Adding upstream version 3.5.24.upstream/3.5.24

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 283 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/util/safe_open.c b/src/util/safe_open.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c7a80cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/util/safe_open.c
@@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
+/*++
+/* NAME
+/*	safe_open 3
+/* SUMMARY
+/*	safely open or create regular file
+/* SYNOPSIS
+/*	#include <safe_open.h>
+/*
+/*	VSTREAM	*safe_open(path, flags, mode, st, user, group, why)
+/*	const char *path;
+/*	int	flags;
+/*	mode_t	mode;
+/*	struct stat *st;
+/*	uid_t	user;
+/*	gid_t	group;
+/*	VSTRING	*why;
+/* DESCRIPTION
+/*	safe_open() carefully opens or creates a file in a directory
+/*	that may be writable by untrusted users. If a file is created
+/*	it is given the specified ownership and permission attributes.
+/*	If an existing file is opened it must not be a symbolic link,
+/*	it must not be a directory, and it must have only one hard link.
+/*
+/*	Arguments:
+/* .IP "path, flags, mode"
+/*	These arguments are the same as with open(2). The O_EXCL flag
+/*	must appear either in combination with O_CREAT, or not at all.
+/* .sp
+/*	No change is made to the permissions of an existing file.
+/* .IP st
+/*	Null pointer, or pointer to storage for the attributes of the
+/*	opened file.
+/* .IP "user, group"
+/*	File ownership for a file created by safe_open(). Specify -1
+/*	in order to disable user and/or group ownership change.
+/* .sp
+/*	No change is made to the ownership of an existing file.
+/* .IP why
+/*	A VSTRING pointer for diagnostics.
+/* DIAGNOSTICS
+/*	Panic: interface violations.
+/*
+/*	A null result means there was a problem.  The nature of the
+/*	problem is returned via the \fIwhy\fR buffer; when an error
+/*	cannot be reported via \fIerrno\fR, the generic value EPERM
+/*	(operation not permitted) is used instead.
+/* HISTORY
+/* .fi
+/* .ad
+/*	A safe open routine was discussed by Casper Dik in article
+/*	<2rdb0s$568@mail.fwi.uva.nl>, posted to comp.security.unix
+/*	(May 18, 1994).
+/*
+/*	Olaf Kirch discusses how the lstat()/open()+fstat() test can
+/*	be fooled by delaying the open() until the inode found with
+/*	lstat() has been re-used for a sensitive file (article
+/*	<20000103212443.A5807@monad.swb.de> posted to bugtraq on
+/*	Jan 3, 2000).  This can be a concern for a set-ugid process
+/*	that runs under the control of a user and that can be
+/*	manipulated with start/stop signals.
+/* LICENSE
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/*	The Secure Mailer license must be distributed with this software.
+/* AUTHOR(S)
+/*	Wietse Venema
+/*	IBM T.J. Watson Research
+/*	P.O. Box 704
+/*	Yorktown Heights, NY 10598, USA
+/*--*/
+
+/* System library. */
+
+#include <sys_defs.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+/* Utility library. */
+
+#include <msg.h>
+#include <vstream.h>
+#include <vstring.h>
+#include <stringops.h>
+#include <safe_open.h>
+#include <warn_stat.h>
+
+/* safe_open_exist - open existing file */
+
+static VSTREAM *safe_open_exist(const char *path, int flags,
+				        struct stat * fstat_st, VSTRING *why)
+{
+    struct stat local_statbuf;
+    struct stat lstat_st;
+    int     saved_errno;
+    VSTREAM *fp;
+
+    /*
+     * Open an existing file.
+     */
+    if ((fp = vstream_fopen(path, flags & ~(O_CREAT | O_EXCL), 0)) == 0) {
+	saved_errno = errno;
+	vstring_sprintf(why, "cannot open file: %m");
+	errno = saved_errno;
+	return (0);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Examine the modes from the open file: it must have exactly one hard
+     * link (so that someone can't lure us into clobbering a sensitive file
+     * by making a hard link to it), and it must be a non-symlink file.
+     */
+    if (fstat_st == 0)
+	fstat_st = &local_statbuf;
+    if (fstat(vstream_fileno(fp), fstat_st) < 0) {
+	msg_fatal("%s: bad open file status: %m", path);
+    } else if (fstat_st->st_nlink != 1) {
+	vstring_sprintf(why, "file has %d hard links",
+			(int) fstat_st->st_nlink);
+	errno = EPERM;
+    } else if (S_ISDIR(fstat_st->st_mode)) {
+	vstring_sprintf(why, "file is a directory");
+	errno = EISDIR;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Look up the file again, this time using lstat(). Compare the fstat()
+     * (open file) modes with the lstat() modes. If there is any difference,
+     * either we followed a symlink while opening an existing file, someone
+     * quickly changed the number of hard links, or someone replaced the file
+     * after the open() call. The link and mode tests aren't really necessary
+     * in daemon processes. Set-uid programs, on the other hand, can be
+     * slowed down by arbitrary amounts, and there it would make sense to
+     * compare even more file attributes, such as the inode generation number
+     * on systems that have one.
+     * 
+     * Grr. Solaris /dev/whatever is a symlink. We'll have to make an exception
+     * for symlinks owned by root. NEVER, NEVER, make exceptions for symlinks
+     * owned by a non-root user. This would open a security hole when
+     * delivering mail to a world-writable mailbox directory.
+     * 
+     * Sebastian Krahmer of SuSE brought to my attention that some systems have
+     * changed their semantics of link(symlink, newpath), such that the
+     * result is a hardlink to the symlink. For this reason, we now also
+     * require that the symlink's parent directory is writable only by root.
+     */
+    else if (lstat(path, &lstat_st) < 0) {
+	vstring_sprintf(why, "file status changed unexpectedly: %m");
+	errno = EPERM;
+    } else if (S_ISLNK(lstat_st.st_mode)) {
+	if (lstat_st.st_uid == 0) {
+	    VSTRING *parent_buf = vstring_alloc(100);
+	    const char *parent_path = sane_dirname(parent_buf, path);
+	    struct stat parent_st;
+	    int     parent_ok;
+
+	    parent_ok = (stat(parent_path, &parent_st) == 0	/* not lstat */
+			 && parent_st.st_uid == 0
+			 && (parent_st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP | S_IWOTH)) == 0);
+	    vstring_free(parent_buf);
+	    if (parent_ok)
+		return (fp);
+	}
+	vstring_sprintf(why, "file is a symbolic link");
+	errno = EPERM;
+    } else if (fstat_st->st_dev != lstat_st.st_dev
+	       || fstat_st->st_ino != lstat_st.st_ino
+#ifdef HAS_ST_GEN
+	       || fstat_st->st_gen != lstat_st.st_gen
+#endif
+	       || fstat_st->st_nlink != lstat_st.st_nlink
+	       || fstat_st->st_mode != lstat_st.st_mode) {
+	vstring_sprintf(why, "file status changed unexpectedly");
+	errno = EPERM;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * We are almost there...
+     */
+    else {
+	return (fp);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * End up here in case of fstat()/lstat() problems or inconsistencies.
+     */
+    vstream_fclose(fp);
+    return (0);
+}
+
+/* safe_open_create - create new file */
+
+static VSTREAM *safe_open_create(const char *path, int flags, mode_t mode,
+	            struct stat * st, uid_t user, gid_t group, VSTRING *why)
+{
+    VSTREAM *fp;
+
+    /*
+     * Create a non-existing file. This relies on O_CREAT | O_EXCL to not
+     * follow symbolic links.
+     */
+    if ((fp = vstream_fopen(path, flags | (O_CREAT | O_EXCL), mode)) == 0) {
+	vstring_sprintf(why, "cannot create file exclusively: %m");
+	return (0);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Optionally look up the file attributes.
+     */
+    if (st != 0 && fstat(vstream_fileno(fp), st) < 0)
+	msg_fatal("%s: bad open file status: %m", path);
+
+    /*
+     * Optionally change ownership after creating a new file. If there is a
+     * problem we should not attempt to delete the file. Something else may
+     * have opened the file in the mean time.
+     */
+#define CHANGE_OWNER(user, group) (user != (uid_t) -1 || group != (gid_t) -1)
+
+    if (CHANGE_OWNER(user, group)
+	&& fchown(vstream_fileno(fp), user, group) < 0) {
+	msg_warn("%s: cannot change file ownership: %m", path);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * We are almost there...
+     */
+    else {
+	return (fp);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * End up here in case of trouble.
+     */
+    vstream_fclose(fp);
+    return (0);
+}
+
+/* safe_open - safely open or create file */
+
+VSTREAM *safe_open(const char *path, int flags, mode_t mode,
+	            struct stat * st, uid_t user, gid_t group, VSTRING *why)
+{
+    VSTREAM *fp;
+
+    switch (flags & (O_CREAT | O_EXCL)) {
+
+	/*
+	 * Open an existing file, carefully.
+	 */
+    case 0:
+	return (safe_open_exist(path, flags, st, why));
+
+	/*
+	 * Create a new file, carefully.
+	 */
+    case O_CREAT | O_EXCL:
+	return (safe_open_create(path, flags, mode, st, user, group, why));
+
+	/*
+	 * Open an existing file or create a new one, carefully. When opening
+	 * an existing file, we are prepared to deal with "no file" errors
+	 * only. When creating a file, we are prepared for "file exists"
+	 * errors only. Any other error means we better give up trying.
+	 */
+    case O_CREAT:
+	fp = safe_open_exist(path, flags, st, why);
+	if (fp == 0 && errno == ENOENT) {
+	    fp = safe_open_create(path, flags, mode, st, user, group, why);
+	    if (fp == 0 && errno == EEXIST)
+		fp = safe_open_exist(path, flags, st, why);
+	}
+	return (fp);
+
+	/*
+	 * Interface violation. Sorry, but we must be strict.
+	 */
+    default:
+	msg_panic("safe_open: O_EXCL flag without O_CREAT flag");
+    }
+}