Adding upstream version 3.5.24.upstream/3.5.24

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 6695 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/smtpd/smtpd.c b/src/smtpd/smtpd.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c46bdf8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/smtpd/smtpd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,6695 @@
+/*++
+/* NAME
+/*	smtpd 8
+/* SUMMARY
+/*	Postfix SMTP server
+/* SYNOPSIS
+/*	\fBsmtpd\fR [generic Postfix daemon options]
+/*
+/*	\fBsendmail -bs\fR
+/* DESCRIPTION
+/*	The SMTP server accepts network connection requests
+/*	and performs zero or more SMTP transactions per connection.
+/*	Each received message is piped through the \fBcleanup\fR(8)
+/*	daemon, and is placed into the \fBincoming\fR queue as one
+/*	single queue file.  For this mode of operation, the program
+/*	expects to be run from the \fBmaster\fR(8) process manager.
+/*
+/*	Alternatively, the SMTP server be can run in stand-alone
+/*	mode; this is traditionally obtained with "\fBsendmail
+/*	-bs\fR".  When the SMTP server runs stand-alone with non
+/*	$\fBmail_owner\fR privileges, it receives mail even while
+/*	the mail system is not running, deposits messages directly
+/*	into the \fBmaildrop\fR queue, and disables the SMTP server's
+/*	access policies. As of Postfix version 2.3, the SMTP server
+/*	refuses to receive mail from the network when it runs with
+/*	non $\fBmail_owner\fR privileges.
+/*
+/*	The SMTP server implements a variety of policies for connection
+/*	requests, and for parameters given to \fBHELO, ETRN, MAIL FROM, VRFY\fR
+/*	and \fBRCPT TO\fR commands. They are detailed below and in the
+/*	\fBmain.cf\fR configuration file.
+/* SECURITY
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/*	The SMTP server is moderately security-sensitive. It talks to SMTP
+/*	clients and to DNS servers on the network. The SMTP server can be
+/*	run chrooted at fixed low privilege.
+/* STANDARDS
+/*	RFC 821 (SMTP protocol)
+/*	RFC 1123 (Host requirements)
+/*	RFC 1652 (8bit-MIME transport)
+/*	RFC 1869 (SMTP service extensions)
+/*	RFC 1870 (Message size declaration)
+/*	RFC 1985 (ETRN command)
+/*	RFC 2034 (SMTP enhanced status codes)
+/*	RFC 2554 (AUTH command)
+/*	RFC 2821 (SMTP protocol)
+/*	RFC 2920 (SMTP pipelining)
+/*	RFC 3030 (CHUNKING without BINARYMIME)
+/*	RFC 3207 (STARTTLS command)
+/*	RFC 3461 (SMTP DSN extension)
+/*	RFC 3463 (Enhanced status codes)
+/*	RFC 3848 (ESMTP transmission types)
+/*	RFC 4409 (Message submission)
+/*	RFC 4954 (AUTH command)
+/*	RFC 5321 (SMTP protocol)
+/*	RFC 6531 (Internationalized SMTP)
+/*	RFC 6533 (Internationalized Delivery Status Notifications)
+/*	RFC 7505 ("Null MX" No Service Resource Record)
+/* DIAGNOSTICS
+/*	Problems and transactions are logged to \fBsyslogd\fR(8)
+/*	or \fBpostlogd\fR(8).
+/*
+/*	Depending on the setting of the \fBnotify_classes\fR parameter,
+/*	the postmaster is notified of bounces, protocol problems,
+/*	policy violations, and of other trouble.
+/* CONFIGURATION PARAMETERS
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/*	Changes to \fBmain.cf\fR are picked up automatically, as \fBsmtpd\fR(8)
+/*	processes run for only a limited amount of time. Use the command
+/*	"\fBpostfix reload\fR" to speed up a change.
+/*
+/*	The text below provides only a parameter summary. See
+/*	\fBpostconf\fR(5) for more details including examples.
+/* COMPATIBILITY CONTROLS
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/*	The following parameters work around implementation errors in other
+/*	software, and/or allow you to override standards in order to prevent
+/*	undesirable use.
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/* .IP "\fBbroken_sasl_auth_clients (no)\fR"
+/*	Enable interoperability with remote SMTP clients that implement an obsolete
+/*	version of the AUTH command (RFC 4954).
+/* .IP "\fBdisable_vrfy_command (no)\fR"
+/*	Disable the SMTP VRFY command.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_noop_commands (empty)\fR"
+/*	List of commands that the Postfix SMTP server replies to with "250
+/*	Ok", without doing any syntax checks and without changing state.
+/* .IP "\fBstrict_rfc821_envelopes (no)\fR"
+/*	Require that addresses received in SMTP MAIL FROM and RCPT TO
+/*	commands are enclosed with <>, and that those addresses do
+/*	not contain RFC 822 style comments or phrases.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 2.1 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_reject_unlisted_sender (no)\fR"
+/*	Request that the Postfix SMTP server rejects mail from unknown
+/*	sender addresses, even when no explicit reject_unlisted_sender
+/*	access restriction is specified.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_sasl_exceptions_networks (empty)\fR"
+/*	What remote SMTP clients the Postfix SMTP server will not offer
+/*	AUTH support to.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 2.2 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_discard_ehlo_keyword_address_maps (empty)\fR"
+/*	Lookup tables, indexed by the remote SMTP client address, with
+/*	case insensitive lists of EHLO keywords (pipelining, starttls, auth,
+/*	etc.) that the Postfix SMTP server will not send in the EHLO response
+/*	to a
+/*	remote SMTP client.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_discard_ehlo_keywords (empty)\fR"
+/*	A case insensitive list of EHLO keywords (pipelining, starttls,
+/*	auth, etc.) that the Postfix SMTP server will not send in the EHLO
+/*	response
+/*	to a remote SMTP client.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_delay_open_until_valid_rcpt (yes)\fR"
+/*	Postpone the start of an SMTP mail transaction until a valid
+/*	RCPT TO command is received.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 2.3 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_always_issue_session_ids (yes)\fR"
+/*	Force the Postfix SMTP server to issue a TLS session id, even
+/*	when TLS session caching is turned off (smtpd_tls_session_cache_database
+/*	is empty).
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 2.6 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBtcp_windowsize (0)\fR"
+/*	An optional workaround for routers that break TCP window scaling.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 2.7 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_command_filter (empty)\fR"
+/*	A mechanism to transform commands from remote SMTP clients.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 2.9 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_per_record_deadline (normal: no, overload: yes)\fR"
+/*	Change the behavior of the smtpd_timeout and smtpd_starttls_timeout
+/*	time limits, from a
+/*	time limit per read or write system call, to a time limit to send
+/*	or receive a complete record (an SMTP command line, SMTP response
+/*	line, SMTP message content line, or TLS protocol message).
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 3.0 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_dns_reply_filter (empty)\fR"
+/*	Optional filter for Postfix SMTP server DNS lookup results.
+/* ADDRESS REWRITING CONTROLS
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/*	See the ADDRESS_REWRITING_README document for a detailed
+/*	discussion of Postfix address rewriting.
+/* .IP "\fBreceive_override_options (empty)\fR"
+/*	Enable or disable recipient validation, built-in content
+/*	filtering, or address mapping.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 2.2 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBlocal_header_rewrite_clients (permit_inet_interfaces)\fR"
+/*	Rewrite message header addresses in mail from these clients and
+/*	update incomplete addresses with the domain name in $myorigin or
+/*	$mydomain; either don't rewrite message headers from other clients
+/*	at all, or rewrite message headers and update incomplete addresses
+/*	with the domain specified in the remote_header_rewrite_domain
+/*	parameter.
+/* BEFORE-SMTPD PROXY AGENT
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/*	Available in Postfix version 2.10 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_upstream_proxy_protocol (empty)\fR"
+/*	The name of the proxy protocol used by an optional before-smtpd
+/*	proxy agent.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_upstream_proxy_timeout (5s)\fR"
+/*	The time limit for the proxy protocol specified with the
+/*	smtpd_upstream_proxy_protocol parameter.
+/* AFTER QUEUE EXTERNAL CONTENT INSPECTION CONTROLS
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/*	As of version 1.0, Postfix can be configured to send new mail to
+/*	an external content filter AFTER the mail is queued. This content
+/*	filter is expected to inject mail back into a (Postfix or other)
+/*	MTA for further delivery. See the FILTER_README document for details.
+/* .IP "\fBcontent_filter (empty)\fR"
+/*	After the message is queued, send the entire message to the
+/*	specified \fItransport:destination\fR.
+/* BEFORE QUEUE EXTERNAL CONTENT INSPECTION CONTROLS
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/*	As of version 2.1, the Postfix SMTP server can be configured
+/*	to send incoming mail to a real-time SMTP-based content filter
+/*	BEFORE mail is queued.  This content filter is expected to inject
+/*	mail back into Postfix.  See the SMTPD_PROXY_README document for
+/*	details on how to configure and operate this feature.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_proxy_filter (empty)\fR"
+/*	The hostname and TCP port of the mail filtering proxy server.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_proxy_ehlo ($myhostname)\fR"
+/*	How the Postfix SMTP server announces itself to the proxy filter.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_proxy_options (empty)\fR"
+/*	List of options that control how the Postfix SMTP server
+/*	communicates with a before-queue content filter.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_proxy_timeout (100s)\fR"
+/*	The time limit for connecting to a proxy filter and for sending or
+/*	receiving information.
+/* BEFORE QUEUE MILTER CONTROLS
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/*	As of version 2.3, Postfix supports the Sendmail version 8
+/*	Milter (mail filter) protocol. These content filters run
+/*	outside Postfix. They can inspect the SMTP command stream
+/*	and the message content, and can request modifications before
+/*	mail is queued. For details see the MILTER_README document.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_milters (empty)\fR"
+/*	A list of Milter (mail filter) applications for new mail that
+/*	arrives via the Postfix \fBsmtpd\fR(8) server.
+/* .IP "\fBmilter_protocol (6)\fR"
+/*	The mail filter protocol version and optional protocol extensions
+/*	for communication with a Milter application; prior to Postfix 2.6
+/*	the default protocol is 2.
+/* .IP "\fBmilter_default_action (tempfail)\fR"
+/*	The default action when a Milter (mail filter) response is
+/*	unavailable (for example, bad Postfix configuration or Milter
+/*	failure).
+/* .IP "\fBmilter_macro_daemon_name ($myhostname)\fR"
+/*	The {daemon_name} macro value for Milter (mail filter) applications.
+/* .IP "\fBmilter_macro_v ($mail_name $mail_version)\fR"
+/*	The {v} macro value for Milter (mail filter) applications.
+/* .IP "\fBmilter_connect_timeout (30s)\fR"
+/*	The time limit for connecting to a Milter (mail filter)
+/*	application, and for negotiating protocol options.
+/* .IP "\fBmilter_command_timeout (30s)\fR"
+/*	The time limit for sending an SMTP command to a Milter (mail
+/*	filter) application, and for receiving the response.
+/* .IP "\fBmilter_content_timeout (300s)\fR"
+/*	The time limit for sending message content to a Milter (mail
+/*	filter) application, and for receiving the response.
+/* .IP "\fBmilter_connect_macros (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
+/*	The macros that are sent to Milter (mail filter) applications
+/*	after completion of an SMTP connection.
+/* .IP "\fBmilter_helo_macros (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
+/*	The macros that are sent to Milter (mail filter) applications
+/*	after the SMTP HELO or EHLO command.
+/* .IP "\fBmilter_mail_macros (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
+/*	The macros that are sent to Milter (mail filter) applications
+/*	after the SMTP MAIL FROM command.
+/* .IP "\fBmilter_rcpt_macros (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
+/*	The macros that are sent to Milter (mail filter) applications
+/*	after the SMTP RCPT TO command.
+/* .IP "\fBmilter_data_macros (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
+/*	The macros that are sent to version 4 or higher Milter (mail
+/*	filter) applications after the SMTP DATA command.
+/* .IP "\fBmilter_unknown_command_macros (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
+/*	The macros that are sent to version 3 or higher Milter (mail
+/*	filter) applications after an unknown SMTP command.
+/* .IP "\fBmilter_end_of_header_macros (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
+/*	The macros that are sent to Milter (mail filter) applications
+/*	after the end of the message header.
+/* .IP "\fBmilter_end_of_data_macros (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
+/*	The macros that are sent to Milter (mail filter) applications
+/*	after the message end-of-data.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 3.1 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBmilter_macro_defaults (empty)\fR"
+/*	Optional list of \fIname=value\fR pairs that specify default
+/*	values for arbitrary macros that Postfix may send to Milter
+/*	applications.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 3.2 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_milter_maps (empty)\fR"
+/*	Lookup tables with Milter settings per remote SMTP client IP
+/*	address.
+/* GENERAL CONTENT INSPECTION CONTROLS
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/*	The following parameters are applicable for both built-in
+/*	and external content filters.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 2.1 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBreceive_override_options (empty)\fR"
+/*	Enable or disable recipient validation, built-in content
+/*	filtering, or address mapping.
+/* EXTERNAL CONTENT INSPECTION CONTROLS
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/*	The following parameters are applicable for both before-queue
+/*	and after-queue content filtering.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 2.1 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_authorized_xforward_hosts (empty)\fR"
+/*	What remote SMTP clients are allowed to use the XFORWARD feature.
+/* SASL AUTHENTICATION CONTROLS
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/*	Postfix SASL support (RFC 4954) can be used to authenticate remote
+/*	SMTP clients to the Postfix SMTP server, and to authenticate the
+/*	Postfix SMTP client to a remote SMTP server.
+/*	See the SASL_README document for details.
+/* .IP "\fBbroken_sasl_auth_clients (no)\fR"
+/*	Enable interoperability with remote SMTP clients that implement an obsolete
+/*	version of the AUTH command (RFC 4954).
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_sasl_auth_enable (no)\fR"
+/*	Enable SASL authentication in the Postfix SMTP server.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_sasl_local_domain (empty)\fR"
+/*	The name of the Postfix SMTP server's local SASL authentication
+/*	realm.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_sasl_security_options (noanonymous)\fR"
+/*	Postfix SMTP server SASL security options; as of Postfix 2.3
+/*	the list of available
+/*	features depends on the SASL server implementation that is selected
+/*	with \fBsmtpd_sasl_type\fR.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_sender_login_maps (empty)\fR"
+/*	Optional lookup table with the SASL login names that own the sender
+/*	(MAIL FROM) addresses.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 2.1 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_sasl_exceptions_networks (empty)\fR"
+/*	What remote SMTP clients the Postfix SMTP server will not offer
+/*	AUTH support to.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 2.1 and 2.2:
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_sasl_application_name (smtpd)\fR"
+/*	The application name that the Postfix SMTP server uses for SASL
+/*	server initialization.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 2.3 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_sasl_authenticated_header (no)\fR"
+/*	Report the SASL authenticated user name in the \fBsmtpd\fR(8) Received
+/*	message header.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_sasl_path (smtpd)\fR"
+/*	Implementation-specific information that the Postfix SMTP server
+/*	passes through to
+/*	the SASL plug-in implementation that is selected with
+/*	\fBsmtpd_sasl_type\fR.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_sasl_type (cyrus)\fR"
+/*	The SASL plug-in type that the Postfix SMTP server should use
+/*	for authentication.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 2.5 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBcyrus_sasl_config_path (empty)\fR"
+/*	Search path for Cyrus SASL application configuration files,
+/*	currently used only to locate the $smtpd_sasl_path.conf file.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 2.11 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_sasl_service (smtp)\fR"
+/*	The service name that is passed to the SASL plug-in that is
+/*	selected with \fBsmtpd_sasl_type\fR and \fBsmtpd_sasl_path\fR.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 3.4 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_sasl_response_limit (12288)\fR"
+/*	The maximum length of a SASL client's response to a server challenge.
+/* STARTTLS SUPPORT CONTROLS
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/*	Detailed information about STARTTLS configuration may be
+/*	found in the TLS_README document.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_security_level (empty)\fR"
+/*	The SMTP TLS security level for the Postfix SMTP server; when
+/*	a non-empty value is specified, this overrides the obsolete parameters
+/*	smtpd_use_tls and smtpd_enforce_tls.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_sasl_tls_security_options ($smtpd_sasl_security_options)\fR"
+/*	The SASL authentication security options that the Postfix SMTP
+/*	server uses for TLS encrypted SMTP sessions.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_starttls_timeout (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
+/*	The time limit for Postfix SMTP server write and read operations
+/*	during TLS startup and shutdown handshake procedures.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_CAfile (empty)\fR"
+/*	A file containing (PEM format) CA certificates of root CAs trusted
+/*	to sign either remote SMTP client certificates or intermediate CA
+/*	certificates.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_CApath (empty)\fR"
+/*	A directory containing (PEM format) CA certificates of root CAs
+/*	trusted to sign either remote SMTP client certificates or intermediate CA
+/*	certificates.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_always_issue_session_ids (yes)\fR"
+/*	Force the Postfix SMTP server to issue a TLS session id, even
+/*	when TLS session caching is turned off (smtpd_tls_session_cache_database
+/*	is empty).
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_ask_ccert (no)\fR"
+/*	Ask a remote SMTP client for a client certificate.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_auth_only (no)\fR"
+/*	When TLS encryption is optional in the Postfix SMTP server, do
+/*	not announce or accept SASL authentication over unencrypted
+/*	connections.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_ccert_verifydepth (9)\fR"
+/*	The verification depth for remote SMTP client certificates.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_cert_file (empty)\fR"
+/*	File with the Postfix SMTP server RSA certificate in PEM format.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_exclude_ciphers (empty)\fR"
+/*	List of ciphers or cipher types to exclude from the SMTP server
+/*	cipher list at all TLS security levels.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_dcert_file (empty)\fR"
+/*	File with the Postfix SMTP server DSA certificate in PEM format.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file (empty)\fR"
+/*	File with DH parameters that the Postfix SMTP server should
+/*	use with non-export EDH ciphers.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_dh512_param_file (empty)\fR"
+/*	File with DH parameters that the Postfix SMTP server should
+/*	use with export-grade EDH ciphers.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_dkey_file ($smtpd_tls_dcert_file)\fR"
+/*	File with the Postfix SMTP server DSA private key in PEM format.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_key_file ($smtpd_tls_cert_file)\fR"
+/*	File with the Postfix SMTP server RSA private key in PEM format.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_loglevel (0)\fR"
+/*	Enable additional Postfix SMTP server logging of TLS activity.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_mandatory_ciphers (medium)\fR"
+/*	The minimum TLS cipher grade that the Postfix SMTP server will
+/*	use with mandatory TLS encryption.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_mandatory_exclude_ciphers (empty)\fR"
+/*	Additional list of ciphers or cipher types to exclude from the
+/*	Postfix SMTP server cipher list at mandatory TLS security levels.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_mandatory_protocols (!SSLv2, !SSLv3)\fR"
+/*	The SSL/TLS protocols accepted by the Postfix SMTP server with
+/*	mandatory TLS encryption.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_received_header (no)\fR"
+/*	Request that the Postfix SMTP server produces Received:  message
+/*	headers that include information about the protocol and cipher used,
+/*	as well as the remote SMTP client CommonName and client certificate issuer
+/*	CommonName.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_req_ccert (no)\fR"
+/*	With mandatory TLS encryption, require a trusted remote SMTP client
+/*	certificate in order to allow TLS connections to proceed.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_wrappermode (no)\fR"
+/*	Run the Postfix SMTP server in the non-standard "wrapper" mode,
+/*	instead of using the STARTTLS command.
+/* .IP "\fBtls_daemon_random_bytes (32)\fR"
+/*	The number of pseudo-random bytes that an \fBsmtp\fR(8) or \fBsmtpd\fR(8)
+/*	process requests from the \fBtlsmgr\fR(8) server in order to seed its
+/*	internal pseudo random number generator (PRNG).
+/* .IP "\fBtls_high_cipherlist (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
+/*	The OpenSSL cipherlist for "high" grade ciphers.
+/* .IP "\fBtls_medium_cipherlist (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
+/*	The OpenSSL cipherlist for "medium" or higher grade ciphers.
+/* .IP "\fBtls_low_cipherlist (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
+/*	The OpenSSL cipherlist for "low" or higher grade ciphers.
+/* .IP "\fBtls_export_cipherlist (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
+/*	The OpenSSL cipherlist for "export" or higher grade ciphers.
+/* .IP "\fBtls_null_cipherlist (eNULL:!aNULL)\fR"
+/*	The OpenSSL cipherlist for "NULL" grade ciphers that provide
+/*	authentication without encryption.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 2.5 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_fingerprint_digest (md5)\fR"
+/*	The message digest algorithm to construct remote SMTP
+/*	client-certificate
+/*	fingerprints or public key fingerprints (Postfix 2.9 and later)
+/*	for \fBcheck_ccert_access\fR and \fBpermit_tls_clientcerts\fR.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 2.6 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_protocols (!SSLv2, !SSLv3)\fR"
+/*	List of TLS protocols that the Postfix SMTP server will exclude
+/*	or include with opportunistic TLS encryption.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_ciphers (medium)\fR"
+/*	The minimum TLS cipher grade that the Postfix SMTP server
+/*	will use with opportunistic TLS encryption.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_eccert_file (empty)\fR"
+/*	File with the Postfix SMTP server ECDSA certificate in PEM format.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_eckey_file ($smtpd_tls_eccert_file)\fR"
+/*	File with the Postfix SMTP server ECDSA private key in PEM format.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_eecdh_grade (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
+/*	The Postfix SMTP server security grade for ephemeral elliptic-curve
+/*	Diffie-Hellman (EECDH) key exchange.
+/* .IP "\fBtls_eecdh_strong_curve (prime256v1)\fR"
+/*	The elliptic curve used by the Postfix SMTP server for sensibly
+/*	strong
+/*	ephemeral ECDH key exchange.
+/* .IP "\fBtls_eecdh_ultra_curve (secp384r1)\fR"
+/*	The elliptic curve used by the Postfix SMTP server for maximally
+/*	strong
+/*	ephemeral ECDH key exchange.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 2.8 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBtls_preempt_cipherlist (no)\fR"
+/*	With SSLv3 and later, use the Postfix SMTP server's cipher
+/*	preference order instead of the remote client's cipher preference
+/*	order.
+/* .IP "\fBtls_disable_workarounds (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
+/*	List or bit-mask of OpenSSL bug work-arounds to disable.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 2.11 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBtlsmgr_service_name (tlsmgr)\fR"
+/*	The name of the \fBtlsmgr\fR(8) service entry in master.cf.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 3.0 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBtls_session_ticket_cipher (Postfix >= 3.0: aes-256-cbc, Postfix < 3.0: aes-128-cbc)\fR"
+/*	Algorithm used to encrypt RFC5077 TLS session tickets.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 3.2 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBtls_eecdh_auto_curves (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
+/*	The prioritized list of elliptic curves supported by the Postfix
+/*	SMTP client and server.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 3.4 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_chain_files (empty)\fR"
+/*	List of one or more PEM files, each holding one or more private keys
+/*	directly followed by a corresponding certificate chain.
+/* .IP "\fBtls_server_sni_maps (empty)\fR"
+/*	Optional lookup tables that map names received from remote SMTP
+/*	clients via the TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) extension to the
+/*	appropriate keys and certificate chains.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix 3.5, 3.4.6, 3.3.5, 3.2.10, 3.1.13 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBtls_fast_shutdown_enable (yes)\fR"
+/*	A workaround for implementations that hang Postfix while shutting
+/*	down a TLS session, until Postfix times out.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix 3.5 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBinfo_log_address_format (external)\fR"
+/*	The email address form that will be used in non-debug logging
+/*	(info, warning, etc.).
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix 3.9, 3.8.1, 3.7.6, 3.6.10, 3.5.20 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBtls_config_file (default)\fR"
+/*	Optional configuration file with baseline OpenSSL settings.
+/* .IP "\fBtls_config_name (empty)\fR"
+/*	The application name passed by Postfix to OpenSSL library
+/*	initialization functions.
+/* OBSOLETE STARTTLS CONTROLS
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/*	The following configuration parameters exist for compatibility
+/*	with Postfix versions before 2.3. Support for these will
+/*	be removed in a future release.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_use_tls (no)\fR"
+/*	Opportunistic TLS: announce STARTTLS support to remote SMTP clients,
+/*	but do not require that clients use TLS encryption.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_enforce_tls (no)\fR"
+/*	Mandatory TLS: announce STARTTLS support to remote SMTP clients,
+/*	and require that clients use TLS encryption.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_cipherlist (empty)\fR"
+/*	Obsolete Postfix < 2.3 control for the Postfix SMTP server TLS
+/*	cipher list.
+/* SMTPUTF8 CONTROLS
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/*	Preliminary SMTPUTF8 support is introduced with Postfix 3.0.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtputf8_enable (yes)\fR"
+/*	Enable preliminary SMTPUTF8 support for the protocols described
+/*	in RFC 6531..6533.
+/* .IP "\fBstrict_smtputf8 (no)\fR"
+/*	Enable stricter enforcement of the SMTPUTF8 protocol.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtputf8_autodetect_classes (sendmail, verify)\fR"
+/*	Detect that a message requires SMTPUTF8 support for the specified
+/*	mail origin classes.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 3.2 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBenable_idna2003_compatibility (no)\fR"
+/*	Enable 'transitional' compatibility between IDNA2003 and IDNA2008,
+/*	when converting UTF-8 domain names to/from the ASCII form that is
+/*	used for DNS lookups.
+/* VERP SUPPORT CONTROLS
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/*	With VERP style delivery, each recipient of a message receives a
+/*	customized copy of the message with his/her own recipient address
+/*	encoded in the envelope sender address.  The VERP_README file
+/*	describes configuration and operation details of Postfix support
+/*	for variable envelope return path addresses.  VERP style delivery
+/*	is requested with the SMTP XVERP command or with the "sendmail
+/*	-V" command-line option and is available in Postfix version 1.1
+/*	and later.
+/* .IP "\fBdefault_verp_delimiters (+=)\fR"
+/*	The two default VERP delimiter characters.
+/* .IP "\fBverp_delimiter_filter (-=+)\fR"
+/*	The characters Postfix accepts as VERP delimiter characters on the
+/*	Postfix \fBsendmail\fR(1) command line and in SMTP commands.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 1.1 and 2.0:
+/* .IP "\fBauthorized_verp_clients ($mynetworks)\fR"
+/*	What remote SMTP clients are allowed to specify the XVERP command.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 2.1 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_authorized_verp_clients ($authorized_verp_clients)\fR"
+/*	What remote SMTP clients are allowed to specify the XVERP command.
+/* TROUBLE SHOOTING CONTROLS
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/*	The DEBUG_README document describes how to debug parts of the
+/*	Postfix mail system. The methods vary from making the software log
+/*	a lot of detail, to running some daemon processes under control of
+/*	a call tracer or debugger.
+/* .IP "\fBdebug_peer_level (2)\fR"
+/*	The increment in verbose logging level when a remote client or
+/*	server matches a pattern in the debug_peer_list parameter.
+/* .IP "\fBdebug_peer_list (empty)\fR"
+/*	Optional list of remote client or server hostname or network
+/*	address patterns that cause the verbose logging level to increase
+/*	by the amount specified in $debug_peer_level.
+/* .IP "\fBerror_notice_recipient (postmaster)\fR"
+/*	The recipient of postmaster notifications about mail delivery
+/*	problems that are caused by policy, resource, software or protocol
+/*	errors.
+/* .IP "\fBinternal_mail_filter_classes (empty)\fR"
+/*	What categories of Postfix-generated mail are subject to
+/*	before-queue content inspection by non_smtpd_milters, header_checks
+/*	and body_checks.
+/* .IP "\fBnotify_classes (resource, software)\fR"
+/*	The list of error classes that are reported to the postmaster.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_reject_footer (empty)\fR"
+/*	Optional information that is appended after each Postfix SMTP
+/*	server
+/*	4XX or 5XX response.
+/* .IP "\fBsoft_bounce (no)\fR"
+/*	Safety net to keep mail queued that would otherwise be returned to
+/*	the sender.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 2.1 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_authorized_xclient_hosts (empty)\fR"
+/*	What remote SMTP clients are allowed to use the XCLIENT feature.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 2.10 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_log_access_permit_actions (empty)\fR"
+/*	Enable logging of the named "permit" actions in SMTP server
+/*	access lists (by default, the SMTP server logs "reject" actions but
+/*	not "permit" actions).
+/* KNOWN VERSUS UNKNOWN RECIPIENT CONTROLS
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/*	As of Postfix version 2.0, the SMTP server rejects mail for
+/*	unknown recipients. This prevents the mail queue from clogging up
+/*	with undeliverable MAILER-DAEMON messages. Additional information
+/*	on this topic is in the LOCAL_RECIPIENT_README and ADDRESS_CLASS_README
+/*	documents.
+/* .IP "\fBshow_user_unknown_table_name (yes)\fR"
+/*	Display the name of the recipient table in the "User unknown"
+/*	responses.
+/* .IP "\fBcanonical_maps (empty)\fR"
+/*	Optional address mapping lookup tables for message headers and
+/*	envelopes.
+/* .IP "\fBrecipient_canonical_maps (empty)\fR"
+/*	Optional address mapping lookup tables for envelope and header
+/*	recipient addresses.
+/* .IP "\fBsender_canonical_maps (empty)\fR"
+/*	Optional address mapping lookup tables for envelope and header
+/*	sender addresses.
+/* .PP
+/*	Parameters concerning known/unknown local recipients:
+/* .IP "\fBmydestination ($myhostname, localhost.$mydomain, localhost)\fR"
+/*	The list of domains that are delivered via the $local_transport
+/*	mail delivery transport.
+/* .IP "\fBinet_interfaces (all)\fR"
+/*	The network interface addresses that this mail system receives
+/*	mail on.
+/* .IP "\fBproxy_interfaces (empty)\fR"
+/*	The network interface addresses that this mail system receives mail
+/*	on by way of a proxy or network address translation unit.
+/* .IP "\fBinet_protocols (all)\fR"
+/*	The Internet protocols Postfix will attempt to use when making
+/*	or accepting connections.
+/* .IP "\fBlocal_recipient_maps (proxy:unix:passwd.byname $alias_maps)\fR"
+/*	Lookup tables with all names or addresses of local recipients:
+/*	a recipient address is local when its domain matches $mydestination,
+/*	$inet_interfaces or $proxy_interfaces.
+/* .IP "\fBunknown_local_recipient_reject_code (550)\fR"
+/*	The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code when a recipient
+/*	address is local, and $local_recipient_maps specifies a list of
+/*	lookup tables that does not match the recipient.
+/* .PP
+/*	Parameters concerning known/unknown recipients of relay destinations:
+/* .IP "\fBrelay_domains (Postfix >= 3.0: empty, Postfix < 3.0: $mydestination)\fR"
+/*	What destination domains (and subdomains thereof) this system
+/*	will relay mail to.
+/* .IP "\fBrelay_recipient_maps (empty)\fR"
+/*	Optional lookup tables with all valid addresses in the domains
+/*	that match $relay_domains.
+/* .IP "\fBunknown_relay_recipient_reject_code (550)\fR"
+/*	The numerical Postfix SMTP server reply code when a recipient
+/*	address matches $relay_domains, and relay_recipient_maps specifies
+/*	a list of lookup tables that does not match the recipient address.
+/* .PP
+/*	Parameters concerning known/unknown recipients in virtual alias
+/*	domains:
+/* .IP "\fBvirtual_alias_domains ($virtual_alias_maps)\fR"
+/*	Postfix is final destination for the specified list of virtual
+/*	alias domains, that is, domains for which all addresses are aliased
+/*	to addresses in other local or remote domains.
+/* .IP "\fBvirtual_alias_maps ($virtual_maps)\fR"
+/*	Optional lookup tables that alias specific mail addresses or domains
+/*	to other local or remote address.
+/* .IP "\fBunknown_virtual_alias_reject_code (550)\fR"
+/*	The Postfix SMTP server reply code when a recipient address matches
+/*	$virtual_alias_domains, and $virtual_alias_maps specifies a list
+/*	of lookup tables that does not match the recipient address.
+/* .PP
+/*	Parameters concerning known/unknown recipients in virtual mailbox
+/*	domains:
+/* .IP "\fBvirtual_mailbox_domains ($virtual_mailbox_maps)\fR"
+/*	Postfix is final destination for the specified list of domains;
+/*	mail is delivered via the $virtual_transport mail delivery transport.
+/* .IP "\fBvirtual_mailbox_maps (empty)\fR"
+/*	Optional lookup tables with all valid addresses in the domains that
+/*	match $virtual_mailbox_domains.
+/* .IP "\fBunknown_virtual_mailbox_reject_code (550)\fR"
+/*	The Postfix SMTP server reply code when a recipient address matches
+/*	$virtual_mailbox_domains, and $virtual_mailbox_maps specifies a list
+/*	of lookup tables that does not match the recipient address.
+/* RESOURCE AND RATE CONTROLS
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/*	The following parameters limit resource usage by the SMTP
+/*	server and/or control client request rates.
+/* .IP "\fBline_length_limit (2048)\fR"
+/*	Upon input, long lines are chopped up into pieces of at most
+/*	this length; upon delivery, long lines are reconstructed.
+/* .IP "\fBqueue_minfree (0)\fR"
+/*	The minimal amount of free space in bytes in the queue file system
+/*	that is needed to receive mail.
+/* .IP "\fBmessage_size_limit (10240000)\fR"
+/*	The maximal size in bytes of a message, including envelope information.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_recipient_limit (1000)\fR"
+/*	The maximal number of recipients that the Postfix SMTP server
+/*	accepts per message delivery request.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_timeout (normal: 300s, overload: 10s)\fR"
+/*	The time limit for sending a Postfix SMTP server response and for
+/*	receiving a remote SMTP client request.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_history_flush_threshold (100)\fR"
+/*	The maximal number of lines in the Postfix SMTP server command history
+/*	before it is flushed upon receipt of EHLO, RSET, or end of DATA.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 2.3 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_peername_lookup (yes)\fR"
+/*	Attempt to look up the remote SMTP client hostname, and verify that
+/*	the name matches the client IP address.
+/* .PP
+/*	The per SMTP client connection count and request rate limits are
+/*	implemented in co-operation with the \fBanvil\fR(8) service, and
+/*	are available in Postfix version 2.2 and later.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_client_connection_count_limit (50)\fR"
+/*	How many simultaneous connections any client is allowed to
+/*	make to this service.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_client_connection_rate_limit (0)\fR"
+/*	The maximal number of connection attempts any client is allowed to
+/*	make to this service per time unit.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_client_message_rate_limit (0)\fR"
+/*	The maximal number of message delivery requests that any client is
+/*	allowed to make to this service per time unit, regardless of whether
+/*	or not Postfix actually accepts those messages.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_client_recipient_rate_limit (0)\fR"
+/*	The maximal number of recipient addresses that any client is allowed
+/*	to send to this service per time unit, regardless of whether or not
+/*	Postfix actually accepts those recipients.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_client_event_limit_exceptions ($mynetworks)\fR"
+/*	Clients that are excluded from smtpd_client_*_count/rate_limit
+/*	restrictions.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 2.3 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_client_new_tls_session_rate_limit (0)\fR"
+/*	The maximal number of new (i.e., uncached) TLS sessions that a
+/*	remote SMTP client is allowed to negotiate with this service per
+/*	time unit.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 2.9 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_per_record_deadline (normal: no, overload: yes)\fR"
+/*	Change the behavior of the smtpd_timeout and smtpd_starttls_timeout
+/*	time limits, from a
+/*	time limit per read or write system call, to a time limit to send
+/*	or receive a complete record (an SMTP command line, SMTP response
+/*	line, SMTP message content line, or TLS protocol message).
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 3.1 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_client_auth_rate_limit (0)\fR"
+/*	The maximal number of AUTH commands that any client is allowed to
+/*	send to this service per time unit, regardless of whether or not
+/*	Postfix actually accepts those commands.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix 3.9, 3.8.1, 3.7.6, 3.6.10, 3.5.20 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_forbid_unauth_pipelining (Postfix >= 3.9: yes)\fR"
+/*	Disconnect remote SMTP clients that violate RFC 2920 (or 5321)
+/*	command pipelining constraints.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix 3.9, 3.8.4, 3.7.9, 3.6.13, 3.5.23 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_forbid_bare_newline (Postfix < 3.9: no)\fR"
+/*	Reject or restrict input lines from an SMTP client that end in
+/*	<LF> instead of the standard <CR><LF>.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_forbid_bare_newline_exclusions ($mynetworks)\fR"
+/*	Exclude the specified clients from smtpd_forbid_bare_newline
+/*	enforcement.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix 3.9, 3.8.5, 3.7.10, 3.6.14, 3.5.24 and
+/*	later:
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_forbid_bare_newline_reject_code (550)\fR"
+/*	The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code when rejecting a
+/*	request with "smtpd_forbid_bare_newline = reject".
+/* TARPIT CONTROLS
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/*	When a remote SMTP client makes errors, the Postfix SMTP server
+/*	can insert delays before responding. This can help to slow down
+/*	run-away software.  The behavior is controlled by an error counter
+/*	that counts the number of errors within an SMTP session that a
+/*	client makes without delivering mail.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_error_sleep_time (1s)\fR"
+/*	With Postfix version 2.1 and later: the SMTP server response delay after
+/*	a client has made more than $smtpd_soft_error_limit errors, and
+/*	fewer than $smtpd_hard_error_limit errors, without delivering mail.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_soft_error_limit (10)\fR"
+/*	The number of errors a remote SMTP client is allowed to make without
+/*	delivering mail before the Postfix SMTP server slows down all its
+/*	responses.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_hard_error_limit (normal: 20, overload: 1)\fR"
+/*	The maximal number of errors a remote SMTP client is allowed to
+/*	make without delivering mail.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_junk_command_limit (normal: 100, overload: 1)\fR"
+/*	The number of junk commands (NOOP, VRFY, ETRN or RSET) that a remote
+/*	SMTP client can send before the Postfix SMTP server starts to
+/*	increment the error counter with each junk command.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 2.1 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_recipient_overshoot_limit (1000)\fR"
+/*	The number of recipients that a remote SMTP client can send in
+/*	excess of the limit specified with $smtpd_recipient_limit, before
+/*	the Postfix SMTP server increments the per-session error count
+/*	for each excess recipient.
+/* ACCESS POLICY DELEGATION CONTROLS
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/*	As of version 2.1, Postfix can be configured to delegate access
+/*	policy decisions to an external server that runs outside Postfix.
+/*	See the file SMTPD_POLICY_README for more information.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_policy_service_max_idle (300s)\fR"
+/*	The time after which an idle SMTPD policy service connection is
+/*	closed.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_policy_service_max_ttl (1000s)\fR"
+/*	The time after which an active SMTPD policy service connection is
+/*	closed.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_policy_service_timeout (100s)\fR"
+/*	The time limit for connecting to, writing to, or receiving from a
+/*	delegated SMTPD policy server.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 3.0 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_policy_service_default_action (451 4.3.5 Server configuration problem)\fR"
+/*	The default action when an SMTPD policy service request fails.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_policy_service_request_limit (0)\fR"
+/*	The maximal number of requests per SMTPD policy service connection,
+/*	or zero (no limit).
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_policy_service_try_limit (2)\fR"
+/*	The maximal number of attempts to send an SMTPD policy service
+/*	request before giving up.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_policy_service_retry_delay (1s)\fR"
+/*	The delay between attempts to resend a failed SMTPD policy
+/*	service request.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 3.1 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_policy_service_policy_context (empty)\fR"
+/*	Optional information that the Postfix SMTP server specifies in
+/*	the "policy_context" attribute of a policy service request (originally,
+/*	to share the same service endpoint among multiple check_policy_service
+/*	clients).
+/* ACCESS CONTROLS
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/*	The SMTPD_ACCESS_README document gives an introduction to all the
+/*	SMTP server access control features.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_delay_reject (yes)\fR"
+/*	Wait until the RCPT TO command before evaluating
+/*	$smtpd_client_restrictions, $smtpd_helo_restrictions and
+/*	$smtpd_sender_restrictions, or wait until the ETRN command before
+/*	evaluating $smtpd_client_restrictions and $smtpd_helo_restrictions.
+/* .IP "\fBparent_domain_matches_subdomains (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
+/*	A list of Postfix features where the pattern "example.com" also
+/*	matches subdomains of example.com,
+/*	instead of requiring an explicit ".example.com" pattern.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_client_restrictions (empty)\fR"
+/*	Optional restrictions that the Postfix SMTP server applies in the
+/*	context of a client connection request.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_helo_required (no)\fR"
+/*	Require that a remote SMTP client introduces itself with the HELO
+/*	or EHLO command before sending the MAIL command or other commands
+/*	that require EHLO negotiation.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_helo_restrictions (empty)\fR"
+/*	Optional restrictions that the Postfix SMTP server applies in the
+/*	context of a client HELO command.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_sender_restrictions (empty)\fR"
+/*	Optional restrictions that the Postfix SMTP server applies in the
+/*	context of a client MAIL FROM command.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_recipient_restrictions (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
+/*	Optional restrictions that the Postfix SMTP server applies in the
+/*	context of a client RCPT TO command, after smtpd_relay_restrictions.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_etrn_restrictions (empty)\fR"
+/*	Optional restrictions that the Postfix SMTP server applies in the
+/*	context of a client ETRN command.
+/* .IP "\fBallow_untrusted_routing (no)\fR"
+/*	Forward mail with sender-specified routing (user[@%!]remote[@%!]site)
+/*	from untrusted clients to destinations matching $relay_domains.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_restriction_classes (empty)\fR"
+/*	User-defined aliases for groups of access restrictions.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_null_access_lookup_key (<>)\fR"
+/*	The lookup key to be used in SMTP \fBaccess\fR(5) tables instead of the
+/*	null sender address.
+/* .IP "\fBpermit_mx_backup_networks (empty)\fR"
+/*	Restrict the use of the permit_mx_backup SMTP access feature to
+/*	only domains whose primary MX hosts match the listed networks.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 2.0 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_data_restrictions (empty)\fR"
+/*	Optional access restrictions that the Postfix SMTP server applies
+/*	in the context of the SMTP DATA command.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_expansion_filter (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
+/*	What characters are allowed in $name expansions of RBL reply
+/*	templates.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 2.1 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_reject_unlisted_sender (no)\fR"
+/*	Request that the Postfix SMTP server rejects mail from unknown
+/*	sender addresses, even when no explicit reject_unlisted_sender
+/*	access restriction is specified.
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_reject_unlisted_recipient (yes)\fR"
+/*	Request that the Postfix SMTP server rejects mail for unknown
+/*	recipient addresses, even when no explicit reject_unlisted_recipient
+/*	access restriction is specified.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 2.2 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_end_of_data_restrictions (empty)\fR"
+/*	Optional access restrictions that the Postfix SMTP server
+/*	applies in the context of the SMTP END-OF-DATA command.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 2.10 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_relay_restrictions (permit_mynetworks, permit_sasl_authenticated, defer_unauth_destination)\fR"
+/*	Access restrictions for mail relay control that the Postfix
+/*	SMTP server applies in the context of the RCPT TO command, before
+/*	smtpd_recipient_restrictions.
+/* SENDER AND RECIPIENT ADDRESS VERIFICATION CONTROLS
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/*	Postfix version 2.1 introduces sender and recipient address verification.
+/*	This feature is implemented by sending probe email messages that
+/*	are not actually delivered.
+/*	This feature is requested via the reject_unverified_sender and
+/*	reject_unverified_recipient access restrictions.  The status of
+/*	verification probes is maintained by the \fBverify\fR(8) server.
+/*	See the file ADDRESS_VERIFICATION_README for information
+/*	about how to configure and operate the Postfix sender/recipient
+/*	address verification service.
+/* .IP "\fBaddress_verify_poll_count (normal: 3, overload: 1)\fR"
+/*	How many times to query the \fBverify\fR(8) service for the completion
+/*	of an address verification request in progress.
+/* .IP "\fBaddress_verify_poll_delay (3s)\fR"
+/*	The delay between queries for the completion of an address
+/*	verification request in progress.
+/* .IP "\fBaddress_verify_sender ($double_bounce_sender)\fR"
+/*	The sender address to use in address verification probes; prior
+/*	to Postfix 2.5 the default was "postmaster".
+/* .IP "\fBunverified_sender_reject_code (450)\fR"
+/*	The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code when a recipient
+/*	address is rejected by the reject_unverified_sender restriction.
+/* .IP "\fBunverified_recipient_reject_code (450)\fR"
+/*	The numerical Postfix SMTP server response when a recipient address
+/*	is rejected by the reject_unverified_recipient restriction.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 2.6 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBunverified_sender_defer_code (450)\fR"
+/*	The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code when a sender address
+/*	probe fails due to a temporary error condition.
+/* .IP "\fBunverified_recipient_defer_code (450)\fR"
+/*	The numerical Postfix SMTP server response when a recipient address
+/*	probe fails due to a temporary error condition.
+/* .IP "\fBunverified_sender_reject_reason (empty)\fR"
+/*	The Postfix SMTP server's reply when rejecting mail with
+/*	reject_unverified_sender.
+/* .IP "\fBunverified_recipient_reject_reason (empty)\fR"
+/*	The Postfix SMTP server's reply when rejecting mail with
+/*	reject_unverified_recipient.
+/* .IP "\fBunverified_sender_tempfail_action ($reject_tempfail_action)\fR"
+/*	The Postfix SMTP server's action when reject_unverified_sender
+/*	fails due to a temporary error condition.
+/* .IP "\fBunverified_recipient_tempfail_action ($reject_tempfail_action)\fR"
+/*	The Postfix SMTP server's action when reject_unverified_recipient
+/*	fails due to a temporary error condition.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available with Postfix 2.9 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBaddress_verify_sender_ttl (0s)\fR"
+/*	The time between changes in the time-dependent portion of address
+/*	verification probe sender addresses.
+/* ACCESS CONTROL RESPONSES
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/*	The following parameters control numerical SMTP reply codes
+/*	and/or text responses.
+/* .IP "\fBaccess_map_reject_code (554)\fR"
+/*	The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code for
+/*	an \fBaccess\fR(5) map "reject" action.
+/* .IP "\fBdefer_code (450)\fR"
+/*	The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code when a remote SMTP
+/*	client request is rejected by the "defer" restriction.
+/* .IP "\fBinvalid_hostname_reject_code (501)\fR"
+/*	The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code when the client
+/*	HELO or EHLO command parameter is rejected by the reject_invalid_helo_hostname
+/*	restriction.
+/* .IP "\fBmaps_rbl_reject_code (554)\fR"
+/*	The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code when a remote SMTP
+/*	client request is blocked by the reject_rbl_client, reject_rhsbl_client,
+/*	reject_rhsbl_reverse_client, reject_rhsbl_sender or
+/*	reject_rhsbl_recipient restriction.
+/* .IP "\fBnon_fqdn_reject_code (504)\fR"
+/*	The numerical Postfix SMTP server reply code when a client request
+/*	is rejected by the reject_non_fqdn_helo_hostname, reject_non_fqdn_sender
+/*	or reject_non_fqdn_recipient restriction.
+/* .IP "\fBplaintext_reject_code (450)\fR"
+/*	The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code when a request
+/*	is rejected by the \fBreject_plaintext_session\fR restriction.
+/* .IP "\fBreject_code (554)\fR"
+/*	The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code when a remote SMTP
+/*	client request is rejected by the "reject" restriction.
+/* .IP "\fBrelay_domains_reject_code (554)\fR"
+/*	The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code when a client
+/*	request is rejected by the reject_unauth_destination recipient
+/*	restriction.
+/* .IP "\fBunknown_address_reject_code (450)\fR"
+/*	The numerical response code when the Postfix SMTP server rejects a
+/*	sender or recipient address because its domain is unknown.
+/* .IP "\fBunknown_client_reject_code (450)\fR"
+/*	The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code when a client
+/*	without valid address <=> name mapping is rejected by the
+/*	reject_unknown_client_hostname restriction.
+/* .IP "\fBunknown_hostname_reject_code (450)\fR"
+/*	The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code when the hostname
+/*	specified with the HELO or EHLO command is rejected by the
+/*	reject_unknown_helo_hostname restriction.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 2.0 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBdefault_rbl_reply (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
+/*	The default Postfix SMTP server response template for a request that is
+/*	rejected by an RBL-based restriction.
+/* .IP "\fBmulti_recipient_bounce_reject_code (550)\fR"
+/*	The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code when a remote SMTP
+/*	client request is blocked by the reject_multi_recipient_bounce
+/*	restriction.
+/* .IP "\fBrbl_reply_maps (empty)\fR"
+/*	Optional lookup tables with RBL response templates.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 2.6 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBaccess_map_defer_code (450)\fR"
+/*	The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code for
+/*	an \fBaccess\fR(5) map "defer" action, including "defer_if_permit"
+/*	or "defer_if_reject".
+/* .IP "\fBreject_tempfail_action (defer_if_permit)\fR"
+/*	The Postfix SMTP server's action when a reject-type restriction
+/*	fails due to a temporary error condition.
+/* .IP "\fBunknown_helo_hostname_tempfail_action ($reject_tempfail_action)\fR"
+/*	The Postfix SMTP server's action when reject_unknown_helo_hostname
+/*	fails due to a temporary error condition.
+/* .IP "\fBunknown_address_tempfail_action ($reject_tempfail_action)\fR"
+/*	The Postfix SMTP server's action when reject_unknown_sender_domain
+/*	or reject_unknown_recipient_domain fail due to a temporary error
+/*	condition.
+/* MISCELLANEOUS CONTROLS
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/* .IP "\fBconfig_directory (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
+/*	The default location of the Postfix main.cf and master.cf
+/*	configuration files.
+/* .IP "\fBdaemon_timeout (18000s)\fR"
+/*	How much time a Postfix daemon process may take to handle a
+/*	request before it is terminated by a built-in watchdog timer.
+/* .IP "\fBcommand_directory (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
+/*	The location of all postfix administrative commands.
+/* .IP "\fBdouble_bounce_sender (double-bounce)\fR"
+/*	The sender address of postmaster notifications that are generated
+/*	by the mail system.
+/* .IP "\fBipc_timeout (3600s)\fR"
+/*	The time limit for sending or receiving information over an internal
+/*	communication channel.
+/* .IP "\fBmail_name (Postfix)\fR"
+/*	The mail system name that is displayed in Received: headers, in
+/*	the SMTP greeting banner, and in bounced mail.
+/* .IP "\fBmail_owner (postfix)\fR"
+/*	The UNIX system account that owns the Postfix queue and most Postfix
+/*	daemon processes.
+/* .IP "\fBmax_idle (100s)\fR"
+/*	The maximum amount of time that an idle Postfix daemon process waits
+/*	for an incoming connection before terminating voluntarily.
+/* .IP "\fBmax_use (100)\fR"
+/*	The maximal number of incoming connections that a Postfix daemon
+/*	process will service before terminating voluntarily.
+/* .IP "\fBmyhostname (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
+/*	The internet hostname of this mail system.
+/* .IP "\fBmynetworks (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
+/*	The list of "trusted" remote SMTP clients that have more privileges than
+/*	"strangers".
+/* .IP "\fBmyorigin ($myhostname)\fR"
+/*	The domain name that locally-posted mail appears to come
+/*	from, and that locally posted mail is delivered to.
+/* .IP "\fBprocess_id (read-only)\fR"
+/*	The process ID of a Postfix command or daemon process.
+/* .IP "\fBprocess_name (read-only)\fR"
+/*	The process name of a Postfix command or daemon process.
+/* .IP "\fBqueue_directory (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
+/*	The location of the Postfix top-level queue directory.
+/* .IP "\fBrecipient_delimiter (empty)\fR"
+/*	The set of characters that can separate a user name from its
+/*	extension (example: user+foo), or a .forward file name from its
+/*	extension (example: .forward+foo).
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_banner ($myhostname ESMTP $mail_name)\fR"
+/*	The text that follows the 220 status code in the SMTP greeting
+/*	banner.
+/* .IP "\fBsyslog_facility (mail)\fR"
+/*	The syslog facility of Postfix logging.
+/* .IP "\fBsyslog_name (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR"
+/*	A prefix that is prepended to the process name in syslog
+/*	records, so that, for example, "smtpd" becomes "prefix/smtpd".
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 2.2 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_forbidden_commands (CONNECT, GET, POST)\fR"
+/*	List of commands that cause the Postfix SMTP server to immediately
+/*	terminate the session with a 221 code.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix version 2.5 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_client_port_logging (no)\fR"
+/*	Enable logging of the remote SMTP client port in addition to
+/*	the hostname and IP address.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix 3.3 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBservice_name (read-only)\fR"
+/*	The master.cf service name of a Postfix daemon process.
+/* .PP
+/*	Available in Postfix 3.4 and later:
+/* .IP "\fBsmtpd_reject_footer_maps (empty)\fR"
+/*	Lookup tables, indexed by the complete Postfix SMTP server 4xx or
+/*	5xx response, with reject footer templates.
+/* SEE ALSO
+/*	anvil(8), connection/rate limiting
+/*	cleanup(8), message canonicalization
+/*	tlsmgr(8), TLS session and PRNG management
+/*	trivial-rewrite(8), address resolver
+/*	verify(8), address verification service
+/*	postconf(5), configuration parameters
+/*	master(5), generic daemon options
+/*	master(8), process manager
+/*	postlogd(8), Postfix logging
+/*	syslogd(8), system logging
+/* README FILES
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/*	Use "\fBpostconf readme_directory\fR" or
+/*	"\fBpostconf html_directory\fR" to locate this information.
+/* .na
+/* .nf
+/*	ADDRESS_CLASS_README, blocking unknown hosted or relay recipients
+/*	ADDRESS_REWRITING_README, Postfix address manipulation
+/*	BDAT_README, Postfix CHUNKING support
+/*	FILTER_README, external after-queue content filter
+/*	LOCAL_RECIPIENT_README, blocking unknown local recipients
+/*	MILTER_README, before-queue mail filter applications
+/*	SMTPD_ACCESS_README, built-in access policies
+/*	SMTPD_POLICY_README, external policy server
+/*	SMTPD_PROXY_README, external before-queue content filter
+/*	SASL_README, Postfix SASL howto
+/*	TLS_README, Postfix STARTTLS howto
+/*	VERP_README, Postfix XVERP extension
+/*	XCLIENT_README, Postfix XCLIENT extension
+/*	XFORWARD_README, Postfix XFORWARD extension
+/* LICENSE
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/*	The Secure Mailer license must be distributed with this software.
+/* AUTHOR(S)
+/*	Wietse Venema
+/*	IBM T.J. Watson Research
+/*	P.O. Box 704
+/*	Yorktown Heights, NY 10598, USA
+/*
+/*	Wietse Venema
+/*	Google, Inc.
+/*	111 8th Avenue
+/*	New York, NY 10011, USA
+/*
+/*	SASL support originally by:
+/*	Till Franke
+/*	SuSE Rhein/Main AG
+/*	65760 Eschborn, Germany
+/*
+/*	TLS support originally by:
+/*	Lutz Jaenicke
+/*	BTU Cottbus
+/*	Allgemeine Elektrotechnik
+/*	Universitaetsplatz 3-4
+/*	D-03044 Cottbus, Germany
+/*
+/*	Revised TLS support by:
+/*	Victor Duchovni
+/*	Morgan Stanley
+/*--*/
+
+/* System library. */
+
+#include <sys_defs.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>			/* remove() */
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stddef.h>			/* offsetof() */
+
+#ifdef STRCASECMP_IN_STRINGS_H
+#include <strings.h>
+#endif
+
+/* Utility library. */
+
+#include <msg.h>
+#include <mymalloc.h>
+#include <vstring.h>
+#include <vstream.h>
+#include <vstring_vstream.h>
+#include <stringops.h>
+#include <events.h>
+#include <smtp_stream.h>
+#include <valid_hostname.h>
+#include <dict.h>
+#include <watchdog.h>
+#include <iostuff.h>
+#include <split_at.h>
+#include <name_code.h>
+#include <inet_proto.h>
+
+/* Global library. */
+
+#include <mail_params.h>
+#include <mail_version.h>		/* milter_macro_v */
+#include <record.h>
+#include <rec_type.h>
+#include <mail_proto.h>
+#include <cleanup_user.h>
+#include <mail_date.h>
+#include <mail_conf.h>
+#include <off_cvt.h>
+#include <debug_peer.h>
+#include <mail_error.h>
+#include <flush_clnt.h>
+#include <mail_stream.h>
+#include <mail_queue.h>
+#include <tok822.h>
+#include <verp_sender.h>
+#include <string_list.h>
+#include <quote_822_local.h>
+#include <lex_822.h>
+#include <namadr_list.h>
+#include <input_transp.h>
+#include <is_header.h>
+#include <anvil_clnt.h>
+#include <flush_clnt.h>
+#include <ehlo_mask.h>			/* ehlo filter */
+#include <maps.h>			/* ehlo filter */
+#include <valid_mailhost_addr.h>
+#include <dsn_mask.h>
+#include <xtext.h>
+#include <uxtext.h>
+#include <tls_proxy.h>
+#include <verify_sender_addr.h>
+#include <smtputf8.h>
+#include <match_parent_style.h>
+#include <normalize_mailhost_addr.h>
+#include <info_log_addr_form.h>
+
+/* Single-threaded server skeleton. */
+
+#include <mail_server.h>
+
+/* Mail filter library. */
+
+#include <milter.h>
+
+/* DNS library. */
+
+#include <dns.h>
+
+/* Application-specific */
+
+#include <smtpd_token.h>
+#include <smtpd.h>
+#include <smtpd_check.h>
+#include <smtpd_chat.h>
+#include <smtpd_sasl_proto.h>
+#include <smtpd_sasl_glue.h>
+#include <smtpd_proxy.h>
+#include <smtpd_milter.h>
+#include <smtpd_expand.h>
+
+ /*
+  * Tunable parameters. Make sure that there is some bound on the length of
+  * an SMTP command, so that the mail system stays in control even when a
+  * malicious client sends commands of unreasonable length (qmail-dos-1).
+  * Make sure there is some bound on the number of recipients, so that the
+  * mail system stays in control even when a malicious client sends an
+  * unreasonable number of recipients (qmail-dos-2).
+  */
+int     var_smtpd_rcpt_limit;
+int     var_smtpd_tmout;
+int     var_smtpd_soft_erlim;
+int     var_smtpd_hard_erlim;
+long    var_queue_minfree;		/* XXX use off_t */
+char   *var_smtpd_banner;
+char   *var_notify_classes;
+char   *var_client_checks;
+char   *var_helo_checks;
+char   *var_mail_checks;
+char   *var_relay_checks;
+char   *var_rcpt_checks;
+char   *var_etrn_checks;
+char   *var_data_checks;
+char   *var_eod_checks;
+int     var_unk_client_code;
+int     var_bad_name_code;
+int     var_unk_name_code;
+int     var_unk_addr_code;
+int     var_relay_code;
+int     var_maps_rbl_code;
+int     var_map_reject_code;
+int     var_map_defer_code;
+char   *var_maps_rbl_domains;
+char   *var_rbl_reply_maps;
+int     var_helo_required;
+int     var_reject_code;
+int     var_defer_code;
+int     var_smtpd_err_sleep;
+int     var_non_fqdn_code;
+char   *var_bounce_rcpt;
+char   *var_error_rcpt;
+int     var_smtpd_delay_reject;
+char   *var_rest_classes;
+int     var_strict_rfc821_env;
+bool    var_disable_vrfy_cmd;
+char   *var_canonical_maps;
+char   *var_send_canon_maps;
+char   *var_rcpt_canon_maps;
+char   *var_virt_alias_maps;
+char   *var_virt_mailbox_maps;
+char   *var_alias_maps;
+char   *var_local_rcpt_maps;
+bool    var_allow_untrust_route;
+int     var_smtpd_junk_cmd_limit;
+int     var_smtpd_rcpt_overlim;
+bool    var_smtpd_sasl_enable;
+bool    var_smtpd_sasl_auth_hdr;
+char   *var_smtpd_sasl_opts;
+char   *var_smtpd_sasl_path;
+char   *var_smtpd_sasl_service;
+char   *var_cyrus_conf_path;
+char   *var_smtpd_sasl_realm;
+int     var_smtpd_sasl_resp_limit;
+char   *var_smtpd_sasl_exceptions_networks;
+char   *var_smtpd_sasl_type;
+char   *var_filter_xport;
+bool    var_broken_auth_clients;
+char   *var_perm_mx_networks;
+char   *var_smtpd_snd_auth_maps;
+char   *var_smtpd_noop_cmds;
+char   *var_smtpd_null_key;
+int     var_smtpd_hist_thrsh;
+char   *var_smtpd_exp_filter;
+char   *var_def_rbl_reply;
+int     var_unv_from_rcode;
+int     var_unv_rcpt_rcode;
+int     var_unv_from_dcode;
+int     var_unv_rcpt_dcode;
+char   *var_unv_from_why;
+char   *var_unv_rcpt_why;
+int     var_mul_rcpt_code;
+char   *var_relay_rcpt_maps;
+int     var_local_rcpt_code;
+int     var_virt_alias_code;
+int     var_virt_mailbox_code;
+int     var_relay_rcpt_code;
+char   *var_verp_clients;
+int     var_show_unk_rcpt_table;
+int     var_verify_poll_count;
+int     var_verify_poll_delay;
+char   *var_smtpd_proxy_filt;
+int     var_smtpd_proxy_tmout;
+char   *var_smtpd_proxy_ehlo;
+char   *var_smtpd_proxy_opts;
+char   *var_input_transp;
+int     var_smtpd_policy_tmout;
+int     var_smtpd_policy_req_limit;
+int     var_smtpd_policy_try_limit;
+int     var_smtpd_policy_try_delay;
+char   *var_smtpd_policy_def_action;
+char   *var_smtpd_policy_context;
+int     var_smtpd_policy_idle;
+int     var_smtpd_policy_ttl;
+char   *var_xclient_hosts;
+char   *var_xforward_hosts;
+bool    var_smtpd_rej_unl_from;
+bool    var_smtpd_rej_unl_rcpt;
+char   *var_smtpd_forbid_cmds;
+int     var_smtpd_crate_limit;
+int     var_smtpd_cconn_limit;
+int     var_smtpd_cmail_limit;
+int     var_smtpd_crcpt_limit;
+int     var_smtpd_cntls_limit;
+int     var_smtpd_cauth_limit;
+char   *var_smtpd_hoggers;
+char   *var_local_rwr_clients;
+char   *var_smtpd_ehlo_dis_words;
+char   *var_smtpd_ehlo_dis_maps;
+
+char   *var_smtpd_tls_level;
+bool    var_smtpd_use_tls;
+bool    var_smtpd_enforce_tls;
+bool    var_smtpd_tls_wrappermode;
+bool    var_smtpd_tls_auth_only;
+char   *var_smtpd_cmd_filter;
+char   *var_smtpd_rej_footer;
+char   *var_smtpd_rej_ftr_maps;
+char   *var_smtpd_acl_perm_log;
+char   *var_smtpd_dns_re_filter;
+
+#ifdef USE_TLS
+char   *var_smtpd_relay_ccerts;
+char   *var_smtpd_sasl_tls_opts;
+int     var_smtpd_starttls_tmout;
+char   *var_smtpd_tls_CAfile;
+char   *var_smtpd_tls_CApath;
+bool    var_smtpd_tls_ask_ccert;
+int     var_smtpd_tls_ccert_vd;
+char   *var_smtpd_tls_cert_file;
+char   *var_smtpd_tls_mand_ciph;
+char   *var_smtpd_tls_excl_ciph;
+char   *var_smtpd_tls_mand_excl;
+char   *var_smtpd_tls_dcert_file;
+char   *var_smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file;
+char   *var_smtpd_tls_dh512_param_file;
+char   *var_smtpd_tls_dkey_file;
+char   *var_smtpd_tls_key_file;
+char   *var_smtpd_tls_loglevel;
+char   *var_smtpd_tls_mand_proto;
+bool    var_smtpd_tls_received_header;
+bool    var_smtpd_tls_req_ccert;
+bool    var_smtpd_tls_set_sessid;
+char   *var_smtpd_tls_fpt_dgst;
+char   *var_smtpd_tls_ciph;
+char   *var_smtpd_tls_proto;
+char   *var_smtpd_tls_eecdh;
+char   *var_smtpd_tls_eccert_file;
+char   *var_smtpd_tls_eckey_file;
+char   *var_smtpd_tls_chain_files;
+
+#endif
+
+bool    var_smtpd_peername_lookup;
+int     var_plaintext_code;
+bool    var_smtpd_delay_open;
+char   *var_smtpd_milters;
+char   *var_smtpd_milter_maps;
+int     var_milt_conn_time;
+int     var_milt_cmd_time;
+int     var_milt_msg_time;
+char   *var_milt_protocol;
+char   *var_milt_def_action;
+char   *var_milt_daemon_name;
+char   *var_milt_v;
+char   *var_milt_conn_macros;
+char   *var_milt_helo_macros;
+char   *var_milt_mail_macros;
+char   *var_milt_rcpt_macros;
+char   *var_milt_data_macros;
+char   *var_milt_eoh_macros;
+char   *var_milt_eod_macros;
+char   *var_milt_unk_macros;
+char   *var_milt_macro_deflts;
+bool    var_smtpd_client_port_log;
+bool    var_smtpd_forbid_unauth_pipe;
+char   *var_stress;
+
+char   *var_reject_tmpf_act;
+char   *var_unk_name_tf_act;
+char   *var_unk_addr_tf_act;
+char   *var_unv_rcpt_tf_act;
+char   *var_unv_from_tf_act;
+bool    var_smtpd_rec_deadline;
+
+int     smtpd_proxy_opts;
+
+#ifdef USE_TLSPROXY
+char   *var_tlsproxy_service;
+
+#endif
+
+char   *var_smtpd_uproxy_proto;
+int     var_smtpd_uproxy_tmout;
+
+char   *var_smtpd_forbid_bare_lf;
+char   *var_smtpd_forbid_bare_lf_excl;
+int     var_smtpd_forbid_bare_lf_code;
+static int bare_lf_mask;
+static NAMADR_LIST *bare_lf_excl;
+
+ /*
+  * Silly little macros.
+  */
+#define STR(x)	vstring_str(x)
+#define LEN(x)	VSTRING_LEN(x)
+
+ /*
+  * EHLO keyword filter
+  */
+static MAPS *ehlo_discard_maps;
+
+ /*
+  * Per-client Milter support.
+  */
+static MAPS *smtpd_milter_maps;
+static void setup_milters(SMTPD_STATE *);
+static void teardown_milters(SMTPD_STATE *);
+
+ /*
+  * VERP command name.
+  */
+#define VERP_CMD	"XVERP"
+#define VERP_CMD_LEN	5
+
+static NAMADR_LIST *verp_clients;
+
+ /*
+  * XCLIENT command. Access control is cached, so that XCLIENT can't override
+  * its own access control.
+  */
+static NAMADR_LIST *xclient_hosts;
+static int xclient_allowed;		/* XXX should be SMTPD_STATE member */
+
+ /*
+  * XFORWARD command. Access control is cached.
+  */
+static NAMADR_LIST *xforward_hosts;
+static int xforward_allowed;		/* XXX should be SMTPD_STATE member */
+
+ /*
+  * Client connection and rate limiting.
+  */
+ANVIL_CLNT *anvil_clnt;
+static NAMADR_LIST *hogger_list;
+
+ /*
+  * Other application-specific globals.
+  */
+int     smtpd_input_transp_mask;
+
+ /*
+  * Forward declarations.
+  */
+static void helo_reset(SMTPD_STATE *);
+static void mail_reset(SMTPD_STATE *);
+static void rcpt_reset(SMTPD_STATE *);
+static void chat_reset(SMTPD_STATE *, int);
+
+#ifdef USE_TLS
+static void tls_reset(SMTPD_STATE *);
+
+#endif
+
+ /*
+  * This filter is applied after printable().
+  */
+#define NEUTER_CHARACTERS " <>()\\\";@"
+
+ /*
+  * Reasons for losing the client.
+  */
+#define REASON_TIMEOUT		"timeout"
+#define REASON_LOST_CONNECTION	"lost connection"
+#define REASON_ERROR_LIMIT	"too many errors"
+
+#ifdef USE_TLS
+
+ /*
+  * TLS initialization status.
+  */
+#ifndef USE_TLSPROXY
+static TLS_APPL_STATE *smtpd_tls_ctx;
+static int ask_client_cert;
+
+#endif					/* USE_TLSPROXY */
+#endif
+
+ /*
+  * SMTP command mapping for broken clients.
+  */
+static DICT *smtpd_cmd_filter;
+
+ /*
+  * Bare LF and End-of-DATA controls (bare CR is handled elsewhere).
+  * 
+  * At the smtp_get*() line reader level, setting any of these flags in the
+  * smtp_detect_bare_lf variable enables the detection of bare newlines. The
+  * line reader will set the same flags in the smtp_got_bare_lf variable
+  * after it detects a bare newline, otherwise it clears smtp_got_bare_lf.
+  * 
+  * At the SMTP command level, the flags in smtp_got_bare_lf control whether
+  * commands ending in a bare newline are rejected.
+  * 
+  * At the DATA and BDAT content level, the flags in smtp_got_bare_lf control
+  * whether the standard End-of-DATA sequence CRLF.CRLF is required, and
+  * whether lines ending in bare newlines are rejected.
+  * 
+  * Postfix implements "delayed reject" after detecting a bare newline in BDAT
+  * or DATA content. The SMTP server delays a REJECT response until the
+  * command is finished, instead of replying and hanging up immediately. The
+  * End-of-DATA detection is secured with BARE_LF_FLAG_WANT_STD_EOD.
+  */
+#define BARE_LF_FLAG_WANT_STD_EOD	(1<<0)	/* Require CRLF.CRLF */
+#define BARE_LF_FLAG_REPLY_REJECT	(1<<1)	/* Reject bare newline */
+
+#define IS_BARE_LF_WANT_STD_EOD(m)	((m) & BARE_LF_FLAG_WANT_STD_EOD)
+#define IS_BARE_LF_REPLY_REJECT(m)	((m) & BARE_LF_FLAG_REPLY_REJECT)
+
+static const NAME_CODE bare_lf_mask_table[] = {
+    "normalize", BARE_LF_FLAG_WANT_STD_EOD,	/* Default */
+    "yes", BARE_LF_FLAG_WANT_STD_EOD,	/* Migration aid */
+    "reject", BARE_LF_FLAG_WANT_STD_EOD | BARE_LF_FLAG_REPLY_REJECT,
+    "no", 0,
+    0, -1,				/* error */
+};
+
+#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
+
+ /*
+  * SASL exceptions.
+  */
+static NAMADR_LIST *sasl_exceptions_networks;
+
+/* sasl_client_exception - can we offer AUTH for this client */
+
+static int sasl_client_exception(SMTPD_STATE *state)
+{
+    int     match;
+
+    /*
+     * This is to work around a Netscape mail client bug where it tries to
+     * use AUTH if available, even if user has not configured it. Returns
+     * TRUE if AUTH should be offered in the EHLO.
+     */
+    if (sasl_exceptions_networks == 0)
+	return (0);
+
+    if ((match = namadr_list_match(sasl_exceptions_networks,
+				   state->name, state->addr)) == 0)
+	match = sasl_exceptions_networks->error;
+
+    if (msg_verbose)
+	msg_info("sasl_exceptions: %s, match=%d",
+		 state->namaddr, match);
+
+    return (match);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/* smtpd_whatsup - gather available evidence for logging */
+
+static const char *smtpd_whatsup(SMTPD_STATE *state)
+{
+    static VSTRING *buf = 0;
+
+    if (buf == 0)
+	buf = vstring_alloc(100);
+    else
+	VSTRING_RESET(buf);
+    if (state->sender)
+	vstring_sprintf_append(buf, " from=<%s>",
+			       info_log_addr_form_sender(state->sender));
+    if (state->recipient)
+	vstring_sprintf_append(buf, " to=<%s>",
+			    info_log_addr_form_recipient(state->recipient));
+    if (state->protocol)
+	vstring_sprintf_append(buf, " proto=%s", state->protocol);
+    if (state->helo_name)
+	vstring_sprintf_append(buf, " helo=<%s>", state->helo_name);
+#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
+    if (state->sasl_username)
+	vstring_sprintf_append(buf, " sasl_username=<%s>",
+			       state->sasl_username);
+#endif
+    return (STR(buf));
+}
+
+/* collapse_args - put arguments together again */
+
+static void collapse_args(int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *argv)
+{
+    int     i;
+
+    for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) {
+	vstring_strcat(argv[0].vstrval, " ");
+	vstring_strcat(argv[0].vstrval, argv[i].strval);
+    }
+    argv[0].strval = STR(argv[0].vstrval);
+}
+
+/* check_milter_reply - process reply from Milter */
+
+static const char *check_milter_reply(SMTPD_STATE *state, const char *reply)
+{
+    const char *queue_id = state->queue_id ? state->queue_id : "NOQUEUE";
+    const char *action;
+    const char *text;
+
+    /*
+     * The syntax of user-specified SMTP replies is checked by the Milter
+     * module, because the replies are also used in the cleanup server.
+     * Automatically disconnect after 421 (shutdown) reply. The Sendmail 8
+     * Milter quarantine action is not final, so it is not included in
+     * MILTER_SKIP_FLAGS.
+     */
+#define MILTER_SKIP_FLAGS (CLEANUP_FLAG_DISCARD)
+
+    switch (reply[0]) {
+    case 'H':
+	state->saved_flags |= CLEANUP_FLAG_HOLD;
+	action = "milter-hold";
+	reply = 0;
+	text = "milter triggers HOLD action";
+	break;
+    case 'D':
+	state->saved_flags |= CLEANUP_FLAG_DISCARD;
+	action = "milter-discard";
+	reply = 0;
+	text = "milter triggers DISCARD action";
+	break;
+    case 'S':
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
+	action = "milter-reject";
+	reply = "421 4.7.0 Server closing connection";
+	text = 0;
+	break;
+    case '4':
+    case '5':
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
+	action = "milter-reject";
+	text = 0;
+	break;
+    default:
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_SOFTWARE;
+	action = "reject";
+	reply = "421 4.3.5 Server configuration error";
+	text = 0;
+	break;
+    }
+    msg_info("%s: %s: %s from %s: %s;%s", queue_id, action, state->where,
+	     state->namaddr, reply ? reply : text, smtpd_whatsup(state));
+    return (reply);
+}
+
+/* helo_cmd - process HELO command */
+
+static int helo_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *argv)
+{
+    const char *err;
+
+    /*
+     * RFC 2034: the text part of all 2xx, 4xx, and 5xx SMTP responses other
+     * than the initial greeting and any response to HELO or EHLO are
+     * prefaced with a status code as defined in RFC 3463.
+     */
+    if (argc < 2) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 Syntax: HELO hostname");
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    if (argc > 2)
+	collapse_args(argc - 1, argv + 1);
+    if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0
+	&& var_smtpd_delay_reject == 0
+	&& (err = smtpd_check_helo(state, argv[1].strval)) != 0) {
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err);
+	return (-1);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * XXX Sendmail compatibility: if a Milter rejects CONNECT, EHLO, or
+     * HELO, reply with 250 except in case of 421 (disconnect). The reply
+     * persists so it will apply to MAIL FROM and to other commands such as
+     * AUTH, STARTTLS, and VRFY.
+     */
+#define PUSH_STRING(old, curr, new)	{ char *old = (curr); (curr) = (new);
+#define POP_STRING(old, curr)		(curr) = old; }
+
+    if (state->milters != 0
+	&& (state->saved_flags & MILTER_SKIP_FLAGS) == 0
+     && (err = milter_helo_event(state->milters, argv[1].strval, 0)) != 0) {
+	/* Log reject etc. with correct HELO information. */
+	PUSH_STRING(saved_helo, state->helo_name, argv[1].strval);
+	err = check_milter_reply(state, err);
+	POP_STRING(saved_helo, state->helo_name);
+	if (err != 0 && strncmp(err, "421", 3) == 0) {
+	    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err);
+	    return (-1);
+	}
+    }
+    if (state->helo_name != 0)
+	helo_reset(state);
+    chat_reset(state, var_smtpd_hist_thrsh);
+    mail_reset(state);
+    rcpt_reset(state);
+    state->helo_name = mystrdup(printable(argv[1].strval, '?'));
+    neuter(state->helo_name, NEUTER_CHARACTERS, '?');
+    /* Downgrading the protocol name breaks the unauthorized pipelining test. */
+    if (strcasecmp(state->protocol, MAIL_PROTO_ESMTP) != 0
+	&& strcasecmp(state->protocol, MAIL_PROTO_SMTP) != 0) {
+	myfree(state->protocol);
+	state->protocol = mystrdup(MAIL_PROTO_SMTP);
+    }
+    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250 %s", var_myhostname);
+    return (0);
+}
+
+/* cant_announce_feature - explain and terminate this session */
+
+static NORETURN cant_announce_feature(SMTPD_STATE *state, const char *feature)
+{
+    msg_warn("don't know if EHLO feature %s should be announced to %s",
+	     feature, state->namaddr);
+    vstream_longjmp(state->client, SMTP_ERR_DATA);
+}
+
+/* cant_permit_command - explain and terminate this session */
+
+static NORETURN cant_permit_command(SMTPD_STATE *state, const char *command)
+{
+    msg_warn("don't know if command %s should be allowed from %s",
+	     command, state->namaddr);
+    vstream_longjmp(state->client, SMTP_ERR_DATA);
+}
+
+/* ehlo_cmd - process EHLO command */
+
+static int ehlo_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *argv)
+{
+    const char *err;
+    int     discard_mask;
+    char  **cpp;
+
+    /*
+     * XXX 2821 new feature: Section 4.1.4 specifies that a server must clear
+     * all buffers and reset the state exactly as if a RSET command had been
+     * issued.
+     * 
+     * RFC 2034: the text part of all 2xx, 4xx, and 5xx SMTP responses other
+     * than the initial greeting and any response to HELO or EHLO are
+     * prefaced with a status code as defined in RFC 3463.
+     */
+    if (argc < 2) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 Syntax: EHLO hostname");
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    if (argc > 2)
+	collapse_args(argc - 1, argv + 1);
+    if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0
+	&& var_smtpd_delay_reject == 0
+	&& (err = smtpd_check_helo(state, argv[1].strval)) != 0) {
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err);
+	return (-1);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * XXX Sendmail compatibility: if a Milter 5xx rejects CONNECT, EHLO, or
+     * HELO, reply with ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES except in case of immediate
+     * disconnect. The reply persists so it will apply to MAIL FROM and to
+     * other commands such as AUTH, STARTTLS, and VRFY.
+     */
+    err = 0;
+    if (state->milters != 0
+	&& (state->saved_flags & MILTER_SKIP_FLAGS) == 0
+     && (err = milter_helo_event(state->milters, argv[1].strval, 1)) != 0) {
+	/* Log reject etc. with correct HELO information. */
+	PUSH_STRING(saved_helo, state->helo_name, argv[1].strval);
+	err = check_milter_reply(state, err);
+	POP_STRING(saved_helo, state->helo_name);
+	if (err != 0 && strncmp(err, "421", 3) == 0) {
+	    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err);
+	    return (-1);
+	}
+    }
+    if (state->helo_name != 0)
+	helo_reset(state);
+    chat_reset(state, var_smtpd_hist_thrsh);
+    mail_reset(state);
+    rcpt_reset(state);
+    state->helo_name = mystrdup(printable(argv[1].strval, '?'));
+    neuter(state->helo_name, NEUTER_CHARACTERS, '?');
+
+    /*
+     * XXX reject_unauth_pipelining depends on the following. If the user
+     * sends EHLO then we announce PIPELINING and we can't accuse them of
+     * using pipelining in places where it is allowed.
+     * 
+     * XXX The reject_unauth_pipelining test needs to change and also account
+     * for mechanisms that disable PIPELINING selectively.
+     */
+    if (strcasecmp(state->protocol, MAIL_PROTO_ESMTP) != 0) {
+	myfree(state->protocol);
+	state->protocol = mystrdup(MAIL_PROTO_ESMTP);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Build the EHLO response, producing no output until we know what to
+     * send - this simplifies exception handling. The CRLF record boundaries
+     * don't exist at this level in the code, so we represent multi-line
+     * output as an array of single-line responses.
+     */
+#define EHLO_APPEND(state, cmd) \
+    do { \
+	vstring_sprintf((state)->ehlo_buf, (cmd)); \
+	argv_add((state)->ehlo_argv, STR((state)->ehlo_buf), (char *) 0); \
+    } while (0)
+
+#define EHLO_APPEND1(state, cmd, arg) \
+    do { \
+	vstring_sprintf((state)->ehlo_buf, (cmd), (arg)); \
+	argv_add((state)->ehlo_argv, STR((state)->ehlo_buf), (char *) 0); \
+    } while (0)
+
+    /*
+     * XXX Sendmail compatibility: if a Milter 5XX rejects CONNECT, EHLO, or
+     * HELO, reply with ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES only. The reply persists so it
+     * will apply to MAIL FROM, but we currently don't have a proper
+     * mechanism to apply Milter rejects to AUTH, STARTTLS, VRFY, and other
+     * commands while still allowing HELO/EHLO.
+     */
+    discard_mask = state->ehlo_discard_mask;
+    if (err != 0 && err[0] == '5')
+	discard_mask |= ~EHLO_MASK_ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES;
+    if ((discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES) == 0)
+	if (discard_mask && !(discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_SILENT))
+	    msg_info("discarding EHLO keywords: %s", str_ehlo_mask(discard_mask));
+    if (ehlo_discard_maps && ehlo_discard_maps->error) {
+	msg_warn("don't know what EHLO features to announce to %s",
+		 state->namaddr);
+	vstream_longjmp(state->client, SMTP_ERR_DATA);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * These may still exist after a prior exception.
+     */
+    if (state->ehlo_argv == 0) {
+	state->ehlo_argv = argv_alloc(10);
+	state->ehlo_buf = vstring_alloc(10);
+    } else
+	argv_truncate(state->ehlo_argv, 0);
+
+    EHLO_APPEND1(state, "%s", var_myhostname);
+    if ((discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_PIPELINING) == 0)
+	EHLO_APPEND(state, "PIPELINING");
+    if ((discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_SIZE) == 0) {
+	if (ENFORCING_SIZE_LIMIT(var_message_limit))
+	    EHLO_APPEND1(state, "SIZE %lu",
+			 (unsigned long) var_message_limit);	/* XXX */
+	else
+	    EHLO_APPEND(state, "SIZE");
+    }
+    if ((discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_VRFY) == 0)
+	if (var_disable_vrfy_cmd == 0)
+	    EHLO_APPEND(state, SMTPD_CMD_VRFY);
+    if ((discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_ETRN) == 0)
+	EHLO_APPEND(state, SMTPD_CMD_ETRN);
+#ifdef USE_TLS
+    if ((discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_STARTTLS) == 0)
+	if (var_smtpd_use_tls && (!state->tls_context))
+	    EHLO_APPEND(state, SMTPD_CMD_STARTTLS);
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
+#ifndef AUTH_CMD
+#define AUTH_CMD	"AUTH"
+#endif
+    if ((discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_AUTH) == 0) {
+	if (smtpd_sasl_is_active(state) && !sasl_client_exception(state)) {
+	    EHLO_APPEND1(state, "AUTH %s", state->sasl_mechanism_list);
+	    if (var_broken_auth_clients)
+		EHLO_APPEND1(state, "AUTH=%s", state->sasl_mechanism_list);
+	} else if (sasl_exceptions_networks && sasl_exceptions_networks->error)
+	    cant_announce_feature(state, AUTH_CMD);
+    }
+#define XCLIENT_LOGIN_KLUDGE	" " XCLIENT_LOGIN
+#else
+#define XCLIENT_LOGIN_KLUDGE	""
+#endif
+    if ((discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_VERP) == 0) {
+	if (namadr_list_match(verp_clients, state->name, state->addr))
+	    EHLO_APPEND(state, VERP_CMD);
+	else if (verp_clients && verp_clients->error)
+	    cant_announce_feature(state, VERP_CMD);
+    }
+    /* XCLIENT must not override its own access control. */
+    if ((discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_XCLIENT) == 0) {
+	if (xclient_allowed)
+	    EHLO_APPEND(state, XCLIENT_CMD
+			" " XCLIENT_NAME " " XCLIENT_ADDR
+			" " XCLIENT_PROTO " " XCLIENT_HELO
+			" " XCLIENT_REVERSE_NAME " " XCLIENT_PORT
+			XCLIENT_LOGIN_KLUDGE
+			" " XCLIENT_DESTADDR
+			" " XCLIENT_DESTPORT);
+	else if (xclient_hosts && xclient_hosts->error)
+	    cant_announce_feature(state, XCLIENT_CMD);
+    }
+    if ((discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_XFORWARD) == 0) {
+	if (xforward_allowed)
+	    EHLO_APPEND(state, XFORWARD_CMD
+			" " XFORWARD_NAME " " XFORWARD_ADDR
+			" " XFORWARD_PROTO " " XFORWARD_HELO
+			" " XFORWARD_DOMAIN " " XFORWARD_PORT
+			" " XFORWARD_IDENT);
+	else if (xforward_hosts && xforward_hosts->error)
+	    cant_announce_feature(state, XFORWARD_CMD);
+    }
+    if ((discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES) == 0)
+	EHLO_APPEND(state, "ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES");
+    if ((discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_8BITMIME) == 0)
+	EHLO_APPEND(state, "8BITMIME");
+    if ((discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_DSN) == 0)
+	EHLO_APPEND(state, "DSN");
+    if (var_smtputf8_enable && (discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_SMTPUTF8) == 0)
+	EHLO_APPEND(state, "SMTPUTF8");
+    if ((discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_CHUNKING) == 0)
+	EHLO_APPEND(state, "CHUNKING");
+
+    /*
+     * Send the reply.
+     */
+    for (cpp = state->ehlo_argv->argv; *cpp; cpp++)
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250%c%s", cpp[1] ? '-' : ' ', *cpp);
+
+    /*
+     * Clean up.
+     */
+    argv_free(state->ehlo_argv);
+    state->ehlo_argv = 0;
+    vstring_free(state->ehlo_buf);
+    state->ehlo_buf = 0;
+
+    return (0);
+}
+
+/* helo_reset - reset HELO/EHLO command stuff */
+
+static void helo_reset(SMTPD_STATE *state)
+{
+    if (state->helo_name) {
+	myfree(state->helo_name);
+	state->helo_name = 0;
+	if (state->milters != 0)
+	    milter_abort(state->milters);
+    }
+    if (state->ehlo_argv) {
+	argv_free(state->ehlo_argv);
+	state->ehlo_argv = 0;
+    }
+    if (state->ehlo_buf) {
+	vstring_free(state->ehlo_buf);
+	state->ehlo_buf = 0;
+    }
+}
+
+#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
+
+/* smtpd_sasl_auth_cmd_wrapper - smtpd_sasl_auth_cmd front-end */
+
+static int smtpd_sasl_auth_cmd_wrapper(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc,
+				               SMTPD_TOKEN *argv)
+{
+    int     rate;
+
+    if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0
+	&& !xclient_allowed
+	&& anvil_clnt
+	&& var_smtpd_cauth_limit > 0
+	&& !namadr_list_match(hogger_list, state->name, state->addr)
+	&& anvil_clnt_auth(anvil_clnt, state->service, state->addr,
+			   &rate) == ANVIL_STAT_OK
+	&& rate > var_smtpd_cauth_limit) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
+	msg_warn("AUTH command rate limit exceeded: %d from %s for service %s",
+		 rate, state->namaddr, state->service);
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state,
+			 "450 4.7.1 Error: too many AUTH commands from %s",
+			 state->addr);
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    return (smtpd_sasl_auth_cmd(state, argc, argv));
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/* mail_open_stream - open mail queue file or IPC stream */
+
+static int mail_open_stream(SMTPD_STATE *state)
+{
+
+    /*
+     * Connect to the before-queue filter when one is configured. The MAIL
+     * FROM and RCPT TO commands are forwarded as received (including DSN
+     * attributes), with the exception that the before-filter smtpd process
+     * handles all authentication, encryption, access control and relay
+     * control, and that the before-filter smtpd process does not forward
+     * blocked commands. If the after-filter smtp server does not support
+     * some of Postfix's ESMTP features, then they must be turned off in the
+     * before-filter smtpd process with the smtpd_discard_ehlo_keywords
+     * feature.
+     */
+    if (state->proxy_mail) {
+	if (smtpd_proxy_create(state, smtpd_proxy_opts, var_smtpd_proxy_filt,
+			       var_smtpd_proxy_tmout, var_smtpd_proxy_ehlo,
+			       state->proxy_mail) != 0) {
+	    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", STR(state->proxy->reply));
+	    smtpd_proxy_free(state);
+	    return (-1);
+	}
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * If running from the master or from inetd, connect to the cleanup
+     * service.
+     * 
+     * XXX 2821: An SMTP server is not allowed to "clean up" mail except in the
+     * case of original submissions.
+     * 
+     * We implement this by distinguishing between mail that we are willing to
+     * rewrite (the local rewrite context) and mail from elsewhere.
+     */
+    else if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0) {
+	int     cleanup_flags;
+
+	cleanup_flags = input_transp_cleanup(CLEANUP_FLAG_MASK_EXTERNAL,
+					     smtpd_input_transp_mask)
+	    | CLEANUP_FLAG_SMTP_REPLY;
+	if (state->flags & SMTPD_FLAG_SMTPUTF8)
+	    cleanup_flags |= CLEANUP_FLAG_SMTPUTF8;
+	else
+	    cleanup_flags |= smtputf8_autodetect(MAIL_SRC_MASK_SMTPD);
+	state->dest = mail_stream_service(MAIL_CLASS_PUBLIC,
+					  var_cleanup_service);
+	if (state->dest == 0
+	    || attr_print(state->dest->stream, ATTR_FLAG_NONE,
+			  SEND_ATTR_INT(MAIL_ATTR_FLAGS, cleanup_flags),
+			  ATTR_TYPE_END) != 0)
+	    msg_fatal("unable to connect to the %s %s service",
+		      MAIL_CLASS_PUBLIC, var_cleanup_service);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Otherwise, pipe the message through the privileged postdrop helper.
+     * XXX Make postdrop a manifest constant.
+     */
+    else {
+	char   *postdrop_command;
+
+	postdrop_command = concatenate(var_command_dir, "/postdrop",
+			      msg_verbose ? " -v" : (char *) 0, (char *) 0);
+	state->dest = mail_stream_command(postdrop_command);
+	if (state->dest == 0)
+	    msg_fatal("unable to execute %s", postdrop_command);
+	myfree(postdrop_command);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Record the time of arrival, the SASL-related stuff if applicable, the
+     * sender envelope address, some session information, and some additional
+     * attributes.
+     * 
+     * XXX Send Milter information first, because this will hang when cleanup
+     * goes into "throw away" mode. Also, cleanup needs to know early on
+     * whether or not it has to do its own SMTP event emulation.
+     * 
+     * XXX At this point we send only dummy information to keep the cleanup
+     * server from using its non_smtpd_milters settings. We have to send
+     * up-to-date Milter information after DATA so that the cleanup server
+     * knows the actual Milter state.
+     */
+    if (state->dest) {
+	state->cleanup = state->dest->stream;
+	state->queue_id = mystrdup(state->dest->id);
+	if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0) {
+	    if (state->milters != 0
+		&& (state->saved_flags & MILTER_SKIP_FLAGS) == 0)
+		/* Send place-holder smtpd_milters list. */
+		(void) milter_dummy(state->milters, state->cleanup);
+	    rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_TIME, REC_TYPE_TIME_FORMAT,
+			REC_TYPE_TIME_ARG(state->arrival_time));
+	    if (*var_filter_xport)
+		rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_FILT, "%s", var_filter_xport);
+	    if (FORWARD_IDENT(state))
+		rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s",
+			    MAIL_ATTR_LOG_IDENT, FORWARD_IDENT(state));
+	    rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s",
+			MAIL_ATTR_RWR_CONTEXT, FORWARD_DOMAIN(state));
+#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
+	    /* Make external authentication painless (e.g., XCLIENT). */
+	    if (state->sasl_method)
+		rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s",
+			    MAIL_ATTR_SASL_METHOD, state->sasl_method);
+	    if (state->sasl_username)
+		rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s",
+			    MAIL_ATTR_SASL_USERNAME, state->sasl_username);
+	    if (state->sasl_sender)
+		rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s",
+			    MAIL_ATTR_SASL_SENDER, state->sasl_sender);
+#endif
+
+	    /*
+	     * Record DSN related information that was received with the MAIL
+	     * FROM command.
+	     * 
+	     * RFC 3461 Section 5.2.1. If no ENVID parameter was included in the
+	     * MAIL command when the message was received, the ENVID
+	     * parameter MUST NOT be supplied when the message is relayed.
+	     * Ditto for the RET parameter.
+	     * 
+	     * In other words, we can't simply make up our default ENVID or RET
+	     * values. We have to remember whether the client sent any.
+	     * 
+	     * We store DSN information as named attribute records so that we
+	     * don't have to pollute the queue file with records that are
+	     * incompatible with past Postfix versions. Preferably, people
+	     * should be able to back out from an upgrade without losing
+	     * mail.
+	     */
+	    if (state->dsn_envid)
+		rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s",
+			    MAIL_ATTR_DSN_ENVID, state->dsn_envid);
+	    if (state->dsn_ret)
+		rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%d",
+			    MAIL_ATTR_DSN_RET, state->dsn_ret);
+	}
+	rec_fputs(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_FROM, state->sender);
+	if (state->encoding != 0)
+	    rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s",
+			MAIL_ATTR_ENCODING, state->encoding);
+
+	/*
+	 * Store client attributes.
+	 */
+	if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0) {
+
+	    /*
+	     * Attributes for logging, also used for XFORWARD.
+	     * 
+	     * We store all client attributes, including ones with unknown
+	     * values. Otherwise, an unknown client hostname would be treated
+	     * as a non-existent hostname (i.e. local submission).
+	     */
+	    rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s",
+			MAIL_ATTR_LOG_CLIENT_NAME, FORWARD_NAME(state));
+	    /* XXX Note: state->rfc_addr, not state->addr. */
+	    rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s",
+			MAIL_ATTR_LOG_CLIENT_ADDR, FORWARD_ADDR(state));
+	    rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s",
+			MAIL_ATTR_LOG_CLIENT_PORT, FORWARD_PORT(state));
+	    rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s",
+			MAIL_ATTR_LOG_ORIGIN, FORWARD_NAMADDR(state));
+	    if (FORWARD_HELO(state))
+		rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s",
+			    MAIL_ATTR_LOG_HELO_NAME, FORWARD_HELO(state));
+	    rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s",
+			MAIL_ATTR_LOG_PROTO_NAME, FORWARD_PROTO(state));
+
+	    /*
+	     * Attributes with actual client information. These are used by
+	     * the smtpd Milter client for policy decisions. Mail that is
+	     * requeued with "postsuper -r" is not subject to processing by
+	     * the cleanup Milter client, because a) it has already been
+	     * filtered, and b) we don't have sufficient information to
+	     * reproduce the exact same SMTP events and Sendmail macros that
+	     * the smtpd Milter client received when the message originally
+	     * arrived in Postfix.
+	     */
+	    rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s",
+			MAIL_ATTR_ACT_CLIENT_NAME, state->name);
+	    rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s",
+		    MAIL_ATTR_ACT_REVERSE_CLIENT_NAME, state->reverse_name);
+	    /* XXX Note: state->addr, not state->rfc_addr. */
+	    rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s",
+			MAIL_ATTR_ACT_CLIENT_ADDR, state->addr);
+	    rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s",
+			MAIL_ATTR_ACT_CLIENT_PORT, state->port);
+	    rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s",
+			MAIL_ATTR_ACT_SERVER_ADDR, state->dest_addr);
+	    rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s",
+			MAIL_ATTR_ACT_SERVER_PORT, state->dest_port);
+	    if (state->helo_name)
+		rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s",
+			    MAIL_ATTR_ACT_HELO_NAME, state->helo_name);
+	    rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s",
+			MAIL_ATTR_ACT_PROTO_NAME, state->protocol);
+	    rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%u",
+			MAIL_ATTR_ACT_CLIENT_AF, state->addr_family);
+
+	    /*
+	     * Don't send client certificate down the pipeline unless it is
+	     * a) verified or b) just a fingerprint.
+	     */
+	}
+	if (state->verp_delims)
+	    rec_fputs(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_VERP, state->verp_delims);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Log the queue ID with the message origin.
+     */
+#define PRINT_OR_NULL(cond, str) \
+	    ((cond) ? (str) : "")
+#define PRINT2_OR_NULL(cond, name, value) \
+	    PRINT_OR_NULL((cond), (name)), PRINT_OR_NULL((cond), (value))
+
+    msg_info("%s: client=%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s",
+	     (state->queue_id ? state->queue_id : "NOQUEUE"),
+	     state->namaddr,
+#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
+	     PRINT2_OR_NULL(state->sasl_method,
+			    ", sasl_method=", state->sasl_method),
+	     PRINT2_OR_NULL(state->sasl_username,
+			    ", sasl_username=", state->sasl_username),
+	     PRINT2_OR_NULL(state->sasl_sender,
+			    ", sasl_sender=", state->sasl_sender),
+#else
+	     "", "", "", "", "", "",
+#endif
+    /* Insert transaction TLS status here. */
+	     PRINT2_OR_NULL(HAVE_FORWARDED_IDENT(state),
+			    ", orig_queue_id=", FORWARD_IDENT(state)),
+	     PRINT2_OR_NULL(HAVE_FORWARDED_CLIENT_ATTR(state),
+			    ", orig_client=", FORWARD_NAMADDR(state)));
+    return (0);
+}
+
+/* extract_addr - extract address from rubble */
+
+static int extract_addr(SMTPD_STATE *state, SMTPD_TOKEN *arg,
+			        int allow_empty_addr, int strict_rfc821,
+			        int smtputf8)
+{
+    const char *myname = "extract_addr";
+    TOK822 *tree;
+    TOK822 *tp;
+    TOK822 *addr = 0;
+    int     naddr;
+    int     non_addr;
+    int     err = 0;
+    char   *junk = 0;
+    char   *text;
+    char   *colon;
+
+    /*
+     * Special case.
+     */
+#define PERMIT_EMPTY_ADDR	1
+#define REJECT_EMPTY_ADDR	0
+
+    /*
+     * Some mailers send RFC822-style address forms (with comments and such)
+     * in SMTP envelopes. We cannot blame users for this: the blame is with
+     * programmers violating the RFC, and with sendmail for being permissive.
+     * 
+     * XXX The SMTP command tokenizer must leave the address in externalized
+     * (quoted) form, so that the address parser can correctly extract the
+     * address from surrounding junk.
+     * 
+     * XXX We have only one address parser, written according to the rules of
+     * RFC 822. That standard differs subtly from RFC 821.
+     */
+    if (msg_verbose)
+	msg_info("%s: input: %s", myname, STR(arg->vstrval));
+    if (STR(arg->vstrval)[0] == '<'
+	&& STR(arg->vstrval)[LEN(arg->vstrval) - 1] == '>') {
+	junk = text = mystrndup(STR(arg->vstrval) + 1, LEN(arg->vstrval) - 2);
+    } else
+	text = STR(arg->vstrval);
+
+    /*
+     * Truncate deprecated route address form.
+     */
+    if (*text == '@' && (colon = strchr(text, ':')) != 0)
+	text = colon + 1;
+    tree = tok822_parse(text);
+
+    if (junk)
+	myfree(junk);
+
+    /*
+     * Find trouble.
+     */
+    for (naddr = non_addr = 0, tp = tree; tp != 0; tp = tp->next) {
+	if (tp->type == TOK822_ADDR) {
+	    addr = tp;
+	    naddr += 1;				/* count address forms */
+	} else if (tp->type == '<' || tp->type == '>') {
+	     /* void */ ;			/* ignore brackets */
+	} else {
+	    non_addr += 1;			/* count non-address forms */
+	}
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Report trouble. XXX Should log a warning only if we are going to
+     * sleep+reject so that attackers can't flood our logfiles.
+     * 
+     * XXX Unfortunately, the sleep-before-reject feature had to be abandoned
+     * (at least for small error counts) because servers were DOS-ing
+     * themselves when flooded by backscatter traffic.
+     */
+    if (naddr > 1
+	|| (strict_rfc821 && (non_addr || *STR(arg->vstrval) != '<'))) {
+	msg_warn("Illegal address syntax from %s in %s command: %s",
+		 state->namaddr, state->where,
+		 printable(STR(arg->vstrval), '?'));
+	err = 1;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Don't overwrite the input with the extracted address. We need the
+     * original (external) form in case the client does not send ORCPT
+     * information; and error messages are more accurate if we log the
+     * unmodified form. We need the internal form for all other purposes.
+     */
+    if (addr)
+	tok822_internalize(state->addr_buf, addr->head, TOK822_STR_DEFL);
+    else
+	vstring_strcpy(state->addr_buf, "");
+
+    /*
+     * Report trouble. XXX Should log a warning only if we are going to
+     * sleep+reject so that attackers can't flood our logfiles. Log the
+     * original address.
+     */
+    if (err == 0)
+	if ((STR(state->addr_buf)[0] == 0 && !allow_empty_addr)
+	    || (strict_rfc821 && STR(state->addr_buf)[0] == '@')
+	    || (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0
+	     && smtpd_check_addr(strcmp(state->where, SMTPD_CMD_MAIL) == 0 ?
+				 state->recipient : state->sender,
+				 STR(state->addr_buf), smtputf8) != 0)) {
+	    msg_warn("Illegal address syntax from %s in %s command: %s",
+		     state->namaddr, state->where,
+		     printable(STR(arg->vstrval), '?'));
+	    err = 1;
+	}
+
+    /*
+     * Cleanup.
+     */
+    tok822_free_tree(tree);
+    if (msg_verbose)
+	msg_info("%s: in: %s, result: %s",
+		 myname, STR(arg->vstrval), STR(state->addr_buf));
+    return (err);
+}
+
+/* milter_argv - impedance adapter */
+
+static const char **milter_argv(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *argv)
+{
+    int     n;
+    ssize_t len = argc + 1;
+
+    if (state->milter_argc < len) {
+	if (state->milter_argc > 0)
+	    state->milter_argv = (const char **)
+		myrealloc((void *) state->milter_argv,
+			  sizeof(const char *) * len);
+	else
+	    state->milter_argv = (const char **)
+		mymalloc(sizeof(const char *) * len);
+	state->milter_argc = len;
+    }
+    for (n = 0; n < argc; n++)
+	state->milter_argv[n] = argv[n].strval;
+    state->milter_argv[n] = 0;
+    return (state->milter_argv);
+}
+
+/* mail_cmd - process MAIL command */
+
+static int mail_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *argv)
+{
+    const char *err;
+    int     narg;
+    char   *arg;
+    char   *verp_delims = 0;
+    int     rate;
+    int     dsn_envid = 0;
+
+    state->flags &= ~SMTPD_FLAG_SMTPUTF8;
+    state->encoding = 0;
+    state->dsn_ret = 0;
+
+    /*
+     * Sanity checks.
+     * 
+     * XXX 2821 pedantism: Section 4.1.2 says that SMTP servers that receive a
+     * command in which invalid character codes have been employed, and for
+     * which there are no other reasons for rejection, MUST reject that
+     * command with a 501 response. Postfix attempts to be 8-bit clean.
+     */
+    if (var_helo_required && state->helo_name == 0) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "503 5.5.1 Error: send HELO/EHLO first");
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    if (SMTPD_IN_MAIL_TRANSACTION(state)) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "503 5.5.1 Error: nested MAIL command");
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    /* Don't accept MAIL after out-of-order BDAT. */
+    if (SMTPD_PROCESSING_BDAT(state)) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "503 5.5.1 Error: MAIL after BDAT");
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    if (argc < 3
+	|| strcasecmp(argv[1].strval, "from:") != 0) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Syntax: MAIL FROM:<address>");
+	return (-1);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * XXX The client event count/rate control must be consistent in its use
+     * of client address information in connect and disconnect events. For
+     * now we exclude xclient authorized hosts from event count/rate control.
+     */
+    if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0
+	&& !xclient_allowed
+	&& anvil_clnt
+	&& var_smtpd_cmail_limit > 0
+	&& !namadr_list_match(hogger_list, state->name, state->addr)
+	&& anvil_clnt_mail(anvil_clnt, state->service, state->addr,
+			   &rate) == ANVIL_STAT_OK
+	&& rate > var_smtpd_cmail_limit) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "450 4.7.1 Error: too much mail from %s",
+			 state->addr);
+	msg_warn("Message delivery request rate limit exceeded: %d from %s for service %s",
+		 rate, state->namaddr, state->service);
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    if (argv[2].tokval == SMTPD_TOK_ERROR) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.1.7 Bad sender address syntax");
+	return (-1);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * XXX The sender address comes first, but the optional SMTPUTF8
+     * parameter determines what address syntax is permitted. We must process
+     * this parameter early.
+     */
+    if (var_smtputf8_enable
+	&& (state->ehlo_discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_SMTPUTF8) == 0) {
+	for (narg = 3; narg < argc; narg++) {
+	    arg = argv[narg].strval;
+	    if (strcasecmp(arg, "SMTPUTF8") == 0) {	/* RFC 6531 */
+		/* Fix 20161206: allow UTF8 in smtpd_sender_restrictions. */
+		state->flags |= SMTPD_FLAG_SMTPUTF8;
+		break;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+    if (extract_addr(state, argv + 2, PERMIT_EMPTY_ADDR,
+		     var_strict_rfc821_env,
+		     state->flags & SMTPD_FLAG_SMTPUTF8) != 0) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.1.7 Bad sender address syntax");
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    for (narg = 3; narg < argc; narg++) {
+	arg = argv[narg].strval;
+	if (strcasecmp(arg, "BODY=8BITMIME") == 0) {	/* RFC 1652 */
+	    state->encoding = MAIL_ATTR_ENC_8BIT;
+	} else if (strcasecmp(arg, "BODY=7BIT") == 0) {	/* RFC 1652 */
+	    state->encoding = MAIL_ATTR_ENC_7BIT;
+	} else if (strncasecmp(arg, "SIZE=", 5) == 0) {	/* RFC 1870 */
+	    /* Reject non-numeric size. */
+	    if (!alldig(arg + 5)) {
+		state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+		smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad message size syntax");
+		return (-1);
+	    }
+	    /* Reject size overflow. */
+	    if ((state->msg_size = off_cvt_string(arg + 5)) < 0) {
+		state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
+		smtpd_chat_reply(state, "552 5.3.4 Message size exceeds file system imposed limit");
+		return (-1);
+	    }
+	} else if (var_smtputf8_enable
+		   && (state->ehlo_discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_SMTPUTF8) == 0
+		   && strcasecmp(arg, "SMTPUTF8") == 0) {	/* RFC 6531 */
+	     /* Already processed early. */ ;
+#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
+	} else if (strncasecmp(arg, "AUTH=", 5) == 0) {
+	    if ((err = smtpd_sasl_mail_opt(state, arg + 5)) != 0) {
+		smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err);
+		return (-1);
+	    }
+#endif
+	} else if (namadr_list_match(verp_clients, state->name, state->addr)
+		   && strncasecmp(arg, VERP_CMD, VERP_CMD_LEN) == 0
+		   && (arg[VERP_CMD_LEN] == '=' || arg[VERP_CMD_LEN] == 0)) {
+	    if (arg[VERP_CMD_LEN] == 0) {
+		verp_delims = var_verp_delims;
+	    } else {
+		verp_delims = arg + VERP_CMD_LEN + 1;
+		if (verp_delims_verify(verp_delims) != 0) {
+		    state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+		    smtpd_chat_reply(state,
+			 "501 5.5.4 Error: %s needs two characters from %s",
+				     VERP_CMD, var_verp_filter);
+		    return (-1);
+		}
+	    }
+	} else if (strncasecmp(arg, "RET=", 4) == 0) {	/* RFC 3461 */
+	    /* Sanitized on input. */
+	    if (state->ehlo_discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_DSN) {
+		state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+		smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.7.1 DSN support is disabled");
+		return (-1);
+	    }
+	    if (state->dsn_ret
+		|| (state->dsn_ret = dsn_ret_code(arg + 4)) == 0) {
+		state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+		smtpd_chat_reply(state,
+				 "501 5.5.4 Bad RET parameter syntax");
+		return (-1);
+	    }
+	} else if (strncasecmp(arg, "ENVID=", 6) == 0) {	/* RFC 3461 */
+	    /* Sanitized by bounce server. */
+	    if (state->ehlo_discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_DSN) {
+		state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+		smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.7.1 DSN support is disabled");
+		return (-1);
+	    }
+	    if (dsn_envid
+		|| xtext_unquote(state->dsn_buf, arg + 6) == 0
+		|| !allprint(STR(state->dsn_buf))) {
+		state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+		smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad ENVID parameter syntax");
+		return (-1);
+	    }
+	    dsn_envid = 1;
+	} else {
+	    state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+	    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "555 5.5.4 Unsupported option: %s", arg);
+	    return (-1);
+	}
+    }
+    /* Fix 20161205: show the envelope sender in reject logging. */
+    PUSH_STRING(saved_sender, state->sender, STR(state->addr_buf));
+    err = smtpd_check_size(state, state->msg_size);
+    POP_STRING(saved_sender, state->sender);
+    if (err != 0) {
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err);
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    if (verp_delims && STR(state->addr_buf)[0] == 0) {
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "503 5.5.4 Error: %s requires non-null sender",
+			 VERP_CMD);
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0) {
+	const char *verify_sender;
+
+	/*
+	 * XXX Don't reject the address when we're probed with our own
+	 * address verification sender address. Otherwise, some timeout or
+	 * some UCE block may result in mutual negative caching, making it
+	 * painful to get the mail through. Unfortunately we still have to
+	 * send the address to the Milters otherwise they may bail out with a
+	 * "missing recipient" protocol error.
+	 */
+	verify_sender = valid_verify_sender_addr(STR(state->addr_buf));
+	if (verify_sender != 0)
+	    vstring_strcpy(state->addr_buf, verify_sender);
+    }
+    if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0
+	&& var_smtpd_delay_reject == 0
+	&& (err = smtpd_check_mail(state, STR(state->addr_buf))) != 0) {
+	/* XXX Reset access map side effects. */
+	mail_reset(state);
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err);
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    if (state->milters != 0
+	&& (state->saved_flags & MILTER_SKIP_FLAGS) == 0) {
+	state->flags |= SMTPD_FLAG_NEED_MILTER_ABORT;
+	PUSH_STRING(saved_sender, state->sender, STR(state->addr_buf));
+	err = milter_mail_event(state->milters,
+				milter_argv(state, argc - 2, argv + 2));
+	if (err != 0) {
+	    /* Log reject etc. with correct sender information. */
+	    err = check_milter_reply(state, err);
+	}
+	POP_STRING(saved_sender, state->sender);
+	if (err != 0) {
+	    /* XXX Reset access map side effects. */
+	    mail_reset(state);
+	    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err);
+	    return (-1);
+	}
+    }
+    if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0) {
+	err = smtpd_check_rewrite(state);
+	if (err != 0) {
+	    /* XXX Reset access map side effects. */
+	    mail_reset(state);
+	    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err);
+	    return (-1);
+	}
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Historically, Postfix does not forbid 8-bit envelope localparts.
+     * Changing this would be a compatibility break. That can't happen in the
+     * foreseeable future.
+     */
+    if ((var_strict_smtputf8 || warn_compat_break_smtputf8_enable)
+	&& (state->flags & SMTPD_FLAG_SMTPUTF8) == 0
+	&& *STR(state->addr_buf) && !allascii(STR(state->addr_buf))) {
+	if (var_strict_smtputf8) {
+	    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "553 5.6.7 Must declare SMTPUTF8 to "
+			     "send unicode address");
+	    return (-1);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Not: #ifndef NO_EAI. They must configure SMTPUTF8_ENABLE=no if a
+	 * warning message is logged, so that they don't suddenly start to
+	 * lose mail after Postfix is built with EAI support.
+	 */
+	if (warn_compat_break_smtputf8_enable)
+	    msg_info("using backwards-compatible default setting "
+		     VAR_SMTPUTF8_ENABLE "=no to accept non-ASCII sender "
+		     "address \"%s\" from %s", STR(state->addr_buf),
+		     state->namaddr);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Check the queue file space, if applicable. The optional before-filter
+     * speed-adjust buffers use disk space. However, we don't know if they
+     * compete for storage space with the after-filter queue, so we can't
+     * simply bump up the free space requirement to 2.5 * message_size_limit.
+     */
+    if (!USE_SMTPD_PROXY(state)
+	|| (smtpd_proxy_opts & SMTPD_PROXY_FLAG_SPEED_ADJUST)) {
+	if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0
+	    && (err = smtpd_check_queue(state)) != 0) {
+	    /* XXX Reset access map side effects. */
+	    mail_reset(state);
+	    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err);
+	    return (-1);
+	}
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * No more early returns. The mail transaction is in progress.
+     */
+    GETTIMEOFDAY(&state->arrival_time);
+    state->sender = mystrdup(STR(state->addr_buf));
+    vstring_sprintf(state->instance, "%x.%lx.%lx.%x",
+		    var_pid, (unsigned long) state->arrival_time.tv_sec,
+	       (unsigned long) state->arrival_time.tv_usec, state->seqno++);
+    if (verp_delims)
+	state->verp_delims = mystrdup(verp_delims);
+    if (dsn_envid)
+	state->dsn_envid = mystrdup(STR(state->dsn_buf));
+    if (USE_SMTPD_PROXY(state))
+	state->proxy_mail = mystrdup(STR(state->buffer));
+    if (var_smtpd_delay_open == 0 && mail_open_stream(state) < 0) {
+	/* XXX Reset access map side effects. */
+	mail_reset(state);
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250 2.1.0 Ok");
+    return (0);
+}
+
+/* mail_reset - reset MAIL command stuff */
+
+static void mail_reset(SMTPD_STATE *state)
+{
+    state->msg_size = 0;
+    state->act_size = 0;
+    state->flags &= SMTPD_MASK_MAIL_KEEP;
+
+    /*
+     * Unceremoniously close the pipe to the cleanup service. The cleanup
+     * service will delete the queue file when it detects a premature
+     * end-of-file condition on input.
+     */
+    if (state->cleanup != 0) {
+	mail_stream_cleanup(state->dest);
+	state->dest = 0;
+	state->cleanup = 0;
+    }
+    state->err = 0;
+    if (state->queue_id != 0) {
+	myfree(state->queue_id);
+	state->queue_id = 0;
+    }
+    if (state->sender) {
+	myfree(state->sender);
+	state->sender = 0;
+    }
+    /* WeiYu Wu: need to undo milter_mail_event() state change. */
+    if (state->flags & SMTPD_FLAG_NEED_MILTER_ABORT) {
+	milter_abort(state->milters);
+	state->flags &= ~SMTPD_FLAG_NEED_MILTER_ABORT;
+    }
+    if (state->verp_delims) {
+	myfree(state->verp_delims);
+	state->verp_delims = 0;
+    }
+    if (state->proxy_mail) {
+	myfree(state->proxy_mail);
+	state->proxy_mail = 0;
+    }
+    if (state->saved_filter) {
+	myfree(state->saved_filter);
+	state->saved_filter = 0;
+    }
+    if (state->saved_redirect) {
+	myfree(state->saved_redirect);
+	state->saved_redirect = 0;
+    }
+    if (state->saved_bcc) {
+	argv_free(state->saved_bcc);
+	state->saved_bcc = 0;
+    }
+    state->saved_flags = 0;
+#ifdef DELAY_ACTION
+    state->saved_delay = 0;
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
+    if (state->sasl_sender)
+	smtpd_sasl_mail_reset(state);
+#endif
+    state->discard = 0;
+    VSTRING_RESET(state->instance);
+    VSTRING_TERMINATE(state->instance);
+
+    if (state->proxy)
+	smtpd_proxy_free(state);
+    if (state->xforward.flags)
+	smtpd_xforward_reset(state);
+    if (state->prepend)
+	state->prepend = argv_free(state->prepend);
+    if (state->dsn_envid) {
+	myfree(state->dsn_envid);
+	state->dsn_envid = 0;
+    }
+    if (state->milter_argv) {
+	myfree((void *) state->milter_argv);
+	state->milter_argv = 0;
+	state->milter_argc = 0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * BDAT.
+     */
+    state->bdat_state = SMTPD_BDAT_STAT_NONE;
+    if (state->bdat_get_stream) {
+	(void) vstream_fclose(state->bdat_get_stream);
+	state->bdat_get_stream = 0;
+    }
+    if (state->bdat_get_buffer)
+	VSTRING_RESET(state->bdat_get_buffer);
+}
+
+/* rcpt_cmd - process RCPT TO command */
+
+static int rcpt_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *argv)
+{
+    SMTPD_PROXY *proxy;
+    const char *err;
+    int     narg;
+    char   *arg;
+    int     rate;
+    const char *dsn_orcpt_addr = 0;
+    ssize_t dsn_orcpt_addr_len = 0;
+    const char *dsn_orcpt_type = 0;
+    int     dsn_notify = 0;
+    const char *coded_addr;
+    const char *milter_err;
+
+    /*
+     * Sanity checks.
+     * 
+     * XXX 2821 pedantism: Section 4.1.2 says that SMTP servers that receive a
+     * command in which invalid character codes have been employed, and for
+     * which there are no other reasons for rejection, MUST reject that
+     * command with a 501 response. So much for the principle of "be liberal
+     * in what you accept, be strict in what you send".
+     */
+    if (!SMTPD_IN_MAIL_TRANSACTION(state)) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "503 5.5.1 Error: need MAIL command");
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    /* Don't accept RCPT after BDAT. */
+    if (SMTPD_PROCESSING_BDAT(state)) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "503 5.5.1 Error: RCPT after BDAT");
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    if (argc < 3
+	|| strcasecmp(argv[1].strval, "to:") != 0) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Syntax: RCPT TO:<address>");
+	return (-1);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * XXX The client event count/rate control must be consistent in its use
+     * of client address information in connect and disconnect events. For
+     * now we exclude xclient authorized hosts from event count/rate control.
+     */
+    if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0
+	&& !xclient_allowed
+	&& anvil_clnt
+	&& var_smtpd_crcpt_limit > 0
+	&& !namadr_list_match(hogger_list, state->name, state->addr)
+	&& anvil_clnt_rcpt(anvil_clnt, state->service, state->addr,
+			   &rate) == ANVIL_STAT_OK
+	&& rate > var_smtpd_crcpt_limit) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
+	msg_warn("Recipient address rate limit exceeded: %d from %s for service %s",
+		 rate, state->namaddr, state->service);
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "450 4.7.1 Error: too many recipients from %s",
+			 state->addr);
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    if (argv[2].tokval == SMTPD_TOK_ERROR) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.1.3 Bad recipient address syntax");
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    if (extract_addr(state, argv + 2, REJECT_EMPTY_ADDR, var_strict_rfc821_env,
+		     state->flags & SMTPD_FLAG_SMTPUTF8) != 0) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.1.3 Bad recipient address syntax");
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    for (narg = 3; narg < argc; narg++) {
+	arg = argv[narg].strval;
+	if (strncasecmp(arg, "NOTIFY=", 7) == 0) {	/* RFC 3461 */
+	    /* Sanitized on input. */
+	    if (state->ehlo_discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_DSN) {
+		state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+		smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.7.1 DSN support is disabled");
+		return (-1);
+	    }
+	    if (dsn_notify || (dsn_notify = dsn_notify_mask(arg + 7)) == 0) {
+		state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+		smtpd_chat_reply(state,
+			    "501 5.5.4 Error: Bad NOTIFY parameter syntax");
+		return (-1);
+	    }
+	} else if (strncasecmp(arg, "ORCPT=", 6) == 0) {	/* RFC 3461 */
+	    /* Sanitized by bounce server. */
+	    if (state->ehlo_discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_DSN) {
+		state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+		smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.7.1 DSN support is disabled");
+		return (-1);
+	    }
+	    vstring_strcpy(state->dsn_orcpt_buf, arg + 6);
+	    if (dsn_orcpt_addr
+	     || (coded_addr = split_at(STR(state->dsn_orcpt_buf), ';')) == 0
+		|| *(dsn_orcpt_type = STR(state->dsn_orcpt_buf)) == 0
+		|| (strcasecmp(dsn_orcpt_type, "utf-8") == 0 ?
+		    uxtext_unquote(state->dsn_buf, coded_addr) == 0 :
+		    xtext_unquote(state->dsn_buf, coded_addr) == 0)) {
+		state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+		smtpd_chat_reply(state,
+			     "501 5.5.4 Error: Bad ORCPT parameter syntax");
+		return (-1);
+	    }
+	    dsn_orcpt_addr = STR(state->dsn_buf);
+	    dsn_orcpt_addr_len = LEN(state->dsn_buf);
+	} else {
+	    state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+	    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "555 5.5.4 Unsupported option: %s", arg);
+	    return (-1);
+	}
+    }
+    if (var_smtpd_rcpt_limit && state->rcpt_count >= var_smtpd_rcpt_limit) {
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "452 4.5.3 Error: too many recipients");
+	if (state->rcpt_overshoot++ < var_smtpd_rcpt_overlim)
+	    return (0);
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
+	return (-1);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Historically, Postfix does not forbid 8-bit envelope localparts.
+     * Changing this would be a compatibility break. That can't happen in the
+     * foreseeable future.
+     */
+    if ((var_strict_smtputf8 || warn_compat_break_smtputf8_enable)
+	&& (state->flags & SMTPD_FLAG_SMTPUTF8) == 0
+	&& *STR(state->addr_buf) && !allascii(STR(state->addr_buf))) {
+	if (var_strict_smtputf8) {
+	    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "553 5.6.7 Must declare SMTPUTF8 to "
+			     "send unicode address");
+	    return (-1);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Not: #ifndef NO_EAI. They must configure SMTPUTF8_ENABLE=no if a
+	 * warning message is logged, so that they don't suddenly start to
+	 * lose mail after Postfix is built with EAI support.
+	 */
+	if (warn_compat_break_smtputf8_enable)
+	    msg_info("using backwards-compatible default setting "
+		     VAR_SMTPUTF8_ENABLE "=no to accept non-ASCII recipient "
+		     "address \"%s\" from %s", STR(state->addr_buf),
+		     state->namaddr);
+    }
+    if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0) {
+	const char *verify_sender;
+
+	/*
+	 * XXX Don't reject the address when we're probed with our own
+	 * address verification sender address. Otherwise, some timeout or
+	 * some UCE block may result in mutual negative caching, making it
+	 * painful to get the mail through. Unfortunately we still have to
+	 * send the address to the Milters otherwise they may bail out with a
+	 * "missing recipient" protocol error.
+	 */
+	verify_sender = valid_verify_sender_addr(STR(state->addr_buf));
+	if (verify_sender != 0) {
+	    vstring_strcpy(state->addr_buf, verify_sender);
+	    err = 0;
+	} else {
+	    err = smtpd_check_rcpt(state, STR(state->addr_buf));
+	}
+	if (state->milters != 0
+	    && (state->saved_flags & MILTER_SKIP_FLAGS) == 0) {
+	    PUSH_STRING(saved_rcpt, state->recipient, STR(state->addr_buf));
+	    state->milter_reject_text = err;
+	    milter_err = milter_rcpt_event(state->milters,
+					   err == 0 ? MILTER_FLAG_NONE :
+					   MILTER_FLAG_WANT_RCPT_REJ,
+				    milter_argv(state, argc - 2, argv + 2));
+	    if (err == 0 && milter_err != 0) {
+		/* Log reject etc. with correct recipient information. */
+		err = check_milter_reply(state, milter_err);
+	    }
+	    POP_STRING(saved_rcpt, state->recipient);
+	}
+	if (err != 0) {
+	    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err);
+	    return (-1);
+	}
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Don't access the proxy, queue file, or queue file writer process until
+     * we have a valid recipient address.
+     */
+    if (state->proxy == 0 && state->cleanup == 0 && mail_open_stream(state) < 0)
+	return (-1);
+
+    /*
+     * Proxy the recipient. OK, so we lied. If the real-time proxy rejects
+     * the recipient then we can have a proxy connection without having
+     * accepted a recipient.
+     */
+    proxy = state->proxy;
+    if (proxy != 0 && proxy->cmd(state, SMTPD_PROX_WANT_OK,
+				 "%s", STR(state->buffer)) != 0) {
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", STR(proxy->reply));
+	return (-1);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Store the recipient. Remember the first one.
+     * 
+     * Flush recipients to maintain a stiffer coupling with the next stage and
+     * to better utilize parallelism.
+     * 
+     * RFC 3461 Section 5.2.1: If the NOTIFY parameter was not supplied for a
+     * recipient when the message was received, the NOTIFY parameter MUST NOT
+     * be supplied for that recipient when the message is relayed.
+     * 
+     * In other words, we can't simply make up our default NOTIFY value. We have
+     * to remember whether the client sent any.
+     * 
+     * RFC 3461 Section 5.2.1: If no ORCPT parameter was present when the
+     * message was received, an ORCPT parameter MAY be added to the RCPT
+     * command when the message is relayed.  If an ORCPT parameter is added
+     * by the relaying MTA, it MUST contain the recipient address from the
+     * RCPT command used when the message was received by that MTA.
+     * 
+     * In other words, it is OK to make up our own DSN original recipient when
+     * the client didn't send one. Although the RFC mentions mail relaying
+     * only, we also make up our own original recipient for the purpose of
+     * final delivery. For now, we do this here, rather than on the fly.
+     * 
+     * XXX We use REC_TYPE_ATTR for DSN-related recipient attributes even though
+     * 1) REC_TYPE_ATTR is not meant for multiple instances of the same named
+     * attribute, and 2) mixing REC_TYPE_ATTR with REC_TYPE_(not attr)
+     * requires that we map attributes with rec_attr_map() in order to
+     * simplify the recipient record processing loops in the cleanup and qmgr
+     * servers.
+     * 
+     * Another possibility, yet to be explored, is to leave the additional
+     * recipient information in the queue file and just pass queue file
+     * offsets along with the delivery request. This is a trade off between
+     * memory allocation versus numeric conversion overhead.
+     * 
+     * Since we have no record grouping mechanism, all recipient-specific
+     * parameters must be sent to the cleanup server before the actual
+     * recipient address.
+     */
+    state->rcpt_count++;
+    if (state->recipient == 0)
+	state->recipient = mystrdup(STR(state->addr_buf));
+    if (state->cleanup) {
+	/* Note: RFC(2)821 externalized address! */
+	if (dsn_orcpt_addr == 0) {
+	    dsn_orcpt_type = "rfc822";
+	    dsn_orcpt_addr = argv[2].strval;
+	    dsn_orcpt_addr_len = strlen(argv[2].strval);
+	    if (dsn_orcpt_addr[0] == '<'
+		&& dsn_orcpt_addr[dsn_orcpt_addr_len - 1] == '>') {
+		dsn_orcpt_addr += 1;
+		dsn_orcpt_addr_len -= 2;
+	    }
+	}
+	if (dsn_notify)
+	    rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%d",
+			MAIL_ATTR_DSN_NOTIFY, dsn_notify);
+	rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s;%.*s",
+		    MAIL_ATTR_DSN_ORCPT, dsn_orcpt_type,
+		    (int) dsn_orcpt_addr_len, dsn_orcpt_addr);
+	rec_fputs(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_RCPT, STR(state->addr_buf));
+	vstream_fflush(state->cleanup);
+    }
+    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250 2.1.5 Ok");
+    return (0);
+}
+
+/* rcpt_reset - reset RCPT stuff */
+
+static void rcpt_reset(SMTPD_STATE *state)
+{
+    if (state->recipient) {
+	myfree(state->recipient);
+	state->recipient = 0;
+    }
+    state->rcpt_count = 0;
+    /* XXX Must flush the command history. */
+    state->rcpt_overshoot = 0;
+}
+
+#if 0
+
+/* rfc2047_comment_encode - encode comment string */
+
+static VSTRING *rfc2047_comment_encode(const char *str, const char *charset)
+{
+    VSTRING *buf = vstring_alloc(30);
+    const unsigned char *cp;
+    int     ch;
+
+    /*
+     * XXX This is problematic code.
+     * 
+     * XXX Most of the RFC 2047 "especials" are not special in RFC*822 comments,
+     * but we encode them anyway to avoid complaints.
+     * 
+     * XXX In Received: header comments we enclose peer and issuer common names
+     * with "" quotes (inherited from the Lutz Jaenicke patch). This is the
+     * cause of several quirks.
+     * 
+     * 1) We encode text that contains the " character, even though that
+     * character is not special for RFC*822 comments.
+     * 
+     * 2) We ignore the recommended limit of 75 characters per encoded word,
+     * because long comments look ugly when folded in-between quotes.
+     * 
+     * 3) We encode the enclosing quotes, to avoid producing invalid encoded
+     * words. Microsoft abuses RFC 2047 encoding with attachment names, but
+     * we have no information on what decoders do with malformed encoding in
+     * comments. This means the comments are Jaenicke-compatible only after
+     * decoding.
+     */
+#define ESPECIALS "()<>@,;:\"/[]?.="		/* Special in RFC 2047 */
+#define QSPECIALS "_" ESPECIALS			/* Special in RFC 2047 'Q' */
+#define CSPECIALS "\\\"()"			/* Special in our comments */
+
+    /* Don't encode if not needed. */
+    for (cp = (unsigned char *) str; /* see below */ ; ++cp) {
+	if ((ch = *cp) == 0) {
+	    vstring_sprintf(buf, "\"%s\"", str);
+	    return (buf);
+	}
+	if (!ISPRINT(ch) || strchr(CSPECIALS, ch))
+	    break;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Use quoted-printable (like) encoding with spaces mapped to underscore.
+     */
+    vstring_sprintf(buf, "=?%s?Q?=%02X", charset, '"');
+    for (cp = (unsigned char *) str; (ch = *cp) != 0; ++cp) {
+	if (!ISPRINT(ch) || strchr(QSPECIALS CSPECIALS, ch)) {
+	    vstring_sprintf_append(buf, "=%02X", ch);
+	} else if (ch == ' ') {
+	    VSTRING_ADDCH(buf, '_');
+	} else {
+	    VSTRING_ADDCH(buf, ch);
+	}
+    }
+    vstring_sprintf_append(buf, "=%02X?=", '"');
+    return (buf);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/* comment_sanitize - clean up comment string */
+
+static void comment_sanitize(VSTRING *comment_string)
+{
+    unsigned char *cp;
+    int     ch;
+    int     pc;
+
+    /*
+     * Postfix Received: headers can be configured to include a comment with
+     * the CN (CommonName) of the peer and its issuer, or the login name of a
+     * SASL authenticated user. To avoid problems with RFC 822 etc. syntax,
+     * we limit this information to printable ASCII text, and neutralize
+     * characters that affect comment parsing: the backslash and unbalanced
+     * parentheses.
+     */
+    for (pc = 0, cp = (unsigned char *) STR(comment_string); (ch = *cp) != 0; cp++) {
+	if (!ISASCII(ch) || !ISPRINT(ch) || ch == '\\') {
+	    *cp = '?';
+	} else if (ch == '(') {
+	    pc++;
+	} else if (ch == ')') {
+	    if (pc > 0)
+		pc--;
+	    else
+		*cp = '?';
+	}
+    }
+    while (pc-- > 0)
+	VSTRING_ADDCH(comment_string, ')');
+    VSTRING_TERMINATE(comment_string);
+}
+
+static void common_pre_message_handling(SMTPD_STATE *state,
+	          int (*out_record) (VSTREAM *, int, const char *, ssize_t),
+	              int (*out_fprintf) (VSTREAM *, int, const char *,...),
+				        VSTREAM *out_stream, int out_error);
+static void receive_data_message(SMTPD_STATE *state,
+	          int (*out_record) (VSTREAM *, int, const char *, ssize_t),
+	              int (*out_fprintf) (VSTREAM *, int, const char *,...),
+				         VSTREAM *out_stream, int out_error);
+static int common_post_message_handling(SMTPD_STATE *state);
+
+/* data_cmd - process DATA command */
+
+static int data_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *unused_argv)
+{
+    SMTPD_PROXY *proxy;
+    const char *err;
+    int     (*out_record) (VSTREAM *, int, const char *, ssize_t);
+    int     (*out_fprintf) (VSTREAM *, int, const char *,...);
+    VSTREAM *out_stream;
+    int     out_error;
+
+    /*
+     * Sanity checks. With ESMTP command pipelining the client can send DATA
+     * before all recipients are rejected, so don't report that as a protocol
+     * error.
+     */
+    if (SMTPD_PROCESSING_BDAT(state)) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "503 5.5.1 Error: DATA after BDAT");
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    if (state->rcpt_count == 0) {
+	if (!SMTPD_IN_MAIL_TRANSACTION(state)) {
+	    state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+	    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "503 5.5.1 Error: need RCPT command");
+	} else {
+	    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "554 5.5.1 Error: no valid recipients");
+	}
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    if (argc != 1) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Syntax: DATA");
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0 && (err = smtpd_check_data(state)) != 0) {
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err);
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    if (state->milters != 0
+	&& (state->saved_flags & MILTER_SKIP_FLAGS) == 0
+	&& (err = milter_data_event(state->milters)) != 0
+	&& (err = check_milter_reply(state, err)) != 0) {
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err);
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    proxy = state->proxy;
+    if (proxy != 0 && proxy->cmd(state, SMTPD_PROX_WANT_MORE,
+				 "%s", STR(state->buffer)) != 0) {
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", STR(proxy->reply));
+	return (-1);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * One level of indirection to choose between normal or proxied
+     * operation. We want to avoid massive code duplication within tons of
+     * if-else clauses.
+     */
+    if (proxy) {
+	out_stream = proxy->stream;
+	out_record = proxy->rec_put;
+	out_fprintf = proxy->rec_fprintf;
+	out_error = CLEANUP_STAT_PROXY;
+    } else {
+	out_stream = state->cleanup;
+	out_record = rec_put;
+	out_fprintf = rec_fprintf;
+	out_error = CLEANUP_STAT_WRITE;
+    }
+    common_pre_message_handling(state, out_record, out_fprintf,
+				out_stream, out_error);
+    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "354 End data with <CR><LF>.<CR><LF>");
+    state->where = SMTPD_AFTER_DATA;
+    receive_data_message(state, out_record, out_fprintf, out_stream, out_error);
+    return common_post_message_handling(state);
+}
+
+/* common_pre_message_handling - finish envelope and open message segment */
+
+static void common_pre_message_handling(SMTPD_STATE *state,
+	          int (*out_record) (VSTREAM *, int, const char *, ssize_t),
+	              int (*out_fprintf) (VSTREAM *, int, const char *,...),
+					        VSTREAM *out_stream,
+					        int out_error)
+{
+    SMTPD_PROXY *proxy = state->proxy;
+    char  **cpp;
+    const char *rfc3848_sess;
+    const char *rfc3848_auth;
+    const char *with_protocol = (state->flags & SMTPD_FLAG_SMTPUTF8) ?
+    "UTF8SMTP" : state->protocol;
+
+#ifdef USE_TLS
+    VSTRING *peer_CN;
+    VSTRING *issuer_CN;
+
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
+    VSTRING *username;
+
+#endif
+
+    /*
+     * Flush out a first batch of access table actions that are delegated to
+     * the cleanup server, and that may trigger before we accept the first
+     * valid recipient. There will be more after end-of-data.
+     * 
+     * Terminate the message envelope segment. Start the message content
+     * segment, and prepend our own Received: header. If there is only one
+     * recipient, list the recipient address.
+     */
+    if (state->cleanup) {
+	if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0) {
+	    if (state->milters != 0
+		&& (state->saved_flags & MILTER_SKIP_FLAGS) == 0)
+		/* Send actual smtpd_milters list. */
+		(void) milter_send(state->milters, state->cleanup);
+	    if (state->saved_flags)
+		rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_FLGS, "%d",
+			    state->saved_flags);
+	}
+	rec_fputs(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_MESG, "");
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * PREPEND message headers above our own Received: header.
+     */
+    if (state->prepend)
+	for (cpp = state->prepend->argv; *cpp; cpp++)
+	    out_fprintf(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM, "%s", *cpp);
+
+    /*
+     * Suppress our own Received: header in the unlikely case that we are an
+     * intermediate proxy.
+     */
+    if (!proxy || state->xforward.flags == 0) {
+	out_fprintf(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM,
+		    "Received: from %s (%s [%s])",
+		    state->helo_name ? state->helo_name : state->name,
+		    state->name, state->rfc_addr);
+
+#define VSTRING_STRDUP(s) vstring_strcpy(vstring_alloc(strlen(s) + 1), (s))
+
+#ifdef USE_TLS
+	if (var_smtpd_tls_received_header && state->tls_context) {
+	    int     cont = 0;
+
+	    vstring_sprintf(state->buffer,
+			    "\t(using %s with cipher %s (%d/%d bits)",
+			    state->tls_context->protocol,
+			    state->tls_context->cipher_name,
+			    state->tls_context->cipher_usebits,
+			    state->tls_context->cipher_algbits);
+	    if (state->tls_context->kex_name && *state->tls_context->kex_name) {
+		out_record(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM, STR(state->buffer),
+			   LEN(state->buffer));
+		vstring_sprintf(state->buffer, "\t key-exchange %s",
+				state->tls_context->kex_name);
+		if (state->tls_context->kex_curve
+		    && *state->tls_context->kex_curve)
+		    vstring_sprintf_append(state->buffer, " (%s)",
+					   state->tls_context->kex_curve);
+		else if (state->tls_context->kex_bits > 0)
+		    vstring_sprintf_append(state->buffer, " (%d bits)",
+					   state->tls_context->kex_bits);
+		cont = 1;
+	    }
+	    if (state->tls_context->srvr_sig_name
+		&& *state->tls_context->srvr_sig_name) {
+		if (cont) {
+		    vstring_sprintf_append(state->buffer, " server-signature %s",
+					 state->tls_context->srvr_sig_name);
+		} else {
+		    out_record(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM, STR(state->buffer),
+			       LEN(state->buffer));
+		    vstring_sprintf(state->buffer, "\t server-signature %s",
+				    state->tls_context->srvr_sig_name);
+		}
+		if (state->tls_context->srvr_sig_curve
+		    && *state->tls_context->srvr_sig_curve)
+		    vstring_sprintf_append(state->buffer, " (%s)",
+					state->tls_context->srvr_sig_curve);
+		else if (state->tls_context->srvr_sig_bits > 0)
+		    vstring_sprintf_append(state->buffer, " (%d bits)",
+					 state->tls_context->srvr_sig_bits);
+		if (state->tls_context->srvr_sig_dgst
+		    && *state->tls_context->srvr_sig_dgst)
+		    vstring_sprintf_append(state->buffer, " server-digest %s",
+					 state->tls_context->srvr_sig_dgst);
+	    }
+	    if (state->tls_context->clnt_sig_name
+		&& *state->tls_context->clnt_sig_name) {
+		out_record(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM, STR(state->buffer),
+			   LEN(state->buffer));
+		vstring_sprintf(state->buffer, "\t client-signature %s",
+				state->tls_context->clnt_sig_name);
+		if (state->tls_context->clnt_sig_curve
+		    && *state->tls_context->clnt_sig_curve)
+		    vstring_sprintf_append(state->buffer, " (%s)",
+					state->tls_context->clnt_sig_curve);
+		else if (state->tls_context->clnt_sig_bits > 0)
+		    vstring_sprintf_append(state->buffer, " (%d bits)",
+					 state->tls_context->clnt_sig_bits);
+		if (state->tls_context->clnt_sig_dgst
+		    && *state->tls_context->clnt_sig_dgst)
+		    vstring_sprintf_append(state->buffer, " client-digest %s",
+					 state->tls_context->clnt_sig_dgst);
+	    }
+	    out_fprintf(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM, "%s)", STR(state->buffer));
+	    if (TLS_CERT_IS_PRESENT(state->tls_context)) {
+		peer_CN = VSTRING_STRDUP(state->tls_context->peer_CN);
+		comment_sanitize(peer_CN);
+		issuer_CN = VSTRING_STRDUP(state->tls_context->issuer_CN ?
+					state->tls_context->issuer_CN : "");
+		comment_sanitize(issuer_CN);
+		out_fprintf(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM,
+			    "\t(Client CN \"%s\", Issuer \"%s\" (%s))",
+			    STR(peer_CN), STR(issuer_CN),
+			    TLS_CERT_IS_TRUSTED(state->tls_context) ?
+			    "verified OK" : "not verified");
+		vstring_free(issuer_CN);
+		vstring_free(peer_CN);
+	    } else if (var_smtpd_tls_ask_ccert)
+		out_fprintf(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM,
+			    "\t(Client did not present a certificate)");
+	    else
+		out_fprintf(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM,
+			    "\t(No client certificate requested)");
+	}
+	/* RFC 3848 is defined for ESMTP only. */
+	if (state->tls_context != 0
+	    && strcmp(state->protocol, MAIL_PROTO_ESMTP) == 0)
+	    rfc3848_sess = "S";
+	else
+#endif
+	    rfc3848_sess = "";
+#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
+	if (var_smtpd_sasl_auth_hdr && state->sasl_username) {
+	    username = VSTRING_STRDUP(state->sasl_username);
+	    comment_sanitize(username);
+	    out_fprintf(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM,
+			"\t(Authenticated sender: %s)", STR(username));
+	    vstring_free(username);
+	}
+	/* RFC 3848 is defined for ESMTP only. */
+	if (state->sasl_username
+	    && strcmp(state->protocol, MAIL_PROTO_ESMTP) == 0)
+	    rfc3848_auth = "A";
+	else
+#endif
+	    rfc3848_auth = "";
+	if (state->rcpt_count == 1 && state->recipient) {
+	    out_fprintf(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM,
+			state->cleanup ? "\tby %s (%s) with %s%s%s id %s" :
+			"\tby %s (%s) with %s%s%s",
+			var_myhostname, var_mail_name,
+			with_protocol, rfc3848_sess,
+			rfc3848_auth, state->queue_id);
+	    quote_822_local(state->buffer, state->recipient);
+	    out_fprintf(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM,
+			"\tfor <%s>; %s", STR(state->buffer),
+			mail_date(state->arrival_time.tv_sec));
+	} else {
+	    out_fprintf(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM,
+			state->cleanup ? "\tby %s (%s) with %s%s%s id %s;" :
+			"\tby %s (%s) with %s%s%s;",
+			var_myhostname, var_mail_name,
+			with_protocol, rfc3848_sess,
+			rfc3848_auth, state->queue_id);
+	    out_fprintf(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM,
+			"\t%s", mail_date(state->arrival_time.tv_sec));
+	}
+#ifdef RECEIVED_ENVELOPE_FROM
+	quote_822_local(state->buffer, state->sender);
+	out_fprintf(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM,
+		    "\t(envelope-from %s)", STR(state->buffer));
+#endif
+    }
+}
+
+/* receive_data_message - finish envelope and open message segment */
+
+static void receive_data_message(SMTPD_STATE *state,
+	          int (*out_record) (VSTREAM *, int, const char *, ssize_t),
+	              int (*out_fprintf) (VSTREAM *, int, const char *,...),
+				         VSTREAM *out_stream,
+				         int out_error)
+{
+    SMTPD_PROXY *proxy = state->proxy;
+    char   *start;
+    int     len;
+    int     curr_rec_type;
+    int     prev_rec_type;
+    int     first = 1;
+    int     prev_got_bare_lf = 0;
+
+    /*
+     * Copy the message content. If the cleanup process has a problem, keep
+     * reading until the remote stops sending, then complain. Produce typed
+     * records from the SMTP stream so we can handle data that spans buffers.
+     * 
+     * XXX Force an empty record when the queue file content begins with
+     * whitespace, so that it won't be considered as being part of our own
+     * Received: header. What an ugly Kluge.
+     * 
+     * XXX Deal with UNIX-style From_ lines at the start of message content
+     * because sendmail permits it.
+     */
+    for (prev_rec_type = 0; /* void */ ; prev_rec_type = curr_rec_type,
+	 prev_got_bare_lf = smtp_got_bare_lf) {
+	if (smtp_get(state->buffer, state->client, var_line_limit,
+		     SMTP_GET_FLAG_NONE) == '\n')
+	    curr_rec_type = REC_TYPE_NORM;
+	else
+	    curr_rec_type = REC_TYPE_CONT;
+	if (IS_BARE_LF_REPLY_REJECT(smtp_got_bare_lf))
+	    state->err |= CLEANUP_STAT_BARE_LF;
+	start = vstring_str(state->buffer);
+	len = VSTRING_LEN(state->buffer);
+	if (first) {
+	    if (strncmp(start + strspn(start, ">"), "From ", 5) == 0) {
+		out_fprintf(out_stream, curr_rec_type,
+			    "X-Mailbox-Line: %s", start);
+		continue;
+	    }
+	    first = 0;
+	    if (len > 0 && IS_SPACE_TAB(start[0]))
+		out_record(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM, "", 0);
+	}
+	if (prev_rec_type != REC_TYPE_CONT && *start == '.') {
+	    if (len == 1 && IS_BARE_LF_WANT_STD_EOD(smtp_detect_bare_lf)
+		&& (smtp_got_bare_lf || prev_got_bare_lf))
+		/* Do not store or send to proxy filter. */
+		continue;
+	    if (proxy == 0 ? (++start, --len) == 0 : len == 1)
+		break;
+	}
+	if (state->err == CLEANUP_STAT_OK) {
+	    if (ENFORCING_SIZE_LIMIT(var_message_limit)
+		&& var_message_limit - state->act_size < len + 2) {
+		state->err = CLEANUP_STAT_SIZE;
+		msg_warn("%s: queue file size limit exceeded",
+			 state->queue_id ? state->queue_id : "NOQUEUE");
+	    } else {
+		state->act_size += len + 2;
+		if (out_record(out_stream, curr_rec_type, start, len) < 0)
+		    state->err = out_error;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+    state->where = SMTPD_AFTER_EOM;
+}
+
+/* common_post_message_handling - commit message or report error */
+
+static int common_post_message_handling(SMTPD_STATE *state)
+{
+    SMTPD_PROXY *proxy = state->proxy;
+    const char *err;
+    VSTRING *why = 0;
+    int     saved_err;
+    const CLEANUP_STAT_DETAIL *detail;
+
+#define IS_SMTP_REJECT(s) \
+	(((s)[0] == '4' || (s)[0] == '5') \
+	 && ISDIGIT((s)[1]) && ISDIGIT((s)[2]) \
+	 && ((s)[3] == '\0' || (s)[3] == ' ' || (s)[3] == '-'))
+
+    if (state->err == CLEANUP_STAT_OK
+	&& SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0
+	&& (err = smtpd_check_eod(state)) != 0) {
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err);
+	if (proxy) {
+	    smtpd_proxy_close(state);
+	} else {
+	    mail_stream_cleanup(state->dest);
+	    state->dest = 0;
+	    state->cleanup = 0;
+	}
+	return (-1);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Send the end of DATA and finish the proxy connection. Set the
+     * CLEANUP_STAT_PROXY error flag in case of trouble.
+     */
+    if (proxy) {
+	if (state->err == CLEANUP_STAT_OK) {
+	    (void) proxy->cmd(state, SMTPD_PROX_WANT_ANY, ".");
+	    if (state->err == CLEANUP_STAT_OK &&
+		*STR(proxy->reply) != '2')
+		state->err = CLEANUP_STAT_CONT;
+	}
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Flush out access table actions that are delegated to the cleanup
+     * server. There is similar code at the beginning of the DATA command.
+     * 
+     * Send the end-of-segment markers and finish the queue file record stream.
+     */
+    else {
+	if (state->err == CLEANUP_STAT_OK) {
+	    rec_fputs(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_XTRA, "");
+	    if (state->saved_filter)
+		rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_FILT, "%s",
+			    state->saved_filter);
+	    if (state->saved_redirect)
+		rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_RDR, "%s",
+			    state->saved_redirect);
+	    if (state->saved_bcc) {
+		char  **cpp;
+
+		for (cpp = state->saved_bcc->argv; *cpp; cpp++) {
+		    rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_RCPT, "%s",
+				*cpp);
+		    rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%d",
+				MAIL_ATTR_DSN_NOTIFY, DSN_NOTIFY_NEVER);
+		}
+	    }
+	    if (state->saved_flags)
+		rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_FLGS, "%d",
+			    state->saved_flags);
+#ifdef DELAY_ACTION
+	    if (state->saved_delay)
+		rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_DELAY, "%d",
+			    state->saved_delay);
+#endif
+	    if (vstream_ferror(state->cleanup))
+		state->err = CLEANUP_STAT_WRITE;
+	}
+	if (state->err == CLEANUP_STAT_OK)
+	    if (rec_fputs(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_END, "") < 0
+		|| vstream_fflush(state->cleanup))
+		state->err = CLEANUP_STAT_WRITE;
+	if (state->err == 0) {
+	    why = vstring_alloc(10);
+	    state->err = mail_stream_finish(state->dest, why);
+	    if (IS_SMTP_REJECT(STR(why)))
+		printable_except(STR(why), ' ', "\r\n");
+	    else
+		printable(STR(why), ' ');
+	} else
+	    mail_stream_cleanup(state->dest);
+	state->dest = 0;
+	state->cleanup = 0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * XXX If we lose the cleanup server while it is editing a queue file,
+     * the Postfix SMTP server will be out of sync with Milter applications.
+     * Sending an ABORT to the Milters is not sufficient to restore
+     * synchronization, because there may be any number of Milter replies
+     * already in flight. Destroying and recreating the Milters (and faking
+     * the connect and ehlo events) is too much trouble for testing and
+     * maintenance. Workaround: force the Postfix SMTP server to hang up with
+     * a 421 response in the rare case that the cleanup server breaks AND
+     * that the remote SMTP client continues the session after end-of-data.
+     * 
+     * XXX Should use something other than CLEANUP_STAT_WRITE when we lose
+     * contact with the cleanup server. This requires changes to the
+     * mail_stream module and its users (smtpd, qmqpd, perhaps sendmail).
+     * 
+     * XXX See exception below in code that overrides state->access_denied for
+     * compliance with RFC 2821 Sec 3.1.
+     */
+    if (state->milters != 0 && (state->err & CLEANUP_STAT_WRITE) != 0)
+	state->access_denied = mystrdup("421 4.3.0 Mail system error");
+
+    /*
+     * Handle any errors. One message may suffer from multiple errors, so
+     * complain only about the most severe error. Forgive any previous client
+     * errors when a message was received successfully.
+     * 
+     * See also: qmqpd.c
+     */
+    if (state->err == CLEANUP_STAT_OK) {
+	state->error_count = 0;
+	state->error_mask = 0;
+	state->junk_cmds = 0;
+	if (proxy)
+	    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", STR(proxy->reply));
+	else if (SMTPD_PROCESSING_BDAT(state))
+	    smtpd_chat_reply(state,
+			     "250 2.0.0 Ok: %ld bytes queued as %s",
+			     (long) state->act_size, state->queue_id);
+	else
+	    smtpd_chat_reply(state,
+			     "250 2.0.0 Ok: queued as %s", state->queue_id);
+    } else if ((state->err & CLEANUP_STAT_BARE_LF) != 0) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+	log_whatsup(state, "reject", "bare <LF> received");
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%d 5.5.2 %s Error: bare <LF> received",
+			 var_smtpd_forbid_bare_lf_code, var_myhostname);
+    } else if (why && IS_SMTP_REJECT(STR(why))) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", STR(why));
+    } else if ((state->err & CLEANUP_STAT_DEFER) != 0) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
+	detail = cleanup_stat_detail(CLEANUP_STAT_DEFER);
+	if (why && LEN(why) > 0) {
+	    /* Allow address-specific DSN status in header/body_checks. */
+	    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%d %s", detail->smtp, STR(why));
+	} else {
+	    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%d %s Error: %s",
+			     detail->smtp, detail->dsn, detail->text);
+	}
+    } else if ((state->err & CLEANUP_STAT_BAD) != 0) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_SOFTWARE;
+	detail = cleanup_stat_detail(CLEANUP_STAT_BAD);
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%d %s Error: internal error %d",
+			 detail->smtp, detail->dsn, state->err);
+    } else if ((state->err & CLEANUP_STAT_SIZE) != 0) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_BOUNCE;
+	detail = cleanup_stat_detail(CLEANUP_STAT_SIZE);
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%d %s Error: %s",
+			 detail->smtp, detail->dsn, detail->text);
+    } else if ((state->err & CLEANUP_STAT_HOPS) != 0) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_BOUNCE;
+	detail = cleanup_stat_detail(CLEANUP_STAT_HOPS);
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%d %s Error: %s",
+			 detail->smtp, detail->dsn, detail->text);
+    } else if ((state->err & CLEANUP_STAT_CONT) != 0) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
+	detail = cleanup_stat_detail(CLEANUP_STAT_CONT);
+	if (proxy) {
+	    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", STR(proxy->reply));
+	} else if (why && LEN(why) > 0) {
+	    /* Allow address-specific DSN status in header/body_checks. */
+	    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%d %s", detail->smtp, STR(why));
+	} else {
+	    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%d %s Error: %s",
+			     detail->smtp, detail->dsn, detail->text);
+	}
+    } else if ((state->err & CLEANUP_STAT_WRITE) != 0) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_RESOURCE;
+	detail = cleanup_stat_detail(CLEANUP_STAT_WRITE);
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%d %s Error: %s",
+			 detail->smtp, detail->dsn, detail->text);
+    } else if ((state->err & CLEANUP_STAT_PROXY) != 0) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_SOFTWARE;
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", STR(proxy->reply));
+    } else {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_SOFTWARE;
+	detail = cleanup_stat_detail(CLEANUP_STAT_BAD);
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%d %s Error: internal error %d",
+			 detail->smtp, detail->dsn, state->err);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * By popular command: the proxy's end-of-data reply.
+     */
+    if (proxy)
+	msg_info("proxy-%s: %s: %s;%s",
+		 (state->err == CLEANUP_STAT_OK) ? "accept" : "reject",
+		 state->where, STR(proxy->reply), smtpd_whatsup(state));
+
+    /*
+     * Cleanup. The client may send another MAIL command.
+     */
+    saved_err = state->err;
+    chat_reset(state, var_smtpd_hist_thrsh);
+    mail_reset(state);
+    rcpt_reset(state);
+    if (why)
+	vstring_free(why);
+    return (saved_err);
+}
+
+/* skip_bdat - skip content and respond to BDAT error */
+
+static int skip_bdat(SMTPD_STATE *state, off_t chunk_size,
+		             bool final_chunk, const char *format,...)
+{
+    va_list ap;
+    off_t   done;
+    off_t   len;
+
+    /*
+     * Read and discard content from the remote SMTP client. TODO: drop the
+     * connection in case of overload.
+     */
+    for (done = 0; done < chunk_size; done += len) {
+	if ((len = chunk_size - done) > VSTREAM_BUFSIZE)
+	    len = VSTREAM_BUFSIZE;
+	smtp_fread_buf(state->buffer, len, state->client);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Send the response to the remote SMTP client.
+     */
+    va_start(ap, format);
+    vsmtpd_chat_reply(state, format, ap);
+    va_end(ap);
+
+    /*
+     * Reset state, or drop subsequent BDAT payloads until BDAT LAST or RSET.
+     */
+    if (final_chunk)
+	mail_reset(state);
+    else
+	state->bdat_state = SMTPD_BDAT_STAT_ERROR;
+    return (-1);
+}
+
+/* bdat_cmd - process BDAT command */
+
+static int bdat_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *argv)
+{
+    SMTPD_PROXY *proxy;
+    const char *err;
+    off_t   chunk_size;
+    bool    final_chunk;
+    off_t   done;
+    off_t   read_len;
+    char   *start;
+    int     len;
+    int     curr_rec_type;
+    int     (*out_record) (VSTREAM *, int, const char *, ssize_t);
+    int     (*out_fprintf) (VSTREAM *, int, const char *,...);
+    VSTREAM *out_stream;
+    int     out_error;
+
+    /*
+     * Hang up if the BDAT command is disabled. The next input would be raw
+     * message content and that would trigger lots of command errors.
+     */
+    if (state->ehlo_discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_CHUNKING) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "521 5.5.1 Error: command not implemented");
+	return (-1);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Hang up if the BDAT command is malformed. The next input would be raw
+     * message content and that would trigger lots of command errors.
+     */
+    if (argc < 2 || argc > 3 || !alldig(argv[1].strval)
+	|| (chunk_size = off_cvt_string(argv[1].strval)) < 0
+	|| ((final_chunk = (argc == 3))
+	    && strcasecmp(argv[2].strval, "LAST") != 0)) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+	msg_warn("%s: malformed BDAT command syntax from %s: %.100s",
+		 state->queue_id ? state->queue_id : "NOQUEUE",
+		 state->namaddr, printable(vstring_str(state->buffer), '?'));
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "521 5.5.4 Syntax: BDAT count [LAST]");
+	return (-1);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Block abuse involving empty chunks (alternatively, we could count
+     * "BDAT 0" as a "NOOP", but then we would have to refactor the code that
+     * enforces the junk command limit). Clients that send a message as a
+     * sequence of "BDAT 1" should not be a problem: the Postfix BDAT
+     * implementation should be efficient enough to handle that.
+     */
+    if (chunk_size == 0 && !final_chunk) {
+	msg_warn("%s: null BDAT request from %s",
+		 state->queue_id ? state->queue_id : "NOQUEUE",
+		 state->namaddr);
+	return skip_bdat(state, chunk_size, final_chunk,
+			 "551 5.7.1 Null BDAT request");
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * BDAT commands may be pipelined within a MAIL transaction. After a BDAT
+     * request fails, keep accepting BDAT requests and skipping BDAT payloads
+     * to maintain synchronization with the remote SMTP client, until the
+     * client sends BDAT LAST or RSET.
+     */
+    if (state->bdat_state == SMTPD_BDAT_STAT_ERROR)
+	return skip_bdat(state, chunk_size, final_chunk,
+			 "551 5.0.0 Discarded %ld bytes after earlier error",
+			 (long) chunk_size);
+
+    /*
+     * Special handling for the first BDAT command in a MAIL transaction,
+     * treating it as a kind of "DATA" command for the purpose of policy
+     * evaluation.
+     */
+    if (!SMTPD_PROCESSING_BDAT(state)) {
+
+	/*
+	 * With ESMTP command pipelining a client may send BDAT before the
+	 * server has replied to all RCPT commands. For this reason we cannot
+	 * treat BDAT without valid recipients as a protocol error.  Worse,
+	 * RFC 3030 does not discuss the role of BDAT commands in RFC 2920
+	 * command groups (batches of commands that may be sent without
+	 * waiting for a response to each individual command). Therefore we
+	 * have to allow for clients that pipeline the entire SMTP session
+	 * after EHLO, including multiple MAIL transactions.
+	 */
+	if (state->rcpt_count == 0) {
+	    if (!SMTPD_IN_MAIL_TRANSACTION(state)) {
+		/* TODO: maybe remove this from the DATA and BDAT handlers. */
+		state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+		return skip_bdat(state, chunk_size, final_chunk,
+				 "503 5.5.1 Error: need RCPT command");
+	    } else {
+		return skip_bdat(state, chunk_size, final_chunk,
+				 "554 5.5.1 Error: no valid recipients");
+	    }
+	}
+	if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0
+	    && (err = smtpd_check_data(state)) != 0) {
+	    return skip_bdat(state, chunk_size, final_chunk, "%s", err);
+	}
+	if (state->milters != 0
+	    && (state->saved_flags & MILTER_SKIP_FLAGS) == 0
+	    && (err = milter_data_event(state->milters)) != 0
+	    && (err = check_milter_reply(state, err)) != 0) {
+	    return skip_bdat(state, chunk_size, final_chunk, "%s", err);
+	}
+	proxy = state->proxy;
+	if (proxy != 0 && proxy->cmd(state, SMTPD_PROX_WANT_MORE,
+				     SMTPD_CMD_DATA) != 0) {
+	    return skip_bdat(state, chunk_size, final_chunk,
+			     "%s", STR(proxy->reply));
+	}
+    }
+    /* Block too large chunks. */
+    if (ENFORCING_SIZE_LIMIT(var_message_limit)
+	&& state->act_size > var_message_limit - chunk_size) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
+	msg_warn("%s: BDAT request from %s exceeds message size limit",
+		 state->queue_id ? state->queue_id : "NOQUEUE",
+		 state->namaddr);
+	return skip_bdat(state, chunk_size, final_chunk,
+			 "552 5.3.4 Chunk exceeds message size limit");
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * One level of indirection to choose between normal or proxied
+     * operation. We want to avoid massive code duplication within tons of
+     * if-else clauses. TODO: store this in its own data structure, or in
+     * SMTPD_STATE.
+     */
+    proxy = state->proxy;
+    if (proxy) {
+	out_stream = proxy->stream;
+	out_record = proxy->rec_put;
+	out_fprintf = proxy->rec_fprintf;
+	out_error = CLEANUP_STAT_PROXY;
+    } else {
+	out_stream = state->cleanup;
+	out_record = rec_put;
+	out_fprintf = rec_fprintf;
+	out_error = CLEANUP_STAT_WRITE;
+    }
+    if (!SMTPD_PROCESSING_BDAT(state)) {
+	common_pre_message_handling(state, out_record, out_fprintf,
+				    out_stream, out_error);
+	if (state->bdat_get_buffer == 0)
+	    state->bdat_get_buffer = vstring_alloc(VSTREAM_BUFSIZE);
+	else
+	    VSTRING_RESET(state->bdat_get_buffer);
+	state->bdat_prev_rec_type = 0;
+    }
+    state->bdat_state = SMTPD_BDAT_STAT_OK;
+    state->where = SMTPD_AFTER_BDAT;
+
+    /*
+     * Copy the message content. If the cleanup process has a problem, keep
+     * reading until the remote stops sending, then complain. Produce typed
+     * records from the SMTP stream so we can handle data that spans buffers.
+     */
+
+    /*
+     * Instead of reading the entire BDAT chunk into memory, read the chunk
+     * one fragment at a time. The loops below always make one iteration, to
+     * avoid code duplication for the "BDAT 0 LAST" case (empty chunk).
+     */
+    done = 0;
+    do {
+
+	/*
+	 * Do not skip the smtp_fread_buf() call if read_len == 0. We still
+	 * need the side effects which include resetting the buffer write
+	 * position. Skipping the call would invalidate the buffer state.
+	 * 
+	 * Caution: smtp_fread_buf() will long jump after EOF or timeout.
+	 */
+	if ((read_len = chunk_size - done) > VSTREAM_BUFSIZE)
+	    read_len = VSTREAM_BUFSIZE;
+	smtp_fread_buf(state->buffer, read_len, state->client);
+	state->bdat_get_stream = vstream_memreopen(
+			   state->bdat_get_stream, state->buffer, O_RDONLY);
+
+	/*
+	 * Read lines from the fragment. The last line may continue in the
+	 * next fragment, or in the next chunk.
+	 */
+	do {
+	    if (smtp_get_noexcept(state->bdat_get_buffer,
+				  state->bdat_get_stream,
+				  var_line_limit,
+				  SMTP_GET_FLAG_APPEND) == '\n') {
+		/* Stopped at end-of-line. */
+		curr_rec_type = REC_TYPE_NORM;
+	    } else if (!vstream_feof(state->bdat_get_stream)) {
+		/* Stopped at var_line_limit. */
+		curr_rec_type = REC_TYPE_CONT;
+	    } else if (VSTRING_LEN(state->bdat_get_buffer) > 0
+		       && final_chunk && read_len == chunk_size - done) {
+		/* Stopped at final chunk end; handle missing end-of-line. */
+		curr_rec_type = REC_TYPE_NORM;
+	    } else {
+		/* Stopped at fragment end; empty buffer or not at chunk end. */
+		/* Skip the out_record() and VSTRING_RESET() calls below. */
+		break;
+	    }
+	    if (IS_BARE_LF_REPLY_REJECT(smtp_got_bare_lf))
+		state->err |= CLEANUP_STAT_BARE_LF;
+	    start = vstring_str(state->bdat_get_buffer);
+	    len = VSTRING_LEN(state->bdat_get_buffer);
+	    if (state->err == CLEANUP_STAT_OK) {
+		if (ENFORCING_SIZE_LIMIT(var_message_limit)
+		    && var_message_limit - state->act_size < len + 2) {
+		    state->err = CLEANUP_STAT_SIZE;
+		    msg_warn("%s: queue file size limit exceeded",
+			     state->queue_id ? state->queue_id : "NOQUEUE");
+		} else {
+		    state->act_size += len + 2;
+		    if (*start == '.' && proxy != 0
+			&& state->bdat_prev_rec_type != REC_TYPE_CONT)
+			if (out_record(out_stream, REC_TYPE_CONT, ".", 1) < 0)
+			    state->err = out_error;
+		    if (state->err == CLEANUP_STAT_OK
+			&& out_record(out_stream, curr_rec_type,
+				      vstring_str(state->bdat_get_buffer),
+				   VSTRING_LEN(state->bdat_get_buffer)) < 0)
+			state->err = out_error;
+		}
+	    }
+	    VSTRING_RESET(state->bdat_get_buffer);
+	    state->bdat_prev_rec_type = curr_rec_type;
+	} while (!vstream_feof(state->bdat_get_stream));
+	done += read_len;
+    } while (done < chunk_size);
+
+    /*
+     * Special handling for BDAT LAST (successful or unsuccessful).
+     */
+    if (final_chunk) {
+	state->where = SMTPD_AFTER_EOM;
+	return common_post_message_handling(state);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Unsuccessful non-final BDAT command. common_post_message_handling()
+     * resets all MAIL transaction state including BDAT state. To avoid
+     * useless error messages due to pipelined BDAT commands, enter the
+     * SMTPD_BDAT_STAT_ERROR state to accept BDAT commands and skip BDAT
+     * payloads.
+     */
+    else if (state->err != CLEANUP_STAT_OK) {
+	/* NOT: state->where = SMTPD_AFTER_EOM; */
+	(void) common_post_message_handling(state);
+	state->bdat_state = SMTPD_BDAT_STAT_ERROR;
+	return (-1);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Successful non-final BDAT command.
+     */
+    else {
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250 2.0.0 Ok: %ld bytes", (long) chunk_size);
+	return (0);
+    }
+}
+
+/* rset_cmd - process RSET */
+
+static int rset_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *unused_argv)
+{
+
+    /*
+     * Sanity checks.
+     */
+    if (argc != 1) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Syntax: RSET");
+	return (-1);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Restore state to right after HELO/EHLO command.
+     */
+    chat_reset(state, var_smtpd_hist_thrsh);
+    mail_reset(state);
+    rcpt_reset(state);
+    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250 2.0.0 Ok");
+    return (0);
+}
+
+/* noop_cmd - process NOOP */
+
+static int noop_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *unused_argv)
+{
+
+    /*
+     * XXX 2821 incompatibility: Section 4.1.1.9 says that NOOP can have a
+     * parameter string which is to be ignored. NOOP instructions with
+     * parameters? Go figure.
+     * 
+     * RFC 2821 violates RFC 821, which says that NOOP takes no parameters.
+     */
+#ifdef RFC821_SYNTAX
+
+    /*
+     * Sanity checks.
+     */
+    if (argc != 1) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Syntax: NOOP");
+	return (-1);
+    }
+#endif
+    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250 2.0.0 Ok");
+    return (0);
+}
+
+/* vrfy_cmd - process VRFY */
+
+static int vrfy_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *argv)
+{
+    const char *err = 0;
+    int     rate;
+    int     smtputf8 = 0;
+    int     saved_flags;
+
+    /*
+     * The SMTP standard (RFC 821) disallows unquoted special characters in
+     * the VRFY argument. Common practice violates the standard, however.
+     * Postfix accommodates common practice where it violates the standard.
+     * 
+     * XXX Impedance mismatch! The SMTP command tokenizer preserves quoting,
+     * whereas the recipient restrictions checks expect unquoted (internal)
+     * address forms. Therefore we must parse out the address, or we must
+     * stop doing recipient restriction checks and lose the opportunity to
+     * say "user unknown" at the SMTP port.
+     * 
+     * XXX 2821 incompatibility and brain damage: Section 4.5.1 requires that
+     * VRFY is implemented. RFC 821 specifies that VRFY is optional. It gets
+     * even worse: section 3.5.3 says that a 502 (command recognized but not
+     * implemented) reply is not fully compliant.
+     * 
+     * Thus, an RFC 2821 compliant implementation cannot refuse to supply
+     * information in reply to VRFY queries. That is simply bogus. The only
+     * reply we could supply is a generic 252 reply. This causes spammers to
+     * add tons of bogus addresses to their mailing lists (spam harvesting by
+     * trying out large lists of potential recipient names with VRFY).
+     */
+#define SLOPPY	0
+
+    if (var_disable_vrfy_cmd) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "502 5.5.1 VRFY command is disabled");
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    /* Fix 20140707: handle missing address. */
+    if (var_smtputf8_enable
+	&& (state->ehlo_discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_SMTPUTF8) == 0
+	&& argc > 1 && strcasecmp(argv[argc - 1].strval, "SMTPUTF8") == 0) {
+	argc--;					/* RFC 6531 */
+	smtputf8 = 1;
+    }
+    if (argc < 2) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Syntax: VRFY address%s",
+			 var_smtputf8_enable ? " [SMTPUTF8]" : "");
+	return (-1);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * XXX The client event count/rate control must be consistent in its use
+     * of client address information in connect and disconnect events. For
+     * now we exclude xclient authorized hosts from event count/rate control.
+     */
+    if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0
+	&& !xclient_allowed
+	&& anvil_clnt
+	&& var_smtpd_crcpt_limit > 0
+	&& !namadr_list_match(hogger_list, state->name, state->addr)
+	&& anvil_clnt_rcpt(anvil_clnt, state->service, state->addr,
+			   &rate) == ANVIL_STAT_OK
+	&& rate > var_smtpd_crcpt_limit) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
+	msg_warn("Recipient address rate limit exceeded: %d from %s for service %s",
+		 rate, state->namaddr, state->service);
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "450 4.7.1 Error: too many recipients from %s",
+			 state->addr);
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    if (state->milters != 0 && (err = milter_other_event(state->milters)) != 0
+	&& (err[0] == '5' || err[0] == '4')) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err);
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    if (argc > 2)
+	collapse_args(argc - 1, argv + 1);
+    if (extract_addr(state, argv + 1, REJECT_EMPTY_ADDR, SLOPPY, smtputf8) != 0) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.1.3 Bad recipient address syntax");
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    /* Fix 20140707: Check the VRFY command. */
+    if (smtputf8 == 0 && var_strict_smtputf8) {
+	if (*STR(state->addr_buf) && !allascii(STR(state->addr_buf))) {
+	    mail_reset(state);
+	    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "553 5.6.7 Must declare SMTPUTF8 to send unicode address");
+	    return (-1);
+	}
+    }
+    /* Use state->addr_buf, with the unquoted result from extract_addr() */
+    if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0) {
+	/* Fix 20161206: allow UTF8 in smtpd_recipient_restrictions. */
+	saved_flags = state->flags;
+	if (smtputf8)
+	    state->flags |= SMTPD_FLAG_SMTPUTF8;
+	err = smtpd_check_rcpt(state, STR(state->addr_buf));
+	state->flags = saved_flags;
+	if (err != 0) {
+	    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err);
+	    return (-1);
+	}
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * XXX 2821 new feature: Section 3.5.1 requires that the VRFY response is
+     * either "full name <user@domain>" or "user@domain". Postfix replies
+     * with the string that was provided by the client, whether or not it is
+     * in fully qualified domain form and the address is in <>.
+     * 
+     * Reply code 250 is reserved for the case where the address is verified;
+     * reply code 252 should be used when no definitive certainty exists.
+     */
+    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "252 2.0.0 %s", argv[1].strval);
+    return (0);
+}
+
+/* etrn_cmd - process ETRN command */
+
+static int etrn_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *argv)
+{
+    const char *err;
+
+    /*
+     * Sanity checks.
+     */
+    if (var_helo_required && state->helo_name == 0) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "503 Error: send HELO/EHLO first");
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    if (state->milters != 0 && (err = milter_other_event(state->milters)) != 0
+	&& (err[0] == '5' || err[0] == '4')) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err);
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    if (SMTPD_IN_MAIL_TRANSACTION(state)) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "503 Error: MAIL transaction in progress");
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    if (argc != 2) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "500 Syntax: ETRN domain");
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    if (argv[1].strval[0] == '@' || argv[1].strval[0] == '#')
+	argv[1].strval++;
+
+    /*
+     * As an extension to RFC 1985 we also allow an RFC 2821 address literal
+     * enclosed in [].
+     * 
+     * XXX There does not appear to be an ETRN parameter to indicate that the
+     * domain name is UTF-8.
+     */
+    if (!valid_hostname(argv[1].strval, DONT_GRIPE)
+	&& !valid_mailhost_literal(argv[1].strval, DONT_GRIPE)) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 Error: invalid parameter syntax");
+	return (-1);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * XXX The implementation borrows heavily from the code that implements
+     * UCE restrictions. These typically return 450 or 550 when a request is
+     * rejected. RFC 1985 requires that 459 be sent when the server refuses
+     * to perform the request.
+     */
+    if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state)) {
+	msg_warn("do not use ETRN in \"sendmail -bs\" mode");
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "458 Unable to queue messages");
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    if ((err = smtpd_check_etrn(state, argv[1].strval)) != 0) {
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err);
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    switch (flush_send_site(argv[1].strval)) {
+    case FLUSH_STAT_OK:
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250 Queuing started");
+	return (0);
+    case FLUSH_STAT_DENY:
+	msg_warn("reject: ETRN %.100s... from %s",
+		 argv[1].strval, state->namaddr);
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "459 <%s>: service unavailable",
+			 argv[1].strval);
+	return (-1);
+    case FLUSH_STAT_BAD:
+	msg_warn("bad ETRN %.100s... from %s", argv[1].strval, state->namaddr);
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "458 Unable to queue messages");
+	return (-1);
+    default:
+	msg_warn("unable to talk to fast flush service");
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "458 Unable to queue messages");
+	return (-1);
+    }
+}
+
+/* quit_cmd - process QUIT command */
+
+static int quit_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int unused_argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *unused_argv)
+{
+    int     out_pending = vstream_bufstat(state->client, VSTREAM_BST_OUT_PEND);
+
+    /*
+     * Don't bother checking the syntax.
+     */
+    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "221 2.0.0 Bye");
+
+    /*
+     * When the "." and quit replies are pipelined, make sure they are
+     * flushed now, to avoid repeated mail deliveries in case of a crash in
+     * the "clean up before disconnect" code.
+     * 
+     * XXX When this was added in Postfix 2.1 we used vstream_fflush(). As of
+     * Postfix 2.3 we use smtp_flush() for better error reporting.
+     */
+    if (out_pending > 0)
+	smtp_flush(state->client);
+    return (0);
+}
+
+/* xclient_cmd - override SMTP client attributes */
+
+static int xclient_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *argv)
+{
+    SMTPD_TOKEN *argp;
+    char   *raw_value;
+    char   *attr_value;
+    char   *attr_name;
+    int     update_namaddr = 0;
+    int     name_status;
+    static const NAME_CODE peer_codes[] = {
+	XCLIENT_UNAVAILABLE, SMTPD_PEER_CODE_PERM,
+	XCLIENT_TEMPORARY, SMTPD_PEER_CODE_TEMP,
+	0, SMTPD_PEER_CODE_OK,
+    };
+    static const NAME_CODE proto_names[] = {
+	MAIL_PROTO_SMTP, 1,
+	MAIL_PROTO_ESMTP, 2,
+	0, -1,
+    };
+    int     got_helo = 0;
+    int     got_proto = 0;
+
+#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
+    int     got_login = 0;
+    char   *saved_username;
+
+#endif
+
+    /*
+     * Sanity checks.
+     * 
+     * XXX The XCLIENT command will override its own access control, so that
+     * connection count/rate restrictions can be correctly simulated.
+     */
+    if (SMTPD_IN_MAIL_TRANSACTION(state)) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "503 5.5.1 Error: MAIL transaction in progress");
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    if (argc < 2) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Syntax: %s attribute=value...",
+			 XCLIENT_CMD);
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    if (xclient_hosts && xclient_hosts->error)
+	cant_permit_command(state, XCLIENT_CMD);
+    if (!xclient_allowed) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "550 5.7.0 Error: insufficient authorization");
+	return (-1);
+    }
+#define STREQ(x,y)	(strcasecmp((x), (y)) == 0)
+
+    /*
+     * Initialize.
+     */
+    if (state->expand_buf == 0)
+	state->expand_buf = vstring_alloc(100);
+
+    /*
+     * Iterate over all attribute=value elements.
+     */
+    for (argp = argv + 1; argp < argv + argc; argp++) {
+	attr_name = argp->strval;
+
+	if ((raw_value = split_at(attr_name, '=')) == 0 || *raw_value == 0) {
+	    state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+	    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Error: attribute=value expected");
+	    return (-1);
+	}
+	if (strlen(raw_value) > 255) {
+	    state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+	    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Error: attribute value too long");
+	    return (-1);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Backwards compatibility: Postfix prior to version 2.3 does not
+	 * xtext encode attribute values.
+	 */
+	attr_value = xtext_unquote(state->expand_buf, raw_value) ?
+	    STR(state->expand_buf) : raw_value;
+
+	/*
+	 * For safety's sake mask non-printable characters. We'll do more
+	 * specific censoring later.
+	 */
+	printable(attr_value, '?');
+
+#define UPDATE_STR(s, v) do { \
+	const char *_v = (v); \
+	if (s) myfree(s); \
+	(s) = (_v) ? mystrdup(_v) : 0; \
+    } while(0)
+
+	/*
+	 * NAME=substitute SMTP client hostname (and reverse/forward name, in
+	 * case of success). Also updates the client hostname lookup status
+	 * code.
+	 */
+	if (STREQ(attr_name, XCLIENT_NAME)) {
+	    name_status = name_code(peer_codes, NAME_CODE_FLAG_NONE, attr_value);
+	    if (name_status != SMTPD_PEER_CODE_OK) {
+		attr_value = CLIENT_NAME_UNKNOWN;
+	    } else {
+		/* XXX EAI */
+		if (!valid_hostname(attr_value, DONT_GRIPE)) {
+		    state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+		    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s syntax: %s",
+				     XCLIENT_NAME, attr_value);
+		    return (-1);
+		}
+	    }
+	    state->name_status = name_status;
+	    UPDATE_STR(state->name, attr_value);
+	    update_namaddr = 1;
+	    if (name_status == SMTPD_PEER_CODE_OK) {
+		UPDATE_STR(state->reverse_name, attr_value);
+		state->reverse_name_status = name_status;
+	    }
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * REVERSE_NAME=substitute SMTP client reverse hostname. Also updates
+	 * the client reverse hostname lookup status code.
+	 */
+	else if (STREQ(attr_name, XCLIENT_REVERSE_NAME)) {
+	    name_status = name_code(peer_codes, NAME_CODE_FLAG_NONE, attr_value);
+	    if (name_status != SMTPD_PEER_CODE_OK) {
+		attr_value = CLIENT_NAME_UNKNOWN;
+	    } else {
+		/* XXX EAI */
+		if (!valid_hostname(attr_value, DONT_GRIPE)) {
+		    state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+		    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s syntax: %s",
+				     XCLIENT_REVERSE_NAME, attr_value);
+		    return (-1);
+		}
+	    }
+	    state->reverse_name_status = name_status;
+	    UPDATE_STR(state->reverse_name, attr_value);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * ADDR=substitute SMTP client network address.
+	 */
+	else if (STREQ(attr_name, XCLIENT_ADDR)) {
+	    if (STREQ(attr_value, XCLIENT_UNAVAILABLE)) {
+		attr_value = CLIENT_ADDR_UNKNOWN;
+		UPDATE_STR(state->addr, attr_value);
+		UPDATE_STR(state->rfc_addr, attr_value);
+	    } else {
+		neuter(attr_value, NEUTER_CHARACTERS, '?');
+		if (normalize_mailhost_addr(attr_value, &state->rfc_addr,
+					    &state->addr,
+					    &state->addr_family) < 0) {
+		    state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+		    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s syntax: %s",
+				     XCLIENT_ADDR, attr_value);
+		    return (-1);
+		}
+	    }
+	    update_namaddr = 1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * PORT=substitute SMTP client port number.
+	 */
+	else if (STREQ(attr_name, XCLIENT_PORT)) {
+	    if (STREQ(attr_value, XCLIENT_UNAVAILABLE)) {
+		attr_value = CLIENT_PORT_UNKNOWN;
+	    } else {
+		if (!alldig(attr_value)
+		    || strlen(attr_value) > sizeof("65535") - 1) {
+		    state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+		    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s syntax: %s",
+				     XCLIENT_PORT, attr_value);
+		    return (-1);
+		}
+	    }
+	    UPDATE_STR(state->port, attr_value);
+	    update_namaddr = 1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * HELO=substitute SMTP client HELO parameter. Censor special
+	 * characters that could mess up message headers.
+	 */
+	else if (STREQ(attr_name, XCLIENT_HELO)) {
+	    if (STREQ(attr_value, XCLIENT_UNAVAILABLE)) {
+		attr_value = CLIENT_HELO_UNKNOWN;
+	    } else {
+		if (strlen(attr_value) > VALID_HOSTNAME_LEN) {
+		    state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+		    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s syntax: %s",
+				     XCLIENT_HELO, attr_value);
+		    return (-1);
+		}
+		neuter(attr_value, NEUTER_CHARACTERS, '?');
+	    }
+	    UPDATE_STR(state->helo_name, attr_value);
+	    got_helo = 1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * PROTO=SMTP protocol name.
+	 */
+	else if (STREQ(attr_name, XCLIENT_PROTO)) {
+	    if (name_code(proto_names, NAME_CODE_FLAG_NONE, attr_value) < 0) {
+		state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+		smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s syntax: %s",
+				 XCLIENT_PROTO, attr_value);
+		return (-1);
+	    }
+	    UPDATE_STR(state->protocol, uppercase(attr_value));
+	    got_proto = 1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * LOGIN=sasl_username. Sets the authentication method as XCLIENT.
+	 * This can be used even if SASL authentication is turned off in
+	 * main.cf. We can't make it easier than that.
+	 */
+#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
+	else if (STREQ(attr_name, XCLIENT_LOGIN)) {
+	    if (STREQ(attr_value, XCLIENT_UNAVAILABLE) == 0) {
+		smtpd_sasl_auth_extern(state, attr_value, XCLIENT_CMD);
+		got_login = 1;
+	    }
+	}
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * DESTADDR=substitute SMTP server network address.
+	 */
+	else if (STREQ(attr_name, XCLIENT_DESTADDR)) {
+	    if (STREQ(attr_value, XCLIENT_UNAVAILABLE)) {
+		attr_value = SERVER_ADDR_UNKNOWN;
+		UPDATE_STR(state->dest_addr, attr_value);
+	    } else {
+#define NO_NORM_RFC_ADDR		((char **) 0)
+#define NO_NORM_ADDR_FAMILY	((int *) 0)
+		neuter(attr_value, NEUTER_CHARACTERS, '?');
+		if (normalize_mailhost_addr(attr_value, NO_NORM_RFC_ADDR,
+					    &state->dest_addr,
+					    NO_NORM_ADDR_FAMILY) < 0) {
+		    state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+		    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s syntax: %s",
+				     XCLIENT_DESTADDR, attr_value);
+		    return (-1);
+		}
+	    }
+	    /* XXX Require same address family as client address. */
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * DESTPORT=substitute SMTP server port number.
+	 */
+	else if (STREQ(attr_name, XCLIENT_DESTPORT)) {
+	    if (STREQ(attr_value, XCLIENT_UNAVAILABLE)) {
+		attr_value = SERVER_PORT_UNKNOWN;
+	    } else {
+		if (!alldig(attr_value)
+		    || strlen(attr_value) > sizeof("65535") - 1) {
+		    state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+		    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s syntax: %s",
+				     XCLIENT_DESTPORT, attr_value);
+		    return (-1);
+		}
+	    }
+	    UPDATE_STR(state->dest_port, attr_value);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Unknown attribute name. Complain.
+	 */
+	else {
+	    state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+	    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s attribute name: %s",
+			     XCLIENT_CMD, attr_name);
+	    return (-1);
+	}
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Update the combined name and address when either has changed.
+     */
+    if (update_namaddr) {
+	if (state->namaddr)
+	    myfree(state->namaddr);
+	state->namaddr =
+	    SMTPD_BUILD_NAMADDRPORT(state->name, state->addr, state->port);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * XXX Compatibility: when the client issues XCLIENT then we have to go
+     * back to initial server greeting stage, otherwise we can't correctly
+     * simulate smtpd_client_restrictions (with smtpd_delay_reject=0) and
+     * Milter connect restrictions.
+     * 
+     * XXX Compatibility: for accurate simulation we must also reset the HELO
+     * information. We keep the information if it was specified in the
+     * XCLIENT command.
+     * 
+     * XXX The client connection count/rate control must be consistent in its
+     * use of client address information in connect and disconnect events. We
+     * re-evaluate xclient so that we correctly simulate connection
+     * concurrency and connection rate restrictions.
+     * 
+     * XXX Duplicated from smtpd_proto().
+     */
+    xclient_allowed =
+	namadr_list_match(xclient_hosts, state->name, state->addr);
+    smtp_detect_bare_lf = (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE((state)) == 0 && bare_lf_mask
+	    && !namadr_list_match(bare_lf_excl, state->name, state->addr)) ?
+	bare_lf_mask : 0;
+    /* NOT: tls_reset() */
+    if (got_helo == 0)
+	helo_reset(state);
+    if (got_proto == 0 && strcasecmp(state->protocol, MAIL_PROTO_SMTP) != 0) {
+	myfree(state->protocol);
+	state->protocol = mystrdup(MAIL_PROTO_SMTP);
+    }
+#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
+    /* XXX What if they send the parameters via multiple commands? */
+    if (got_login == 0)
+	smtpd_sasl_auth_reset(state);
+    if (smtpd_sasl_is_active(state)) {
+	if (got_login)
+	    saved_username = mystrdup(state->sasl_username);
+	smtpd_sasl_deactivate(state);
+#ifdef USE_TLS
+	if (state->tls_context != 0)		/* TLS from XCLIENT proxy? */
+	    smtpd_sasl_activate(state, VAR_SMTPD_SASL_TLS_OPTS,
+				var_smtpd_sasl_tls_opts);
+	else
+#endif
+	    smtpd_sasl_activate(state, VAR_SMTPD_SASL_OPTS,
+				var_smtpd_sasl_opts);
+	if (got_login) {
+	    smtpd_sasl_auth_extern(state, saved_username, XCLIENT_CMD);
+	    myfree(saved_username);
+	}
+    }
+#endif
+    chat_reset(state, 0);
+    mail_reset(state);
+    rcpt_reset(state);
+    if (state->milters)
+	milter_disc_event(state->milters);
+    /* Following duplicates the top-level connect/disconnect handler. */
+    teardown_milters(state);
+    setup_milters(state);
+    vstream_longjmp(state->client, SMTP_ERR_NONE);
+    return (0);
+}
+
+/* xforward_cmd - forward logging attributes */
+
+static int xforward_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *argv)
+{
+    SMTPD_TOKEN *argp;
+    char   *raw_value;
+    char   *attr_value;
+    char   *attr_name;
+    int     updated = 0;
+    static const NAME_CODE xforward_flags[] = {
+	XFORWARD_NAME, SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_NAME,
+	XFORWARD_ADDR, SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_ADDR,
+	XFORWARD_PORT, SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_PORT,
+	XFORWARD_PROTO, SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_PROTO,
+	XFORWARD_HELO, SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_HELO,
+	XFORWARD_IDENT, SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_IDENT,
+	XFORWARD_DOMAIN, SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_DOMAIN,
+	0, 0,
+    };
+    static const char *context_name[] = {
+	MAIL_ATTR_RWR_LOCAL,		/* Postfix internal form */
+	MAIL_ATTR_RWR_REMOTE,		/* Postfix internal form */
+    };
+    static const NAME_CODE xforward_to_context[] = {
+	XFORWARD_DOM_LOCAL, 0,		/* XFORWARD representation */
+	XFORWARD_DOM_REMOTE, 1,		/* XFORWARD representation */
+	0, -1,
+    };
+    int     flag;
+    int     context_code;
+
+    /*
+     * Sanity checks.
+     */
+    if (SMTPD_IN_MAIL_TRANSACTION(state)) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "503 5.5.1 Error: MAIL transaction in progress");
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    if (argc < 2) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Syntax: %s attribute=value...",
+			 XFORWARD_CMD);
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    if (xforward_hosts && xforward_hosts->error)
+	cant_permit_command(state, XFORWARD_CMD);
+    if (!xforward_allowed) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "550 5.7.0 Error: insufficient authorization");
+	return (-1);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Initialize.
+     */
+    if (state->xforward.flags == 0)
+	smtpd_xforward_preset(state);
+    if (state->expand_buf == 0)
+	state->expand_buf = vstring_alloc(100);
+
+    /*
+     * Iterate over all attribute=value elements.
+     */
+    for (argp = argv + 1; argp < argv + argc; argp++) {
+	attr_name = argp->strval;
+
+	if ((raw_value = split_at(attr_name, '=')) == 0 || *raw_value == 0) {
+	    state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+	    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Error: attribute=value expected");
+	    return (-1);
+	}
+	if (strlen(raw_value) > 255) {
+	    state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+	    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Error: attribute value too long");
+	    return (-1);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Backwards compatibility: Postfix prior to version 2.3 does not
+	 * xtext encode attribute values.
+	 */
+	attr_value = xtext_unquote(state->expand_buf, raw_value) ?
+	    STR(state->expand_buf) : raw_value;
+
+	/*
+	 * For safety's sake mask non-printable characters. We'll do more
+	 * specific censoring later.
+	 */
+	printable(attr_value, '?');
+
+	flag = name_code(xforward_flags, NAME_CODE_FLAG_NONE, attr_name);
+	switch (flag) {
+
+	    /*
+	     * NAME=up-stream host name, not necessarily in the DNS. Censor
+	     * special characters that could mess up message headers.
+	     */
+	case SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_NAME:
+	    if (STREQ(attr_value, XFORWARD_UNAVAILABLE)) {
+		attr_value = CLIENT_NAME_UNKNOWN;
+	    } else {
+		/* XXX EAI */
+		neuter(attr_value, NEUTER_CHARACTERS, '?');
+		if (!valid_hostname(attr_value, DONT_GRIPE)) {
+		    state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+		    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s syntax: %s",
+				     XFORWARD_NAME, attr_value);
+		    return (-1);
+		}
+	    }
+	    UPDATE_STR(state->xforward.name, attr_value);
+	    break;
+
+	    /*
+	     * ADDR=up-stream host network address, not necessarily on the
+	     * Internet. Censor special characters that could mess up message
+	     * headers.
+	     */
+	case SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_ADDR:
+	    if (STREQ(attr_value, XFORWARD_UNAVAILABLE)) {
+		attr_value = CLIENT_ADDR_UNKNOWN;
+		UPDATE_STR(state->xforward.addr, attr_value);
+	    } else {
+		neuter(attr_value, NEUTER_CHARACTERS, '?');
+		if (normalize_mailhost_addr(attr_value,
+					    &state->xforward.rfc_addr,
+					    &state->xforward.addr,
+					    NO_NORM_ADDR_FAMILY) < 0) {
+		    state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+		    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s syntax: %s",
+				     XFORWARD_ADDR, attr_value);
+		    return (-1);
+		}
+	    }
+	    break;
+
+	    /*
+	     * PORT=up-stream port number.
+	     */
+	case SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_PORT:
+	    if (STREQ(attr_value, XFORWARD_UNAVAILABLE)) {
+		attr_value = CLIENT_PORT_UNKNOWN;
+	    } else {
+		if (!alldig(attr_value)
+		    || strlen(attr_value) > sizeof("65535") - 1) {
+		    state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+		    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s syntax: %s",
+				     XFORWARD_PORT, attr_value);
+		    return (-1);
+		}
+	    }
+	    UPDATE_STR(state->xforward.port, attr_value);
+	    break;
+
+	    /*
+	     * HELO=hostname that the up-stream MTA introduced itself with
+	     * (not necessarily SMTP HELO). Censor special characters that
+	     * could mess up message headers.
+	     */
+	case SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_HELO:
+	    if (STREQ(attr_value, XFORWARD_UNAVAILABLE)) {
+		attr_value = CLIENT_HELO_UNKNOWN;
+	    } else {
+		neuter(attr_value, NEUTER_CHARACTERS, '?');
+	    }
+	    UPDATE_STR(state->xforward.helo_name, attr_value);
+	    break;
+
+	    /*
+	     * PROTO=up-stream protocol, not necessarily SMTP or ESMTP.
+	     * Censor special characters that could mess up message headers.
+	     */
+	case SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_PROTO:
+	    if (STREQ(attr_value, XFORWARD_UNAVAILABLE)) {
+		attr_value = CLIENT_PROTO_UNKNOWN;
+	    } else {
+		if (strlen(attr_value) > 64) {
+		    state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+		    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s syntax: %s",
+				     XFORWARD_PROTO, attr_value);
+		    return (-1);
+		}
+		neuter(attr_value, NEUTER_CHARACTERS, '?');
+	    }
+	    UPDATE_STR(state->xforward.protocol, attr_value);
+	    break;
+
+	    /*
+	     * IDENT=local message identifier on the up-stream MTA. Censor
+	     * special characters that could mess up logging or macro
+	     * expansions.
+	     */
+	case SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_IDENT:
+	    if (STREQ(attr_value, XFORWARD_UNAVAILABLE)) {
+		attr_value = CLIENT_IDENT_UNKNOWN;
+	    } else {
+		neuter(attr_value, NEUTER_CHARACTERS, '?');
+	    }
+	    UPDATE_STR(state->xforward.ident, attr_value);
+	    break;
+
+	    /*
+	     * DOMAIN=local or remote.
+	     */
+	case SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_DOMAIN:
+	    if (STREQ(attr_value, XFORWARD_UNAVAILABLE))
+		attr_value = XFORWARD_DOM_LOCAL;
+	    if ((context_code = name_code(xforward_to_context,
+					  NAME_CODE_FLAG_NONE,
+					  attr_value)) < 0) {
+		state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+		smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s syntax: %s",
+				 XFORWARD_DOMAIN, attr_value);
+		return (-1);
+	    }
+	    UPDATE_STR(state->xforward.domain, context_name[context_code]);
+	    break;
+
+	    /*
+	     * Unknown attribute name. Complain.
+	     */
+	default:
+	    state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+	    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s attribute name: %s",
+			     XFORWARD_CMD, attr_name);
+	    return (-1);
+	}
+	updated |= flag;
+    }
+    state->xforward.flags |= updated;
+
+    /*
+     * Update the combined name and address when either has changed. Use only
+     * the name when no address is available.
+     */
+    if (updated & (SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_NAME | SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_ADDR
+		   | SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_PORT)) {
+	if (state->xforward.namaddr)
+	    myfree(state->xforward.namaddr);
+	state->xforward.namaddr =
+	    IS_AVAIL_CLIENT_ADDR(state->xforward.addr) ?
+	    SMTPD_BUILD_NAMADDRPORT(state->xforward.name,
+				    state->xforward.addr,
+				    state->xforward.port) :
+	    mystrdup(state->xforward.name);
+    }
+    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250 2.0.0 Ok");
+    return (0);
+}
+
+/* chat_reset - notify postmaster and reset conversation log */
+
+static void chat_reset(SMTPD_STATE *state, int threshold)
+{
+
+    /*
+     * Notify the postmaster if there were errors. This usually indicates a
+     * client configuration problem, or that someone is trying nasty things.
+     * Either is significant enough to bother the postmaster. XXX Can't
+     * report problems when running in stand-alone mode: postmaster notices
+     * require availability of the cleanup service.
+     */
+    if (state->history != 0 && state->history->argc > threshold) {
+	if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0
+	    && (state->error_mask & state->notify_mask))
+	    smtpd_chat_notify(state);
+	state->error_mask = 0;
+	smtpd_chat_reset(state);
+    }
+}
+
+#ifdef USE_TLS
+
+/* smtpd_start_tls - turn on TLS or force disconnect */
+
+static void smtpd_start_tls(SMTPD_STATE *state)
+{
+    int     rate;
+    int     cert_present;
+    int     requirecert;
+
+#ifdef USE_TLSPROXY
+
+    /*
+     * This is non-production code, for tlsproxy(8) load testing only. It
+     * implements enough to enable some Postfix features that depend on TLS
+     * encryption.
+     * 
+     * To insert tlsproxy(8) between this process and the SMTP client, we swap
+     * the file descriptors between the state->tlsproxy and state->client
+     * VSTREAMS, so that we don't lose all the user-configurable
+     * state->client attributes (such as longjump buffers or timeouts).
+     * 
+     * As we implement tlsproxy support in the Postfix SMTP client we should
+     * develop a usable abstraction that encapsulates this stream plumbing in
+     * a library module.
+     */
+    vstream_control(state->tlsproxy, CA_VSTREAM_CTL_DOUBLE, CA_VSTREAM_CTL_END);
+    vstream_control(state->client, CA_VSTREAM_CTL_SWAP_FD(state->tlsproxy),
+		    CA_VSTREAM_CTL_END);
+    (void) vstream_fclose(state->tlsproxy);	/* direct-to-client stream! */
+    state->tlsproxy = 0;
+
+    /*
+     * After plumbing the plaintext stream, receive the TLS context object.
+     * For this we must use the same VSTREAM buffer that we also use to
+     * receive subsequent SMTP commands. The attribute protocol is robust
+     * enough that an adversary cannot inject their own bogus TLS context
+     * attributes into the stream.
+     */
+    state->tls_context = tls_proxy_context_receive(state->client);
+
+    /*
+     * XXX Maybe it is better to send this information to tlsproxy(8) when
+     * requesting service, effectively making a remote tls_server_start()
+     * call.
+     */
+    requirecert = (var_smtpd_tls_req_ccert && var_smtpd_enforce_tls);
+
+#else						/* USE_TLSPROXY */
+    TLS_SERVER_START_PROPS props;
+    static char *cipher_grade;
+    static VSTRING *cipher_exclusions;
+
+    /*
+     * Wrapper mode uses a dedicated port and always requires TLS.
+     * 
+     * XXX In non-wrapper mode, it is possible to require client certificate
+     * verification without requiring TLS. Since certificates can be verified
+     * only while TLS is turned on, this means that Postfix will happily
+     * perform SMTP transactions when the client does not use the STARTTLS
+     * command. For this reason, Postfix does not require client certificate
+     * verification unless TLS is required.
+     * 
+     * The cipher grade and exclusions don't change between sessions. Compute
+     * just once and cache.
+     */
+#define ADD_EXCLUDE(vstr, str) \
+    do { \
+	if (*(str)) \
+	    vstring_sprintf_append((vstr), "%s%s", \
+				   VSTRING_LEN(vstr) ? " " : "", (str)); \
+    } while (0)
+
+    if (cipher_grade == 0) {
+	cipher_grade = var_smtpd_enforce_tls ?
+	    var_smtpd_tls_mand_ciph : var_smtpd_tls_ciph;
+	cipher_exclusions = vstring_alloc(10);
+	ADD_EXCLUDE(cipher_exclusions, var_smtpd_tls_excl_ciph);
+	if (var_smtpd_enforce_tls)
+	    ADD_EXCLUDE(cipher_exclusions, var_smtpd_tls_mand_excl);
+	if (ask_client_cert)
+	    ADD_EXCLUDE(cipher_exclusions, "aNULL");
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Perform the TLS handshake now. Check the client certificate
+     * requirements later, if necessary.
+     */
+    requirecert = (var_smtpd_tls_req_ccert && var_smtpd_enforce_tls);
+
+    state->tls_context =
+	TLS_SERVER_START(&props,
+			 ctx = smtpd_tls_ctx,
+			 stream = state->client,
+			 fd = -1,
+			 timeout = var_smtpd_starttls_tmout,
+			 requirecert = requirecert,
+			 serverid = state->service,
+			 namaddr = state->namaddr,
+			 cipher_grade = cipher_grade,
+			 cipher_exclusions = STR(cipher_exclusions),
+			 mdalg = var_smtpd_tls_fpt_dgst);
+
+#endif						/* USE_TLSPROXY */
+
+    /*
+     * For new (i.e. not re-used) TLS sessions, increment the client's new
+     * TLS session rate counter. We enforce the limit here only for human
+     * factors reasons (reduce the WTF factor), even though it is too late to
+     * save the CPU that was already burnt on PKI ops. The real safety
+     * mechanism applies with future STARTTLS commands (or wrappermode
+     * connections), prior to the SSL handshake.
+     * 
+     * XXX The client event count/rate control must be consistent in its use of
+     * client address information in connect and disconnect events. For now
+     * we exclude xclient authorized hosts from event count/rate control.
+     */
+    if (var_smtpd_cntls_limit > 0
+     && (state->tls_context == 0 || state->tls_context->session_reused == 0)
+	&& SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0
+	&& !xclient_allowed
+	&& anvil_clnt
+	&& !namadr_list_match(hogger_list, state->name, state->addr)
+	&& anvil_clnt_newtls(anvil_clnt, state->service, state->addr,
+			     &rate) == ANVIL_STAT_OK
+	&& rate > var_smtpd_cntls_limit) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
+	msg_warn("New TLS session rate limit exceeded: %d from %s for service %s",
+		 rate, state->namaddr, state->service);
+	if (state->tls_context)
+	    smtpd_chat_reply(state,
+		    "421 4.7.0 %s Error: too many new TLS sessions from %s",
+			     var_myhostname, state->namaddr);
+	/* XXX Use regular return to signal end of session. */
+	vstream_longjmp(state->client, SMTP_ERR_QUIET);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * When the TLS handshake fails, the conversation is in an unknown state.
+     * There is nothing we can do except to disconnect from the client.
+     */
+    if (state->tls_context == 0)
+	vstream_longjmp(state->client, SMTP_ERR_EOF);
+
+    /*
+     * If we are requiring verified client certs, enforce the constraint
+     * here. We have a usable TLS session with the client, so no need to
+     * disable I/O, ...  we can even be polite and send "421 ...".
+     */
+    if (requirecert && TLS_CERT_IS_TRUSTED(state->tls_context) == 0) {
+
+	/*
+	 * In non-wrappermode, fetch the next command (should be EHLO). Reply
+	 * with 421, then disconnect (as a side-effect of replying with 421).
+	 */
+	cert_present = TLS_CERT_IS_PRESENT(state->tls_context);
+	msg_info("NOQUEUE: abort: TLS from %s: %s",
+		 state->namaddr, cert_present ?
+		 "Client certificate not trusted" :
+		 "No client certificate presented");
+	if (var_smtpd_tls_wrappermode == 0)
+	    smtpd_chat_query(state);
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "421 4.7.1 %s Error: %s",
+			 var_myhostname, cert_present ?
+			 "Client certificate not trusted" :
+			 "No client certificate presented");
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
+	return;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * When TLS is turned on, we may offer AUTH methods that would not be
+     * offered within a plain-text session.
+     * 
+     * XXX Always refresh SASL the mechanism list after STARTTLS. Dovecot
+     * responses may depend on whether the SMTP connection is encrypted.
+     */
+#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
+    if (var_smtpd_sasl_enable) {
+	/* Non-wrappermode, presumably. */
+	if (smtpd_sasl_is_active(state)) {
+	    smtpd_sasl_auth_reset(state);
+	    smtpd_sasl_deactivate(state);
+	}
+	/* Wrappermode and non-wrappermode. */
+	if (smtpd_sasl_is_active(state) == 0)
+	    smtpd_sasl_activate(state, VAR_SMTPD_SASL_TLS_OPTS,
+				var_smtpd_sasl_tls_opts);
+    }
+#endif
+}
+
+/* starttls_cmd - respond to STARTTLS */
+
+static int starttls_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *unused_argv)
+{
+    const char *err;
+    int     rate;
+
+    if (argc != 1) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Syntax: STARTTLS");
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    if (state->milters != 0 && (err = milter_other_event(state->milters)) != 0) {
+	if (err[0] == '5') {
+	    state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
+	    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err);
+	    return (-1);
+	}
+	/* Sendmail compatibility: map 4xx into 454. */
+	else if (err[0] == '4') {
+	    state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
+	    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "454 4.3.0 Try again later");
+	    return (-1);
+	}
+    }
+    if (state->tls_context != 0) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "554 5.5.1 Error: TLS already active");
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    if (var_smtpd_use_tls == 0
+	|| (state->ehlo_discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_STARTTLS)) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "502 5.5.1 Error: command not implemented");
+	return (-1);
+    }
+#ifdef USE_TLSPROXY
+
+    /*
+     * Note: state->tlsproxy is left open when smtp_flush() calls longjmp(),
+     * so we garbage-collect the VSTREAM in smtpd_state_reset().
+     */
+#define PROXY_OPEN_FLAGS \
+	(TLS_PROXY_FLAG_ROLE_SERVER | TLS_PROXY_FLAG_SEND_CONTEXT)
+
+    state->tlsproxy =
+	tls_proxy_legacy_open(var_tlsproxy_service, PROXY_OPEN_FLAGS,
+			      state->client, state->addr,
+			      state->port, var_smtpd_tmout,
+			      state->service);
+    if (state->tlsproxy == 0) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_SOFTWARE;
+	/* RFC 3207 Section 4. */
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "454 4.7.0 TLS not available due to local problem");
+	return (-1);
+    }
+#else						/* USE_TLSPROXY */
+    if (smtpd_tls_ctx == 0) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_SOFTWARE;
+	/* RFC 3207 Section 4. */
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "454 4.7.0 TLS not available due to local problem");
+	return (-1);
+    }
+#endif						/* USE_TLSPROXY */
+
+    /*
+     * Enforce TLS handshake rate limit when this client negotiated too many
+     * new TLS sessions in the recent past.
+     * 
+     * XXX The client event count/rate control must be consistent in its use of
+     * client address information in connect and disconnect events. For now
+     * we exclude xclient authorized hosts from event count/rate control.
+     */
+    if (var_smtpd_cntls_limit > 0
+	&& SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0
+	&& !xclient_allowed
+	&& anvil_clnt
+	&& !namadr_list_match(hogger_list, state->name, state->addr)
+	&& anvil_clnt_newtls_stat(anvil_clnt, state->service, state->addr,
+				  &rate) == ANVIL_STAT_OK
+	&& rate > var_smtpd_cntls_limit) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
+	msg_warn("Refusing STARTTLS request from %s for service %s",
+		 state->namaddr, state->service);
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state,
+		       "454 4.7.0 Error: too many new TLS sessions from %s",
+			 state->namaddr);
+#ifdef USE_TLSPROXY
+	(void) vstream_fclose(state->tlsproxy);
+	state->tlsproxy = 0;
+#endif
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "220 2.0.0 Ready to start TLS");
+    /* Flush before we switch read/write routines or file descriptors. */
+    smtp_flush(state->client);
+    /* At this point there must not be any pending plaintext. */
+    vstream_fpurge(state->client, VSTREAM_PURGE_BOTH);
+
+    /*
+     * Reset all inputs to the initial state.
+     * 
+     * XXX RFC 2487 does not forbid the use of STARTTLS while mail transfer is
+     * in progress, so we have to allow it even when it makes no sense.
+     */
+    helo_reset(state);
+    mail_reset(state);
+    rcpt_reset(state);
+
+    /*
+     * Turn on TLS, using code that is shared with TLS wrapper mode. This
+     * code does not return when the handshake fails.
+     */
+    smtpd_start_tls(state);
+    return (0);
+}
+
+/* tls_reset - undo STARTTLS */
+
+static void tls_reset(SMTPD_STATE *state)
+{
+    int     failure = 0;
+
+    /*
+     * Don't waste time when we lost contact.
+     */
+    if (state->tls_context) {
+	if (vstream_feof(state->client) || vstream_ferror(state->client))
+	    failure = 1;
+	vstream_fflush(state->client);		/* NOT: smtp_flush() */
+#ifdef USE_TLSPROXY
+	tls_proxy_context_free(state->tls_context);
+#else
+	tls_server_stop(smtpd_tls_ctx, state->client, var_smtpd_starttls_tmout,
+			failure, state->tls_context);
+#endif
+	state->tls_context = 0;
+    }
+}
+
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(USE_TLS) || !defined(USE_SASL_AUTH)
+
+/* unimpl_cmd - dummy for functionality that is not compiled in */
+
+static int unimpl_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *unused_argv)
+{
+
+    /*
+     * When a connection is closed we want to log the request counts for
+     * unimplemented STARTTLS or AUTH commands separately, instead of logging
+     * those commands as "unknown". By handling unimplemented commands with
+     * this dummy function, we avoid messing up the command processing loop.
+     */
+    state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "502 5.5.1 Error: command not implemented");
+    return (-1);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+ /*
+  * The table of all SMTP commands that we know. Set the junk limit flag on
+  * any command that can be repeated an arbitrary number of times without
+  * triggering a tarpit delay of some sort.
+  */
+typedef struct SMTPD_CMD {
+    char   *name;
+    int     (*action) (SMTPD_STATE *, int, SMTPD_TOKEN *);
+    int     flags;
+    int     success_count;
+    int     total_count;
+} SMTPD_CMD;
+
+ /*
+  * Per RFC 2920: "In particular, the commands RSET, MAIL FROM, SEND FROM,
+  * SOML FROM, SAML FROM, and RCPT TO can all appear anywhere in a pipelined
+  * command group. The EHLO, DATA, VRFY, EXPN, TURN, QUIT, and NOOP commands
+  * can only appear as the last command in a group". RFC 3030 allows BDAT
+  * commands to be pipelined as well.
+  */
+#define SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LIMIT	(1<<0)	/* limit usage */
+#define SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_PRE_TLS	(1<<1)	/* allow before STARTTLS */
+#define SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LAST	(1<<2)	/* last in PIPELINING command group */
+
+static SMTPD_CMD smtpd_cmd_table[] = {
+    {SMTPD_CMD_HELO, helo_cmd, SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LIMIT | SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_PRE_TLS | SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LAST,},
+    {SMTPD_CMD_EHLO, ehlo_cmd, SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LIMIT | SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_PRE_TLS | SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LAST,},
+    {SMTPD_CMD_XCLIENT, xclient_cmd, SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_PRE_TLS},
+    {SMTPD_CMD_XFORWARD, xforward_cmd,},
+#ifdef USE_TLS
+    {SMTPD_CMD_STARTTLS, starttls_cmd, SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_PRE_TLS,},
+#else
+    {SMTPD_CMD_STARTTLS, unimpl_cmd, SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_PRE_TLS,},
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
+    {SMTPD_CMD_AUTH, smtpd_sasl_auth_cmd_wrapper,},
+#else
+    {SMTPD_CMD_AUTH, unimpl_cmd,},
+#endif
+    {SMTPD_CMD_MAIL, mail_cmd,},
+    {SMTPD_CMD_RCPT, rcpt_cmd,},
+    {SMTPD_CMD_DATA, data_cmd, SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LAST,},
+    {SMTPD_CMD_BDAT, bdat_cmd,},
+    {SMTPD_CMD_RSET, rset_cmd, SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LIMIT,},
+    {SMTPD_CMD_NOOP, noop_cmd, SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LIMIT | SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_PRE_TLS | SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LAST,},
+    {SMTPD_CMD_VRFY, vrfy_cmd, SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LIMIT | SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LAST,},
+    {SMTPD_CMD_ETRN, etrn_cmd, SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LIMIT,},
+    {SMTPD_CMD_QUIT, quit_cmd, SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_PRE_TLS,},
+    {0,},
+};
+
+static STRING_LIST *smtpd_noop_cmds;
+static STRING_LIST *smtpd_forbid_cmds;
+
+/* smtpd_flag_ill_pipelining - flag pipelining protocol violation */
+
+static int smtpd_flag_ill_pipelining(SMTPD_STATE *state)
+{
+
+    /*
+     * This code will not return after I/O error, timeout, or EOF. VSTREAM
+     * exceptions must be enabled in advance with smtp_stream_setup().
+     */
+    if (vstream_peek(state->client) == 0
+	&& peekfd(vstream_fileno(state->client)) > 0)
+	(void) vstream_ungetc(state->client, smtp_fgetc(state->client));
+    if (vstream_peek(state->client) > 0) {
+	if (state->expand_buf == 0)
+	    state->expand_buf = vstring_alloc(100);
+	escape(state->expand_buf, vstream_peek_data(state->client),
+	       vstream_peek(state->client) < 100 ?
+	       vstream_peek(state->client) : 100);
+	msg_info("improper command pipelining after %s from %s: %s",
+		 state->where, state->namaddr, STR(state->expand_buf));
+	state->flags |= SMTPD_FLAG_ILL_PIPELINING;
+	return (1);
+    }
+    return (0);
+}
+
+/* smtpd_proto - talk the SMTP protocol */
+
+static void smtpd_proto(SMTPD_STATE *state)
+{
+    int     argc;
+    SMTPD_TOKEN *argv;
+    SMTPD_CMD *cmdp;
+    const char *ehlo_words;
+    const char *err;
+    int     status;
+    const char *cp;
+
+#ifdef USE_TLS
+    int     tls_rate;
+
+#endif
+
+    /*
+     * Print a greeting banner and run the state machine. Read SMTP commands
+     * one line at a time. According to the standard, a sender or recipient
+     * address could contain an escaped newline. I think this is perverse,
+     * and anyone depending on this is really asking for trouble.
+     * 
+     * In case of mail protocol trouble, the program jumps back to this place,
+     * so that it can perform the necessary cleanup before talking to the
+     * next client. The setjmp/longjmp primitives are like a sharp tool: use
+     * with care. I would certainly recommend against the use of
+     * setjmp/longjmp in programs that change privilege levels.
+     * 
+     * In case of file system trouble the program terminates after logging the
+     * error and after informing the client. In all other cases (out of
+     * memory, panic) the error is logged, and the msg_cleanup() exit handler
+     * cleans up, but no attempt is made to inform the client of the nature
+     * of the problem.
+     */
+    smtp_stream_setup(state->client, var_smtpd_tmout, var_smtpd_rec_deadline);
+
+    while ((status = vstream_setjmp(state->client)) == SMTP_ERR_NONE)
+	 /* void */ ;
+    switch (status) {
+
+    default:
+	msg_panic("smtpd_proto: unknown error reading from %s",
+		  state->namaddr);
+	break;
+
+    case SMTP_ERR_TIME:
+	state->reason = REASON_TIMEOUT;
+	if (vstream_setjmp(state->client) == 0)
+	    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "421 4.4.2 %s Error: timeout exceeded",
+			     var_myhostname);
+	break;
+
+    case SMTP_ERR_EOF:
+	state->reason = REASON_LOST_CONNECTION;
+	break;
+
+    case SMTP_ERR_QUIET:
+	break;
+
+    case SMTP_ERR_DATA:
+	msg_info("%s: reject: %s from %s: "
+		 "421 4.3.0 %s Server local data error",
+		 (state->queue_id ? state->queue_id : "NOQUEUE"),
+		 state->where, state->namaddr, var_myhostname);
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_DATA;
+	if (vstream_setjmp(state->client) == 0)
+	    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "421 4.3.0 %s Server local data error",
+			     var_myhostname);
+	break;
+
+    case 0:
+
+	/*
+	 * Don't bother doing anything if some pre-SMTP handshake (haproxy)
+	 * did not work out.
+	 */
+	if (state->flags & SMTPD_FLAG_HANGUP) {
+	    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "421 4.3.0 %s Server local error",
+			     var_myhostname);
+	    break;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * In TLS wrapper mode, turn on TLS using code that is shared with
+	 * the STARTTLS command. This code does not return when the handshake
+	 * fails.
+	 * 
+	 * Enforce TLS handshake rate limit when this client negotiated too many
+	 * new TLS sessions in the recent past.
+	 * 
+	 * XXX This means we don't complete a TLS handshake just to tell the
+	 * client that we don't provide service. TLS wrapper mode is
+	 * obsolete, so we don't have to provide perfect support.
+	 */
+#ifdef USE_TLS
+	if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0 && var_smtpd_tls_wrappermode
+	    && state->tls_context == 0) {
+#ifdef USE_TLSPROXY
+	    /* We garbage-collect the VSTREAM in smtpd_state_reset() */
+	    state->tlsproxy =
+		tls_proxy_legacy_open(var_tlsproxy_service,
+				      PROXY_OPEN_FLAGS,
+				      state->client, state->addr,
+				      state->port, var_smtpd_tmout,
+				      state->service);
+	    if (state->tlsproxy == 0) {
+		msg_warn("Wrapper-mode request dropped from %s for service %s."
+		       " TLS context initialization failed. For details see"
+			 " earlier warnings in your logs.",
+			 state->namaddr, state->service);
+		break;
+	    }
+#else						/* USE_TLSPROXY */
+	    if (smtpd_tls_ctx == 0) {
+		msg_warn("Wrapper-mode request dropped from %s for service %s."
+		       " TLS context initialization failed. For details see"
+			 " earlier warnings in your logs.",
+			 state->namaddr, state->service);
+		break;
+	    }
+#endif						/* USE_TLSPROXY */
+	    if (var_smtpd_cntls_limit > 0
+		&& !xclient_allowed
+		&& anvil_clnt
+		&& !namadr_list_match(hogger_list, state->name, state->addr)
+		&& anvil_clnt_newtls_stat(anvil_clnt, state->service,
+				    state->addr, &tls_rate) == ANVIL_STAT_OK
+		&& tls_rate > var_smtpd_cntls_limit) {
+		state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
+		msg_warn("Refusing TLS service request from %s for service %s",
+			 state->namaddr, state->service);
+		break;
+	    }
+	    smtpd_start_tls(state);
+	}
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * If the client spoke before the server sends the initial greeting,
+	 * raise a flag and log the content of the protocol violation. This
+	 * check MUST NOT apply to TLS wrappermode connections.
+	 */
+	if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0
+	    && vstream_context(state->client) == 0	/* not postscreen */
+	    && (state->flags & SMTPD_FLAG_ILL_PIPELINING) == 0
+	    && smtpd_flag_ill_pipelining(state)
+	    && var_smtpd_forbid_unauth_pipe) {
+	    smtpd_chat_reply(state,
+			  "554 5.5.0 Error: SMTP protocol synchronization");
+	    break;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * XXX The client connection count/rate control must be consistent in
+	 * its use of client address information in connect and disconnect
+	 * events. For now we exclude xclient authorized hosts from
+	 * connection count/rate control.
+	 * 
+	 * XXX Must send connect/disconnect events to the anvil server even when
+	 * this service is not connection count or rate limited, otherwise it
+	 * will discard client message or recipient rate information too
+	 * early or too late.
+	 */
+	if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0
+	    && !xclient_allowed
+	    && anvil_clnt
+	    && !namadr_list_match(hogger_list, state->name, state->addr)
+	    && anvil_clnt_connect(anvil_clnt, state->service, state->addr,
+				  &state->conn_count, &state->conn_rate)
+	    == ANVIL_STAT_OK) {
+	    if (var_smtpd_cconn_limit > 0
+		&& state->conn_count > var_smtpd_cconn_limit) {
+		state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
+		msg_warn("Connection concurrency limit exceeded: %d from %s for service %s",
+			 state->conn_count, state->namaddr, state->service);
+		smtpd_chat_reply(state, "421 4.7.0 %s Error: too many connections from %s",
+				 var_myhostname, state->addr);
+		break;
+	    }
+	    if (var_smtpd_crate_limit > 0
+		&& state->conn_rate > var_smtpd_crate_limit) {
+		msg_warn("Connection rate limit exceeded: %d from %s for service %s",
+			 state->conn_rate, state->namaddr, state->service);
+		smtpd_chat_reply(state, "421 4.7.0 %s Error: too many connections from %s",
+				 var_myhostname, state->addr);
+		break;
+	    }
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Determine what server ESMTP features to suppress, typically to
+	 * avoid inter-operability problems. Moved up so we don't send 421
+	 * immediately after sending the initial server response.
+	 */
+	if (ehlo_discard_maps == 0
+	|| (ehlo_words = maps_find(ehlo_discard_maps, state->addr, 0)) == 0)
+	    ehlo_words = var_smtpd_ehlo_dis_words;
+	state->ehlo_discard_mask = ehlo_mask(ehlo_words);
+
+	/* XXX We use the real client for connect access control. */
+	if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0
+	    && var_smtpd_delay_reject == 0
+	    && (err = smtpd_check_client(state)) != 0) {
+	    state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
+	    state->access_denied = mystrdup(err);
+	    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", state->access_denied);
+	    state->error_count++;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * RFC 2034: the text part of all 2xx, 4xx, and 5xx SMTP responses
+	 * other than the initial greeting and any response to HELO or EHLO
+	 * are prefaced with a status code as defined in RFC 3463.
+	 */
+
+	/*
+	 * XXX If a Milter rejects CONNECT, reply with 220 except in case of
+	 * hard reject or 421 (disconnect). The reply persists so it will
+	 * apply to MAIL FROM and to other commands such as AUTH, STARTTLS,
+	 * and VRFY. Note: after a Milter CONNECT reject, we must not reject
+	 * HELO or EHLO, but we do change the feature list that is announced
+	 * in the EHLO response.
+	 */
+	else {
+	    err = 0;
+	    if (state->milters != 0) {
+		milter_macro_callback(state->milters, smtpd_milter_eval,
+				      (void *) state);
+		if ((err = milter_conn_event(state->milters, state->name,
+					     state->addr,
+				  strcmp(state->port, CLIENT_PORT_UNKNOWN) ?
+					     state->port : "0",
+					     state->addr_family)) != 0)
+		    err = check_milter_reply(state, err);
+	    }
+	    if (err && err[0] == '5') {
+		state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
+		smtpd_chat_reply(state, "554 %s ESMTP not accepting connections",
+				 var_myhostname);
+		state->error_count++;
+	    } else if (err && strncmp(err, "421", 3) == 0) {
+		state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY;
+		smtpd_chat_reply(state, "421 %s Service unavailable - try again later",
+				 var_myhostname);
+		/* Not: state->error_count++; */
+	    } else {
+		smtpd_chat_reply(state, "220 %s", var_smtpd_banner);
+	    }
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * SASL initialization for plaintext mode.
+	 * 
+	 * XXX Backwards compatibility: allow AUTH commands when the AUTH
+	 * announcement is suppressed via smtpd_sasl_exceptions_networks.
+	 * 
+	 * XXX Safety: don't enable SASL with "smtpd_tls_auth_only = yes" and
+	 * non-TLS build.
+	 */
+#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
+	if (var_smtpd_sasl_enable && smtpd_sasl_is_active(state) == 0
+#ifdef USE_TLS
+	    && state->tls_context == 0 && !var_smtpd_tls_auth_only
+#else
+	    && var_smtpd_tls_auth_only == 0
+#endif
+	    )
+	    smtpd_sasl_activate(state, VAR_SMTPD_SASL_OPTS,
+				var_smtpd_sasl_opts);
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * The command read/execute loop.
+	 */
+	for (;;) {
+	    if (state->flags & SMTPD_FLAG_HANGUP)
+		break;
+	    if (state->error_count >= var_smtpd_hard_erlim) {
+		state->reason = REASON_ERROR_LIMIT;
+		state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+		smtpd_chat_reply(state, "421 4.7.0 %s Error: too many errors",
+				 var_myhostname);
+		break;
+	    }
+	    watchdog_pat();
+	    smtpd_chat_query(state);
+	    if (IS_BARE_LF_REPLY_REJECT(smtp_got_bare_lf)) {
+		log_whatsup(state, "reject", "bare <LF> received");
+		state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+		smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%d 5.5.2 %s Error: bare <LF> received",
+			     var_smtpd_forbid_bare_lf_code, var_myhostname);
+		break;
+	    }
+	    /* Safety: protect internal interfaces against malformed UTF-8. */
+	    if (var_smtputf8_enable && valid_utf8_string(STR(state->buffer),
+						 LEN(state->buffer)) == 0) {
+		state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+		smtpd_chat_reply(state, "500 5.5.2 Error: bad UTF-8 syntax");
+		state->error_count++;
+		continue;
+	    }
+	    /* Move into smtpd_chat_query() and update session transcript. */
+	    if (smtpd_cmd_filter != 0) {
+		for (cp = STR(state->buffer); *cp && IS_SPACE_TAB(*cp); cp++)
+		     /* void */ ;
+		if ((cp = dict_get(smtpd_cmd_filter, cp)) != 0) {
+		    msg_info("%s: replacing command \"%.100s\" with \"%.100s\"",
+			     state->namaddr, STR(state->buffer), cp);
+		    vstring_strcpy(state->buffer, cp);
+		} else if (smtpd_cmd_filter->error != 0) {
+		    msg_warn("%s:%s lookup error for \"%.100s\"",
+			     smtpd_cmd_filter->type, smtpd_cmd_filter->name,
+			     printable(STR(state->buffer), '?'));
+		    vstream_longjmp(state->client, SMTP_ERR_DATA);
+		}
+	    }
+	    if ((argc = smtpd_token(vstring_str(state->buffer), &argv)) == 0) {
+		state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+		smtpd_chat_reply(state, "500 5.5.2 Error: bad syntax");
+		state->error_count++;
+		continue;
+	    }
+	    /* Ignore smtpd_noop_cmds lookup errors. Non-critical feature. */
+	    if (*var_smtpd_noop_cmds
+		&& string_list_match(smtpd_noop_cmds, argv[0].strval)) {
+		smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250 2.0.0 Ok");
+		if (state->junk_cmds++ > var_smtpd_junk_cmd_limit)
+		    state->error_count++;
+		continue;
+	    }
+	    for (cmdp = smtpd_cmd_table; cmdp->name != 0; cmdp++)
+		if (strcasecmp(argv[0].strval, cmdp->name) == 0)
+		    break;
+	    cmdp->total_count += 1;
+	    /* Ignore smtpd_forbid_cmds lookup errors. Non-critical feature. */
+	    if (cmdp->name == 0) {
+		state->where = SMTPD_CMD_UNKNOWN;
+		if (is_header(argv[0].strval)
+		    || (*var_smtpd_forbid_cmds
+		 && string_list_match(smtpd_forbid_cmds, argv[0].strval))) {
+		    msg_warn("non-SMTP command from %s: %.100s",
+			     state->namaddr, vstring_str(state->buffer));
+		    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "221 2.7.0 Error: I can break rules, too. Goodbye.");
+		    break;
+		}
+	    }
+	    /* XXX We use the real client for connect access control. */
+	    if (state->access_denied && cmdp->action != quit_cmd) {
+		/* XXX Exception for Milter override. */
+		if (strncmp(state->access_denied + 1, "21", 2) == 0) {
+		    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", state->access_denied);
+		    continue;
+		}
+		smtpd_chat_reply(state, "503 5.7.0 Error: access denied for %s",
+				 state->namaddr);	/* RFC 2821 Sec 3.1 */
+		state->error_count++;
+		continue;
+	    }
+	    /* state->access_denied == 0 || cmdp->action == quit_cmd */
+	    if (cmdp->name == 0) {
+		if (state->milters != 0
+		    && (err = milter_unknown_event(state->milters,
+						   argv[0].strval)) != 0
+		    && (err = check_milter_reply(state, err)) != 0) {
+		    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err);
+		} else
+		    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "502 5.5.2 Error: command not recognized");
+		state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+		state->error_count++;
+		continue;
+	    }
+#ifdef USE_TLS
+	    if (var_smtpd_enforce_tls &&
+		!state->tls_context &&
+		(cmdp->flags & SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_PRE_TLS) == 0) {
+		smtpd_chat_reply(state,
+			   "530 5.7.0 Must issue a STARTTLS command first");
+		state->error_count++;
+		continue;
+	    }
+#endif
+	    state->where = cmdp->name;
+	    if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0
+		&& (strcasecmp(state->protocol, MAIL_PROTO_ESMTP) != 0
+		    || (cmdp->flags & SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LAST))
+		&& (state->flags & SMTPD_FLAG_ILL_PIPELINING) == 0
+		&& smtpd_flag_ill_pipelining(state)
+		&& var_smtpd_forbid_unauth_pipe) {
+		smtpd_chat_reply(state,
+			  "554 5.5.0 Error: SMTP protocol synchronization");
+		break;
+	    }
+	    if (cmdp->action(state, argc, argv) != 0)
+		state->error_count++;
+	    else
+		cmdp->success_count += 1;
+	    if ((cmdp->flags & SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LIMIT)
+		&& state->junk_cmds++ > var_smtpd_junk_cmd_limit)
+		state->error_count++;
+	    if (cmdp->action == quit_cmd)
+		break;
+	}
+	break;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * XXX The client connection count/rate control must be consistent in its
+     * use of client address information in connect and disconnect events.
+     * For now we exclude xclient authorized hosts from connection count/rate
+     * control.
+     * 
+     * XXX Must send connect/disconnect events to the anvil server even when
+     * this service is not connection count or rate limited, otherwise it
+     * will discard client message or recipient rate information too early or
+     * too late.
+     */
+    if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0
+	&& !xclient_allowed
+	&& anvil_clnt
+	&& !namadr_list_match(hogger_list, state->name, state->addr))
+	anvil_clnt_disconnect(anvil_clnt, state->service, state->addr);
+
+    /*
+     * Log abnormal session termination, in case postmaster notification has
+     * been turned off. In the log, indicate the last recognized state before
+     * things went wrong. Don't complain about clients that go away without
+     * sending QUIT. Log the byte count after DATA to help diagnose MTU
+     * troubles.
+     */
+    if (state->reason && state->where) {
+	if (strcmp(state->where, SMTPD_AFTER_DATA) == 0) {
+	    msg_info("%s after %s (%lu bytes) from %s",	/* 2.5 compat */
+		     state->reason, SMTPD_CMD_DATA,	/* 2.5 compat */
+		     (long) (state->act_size + vstream_peek(state->client)),
+		     state->namaddr);
+	} else if (strcmp(state->where, SMTPD_AFTER_BDAT) == 0) {
+	    msg_info("%s after %s (%lu bytes) from %s",
+		     state->reason, SMTPD_CMD_BDAT,
+		     (long) (state->act_size + VSTRING_LEN(state->buffer)
+			     + VSTRING_LEN(state->bdat_get_buffer)),
+		     state->namaddr);
+	} else if (strcmp(state->where, SMTPD_AFTER_EOM)
+		   || strcmp(state->reason, REASON_LOST_CONNECTION)) {
+	    msg_info("%s after %s from %s",
+		     state->reason, state->where, state->namaddr);
+	}
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Cleanup whatever information the client gave us during the SMTP
+     * dialog.
+     * 
+     * XXX Duplicated in xclient_cmd().
+     */
+#ifdef USE_TLS
+    tls_reset(state);
+#endif
+    helo_reset(state);
+#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
+    smtpd_sasl_auth_reset(state);
+    if (smtpd_sasl_is_active(state)) {
+	smtpd_sasl_deactivate(state);
+    }
+#endif
+    chat_reset(state, 0);
+    mail_reset(state);
+    rcpt_reset(state);
+    if (state->milters)
+	milter_disc_event(state->milters);
+}
+
+/* smtpd_format_cmd_stats - format per-command statistics */
+
+static char *smtpd_format_cmd_stats(VSTRING *buf)
+{
+    SMTPD_CMD *cmdp;
+    int     all_success = 0;
+    int     all_total = 0;
+
+    /*
+     * Log the statistics. Note that this loop produces no output when no
+     * command was received. We address that after the loop.
+     */
+    VSTRING_RESET(buf);
+    for (cmdp = smtpd_cmd_table; /* see below */ ; cmdp++) {
+	if (cmdp->total_count > 0) {
+	    vstring_sprintf_append(buf, " %s=%d",
+				   cmdp->name ? cmdp->name : "unknown",
+				   cmdp->success_count);
+	    if (cmdp->success_count != cmdp->total_count)
+		vstring_sprintf_append(buf, "/%d", cmdp->total_count);
+	    all_success += cmdp->success_count;
+	    all_total += cmdp->total_count;
+	}
+	if (cmdp->name == 0)
+	    break;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Reset the per-command counters.
+     * 
+     * Fix 20190621: the command counter resetting code was moved from the SMTP
+     * protocol handler to this place, because the protocol handler was never
+     * called after HaProxy handshake error, causing stale numbers to be
+     * logged.
+     */
+    for (cmdp = smtpd_cmd_table; /* see below */ ; cmdp++) {
+	cmdp->success_count = cmdp->total_count = 0;
+	if (cmdp->name == 0)
+	    break;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Log total numbers, so that logfile analyzers will see something even
+     * if the above loop produced no output. When no commands were received
+     * log "0/0" to simplify the identification of abnormal sessions: any
+     * statistics with [0-9]/ indicate that there was a problem.
+     */
+    vstring_sprintf_append(buf, " commands=%d", all_success);
+    if (all_success != all_total || all_total == 0)
+	vstring_sprintf_append(buf, "/%d", all_total);
+    return (lowercase(STR(buf)));
+}
+
+/* setup_milters - set up Milters after a connection is established */
+
+static void setup_milters(SMTPD_STATE *state)
+{
+    const char *milter_string;
+
+    /*
+     * Postcondition: either state->milters is set, or the
+     * INPUT_TRANSP_MILTER flag is passed down-stream.
+     */
+    if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0
+	&& (smtpd_input_transp_mask & INPUT_TRANSP_MILTER) == 0
+	&& ((smtpd_milter_maps
+	     && (milter_string =
+		 maps_find(smtpd_milter_maps, state->addr, 0)) != 0)
+	    || *(milter_string = var_smtpd_milters) != 0)
+	&& strcasecmp(milter_string, SMTPD_MILTERS_DISABLE) != 0) {
+	state->milters = milter_create(milter_string,
+				       var_milt_conn_time,
+				       var_milt_cmd_time,
+				       var_milt_msg_time,
+				       var_milt_protocol,
+				       var_milt_def_action,
+				       var_milt_conn_macros,
+				       var_milt_helo_macros,
+				       var_milt_mail_macros,
+				       var_milt_rcpt_macros,
+				       var_milt_data_macros,
+				       var_milt_eoh_macros,
+				       var_milt_eod_macros,
+				       var_milt_unk_macros,
+				       var_milt_macro_deflts);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Safety: disable non_smtpd_milters when not sending our own mail filter
+     * list. Otherwise the next stage could handle this message as a local
+     * submission.
+     */
+    if (state->milters == 0)
+	smtpd_input_transp_mask |= INPUT_TRANSP_MILTER;
+}
+
+/* teardown_milters - release resources */
+
+static void teardown_milters(SMTPD_STATE *state)
+{
+    if (state->milters) {
+	milter_free(state->milters);
+	state->milters = 0;
+    }
+    smtpd_input_transp_mask =
+	input_transp_mask(VAR_INPUT_TRANSP, var_input_transp);
+}
+
+
+/* smtpd_service - service one client */
+
+static void smtpd_service(VSTREAM *stream, char *service, char **argv)
+{
+    SMTPD_STATE state;
+
+    /*
+     * Sanity check. This service takes no command-line arguments.
+     */
+    if (argv[0])
+	msg_fatal("unexpected command-line argument: %s", argv[0]);
+
+    /*
+     * For sanity, require that at least one of INET or INET6 is enabled.
+     * Otherwise, we can't look up interface information, and we can't
+     * convert names or addresses.
+     */
+    if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE_STREAM(stream) == 0
+	&& inet_proto_info()->ai_family_list[0] == 0)
+	msg_fatal("all network protocols are disabled (%s = %s)",
+		  VAR_INET_PROTOCOLS, var_inet_protocols);
+
+    /*
+     * This routine runs when a client has connected to our network port, or
+     * when the smtp server is run in stand-alone mode (input from pipe).
+     * 
+     * Look up and sanitize the peer name, then initialize some connection-
+     * specific state. When the name service is hosed, hostname lookup will
+     * take a while. This is why I always run a local name server on critical
+     * machines.
+     */
+    smtpd_state_init(&state, stream, service);
+    msg_info("connect from %s", state.namaddr);
+
+    /*
+     * Disable TLS when running in stand-alone mode via "sendmail -bs".
+     */
+    if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE((&state))) {
+	var_smtpd_use_tls = 0;
+	var_smtpd_enforce_tls = 0;
+	var_smtpd_tls_auth_only = 0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * XCLIENT must not override its own access control.
+     */
+    xclient_allowed = SMTPD_STAND_ALONE((&state)) == 0 &&
+	namadr_list_match(xclient_hosts, state.name, state.addr);
+
+    /*
+     * Overriding XFORWARD access control makes no sense, either.
+     */
+    xforward_allowed = SMTPD_STAND_ALONE((&state)) == 0 &&
+	namadr_list_match(xforward_hosts, state.name, state.addr);
+
+    /*
+     * Reject or normalize bare LF, with compatibility exclusions.
+     */
+    smtp_detect_bare_lf = (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE((&state)) == 0 && bare_lf_mask
+	      && !namadr_list_match(bare_lf_excl, state.name, state.addr)) ?
+	bare_lf_mask : 0;
+
+    /*
+     * See if we need to turn on verbose logging for this client.
+     */
+    debug_peer_check(state.name, state.addr);
+
+    /*
+     * Set up Milters, or disable Milters down-stream.
+     */
+    setup_milters(&state);			/* duplicates xclient_cmd */
+
+    /*
+     * Provide the SMTP service.
+     */
+    smtpd_proto(&state);
+
+    /*
+     * After the client has gone away, clean up whatever we have set up at
+     * connection time.
+     */
+    msg_info("disconnect from %s%s", state.namaddr,
+	     smtpd_format_cmd_stats(state.buffer));
+    teardown_milters(&state);			/* duplicates xclient_cmd */
+    smtpd_state_reset(&state);
+    debug_peer_restore();
+}
+
+/* pre_accept - see if tables have changed */
+
+static void pre_accept(char *unused_name, char **unused_argv)
+{
+    const char *table;
+
+    if ((table = dict_changed_name()) != 0) {
+	msg_info("table %s has changed -- restarting", table);
+	exit(0);
+    }
+}
+
+/* pre_jail_init - pre-jail initialization */
+
+static void pre_jail_init(char *unused_name, char **unused_argv)
+{
+
+    /*
+     * Initialize blacklist/etc. patterns before entering the chroot jail, in
+     * case they specify a filename pattern.
+     */
+    smtpd_noop_cmds = string_list_init(VAR_SMTPD_NOOP_CMDS, MATCH_FLAG_RETURN,
+				       var_smtpd_noop_cmds);
+    smtpd_forbid_cmds = string_list_init(VAR_SMTPD_FORBID_CMDS,
+					 MATCH_FLAG_RETURN,
+					 var_smtpd_forbid_cmds);
+    verp_clients = namadr_list_init(VAR_VERP_CLIENTS, MATCH_FLAG_RETURN,
+				    var_verp_clients);
+    xclient_hosts = namadr_list_init(VAR_XCLIENT_HOSTS, MATCH_FLAG_RETURN,
+				     var_xclient_hosts);
+    xforward_hosts = namadr_list_init(VAR_XFORWARD_HOSTS, MATCH_FLAG_RETURN,
+				      var_xforward_hosts);
+    hogger_list = namadr_list_init(VAR_SMTPD_HOGGERS, MATCH_FLAG_RETURN
+				   | match_parent_style(VAR_SMTPD_HOGGERS),
+				   var_smtpd_hoggers);
+    bare_lf_excl = namadr_list_init(VAR_SMTPD_FORBID_BARE_LF_EXCL,
+				    MATCH_FLAG_RETURN
+				    | match_parent_style(VAR_MYNETWORKS),
+				    var_smtpd_forbid_bare_lf_excl);
+    if ((bare_lf_mask = name_code(bare_lf_mask_table, NAME_CODE_FLAG_NONE,
+				  var_smtpd_forbid_bare_lf)) < 0)
+	msg_fatal("bad parameter value: '%s = %s'",
+		  VAR_SMTPD_FORBID_BARE_LF, var_smtpd_forbid_bare_lf);
+
+    /*
+     * Open maps before dropping privileges so we can read passwords etc.
+     * 
+     * XXX We should not do this in stand-alone (sendmail -bs) mode, but we
+     * can't use SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) here. This means "sendmail -bs"
+     * will try to connect to proxymap when invoked by root for mail
+     * submission. To fix, we would have to pass stand-alone mode information
+     * via different means. For now we have to tell people not to run mail
+     * clients as root.
+     */
+    if (getuid() == 0 || getuid() == var_owner_uid)
+	smtpd_check_init();
+    smtpd_expand_init();
+    debug_peer_init();
+
+    if (var_smtpd_sasl_enable)
+#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
+	smtpd_sasl_initialize();
+
+    if (*var_smtpd_sasl_exceptions_networks)
+	sasl_exceptions_networks =
+	    namadr_list_init(VAR_SMTPD_SASL_EXCEPTIONS_NETWORKS,
+			     MATCH_FLAG_RETURN,
+			     var_smtpd_sasl_exceptions_networks);
+#else
+	msg_warn("%s is true, but SASL support is not compiled in",
+		 VAR_SMTPD_SASL_ENABLE);
+#endif
+
+    if (*var_smtpd_cmd_filter)
+	smtpd_cmd_filter = dict_open(var_smtpd_cmd_filter, O_RDONLY,
+				     DICT_FLAG_LOCK | DICT_FLAG_FOLD_FIX);
+
+    /*
+     * XXX Temporary fix to pretend that we consistently implement TLS
+     * security levels. We implement only a subset for now. If we implement
+     * more levels, wrappermode should override only weaker TLS security
+     * levels.
+     * 
+     * Note: tls_level_lookup() logs no warning.
+     */
+    if (!var_smtpd_tls_wrappermode && *var_smtpd_tls_level) {
+	switch (tls_level_lookup(var_smtpd_tls_level)) {
+	default:
+	    msg_fatal("Invalid TLS level \"%s\"", var_smtpd_tls_level);
+	    /* NOTREACHED */
+	    break;
+	case TLS_LEV_SECURE:
+	case TLS_LEV_VERIFY:
+	case TLS_LEV_FPRINT:
+	    msg_warn("%s: unsupported TLS level \"%s\", using \"encrypt\"",
+		     VAR_SMTPD_TLS_LEVEL, var_smtpd_tls_level);
+	    /* FALLTHROUGH */
+	case TLS_LEV_ENCRYPT:
+	    var_smtpd_enforce_tls = var_smtpd_use_tls = 1;
+	    break;
+	case TLS_LEV_MAY:
+	    var_smtpd_enforce_tls = 0;
+	    var_smtpd_use_tls = 1;
+	    break;
+	case TLS_LEV_NONE:
+	    var_smtpd_enforce_tls = var_smtpd_use_tls = 0;
+	    break;
+	}
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * With TLS wrapper mode, we run on a dedicated port and turn on TLS
+     * before actually speaking the SMTP protocol. This implies TLS enforce
+     * mode.
+     * 
+     * With non-wrapper mode, TLS enforce mode implies that we don't advertise
+     * AUTH before the client issues STARTTLS.
+     */
+    var_smtpd_enforce_tls = var_smtpd_tls_wrappermode || var_smtpd_enforce_tls;
+    var_smtpd_tls_auth_only = var_smtpd_tls_auth_only || var_smtpd_enforce_tls;
+    var_smtpd_use_tls = var_smtpd_use_tls || var_smtpd_enforce_tls;
+
+    /*
+     * Keys can only be loaded when running with suitable permissions. When
+     * called from "sendmail -bs" this is not the case, so we must not
+     * announce STARTTLS support.
+     */
+    if (getuid() == 0 || getuid() == var_owner_uid) {
+	if (var_smtpd_use_tls) {
+#ifdef USE_TLS
+#ifndef USE_TLSPROXY
+	    TLS_SERVER_INIT_PROPS props;
+	    const char *cert_file;
+	    int     have_server_cert;
+	    int     no_server_cert_ok;
+	    int     require_server_cert;
+
+	    /*
+	     * Can't use anonymous ciphers if we want client certificates.
+	     * Must use anonymous ciphers if we have no certificates.
+	     * 
+	     * XXX: Ugh! Too many booleans!
+	     */
+	    ask_client_cert = require_server_cert =
+		(var_smtpd_tls_ask_ccert
+		 || (var_smtpd_enforce_tls && var_smtpd_tls_req_ccert));
+	    if (strcasecmp(var_smtpd_tls_cert_file, "none") == 0) {
+		no_server_cert_ok = 1;
+		cert_file = "";
+	    } else {
+		no_server_cert_ok = 0;
+		cert_file = var_smtpd_tls_cert_file;
+	    }
+
+	    have_server_cert = *cert_file != 0;
+	    have_server_cert |= *var_smtpd_tls_eccert_file != 0;
+	    have_server_cert |= *var_smtpd_tls_dcert_file != 0;
+
+	    if (*var_smtpd_tls_chain_files != 0) {
+		if (!have_server_cert)
+		    have_server_cert = 1;
+		else
+		    msg_warn("Both %s and one or more of the legacy "
+			     " %s, %s or %s are non-empty; the legacy "
+			     " parameters will be ignored",
+			     VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CHAIN_FILES,
+			     VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CERT_FILE,
+			     VAR_SMTPD_TLS_ECCERT_FILE,
+			     VAR_SMTPD_TLS_DCERT_FILE);
+	    }
+	    /* Some TLS configuration errors are not show stoppers. */
+	    if (!have_server_cert && require_server_cert)
+		msg_warn("Need a server cert to request client certs");
+	    if (!var_smtpd_enforce_tls && var_smtpd_tls_req_ccert)
+		msg_warn("Can't require client certs unless TLS is required");
+	    /* After a show-stopper error, reply with 454 to STARTTLS. */
+	    if (have_server_cert
+		|| (no_server_cert_ok && !require_server_cert)) {
+
+		tls_pre_jail_init(TLS_ROLE_SERVER);
+
+		/*
+		 * Large parameter lists are error-prone, so we emulate a
+		 * language feature that C does not have natively: named
+		 * parameter lists.
+		 */
+		smtpd_tls_ctx =
+		    TLS_SERVER_INIT(&props,
+				    log_param = VAR_SMTPD_TLS_LOGLEVEL,
+				    log_level = var_smtpd_tls_loglevel,
+				    verifydepth = var_smtpd_tls_ccert_vd,
+				    cache_type = TLS_MGR_SCACHE_SMTPD,
+				    set_sessid = var_smtpd_tls_set_sessid,
+				    chain_files = var_smtpd_tls_chain_files,
+				    cert_file = cert_file,
+				    key_file = var_smtpd_tls_key_file,
+				    dcert_file = var_smtpd_tls_dcert_file,
+				    dkey_file = var_smtpd_tls_dkey_file,
+				    eccert_file = var_smtpd_tls_eccert_file,
+				    eckey_file = var_smtpd_tls_eckey_file,
+				    CAfile = var_smtpd_tls_CAfile,
+				    CApath = var_smtpd_tls_CApath,
+				    dh1024_param_file
+				    = var_smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file,
+				    dh512_param_file
+				    = var_smtpd_tls_dh512_param_file,
+				    eecdh_grade = var_smtpd_tls_eecdh,
+				    protocols = var_smtpd_enforce_tls ?
+				    var_smtpd_tls_mand_proto :
+				    var_smtpd_tls_proto,
+				    ask_ccert = ask_client_cert,
+				    mdalg = var_smtpd_tls_fpt_dgst);
+	    } else {
+		msg_warn("No server certs available. TLS won't be enabled");
+	    }
+#endif						/* USE_TLSPROXY */
+#else
+	    msg_warn("TLS has been selected, but TLS support is not compiled in");
+#endif
+	}
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * flush client.
+     */
+    flush_init();
+
+    /*
+     * EHLO keyword filter.
+     */
+    if (*var_smtpd_ehlo_dis_maps)
+	ehlo_discard_maps = maps_create(VAR_SMTPD_EHLO_DIS_MAPS,
+					var_smtpd_ehlo_dis_maps,
+					DICT_FLAG_LOCK);
+
+    /*
+     * Per-client Milter support.
+     */
+    if (*var_smtpd_milter_maps)
+	smtpd_milter_maps = maps_create(VAR_SMTPD_MILTER_MAPS,
+					var_smtpd_milter_maps,
+					DICT_FLAG_LOCK);
+
+    /*
+     * DNS reply filter.
+     */
+    if (*var_smtpd_dns_re_filter)
+	dns_rr_filter_compile(VAR_SMTPD_DNS_RE_FILTER,
+			      var_smtpd_dns_re_filter);
+
+    /*
+     * Reject footer.
+     */
+    if (*var_smtpd_rej_ftr_maps)
+	smtpd_chat_pre_jail_init();
+}
+
+/* post_jail_init - post-jail initialization */
+
+static void post_jail_init(char *unused_name, char **unused_argv)
+{
+
+    /*
+     * Initialize the receive transparency options: do we want unknown
+     * recipient checks, address mapping, header_body_checks?.
+     */
+    smtpd_input_transp_mask =
+    input_transp_mask(VAR_INPUT_TRANSP, var_input_transp);
+
+    /*
+     * Initialize before-queue filter options: do we want speed-matching
+     * support so that the entire message is received before we contact a
+     * before-queue content filter?
+     */
+    if (*var_smtpd_proxy_filt)
+	smtpd_proxy_opts =
+	    smtpd_proxy_parse_opts(VAR_SMTPD_PROXY_OPTS, var_smtpd_proxy_opts);
+
+    /*
+     * Sanity checks. The queue_minfree value should be at least as large as
+     * (process_limit * message_size_limit) but that is unpractical, so we
+     * arbitrarily pick a small multiple of the per-message size limit. This
+     * helps to avoid many unneeded (re)transmissions.
+     */
+    if (ENFORCING_SIZE_LIMIT(var_queue_minfree)
+	&& ENFORCING_SIZE_LIMIT(var_message_limit)
+	&& var_queue_minfree / 1.5 < var_message_limit)
+	msg_warn("%s(%lu) should be at least 1.5*%s(%lu)",
+		 VAR_QUEUE_MINFREE, (unsigned long) var_queue_minfree,
+		 VAR_MESSAGE_LIMIT, (unsigned long) var_message_limit);
+
+    /*
+     * Connection rate management.
+     */
+    if (var_smtpd_crate_limit || var_smtpd_cconn_limit
+	|| var_smtpd_cmail_limit || var_smtpd_crcpt_limit
+	|| var_smtpd_cntls_limit || var_smtpd_cauth_limit)
+	anvil_clnt = anvil_clnt_create();
+}
+
+MAIL_VERSION_STAMP_DECLARE;
+
+/* main - the main program */
+
+int     main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    static const CONFIG_NINT_TABLE nint_table[] = {
+	VAR_SMTPD_SOFT_ERLIM, DEF_SMTPD_SOFT_ERLIM, &var_smtpd_soft_erlim, 1, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_HARD_ERLIM, DEF_SMTPD_HARD_ERLIM, &var_smtpd_hard_erlim, 1, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_JUNK_CMD, DEF_SMTPD_JUNK_CMD, &var_smtpd_junk_cmd_limit, 1, 0,
+	VAR_VERIFY_POLL_COUNT, DEF_VERIFY_POLL_COUNT, &var_verify_poll_count, 1, 0,
+	0,
+    };
+    static const CONFIG_INT_TABLE int_table[] = {
+	VAR_SMTPD_RCPT_LIMIT, DEF_SMTPD_RCPT_LIMIT, &var_smtpd_rcpt_limit, 1, 0,
+	VAR_UNK_CLIENT_CODE, DEF_UNK_CLIENT_CODE, &var_unk_client_code, 0, 0,
+	VAR_BAD_NAME_CODE, DEF_BAD_NAME_CODE, &var_bad_name_code, 0, 0,
+	VAR_UNK_NAME_CODE, DEF_UNK_NAME_CODE, &var_unk_name_code, 0, 0,
+	VAR_UNK_ADDR_CODE, DEF_UNK_ADDR_CODE, &var_unk_addr_code, 0, 0,
+	VAR_RELAY_CODE, DEF_RELAY_CODE, &var_relay_code, 0, 0,
+	VAR_MAPS_RBL_CODE, DEF_MAPS_RBL_CODE, &var_maps_rbl_code, 0, 0,
+	VAR_MAP_REJECT_CODE, DEF_MAP_REJECT_CODE, &var_map_reject_code, 0, 0,
+	VAR_MAP_DEFER_CODE, DEF_MAP_DEFER_CODE, &var_map_defer_code, 0, 0,
+	VAR_REJECT_CODE, DEF_REJECT_CODE, &var_reject_code, 0, 0,
+	VAR_DEFER_CODE, DEF_DEFER_CODE, &var_defer_code, 0, 0,
+	VAR_NON_FQDN_CODE, DEF_NON_FQDN_CODE, &var_non_fqdn_code, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_RCPT_OVERLIM, DEF_SMTPD_RCPT_OVERLIM, &var_smtpd_rcpt_overlim, 1, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_HIST_THRSH, DEF_SMTPD_HIST_THRSH, &var_smtpd_hist_thrsh, 1, 0,
+	VAR_UNV_FROM_RCODE, DEF_UNV_FROM_RCODE, &var_unv_from_rcode, 200, 599,
+	VAR_UNV_RCPT_RCODE, DEF_UNV_RCPT_RCODE, &var_unv_rcpt_rcode, 200, 599,
+	VAR_UNV_FROM_DCODE, DEF_UNV_FROM_DCODE, &var_unv_from_dcode, 200, 499,
+	VAR_UNV_RCPT_DCODE, DEF_UNV_RCPT_DCODE, &var_unv_rcpt_dcode, 200, 499,
+	VAR_MUL_RCPT_CODE, DEF_MUL_RCPT_CODE, &var_mul_rcpt_code, 0, 0,
+	VAR_LOCAL_RCPT_CODE, DEF_LOCAL_RCPT_CODE, &var_local_rcpt_code, 0, 0,
+	VAR_VIRT_ALIAS_CODE, DEF_VIRT_ALIAS_CODE, &var_virt_alias_code, 0, 0,
+	VAR_VIRT_MAILBOX_CODE, DEF_VIRT_MAILBOX_CODE, &var_virt_mailbox_code, 0, 0,
+	VAR_RELAY_RCPT_CODE, DEF_RELAY_RCPT_CODE, &var_relay_rcpt_code, 0, 0,
+	VAR_PLAINTEXT_CODE, DEF_PLAINTEXT_CODE, &var_plaintext_code, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_FORBID_BARE_LF_CODE, DEF_SMTPD_FORBID_BARE_LF_CODE, &var_smtpd_forbid_bare_lf_code, 500, 599,
+	VAR_SMTPD_CRATE_LIMIT, DEF_SMTPD_CRATE_LIMIT, &var_smtpd_crate_limit, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_CCONN_LIMIT, DEF_SMTPD_CCONN_LIMIT, &var_smtpd_cconn_limit, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_CMAIL_LIMIT, DEF_SMTPD_CMAIL_LIMIT, &var_smtpd_cmail_limit, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_CRCPT_LIMIT, DEF_SMTPD_CRCPT_LIMIT, &var_smtpd_crcpt_limit, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_CNTLS_LIMIT, DEF_SMTPD_CNTLS_LIMIT, &var_smtpd_cntls_limit, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_CAUTH_LIMIT, DEF_SMTPD_CAUTH_LIMIT, &var_smtpd_cauth_limit, 0, 0,
+#ifdef USE_TLS
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CCERT_VD, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CCERT_VD, &var_smtpd_tls_ccert_vd, 0, 0,
+#endif
+	VAR_SMTPD_SASL_RESP_LIMIT, DEF_SMTPD_SASL_RESP_LIMIT, &var_smtpd_sasl_resp_limit, DEF_SMTPD_SASL_RESP_LIMIT, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_POLICY_REQ_LIMIT, DEF_SMTPD_POLICY_REQ_LIMIT, &var_smtpd_policy_req_limit, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_POLICY_TRY_LIMIT, DEF_SMTPD_POLICY_TRY_LIMIT, &var_smtpd_policy_try_limit, 1, 0,
+	0,
+    };
+    static const CONFIG_LONG_TABLE long_table[] = {
+	VAR_QUEUE_MINFREE, DEF_QUEUE_MINFREE, &var_queue_minfree, 0, 0,
+	0,
+    };
+    static const CONFIG_TIME_TABLE time_table[] = {
+	VAR_SMTPD_TMOUT, DEF_SMTPD_TMOUT, &var_smtpd_tmout, 1, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_ERR_SLEEP, DEF_SMTPD_ERR_SLEEP, &var_smtpd_err_sleep, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_PROXY_TMOUT, DEF_SMTPD_PROXY_TMOUT, &var_smtpd_proxy_tmout, 1, 0,
+	VAR_VERIFY_POLL_DELAY, DEF_VERIFY_POLL_DELAY, &var_verify_poll_delay, 1, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_POLICY_TMOUT, DEF_SMTPD_POLICY_TMOUT, &var_smtpd_policy_tmout, 1, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_POLICY_IDLE, DEF_SMTPD_POLICY_IDLE, &var_smtpd_policy_idle, 1, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_POLICY_TTL, DEF_SMTPD_POLICY_TTL, &var_smtpd_policy_ttl, 1, 0,
+#ifdef USE_TLS
+	VAR_SMTPD_STARTTLS_TMOUT, DEF_SMTPD_STARTTLS_TMOUT, &var_smtpd_starttls_tmout, 1, 0,
+#endif
+	VAR_MILT_CONN_TIME, DEF_MILT_CONN_TIME, &var_milt_conn_time, 1, 0,
+	VAR_MILT_CMD_TIME, DEF_MILT_CMD_TIME, &var_milt_cmd_time, 1, 0,
+	VAR_MILT_MSG_TIME, DEF_MILT_MSG_TIME, &var_milt_msg_time, 1, 0,
+	VAR_VERIFY_SENDER_TTL, DEF_VERIFY_SENDER_TTL, &var_verify_sender_ttl, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_UPROXY_TMOUT, DEF_SMTPD_UPROXY_TMOUT, &var_smtpd_uproxy_tmout, 1, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_POLICY_TRY_DELAY, DEF_SMTPD_POLICY_TRY_DELAY, &var_smtpd_policy_try_delay, 1, 0,
+	0,
+    };
+    static const CONFIG_BOOL_TABLE bool_table[] = {
+	VAR_HELO_REQUIRED, DEF_HELO_REQUIRED, &var_helo_required,
+	VAR_SMTPD_DELAY_REJECT, DEF_SMTPD_DELAY_REJECT, &var_smtpd_delay_reject,
+	VAR_STRICT_RFC821_ENV, DEF_STRICT_RFC821_ENV, &var_strict_rfc821_env,
+	VAR_DISABLE_VRFY_CMD, DEF_DISABLE_VRFY_CMD, &var_disable_vrfy_cmd,
+	VAR_ALLOW_UNTRUST_ROUTE, DEF_ALLOW_UNTRUST_ROUTE, &var_allow_untrust_route,
+	VAR_SMTPD_SASL_ENABLE, DEF_SMTPD_SASL_ENABLE, &var_smtpd_sasl_enable,
+	VAR_SMTPD_SASL_AUTH_HDR, DEF_SMTPD_SASL_AUTH_HDR, &var_smtpd_sasl_auth_hdr,
+	VAR_BROKEN_AUTH_CLNTS, DEF_BROKEN_AUTH_CLNTS, &var_broken_auth_clients,
+	VAR_SHOW_UNK_RCPT_TABLE, DEF_SHOW_UNK_RCPT_TABLE, &var_show_unk_rcpt_table,
+	VAR_SMTPD_REJ_UNL_FROM, DEF_SMTPD_REJ_UNL_FROM, &var_smtpd_rej_unl_from,
+	VAR_SMTPD_REJ_UNL_RCPT, DEF_SMTPD_REJ_UNL_RCPT, &var_smtpd_rej_unl_rcpt,
+	VAR_SMTPD_USE_TLS, DEF_SMTPD_USE_TLS, &var_smtpd_use_tls,
+	VAR_SMTPD_ENFORCE_TLS, DEF_SMTPD_ENFORCE_TLS, &var_smtpd_enforce_tls,
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_WRAPPER, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_WRAPPER, &var_smtpd_tls_wrappermode,
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_AUTH_ONLY, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_AUTH_ONLY, &var_smtpd_tls_auth_only,
+#ifdef USE_TLS
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_ACERT, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_ACERT, &var_smtpd_tls_ask_ccert,
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_RCERT, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_RCERT, &var_smtpd_tls_req_ccert,
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_RECHEAD, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_RECHEAD, &var_smtpd_tls_received_header,
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_SET_SESSID, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_SET_SESSID, &var_smtpd_tls_set_sessid,
+#endif
+	VAR_SMTPD_PEERNAME_LOOKUP, DEF_SMTPD_PEERNAME_LOOKUP, &var_smtpd_peername_lookup,
+	VAR_SMTPD_DELAY_OPEN, DEF_SMTPD_DELAY_OPEN, &var_smtpd_delay_open,
+	VAR_SMTPD_CLIENT_PORT_LOG, DEF_SMTPD_CLIENT_PORT_LOG, &var_smtpd_client_port_log,
+	VAR_SMTPD_FORBID_UNAUTH_PIPE, DEF_SMTPD_FORBID_UNAUTH_PIPE, &var_smtpd_forbid_unauth_pipe,
+	0,
+    };
+    static const CONFIG_NBOOL_TABLE nbool_table[] = {
+	VAR_SMTPD_REC_DEADLINE, DEF_SMTPD_REC_DEADLINE, &var_smtpd_rec_deadline,
+	0,
+    };
+    static const CONFIG_STR_TABLE str_table[] = {
+	VAR_SMTPD_BANNER, DEF_SMTPD_BANNER, &var_smtpd_banner, 1, 0,
+	VAR_NOTIFY_CLASSES, DEF_NOTIFY_CLASSES, &var_notify_classes, 0, 0,
+	VAR_CLIENT_CHECKS, DEF_CLIENT_CHECKS, &var_client_checks, 0, 0,
+	VAR_HELO_CHECKS, DEF_HELO_CHECKS, &var_helo_checks, 0, 0,
+	VAR_MAIL_CHECKS, DEF_MAIL_CHECKS, &var_mail_checks, 0, 0,
+	VAR_RELAY_CHECKS, DEF_RELAY_CHECKS, &var_relay_checks, 0, 0,
+	VAR_RCPT_CHECKS, DEF_RCPT_CHECKS, &var_rcpt_checks, 0, 0,
+	VAR_ETRN_CHECKS, DEF_ETRN_CHECKS, &var_etrn_checks, 0, 0,
+	VAR_DATA_CHECKS, DEF_DATA_CHECKS, &var_data_checks, 0, 0,
+	VAR_EOD_CHECKS, DEF_EOD_CHECKS, &var_eod_checks, 0, 0,
+	VAR_MAPS_RBL_DOMAINS, DEF_MAPS_RBL_DOMAINS, &var_maps_rbl_domains, 0, 0,
+	VAR_RBL_REPLY_MAPS, DEF_RBL_REPLY_MAPS, &var_rbl_reply_maps, 0, 0,
+	VAR_BOUNCE_RCPT, DEF_BOUNCE_RCPT, &var_bounce_rcpt, 1, 0,
+	VAR_ERROR_RCPT, DEF_ERROR_RCPT, &var_error_rcpt, 1, 0,
+	VAR_REST_CLASSES, DEF_REST_CLASSES, &var_rest_classes, 0, 0,
+	VAR_CANONICAL_MAPS, DEF_CANONICAL_MAPS, &var_canonical_maps, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SEND_CANON_MAPS, DEF_SEND_CANON_MAPS, &var_send_canon_maps, 0, 0,
+	VAR_RCPT_CANON_MAPS, DEF_RCPT_CANON_MAPS, &var_rcpt_canon_maps, 0, 0,
+	VAR_VIRT_ALIAS_MAPS, DEF_VIRT_ALIAS_MAPS, &var_virt_alias_maps, 0, 0,
+	VAR_VIRT_MAILBOX_MAPS, DEF_VIRT_MAILBOX_MAPS, &var_virt_mailbox_maps, 0, 0,
+	VAR_ALIAS_MAPS, DEF_ALIAS_MAPS, &var_alias_maps, 0, 0,
+	VAR_LOCAL_RCPT_MAPS, DEF_LOCAL_RCPT_MAPS, &var_local_rcpt_maps, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_SASL_OPTS, DEF_SMTPD_SASL_OPTS, &var_smtpd_sasl_opts, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_SASL_PATH, DEF_SMTPD_SASL_PATH, &var_smtpd_sasl_path, 1, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_SASL_SERVICE, DEF_SMTPD_SASL_SERVICE, &var_smtpd_sasl_service, 1, 0,
+	VAR_CYRUS_CONF_PATH, DEF_CYRUS_CONF_PATH, &var_cyrus_conf_path, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_SASL_REALM, DEF_SMTPD_SASL_REALM, &var_smtpd_sasl_realm, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_SASL_EXCEPTIONS_NETWORKS, DEF_SMTPD_SASL_EXCEPTIONS_NETWORKS, &var_smtpd_sasl_exceptions_networks, 0, 0,
+	VAR_FILTER_XPORT, DEF_FILTER_XPORT, &var_filter_xport, 0, 0,
+	VAR_PERM_MX_NETWORKS, DEF_PERM_MX_NETWORKS, &var_perm_mx_networks, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_SND_AUTH_MAPS, DEF_SMTPD_SND_AUTH_MAPS, &var_smtpd_snd_auth_maps, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_NOOP_CMDS, DEF_SMTPD_NOOP_CMDS, &var_smtpd_noop_cmds, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_FORBID_CMDS, DEF_SMTPD_FORBID_CMDS, &var_smtpd_forbid_cmds, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_NULL_KEY, DEF_SMTPD_NULL_KEY, &var_smtpd_null_key, 0, 0,
+	VAR_RELAY_RCPT_MAPS, DEF_RELAY_RCPT_MAPS, &var_relay_rcpt_maps, 0, 0,
+	VAR_VERIFY_SENDER, DEF_VERIFY_SENDER, &var_verify_sender, 0, 0,
+	VAR_VERP_CLIENTS, DEF_VERP_CLIENTS, &var_verp_clients, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_PROXY_FILT, DEF_SMTPD_PROXY_FILT, &var_smtpd_proxy_filt, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_PROXY_EHLO, DEF_SMTPD_PROXY_EHLO, &var_smtpd_proxy_ehlo, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_PROXY_OPTS, DEF_SMTPD_PROXY_OPTS, &var_smtpd_proxy_opts, 0, 0,
+	VAR_INPUT_TRANSP, DEF_INPUT_TRANSP, &var_input_transp, 0, 0,
+	VAR_XCLIENT_HOSTS, DEF_XCLIENT_HOSTS, &var_xclient_hosts, 0, 0,
+	VAR_XFORWARD_HOSTS, DEF_XFORWARD_HOSTS, &var_xforward_hosts, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_HOGGERS, DEF_SMTPD_HOGGERS, &var_smtpd_hoggers, 0, 0,
+	VAR_LOC_RWR_CLIENTS, DEF_LOC_RWR_CLIENTS, &var_local_rwr_clients, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_EHLO_DIS_WORDS, DEF_SMTPD_EHLO_DIS_WORDS, &var_smtpd_ehlo_dis_words, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_EHLO_DIS_MAPS, DEF_SMTPD_EHLO_DIS_MAPS, &var_smtpd_ehlo_dis_maps, 0, 0,
+#ifdef USE_TLS
+	VAR_RELAY_CCERTS, DEF_RELAY_CCERTS, &var_smtpd_relay_ccerts, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_SASL_TLS_OPTS, DEF_SMTPD_SASL_TLS_OPTS, &var_smtpd_sasl_tls_opts, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CHAIN_FILES, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CHAIN_FILES, &var_smtpd_tls_chain_files, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CERT_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CERT_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_cert_file, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_KEY_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_KEY_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_key_file, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_DCERT_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_DCERT_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_dcert_file, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_DKEY_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_DKEY_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_dkey_file, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_ECCERT_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_ECCERT_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_eccert_file, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_ECKEY_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_ECKEY_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_eckey_file, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CA_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CA_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_CAfile, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CA_PATH, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CA_PATH, &var_smtpd_tls_CApath, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CIPH, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CIPH, &var_smtpd_tls_ciph, 1, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_MAND_CIPH, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_MAND_CIPH, &var_smtpd_tls_mand_ciph, 1, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_EXCL_CIPH, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_EXCL_CIPH, &var_smtpd_tls_excl_ciph, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_MAND_EXCL, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_MAND_EXCL, &var_smtpd_tls_mand_excl, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_PROTO, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_PROTO, &var_smtpd_tls_proto, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_MAND_PROTO, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_MAND_PROTO, &var_smtpd_tls_mand_proto, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_512_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_512_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_dh512_param_file, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_1024_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_1024_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_EECDH, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_EECDH, &var_smtpd_tls_eecdh, 1, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_FPT_DGST, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_FPT_DGST, &var_smtpd_tls_fpt_dgst, 1, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_LOGLEVEL, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_LOGLEVEL, &var_smtpd_tls_loglevel, 0, 0,
+#endif
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_LEVEL, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_LEVEL, &var_smtpd_tls_level, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_SASL_TYPE, DEF_SMTPD_SASL_TYPE, &var_smtpd_sasl_type, 1, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_MILTERS, DEF_SMTPD_MILTERS, &var_smtpd_milters, 0, 0,
+	VAR_MILT_CONN_MACROS, DEF_MILT_CONN_MACROS, &var_milt_conn_macros, 0, 0,
+	VAR_MILT_HELO_MACROS, DEF_MILT_HELO_MACROS, &var_milt_helo_macros, 0, 0,
+	VAR_MILT_MAIL_MACROS, DEF_MILT_MAIL_MACROS, &var_milt_mail_macros, 0, 0,
+	VAR_MILT_RCPT_MACROS, DEF_MILT_RCPT_MACROS, &var_milt_rcpt_macros, 0, 0,
+	VAR_MILT_DATA_MACROS, DEF_MILT_DATA_MACROS, &var_milt_data_macros, 0, 0,
+	VAR_MILT_EOH_MACROS, DEF_MILT_EOH_MACROS, &var_milt_eoh_macros, 0, 0,
+	VAR_MILT_EOD_MACROS, DEF_MILT_EOD_MACROS, &var_milt_eod_macros, 0, 0,
+	VAR_MILT_UNK_MACROS, DEF_MILT_UNK_MACROS, &var_milt_unk_macros, 0, 0,
+	VAR_MILT_PROTOCOL, DEF_MILT_PROTOCOL, &var_milt_protocol, 1, 0,
+	VAR_MILT_DEF_ACTION, DEF_MILT_DEF_ACTION, &var_milt_def_action, 1, 0,
+	VAR_MILT_DAEMON_NAME, DEF_MILT_DAEMON_NAME, &var_milt_daemon_name, 1, 0,
+	VAR_MILT_V, DEF_MILT_V, &var_milt_v, 1, 0,
+	VAR_MILT_MACRO_DEFLTS, DEF_MILT_MACRO_DEFLTS, &var_milt_macro_deflts, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_MILTER_MAPS, DEF_SMTPD_MILTER_MAPS, &var_smtpd_milter_maps, 0, 0,
+	VAR_STRESS, DEF_STRESS, &var_stress, 0, 0,
+	VAR_UNV_FROM_WHY, DEF_UNV_FROM_WHY, &var_unv_from_why, 0, 0,
+	VAR_UNV_RCPT_WHY, DEF_UNV_RCPT_WHY, &var_unv_rcpt_why, 0, 0,
+	VAR_REJECT_TMPF_ACT, DEF_REJECT_TMPF_ACT, &var_reject_tmpf_act, 1, 0,
+	VAR_UNK_NAME_TF_ACT, DEF_UNK_NAME_TF_ACT, &var_unk_name_tf_act, 1, 0,
+	VAR_UNK_ADDR_TF_ACT, DEF_UNK_ADDR_TF_ACT, &var_unk_addr_tf_act, 1, 0,
+	VAR_UNV_RCPT_TF_ACT, DEF_UNV_RCPT_TF_ACT, &var_unv_rcpt_tf_act, 1, 0,
+	VAR_UNV_FROM_TF_ACT, DEF_UNV_FROM_TF_ACT, &var_unv_from_tf_act, 1, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_CMD_FILTER, DEF_SMTPD_CMD_FILTER, &var_smtpd_cmd_filter, 0, 0,
+#ifdef USE_TLSPROXY
+	VAR_TLSPROXY_SERVICE, DEF_TLSPROXY_SERVICE, &var_tlsproxy_service, 1, 0,
+#endif
+	VAR_SMTPD_ACL_PERM_LOG, DEF_SMTPD_ACL_PERM_LOG, &var_smtpd_acl_perm_log, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_UPROXY_PROTO, DEF_SMTPD_UPROXY_PROTO, &var_smtpd_uproxy_proto, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_POLICY_DEF_ACTION, DEF_SMTPD_POLICY_DEF_ACTION, &var_smtpd_policy_def_action, 1, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_POLICY_CONTEXT, DEF_SMTPD_POLICY_CONTEXT, &var_smtpd_policy_context, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_DNS_RE_FILTER, DEF_SMTPD_DNS_RE_FILTER, &var_smtpd_dns_re_filter, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_REJ_FTR_MAPS, DEF_SMTPD_REJ_FTR_MAPS, &var_smtpd_rej_ftr_maps, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_FORBID_BARE_LF_EXCL, DEF_SMTPD_FORBID_BARE_LF_EXCL, &var_smtpd_forbid_bare_lf_excl, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_FORBID_BARE_LF, DEF_SMTPD_FORBID_BARE_LF, &var_smtpd_forbid_bare_lf, 1, 0,
+	0,
+    };
+    static const CONFIG_RAW_TABLE raw_table[] = {
+	VAR_SMTPD_EXP_FILTER, DEF_SMTPD_EXP_FILTER, &var_smtpd_exp_filter, 1, 0,
+	VAR_DEF_RBL_REPLY, DEF_DEF_RBL_REPLY, &var_def_rbl_reply, 1, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_REJ_FOOTER, DEF_SMTPD_REJ_FOOTER, &var_smtpd_rej_footer, 0, 0,
+	0,
+    };
+
+    /*
+     * Fingerprint executables and core dumps.
+     */
+    MAIL_VERSION_STAMP_ALLOCATE;
+
+    /*
+     * Pass control to the single-threaded service skeleton.
+     */
+    single_server_main(argc, argv, smtpd_service,
+		       CA_MAIL_SERVER_NINT_TABLE(nint_table),
+		       CA_MAIL_SERVER_INT_TABLE(int_table),
+		       CA_MAIL_SERVER_LONG_TABLE(long_table),
+		       CA_MAIL_SERVER_STR_TABLE(str_table),
+		       CA_MAIL_SERVER_RAW_TABLE(raw_table),
+		       CA_MAIL_SERVER_BOOL_TABLE(bool_table),
+		       CA_MAIL_SERVER_NBOOL_TABLE(nbool_table),
+		       CA_MAIL_SERVER_TIME_TABLE(time_table),
+		       CA_MAIL_SERVER_PRE_INIT(pre_jail_init),
+		       CA_MAIL_SERVER_PRE_ACCEPT(pre_accept),
+		       CA_MAIL_SERVER_POST_INIT(post_jail_init),
+		       0);
+}