;
+ struct seccomp_data data;
+};
+
+struct seccomp_notif_resp {
+ __u64 id;
+ __s64 val;
+ __s32 error;
+ __u32 flags;
+};
+
+struct seccomp_notif_sizes {
+ __u16 seccomp_notif;
+ __u16 seccomp_notif_resp;
+ __u16 seccomp_data;
+};
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ADDFD
+/* On success, the return value is the remote process's added fd number */
+#define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ADDFD SECCOMP_IOW(3, \
+ struct seccomp_notif_addfd)
+
+/* valid flags for seccomp_notif_addfd */
+#define SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_SETFD (1UL << 0) /* Specify remote fd */
+
+struct seccomp_notif_addfd {
+ __u64 id;
+ __u32 flags;
+ __u32 srcfd;
+ __u32 newfd;
+ __u32 newfd_flags;
+};
+#endif
+
+struct seccomp_notif_addfd_small {
+ __u64 id;
+ char weird[4];
+};
+#define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ADDFD_SMALL \
+ SECCOMP_IOW(3, struct seccomp_notif_addfd_small)
+
+struct seccomp_notif_addfd_big {
+ union {
+ struct seccomp_notif_addfd addfd;
+ char buf[sizeof(struct seccomp_notif_addfd) + 8];
+ };
+};
+#define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ADDFD_BIG \
+ SECCOMP_IOWR(3, struct seccomp_notif_addfd_big)
+
+#ifndef PTRACE_EVENTMSG_SYSCALL_ENTRY
+#define PTRACE_EVENTMSG_SYSCALL_ENTRY 1
+#define PTRACE_EVENTMSG_SYSCALL_EXIT 2
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE
+#define SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE 0x00000001
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC_ESRCH
+#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC_ESRCH (1UL << 4)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef seccomp
+int seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags, void *args)
+{
+ errno = 0;
+ return syscall(__NR_seccomp, op, flags, args);
+}
+#endif
+
+#if __BYTE_ORDER == __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+#define syscall_arg(_n) (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[_n]))
+#elif __BYTE_ORDER == __BIG_ENDIAN
+#define syscall_arg(_n) (offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[_n]) + sizeof(__u32))
+#else
+#error "wut? Unknown __BYTE_ORDER?!"
+#endif
+
+#define SIBLING_EXIT_UNKILLED 0xbadbeef
+#define SIBLING_EXIT_FAILURE 0xbadface
+#define SIBLING_EXIT_NEWPRIVS 0xbadfeed
+
+static int __filecmp(pid_t pid1, pid_t pid2, int fd1, int fd2)
+{
+#ifdef __NR_kcmp
+ errno = 0;
+ return syscall(__NR_kcmp, pid1, pid2, KCMP_FILE, fd1, fd2);
+#else
+ errno = ENOSYS;
+ return -1;
+#endif
+}
+
+/* Have TH_LOG report actual location filecmp() is used. */
+#define filecmp(pid1, pid2, fd1, fd2) ({ \
+ int _ret; \
+ \
+ _ret = __filecmp(pid1, pid2, fd1, fd2); \
+ if (_ret != 0) { \
+ if (_ret < 0 && errno == ENOSYS) { \
+ TH_LOG("kcmp() syscall missing (test is less accurate)");\
+ _ret = 0; \
+ } \
+ } \
+ _ret; })
+
+TEST(kcmp)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = __filecmp(getpid(), getpid(), 1, 1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+ if (ret != 0 && errno == ENOSYS)
+ SKIP(return, "Kernel does not support kcmp() (missing CONFIG_KCMP?)");
+}
+
+TEST(mode_strict_support)
+{
+ long ret;
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support CONFIG_SECCOMP");
+ }
+ syscall(__NR_exit, 0);
+}
+
+TEST_SIGNAL(mode_strict_cannot_call_prctl, SIGKILL)
+{
+ long ret;
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support CONFIG_SECCOMP");
+ }
+ syscall(__NR_prctl, PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER,
+ NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ EXPECT_FALSE(true) {
+ TH_LOG("Unreachable!");
+ }
+}
+
+/* Note! This doesn't test no new privs behavior */
+TEST(no_new_privs_support)
+{
+ long ret;
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
+ }
+}
+
+/* Tests kernel support by checking for a copy_from_user() fault on NULL. */
+TEST(mode_filter_support)
+{
+ long ret;
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, NULL, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
+ }
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(EFAULT, errno) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER!");
+ }
+}
+
+TEST(mode_filter_without_nnp)
+{
+ struct sock_filter filter[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ };
+ struct sock_fprog prog = {
+ .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
+ .filter = filter,
+ };
+ long ret;
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 0, NULL, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ret) {
+ TH_LOG("Expected 0 or unsupported for NO_NEW_PRIVS");
+ }
+ errno = 0;
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog, 0, 0);
+ /* Succeeds with CAP_SYS_ADMIN, fails without */
+ /* TODO(wad) check caps not euid */
+ if (geteuid()) {
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+ } else {
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ }
+}
+
+#define MAX_INSNS_PER_PATH 32768
+
+TEST(filter_size_limits)
+{
+ int i;
+ int count = BPF_MAXINSNS + 1;
+ struct sock_filter allow[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ };
+ struct sock_filter *filter;
+ struct sock_fprog prog = { };
+ long ret;
+
+ filter = calloc(count, sizeof(*filter));
+ ASSERT_NE(NULL, filter);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
+ filter[i] = allow[0];
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ prog.filter = filter;
+ prog.len = count;
+
+ /* Too many filter instructions in a single filter. */
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_NE(0, ret) {
+ TH_LOG("Installing %d insn filter was allowed", prog.len);
+ }
+
+ /* One less is okay, though. */
+ prog.len -= 1;
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret) {
+ TH_LOG("Installing %d insn filter wasn't allowed", prog.len);
+ }
+}
+
+TEST(filter_chain_limits)
+{
+ int i;
+ int count = BPF_MAXINSNS;
+ struct sock_filter allow[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ };
+ struct sock_filter *filter;
+ struct sock_fprog prog = { };
+ long ret;
+
+ filter = calloc(count, sizeof(*filter));
+ ASSERT_NE(NULL, filter);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
+ filter[i] = allow[0];
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ prog.filter = filter;
+ prog.len = 1;
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ prog.len = count;
+
+ /* Too many total filter instructions. */
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_INSNS_PER_PATH; i++) {
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog, 0, 0);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ ASSERT_NE(0, ret) {
+ TH_LOG("Allowed %d %d-insn filters (total with penalties:%d)",
+ i, count, i * (count + 4));
+ }
+}
+
+TEST(mode_filter_cannot_move_to_strict)
+{
+ struct sock_filter filter[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ };
+ struct sock_fprog prog = {
+ .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
+ .filter = filter,
+ };
+ long ret;
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT, NULL, 0, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
+}
+
+
+TEST(mode_filter_get_seccomp)
+{
+ struct sock_filter filter[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ };
+ struct sock_fprog prog = {
+ .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
+ .filter = filter,
+ };
+ long ret;
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_GET_SECCOMP, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_GET_SECCOMP, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(2, ret);
+}
+
+
+TEST(ALLOW_all)
+{
+ struct sock_filter filter[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ };
+ struct sock_fprog prog = {
+ .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
+ .filter = filter,
+ };
+ long ret;
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+}
+
+TEST(empty_prog)
+{
+ struct sock_filter filter[] = {
+ };
+ struct sock_fprog prog = {
+ .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
+ .filter = filter,
+ };
+ long ret;
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog);
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
+}
+
+TEST(log_all)
+{
+ struct sock_filter filter[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_LOG),
+ };
+ struct sock_fprog prog = {
+ .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
+ .filter = filter,
+ };
+ long ret;
+ pid_t parent = getppid();
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ /* getppid() should succeed and be logged (no check for logging) */
+ EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
+}
+
+TEST_SIGNAL(unknown_ret_is_kill_inside, SIGSYS)
+{
+ struct sock_filter filter[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, 0x10000000U),
+ };
+ struct sock_fprog prog = {
+ .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
+ .filter = filter,
+ };
+ long ret;
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, syscall(__NR_getpid)) {
+ TH_LOG("getpid() shouldn't ever return");
+ }
+}
+
+/* return code >= 0x80000000 is unused. */
+TEST_SIGNAL(unknown_ret_is_kill_above_allow, SIGSYS)
+{
+ struct sock_filter filter[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, 0x90000000U),
+ };
+ struct sock_fprog prog = {
+ .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
+ .filter = filter,
+ };
+ long ret;
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, syscall(__NR_getpid)) {
+ TH_LOG("getpid() shouldn't ever return");
+ }
+}
+
+TEST_SIGNAL(KILL_all, SIGSYS)
+{
+ struct sock_filter filter[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL),
+ };
+ struct sock_fprog prog = {
+ .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
+ .filter = filter,
+ };
+ long ret;
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+}
+
+TEST_SIGNAL(KILL_one, SIGSYS)
+{
+ struct sock_filter filter[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
+ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_getpid, 0, 1),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ };
+ struct sock_fprog prog = {
+ .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
+ .filter = filter,
+ };
+ long ret;
+ pid_t parent = getppid();
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
+ /* getpid() should never return. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, syscall(__NR_getpid));
+}
+
+TEST_SIGNAL(KILL_one_arg_one, SIGSYS)
+{
+ void *fatal_address;
+ struct sock_filter filter[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
+ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_times, 1, 0),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ /* Only both with lower 32-bit for now. */
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS, syscall_arg(0)),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K,
+ (unsigned long)&fatal_address, 0, 1),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ };
+ struct sock_fprog prog = {
+ .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
+ .filter = filter,
+ };
+ long ret;
+ pid_t parent = getppid();
+ struct tms timebuf;
+ clock_t clock = times(&timebuf);
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
+ EXPECT_LE(clock, syscall(__NR_times, &timebuf));
+ /* times() should never return. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, syscall(__NR_times, &fatal_address));
+}
+
+TEST_SIGNAL(KILL_one_arg_six, SIGSYS)
+{
+#ifndef __NR_mmap2
+ int sysno = __NR_mmap;
+#else
+ int sysno = __NR_mmap2;
+#endif
+ struct sock_filter filter[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
+ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, sysno, 1, 0),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ /* Only both with lower 32-bit for now. */
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS, syscall_arg(5)),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, 0x0C0FFEE, 0, 1),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ };
+ struct sock_fprog prog = {
+ .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
+ .filter = filter,
+ };
+ long ret;
+ pid_t parent = getppid();
+ int fd;
+ void *map1, *map2;
+ int page_size = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE);
+
+ ASSERT_LT(0, page_size);
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ fd = open("/dev/zero", O_RDONLY);
+ ASSERT_NE(-1, fd);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
+ map1 = (void *)syscall(sysno,
+ NULL, page_size, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, page_size);
+ EXPECT_NE(MAP_FAILED, map1);
+ /* mmap2() should never return. */
+ map2 = (void *)syscall(sysno,
+ NULL, page_size, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0x0C0FFEE);
+ EXPECT_EQ(MAP_FAILED, map2);
+
+ /* The test failed, so clean up the resources. */
+ munmap(map1, page_size);
+ munmap(map2, page_size);
+ close(fd);
+}
+
+/* This is a thread task to die via seccomp filter violation. */
+void *kill_thread(void *data)
+{
+ bool die = (bool)data;
+
+ if (die) {
+ prctl(PR_GET_SECCOMP, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+ return (void *)SIBLING_EXIT_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ return (void *)SIBLING_EXIT_UNKILLED;
+}
+
+enum kill_t {
+ KILL_THREAD,
+ KILL_PROCESS,
+ RET_UNKNOWN
+};
+
+/* Prepare a thread that will kill itself or both of us. */
+void kill_thread_or_group(struct __test_metadata *_metadata,
+ enum kill_t kill_how)
+{
+ pthread_t thread;
+ void *status;
+ /* Kill only when calling __NR_prctl. */
+ struct sock_filter filter_thread[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
+ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_prctl, 0, 1),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ };
+ struct sock_fprog prog_thread = {
+ .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter_thread),
+ .filter = filter_thread,
+ };
+ int kill = kill_how == KILL_PROCESS ? SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS : 0xAAAAAAAA;
+ struct sock_filter filter_process[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
+ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_prctl, 0, 1),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, kill),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ };
+ struct sock_fprog prog_process = {
+ .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter_process),
+ .filter = filter_process,
+ };
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
+ }
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0,
+ kill_how == KILL_THREAD ? &prog_thread
+ : &prog_process));
+
+ /*
+ * Add the KILL_THREAD rule again to make sure that the KILL_PROCESS
+ * flag cannot be downgraded by a new filter.
+ */
+ if (kill_how == KILL_PROCESS)
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &prog_thread));
+
+ /* Start a thread that will exit immediately. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_create(&thread, NULL, kill_thread, (void *)false));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_join(thread, &status));
+ ASSERT_EQ(SIBLING_EXIT_UNKILLED, (unsigned long)status);
+
+ /* Start a thread that will die immediately. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_create(&thread, NULL, kill_thread, (void *)true));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_join(thread, &status));
+ ASSERT_NE(SIBLING_EXIT_FAILURE, (unsigned long)status);
+
+ /*
+ * If we get here, only the spawned thread died. Let the parent know
+ * the whole process didn't die (i.e. this thread, the spawner,
+ * stayed running).
+ */
+ exit(42);
+}
+
+TEST(KILL_thread)
+{
+ int status;
+ pid_t child_pid;
+
+ child_pid = fork();
+ ASSERT_LE(0, child_pid);
+ if (child_pid == 0) {
+ kill_thread_or_group(_metadata, KILL_THREAD);
+ _exit(38);
+ }
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(child_pid, waitpid(child_pid, &status, 0));
+
+ /* If only the thread was killed, we'll see exit 42. */
+ ASSERT_TRUE(WIFEXITED(status));
+ ASSERT_EQ(42, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+}
+
+TEST(KILL_process)
+{
+ int status;
+ pid_t child_pid;
+
+ child_pid = fork();
+ ASSERT_LE(0, child_pid);
+ if (child_pid == 0) {
+ kill_thread_or_group(_metadata, KILL_PROCESS);
+ _exit(38);
+ }
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(child_pid, waitpid(child_pid, &status, 0));
+
+ /* If the entire process was killed, we'll see SIGSYS. */
+ ASSERT_TRUE(WIFSIGNALED(status));
+ ASSERT_EQ(SIGSYS, WTERMSIG(status));
+}
+
+TEST(KILL_unknown)
+{
+ int status;
+ pid_t child_pid;
+
+ child_pid = fork();
+ ASSERT_LE(0, child_pid);
+ if (child_pid == 0) {
+ kill_thread_or_group(_metadata, RET_UNKNOWN);
+ _exit(38);
+ }
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(child_pid, waitpid(child_pid, &status, 0));
+
+ /* If the entire process was killed, we'll see SIGSYS. */
+ EXPECT_TRUE(WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
+ TH_LOG("Unknown SECCOMP_RET is only killing the thread?");
+ }
+ ASSERT_EQ(SIGSYS, WTERMSIG(status));
+}
+
+/* TODO(wad) add 64-bit versus 32-bit arg tests. */
+TEST(arg_out_of_range)
+{
+ struct sock_filter filter[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS, syscall_arg(6)),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ };
+ struct sock_fprog prog = {
+ .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
+ .filter = filter,
+ };
+ long ret;
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog);
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
+}
+
+#define ERRNO_FILTER(name, errno) \
+ struct sock_filter _read_filter_##name[] = { \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS, \
+ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)), \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_read, 0, 1), \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO | errno), \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), \
+ }; \
+ struct sock_fprog prog_##name = { \
+ .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(_read_filter_##name), \
+ .filter = _read_filter_##name, \
+ }
+
+/* Make sure basic errno values are correctly passed through a filter. */
+TEST(ERRNO_valid)
+{
+ ERRNO_FILTER(valid, E2BIG);
+ long ret;
+ pid_t parent = getppid();
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog_valid);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, read(-1, NULL, 0));
+ EXPECT_EQ(E2BIG, errno);
+}
+
+/* Make sure an errno of zero is correctly handled by the arch code. */
+TEST(ERRNO_zero)
+{
+ ERRNO_FILTER(zero, 0);
+ long ret;
+ pid_t parent = getppid();
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog_zero);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
+ /* "errno" of 0 is ok. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, read(-1, NULL, 0));
+}
+
+/*
+ * The SECCOMP_RET_DATA mask is 16 bits wide, but errno is smaller.
+ * This tests that the errno value gets capped correctly, fixed by
+ * 580c57f10768 ("seccomp: cap SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO data to MAX_ERRNO").
+ */
+TEST(ERRNO_capped)
+{
+ ERRNO_FILTER(capped, 4096);
+ long ret;
+ pid_t parent = getppid();
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog_capped);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, read(-1, NULL, 0));
+ EXPECT_EQ(4095, errno);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Filters are processed in reverse order: last applied is executed first.
+ * Since only the SECCOMP_RET_ACTION mask is tested for return values, the
+ * SECCOMP_RET_DATA mask results will follow the most recently applied
+ * matching filter return (and not the lowest or highest value).
+ */
+TEST(ERRNO_order)
+{
+ ERRNO_FILTER(first, 11);
+ ERRNO_FILTER(second, 13);
+ ERRNO_FILTER(third, 12);
+ long ret;
+ pid_t parent = getppid();
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog_first);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog_second);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog_third);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, read(-1, NULL, 0));
+ EXPECT_EQ(12, errno);
+}
+
+FIXTURE(TRAP) {
+ struct sock_fprog prog;
+};
+
+FIXTURE_SETUP(TRAP)
+{
+ struct sock_filter filter[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
+ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_getpid, 0, 1),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ };
+
+ memset(&self->prog, 0, sizeof(self->prog));
+ self->prog.filter = malloc(sizeof(filter));
+ ASSERT_NE(NULL, self->prog.filter);
+ memcpy(self->prog.filter, filter, sizeof(filter));
+ self->prog.len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter);
+}
+
+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(TRAP)
+{
+ if (self->prog.filter)
+ free(self->prog.filter);
+}
+
+TEST_F_SIGNAL(TRAP, dfl, SIGSYS)
+{
+ long ret;
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->prog);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ syscall(__NR_getpid);
+}
+
+/* Ensure that SIGSYS overrides SIG_IGN */
+TEST_F_SIGNAL(TRAP, ign, SIGSYS)
+{
+ long ret;
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ signal(SIGSYS, SIG_IGN);
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->prog);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ syscall(__NR_getpid);
+}
+
+static siginfo_t TRAP_info;
+static volatile int TRAP_nr;
+static void TRAP_action(int nr, siginfo_t *info, void *void_context)
+{
+ memcpy(&TRAP_info, info, sizeof(TRAP_info));
+ TRAP_nr = nr;
+}
+
+TEST_F(TRAP, handler)
+{
+ int ret, test;
+ struct sigaction act;
+ sigset_t mask;
+
+ memset(&act, 0, sizeof(act));
+ sigemptyset(&mask);
+ sigaddset(&mask, SIGSYS);
+
+ act.sa_sigaction = &TRAP_action;
+ act.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
+ ret = sigaction(SIGSYS, &act, NULL);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret) {
+ TH_LOG("sigaction failed");
+ }
+ ret = sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &mask, NULL);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret) {
+ TH_LOG("sigprocmask failed");
+ }
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->prog);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ TRAP_nr = 0;
+ memset(&TRAP_info, 0, sizeof(TRAP_info));
+ /* Expect the registers to be rolled back. (nr = error) may vary
+ * based on arch. */
+ ret = syscall(__NR_getpid);
+ /* Silence gcc warning about volatile. */
+ test = TRAP_nr;
+ EXPECT_EQ(SIGSYS, test);
+ struct local_sigsys {
+ void *_call_addr; /* calling user insn */
+ int _syscall; /* triggering system call number */
+ unsigned int _arch; /* AUDIT_ARCH_* of syscall */
+ } *sigsys = (struct local_sigsys *)
+#ifdef si_syscall
+ &(TRAP_info.si_call_addr);
+#else
+ &TRAP_info.si_pid;
+#endif
+ EXPECT_EQ(__NR_getpid, sigsys->_syscall);
+ /* Make sure arch is non-zero. */
+ EXPECT_NE(0, sigsys->_arch);
+ EXPECT_NE(0, (unsigned long)sigsys->_call_addr);
+}
+
+FIXTURE(precedence) {
+ struct sock_fprog allow;
+ struct sock_fprog log;
+ struct sock_fprog trace;
+ struct sock_fprog error;
+ struct sock_fprog trap;
+ struct sock_fprog kill;
+};
+
+FIXTURE_SETUP(precedence)
+{
+ struct sock_filter allow_insns[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ };
+ struct sock_filter log_insns[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
+ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_getpid, 1, 0),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_LOG),
+ };
+ struct sock_filter trace_insns[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
+ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_getpid, 1, 0),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE),
+ };
+ struct sock_filter error_insns[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
+ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_getpid, 1, 0),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO),
+ };
+ struct sock_filter trap_insns[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
+ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_getpid, 1, 0),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP),
+ };
+ struct sock_filter kill_insns[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
+ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_getpid, 1, 0),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL),
+ };
+
+ memset(self, 0, sizeof(*self));
+#define FILTER_ALLOC(_x) \
+ self->_x.filter = malloc(sizeof(_x##_insns)); \
+ ASSERT_NE(NULL, self->_x.filter); \
+ memcpy(self->_x.filter, &_x##_insns, sizeof(_x##_insns)); \
+ self->_x.len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(_x##_insns)
+ FILTER_ALLOC(allow);
+ FILTER_ALLOC(log);
+ FILTER_ALLOC(trace);
+ FILTER_ALLOC(error);
+ FILTER_ALLOC(trap);
+ FILTER_ALLOC(kill);
+}
+
+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(precedence)
+{
+#define FILTER_FREE(_x) if (self->_x.filter) free(self->_x.filter)
+ FILTER_FREE(allow);
+ FILTER_FREE(log);
+ FILTER_FREE(trace);
+ FILTER_FREE(error);
+ FILTER_FREE(trap);
+ FILTER_FREE(kill);
+}
+
+TEST_F(precedence, allow_ok)
+{
+ pid_t parent, res = 0;
+ long ret;
+
+ parent = getppid();
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->allow);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->log);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trace);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->error);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trap);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->kill);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ /* Should work just fine. */
+ res = syscall(__NR_getppid);
+ EXPECT_EQ(parent, res);
+}
+
+TEST_F_SIGNAL(precedence, kill_is_highest, SIGSYS)
+{
+ pid_t parent, res = 0;
+ long ret;
+
+ parent = getppid();
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->allow);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->log);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trace);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->error);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trap);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->kill);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ /* Should work just fine. */
+ res = syscall(__NR_getppid);
+ EXPECT_EQ(parent, res);
+ /* getpid() should never return. */
+ res = syscall(__NR_getpid);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, res);
+}
+
+TEST_F_SIGNAL(precedence, kill_is_highest_in_any_order, SIGSYS)
+{
+ pid_t parent;
+ long ret;
+
+ parent = getppid();
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->allow);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->kill);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->error);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->log);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trace);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trap);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ /* Should work just fine. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
+ /* getpid() should never return. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, syscall(__NR_getpid));
+}
+
+TEST_F_SIGNAL(precedence, trap_is_second, SIGSYS)
+{
+ pid_t parent;
+ long ret;
+
+ parent = getppid();
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->allow);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->log);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trace);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->error);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trap);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ /* Should work just fine. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
+ /* getpid() should never return. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, syscall(__NR_getpid));
+}
+
+TEST_F_SIGNAL(precedence, trap_is_second_in_any_order, SIGSYS)
+{
+ pid_t parent;
+ long ret;
+
+ parent = getppid();
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->allow);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trap);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->log);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trace);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->error);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ /* Should work just fine. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
+ /* getpid() should never return. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, syscall(__NR_getpid));
+}
+
+TEST_F(precedence, errno_is_third)
+{
+ pid_t parent;
+ long ret;
+
+ parent = getppid();
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->allow);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->log);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trace);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->error);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ /* Should work just fine. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, syscall(__NR_getpid));
+}
+
+TEST_F(precedence, errno_is_third_in_any_order)
+{
+ pid_t parent;
+ long ret;
+
+ parent = getppid();
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->log);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->error);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trace);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->allow);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ /* Should work just fine. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, syscall(__NR_getpid));
+}
+
+TEST_F(precedence, trace_is_fourth)
+{
+ pid_t parent;
+ long ret;
+
+ parent = getppid();
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->allow);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->log);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trace);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ /* Should work just fine. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
+ /* No ptracer */
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, syscall(__NR_getpid));
+}
+
+TEST_F(precedence, trace_is_fourth_in_any_order)
+{
+ pid_t parent;
+ long ret;
+
+ parent = getppid();
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->trace);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->allow);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->log);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ /* Should work just fine. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
+ /* No ptracer */
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, syscall(__NR_getpid));
+}
+
+TEST_F(precedence, log_is_fifth)
+{
+ pid_t mypid, parent;
+ long ret;
+
+ mypid = getpid();
+ parent = getppid();
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->allow);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->log);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ /* Should work just fine. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
+ /* Should also work just fine */
+ EXPECT_EQ(mypid, syscall(__NR_getpid));
+}
+
+TEST_F(precedence, log_is_fifth_in_any_order)
+{
+ pid_t mypid, parent;
+ long ret;
+
+ mypid = getpid();
+ parent = getppid();
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->log);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->allow);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ /* Should work just fine. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
+ /* Should also work just fine */
+ EXPECT_EQ(mypid, syscall(__NR_getpid));
+}
+
+#ifndef PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP
+#define PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP 0x00000080
+#endif
+
+/* Catch the Ubuntu 12.04 value error. */
+#if PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP != 7
+#undef PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP
+#endif
+
+#ifndef PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP
+#define PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP 7
+#endif
+
+#define IS_SECCOMP_EVENT(status) ((status >> 16) == PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP)
+bool tracer_running;
+void tracer_stop(int sig)
+{
+ tracer_running = false;
+}
+
+typedef void tracer_func_t(struct __test_metadata *_metadata,
+ pid_t tracee, int status, void *args);
+
+void start_tracer(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, int fd, pid_t tracee,
+ tracer_func_t tracer_func, void *args, bool ptrace_syscall)
+{
+ int ret = -1;
+ struct sigaction action = {
+ .sa_handler = tracer_stop,
+ };
+
+ /* Allow external shutdown. */
+ tracer_running = true;
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, sigaction(SIGUSR1, &action, NULL));
+
+ errno = 0;
+ while (ret == -1 && errno != EINVAL)
+ ret = ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, tracee, NULL, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret) {
+ kill(tracee, SIGKILL);
+ }
+ /* Wait for attach stop */
+ wait(NULL);
+
+ ret = ptrace(PTRACE_SETOPTIONS, tracee, NULL, ptrace_syscall ?
+ PTRACE_O_TRACESYSGOOD :
+ PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret) {
+ TH_LOG("Failed to set PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP");
+ kill(tracee, SIGKILL);
+ }
+ ret = ptrace(ptrace_syscall ? PTRACE_SYSCALL : PTRACE_CONT,
+ tracee, NULL, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ /* Unblock the tracee */
+ ASSERT_EQ(1, write(fd, "A", 1));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(fd));
+
+ /* Run until we're shut down. Must assert to stop execution. */
+ while (tracer_running) {
+ int status;
+
+ if (wait(&status) != tracee)
+ continue;
+ if (WIFSIGNALED(status) || WIFEXITED(status))
+ /* Child is dead. Time to go. */
+ return;
+
+ /* Check if this is a seccomp event. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(!ptrace_syscall, IS_SECCOMP_EVENT(status));
+
+ tracer_func(_metadata, tracee, status, args);
+
+ ret = ptrace(ptrace_syscall ? PTRACE_SYSCALL : PTRACE_CONT,
+ tracee, NULL, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ }
+ /* Directly report the status of our test harness results. */
+ syscall(__NR_exit, _metadata->passed ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE);
+}
+
+/* Common tracer setup/teardown functions. */
+void cont_handler(int num)
+{ }
+pid_t setup_trace_fixture(struct __test_metadata *_metadata,
+ tracer_func_t func, void *args, bool ptrace_syscall)
+{
+ char sync;
+ int pipefd[2];
+ pid_t tracer_pid;
+ pid_t tracee = getpid();
+
+ /* Setup a pipe for clean synchronization. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe(pipefd));
+
+ /* Fork a child which we'll promote to tracer */
+ tracer_pid = fork();
+ ASSERT_LE(0, tracer_pid);
+ signal(SIGALRM, cont_handler);
+ if (tracer_pid == 0) {
+ close(pipefd[0]);
+ start_tracer(_metadata, pipefd[1], tracee, func, args,
+ ptrace_syscall);
+ syscall(__NR_exit, 0);
+ }
+ close(pipefd[1]);
+ prctl(PR_SET_PTRACER, tracer_pid, 0, 0, 0);
+ read(pipefd[0], &sync, 1);
+ close(pipefd[0]);
+
+ return tracer_pid;
+}
+
+void teardown_trace_fixture(struct __test_metadata *_metadata,
+ pid_t tracer)
+{
+ if (tracer) {
+ int status;
+ /*
+ * Extract the exit code from the other process and
+ * adopt it for ourselves in case its asserts failed.
+ */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, kill(tracer, SIGUSR1));
+ ASSERT_EQ(tracer, waitpid(tracer, &status, 0));
+ if (WEXITSTATUS(status))
+ _metadata->passed = 0;
+ }
+}
+
+/* "poke" tracer arguments and function. */
+struct tracer_args_poke_t {
+ unsigned long poke_addr;
+};
+
+void tracer_poke(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, pid_t tracee, int status,
+ void *args)
+{
+ int ret;
+ unsigned long msg;
+ struct tracer_args_poke_t *info = (struct tracer_args_poke_t *)args;
+
+ ret = ptrace(PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG, tracee, NULL, &msg);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ /* If this fails, don't try to recover. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0x1001, msg) {
+ kill(tracee, SIGKILL);
+ }
+ /*
+ * Poke in the message.
+ * Registers are not touched to try to keep this relatively arch
+ * agnostic.
+ */
+ ret = ptrace(PTRACE_POKEDATA, tracee, info->poke_addr, 0x1001);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+}
+
+FIXTURE(TRACE_poke) {
+ struct sock_fprog prog;
+ pid_t tracer;
+ long poked;
+ struct tracer_args_poke_t tracer_args;
+};
+
+FIXTURE_SETUP(TRACE_poke)
+{
+ struct sock_filter filter[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
+ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_read, 0, 1),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE | 0x1001),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ };
+
+ self->poked = 0;
+ memset(&self->prog, 0, sizeof(self->prog));
+ self->prog.filter = malloc(sizeof(filter));
+ ASSERT_NE(NULL, self->prog.filter);
+ memcpy(self->prog.filter, filter, sizeof(filter));
+ self->prog.len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter);
+
+ /* Set up tracer args. */
+ self->tracer_args.poke_addr = (unsigned long)&self->poked;
+
+ /* Launch tracer. */
+ self->tracer = setup_trace_fixture(_metadata, tracer_poke,
+ &self->tracer_args, false);
+}
+
+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(TRACE_poke)
+{
+ teardown_trace_fixture(_metadata, self->tracer);
+ if (self->prog.filter)
+ free(self->prog.filter);
+}
+
+TEST_F(TRACE_poke, read_has_side_effects)
+{
+ ssize_t ret;
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->prog, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, self->poked);
+ ret = read(-1, NULL, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0x1001, self->poked);
+}
+
+TEST_F(TRACE_poke, getpid_runs_normally)
+{
+ long ret;
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &self->prog, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, self->poked);
+ EXPECT_NE(0, syscall(__NR_getpid));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, self->poked);
+}
+
+#if defined(__x86_64__)
+# define ARCH_REGS struct user_regs_struct
+# define SYSCALL_NUM(_regs) (_regs).orig_rax
+# define SYSCALL_RET(_regs) (_regs).rax
+#elif defined(__i386__)
+# define ARCH_REGS struct user_regs_struct
+# define SYSCALL_NUM(_regs) (_regs).orig_eax
+# define SYSCALL_RET(_regs) (_regs).eax
+#elif defined(__arm__)
+# define ARCH_REGS struct pt_regs
+# define SYSCALL_NUM(_regs) (_regs).ARM_r7
+# ifndef PTRACE_SET_SYSCALL
+# define PTRACE_SET_SYSCALL 23
+# endif
+# define SYSCALL_NUM_SET(_regs, _nr) \
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_SET_SYSCALL, tracee, NULL, _nr))
+# define SYSCALL_RET(_regs) (_regs).ARM_r0
+#elif defined(__aarch64__)
+# define ARCH_REGS struct user_pt_regs
+# define SYSCALL_NUM(_regs) (_regs).regs[8]
+# ifndef NT_ARM_SYSTEM_CALL
+# define NT_ARM_SYSTEM_CALL 0x404
+# endif
+# define SYSCALL_NUM_SET(_regs, _nr) \
+ do { \
+ struct iovec __v; \
+ typeof(_nr) __nr = (_nr); \
+ __v.iov_base = &__nr; \
+ __v.iov_len = sizeof(__nr); \
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGSET, tracee, \
+ NT_ARM_SYSTEM_CALL, &__v)); \
+ } while (0)
+# define SYSCALL_RET(_regs) (_regs).regs[0]
+#elif defined(__riscv) && __riscv_xlen == 64
+# define ARCH_REGS struct user_regs_struct
+# define SYSCALL_NUM(_regs) (_regs).a7
+# define SYSCALL_RET(_regs) (_regs).a0
+#elif defined(__csky__)
+# define ARCH_REGS struct pt_regs
+# if defined(__CSKYABIV2__)
+# define SYSCALL_NUM(_regs) (_regs).regs[3]
+# else
+# define SYSCALL_NUM(_regs) (_regs).regs[9]
+# endif
+# define SYSCALL_RET(_regs) (_regs).a0
+#elif defined(__hppa__)
+# define ARCH_REGS struct user_regs_struct
+# define SYSCALL_NUM(_regs) (_regs).gr[20]
+# define SYSCALL_RET(_regs) (_regs).gr[28]
+#elif defined(__powerpc__)
+# define ARCH_REGS struct pt_regs
+# define SYSCALL_NUM(_regs) (_regs).gpr[0]
+# define SYSCALL_RET(_regs) (_regs).gpr[3]
+# define SYSCALL_RET_SET(_regs, _val) \
+ do { \
+ typeof(_val) _result = (_val); \
+ if ((_regs.trap & 0xfff0) == 0x3000) { \
+ /* \
+ * scv 0 system call uses -ve result \
+ * for error, so no need to adjust. \
+ */ \
+ SYSCALL_RET(_regs) = _result; \
+ } else { \
+ /* \
+ * A syscall error is signaled by the \
+ * CR0 SO bit and the code is stored as \
+ * a positive value. \
+ */ \
+ if (_result < 0) { \
+ SYSCALL_RET(_regs) = -_result; \
+ (_regs).ccr |= 0x10000000; \
+ } else { \
+ SYSCALL_RET(_regs) = _result; \
+ (_regs).ccr &= ~0x10000000; \
+ } \
+ } \
+ } while (0)
+# define SYSCALL_RET_SET_ON_PTRACE_EXIT
+#elif defined(__s390__)
+# define ARCH_REGS s390_regs
+# define SYSCALL_NUM(_regs) (_regs).gprs[2]
+# define SYSCALL_RET_SET(_regs, _val) \
+ TH_LOG("Can't modify syscall return on this architecture")
+#elif defined(__mips__)
+# include <asm/unistd_nr_n32.h>
+# include <asm/unistd_nr_n64.h>
+# include <asm/unistd_nr_o32.h>
+# define ARCH_REGS struct pt_regs
+# define SYSCALL_NUM(_regs) \
+ ({ \
+ typeof((_regs).regs[2]) _nr; \
+ if ((_regs).regs[2] == __NR_O32_Linux) \
+ _nr = (_regs).regs[4]; \
+ else \
+ _nr = (_regs).regs[2]; \
+ _nr; \
+ })
+# define SYSCALL_NUM_SET(_regs, _nr) \
+ do { \
+ if ((_regs).regs[2] == __NR_O32_Linux) \
+ (_regs).regs[4] = _nr; \
+ else \
+ (_regs).regs[2] = _nr; \
+ } while (0)
+# define SYSCALL_RET_SET(_regs, _val) \
+ TH_LOG("Can't modify syscall return on this architecture")
+#elif defined(__xtensa__)
+# define ARCH_REGS struct user_pt_regs
+# define SYSCALL_NUM(_regs) (_regs).syscall
+/*
+ * On xtensa syscall return value is in the register
+ * a2 of the current window which is not fixed.
+ */
+#define SYSCALL_RET(_regs) (_regs).a[(_regs).windowbase * 4 + 2]
+#elif defined(__sh__)
+# define ARCH_REGS struct pt_regs
+# define SYSCALL_NUM(_regs) (_regs).regs[3]
+# define SYSCALL_RET(_regs) (_regs).regs[0]
+#else
+# error "Do not know how to find your architecture's registers and syscalls"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Most architectures can change the syscall by just updating the
+ * associated register. This is the default if not defined above.
+ */
+#ifndef SYSCALL_NUM_SET
+# define SYSCALL_NUM_SET(_regs, _nr) \
+ do { \
+ SYSCALL_NUM(_regs) = (_nr); \
+ } while (0)
+#endif
+/*
+ * Most architectures can change the syscall return value by just
+ * writing to the SYSCALL_RET register. This is the default if not
+ * defined above. If an architecture cannot set the return value
+ * (for example when the syscall and return value register is
+ * shared), report it with TH_LOG() in an arch-specific definition
+ * of SYSCALL_RET_SET() above, and leave SYSCALL_RET undefined.
+ */
+#if !defined(SYSCALL_RET) && !defined(SYSCALL_RET_SET)
+# error "One of SYSCALL_RET or SYSCALL_RET_SET is needed for this arch"
+#endif
+#ifndef SYSCALL_RET_SET
+# define SYSCALL_RET_SET(_regs, _val) \
+ do { \
+ SYSCALL_RET(_regs) = (_val); \
+ } while (0)
+#endif
+
+/* When the syscall return can't be changed, stub out the tests for it. */
+#ifndef SYSCALL_RET
+# define EXPECT_SYSCALL_RETURN(val, action) EXPECT_EQ(-1, action)
+#else
+# define EXPECT_SYSCALL_RETURN(val, action) \
+ do { \
+ errno = 0; \
+ if (val < 0) { \
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, action); \
+ EXPECT_EQ(-(val), errno); \
+ } else { \
+ EXPECT_EQ(val, action); \
+ } \
+ } while (0)
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Some architectures (e.g. powerpc) can only set syscall
+ * return values on syscall exit during ptrace.
+ */
+const bool ptrace_entry_set_syscall_nr = true;
+const bool ptrace_entry_set_syscall_ret =
+#ifndef SYSCALL_RET_SET_ON_PTRACE_EXIT
+ true;
+#else
+ false;
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Use PTRACE_GETREGS and PTRACE_SETREGS when available. This is useful for
+ * architectures without HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK (e.g. User-mode Linux).
+ */
+#if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__i386__) || defined(__mips__)
+# define ARCH_GETREGS(_regs) ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGS, tracee, 0, &(_regs))
+# define ARCH_SETREGS(_regs) ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGS, tracee, 0, &(_regs))
+#else
+# define ARCH_GETREGS(_regs) ({ \
+ struct iovec __v; \
+ __v.iov_base = &(_regs); \
+ __v.iov_len = sizeof(_regs); \
+ ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET, tracee, NT_PRSTATUS, &__v); \
+ })
+# define ARCH_SETREGS(_regs) ({ \
+ struct iovec __v; \
+ __v.iov_base = &(_regs); \
+ __v.iov_len = sizeof(_regs); \
+ ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGSET, tracee, NT_PRSTATUS, &__v); \
+ })
+#endif
+
+/* Architecture-specific syscall fetching routine. */
+int get_syscall(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, pid_t tracee)
+{
+ ARCH_REGS regs;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ARCH_GETREGS(regs)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return SYSCALL_NUM(regs);
+}
+
+/* Architecture-specific syscall changing routine. */
+void __change_syscall(struct __test_metadata *_metadata,
+ pid_t tracee, long *syscall, long *ret)
+{
+ ARCH_REGS orig, regs;
+
+ /* Do not get/set registers if we have nothing to do. */
+ if (!syscall && !ret)
+ return;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ARCH_GETREGS(regs)) {
+ return;
+ }
+ orig = regs;
+
+ if (syscall)
+ SYSCALL_NUM_SET(regs, *syscall);
+
+ if (ret)
+ SYSCALL_RET_SET(regs, *ret);
+
+ /* Flush any register changes made. */
+ if (memcmp(&orig, &regs, sizeof(orig)) != 0)
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ARCH_SETREGS(regs));
+}
+
+/* Change only syscall number. */
+void change_syscall_nr(struct __test_metadata *_metadata,
+ pid_t tracee, long syscall)
+{
+ __change_syscall(_metadata, tracee, &syscall, NULL);
+}
+
+/* Change syscall return value (and set syscall number to -1). */
+void change_syscall_ret(struct __test_metadata *_metadata,
+ pid_t tracee, long ret)
+{
+ long syscall = -1;
+
+ __change_syscall(_metadata, tracee, &syscall, &ret);
+}
+
+void tracer_seccomp(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, pid_t tracee,
+ int status, void *args)
+{
+ int ret;
+ unsigned long msg;
+
+ /* Make sure we got the right message. */
+ ret = ptrace(PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG, tracee, NULL, &msg);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ /* Validate and take action on expected syscalls. */
+ switch (msg) {
+ case 0x1002:
+ /* change getpid to getppid. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(__NR_getpid, get_syscall(_metadata, tracee));
+ change_syscall_nr(_metadata, tracee, __NR_getppid);
+ break;
+ case 0x1003:
+ /* skip gettid with valid return code. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(__NR_gettid, get_syscall(_metadata, tracee));
+ change_syscall_ret(_metadata, tracee, 45000);
+ break;
+ case 0x1004:
+ /* skip openat with error. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(__NR_openat, get_syscall(_metadata, tracee));
+ change_syscall_ret(_metadata, tracee, -ESRCH);
+ break;
+ case 0x1005:
+ /* do nothing (allow getppid) */
+ EXPECT_EQ(__NR_getppid, get_syscall(_metadata, tracee));
+ break;
+ default:
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, msg) {
+ TH_LOG("Unknown PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG: 0x%lx", msg);
+ kill(tracee, SIGKILL);
+ }
+ }
+
+}
+
+FIXTURE(TRACE_syscall) {
+ struct sock_fprog prog;
+ pid_t tracer, mytid, mypid, parent;
+ long syscall_nr;
+};
+
+void tracer_ptrace(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, pid_t tracee,
+ int status, void *args)
+{
+ int ret;
+ unsigned long msg;
+ static bool entry;
+ long syscall_nr_val, syscall_ret_val;
+ long *syscall_nr = NULL, *syscall_ret = NULL;
+ FIXTURE_DATA(TRACE_syscall) *self = args;
+
+ /*
+ * The traditional way to tell PTRACE_SYSCALL entry/exit
+ * is by counting.
+ */
+ entry = !entry;
+
+ /* Make sure we got an appropriate message. */
+ ret = ptrace(PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG, tracee, NULL, &msg);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(entry ? PTRACE_EVENTMSG_SYSCALL_ENTRY
+ : PTRACE_EVENTMSG_SYSCALL_EXIT, msg);
+
+ /*
+ * Some architectures only support setting return values during
+ * syscall exit under ptrace, and on exit the syscall number may
+ * no longer be available. Therefore, save the initial sycall
+ * number here, so it can be examined during both entry and exit
+ * phases.
+ */
+ if (entry)
+ self->syscall_nr = get_syscall(_metadata, tracee);
+
+ /*
+ * Depending on the architecture's syscall setting abilities, we
+ * pick which things to set during this phase (entry or exit).
+ */
+ if (entry == ptrace_entry_set_syscall_nr)
+ syscall_nr = &syscall_nr_val;
+ if (entry == ptrace_entry_set_syscall_ret)
+ syscall_ret = &syscall_ret_val;
+
+ /* Now handle the actual rewriting cases. */
+ switch (self->syscall_nr) {
+ case __NR_getpid:
+ syscall_nr_val = __NR_getppid;
+ /* Never change syscall return for this case. */
+ syscall_ret = NULL;
+ break;
+ case __NR_gettid:
+ syscall_nr_val = -1;
+ syscall_ret_val = 45000;
+ break;
+ case __NR_openat:
+ syscall_nr_val = -1;
+ syscall_ret_val = -ESRCH;
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* Unhandled, do nothing. */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ __change_syscall(_metadata, tracee, syscall_nr, syscall_ret);
+}
+
+FIXTURE_VARIANT(TRACE_syscall) {
+ /*
+ * All of the SECCOMP_RET_TRACE behaviors can be tested with either
+ * SECCOMP_RET_TRACE+PTRACE_CONT or plain ptrace()+PTRACE_SYSCALL.
+ * This indicates if we should use SECCOMP_RET_TRACE (false), or
+ * ptrace (true).
+ */
+ bool use_ptrace;
+};
+
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(TRACE_syscall, ptrace) {
+ .use_ptrace = true,
+};
+
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(TRACE_syscall, seccomp) {
+ .use_ptrace = false,
+};
+
+FIXTURE_SETUP(TRACE_syscall)
+{
+ struct sock_filter filter[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
+ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_getpid, 0, 1),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE | 0x1002),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_gettid, 0, 1),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE | 0x1003),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_openat, 0, 1),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE | 0x1004),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_getppid, 0, 1),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE | 0x1005),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ };
+ struct sock_fprog prog = {
+ .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
+ .filter = filter,
+ };
+ long ret;
+
+ /* Prepare some testable syscall results. */
+ self->mytid = syscall(__NR_gettid);
+ ASSERT_GT(self->mytid, 0);
+ ASSERT_NE(self->mytid, 1) {
+ TH_LOG("Running this test as init is not supported. :)");
+ }
+
+ self->mypid = getpid();
+ ASSERT_GT(self->mypid, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(self->mytid, self->mypid);
+
+ self->parent = getppid();
+ ASSERT_GT(self->parent, 0);
+ ASSERT_NE(self->parent, self->mypid);
+
+ /* Launch tracer. */
+ self->tracer = setup_trace_fixture(_metadata,
+ variant->use_ptrace ? tracer_ptrace
+ : tracer_seccomp,
+ self, variant->use_ptrace);
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ if (variant->use_ptrace)
+ return;
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+}
+
+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(TRACE_syscall)
+{
+ teardown_trace_fixture(_metadata, self->tracer);
+}
+
+TEST(negative_ENOSYS)
+{
+ /*
+ * There should be no difference between an "internal" skip
+ * and userspace asking for syscall "-1".
+ */
+ errno = 0;
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, syscall(-1));
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno, ENOSYS);
+ /* And no difference for "still not valid but not -1". */
+ errno = 0;
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, syscall(-101));
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno, ENOSYS);
+}
+
+TEST_F(TRACE_syscall, negative_ENOSYS)
+{
+ negative_ENOSYS(_metadata);
+}
+
+TEST_F(TRACE_syscall, syscall_allowed)
+{
+ /* getppid works as expected (no changes). */
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
+ EXPECT_NE(self->mypid, syscall(__NR_getppid));
+}
+
+TEST_F(TRACE_syscall, syscall_redirected)
+{
+ /* getpid has been redirected to getppid as expected. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->parent, syscall(__NR_getpid));
+ EXPECT_NE(self->mypid, syscall(__NR_getpid));
+}
+
+TEST_F(TRACE_syscall, syscall_errno)
+{
+ /* Tracer should skip the open syscall, resulting in ESRCH. */
+ EXPECT_SYSCALL_RETURN(-ESRCH, syscall(__NR_openat));
+}
+
+TEST_F(TRACE_syscall, syscall_faked)
+{
+ /* Tracer skips the gettid syscall and store altered return value. */
+ EXPECT_SYSCALL_RETURN(45000, syscall(__NR_gettid));
+}
+
+TEST_F(TRACE_syscall, skip_after)
+{
+ struct sock_filter filter[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
+ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_getppid, 0, 1),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO | EPERM),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ };
+ struct sock_fprog prog = {
+ .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
+ .filter = filter,
+ };
+ long ret;
+
+ /* Install additional "errno on getppid" filter. */
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ /* Tracer will redirect getpid to getppid, and we should see EPERM. */
+ errno = 0;
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, syscall(__NR_getpid));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, errno);
+}
+
+TEST_F_SIGNAL(TRACE_syscall, kill_after, SIGSYS)
+{
+ struct sock_filter filter[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
+ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_getppid, 0, 1),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ };
+ struct sock_fprog prog = {
+ .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
+ .filter = filter,
+ };
+ long ret;
+
+ /* Install additional "death on getppid" filter. */
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ /* Tracer will redirect getpid to getppid, and we should die. */
+ EXPECT_NE(self->mypid, syscall(__NR_getpid));
+}
+
+TEST(seccomp_syscall)
+{
+ struct sock_filter filter[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ };
+ struct sock_fprog prog = {
+ .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
+ .filter = filter,
+ };
+ long ret;
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
+ }
+
+ /* Reject insane operation. */
+ ret = seccomp(-1, 0, &prog);
+ ASSERT_NE(ENOSYS, errno) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support seccomp syscall!");
+ }
+ EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno) {
+ TH_LOG("Did not reject crazy op value!");
+ }
+
+ /* Reject strict with flags or pointer. */
+ ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT, -1, NULL);
+ EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno) {
+ TH_LOG("Did not reject mode strict with flags!");
+ }
+ ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT, 0, &prog);
+ EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno) {
+ TH_LOG("Did not reject mode strict with uargs!");
+ }
+
+ /* Reject insane args for filter. */
+ ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, -1, &prog);
+ EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno) {
+ TH_LOG("Did not reject crazy filter flags!");
+ }
+ ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, NULL);
+ EXPECT_EQ(EFAULT, errno) {
+ TH_LOG("Did not reject NULL filter!");
+ }
+
+ ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &prog);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, errno) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER: %s",
+ strerror(errno));
+ }
+}
+
+TEST(seccomp_syscall_mode_lock)
+{
+ struct sock_filter filter[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ };
+ struct sock_fprog prog = {
+ .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
+ .filter = filter,
+ };
+ long ret;
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, NULL, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
+ }
+
+ ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &prog);
+ ASSERT_NE(ENOSYS, errno) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support seccomp syscall!");
+ }
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret) {
+ TH_LOG("Could not install filter!");
+ }
+
+ /* Make sure neither entry point will switch to strict. */
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT, 0, 0, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno) {
+ TH_LOG("Switched to mode strict!");
+ }
+
+ ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT, 0, NULL);
+ EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno) {
+ TH_LOG("Switched to mode strict!");
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test detection of known and unknown filter flags. Userspace needs to be able
+ * to check if a filter flag is supported by the current kernel and a good way
+ * of doing that is by attempting to enter filter mode, with the flag bit in
+ * question set, and a NULL pointer for the _args_ parameter. EFAULT indicates
+ * that the flag is valid and EINVAL indicates that the flag is invalid.
+ */
+TEST(detect_seccomp_filter_flags)
+{
+ unsigned int flags[] = { SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC,
+ SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG,
+ SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW,
+ SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER,
+ SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC_ESRCH };
+ unsigned int exclusive[] = {
+ SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC,
+ SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER };
+ unsigned int flag, all_flags, exclusive_mask;
+ int i;
+ long ret;
+
+ /* Test detection of individual known-good filter flags */
+ for (i = 0, all_flags = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(flags); i++) {
+ int bits = 0;
+
+ flag = flags[i];
+ /* Make sure the flag is a single bit! */
+ while (flag) {
+ if (flag & 0x1)
+ bits ++;
+ flag >>= 1;
+ }
+ ASSERT_EQ(1, bits);
+ flag = flags[i];
+
+ ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, flag, NULL);
+ ASSERT_NE(ENOSYS, errno) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support seccomp syscall!");
+ }
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(EFAULT, errno) {
+ TH_LOG("Failed to detect that a known-good filter flag (0x%X) is supported!",
+ flag);
+ }
+
+ all_flags |= flag;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Test detection of all known-good filter flags combined. But
+ * for the exclusive flags we need to mask them out and try them
+ * individually for the "all flags" testing.
+ */
+ exclusive_mask = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(exclusive); i++)
+ exclusive_mask |= exclusive[i];
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(exclusive); i++) {
+ flag = all_flags & ~exclusive_mask;
+ flag |= exclusive[i];
+
+ ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, flag, NULL);
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(EFAULT, errno) {
+ TH_LOG("Failed to detect that all known-good filter flags (0x%X) are supported!",
+ flag);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Test detection of an unknown filter flags, without exclusives. */
+ flag = -1;
+ flag &= ~exclusive_mask;
+ ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, flag, NULL);
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno) {
+ TH_LOG("Failed to detect that an unknown filter flag (0x%X) is unsupported!",
+ flag);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Test detection of an unknown filter flag that may simply need to be
+ * added to this test
+ */
+ flag = flags[ARRAY_SIZE(flags) - 1] << 1;
+ ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, flag, NULL);
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno) {
+ TH_LOG("Failed to detect that an unknown filter flag (0x%X) is unsupported! Does a new flag need to be added to this test?",
+ flag);
+ }
+}
+
+TEST(TSYNC_first)
+{
+ struct sock_filter filter[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ };
+ struct sock_fprog prog = {
+ .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
+ .filter = filter,
+ };
+ long ret;
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, NULL, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
+ }
+
+ ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC,
+ &prog);
+ ASSERT_NE(ENOSYS, errno) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support seccomp syscall!");
+ }
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret) {
+ TH_LOG("Could not install initial filter with TSYNC!");
+ }
+}
+
+#define TSYNC_SIBLINGS 2
+struct tsync_sibling {
+ pthread_t tid;
+ pid_t system_tid;
+ sem_t *started;
+ pthread_cond_t *cond;
+ pthread_mutex_t *mutex;
+ int diverge;
+ int num_waits;
+ struct sock_fprog *prog;
+ struct __test_metadata *metadata;
+};
+
+/*
+ * To avoid joining joined threads (which is not allowed by Bionic),
+ * make sure we both successfully join and clear the tid to skip a
+ * later join attempt during fixture teardown. Any remaining threads
+ * will be directly killed during teardown.
+ */
+#define PTHREAD_JOIN(tid, status) \
+ do { \
+ int _rc = pthread_join(tid, status); \
+ if (_rc) { \
+ TH_LOG("pthread_join of tid %u failed: %d\n", \
+ (unsigned int)tid, _rc); \
+ } else { \
+ tid = 0; \
+ } \
+ } while (0)
+
+FIXTURE(TSYNC) {
+ struct sock_fprog root_prog, apply_prog;
+ struct tsync_sibling sibling[TSYNC_SIBLINGS];
+ sem_t started;
+ pthread_cond_t cond;
+ pthread_mutex_t mutex;
+ int sibling_count;
+};
+
+FIXTURE_SETUP(TSYNC)
+{
+ struct sock_filter root_filter[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ };
+ struct sock_filter apply_filter[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
+ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_read, 0, 1),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ };
+
+ memset(&self->root_prog, 0, sizeof(self->root_prog));
+ memset(&self->apply_prog, 0, sizeof(self->apply_prog));
+ memset(&self->sibling, 0, sizeof(self->sibling));
+ self->root_prog.filter = malloc(sizeof(root_filter));
+ ASSERT_NE(NULL, self->root_prog.filter);
+ memcpy(self->root_prog.filter, &root_filter, sizeof(root_filter));
+ self->root_prog.len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(root_filter);
+
+ self->apply_prog.filter = malloc(sizeof(apply_filter));
+ ASSERT_NE(NULL, self->apply_prog.filter);
+ memcpy(self->apply_prog.filter, &apply_filter, sizeof(apply_filter));
+ self->apply_prog.len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(apply_filter);
+
+ self->sibling_count = 0;
+ pthread_mutex_init(&self->mutex, NULL);
+ pthread_cond_init(&self->cond, NULL);
+ sem_init(&self->started, 0, 0);
+ self->sibling[0].tid = 0;
+ self->sibling[0].cond = &self->cond;
+ self->sibling[0].started = &self->started;
+ self->sibling[0].mutex = &self->mutex;
+ self->sibling[0].diverge = 0;
+ self->sibling[0].num_waits = 1;
+ self->sibling[0].prog = &self->root_prog;
+ self->sibling[0].metadata = _metadata;
+ self->sibling[1].tid = 0;
+ self->sibling[1].cond = &self->cond;
+ self->sibling[1].started = &self->started;
+ self->sibling[1].mutex = &self->mutex;
+ self->sibling[1].diverge = 0;
+ self->sibling[1].prog = &self->root_prog;
+ self->sibling[1].num_waits = 1;
+ self->sibling[1].metadata = _metadata;
+}
+
+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(TSYNC)
+{
+ int sib = 0;
+
+ if (self->root_prog.filter)
+ free(self->root_prog.filter);
+ if (self->apply_prog.filter)
+ free(self->apply_prog.filter);
+
+ for ( ; sib < self->sibling_count; ++sib) {
+ struct tsync_sibling *s = &self->sibling[sib];
+
+ if (!s->tid)
+ continue;
+ /*
+ * If a thread is still running, it may be stuck, so hit
+ * it over the head really hard.
+ */
+ pthread_kill(s->tid, 9);
+ }
+ pthread_mutex_destroy(&self->mutex);
+ pthread_cond_destroy(&self->cond);
+ sem_destroy(&self->started);
+}
+
+void *tsync_sibling(void *data)
+{
+ long ret = 0;
+ struct tsync_sibling *me = data;
+
+ me->system_tid = syscall(__NR_gettid);
+
+ pthread_mutex_lock(me->mutex);
+ if (me->diverge) {
+ /* Just re-apply the root prog to fork the tree */
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER,
+ me->prog, 0, 0);
+ }
+ sem_post(me->started);
+ /* Return outside of started so parent notices failures. */
+ if (ret) {
+ pthread_mutex_unlock(me->mutex);
+ return (void *)SIBLING_EXIT_FAILURE;
+ }
+ do {
+ pthread_cond_wait(me->cond, me->mutex);
+ me->num_waits = me->num_waits - 1;
+ } while (me->num_waits);
+ pthread_mutex_unlock(me->mutex);
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+ if (!ret)
+ return (void *)SIBLING_EXIT_NEWPRIVS;
+ read(-1, NULL, 0);
+ return (void *)SIBLING_EXIT_UNKILLED;
+}
+
+void tsync_start_sibling(struct tsync_sibling *sibling)
+{
+ pthread_create(&sibling->tid, NULL, tsync_sibling, (void *)sibling);
+}
+
+TEST_F(TSYNC, siblings_fail_prctl)
+{
+ long ret;
+ void *status;
+ struct sock_filter filter[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
+ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_prctl, 0, 1),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO | EINVAL),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ };
+ struct sock_fprog prog = {
+ .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
+ .filter = filter,
+ };
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
+ }
+
+ /* Check prctl failure detection by requesting sib 0 diverge. */
+ ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &prog);
+ ASSERT_NE(ENOSYS, errno) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support seccomp syscall!");
+ }
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret) {
+ TH_LOG("setting filter failed");
+ }
+
+ self->sibling[0].diverge = 1;
+ tsync_start_sibling(&self->sibling[0]);
+ tsync_start_sibling(&self->sibling[1]);
+
+ while (self->sibling_count < TSYNC_SIBLINGS) {
+ sem_wait(&self->started);
+ self->sibling_count++;
+ }
+
+ /* Signal the threads to clean up*/
+ pthread_mutex_lock(&self->mutex);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_cond_broadcast(&self->cond)) {
+ TH_LOG("cond broadcast non-zero");
+ }
+ pthread_mutex_unlock(&self->mutex);
+
+ /* Ensure diverging sibling failed to call prctl. */
+ PTHREAD_JOIN(self->sibling[0].tid, &status);
+ EXPECT_EQ(SIBLING_EXIT_FAILURE, (long)status);
+ PTHREAD_JOIN(self->sibling[1].tid, &status);
+ EXPECT_EQ(SIBLING_EXIT_UNKILLED, (long)status);
+}
+
+TEST_F(TSYNC, two_siblings_with_ancestor)
+{
+ long ret;
+ void *status;
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
+ }
+
+ ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &self->root_prog);
+ ASSERT_NE(ENOSYS, errno) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support seccomp syscall!");
+ }
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER!");
+ }
+ tsync_start_sibling(&self->sibling[0]);
+ tsync_start_sibling(&self->sibling[1]);
+
+ while (self->sibling_count < TSYNC_SIBLINGS) {
+ sem_wait(&self->started);
+ self->sibling_count++;
+ }
+
+ ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC,
+ &self->apply_prog);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret) {
+ TH_LOG("Could install filter on all threads!");
+ }
+ /* Tell the siblings to test the policy */
+ pthread_mutex_lock(&self->mutex);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_cond_broadcast(&self->cond)) {
+ TH_LOG("cond broadcast non-zero");
+ }
+ pthread_mutex_unlock(&self->mutex);
+ /* Ensure they are both killed and don't exit cleanly. */
+ PTHREAD_JOIN(self->sibling[0].tid, &status);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0x0, (long)status);
+ PTHREAD_JOIN(self->sibling[1].tid, &status);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0x0, (long)status);
+}
+
+TEST_F(TSYNC, two_sibling_want_nnp)
+{
+ void *status;
+
+ /* start siblings before any prctl() operations */
+ tsync_start_sibling(&self->sibling[0]);
+ tsync_start_sibling(&self->sibling[1]);
+ while (self->sibling_count < TSYNC_SIBLINGS) {
+ sem_wait(&self->started);
+ self->sibling_count++;
+ }
+
+ /* Tell the siblings to test no policy */
+ pthread_mutex_lock(&self->mutex);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_cond_broadcast(&self->cond)) {
+ TH_LOG("cond broadcast non-zero");
+ }
+ pthread_mutex_unlock(&self->mutex);
+
+ /* Ensure they are both upset about lacking nnp. */
+ PTHREAD_JOIN(self->sibling[0].tid, &status);
+ EXPECT_EQ(SIBLING_EXIT_NEWPRIVS, (long)status);
+ PTHREAD_JOIN(self->sibling[1].tid, &status);
+ EXPECT_EQ(SIBLING_EXIT_NEWPRIVS, (long)status);
+}
+
+TEST_F(TSYNC, two_siblings_with_no_filter)
+{
+ long ret;
+ void *status;
+
+ /* start siblings before any prctl() operations */
+ tsync_start_sibling(&self->sibling[0]);
+ tsync_start_sibling(&self->sibling[1]);
+ while (self->sibling_count < TSYNC_SIBLINGS) {
+ sem_wait(&self->started);
+ self->sibling_count++;
+ }
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
+ }
+
+ ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC,
+ &self->apply_prog);
+ ASSERT_NE(ENOSYS, errno) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support seccomp syscall!");
+ }
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret) {
+ TH_LOG("Could install filter on all threads!");
+ }
+
+ /* Tell the siblings to test the policy */
+ pthread_mutex_lock(&self->mutex);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_cond_broadcast(&self->cond)) {
+ TH_LOG("cond broadcast non-zero");
+ }
+ pthread_mutex_unlock(&self->mutex);
+
+ /* Ensure they are both killed and don't exit cleanly. */
+ PTHREAD_JOIN(self->sibling[0].tid, &status);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0x0, (long)status);
+ PTHREAD_JOIN(self->sibling[1].tid, &status);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0x0, (long)status);
+}
+
+TEST_F(TSYNC, two_siblings_with_one_divergence)
+{
+ long ret;
+ void *status;
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
+ }
+
+ ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &self->root_prog);
+ ASSERT_NE(ENOSYS, errno) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support seccomp syscall!");
+ }
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER!");
+ }
+ self->sibling[0].diverge = 1;
+ tsync_start_sibling(&self->sibling[0]);
+ tsync_start_sibling(&self->sibling[1]);
+
+ while (self->sibling_count < TSYNC_SIBLINGS) {
+ sem_wait(&self->started);
+ self->sibling_count++;
+ }
+
+ ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC,
+ &self->apply_prog);
+ ASSERT_EQ(self->sibling[0].system_tid, ret) {
+ TH_LOG("Did not fail on diverged sibling.");
+ }
+
+ /* Wake the threads */
+ pthread_mutex_lock(&self->mutex);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_cond_broadcast(&self->cond)) {
+ TH_LOG("cond broadcast non-zero");
+ }
+ pthread_mutex_unlock(&self->mutex);
+
+ /* Ensure they are both unkilled. */
+ PTHREAD_JOIN(self->sibling[0].tid, &status);
+ EXPECT_EQ(SIBLING_EXIT_UNKILLED, (long)status);
+ PTHREAD_JOIN(self->sibling[1].tid, &status);
+ EXPECT_EQ(SIBLING_EXIT_UNKILLED, (long)status);
+}
+
+TEST_F(TSYNC, two_siblings_with_one_divergence_no_tid_in_err)
+{
+ long ret, flags;
+ void *status;
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
+ }
+
+ ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &self->root_prog);
+ ASSERT_NE(ENOSYS, errno) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support seccomp syscall!");
+ }
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER!");
+ }
+ self->sibling[0].diverge = 1;
+ tsync_start_sibling(&self->sibling[0]);
+ tsync_start_sibling(&self->sibling[1]);
+
+ while (self->sibling_count < TSYNC_SIBLINGS) {
+ sem_wait(&self->started);
+ self->sibling_count++;
+ }
+
+ flags = SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC | \
+ SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC_ESRCH;
+ ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, flags, &self->apply_prog);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ESRCH, errno) {
+ TH_LOG("Did not return ESRCH for diverged sibling.");
+ }
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, ret) {
+ TH_LOG("Did not fail on diverged sibling.");
+ }
+
+ /* Wake the threads */
+ pthread_mutex_lock(&self->mutex);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_cond_broadcast(&self->cond)) {
+ TH_LOG("cond broadcast non-zero");
+ }
+ pthread_mutex_unlock(&self->mutex);
+
+ /* Ensure they are both unkilled. */
+ PTHREAD_JOIN(self->sibling[0].tid, &status);
+ EXPECT_EQ(SIBLING_EXIT_UNKILLED, (long)status);
+ PTHREAD_JOIN(self->sibling[1].tid, &status);
+ EXPECT_EQ(SIBLING_EXIT_UNKILLED, (long)status);
+}
+
+TEST_F(TSYNC, two_siblings_not_under_filter)
+{
+ long ret, sib;
+ void *status;
+ struct timespec delay = { .tv_nsec = 100000000 };
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Sibling 0 will have its own seccomp policy
+ * and Sibling 1 will not be under seccomp at
+ * all. Sibling 1 will enter seccomp and 0
+ * will cause failure.
+ */
+ self->sibling[0].diverge = 1;
+ tsync_start_sibling(&self->sibling[0]);
+ tsync_start_sibling(&self->sibling[1]);
+
+ while (self->sibling_count < TSYNC_SIBLINGS) {
+ sem_wait(&self->started);
+ self->sibling_count++;
+ }
+
+ ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &self->root_prog);
+ ASSERT_NE(ENOSYS, errno) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support seccomp syscall!");
+ }
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER!");
+ }
+
+ ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC,
+ &self->apply_prog);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ret, self->sibling[0].system_tid) {
+ TH_LOG("Did not fail on diverged sibling.");
+ }
+ sib = 1;
+ if (ret == self->sibling[0].system_tid)
+ sib = 0;
+
+ pthread_mutex_lock(&self->mutex);
+
+ /* Increment the other siblings num_waits so we can clean up
+ * the one we just saw.
+ */
+ self->sibling[!sib].num_waits += 1;
+
+ /* Signal the thread to clean up*/
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_cond_broadcast(&self->cond)) {
+ TH_LOG("cond broadcast non-zero");
+ }
+ pthread_mutex_unlock(&self->mutex);
+ PTHREAD_JOIN(self->sibling[sib].tid, &status);
+ EXPECT_EQ(SIBLING_EXIT_UNKILLED, (long)status);
+ /* Poll for actual task death. pthread_join doesn't guarantee it. */
+ while (!kill(self->sibling[sib].system_tid, 0))
+ nanosleep(&delay, NULL);
+ /* Switch to the remaining sibling */
+ sib = !sib;
+
+ ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC,
+ &self->apply_prog);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret) {
+ TH_LOG("Expected the remaining sibling to sync");
+ };
+
+ pthread_mutex_lock(&self->mutex);
+
+ /* If remaining sibling didn't have a chance to wake up during
+ * the first broadcast, manually reduce the num_waits now.
+ */
+ if (self->sibling[sib].num_waits > 1)
+ self->sibling[sib].num_waits = 1;
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_cond_broadcast(&self->cond)) {
+ TH_LOG("cond broadcast non-zero");
+ }
+ pthread_mutex_unlock(&self->mutex);
+ PTHREAD_JOIN(self->sibling[sib].tid, &status);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, (long)status);
+ /* Poll for actual task death. pthread_join doesn't guarantee it. */
+ while (!kill(self->sibling[sib].system_tid, 0))
+ nanosleep(&delay, NULL);
+
+ ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC,
+ &self->apply_prog);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret); /* just us chickens */
+}
+
+/* Make sure restarted syscalls are seen directly as "restart_syscall". */
+TEST(syscall_restart)
+{
+ long ret;
+ unsigned long msg;
+ pid_t child_pid;
+ int pipefd[2];
+ int status;
+ siginfo_t info = { };
+ struct sock_filter filter[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
+ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
+
+#ifdef __NR_sigreturn
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_sigreturn, 7, 0),
+#endif
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_read, 6, 0),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_exit, 5, 0),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_rt_sigreturn, 4, 0),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_nanosleep, 5, 0),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_clock_nanosleep, 4, 0),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_restart_syscall, 4, 0),
+
+ /* Allow __NR_write for easy logging. */
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_write, 0, 1),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL),
+ /* The nanosleep jump target. */
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE|0x100),
+ /* The restart_syscall jump target. */
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE|0x200),
+ };
+ struct sock_fprog prog = {
+ .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
+ .filter = filter,
+ };
+#if defined(__arm__)
+ struct utsname utsbuf;
+#endif
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe(pipefd));
+
+ child_pid = fork();
+ ASSERT_LE(0, child_pid);
+ if (child_pid == 0) {
+ /* Child uses EXPECT not ASSERT to deliver status correctly. */
+ char buf = ' ';
+ struct timespec timeout = { };
+
+ /* Attach parent as tracer and stop. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, raise(SIGSTOP));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(pipefd[1]));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
+ }
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog, 0, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret) {
+ TH_LOG("Failed to install filter!");
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, read(pipefd[0], &buf, 1)) {
+ TH_LOG("Failed to read() sync from parent");
+ }
+ EXPECT_EQ('.', buf) {
+ TH_LOG("Failed to get sync data from read()");
+ }
+
+ /* Start nanosleep to be interrupted. */
+ timeout.tv_sec = 1;
+ errno = 0;
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, nanosleep(&timeout, NULL)) {
+ TH_LOG("Call to nanosleep() failed (errno %d)", errno);
+ }
+
+ /* Read final sync from parent. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, read(pipefd[0], &buf, 1)) {
+ TH_LOG("Failed final read() from parent");
+ }
+ EXPECT_EQ('!', buf) {
+ TH_LOG("Failed to get final data from read()");
+ }
+
+ /* Directly report the status of our test harness results. */
+ syscall(__NR_exit, _metadata->passed ? EXIT_SUCCESS
+ : EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(pipefd[0]));
+
+ /* Attach to child, setup options, and release. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(child_pid, waitpid(child_pid, &status, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(true, WIFSTOPPED(status));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_SETOPTIONS, child_pid, NULL,
+ PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, child_pid, NULL, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(1, write(pipefd[1], ".", 1));
+
+ /* Wait for nanosleep() to start. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(child_pid, waitpid(child_pid, &status, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(true, WIFSTOPPED(status));
+ ASSERT_EQ(SIGTRAP, WSTOPSIG(status));
+ ASSERT_EQ(PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP, (status >> 16));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG, child_pid, NULL, &msg));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0x100, msg);
+ ret = get_syscall(_metadata, child_pid);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(ret == __NR_nanosleep || ret == __NR_clock_nanosleep);
+
+ /* Might as well check siginfo for sanity while we're here. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_GETSIGINFO, child_pid, NULL, &info));
+ ASSERT_EQ(SIGTRAP, info.si_signo);
+ ASSERT_EQ(SIGTRAP | (PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP << 8), info.si_code);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, info.si_errno);
+ EXPECT_EQ(getuid(), info.si_uid);
+ /* Verify signal delivery came from child (seccomp-triggered). */
+ EXPECT_EQ(child_pid, info.si_pid);
+
+ /* Interrupt nanosleep with SIGSTOP (which we'll need to handle). */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, kill(child_pid, SIGSTOP));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, child_pid, NULL, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(child_pid, waitpid(child_pid, &status, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(true, WIFSTOPPED(status));
+ ASSERT_EQ(SIGSTOP, WSTOPSIG(status));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_GETSIGINFO, child_pid, NULL, &info));
+ /*
+ * There is no siginfo on SIGSTOP any more, so we can't verify
+ * signal delivery came from parent now (getpid() == info.si_pid).
+ * https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAGXu5jJaZAOzP1qFz66tYrtbuywqb+UN2SOA1VLHpCCOiYvYeg@mail.gmail.com
+ * At least verify the SIGSTOP via PTRACE_GETSIGINFO.
+ */
+ EXPECT_EQ(SIGSTOP, info.si_signo);
+
+ /* Restart nanosleep with SIGCONT, which triggers restart_syscall. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, kill(child_pid, SIGCONT));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, child_pid, NULL, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(child_pid, waitpid(child_pid, &status, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(true, WIFSTOPPED(status));
+ ASSERT_EQ(SIGCONT, WSTOPSIG(status));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, child_pid, NULL, 0));
+
+ /* Wait for restart_syscall() to start. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(child_pid, waitpid(child_pid, &status, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(true, WIFSTOPPED(status));
+ ASSERT_EQ(SIGTRAP, WSTOPSIG(status));
+ ASSERT_EQ(PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP, (status >> 16));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG, child_pid, NULL, &msg));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(0x200, msg);
+ ret = get_syscall(_metadata, child_pid);
+#if defined(__arm__)
+ /*
+ * FIXME:
+ * - native ARM registers do NOT expose true syscall.
+ * - compat ARM registers on ARM64 DO expose true syscall.
+ */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, uname(&utsbuf));
+ if (strncmp(utsbuf.machine, "arm", 3) == 0) {
+ EXPECT_EQ(__NR_nanosleep, ret);
+ } else
+#endif
+ {
+ EXPECT_EQ(__NR_restart_syscall, ret);
+ }
+
+ /* Write again to end test. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, child_pid, NULL, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(1, write(pipefd[1], "!", 1));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(pipefd[1]));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(child_pid, waitpid(child_pid, &status, 0));
+ if (WIFSIGNALED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status))
+ _metadata->passed = 0;
+}
+
+TEST_SIGNAL(filter_flag_log, SIGSYS)
+{
+ struct sock_filter allow_filter[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ };
+ struct sock_filter kill_filter[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
+ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_getpid, 0, 1),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ };
+ struct sock_fprog allow_prog = {
+ .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(allow_filter),
+ .filter = allow_filter,
+ };
+ struct sock_fprog kill_prog = {
+ .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(kill_filter),
+ .filter = kill_filter,
+ };
+ long ret;
+ pid_t parent = getppid();
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ /* Verify that the FILTER_FLAG_LOG flag isn't accepted in strict mode */
+ ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG,
+ &allow_prog);
+ ASSERT_NE(ENOSYS, errno) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support seccomp syscall!");
+ }
+ EXPECT_NE(0, ret) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel accepted FILTER_FLAG_LOG flag in strict mode!");
+ }
+ EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel returned unexpected errno for FILTER_FLAG_LOG flag in strict mode!");
+ }
+
+ /* Verify that a simple, permissive filter can be added with no flags */
+ ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &allow_prog);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ /* See if the same filter can be added with the FILTER_FLAG_LOG flag */
+ ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG,
+ &allow_prog);
+ ASSERT_NE(EINVAL, errno) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support the FILTER_FLAG_LOG flag!");
+ }
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ /* Ensure that the kill filter works with the FILTER_FLAG_LOG flag */
+ ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG,
+ &kill_prog);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(parent, syscall(__NR_getppid));
+ /* getpid() should never return. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, syscall(__NR_getpid));
+}
+
+TEST(get_action_avail)
+{
+ __u32 actions[] = { SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP,
+ SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE,
+ SECCOMP_RET_LOG, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW };
+ __u32 unknown_action = 0x10000000U;
+ int i;
+ long ret;
+
+ ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL, 0, &actions[0]);
+ ASSERT_NE(ENOSYS, errno) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support seccomp syscall!");
+ }
+ ASSERT_NE(EINVAL, errno) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL operation!");
+ }
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(actions); i++) {
+ ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL, 0, &actions[i]);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0) {
+ TH_LOG("Expected action (0x%X) not available!",
+ actions[i]);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Check that an unknown action is handled properly (EOPNOTSUPP) */
+ ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL, 0, &unknown_action);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno, EOPNOTSUPP);
+}
+
+TEST(get_metadata)
+{
+ pid_t pid;
+ int pipefd[2];
+ char buf;
+ struct seccomp_metadata md;
+ long ret;
+
+ /* Only real root can get metadata. */
+ if (geteuid()) {
+ SKIP(return, "get_metadata requires real root");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe(pipefd));
+
+ pid = fork();
+ ASSERT_GE(pid, 0);
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ struct sock_filter filter[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ };
+ struct sock_fprog prog = {
+ .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
+ .filter = filter,
+ };
+
+ /* one with log, one without */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER,
+ SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG, &prog));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &prog));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(pipefd[0]));
+ ASSERT_EQ(1, write(pipefd[1], "1", 1));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(pipefd[1]));
+
+ while (1)
+ sleep(100);
+ }
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(pipefd[1]));
+ ASSERT_EQ(1, read(pipefd[0], &buf, 1));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid));
+ ASSERT_EQ(pid, waitpid(pid, NULL, 0));
+
+ /* Past here must not use ASSERT or child process is never killed. */
+
+ md.filter_off = 0;
+ errno = 0;
+ ret = ptrace(PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_METADATA, pid, sizeof(md), &md);
+ EXPECT_EQ(sizeof(md), ret) {
+ if (errno == EINVAL)
+ SKIP(goto skip, "Kernel does not support PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_METADATA (missing CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE?)");
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(md.flags, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG);
+ EXPECT_EQ(md.filter_off, 0);
+
+ md.filter_off = 1;
+ ret = ptrace(PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_METADATA, pid, sizeof(md), &md);
+ EXPECT_EQ(sizeof(md), ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(md.flags, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(md.filter_off, 1);
+
+skip:
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, kill(pid, SIGKILL));
+}
+
+static int user_notif_syscall(int nr, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ struct sock_filter filter[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
+ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, nr, 0, 1),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ };
+
+ struct sock_fprog prog = {
+ .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
+ .filter = filter,
+ };
+
+ return seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, flags, &prog);
+}
+
+#define USER_NOTIF_MAGIC INT_MAX
+TEST(user_notification_basic)
+{
+ pid_t pid;
+ long ret;
+ int status, listener;
+ struct seccomp_notif req = {};
+ struct seccomp_notif_resp resp = {};
+ struct pollfd pollfd;
+
+ struct sock_filter filter[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ };
+ struct sock_fprog prog = {
+ .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
+ .filter = filter,
+ };
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
+ }
+
+ pid = fork();
+ ASSERT_GE(pid, 0);
+
+ /* Check that we get -ENOSYS with no listener attached */
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ if (user_notif_syscall(__NR_getppid, 0) < 0)
+ exit(1);
+ ret = syscall(__NR_getppid);
+ exit(ret >= 0 || errno != ENOSYS);
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(waitpid(pid, &status, 0), pid);
+ EXPECT_EQ(true, WIFEXITED(status));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+
+ /* Add some no-op filters for grins. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &prog), 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &prog), 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &prog), 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &prog), 0);
+
+ /* Check that the basic notification machinery works */
+ listener = user_notif_syscall(__NR_getppid,
+ SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER);
+ ASSERT_GE(listener, 0);
+
+ /* Installing a second listener in the chain should EBUSY */
+ EXPECT_EQ(user_notif_syscall(__NR_getppid,
+ SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER),
+ -1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno, EBUSY);
+
+ pid = fork();
+ ASSERT_GE(pid, 0);
+
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ ret = syscall(__NR_getppid);
+ exit(ret != USER_NOTIF_MAGIC);
+ }
+
+ pollfd.fd = listener;
+ pollfd.events = POLLIN | POLLOUT;
+
+ EXPECT_GT(poll(&pollfd, 1, -1), 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(pollfd.revents, POLLIN);
+
+ /* Test that we can't pass garbage to the kernel. */
+ memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
+ req.pid = -1;
+ errno = 0;
+ ret = ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV, &req);
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
+
+ if (ret) {
+ req.pid = 0;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV, &req), 0);
+ }
+
+ pollfd.fd = listener;
+ pollfd.events = POLLIN | POLLOUT;
+
+ EXPECT_GT(poll(&pollfd, 1, -1), 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(pollfd.revents, POLLOUT);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(req.data.nr, __NR_getppid);
+
+ resp.id = req.id;
+ resp.error = 0;
+ resp.val = USER_NOTIF_MAGIC;
+
+ /* check that we make sure flags == 0 */
+ resp.flags = 1;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND, &resp), -1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno, EINVAL);
+
+ resp.flags = 0;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND, &resp), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(waitpid(pid, &status, 0), pid);
+ EXPECT_EQ(true, WIFEXITED(status));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+}
+
+TEST(user_notification_with_tsync)
+{
+ int ret;
+ unsigned int flags;
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
+ }
+
+ /* these were exclusive */
+ flags = SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER |
+ SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC;
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, user_notif_syscall(__NR_getppid, flags));
+ ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
+
+ /* but now they're not */
+ flags |= SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC_ESRCH;
+ ret = user_notif_syscall(__NR_getppid, flags);
+ close(ret);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ret);
+}
+
+TEST(user_notification_kill_in_middle)
+{
+ pid_t pid;
+ long ret;
+ int listener;
+ struct seccomp_notif req = {};
+ struct seccomp_notif_resp resp = {};
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
+ }
+
+ listener = user_notif_syscall(__NR_getppid,
+ SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER);
+ ASSERT_GE(listener, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Check that nothing bad happens when we kill the task in the middle
+ * of a syscall.
+ */
+ pid = fork();
+ ASSERT_GE(pid, 0);
+
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ ret = syscall(__NR_getppid);
+ exit(ret != USER_NOTIF_MAGIC);
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV, &req), 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID, &req.id), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(kill(pid, SIGKILL), 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(waitpid(pid, NULL, 0), pid);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID, &req.id), -1);
+
+ resp.id = req.id;
+ ret = ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND, &resp);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno, ENOENT);
+}
+
+static int handled = -1;
+
+static void signal_handler(int signal)
+{
+ if (write(handled, "c", 1) != 1)
+ perror("write from signal");
+}
+
+TEST(user_notification_signal)
+{
+ pid_t pid;
+ long ret;
+ int status, listener, sk_pair[2];
+ struct seccomp_notif req = {};
+ struct seccomp_notif_resp resp = {};
+ char c;
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
+ }
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(socketpair(PF_LOCAL, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0, sk_pair), 0);
+
+ listener = user_notif_syscall(__NR_gettid,
+ SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER);
+ ASSERT_GE(listener, 0);
+
+ pid = fork();
+ ASSERT_GE(pid, 0);
+
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ close(sk_pair[0]);
+ handled = sk_pair[1];
+ if (signal(SIGUSR1, signal_handler) == SIG_ERR) {
+ perror("signal");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ /*
+ * ERESTARTSYS behavior is a bit hard to test, because we need
+ * to rely on a signal that has not yet been handled. Let's at
+ * least check that the error code gets propagated through, and
+ * hope that it doesn't break when there is actually a signal :)
+ */
+ ret = syscall(__NR_gettid);
+ exit(!(ret == -1 && errno == 512));
+ }
+
+ close(sk_pair[1]);
+
+ memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV, &req), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(kill(pid, SIGUSR1), 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Make sure the signal really is delivered, which means we're not
+ * stuck in the user notification code any more and the notification
+ * should be dead.
+ */
+ EXPECT_EQ(read(sk_pair[0], &c, 1), 1);
+
+ resp.id = req.id;
+ resp.error = -EPERM;
+ resp.val = 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND, &resp), -1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno, ENOENT);
+
+ memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV, &req), 0);
+
+ resp.id = req.id;
+ resp.error = -512; /* -ERESTARTSYS */
+ resp.val = 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND, &resp), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(waitpid(pid, &status, 0), pid);
+ EXPECT_EQ(true, WIFEXITED(status));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+}
+
+TEST(user_notification_closed_listener)
+{
+ pid_t pid;
+ long ret;
+ int status, listener;
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
+ }
+
+ listener = user_notif_syscall(__NR_getppid,
+ SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER);
+ ASSERT_GE(listener, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Check that we get an ENOSYS when the listener is closed.
+ */
+ pid = fork();
+ ASSERT_GE(pid, 0);
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ close(listener);
+ ret = syscall(__NR_getppid);
+ exit(ret != -1 && errno != ENOSYS);
+ }
+
+ close(listener);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(waitpid(pid, &status, 0), pid);
+ EXPECT_EQ(true, WIFEXITED(status));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check that a pid in a child namespace still shows up as valid in ours.
+ */
+TEST(user_notification_child_pid_ns)
+{
+ pid_t pid;
+ int status, listener;
+ struct seccomp_notif req = {};
+ struct seccomp_notif_resp resp = {};
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWPID), 0) {
+ if (errno == EINVAL)
+ SKIP(return, "kernel missing CLONE_NEWUSER support");
+ };
+
+ listener = user_notif_syscall(__NR_getppid,
+ SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER);
+ ASSERT_GE(listener, 0);
+
+ pid = fork();
+ ASSERT_GE(pid, 0);
+
+ if (pid == 0)
+ exit(syscall(__NR_getppid) != USER_NOTIF_MAGIC);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV, &req), 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(req.pid, pid);
+
+ resp.id = req.id;
+ resp.error = 0;
+ resp.val = USER_NOTIF_MAGIC;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND, &resp), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(waitpid(pid, &status, 0), pid);
+ EXPECT_EQ(true, WIFEXITED(status));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+ close(listener);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check that a pid in a sibling (i.e. unrelated) namespace shows up as 0, i.e.
+ * invalid.
+ */
+TEST(user_notification_sibling_pid_ns)
+{
+ pid_t pid, pid2;
+ int status, listener;
+ struct seccomp_notif req = {};
+ struct seccomp_notif_resp resp = {};
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0), 0) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
+ }
+
+ listener = user_notif_syscall(__NR_getppid,
+ SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER);
+ ASSERT_GE(listener, 0);
+
+ pid = fork();
+ ASSERT_GE(pid, 0);
+
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(unshare(CLONE_NEWPID), 0);
+
+ pid2 = fork();
+ ASSERT_GE(pid2, 0);
+
+ if (pid2 == 0)
+ exit(syscall(__NR_getppid) != USER_NOTIF_MAGIC);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(waitpid(pid2, &status, 0), pid2);
+ EXPECT_EQ(true, WIFEXITED(status));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+ exit(WEXITSTATUS(status));
+ }
+
+ /* Create the sibling ns, and sibling in it. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(unshare(CLONE_NEWPID), 0) {
+ if (errno == EPERM)
+ SKIP(return, "CLONE_NEWPID requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN");
+ }
+ ASSERT_EQ(errno, 0);
+
+ pid2 = fork();
+ ASSERT_GE(pid2, 0);
+
+ if (pid2 == 0) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV, &req), 0);
+ /*
+ * The pid should be 0, i.e. the task is in some namespace that
+ * we can't "see".
+ */
+ EXPECT_EQ(req.pid, 0);
+
+ resp.id = req.id;
+ resp.error = 0;
+ resp.val = USER_NOTIF_MAGIC;
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND, &resp), 0);
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ close(listener);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(waitpid(pid, &status, 0), pid);
+ EXPECT_EQ(true, WIFEXITED(status));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(waitpid(pid2, &status, 0), pid2);
+ EXPECT_EQ(true, WIFEXITED(status));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+}
+
+TEST(user_notification_fault_recv)
+{
+ pid_t pid;
+ int status, listener;
+ struct seccomp_notif req = {};
+ struct seccomp_notif_resp resp = {};
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER), 0);
+
+ listener = user_notif_syscall(__NR_getppid,
+ SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER);
+ ASSERT_GE(listener, 0);
+
+ pid = fork();
+ ASSERT_GE(pid, 0);
+
+ if (pid == 0)
+ exit(syscall(__NR_getppid) != USER_NOTIF_MAGIC);
+
+ /* Do a bad recv() */
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV, NULL), -1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno, EFAULT);
+
+ /* We should still be able to receive this notification, though. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV, &req), 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(req.pid, pid);
+
+ resp.id = req.id;
+ resp.error = 0;
+ resp.val = USER_NOTIF_MAGIC;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND, &resp), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(waitpid(pid, &status, 0), pid);
+ EXPECT_EQ(true, WIFEXITED(status));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+}
+
+TEST(seccomp_get_notif_sizes)
+{
+ struct seccomp_notif_sizes sizes;
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(seccomp(SECCOMP_GET_NOTIF_SIZES, 0, &sizes), 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(sizes.seccomp_notif, sizeof(struct seccomp_notif));
+ EXPECT_EQ(sizes.seccomp_notif_resp, sizeof(struct seccomp_notif_resp));
+}
+
+TEST(user_notification_continue)
+{
+ pid_t pid;
+ long ret;
+ int status, listener;
+ struct seccomp_notif req = {};
+ struct seccomp_notif_resp resp = {};
+ struct pollfd pollfd;
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
+ }
+
+ listener = user_notif_syscall(__NR_dup, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER);
+ ASSERT_GE(listener, 0);
+
+ pid = fork();
+ ASSERT_GE(pid, 0);
+
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ int dup_fd, pipe_fds[2];
+ pid_t self;
+
+ ASSERT_GE(pipe(pipe_fds), 0);
+
+ dup_fd = dup(pipe_fds[0]);
+ ASSERT_GE(dup_fd, 0);
+ EXPECT_NE(pipe_fds[0], dup_fd);
+
+ self = getpid();
+ ASSERT_EQ(filecmp(self, self, pipe_fds[0], dup_fd), 0);
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ pollfd.fd = listener;
+ pollfd.events = POLLIN | POLLOUT;
+
+ EXPECT_GT(poll(&pollfd, 1, -1), 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(pollfd.revents, POLLIN);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV, &req), 0);
+
+ pollfd.fd = listener;
+ pollfd.events = POLLIN | POLLOUT;
+
+ EXPECT_GT(poll(&pollfd, 1, -1), 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(pollfd.revents, POLLOUT);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(req.data.nr, __NR_dup);
+
+ resp.id = req.id;
+ resp.flags = SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE;
+
+ /*
+ * Verify that setting SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE enforces other
+ * args be set to 0.
+ */
+ resp.error = 0;
+ resp.val = USER_NOTIF_MAGIC;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND, &resp), -1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno, EINVAL);
+
+ resp.error = USER_NOTIF_MAGIC;
+ resp.val = 0;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND, &resp), -1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno, EINVAL);
+
+ resp.error = 0;
+ resp.val = 0;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND, &resp), 0) {
+ if (errno == EINVAL)
+ SKIP(goto skip, "Kernel does not support SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE");
+ }
+
+skip:
+ EXPECT_EQ(waitpid(pid, &status, 0), pid);
+ EXPECT_EQ(true, WIFEXITED(status));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status)) {
+ if (WEXITSTATUS(status) == 2) {
+ SKIP(return, "Kernel does not support kcmp() syscall");
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+TEST(user_notification_filter_empty)
+{
+ pid_t pid;
+ long ret;
+ int status;
+ struct pollfd pollfd;
+ struct __clone_args args = {
+ .flags = CLONE_FILES,
+ .exit_signal = SIGCHLD,
+ };
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
+ }
+
+ pid = sys_clone3(&args, sizeof(args));
+ ASSERT_GE(pid, 0);
+
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ int listener;
+
+ listener = user_notif_syscall(__NR_mknodat, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER);
+ if (listener < 0)
+ _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+
+ if (dup2(listener, 200) != 200)
+ _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+
+ close(listener);
+
+ _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(waitpid(pid, &status, 0), pid);
+ EXPECT_EQ(true, WIFEXITED(status));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+
+ /*
+ * The seccomp filter has become unused so we should be notified once
+ * the kernel gets around to cleaning up task struct.
+ */
+ pollfd.fd = 200;
+ pollfd.events = POLLHUP;
+
+ EXPECT_GT(poll(&pollfd, 1, 2000), 0);
+ EXPECT_GT((pollfd.revents & POLLHUP) ?: 0, 0);
+}
+
+static void *do_thread(void *data)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+TEST(user_notification_filter_empty_threaded)
+{
+ pid_t pid;
+ long ret;
+ int status;
+ struct pollfd pollfd;
+ struct __clone_args args = {
+ .flags = CLONE_FILES,
+ .exit_signal = SIGCHLD,
+ };
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
+ }
+
+ pid = sys_clone3(&args, sizeof(args));
+ ASSERT_GE(pid, 0);
+
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ pid_t pid1, pid2;
+ int listener, status;
+ pthread_t thread;
+
+ listener = user_notif_syscall(__NR_dup, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER);
+ if (listener < 0)
+ _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+
+ if (dup2(listener, 200) != 200)
+ _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+
+ close(listener);
+
+ pid1 = fork();
+ if (pid1 < 0)
+ _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+
+ if (pid1 == 0)
+ _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+
+ pid2 = fork();
+ if (pid2 < 0)
+ _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+
+ if (pid2 == 0)
+ _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+
+ if (pthread_create(&thread, NULL, do_thread, NULL) ||
+ pthread_join(thread, NULL))
+ _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+
+ if (pthread_create(&thread, NULL, do_thread, NULL) ||
+ pthread_join(thread, NULL))
+ _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+
+ if (waitpid(pid1, &status, 0) != pid1 || !WIFEXITED(status) ||
+ WEXITSTATUS(status))
+ _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+
+ if (waitpid(pid2, &status, 0) != pid2 || !WIFEXITED(status) ||
+ WEXITSTATUS(status))
+ _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+
+ exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(waitpid(pid, &status, 0), pid);
+ EXPECT_EQ(true, WIFEXITED(status));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+
+ /*
+ * The seccomp filter has become unused so we should be notified once
+ * the kernel gets around to cleaning up task struct.
+ */
+ pollfd.fd = 200;
+ pollfd.events = POLLHUP;
+
+ EXPECT_GT(poll(&pollfd, 1, 2000), 0);
+ EXPECT_GT((pollfd.revents & POLLHUP) ?: 0, 0);
+}
+
+TEST(user_notification_addfd)
+{
+ pid_t pid;
+ long ret;
+ int status, listener, memfd, fd;
+ struct seccomp_notif_addfd addfd = {};
+ struct seccomp_notif_addfd_small small = {};
+ struct seccomp_notif_addfd_big big = {};
+ struct seccomp_notif req = {};
+ struct seccomp_notif_resp resp = {};
+ /* 100 ms */
+ struct timespec delay = { .tv_nsec = 100000000 };
+
+ memfd = memfd_create("test", 0);
+ ASSERT_GE(memfd, 0);
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
+ }
+
+ /* Check that the basic notification machinery works */
+ listener = user_notif_syscall(__NR_getppid,
+ SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER);
+ ASSERT_GE(listener, 0);
+
+ pid = fork();
+ ASSERT_GE(pid, 0);
+
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ if (syscall(__NR_getppid) != USER_NOTIF_MAGIC)
+ exit(1);
+ exit(syscall(__NR_getppid) != USER_NOTIF_MAGIC);
+ }
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV, &req), 0);
+
+ addfd.srcfd = memfd;
+ addfd.newfd = 0;
+ addfd.id = req.id;
+ addfd.flags = 0x0;
+
+ /* Verify bad newfd_flags cannot be set */
+ addfd.newfd_flags = ~O_CLOEXEC;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ADDFD, &addfd), -1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno, EINVAL);
+ addfd.newfd_flags = O_CLOEXEC;
+
+ /* Verify bad flags cannot be set */
+ addfd.flags = 0xff;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ADDFD, &addfd), -1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno, EINVAL);
+ addfd.flags = 0;
+
+ /* Verify that remote_fd cannot be set without setting flags */
+ addfd.newfd = 1;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ADDFD, &addfd), -1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno, EINVAL);
+ addfd.newfd = 0;
+
+ /* Verify small size cannot be set */
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ADDFD_SMALL, &small), -1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno, EINVAL);
+
+ /* Verify we can't send bits filled in unknown buffer area */
+ memset(&big, 0xAA, sizeof(big));
+ big.addfd = addfd;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ADDFD_BIG, &big), -1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno, E2BIG);
+
+
+ /* Verify we can set an arbitrary remote fd */
+ fd = ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ADDFD, &addfd);
+ /*
+ * The child has fds 0(stdin), 1(stdout), 2(stderr), 3(memfd),
+ * 4(listener), so the newly allocated fd should be 5.
+ */
+ EXPECT_EQ(fd, 5);
+ EXPECT_EQ(filecmp(getpid(), pid, memfd, fd), 0);
+
+ /* Verify we can set an arbitrary remote fd with large size */
+ memset(&big, 0x0, sizeof(big));
+ big.addfd = addfd;
+ fd = ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ADDFD_BIG, &big);
+ EXPECT_EQ(fd, 6);
+
+ /* Verify we can set a specific remote fd */
+ addfd.newfd = 42;
+ addfd.flags = SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_SETFD;
+ fd = ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ADDFD, &addfd);
+ EXPECT_EQ(fd, 42);
+ EXPECT_EQ(filecmp(getpid(), pid, memfd, fd), 0);
+
+ /* Resume syscall */
+ resp.id = req.id;
+ resp.error = 0;
+ resp.val = USER_NOTIF_MAGIC;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND, &resp), 0);
+
+ /*
+ * This sets the ID of the ADD FD to the last request plus 1. The
+ * notification ID increments 1 per notification.
+ */
+ addfd.id = req.id + 1;
+
+ /* This spins until the underlying notification is generated */
+ while (ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ADDFD, &addfd) != -1 &&
+ errno != -EINPROGRESS)
+ nanosleep(&delay, NULL);
+
+ memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
+ ASSERT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV, &req), 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(addfd.id, req.id);
+
+ resp.id = req.id;
+ resp.error = 0;
+ resp.val = USER_NOTIF_MAGIC;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND, &resp), 0);
+
+ /* Wait for child to finish. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(waitpid(pid, &status, 0), pid);
+ EXPECT_EQ(true, WIFEXITED(status));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+
+ close(memfd);
+}
+
+TEST(user_notification_addfd_rlimit)
+{
+ pid_t pid;
+ long ret;
+ int status, listener, memfd;
+ struct seccomp_notif_addfd addfd = {};
+ struct seccomp_notif req = {};
+ struct seccomp_notif_resp resp = {};
+ const struct rlimit lim = {
+ .rlim_cur = 0,
+ .rlim_max = 0,
+ };
+
+ memfd = memfd_create("test", 0);
+ ASSERT_GE(memfd, 0);
+
+ ret = prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
+ }
+
+ /* Check that the basic notification machinery works */
+ listener = user_notif_syscall(__NR_getppid,
+ SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER);
+ ASSERT_GE(listener, 0);
+
+ pid = fork();
+ ASSERT_GE(pid, 0);
+
+ if (pid == 0)
+ exit(syscall(__NR_getppid) != USER_NOTIF_MAGIC);
+
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV, &req), 0);
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(prlimit(pid, RLIMIT_NOFILE, &lim, NULL), 0);
+
+ addfd.srcfd = memfd;
+ addfd.newfd_flags = O_CLOEXEC;
+ addfd.newfd = 0;
+ addfd.id = req.id;
+ addfd.flags = 0;
+
+ /* Should probably spot check /proc/sys/fs/file-nr */
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ADDFD, &addfd), -1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno, EMFILE);
+
+ addfd.newfd = 100;
+ addfd.flags = SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_SETFD;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ADDFD, &addfd), -1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno, EBADF);
+
+ resp.id = req.id;
+ resp.error = 0;
+ resp.val = USER_NOTIF_MAGIC;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND, &resp), 0);
+
+ /* Wait for child to finish. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(waitpid(pid, &status, 0), pid);
+ EXPECT_EQ(true, WIFEXITED(status));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+
+ close(memfd);
+}
+
+/*
+ * TODO:
+ * - expand NNP testing
+ * - better arch-specific TRACE and TRAP handlers.
+ * - endianness checking when appropriate
+ * - 64-bit arg prodding
+ * - arch value testing (x86 modes especially)
+ * - verify that FILTER_FLAG_LOG filters generate log messages
+ * - verify that RET_LOG generates log messages
+ */
+
+TEST_HARNESS_MAIN