/*++ /* NAME /* smtpd 8 /* SUMMARY /* Postfix SMTP server /* SYNOPSIS /* \fBsmtpd\fR [generic Postfix daemon options] /* /* \fBsendmail -bs\fR /* DESCRIPTION /* The SMTP server accepts network connection requests /* and performs zero or more SMTP transactions per connection. /* Each received message is piped through the \fBcleanup\fR(8) /* daemon, and is placed into the \fBincoming\fR queue as one /* single queue file. For this mode of operation, the program /* expects to be run from the \fBmaster\fR(8) process manager. /* /* Alternatively, the SMTP server be can run in stand-alone /* mode; this is traditionally obtained with "\fBsendmail /* -bs\fR". When the SMTP server runs stand-alone with non /* $\fBmail_owner\fR privileges, it receives mail even while /* the mail system is not running, deposits messages directly /* into the \fBmaildrop\fR queue, and disables the SMTP server's /* access policies. As of Postfix version 2.3, the SMTP server /* refuses to receive mail from the network when it runs with /* non $\fBmail_owner\fR privileges. /* /* The SMTP server implements a variety of policies for connection /* requests, and for parameters given to \fBHELO, ETRN, MAIL FROM, VRFY\fR /* and \fBRCPT TO\fR commands. They are detailed below and in the /* \fBmain.cf\fR configuration file. /* SECURITY /* .ad /* .fi /* The SMTP server is moderately security-sensitive. It talks to SMTP /* clients and to DNS servers on the network. The SMTP server can be /* run chrooted at fixed low privilege. /* STANDARDS /* RFC 821 (SMTP protocol) /* RFC 1123 (Host requirements) /* RFC 1652 (8bit-MIME transport) /* RFC 1869 (SMTP service extensions) /* RFC 1870 (Message size declaration) /* RFC 1985 (ETRN command) /* RFC 2034 (SMTP enhanced status codes) /* RFC 2554 (AUTH command) /* RFC 2821 (SMTP protocol) /* RFC 2920 (SMTP pipelining) /* RFC 3030 (CHUNKING without BINARYMIME) /* RFC 3207 (STARTTLS command) /* RFC 3461 (SMTP DSN extension) /* RFC 3463 (Enhanced status codes) /* RFC 3848 (ESMTP transmission types) /* RFC 4409 (Message submission) /* RFC 4954 (AUTH command) /* RFC 5321 (SMTP protocol) /* RFC 6531 (Internationalized SMTP) /* RFC 6533 (Internationalized Delivery Status Notifications) /* RFC 7505 ("Null MX" No Service Resource Record) /* DIAGNOSTICS /* Problems and transactions are logged to \fBsyslogd\fR(8) /* or \fBpostlogd\fR(8). /* /* Depending on the setting of the \fBnotify_classes\fR parameter, /* the postmaster is notified of bounces, protocol problems, /* policy violations, and of other trouble. /* CONFIGURATION PARAMETERS /* .ad /* .fi /* Changes to \fBmain.cf\fR are picked up automatically, as \fBsmtpd\fR(8) /* processes run for only a limited amount of time. Use the command /* "\fBpostfix reload\fR" to speed up a change. /* /* The text below provides only a parameter summary. See /* \fBpostconf\fR(5) for more details including examples. /* COMPATIBILITY CONTROLS /* .ad /* .fi /* The following parameters work around implementation errors in other /* software, and/or allow you to override standards in order to prevent /* undesirable use. /* .ad /* .fi /* .IP "\fBbroken_sasl_auth_clients (no)\fR" /* Enable interoperability with remote SMTP clients that implement an obsolete /* version of the AUTH command (RFC 4954). /* .IP "\fBdisable_vrfy_command (no)\fR" /* Disable the SMTP VRFY command. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_noop_commands (empty)\fR" /* List of commands that the Postfix SMTP server replies to with "250 /* Ok", without doing any syntax checks and without changing state. /* .IP "\fBstrict_rfc821_envelopes (no)\fR" /* Require that addresses received in SMTP MAIL FROM and RCPT TO /* commands are enclosed with <>, and that those addresses do /* not contain RFC 822 style comments or phrases. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 2.1 and later: /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_reject_unlisted_sender (no)\fR" /* Request that the Postfix SMTP server rejects mail from unknown /* sender addresses, even when no explicit reject_unlisted_sender /* access restriction is specified. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_sasl_exceptions_networks (empty)\fR" /* What remote SMTP clients the Postfix SMTP server will not offer /* AUTH support to. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 2.2 and later: /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_discard_ehlo_keyword_address_maps (empty)\fR" /* Lookup tables, indexed by the remote SMTP client address, with /* case insensitive lists of EHLO keywords (pipelining, starttls, auth, /* etc.) that the Postfix SMTP server will not send in the EHLO response /* to a /* remote SMTP client. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_discard_ehlo_keywords (empty)\fR" /* A case insensitive list of EHLO keywords (pipelining, starttls, /* auth, etc.) that the Postfix SMTP server will not send in the EHLO /* response /* to a remote SMTP client. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_delay_open_until_valid_rcpt (yes)\fR" /* Postpone the start of an SMTP mail transaction until a valid /* RCPT TO command is received. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 2.3 and later: /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_always_issue_session_ids (yes)\fR" /* Force the Postfix SMTP server to issue a TLS session id, even /* when TLS session caching is turned off (smtpd_tls_session_cache_database /* is empty). /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 2.6 and later: /* .IP "\fBtcp_windowsize (0)\fR" /* An optional workaround for routers that break TCP window scaling. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 2.7 and later: /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_command_filter (empty)\fR" /* A mechanism to transform commands from remote SMTP clients. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 2.9 and later: /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_per_record_deadline (normal: no, overload: yes)\fR" /* Change the behavior of the smtpd_timeout and smtpd_starttls_timeout /* time limits, from a /* time limit per read or write system call, to a time limit to send /* or receive a complete record (an SMTP command line, SMTP response /* line, SMTP message content line, or TLS protocol message). /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 3.0 and later: /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_dns_reply_filter (empty)\fR" /* Optional filter for Postfix SMTP server DNS lookup results. /* ADDRESS REWRITING CONTROLS /* .ad /* .fi /* See the ADDRESS_REWRITING_README document for a detailed /* discussion of Postfix address rewriting. /* .IP "\fBreceive_override_options (empty)\fR" /* Enable or disable recipient validation, built-in content /* filtering, or address mapping. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 2.2 and later: /* .IP "\fBlocal_header_rewrite_clients (permit_inet_interfaces)\fR" /* Rewrite message header addresses in mail from these clients and /* update incomplete addresses with the domain name in $myorigin or /* $mydomain; either don't rewrite message headers from other clients /* at all, or rewrite message headers and update incomplete addresses /* with the domain specified in the remote_header_rewrite_domain /* parameter. /* BEFORE-SMTPD PROXY AGENT /* .ad /* .fi /* Available in Postfix version 2.10 and later: /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_upstream_proxy_protocol (empty)\fR" /* The name of the proxy protocol used by an optional before-smtpd /* proxy agent. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_upstream_proxy_timeout (5s)\fR" /* The time limit for the proxy protocol specified with the /* smtpd_upstream_proxy_protocol parameter. /* AFTER QUEUE EXTERNAL CONTENT INSPECTION CONTROLS /* .ad /* .fi /* As of version 1.0, Postfix can be configured to send new mail to /* an external content filter AFTER the mail is queued. This content /* filter is expected to inject mail back into a (Postfix or other) /* MTA for further delivery. See the FILTER_README document for details. /* .IP "\fBcontent_filter (empty)\fR" /* After the message is queued, send the entire message to the /* specified \fItransport:destination\fR. /* BEFORE QUEUE EXTERNAL CONTENT INSPECTION CONTROLS /* .ad /* .fi /* As of version 2.1, the Postfix SMTP server can be configured /* to send incoming mail to a real-time SMTP-based content filter /* BEFORE mail is queued. This content filter is expected to inject /* mail back into Postfix. See the SMTPD_PROXY_README document for /* details on how to configure and operate this feature. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_proxy_filter (empty)\fR" /* The hostname and TCP port of the mail filtering proxy server. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_proxy_ehlo ($myhostname)\fR" /* How the Postfix SMTP server announces itself to the proxy filter. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_proxy_options (empty)\fR" /* List of options that control how the Postfix SMTP server /* communicates with a before-queue content filter. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_proxy_timeout (100s)\fR" /* The time limit for connecting to a proxy filter and for sending or /* receiving information. /* BEFORE QUEUE MILTER CONTROLS /* .ad /* .fi /* As of version 2.3, Postfix supports the Sendmail version 8 /* Milter (mail filter) protocol. These content filters run /* outside Postfix. They can inspect the SMTP command stream /* and the message content, and can request modifications before /* mail is queued. For details see the MILTER_README document. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_milters (empty)\fR" /* A list of Milter (mail filter) applications for new mail that /* arrives via the Postfix \fBsmtpd\fR(8) server. /* .IP "\fBmilter_protocol (6)\fR" /* The mail filter protocol version and optional protocol extensions /* for communication with a Milter application; prior to Postfix 2.6 /* the default protocol is 2. /* .IP "\fBmilter_default_action (tempfail)\fR" /* The default action when a Milter (mail filter) response is /* unavailable (for example, bad Postfix configuration or Milter /* failure). /* .IP "\fBmilter_macro_daemon_name ($myhostname)\fR" /* The {daemon_name} macro value for Milter (mail filter) applications. /* .IP "\fBmilter_macro_v ($mail_name $mail_version)\fR" /* The {v} macro value for Milter (mail filter) applications. /* .IP "\fBmilter_connect_timeout (30s)\fR" /* The time limit for connecting to a Milter (mail filter) /* application, and for negotiating protocol options. /* .IP "\fBmilter_command_timeout (30s)\fR" /* The time limit for sending an SMTP command to a Milter (mail /* filter) application, and for receiving the response. /* .IP "\fBmilter_content_timeout (300s)\fR" /* The time limit for sending message content to a Milter (mail /* filter) application, and for receiving the response. /* .IP "\fBmilter_connect_macros (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR" /* The macros that are sent to Milter (mail filter) applications /* after completion of an SMTP connection. /* .IP "\fBmilter_helo_macros (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR" /* The macros that are sent to Milter (mail filter) applications /* after the SMTP HELO or EHLO command. /* .IP "\fBmilter_mail_macros (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR" /* The macros that are sent to Milter (mail filter) applications /* after the SMTP MAIL FROM command. /* .IP "\fBmilter_rcpt_macros (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR" /* The macros that are sent to Milter (mail filter) applications /* after the SMTP RCPT TO command. /* .IP "\fBmilter_data_macros (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR" /* The macros that are sent to version 4 or higher Milter (mail /* filter) applications after the SMTP DATA command. /* .IP "\fBmilter_unknown_command_macros (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR" /* The macros that are sent to version 3 or higher Milter (mail /* filter) applications after an unknown SMTP command. /* .IP "\fBmilter_end_of_header_macros (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR" /* The macros that are sent to Milter (mail filter) applications /* after the end of the message header. /* .IP "\fBmilter_end_of_data_macros (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR" /* The macros that are sent to Milter (mail filter) applications /* after the message end-of-data. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 3.1 and later: /* .IP "\fBmilter_macro_defaults (empty)\fR" /* Optional list of \fIname=value\fR pairs that specify default /* values for arbitrary macros that Postfix may send to Milter /* applications. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 3.2 and later: /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_milter_maps (empty)\fR" /* Lookup tables with Milter settings per remote SMTP client IP /* address. /* GENERAL CONTENT INSPECTION CONTROLS /* .ad /* .fi /* The following parameters are applicable for both built-in /* and external content filters. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 2.1 and later: /* .IP "\fBreceive_override_options (empty)\fR" /* Enable or disable recipient validation, built-in content /* filtering, or address mapping. /* EXTERNAL CONTENT INSPECTION CONTROLS /* .ad /* .fi /* The following parameters are applicable for both before-queue /* and after-queue content filtering. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 2.1 and later: /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_authorized_xforward_hosts (empty)\fR" /* What remote SMTP clients are allowed to use the XFORWARD feature. /* SASL AUTHENTICATION CONTROLS /* .ad /* .fi /* Postfix SASL support (RFC 4954) can be used to authenticate remote /* SMTP clients to the Postfix SMTP server, and to authenticate the /* Postfix SMTP client to a remote SMTP server. /* See the SASL_README document for details. /* .IP "\fBbroken_sasl_auth_clients (no)\fR" /* Enable interoperability with remote SMTP clients that implement an obsolete /* version of the AUTH command (RFC 4954). /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_sasl_auth_enable (no)\fR" /* Enable SASL authentication in the Postfix SMTP server. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_sasl_local_domain (empty)\fR" /* The name of the Postfix SMTP server's local SASL authentication /* realm. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_sasl_security_options (noanonymous)\fR" /* Postfix SMTP server SASL security options; as of Postfix 2.3 /* the list of available /* features depends on the SASL server implementation that is selected /* with \fBsmtpd_sasl_type\fR. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_sender_login_maps (empty)\fR" /* Optional lookup table with the SASL login names that own the sender /* (MAIL FROM) addresses. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 2.1 and later: /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_sasl_exceptions_networks (empty)\fR" /* What remote SMTP clients the Postfix SMTP server will not offer /* AUTH support to. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 2.1 and 2.2: /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_sasl_application_name (smtpd)\fR" /* The application name that the Postfix SMTP server uses for SASL /* server initialization. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 2.3 and later: /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_sasl_authenticated_header (no)\fR" /* Report the SASL authenticated user name in the \fBsmtpd\fR(8) Received /* message header. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_sasl_path (smtpd)\fR" /* Implementation-specific information that the Postfix SMTP server /* passes through to /* the SASL plug-in implementation that is selected with /* \fBsmtpd_sasl_type\fR. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_sasl_type (cyrus)\fR" /* The SASL plug-in type that the Postfix SMTP server should use /* for authentication. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 2.5 and later: /* .IP "\fBcyrus_sasl_config_path (empty)\fR" /* Search path for Cyrus SASL application configuration files, /* currently used only to locate the $smtpd_sasl_path.conf file. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 2.11 and later: /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_sasl_service (smtp)\fR" /* The service name that is passed to the SASL plug-in that is /* selected with \fBsmtpd_sasl_type\fR and \fBsmtpd_sasl_path\fR. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 3.4 and later: /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_sasl_response_limit (12288)\fR" /* The maximum length of a SASL client's response to a server challenge. /* STARTTLS SUPPORT CONTROLS /* .ad /* .fi /* Detailed information about STARTTLS configuration may be /* found in the TLS_README document. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_security_level (empty)\fR" /* The SMTP TLS security level for the Postfix SMTP server; when /* a non-empty value is specified, this overrides the obsolete parameters /* smtpd_use_tls and smtpd_enforce_tls. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_sasl_tls_security_options ($smtpd_sasl_security_options)\fR" /* The SASL authentication security options that the Postfix SMTP /* server uses for TLS encrypted SMTP sessions. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_starttls_timeout (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR" /* The time limit for Postfix SMTP server write and read operations /* during TLS startup and shutdown handshake procedures. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_CAfile (empty)\fR" /* A file containing (PEM format) CA certificates of root CAs trusted /* to sign either remote SMTP client certificates or intermediate CA /* certificates. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_CApath (empty)\fR" /* A directory containing (PEM format) CA certificates of root CAs /* trusted to sign either remote SMTP client certificates or intermediate CA /* certificates. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_always_issue_session_ids (yes)\fR" /* Force the Postfix SMTP server to issue a TLS session id, even /* when TLS session caching is turned off (smtpd_tls_session_cache_database /* is empty). /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_ask_ccert (no)\fR" /* Ask a remote SMTP client for a client certificate. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_auth_only (no)\fR" /* When TLS encryption is optional in the Postfix SMTP server, do /* not announce or accept SASL authentication over unencrypted /* connections. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_ccert_verifydepth (9)\fR" /* The verification depth for remote SMTP client certificates. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_cert_file (empty)\fR" /* File with the Postfix SMTP server RSA certificate in PEM format. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_exclude_ciphers (empty)\fR" /* List of ciphers or cipher types to exclude from the SMTP server /* cipher list at all TLS security levels. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_dcert_file (empty)\fR" /* File with the Postfix SMTP server DSA certificate in PEM format. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file (empty)\fR" /* File with DH parameters that the Postfix SMTP server should /* use with non-export EDH ciphers. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_dh512_param_file (empty)\fR" /* File with DH parameters that the Postfix SMTP server should /* use with export-grade EDH ciphers. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_dkey_file ($smtpd_tls_dcert_file)\fR" /* File with the Postfix SMTP server DSA private key in PEM format. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_key_file ($smtpd_tls_cert_file)\fR" /* File with the Postfix SMTP server RSA private key in PEM format. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_loglevel (0)\fR" /* Enable additional Postfix SMTP server logging of TLS activity. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_mandatory_ciphers (medium)\fR" /* The minimum TLS cipher grade that the Postfix SMTP server will /* use with mandatory TLS encryption. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_mandatory_exclude_ciphers (empty)\fR" /* Additional list of ciphers or cipher types to exclude from the /* Postfix SMTP server cipher list at mandatory TLS security levels. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_mandatory_protocols (!SSLv2, !SSLv3)\fR" /* The SSL/TLS protocols accepted by the Postfix SMTP server with /* mandatory TLS encryption. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_received_header (no)\fR" /* Request that the Postfix SMTP server produces Received: message /* headers that include information about the protocol and cipher used, /* as well as the remote SMTP client CommonName and client certificate issuer /* CommonName. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_req_ccert (no)\fR" /* With mandatory TLS encryption, require a trusted remote SMTP client /* certificate in order to allow TLS connections to proceed. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_wrappermode (no)\fR" /* Run the Postfix SMTP server in the non-standard "wrapper" mode, /* instead of using the STARTTLS command. /* .IP "\fBtls_daemon_random_bytes (32)\fR" /* The number of pseudo-random bytes that an \fBsmtp\fR(8) or \fBsmtpd\fR(8) /* process requests from the \fBtlsmgr\fR(8) server in order to seed its /* internal pseudo random number generator (PRNG). /* .IP "\fBtls_high_cipherlist (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR" /* The OpenSSL cipherlist for "high" grade ciphers. /* .IP "\fBtls_medium_cipherlist (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR" /* The OpenSSL cipherlist for "medium" or higher grade ciphers. /* .IP "\fBtls_low_cipherlist (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR" /* The OpenSSL cipherlist for "low" or higher grade ciphers. /* .IP "\fBtls_export_cipherlist (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR" /* The OpenSSL cipherlist for "export" or higher grade ciphers. /* .IP "\fBtls_null_cipherlist (eNULL:!aNULL)\fR" /* The OpenSSL cipherlist for "NULL" grade ciphers that provide /* authentication without encryption. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 2.5 and later: /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_fingerprint_digest (md5)\fR" /* The message digest algorithm to construct remote SMTP /* client-certificate /* fingerprints or public key fingerprints (Postfix 2.9 and later) /* for \fBcheck_ccert_access\fR and \fBpermit_tls_clientcerts\fR. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 2.6 and later: /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_protocols (!SSLv2, !SSLv3)\fR" /* List of TLS protocols that the Postfix SMTP server will exclude /* or include with opportunistic TLS encryption. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_ciphers (medium)\fR" /* The minimum TLS cipher grade that the Postfix SMTP server /* will use with opportunistic TLS encryption. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_eccert_file (empty)\fR" /* File with the Postfix SMTP server ECDSA certificate in PEM format. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_eckey_file ($smtpd_tls_eccert_file)\fR" /* File with the Postfix SMTP server ECDSA private key in PEM format. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_eecdh_grade (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR" /* The Postfix SMTP server security grade for ephemeral elliptic-curve /* Diffie-Hellman (EECDH) key exchange. /* .IP "\fBtls_eecdh_strong_curve (prime256v1)\fR" /* The elliptic curve used by the Postfix SMTP server for sensibly /* strong /* ephemeral ECDH key exchange. /* .IP "\fBtls_eecdh_ultra_curve (secp384r1)\fR" /* The elliptic curve used by the Postfix SMTP server for maximally /* strong /* ephemeral ECDH key exchange. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 2.8 and later: /* .IP "\fBtls_preempt_cipherlist (no)\fR" /* With SSLv3 and later, use the Postfix SMTP server's cipher /* preference order instead of the remote client's cipher preference /* order. /* .IP "\fBtls_disable_workarounds (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR" /* List or bit-mask of OpenSSL bug work-arounds to disable. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 2.11 and later: /* .IP "\fBtlsmgr_service_name (tlsmgr)\fR" /* The name of the \fBtlsmgr\fR(8) service entry in master.cf. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 3.0 and later: /* .IP "\fBtls_session_ticket_cipher (Postfix >= 3.0: aes-256-cbc, Postfix < 3.0: aes-128-cbc)\fR" /* Algorithm used to encrypt RFC5077 TLS session tickets. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 3.2 and later: /* .IP "\fBtls_eecdh_auto_curves (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR" /* The prioritized list of elliptic curves supported by the Postfix /* SMTP client and server. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 3.4 and later: /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_chain_files (empty)\fR" /* List of one or more PEM files, each holding one or more private keys /* directly followed by a corresponding certificate chain. /* .IP "\fBtls_server_sni_maps (empty)\fR" /* Optional lookup tables that map names received from remote SMTP /* clients via the TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) extension to the /* appropriate keys and certificate chains. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix 3.5, 3.4.6, 3.3.5, 3.2.10, 3.1.13 and later: /* .IP "\fBtls_fast_shutdown_enable (yes)\fR" /* A workaround for implementations that hang Postfix while shutting /* down a TLS session, until Postfix times out. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix 3.5 and later: /* .IP "\fBinfo_log_address_format (external)\fR" /* The email address form that will be used in non-debug logging /* (info, warning, etc.). /* .PP /* Available in Postfix 3.9, 3.8.1, 3.7.6, 3.6.10, 3.5.20 and later: /* .IP "\fBtls_config_file (default)\fR" /* Optional configuration file with baseline OpenSSL settings. /* .IP "\fBtls_config_name (empty)\fR" /* The application name passed by Postfix to OpenSSL library /* initialization functions. /* OBSOLETE STARTTLS CONTROLS /* .ad /* .fi /* The following configuration parameters exist for compatibility /* with Postfix versions before 2.3. Support for these will /* be removed in a future release. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_use_tls (no)\fR" /* Opportunistic TLS: announce STARTTLS support to remote SMTP clients, /* but do not require that clients use TLS encryption. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_enforce_tls (no)\fR" /* Mandatory TLS: announce STARTTLS support to remote SMTP clients, /* and require that clients use TLS encryption. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_tls_cipherlist (empty)\fR" /* Obsolete Postfix < 2.3 control for the Postfix SMTP server TLS /* cipher list. /* SMTPUTF8 CONTROLS /* .ad /* .fi /* Preliminary SMTPUTF8 support is introduced with Postfix 3.0. /* .IP "\fBsmtputf8_enable (yes)\fR" /* Enable preliminary SMTPUTF8 support for the protocols described /* in RFC 6531..6533. /* .IP "\fBstrict_smtputf8 (no)\fR" /* Enable stricter enforcement of the SMTPUTF8 protocol. /* .IP "\fBsmtputf8_autodetect_classes (sendmail, verify)\fR" /* Detect that a message requires SMTPUTF8 support for the specified /* mail origin classes. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 3.2 and later: /* .IP "\fBenable_idna2003_compatibility (no)\fR" /* Enable 'transitional' compatibility between IDNA2003 and IDNA2008, /* when converting UTF-8 domain names to/from the ASCII form that is /* used for DNS lookups. /* VERP SUPPORT CONTROLS /* .ad /* .fi /* With VERP style delivery, each recipient of a message receives a /* customized copy of the message with his/her own recipient address /* encoded in the envelope sender address. The VERP_README file /* describes configuration and operation details of Postfix support /* for variable envelope return path addresses. VERP style delivery /* is requested with the SMTP XVERP command or with the "sendmail /* -V" command-line option and is available in Postfix version 1.1 /* and later. /* .IP "\fBdefault_verp_delimiters (+=)\fR" /* The two default VERP delimiter characters. /* .IP "\fBverp_delimiter_filter (-=+)\fR" /* The characters Postfix accepts as VERP delimiter characters on the /* Postfix \fBsendmail\fR(1) command line and in SMTP commands. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 1.1 and 2.0: /* .IP "\fBauthorized_verp_clients ($mynetworks)\fR" /* What remote SMTP clients are allowed to specify the XVERP command. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 2.1 and later: /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_authorized_verp_clients ($authorized_verp_clients)\fR" /* What remote SMTP clients are allowed to specify the XVERP command. /* TROUBLE SHOOTING CONTROLS /* .ad /* .fi /* The DEBUG_README document describes how to debug parts of the /* Postfix mail system. The methods vary from making the software log /* a lot of detail, to running some daemon processes under control of /* a call tracer or debugger. /* .IP "\fBdebug_peer_level (2)\fR" /* The increment in verbose logging level when a remote client or /* server matches a pattern in the debug_peer_list parameter. /* .IP "\fBdebug_peer_list (empty)\fR" /* Optional list of remote client or server hostname or network /* address patterns that cause the verbose logging level to increase /* by the amount specified in $debug_peer_level. /* .IP "\fBerror_notice_recipient (postmaster)\fR" /* The recipient of postmaster notifications about mail delivery /* problems that are caused by policy, resource, software or protocol /* errors. /* .IP "\fBinternal_mail_filter_classes (empty)\fR" /* What categories of Postfix-generated mail are subject to /* before-queue content inspection by non_smtpd_milters, header_checks /* and body_checks. /* .IP "\fBnotify_classes (resource, software)\fR" /* The list of error classes that are reported to the postmaster. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_reject_footer (empty)\fR" /* Optional information that is appended after each Postfix SMTP /* server /* 4XX or 5XX response. /* .IP "\fBsoft_bounce (no)\fR" /* Safety net to keep mail queued that would otherwise be returned to /* the sender. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 2.1 and later: /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_authorized_xclient_hosts (empty)\fR" /* What remote SMTP clients are allowed to use the XCLIENT feature. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 2.10 and later: /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_log_access_permit_actions (empty)\fR" /* Enable logging of the named "permit" actions in SMTP server /* access lists (by default, the SMTP server logs "reject" actions but /* not "permit" actions). /* KNOWN VERSUS UNKNOWN RECIPIENT CONTROLS /* .ad /* .fi /* As of Postfix version 2.0, the SMTP server rejects mail for /* unknown recipients. This prevents the mail queue from clogging up /* with undeliverable MAILER-DAEMON messages. Additional information /* on this topic is in the LOCAL_RECIPIENT_README and ADDRESS_CLASS_README /* documents. /* .IP "\fBshow_user_unknown_table_name (yes)\fR" /* Display the name of the recipient table in the "User unknown" /* responses. /* .IP "\fBcanonical_maps (empty)\fR" /* Optional address mapping lookup tables for message headers and /* envelopes. /* .IP "\fBrecipient_canonical_maps (empty)\fR" /* Optional address mapping lookup tables for envelope and header /* recipient addresses. /* .IP "\fBsender_canonical_maps (empty)\fR" /* Optional address mapping lookup tables for envelope and header /* sender addresses. /* .PP /* Parameters concerning known/unknown local recipients: /* .IP "\fBmydestination ($myhostname, localhost.$mydomain, localhost)\fR" /* The list of domains that are delivered via the $local_transport /* mail delivery transport. /* .IP "\fBinet_interfaces (all)\fR" /* The network interface addresses that this mail system receives /* mail on. /* .IP "\fBproxy_interfaces (empty)\fR" /* The network interface addresses that this mail system receives mail /* on by way of a proxy or network address translation unit. /* .IP "\fBinet_protocols (all)\fR" /* The Internet protocols Postfix will attempt to use when making /* or accepting connections. /* .IP "\fBlocal_recipient_maps (proxy:unix:passwd.byname $alias_maps)\fR" /* Lookup tables with all names or addresses of local recipients: /* a recipient address is local when its domain matches $mydestination, /* $inet_interfaces or $proxy_interfaces. /* .IP "\fBunknown_local_recipient_reject_code (550)\fR" /* The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code when a recipient /* address is local, and $local_recipient_maps specifies a list of /* lookup tables that does not match the recipient. /* .PP /* Parameters concerning known/unknown recipients of relay destinations: /* .IP "\fBrelay_domains (Postfix >= 3.0: empty, Postfix < 3.0: $mydestination)\fR" /* What destination domains (and subdomains thereof) this system /* will relay mail to. /* .IP "\fBrelay_recipient_maps (empty)\fR" /* Optional lookup tables with all valid addresses in the domains /* that match $relay_domains. /* .IP "\fBunknown_relay_recipient_reject_code (550)\fR" /* The numerical Postfix SMTP server reply code when a recipient /* address matches $relay_domains, and relay_recipient_maps specifies /* a list of lookup tables that does not match the recipient address. /* .PP /* Parameters concerning known/unknown recipients in virtual alias /* domains: /* .IP "\fBvirtual_alias_domains ($virtual_alias_maps)\fR" /* Postfix is final destination for the specified list of virtual /* alias domains, that is, domains for which all addresses are aliased /* to addresses in other local or remote domains. /* .IP "\fBvirtual_alias_maps ($virtual_maps)\fR" /* Optional lookup tables that alias specific mail addresses or domains /* to other local or remote address. /* .IP "\fBunknown_virtual_alias_reject_code (550)\fR" /* The Postfix SMTP server reply code when a recipient address matches /* $virtual_alias_domains, and $virtual_alias_maps specifies a list /* of lookup tables that does not match the recipient address. /* .PP /* Parameters concerning known/unknown recipients in virtual mailbox /* domains: /* .IP "\fBvirtual_mailbox_domains ($virtual_mailbox_maps)\fR" /* Postfix is final destination for the specified list of domains; /* mail is delivered via the $virtual_transport mail delivery transport. /* .IP "\fBvirtual_mailbox_maps (empty)\fR" /* Optional lookup tables with all valid addresses in the domains that /* match $virtual_mailbox_domains. /* .IP "\fBunknown_virtual_mailbox_reject_code (550)\fR" /* The Postfix SMTP server reply code when a recipient address matches /* $virtual_mailbox_domains, and $virtual_mailbox_maps specifies a list /* of lookup tables that does not match the recipient address. /* RESOURCE AND RATE CONTROLS /* .ad /* .fi /* The following parameters limit resource usage by the SMTP /* server and/or control client request rates. /* .IP "\fBline_length_limit (2048)\fR" /* Upon input, long lines are chopped up into pieces of at most /* this length; upon delivery, long lines are reconstructed. /* .IP "\fBqueue_minfree (0)\fR" /* The minimal amount of free space in bytes in the queue file system /* that is needed to receive mail. /* .IP "\fBmessage_size_limit (10240000)\fR" /* The maximal size in bytes of a message, including envelope information. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_recipient_limit (1000)\fR" /* The maximal number of recipients that the Postfix SMTP server /* accepts per message delivery request. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_timeout (normal: 300s, overload: 10s)\fR" /* The time limit for sending a Postfix SMTP server response and for /* receiving a remote SMTP client request. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_history_flush_threshold (100)\fR" /* The maximal number of lines in the Postfix SMTP server command history /* before it is flushed upon receipt of EHLO, RSET, or end of DATA. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 2.3 and later: /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_peername_lookup (yes)\fR" /* Attempt to look up the remote SMTP client hostname, and verify that /* the name matches the client IP address. /* .PP /* The per SMTP client connection count and request rate limits are /* implemented in co-operation with the \fBanvil\fR(8) service, and /* are available in Postfix version 2.2 and later. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_client_connection_count_limit (50)\fR" /* How many simultaneous connections any client is allowed to /* make to this service. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_client_connection_rate_limit (0)\fR" /* The maximal number of connection attempts any client is allowed to /* make to this service per time unit. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_client_message_rate_limit (0)\fR" /* The maximal number of message delivery requests that any client is /* allowed to make to this service per time unit, regardless of whether /* or not Postfix actually accepts those messages. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_client_recipient_rate_limit (0)\fR" /* The maximal number of recipient addresses that any client is allowed /* to send to this service per time unit, regardless of whether or not /* Postfix actually accepts those recipients. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_client_event_limit_exceptions ($mynetworks)\fR" /* Clients that are excluded from smtpd_client_*_count/rate_limit /* restrictions. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 2.3 and later: /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_client_new_tls_session_rate_limit (0)\fR" /* The maximal number of new (i.e., uncached) TLS sessions that a /* remote SMTP client is allowed to negotiate with this service per /* time unit. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 2.9 and later: /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_per_record_deadline (normal: no, overload: yes)\fR" /* Change the behavior of the smtpd_timeout and smtpd_starttls_timeout /* time limits, from a /* time limit per read or write system call, to a time limit to send /* or receive a complete record (an SMTP command line, SMTP response /* line, SMTP message content line, or TLS protocol message). /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 3.1 and later: /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_client_auth_rate_limit (0)\fR" /* The maximal number of AUTH commands that any client is allowed to /* send to this service per time unit, regardless of whether or not /* Postfix actually accepts those commands. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix 3.9, 3.8.1, 3.7.6, 3.6.10, 3.5.20 and later: /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_forbid_unauth_pipelining (Postfix >= 3.9: yes)\fR" /* Disconnect remote SMTP clients that violate RFC 2920 (or 5321) /* command pipelining constraints. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix 3.9, 3.8.4, 3.7.9, 3.6.13, 3.5.23 and later: /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_forbid_bare_newline (Postfix < 3.9: no)\fR" /* Reject or restrict input lines from an SMTP client that end in /* instead of the standard . /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_forbid_bare_newline_exclusions ($mynetworks)\fR" /* Exclude the specified clients from smtpd_forbid_bare_newline /* enforcement. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix 3.9, 3.8.5, 3.7.10, 3.6.14, 3.5.24 and /* later: /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_forbid_bare_newline_reject_code (550)\fR" /* The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code when rejecting a /* request with "smtpd_forbid_bare_newline = reject". /* TARPIT CONTROLS /* .ad /* .fi /* When a remote SMTP client makes errors, the Postfix SMTP server /* can insert delays before responding. This can help to slow down /* run-away software. The behavior is controlled by an error counter /* that counts the number of errors within an SMTP session that a /* client makes without delivering mail. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_error_sleep_time (1s)\fR" /* With Postfix version 2.1 and later: the SMTP server response delay after /* a client has made more than $smtpd_soft_error_limit errors, and /* fewer than $smtpd_hard_error_limit errors, without delivering mail. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_soft_error_limit (10)\fR" /* The number of errors a remote SMTP client is allowed to make without /* delivering mail before the Postfix SMTP server slows down all its /* responses. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_hard_error_limit (normal: 20, overload: 1)\fR" /* The maximal number of errors a remote SMTP client is allowed to /* make without delivering mail. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_junk_command_limit (normal: 100, overload: 1)\fR" /* The number of junk commands (NOOP, VRFY, ETRN or RSET) that a remote /* SMTP client can send before the Postfix SMTP server starts to /* increment the error counter with each junk command. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 2.1 and later: /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_recipient_overshoot_limit (1000)\fR" /* The number of recipients that a remote SMTP client can send in /* excess of the limit specified with $smtpd_recipient_limit, before /* the Postfix SMTP server increments the per-session error count /* for each excess recipient. /* ACCESS POLICY DELEGATION CONTROLS /* .ad /* .fi /* As of version 2.1, Postfix can be configured to delegate access /* policy decisions to an external server that runs outside Postfix. /* See the file SMTPD_POLICY_README for more information. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_policy_service_max_idle (300s)\fR" /* The time after which an idle SMTPD policy service connection is /* closed. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_policy_service_max_ttl (1000s)\fR" /* The time after which an active SMTPD policy service connection is /* closed. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_policy_service_timeout (100s)\fR" /* The time limit for connecting to, writing to, or receiving from a /* delegated SMTPD policy server. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 3.0 and later: /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_policy_service_default_action (451 4.3.5 Server configuration problem)\fR" /* The default action when an SMTPD policy service request fails. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_policy_service_request_limit (0)\fR" /* The maximal number of requests per SMTPD policy service connection, /* or zero (no limit). /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_policy_service_try_limit (2)\fR" /* The maximal number of attempts to send an SMTPD policy service /* request before giving up. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_policy_service_retry_delay (1s)\fR" /* The delay between attempts to resend a failed SMTPD policy /* service request. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 3.1 and later: /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_policy_service_policy_context (empty)\fR" /* Optional information that the Postfix SMTP server specifies in /* the "policy_context" attribute of a policy service request (originally, /* to share the same service endpoint among multiple check_policy_service /* clients). /* ACCESS CONTROLS /* .ad /* .fi /* The SMTPD_ACCESS_README document gives an introduction to all the /* SMTP server access control features. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_delay_reject (yes)\fR" /* Wait until the RCPT TO command before evaluating /* $smtpd_client_restrictions, $smtpd_helo_restrictions and /* $smtpd_sender_restrictions, or wait until the ETRN command before /* evaluating $smtpd_client_restrictions and $smtpd_helo_restrictions. /* .IP "\fBparent_domain_matches_subdomains (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR" /* A list of Postfix features where the pattern "example.com" also /* matches subdomains of example.com, /* instead of requiring an explicit ".example.com" pattern. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_client_restrictions (empty)\fR" /* Optional restrictions that the Postfix SMTP server applies in the /* context of a client connection request. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_helo_required (no)\fR" /* Require that a remote SMTP client introduces itself with the HELO /* or EHLO command before sending the MAIL command or other commands /* that require EHLO negotiation. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_helo_restrictions (empty)\fR" /* Optional restrictions that the Postfix SMTP server applies in the /* context of a client HELO command. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_sender_restrictions (empty)\fR" /* Optional restrictions that the Postfix SMTP server applies in the /* context of a client MAIL FROM command. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_recipient_restrictions (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR" /* Optional restrictions that the Postfix SMTP server applies in the /* context of a client RCPT TO command, after smtpd_relay_restrictions. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_etrn_restrictions (empty)\fR" /* Optional restrictions that the Postfix SMTP server applies in the /* context of a client ETRN command. /* .IP "\fBallow_untrusted_routing (no)\fR" /* Forward mail with sender-specified routing (user[@%!]remote[@%!]site) /* from untrusted clients to destinations matching $relay_domains. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_restriction_classes (empty)\fR" /* User-defined aliases for groups of access restrictions. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_null_access_lookup_key (<>)\fR" /* The lookup key to be used in SMTP \fBaccess\fR(5) tables instead of the /* null sender address. /* .IP "\fBpermit_mx_backup_networks (empty)\fR" /* Restrict the use of the permit_mx_backup SMTP access feature to /* only domains whose primary MX hosts match the listed networks. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 2.0 and later: /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_data_restrictions (empty)\fR" /* Optional access restrictions that the Postfix SMTP server applies /* in the context of the SMTP DATA command. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_expansion_filter (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR" /* What characters are allowed in $name expansions of RBL reply /* templates. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 2.1 and later: /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_reject_unlisted_sender (no)\fR" /* Request that the Postfix SMTP server rejects mail from unknown /* sender addresses, even when no explicit reject_unlisted_sender /* access restriction is specified. /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_reject_unlisted_recipient (yes)\fR" /* Request that the Postfix SMTP server rejects mail for unknown /* recipient addresses, even when no explicit reject_unlisted_recipient /* access restriction is specified. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 2.2 and later: /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_end_of_data_restrictions (empty)\fR" /* Optional access restrictions that the Postfix SMTP server /* applies in the context of the SMTP END-OF-DATA command. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 2.10 and later: /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_relay_restrictions (permit_mynetworks, permit_sasl_authenticated, defer_unauth_destination)\fR" /* Access restrictions for mail relay control that the Postfix /* SMTP server applies in the context of the RCPT TO command, before /* smtpd_recipient_restrictions. /* SENDER AND RECIPIENT ADDRESS VERIFICATION CONTROLS /* .ad /* .fi /* Postfix version 2.1 introduces sender and recipient address verification. /* This feature is implemented by sending probe email messages that /* are not actually delivered. /* This feature is requested via the reject_unverified_sender and /* reject_unverified_recipient access restrictions. The status of /* verification probes is maintained by the \fBverify\fR(8) server. /* See the file ADDRESS_VERIFICATION_README for information /* about how to configure and operate the Postfix sender/recipient /* address verification service. /* .IP "\fBaddress_verify_poll_count (normal: 3, overload: 1)\fR" /* How many times to query the \fBverify\fR(8) service for the completion /* of an address verification request in progress. /* .IP "\fBaddress_verify_poll_delay (3s)\fR" /* The delay between queries for the completion of an address /* verification request in progress. /* .IP "\fBaddress_verify_sender ($double_bounce_sender)\fR" /* The sender address to use in address verification probes; prior /* to Postfix 2.5 the default was "postmaster". /* .IP "\fBunverified_sender_reject_code (450)\fR" /* The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code when a recipient /* address is rejected by the reject_unverified_sender restriction. /* .IP "\fBunverified_recipient_reject_code (450)\fR" /* The numerical Postfix SMTP server response when a recipient address /* is rejected by the reject_unverified_recipient restriction. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 2.6 and later: /* .IP "\fBunverified_sender_defer_code (450)\fR" /* The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code when a sender address /* probe fails due to a temporary error condition. /* .IP "\fBunverified_recipient_defer_code (450)\fR" /* The numerical Postfix SMTP server response when a recipient address /* probe fails due to a temporary error condition. /* .IP "\fBunverified_sender_reject_reason (empty)\fR" /* The Postfix SMTP server's reply when rejecting mail with /* reject_unverified_sender. /* .IP "\fBunverified_recipient_reject_reason (empty)\fR" /* The Postfix SMTP server's reply when rejecting mail with /* reject_unverified_recipient. /* .IP "\fBunverified_sender_tempfail_action ($reject_tempfail_action)\fR" /* The Postfix SMTP server's action when reject_unverified_sender /* fails due to a temporary error condition. /* .IP "\fBunverified_recipient_tempfail_action ($reject_tempfail_action)\fR" /* The Postfix SMTP server's action when reject_unverified_recipient /* fails due to a temporary error condition. /* .PP /* Available with Postfix 2.9 and later: /* .IP "\fBaddress_verify_sender_ttl (0s)\fR" /* The time between changes in the time-dependent portion of address /* verification probe sender addresses. /* ACCESS CONTROL RESPONSES /* .ad /* .fi /* The following parameters control numerical SMTP reply codes /* and/or text responses. /* .IP "\fBaccess_map_reject_code (554)\fR" /* The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code for /* an \fBaccess\fR(5) map "reject" action. /* .IP "\fBdefer_code (450)\fR" /* The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code when a remote SMTP /* client request is rejected by the "defer" restriction. /* .IP "\fBinvalid_hostname_reject_code (501)\fR" /* The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code when the client /* HELO or EHLO command parameter is rejected by the reject_invalid_helo_hostname /* restriction. /* .IP "\fBmaps_rbl_reject_code (554)\fR" /* The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code when a remote SMTP /* client request is blocked by the reject_rbl_client, reject_rhsbl_client, /* reject_rhsbl_reverse_client, reject_rhsbl_sender or /* reject_rhsbl_recipient restriction. /* .IP "\fBnon_fqdn_reject_code (504)\fR" /* The numerical Postfix SMTP server reply code when a client request /* is rejected by the reject_non_fqdn_helo_hostname, reject_non_fqdn_sender /* or reject_non_fqdn_recipient restriction. /* .IP "\fBplaintext_reject_code (450)\fR" /* The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code when a request /* is rejected by the \fBreject_plaintext_session\fR restriction. /* .IP "\fBreject_code (554)\fR" /* The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code when a remote SMTP /* client request is rejected by the "reject" restriction. /* .IP "\fBrelay_domains_reject_code (554)\fR" /* The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code when a client /* request is rejected by the reject_unauth_destination recipient /* restriction. /* .IP "\fBunknown_address_reject_code (450)\fR" /* The numerical response code when the Postfix SMTP server rejects a /* sender or recipient address because its domain is unknown. /* .IP "\fBunknown_client_reject_code (450)\fR" /* The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code when a client /* without valid address <=> name mapping is rejected by the /* reject_unknown_client_hostname restriction. /* .IP "\fBunknown_hostname_reject_code (450)\fR" /* The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code when the hostname /* specified with the HELO or EHLO command is rejected by the /* reject_unknown_helo_hostname restriction. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 2.0 and later: /* .IP "\fBdefault_rbl_reply (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR" /* The default Postfix SMTP server response template for a request that is /* rejected by an RBL-based restriction. /* .IP "\fBmulti_recipient_bounce_reject_code (550)\fR" /* The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code when a remote SMTP /* client request is blocked by the reject_multi_recipient_bounce /* restriction. /* .IP "\fBrbl_reply_maps (empty)\fR" /* Optional lookup tables with RBL response templates. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 2.6 and later: /* .IP "\fBaccess_map_defer_code (450)\fR" /* The numerical Postfix SMTP server response code for /* an \fBaccess\fR(5) map "defer" action, including "defer_if_permit" /* or "defer_if_reject". /* .IP "\fBreject_tempfail_action (defer_if_permit)\fR" /* The Postfix SMTP server's action when a reject-type restriction /* fails due to a temporary error condition. /* .IP "\fBunknown_helo_hostname_tempfail_action ($reject_tempfail_action)\fR" /* The Postfix SMTP server's action when reject_unknown_helo_hostname /* fails due to a temporary error condition. /* .IP "\fBunknown_address_tempfail_action ($reject_tempfail_action)\fR" /* The Postfix SMTP server's action when reject_unknown_sender_domain /* or reject_unknown_recipient_domain fail due to a temporary error /* condition. /* MISCELLANEOUS CONTROLS /* .ad /* .fi /* .IP "\fBconfig_directory (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR" /* The default location of the Postfix main.cf and master.cf /* configuration files. /* .IP "\fBdaemon_timeout (18000s)\fR" /* How much time a Postfix daemon process may take to handle a /* request before it is terminated by a built-in watchdog timer. /* .IP "\fBcommand_directory (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR" /* The location of all postfix administrative commands. /* .IP "\fBdouble_bounce_sender (double-bounce)\fR" /* The sender address of postmaster notifications that are generated /* by the mail system. /* .IP "\fBipc_timeout (3600s)\fR" /* The time limit for sending or receiving information over an internal /* communication channel. /* .IP "\fBmail_name (Postfix)\fR" /* The mail system name that is displayed in Received: headers, in /* the SMTP greeting banner, and in bounced mail. /* .IP "\fBmail_owner (postfix)\fR" /* The UNIX system account that owns the Postfix queue and most Postfix /* daemon processes. /* .IP "\fBmax_idle (100s)\fR" /* The maximum amount of time that an idle Postfix daemon process waits /* for an incoming connection before terminating voluntarily. /* .IP "\fBmax_use (100)\fR" /* The maximal number of incoming connections that a Postfix daemon /* process will service before terminating voluntarily. /* .IP "\fBmyhostname (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR" /* The internet hostname of this mail system. /* .IP "\fBmynetworks (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR" /* The list of "trusted" remote SMTP clients that have more privileges than /* "strangers". /* .IP "\fBmyorigin ($myhostname)\fR" /* The domain name that locally-posted mail appears to come /* from, and that locally posted mail is delivered to. /* .IP "\fBprocess_id (read-only)\fR" /* The process ID of a Postfix command or daemon process. /* .IP "\fBprocess_name (read-only)\fR" /* The process name of a Postfix command or daemon process. /* .IP "\fBqueue_directory (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR" /* The location of the Postfix top-level queue directory. /* .IP "\fBrecipient_delimiter (empty)\fR" /* The set of characters that can separate a user name from its /* extension (example: user+foo), or a .forward file name from its /* extension (example: .forward+foo). /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_banner ($myhostname ESMTP $mail_name)\fR" /* The text that follows the 220 status code in the SMTP greeting /* banner. /* .IP "\fBsyslog_facility (mail)\fR" /* The syslog facility of Postfix logging. /* .IP "\fBsyslog_name (see 'postconf -d' output)\fR" /* A prefix that is prepended to the process name in syslog /* records, so that, for example, "smtpd" becomes "prefix/smtpd". /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 2.2 and later: /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_forbidden_commands (CONNECT, GET, POST)\fR" /* List of commands that cause the Postfix SMTP server to immediately /* terminate the session with a 221 code. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix version 2.5 and later: /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_client_port_logging (no)\fR" /* Enable logging of the remote SMTP client port in addition to /* the hostname and IP address. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix 3.3 and later: /* .IP "\fBservice_name (read-only)\fR" /* The master.cf service name of a Postfix daemon process. /* .PP /* Available in Postfix 3.4 and later: /* .IP "\fBsmtpd_reject_footer_maps (empty)\fR" /* Lookup tables, indexed by the complete Postfix SMTP server 4xx or /* 5xx response, with reject footer templates. /* SEE ALSO /* anvil(8), connection/rate limiting /* cleanup(8), message canonicalization /* tlsmgr(8), TLS session and PRNG management /* trivial-rewrite(8), address resolver /* verify(8), address verification service /* postconf(5), configuration parameters /* master(5), generic daemon options /* master(8), process manager /* postlogd(8), Postfix logging /* syslogd(8), system logging /* README FILES /* .ad /* .fi /* Use "\fBpostconf readme_directory\fR" or /* "\fBpostconf html_directory\fR" to locate this information. /* .na /* .nf /* ADDRESS_CLASS_README, blocking unknown hosted or relay recipients /* ADDRESS_REWRITING_README, Postfix address manipulation /* BDAT_README, Postfix CHUNKING support /* FILTER_README, external after-queue content filter /* LOCAL_RECIPIENT_README, blocking unknown local recipients /* MILTER_README, before-queue mail filter applications /* SMTPD_ACCESS_README, built-in access policies /* SMTPD_POLICY_README, external policy server /* SMTPD_PROXY_README, external before-queue content filter /* SASL_README, Postfix SASL howto /* TLS_README, Postfix STARTTLS howto /* VERP_README, Postfix XVERP extension /* XCLIENT_README, Postfix XCLIENT extension /* XFORWARD_README, Postfix XFORWARD extension /* LICENSE /* .ad /* .fi /* The Secure Mailer license must be distributed with this software. /* AUTHOR(S) /* Wietse Venema /* IBM T.J. Watson Research /* P.O. Box 704 /* Yorktown Heights, NY 10598, USA /* /* Wietse Venema /* Google, Inc. /* 111 8th Avenue /* New York, NY 10011, USA /* /* SASL support originally by: /* Till Franke /* SuSE Rhein/Main AG /* 65760 Eschborn, Germany /* /* TLS support originally by: /* Lutz Jaenicke /* BTU Cottbus /* Allgemeine Elektrotechnik /* Universitaetsplatz 3-4 /* D-03044 Cottbus, Germany /* /* Revised TLS support by: /* Victor Duchovni /* Morgan Stanley /*--*/ /* System library. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include /* remove() */ #include #include #include #include #include #include /* offsetof() */ #ifdef STRCASECMP_IN_STRINGS_H #include #endif /* Utility library. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include /* Global library. */ #include #include /* milter_macro_v */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include /* ehlo filter */ #include /* ehlo filter */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include /* Single-threaded server skeleton. */ #include /* Mail filter library. */ #include /* DNS library. */ #include /* Application-specific */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include /* * Tunable parameters. Make sure that there is some bound on the length of * an SMTP command, so that the mail system stays in control even when a * malicious client sends commands of unreasonable length (qmail-dos-1). * Make sure there is some bound on the number of recipients, so that the * mail system stays in control even when a malicious client sends an * unreasonable number of recipients (qmail-dos-2). */ int var_smtpd_rcpt_limit; int var_smtpd_tmout; int var_smtpd_soft_erlim; int var_smtpd_hard_erlim; long var_queue_minfree; /* XXX use off_t */ char *var_smtpd_banner; char *var_notify_classes; char *var_client_checks; char *var_helo_checks; char *var_mail_checks; char *var_relay_checks; char *var_rcpt_checks; char *var_etrn_checks; char *var_data_checks; char *var_eod_checks; int var_unk_client_code; int var_bad_name_code; int var_unk_name_code; int var_unk_addr_code; int var_relay_code; int var_maps_rbl_code; int var_map_reject_code; int var_map_defer_code; char *var_maps_rbl_domains; char *var_rbl_reply_maps; int var_helo_required; int var_reject_code; int var_defer_code; int var_smtpd_err_sleep; int var_non_fqdn_code; char *var_bounce_rcpt; char *var_error_rcpt; int var_smtpd_delay_reject; char *var_rest_classes; int var_strict_rfc821_env; bool var_disable_vrfy_cmd; char *var_canonical_maps; char *var_send_canon_maps; char *var_rcpt_canon_maps; char *var_virt_alias_maps; char *var_virt_mailbox_maps; char *var_alias_maps; char *var_local_rcpt_maps; bool var_allow_untrust_route; int var_smtpd_junk_cmd_limit; int var_smtpd_rcpt_overlim; bool var_smtpd_sasl_enable; bool var_smtpd_sasl_auth_hdr; char *var_smtpd_sasl_opts; char *var_smtpd_sasl_path; char *var_smtpd_sasl_service; char *var_cyrus_conf_path; char *var_smtpd_sasl_realm; int var_smtpd_sasl_resp_limit; char *var_smtpd_sasl_exceptions_networks; char *var_smtpd_sasl_type; char *var_filter_xport; bool var_broken_auth_clients; char *var_perm_mx_networks; char *var_smtpd_snd_auth_maps; char *var_smtpd_noop_cmds; char *var_smtpd_null_key; int var_smtpd_hist_thrsh; char *var_smtpd_exp_filter; char *var_def_rbl_reply; int var_unv_from_rcode; int var_unv_rcpt_rcode; int var_unv_from_dcode; int var_unv_rcpt_dcode; char *var_unv_from_why; char *var_unv_rcpt_why; int var_mul_rcpt_code; char *var_relay_rcpt_maps; int var_local_rcpt_code; int var_virt_alias_code; int var_virt_mailbox_code; int var_relay_rcpt_code; char *var_verp_clients; int var_show_unk_rcpt_table; int var_verify_poll_count; int var_verify_poll_delay; char *var_smtpd_proxy_filt; int var_smtpd_proxy_tmout; char *var_smtpd_proxy_ehlo; char *var_smtpd_proxy_opts; char *var_input_transp; int var_smtpd_policy_tmout; int var_smtpd_policy_req_limit; int var_smtpd_policy_try_limit; int var_smtpd_policy_try_delay; char *var_smtpd_policy_def_action; char *var_smtpd_policy_context; int var_smtpd_policy_idle; int var_smtpd_policy_ttl; char *var_xclient_hosts; char *var_xforward_hosts; bool var_smtpd_rej_unl_from; bool var_smtpd_rej_unl_rcpt; char *var_smtpd_forbid_cmds; int var_smtpd_crate_limit; int var_smtpd_cconn_limit; int var_smtpd_cmail_limit; int var_smtpd_crcpt_limit; int var_smtpd_cntls_limit; int var_smtpd_cauth_limit; char *var_smtpd_hoggers; char *var_local_rwr_clients; char *var_smtpd_ehlo_dis_words; char *var_smtpd_ehlo_dis_maps; char *var_smtpd_tls_level; bool var_smtpd_use_tls; bool var_smtpd_enforce_tls; bool var_smtpd_tls_wrappermode; bool var_smtpd_tls_auth_only; char *var_smtpd_cmd_filter; char *var_smtpd_rej_footer; char *var_smtpd_rej_ftr_maps; char *var_smtpd_acl_perm_log; char *var_smtpd_dns_re_filter; #ifdef USE_TLS char *var_smtpd_relay_ccerts; char *var_smtpd_sasl_tls_opts; int var_smtpd_starttls_tmout; char *var_smtpd_tls_CAfile; char *var_smtpd_tls_CApath; bool var_smtpd_tls_ask_ccert; int var_smtpd_tls_ccert_vd; char *var_smtpd_tls_cert_file; char *var_smtpd_tls_mand_ciph; char *var_smtpd_tls_excl_ciph; char *var_smtpd_tls_mand_excl; char *var_smtpd_tls_dcert_file; char *var_smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file; char *var_smtpd_tls_dh512_param_file; char *var_smtpd_tls_dkey_file; char *var_smtpd_tls_key_file; char *var_smtpd_tls_loglevel; char *var_smtpd_tls_mand_proto; bool var_smtpd_tls_received_header; bool var_smtpd_tls_req_ccert; bool var_smtpd_tls_set_sessid; char *var_smtpd_tls_fpt_dgst; char *var_smtpd_tls_ciph; char *var_smtpd_tls_proto; char *var_smtpd_tls_eecdh; char *var_smtpd_tls_eccert_file; char *var_smtpd_tls_eckey_file; char *var_smtpd_tls_chain_files; #endif bool var_smtpd_peername_lookup; int var_plaintext_code; bool var_smtpd_delay_open; char *var_smtpd_milters; char *var_smtpd_milter_maps; int var_milt_conn_time; int var_milt_cmd_time; int var_milt_msg_time; char *var_milt_protocol; char *var_milt_def_action; char *var_milt_daemon_name; char *var_milt_v; char *var_milt_conn_macros; char *var_milt_helo_macros; char *var_milt_mail_macros; char *var_milt_rcpt_macros; char *var_milt_data_macros; char *var_milt_eoh_macros; char *var_milt_eod_macros; char *var_milt_unk_macros; char *var_milt_macro_deflts; bool var_smtpd_client_port_log; bool var_smtpd_forbid_unauth_pipe; char *var_stress; char *var_reject_tmpf_act; char *var_unk_name_tf_act; char *var_unk_addr_tf_act; char *var_unv_rcpt_tf_act; char *var_unv_from_tf_act; bool var_smtpd_rec_deadline; int smtpd_proxy_opts; #ifdef USE_TLSPROXY char *var_tlsproxy_service; #endif char *var_smtpd_uproxy_proto; int var_smtpd_uproxy_tmout; char *var_smtpd_forbid_bare_lf; char *var_smtpd_forbid_bare_lf_excl; int var_smtpd_forbid_bare_lf_code; static int bare_lf_mask; static NAMADR_LIST *bare_lf_excl; /* * Silly little macros. */ #define STR(x) vstring_str(x) #define LEN(x) VSTRING_LEN(x) /* * EHLO keyword filter */ static MAPS *ehlo_discard_maps; /* * Per-client Milter support. */ static MAPS *smtpd_milter_maps; static void setup_milters(SMTPD_STATE *); static void teardown_milters(SMTPD_STATE *); /* * VERP command name. */ #define VERP_CMD "XVERP" #define VERP_CMD_LEN 5 static NAMADR_LIST *verp_clients; /* * XCLIENT command. Access control is cached, so that XCLIENT can't override * its own access control. */ static NAMADR_LIST *xclient_hosts; static int xclient_allowed; /* XXX should be SMTPD_STATE member */ /* * XFORWARD command. Access control is cached. */ static NAMADR_LIST *xforward_hosts; static int xforward_allowed; /* XXX should be SMTPD_STATE member */ /* * Client connection and rate limiting. */ ANVIL_CLNT *anvil_clnt; static NAMADR_LIST *hogger_list; /* * Other application-specific globals. */ int smtpd_input_transp_mask; /* * Forward declarations. */ static void helo_reset(SMTPD_STATE *); static void mail_reset(SMTPD_STATE *); static void rcpt_reset(SMTPD_STATE *); static void chat_reset(SMTPD_STATE *, int); #ifdef USE_TLS static void tls_reset(SMTPD_STATE *); #endif /* * This filter is applied after printable(). */ #define NEUTER_CHARACTERS " <>()\\\";@" /* * Reasons for losing the client. */ #define REASON_TIMEOUT "timeout" #define REASON_LOST_CONNECTION "lost connection" #define REASON_ERROR_LIMIT "too many errors" #ifdef USE_TLS /* * TLS initialization status. */ #ifndef USE_TLSPROXY static TLS_APPL_STATE *smtpd_tls_ctx; static int ask_client_cert; #endif /* USE_TLSPROXY */ #endif /* * SMTP command mapping for broken clients. */ static DICT *smtpd_cmd_filter; /* * Bare LF and End-of-DATA controls (bare CR is handled elsewhere). * * At the smtp_get*() line reader level, setting any of these flags in the * smtp_detect_bare_lf variable enables the detection of bare newlines. The * line reader will set the same flags in the smtp_got_bare_lf variable * after it detects a bare newline, otherwise it clears smtp_got_bare_lf. * * At the SMTP command level, the flags in smtp_got_bare_lf control whether * commands ending in a bare newline are rejected. * * At the DATA and BDAT content level, the flags in smtp_got_bare_lf control * whether the standard End-of-DATA sequence CRLF.CRLF is required, and * whether lines ending in bare newlines are rejected. * * Postfix implements "delayed reject" after detecting a bare newline in BDAT * or DATA content. The SMTP server delays a REJECT response until the * command is finished, instead of replying and hanging up immediately. The * End-of-DATA detection is secured with BARE_LF_FLAG_WANT_STD_EOD. */ #define BARE_LF_FLAG_WANT_STD_EOD (1<<0) /* Require CRLF.CRLF */ #define BARE_LF_FLAG_REPLY_REJECT (1<<1) /* Reject bare newline */ #define IS_BARE_LF_WANT_STD_EOD(m) ((m) & BARE_LF_FLAG_WANT_STD_EOD) #define IS_BARE_LF_REPLY_REJECT(m) ((m) & BARE_LF_FLAG_REPLY_REJECT) static const NAME_CODE bare_lf_mask_table[] = { "normalize", BARE_LF_FLAG_WANT_STD_EOD, /* Default */ "yes", BARE_LF_FLAG_WANT_STD_EOD, /* Migration aid */ "reject", BARE_LF_FLAG_WANT_STD_EOD | BARE_LF_FLAG_REPLY_REJECT, "no", 0, 0, -1, /* error */ }; #ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH /* * SASL exceptions. */ static NAMADR_LIST *sasl_exceptions_networks; /* sasl_client_exception - can we offer AUTH for this client */ static int sasl_client_exception(SMTPD_STATE *state) { int match; /* * This is to work around a Netscape mail client bug where it tries to * use AUTH if available, even if user has not configured it. Returns * TRUE if AUTH should be offered in the EHLO. */ if (sasl_exceptions_networks == 0) return (0); if ((match = namadr_list_match(sasl_exceptions_networks, state->name, state->addr)) == 0) match = sasl_exceptions_networks->error; if (msg_verbose) msg_info("sasl_exceptions: %s, match=%d", state->namaddr, match); return (match); } #endif /* smtpd_whatsup - gather available evidence for logging */ static const char *smtpd_whatsup(SMTPD_STATE *state) { static VSTRING *buf = 0; if (buf == 0) buf = vstring_alloc(100); else VSTRING_RESET(buf); if (state->sender) vstring_sprintf_append(buf, " from=<%s>", info_log_addr_form_sender(state->sender)); if (state->recipient) vstring_sprintf_append(buf, " to=<%s>", info_log_addr_form_recipient(state->recipient)); if (state->protocol) vstring_sprintf_append(buf, " proto=%s", state->protocol); if (state->helo_name) vstring_sprintf_append(buf, " helo=<%s>", state->helo_name); #ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH if (state->sasl_username) vstring_sprintf_append(buf, " sasl_username=<%s>", state->sasl_username); #endif return (STR(buf)); } /* collapse_args - put arguments together again */ static void collapse_args(int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *argv) { int i; for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) { vstring_strcat(argv[0].vstrval, " "); vstring_strcat(argv[0].vstrval, argv[i].strval); } argv[0].strval = STR(argv[0].vstrval); } /* check_milter_reply - process reply from Milter */ static const char *check_milter_reply(SMTPD_STATE *state, const char *reply) { const char *queue_id = state->queue_id ? state->queue_id : "NOQUEUE"; const char *action; const char *text; /* * The syntax of user-specified SMTP replies is checked by the Milter * module, because the replies are also used in the cleanup server. * Automatically disconnect after 421 (shutdown) reply. The Sendmail 8 * Milter quarantine action is not final, so it is not included in * MILTER_SKIP_FLAGS. */ #define MILTER_SKIP_FLAGS (CLEANUP_FLAG_DISCARD) switch (reply[0]) { case 'H': state->saved_flags |= CLEANUP_FLAG_HOLD; action = "milter-hold"; reply = 0; text = "milter triggers HOLD action"; break; case 'D': state->saved_flags |= CLEANUP_FLAG_DISCARD; action = "milter-discard"; reply = 0; text = "milter triggers DISCARD action"; break; case 'S': state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY; action = "milter-reject"; reply = "421 4.7.0 Server closing connection"; text = 0; break; case '4': case '5': state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY; action = "milter-reject"; text = 0; break; default: state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_SOFTWARE; action = "reject"; reply = "421 4.3.5 Server configuration error"; text = 0; break; } msg_info("%s: %s: %s from %s: %s;%s", queue_id, action, state->where, state->namaddr, reply ? reply : text, smtpd_whatsup(state)); return (reply); } /* helo_cmd - process HELO command */ static int helo_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *argv) { const char *err; /* * RFC 2034: the text part of all 2xx, 4xx, and 5xx SMTP responses other * than the initial greeting and any response to HELO or EHLO are * prefaced with a status code as defined in RFC 3463. */ if (argc < 2) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 Syntax: HELO hostname"); return (-1); } if (argc > 2) collapse_args(argc - 1, argv + 1); if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0 && var_smtpd_delay_reject == 0 && (err = smtpd_check_helo(state, argv[1].strval)) != 0) { smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err); return (-1); } /* * XXX Sendmail compatibility: if a Milter rejects CONNECT, EHLO, or * HELO, reply with 250 except in case of 421 (disconnect). The reply * persists so it will apply to MAIL FROM and to other commands such as * AUTH, STARTTLS, and VRFY. */ #define PUSH_STRING(old, curr, new) { char *old = (curr); (curr) = (new); #define POP_STRING(old, curr) (curr) = old; } if (state->milters != 0 && (state->saved_flags & MILTER_SKIP_FLAGS) == 0 && (err = milter_helo_event(state->milters, argv[1].strval, 0)) != 0) { /* Log reject etc. with correct HELO information. */ PUSH_STRING(saved_helo, state->helo_name, argv[1].strval); err = check_milter_reply(state, err); POP_STRING(saved_helo, state->helo_name); if (err != 0 && strncmp(err, "421", 3) == 0) { smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err); return (-1); } } if (state->helo_name != 0) helo_reset(state); chat_reset(state, var_smtpd_hist_thrsh); mail_reset(state); rcpt_reset(state); state->helo_name = mystrdup(printable(argv[1].strval, '?')); neuter(state->helo_name, NEUTER_CHARACTERS, '?'); /* Downgrading the protocol name breaks the unauthorized pipelining test. */ if (strcasecmp(state->protocol, MAIL_PROTO_ESMTP) != 0 && strcasecmp(state->protocol, MAIL_PROTO_SMTP) != 0) { myfree(state->protocol); state->protocol = mystrdup(MAIL_PROTO_SMTP); } smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250 %s", var_myhostname); return (0); } /* cant_announce_feature - explain and terminate this session */ static NORETURN cant_announce_feature(SMTPD_STATE *state, const char *feature) { msg_warn("don't know if EHLO feature %s should be announced to %s", feature, state->namaddr); vstream_longjmp(state->client, SMTP_ERR_DATA); } /* cant_permit_command - explain and terminate this session */ static NORETURN cant_permit_command(SMTPD_STATE *state, const char *command) { msg_warn("don't know if command %s should be allowed from %s", command, state->namaddr); vstream_longjmp(state->client, SMTP_ERR_DATA); } /* ehlo_cmd - process EHLO command */ static int ehlo_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *argv) { const char *err; int discard_mask; char **cpp; /* * XXX 2821 new feature: Section 4.1.4 specifies that a server must clear * all buffers and reset the state exactly as if a RSET command had been * issued. * * RFC 2034: the text part of all 2xx, 4xx, and 5xx SMTP responses other * than the initial greeting and any response to HELO or EHLO are * prefaced with a status code as defined in RFC 3463. */ if (argc < 2) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 Syntax: EHLO hostname"); return (-1); } if (argc > 2) collapse_args(argc - 1, argv + 1); if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0 && var_smtpd_delay_reject == 0 && (err = smtpd_check_helo(state, argv[1].strval)) != 0) { smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err); return (-1); } /* * XXX Sendmail compatibility: if a Milter 5xx rejects CONNECT, EHLO, or * HELO, reply with ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES except in case of immediate * disconnect. The reply persists so it will apply to MAIL FROM and to * other commands such as AUTH, STARTTLS, and VRFY. */ err = 0; if (state->milters != 0 && (state->saved_flags & MILTER_SKIP_FLAGS) == 0 && (err = milter_helo_event(state->milters, argv[1].strval, 1)) != 0) { /* Log reject etc. with correct HELO information. */ PUSH_STRING(saved_helo, state->helo_name, argv[1].strval); err = check_milter_reply(state, err); POP_STRING(saved_helo, state->helo_name); if (err != 0 && strncmp(err, "421", 3) == 0) { smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err); return (-1); } } if (state->helo_name != 0) helo_reset(state); chat_reset(state, var_smtpd_hist_thrsh); mail_reset(state); rcpt_reset(state); state->helo_name = mystrdup(printable(argv[1].strval, '?')); neuter(state->helo_name, NEUTER_CHARACTERS, '?'); /* * XXX reject_unauth_pipelining depends on the following. If the user * sends EHLO then we announce PIPELINING and we can't accuse them of * using pipelining in places where it is allowed. * * XXX The reject_unauth_pipelining test needs to change and also account * for mechanisms that disable PIPELINING selectively. */ if (strcasecmp(state->protocol, MAIL_PROTO_ESMTP) != 0) { myfree(state->protocol); state->protocol = mystrdup(MAIL_PROTO_ESMTP); } /* * Build the EHLO response, producing no output until we know what to * send - this simplifies exception handling. The CRLF record boundaries * don't exist at this level in the code, so we represent multi-line * output as an array of single-line responses. */ #define EHLO_APPEND(state, cmd) \ do { \ vstring_sprintf((state)->ehlo_buf, (cmd)); \ argv_add((state)->ehlo_argv, STR((state)->ehlo_buf), (char *) 0); \ } while (0) #define EHLO_APPEND1(state, cmd, arg) \ do { \ vstring_sprintf((state)->ehlo_buf, (cmd), (arg)); \ argv_add((state)->ehlo_argv, STR((state)->ehlo_buf), (char *) 0); \ } while (0) /* * XXX Sendmail compatibility: if a Milter 5XX rejects CONNECT, EHLO, or * HELO, reply with ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES only. The reply persists so it * will apply to MAIL FROM, but we currently don't have a proper * mechanism to apply Milter rejects to AUTH, STARTTLS, VRFY, and other * commands while still allowing HELO/EHLO. */ discard_mask = state->ehlo_discard_mask; if (err != 0 && err[0] == '5') discard_mask |= ~EHLO_MASK_ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES; if ((discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES) == 0) if (discard_mask && !(discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_SILENT)) msg_info("discarding EHLO keywords: %s", str_ehlo_mask(discard_mask)); if (ehlo_discard_maps && ehlo_discard_maps->error) { msg_warn("don't know what EHLO features to announce to %s", state->namaddr); vstream_longjmp(state->client, SMTP_ERR_DATA); } /* * These may still exist after a prior exception. */ if (state->ehlo_argv == 0) { state->ehlo_argv = argv_alloc(10); state->ehlo_buf = vstring_alloc(10); } else argv_truncate(state->ehlo_argv, 0); EHLO_APPEND1(state, "%s", var_myhostname); if ((discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_PIPELINING) == 0) EHLO_APPEND(state, "PIPELINING"); if ((discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_SIZE) == 0) { if (ENFORCING_SIZE_LIMIT(var_message_limit)) EHLO_APPEND1(state, "SIZE %lu", (unsigned long) var_message_limit); /* XXX */ else EHLO_APPEND(state, "SIZE"); } if ((discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_VRFY) == 0) if (var_disable_vrfy_cmd == 0) EHLO_APPEND(state, SMTPD_CMD_VRFY); if ((discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_ETRN) == 0) EHLO_APPEND(state, SMTPD_CMD_ETRN); #ifdef USE_TLS if ((discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_STARTTLS) == 0) if (var_smtpd_use_tls && (!state->tls_context)) EHLO_APPEND(state, SMTPD_CMD_STARTTLS); #endif #ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH #ifndef AUTH_CMD #define AUTH_CMD "AUTH" #endif if ((discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_AUTH) == 0) { if (smtpd_sasl_is_active(state) && !sasl_client_exception(state)) { EHLO_APPEND1(state, "AUTH %s", state->sasl_mechanism_list); if (var_broken_auth_clients) EHLO_APPEND1(state, "AUTH=%s", state->sasl_mechanism_list); } else if (sasl_exceptions_networks && sasl_exceptions_networks->error) cant_announce_feature(state, AUTH_CMD); } #define XCLIENT_LOGIN_KLUDGE " " XCLIENT_LOGIN #else #define XCLIENT_LOGIN_KLUDGE "" #endif if ((discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_VERP) == 0) { if (namadr_list_match(verp_clients, state->name, state->addr)) EHLO_APPEND(state, VERP_CMD); else if (verp_clients && verp_clients->error) cant_announce_feature(state, VERP_CMD); } /* XCLIENT must not override its own access control. */ if ((discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_XCLIENT) == 0) { if (xclient_allowed) EHLO_APPEND(state, XCLIENT_CMD " " XCLIENT_NAME " " XCLIENT_ADDR " " XCLIENT_PROTO " " XCLIENT_HELO " " XCLIENT_REVERSE_NAME " " XCLIENT_PORT XCLIENT_LOGIN_KLUDGE " " XCLIENT_DESTADDR " " XCLIENT_DESTPORT); else if (xclient_hosts && xclient_hosts->error) cant_announce_feature(state, XCLIENT_CMD); } if ((discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_XFORWARD) == 0) { if (xforward_allowed) EHLO_APPEND(state, XFORWARD_CMD " " XFORWARD_NAME " " XFORWARD_ADDR " " XFORWARD_PROTO " " XFORWARD_HELO " " XFORWARD_DOMAIN " " XFORWARD_PORT " " XFORWARD_IDENT); else if (xforward_hosts && xforward_hosts->error) cant_announce_feature(state, XFORWARD_CMD); } if ((discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES) == 0) EHLO_APPEND(state, "ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES"); if ((discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_8BITMIME) == 0) EHLO_APPEND(state, "8BITMIME"); if ((discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_DSN) == 0) EHLO_APPEND(state, "DSN"); if (var_smtputf8_enable && (discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_SMTPUTF8) == 0) EHLO_APPEND(state, "SMTPUTF8"); if ((discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_CHUNKING) == 0) EHLO_APPEND(state, "CHUNKING"); /* * Send the reply. */ for (cpp = state->ehlo_argv->argv; *cpp; cpp++) smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250%c%s", cpp[1] ? '-' : ' ', *cpp); /* * Clean up. */ argv_free(state->ehlo_argv); state->ehlo_argv = 0; vstring_free(state->ehlo_buf); state->ehlo_buf = 0; return (0); } /* helo_reset - reset HELO/EHLO command stuff */ static void helo_reset(SMTPD_STATE *state) { if (state->helo_name) { myfree(state->helo_name); state->helo_name = 0; if (state->milters != 0) milter_abort(state->milters); } if (state->ehlo_argv) { argv_free(state->ehlo_argv); state->ehlo_argv = 0; } if (state->ehlo_buf) { vstring_free(state->ehlo_buf); state->ehlo_buf = 0; } } #ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH /* smtpd_sasl_auth_cmd_wrapper - smtpd_sasl_auth_cmd front-end */ static int smtpd_sasl_auth_cmd_wrapper(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *argv) { int rate; if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0 && !xclient_allowed && anvil_clnt && var_smtpd_cauth_limit > 0 && !namadr_list_match(hogger_list, state->name, state->addr) && anvil_clnt_auth(anvil_clnt, state->service, state->addr, &rate) == ANVIL_STAT_OK && rate > var_smtpd_cauth_limit) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY; msg_warn("AUTH command rate limit exceeded: %d from %s for service %s", rate, state->namaddr, state->service); smtpd_chat_reply(state, "450 4.7.1 Error: too many AUTH commands from %s", state->addr); return (-1); } return (smtpd_sasl_auth_cmd(state, argc, argv)); } #endif /* mail_open_stream - open mail queue file or IPC stream */ static int mail_open_stream(SMTPD_STATE *state) { /* * Connect to the before-queue filter when one is configured. The MAIL * FROM and RCPT TO commands are forwarded as received (including DSN * attributes), with the exception that the before-filter smtpd process * handles all authentication, encryption, access control and relay * control, and that the before-filter smtpd process does not forward * blocked commands. If the after-filter smtp server does not support * some of Postfix's ESMTP features, then they must be turned off in the * before-filter smtpd process with the smtpd_discard_ehlo_keywords * feature. */ if (state->proxy_mail) { if (smtpd_proxy_create(state, smtpd_proxy_opts, var_smtpd_proxy_filt, var_smtpd_proxy_tmout, var_smtpd_proxy_ehlo, state->proxy_mail) != 0) { smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", STR(state->proxy->reply)); smtpd_proxy_free(state); return (-1); } } /* * If running from the master or from inetd, connect to the cleanup * service. * * XXX 2821: An SMTP server is not allowed to "clean up" mail except in the * case of original submissions. * * We implement this by distinguishing between mail that we are willing to * rewrite (the local rewrite context) and mail from elsewhere. */ else if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0) { int cleanup_flags; cleanup_flags = input_transp_cleanup(CLEANUP_FLAG_MASK_EXTERNAL, smtpd_input_transp_mask) | CLEANUP_FLAG_SMTP_REPLY; if (state->flags & SMTPD_FLAG_SMTPUTF8) cleanup_flags |= CLEANUP_FLAG_SMTPUTF8; else cleanup_flags |= smtputf8_autodetect(MAIL_SRC_MASK_SMTPD); state->dest = mail_stream_service(MAIL_CLASS_PUBLIC, var_cleanup_service); if (state->dest == 0 || attr_print(state->dest->stream, ATTR_FLAG_NONE, SEND_ATTR_INT(MAIL_ATTR_FLAGS, cleanup_flags), ATTR_TYPE_END) != 0) msg_fatal("unable to connect to the %s %s service", MAIL_CLASS_PUBLIC, var_cleanup_service); } /* * Otherwise, pipe the message through the privileged postdrop helper. * XXX Make postdrop a manifest constant. */ else { char *postdrop_command; postdrop_command = concatenate(var_command_dir, "/postdrop", msg_verbose ? " -v" : (char *) 0, (char *) 0); state->dest = mail_stream_command(postdrop_command); if (state->dest == 0) msg_fatal("unable to execute %s", postdrop_command); myfree(postdrop_command); } /* * Record the time of arrival, the SASL-related stuff if applicable, the * sender envelope address, some session information, and some additional * attributes. * * XXX Send Milter information first, because this will hang when cleanup * goes into "throw away" mode. Also, cleanup needs to know early on * whether or not it has to do its own SMTP event emulation. * * XXX At this point we send only dummy information to keep the cleanup * server from using its non_smtpd_milters settings. We have to send * up-to-date Milter information after DATA so that the cleanup server * knows the actual Milter state. */ if (state->dest) { state->cleanup = state->dest->stream; state->queue_id = mystrdup(state->dest->id); if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0) { if (state->milters != 0 && (state->saved_flags & MILTER_SKIP_FLAGS) == 0) /* Send place-holder smtpd_milters list. */ (void) milter_dummy(state->milters, state->cleanup); rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_TIME, REC_TYPE_TIME_FORMAT, REC_TYPE_TIME_ARG(state->arrival_time)); if (*var_filter_xport) rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_FILT, "%s", var_filter_xport); if (FORWARD_IDENT(state)) rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s", MAIL_ATTR_LOG_IDENT, FORWARD_IDENT(state)); rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s", MAIL_ATTR_RWR_CONTEXT, FORWARD_DOMAIN(state)); #ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH /* Make external authentication painless (e.g., XCLIENT). */ if (state->sasl_method) rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s", MAIL_ATTR_SASL_METHOD, state->sasl_method); if (state->sasl_username) rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s", MAIL_ATTR_SASL_USERNAME, state->sasl_username); if (state->sasl_sender) rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s", MAIL_ATTR_SASL_SENDER, state->sasl_sender); #endif /* * Record DSN related information that was received with the MAIL * FROM command. * * RFC 3461 Section 5.2.1. If no ENVID parameter was included in the * MAIL command when the message was received, the ENVID * parameter MUST NOT be supplied when the message is relayed. * Ditto for the RET parameter. * * In other words, we can't simply make up our default ENVID or RET * values. We have to remember whether the client sent any. * * We store DSN information as named attribute records so that we * don't have to pollute the queue file with records that are * incompatible with past Postfix versions. Preferably, people * should be able to back out from an upgrade without losing * mail. */ if (state->dsn_envid) rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s", MAIL_ATTR_DSN_ENVID, state->dsn_envid); if (state->dsn_ret) rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%d", MAIL_ATTR_DSN_RET, state->dsn_ret); } rec_fputs(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_FROM, state->sender); if (state->encoding != 0) rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s", MAIL_ATTR_ENCODING, state->encoding); /* * Store client attributes. */ if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0) { /* * Attributes for logging, also used for XFORWARD. * * We store all client attributes, including ones with unknown * values. Otherwise, an unknown client hostname would be treated * as a non-existent hostname (i.e. local submission). */ rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s", MAIL_ATTR_LOG_CLIENT_NAME, FORWARD_NAME(state)); /* XXX Note: state->rfc_addr, not state->addr. */ rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s", MAIL_ATTR_LOG_CLIENT_ADDR, FORWARD_ADDR(state)); rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s", MAIL_ATTR_LOG_CLIENT_PORT, FORWARD_PORT(state)); rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s", MAIL_ATTR_LOG_ORIGIN, FORWARD_NAMADDR(state)); if (FORWARD_HELO(state)) rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s", MAIL_ATTR_LOG_HELO_NAME, FORWARD_HELO(state)); rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s", MAIL_ATTR_LOG_PROTO_NAME, FORWARD_PROTO(state)); /* * Attributes with actual client information. These are used by * the smtpd Milter client for policy decisions. Mail that is * requeued with "postsuper -r" is not subject to processing by * the cleanup Milter client, because a) it has already been * filtered, and b) we don't have sufficient information to * reproduce the exact same SMTP events and Sendmail macros that * the smtpd Milter client received when the message originally * arrived in Postfix. */ rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s", MAIL_ATTR_ACT_CLIENT_NAME, state->name); rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s", MAIL_ATTR_ACT_REVERSE_CLIENT_NAME, state->reverse_name); /* XXX Note: state->addr, not state->rfc_addr. */ rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s", MAIL_ATTR_ACT_CLIENT_ADDR, state->addr); rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s", MAIL_ATTR_ACT_CLIENT_PORT, state->port); rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s", MAIL_ATTR_ACT_SERVER_ADDR, state->dest_addr); rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s", MAIL_ATTR_ACT_SERVER_PORT, state->dest_port); if (state->helo_name) rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s", MAIL_ATTR_ACT_HELO_NAME, state->helo_name); rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s", MAIL_ATTR_ACT_PROTO_NAME, state->protocol); rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%u", MAIL_ATTR_ACT_CLIENT_AF, state->addr_family); /* * Don't send client certificate down the pipeline unless it is * a) verified or b) just a fingerprint. */ } if (state->verp_delims) rec_fputs(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_VERP, state->verp_delims); } /* * Log the queue ID with the message origin. */ #define PRINT_OR_NULL(cond, str) \ ((cond) ? (str) : "") #define PRINT2_OR_NULL(cond, name, value) \ PRINT_OR_NULL((cond), (name)), PRINT_OR_NULL((cond), (value)) msg_info("%s: client=%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s", (state->queue_id ? state->queue_id : "NOQUEUE"), state->namaddr, #ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH PRINT2_OR_NULL(state->sasl_method, ", sasl_method=", state->sasl_method), PRINT2_OR_NULL(state->sasl_username, ", sasl_username=", state->sasl_username), PRINT2_OR_NULL(state->sasl_sender, ", sasl_sender=", state->sasl_sender), #else "", "", "", "", "", "", #endif /* Insert transaction TLS status here. */ PRINT2_OR_NULL(HAVE_FORWARDED_IDENT(state), ", orig_queue_id=", FORWARD_IDENT(state)), PRINT2_OR_NULL(HAVE_FORWARDED_CLIENT_ATTR(state), ", orig_client=", FORWARD_NAMADDR(state))); return (0); } /* extract_addr - extract address from rubble */ static int extract_addr(SMTPD_STATE *state, SMTPD_TOKEN *arg, int allow_empty_addr, int strict_rfc821, int smtputf8) { const char *myname = "extract_addr"; TOK822 *tree; TOK822 *tp; TOK822 *addr = 0; int naddr; int non_addr; int err = 0; char *junk = 0; char *text; char *colon; /* * Special case. */ #define PERMIT_EMPTY_ADDR 1 #define REJECT_EMPTY_ADDR 0 /* * Some mailers send RFC822-style address forms (with comments and such) * in SMTP envelopes. We cannot blame users for this: the blame is with * programmers violating the RFC, and with sendmail for being permissive. * * XXX The SMTP command tokenizer must leave the address in externalized * (quoted) form, so that the address parser can correctly extract the * address from surrounding junk. * * XXX We have only one address parser, written according to the rules of * RFC 822. That standard differs subtly from RFC 821. */ if (msg_verbose) msg_info("%s: input: %s", myname, STR(arg->vstrval)); if (STR(arg->vstrval)[0] == '<' && STR(arg->vstrval)[LEN(arg->vstrval) - 1] == '>') { junk = text = mystrndup(STR(arg->vstrval) + 1, LEN(arg->vstrval) - 2); } else text = STR(arg->vstrval); /* * Truncate deprecated route address form. */ if (*text == '@' && (colon = strchr(text, ':')) != 0) text = colon + 1; tree = tok822_parse(text); if (junk) myfree(junk); /* * Find trouble. */ for (naddr = non_addr = 0, tp = tree; tp != 0; tp = tp->next) { if (tp->type == TOK822_ADDR) { addr = tp; naddr += 1; /* count address forms */ } else if (tp->type == '<' || tp->type == '>') { /* void */ ; /* ignore brackets */ } else { non_addr += 1; /* count non-address forms */ } } /* * Report trouble. XXX Should log a warning only if we are going to * sleep+reject so that attackers can't flood our logfiles. * * XXX Unfortunately, the sleep-before-reject feature had to be abandoned * (at least for small error counts) because servers were DOS-ing * themselves when flooded by backscatter traffic. */ if (naddr > 1 || (strict_rfc821 && (non_addr || *STR(arg->vstrval) != '<'))) { msg_warn("Illegal address syntax from %s in %s command: %s", state->namaddr, state->where, printable(STR(arg->vstrval), '?')); err = 1; } /* * Don't overwrite the input with the extracted address. We need the * original (external) form in case the client does not send ORCPT * information; and error messages are more accurate if we log the * unmodified form. We need the internal form for all other purposes. */ if (addr) tok822_internalize(state->addr_buf, addr->head, TOK822_STR_DEFL); else vstring_strcpy(state->addr_buf, ""); /* * Report trouble. XXX Should log a warning only if we are going to * sleep+reject so that attackers can't flood our logfiles. Log the * original address. */ if (err == 0) if ((STR(state->addr_buf)[0] == 0 && !allow_empty_addr) || (strict_rfc821 && STR(state->addr_buf)[0] == '@') || (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0 && smtpd_check_addr(strcmp(state->where, SMTPD_CMD_MAIL) == 0 ? state->recipient : state->sender, STR(state->addr_buf), smtputf8) != 0)) { msg_warn("Illegal address syntax from %s in %s command: %s", state->namaddr, state->where, printable(STR(arg->vstrval), '?')); err = 1; } /* * Cleanup. */ tok822_free_tree(tree); if (msg_verbose) msg_info("%s: in: %s, result: %s", myname, STR(arg->vstrval), STR(state->addr_buf)); return (err); } /* milter_argv - impedance adapter */ static const char **milter_argv(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *argv) { int n; ssize_t len = argc + 1; if (state->milter_argc < len) { if (state->milter_argc > 0) state->milter_argv = (const char **) myrealloc((void *) state->milter_argv, sizeof(const char *) * len); else state->milter_argv = (const char **) mymalloc(sizeof(const char *) * len); state->milter_argc = len; } for (n = 0; n < argc; n++) state->milter_argv[n] = argv[n].strval; state->milter_argv[n] = 0; return (state->milter_argv); } /* mail_cmd - process MAIL command */ static int mail_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *argv) { const char *err; int narg; char *arg; char *verp_delims = 0; int rate; int dsn_envid = 0; state->flags &= ~SMTPD_FLAG_SMTPUTF8; state->encoding = 0; state->dsn_ret = 0; /* * Sanity checks. * * XXX 2821 pedantism: Section 4.1.2 says that SMTP servers that receive a * command in which invalid character codes have been employed, and for * which there are no other reasons for rejection, MUST reject that * command with a 501 response. Postfix attempts to be 8-bit clean. */ if (var_helo_required && state->helo_name == 0) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "503 5.5.1 Error: send HELO/EHLO first"); return (-1); } if (SMTPD_IN_MAIL_TRANSACTION(state)) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "503 5.5.1 Error: nested MAIL command"); return (-1); } /* Don't accept MAIL after out-of-order BDAT. */ if (SMTPD_PROCESSING_BDAT(state)) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "503 5.5.1 Error: MAIL after BDAT"); return (-1); } if (argc < 3 || strcasecmp(argv[1].strval, "from:") != 0) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Syntax: MAIL FROM:
"); return (-1); } /* * XXX The client event count/rate control must be consistent in its use * of client address information in connect and disconnect events. For * now we exclude xclient authorized hosts from event count/rate control. */ if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0 && !xclient_allowed && anvil_clnt && var_smtpd_cmail_limit > 0 && !namadr_list_match(hogger_list, state->name, state->addr) && anvil_clnt_mail(anvil_clnt, state->service, state->addr, &rate) == ANVIL_STAT_OK && rate > var_smtpd_cmail_limit) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "450 4.7.1 Error: too much mail from %s", state->addr); msg_warn("Message delivery request rate limit exceeded: %d from %s for service %s", rate, state->namaddr, state->service); return (-1); } if (argv[2].tokval == SMTPD_TOK_ERROR) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.1.7 Bad sender address syntax"); return (-1); } /* * XXX The sender address comes first, but the optional SMTPUTF8 * parameter determines what address syntax is permitted. We must process * this parameter early. */ if (var_smtputf8_enable && (state->ehlo_discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_SMTPUTF8) == 0) { for (narg = 3; narg < argc; narg++) { arg = argv[narg].strval; if (strcasecmp(arg, "SMTPUTF8") == 0) { /* RFC 6531 */ /* Fix 20161206: allow UTF8 in smtpd_sender_restrictions. */ state->flags |= SMTPD_FLAG_SMTPUTF8; break; } } } if (extract_addr(state, argv + 2, PERMIT_EMPTY_ADDR, var_strict_rfc821_env, state->flags & SMTPD_FLAG_SMTPUTF8) != 0) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.1.7 Bad sender address syntax"); return (-1); } for (narg = 3; narg < argc; narg++) { arg = argv[narg].strval; if (strcasecmp(arg, "BODY=8BITMIME") == 0) { /* RFC 1652 */ state->encoding = MAIL_ATTR_ENC_8BIT; } else if (strcasecmp(arg, "BODY=7BIT") == 0) { /* RFC 1652 */ state->encoding = MAIL_ATTR_ENC_7BIT; } else if (strncasecmp(arg, "SIZE=", 5) == 0) { /* RFC 1870 */ /* Reject non-numeric size. */ if (!alldig(arg + 5)) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad message size syntax"); return (-1); } /* Reject size overflow. */ if ((state->msg_size = off_cvt_string(arg + 5)) < 0) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "552 5.3.4 Message size exceeds file system imposed limit"); return (-1); } } else if (var_smtputf8_enable && (state->ehlo_discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_SMTPUTF8) == 0 && strcasecmp(arg, "SMTPUTF8") == 0) { /* RFC 6531 */ /* Already processed early. */ ; #ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH } else if (strncasecmp(arg, "AUTH=", 5) == 0) { if ((err = smtpd_sasl_mail_opt(state, arg + 5)) != 0) { smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err); return (-1); } #endif } else if (namadr_list_match(verp_clients, state->name, state->addr) && strncasecmp(arg, VERP_CMD, VERP_CMD_LEN) == 0 && (arg[VERP_CMD_LEN] == '=' || arg[VERP_CMD_LEN] == 0)) { if (arg[VERP_CMD_LEN] == 0) { verp_delims = var_verp_delims; } else { verp_delims = arg + VERP_CMD_LEN + 1; if (verp_delims_verify(verp_delims) != 0) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Error: %s needs two characters from %s", VERP_CMD, var_verp_filter); return (-1); } } } else if (strncasecmp(arg, "RET=", 4) == 0) { /* RFC 3461 */ /* Sanitized on input. */ if (state->ehlo_discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_DSN) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.7.1 DSN support is disabled"); return (-1); } if (state->dsn_ret || (state->dsn_ret = dsn_ret_code(arg + 4)) == 0) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad RET parameter syntax"); return (-1); } } else if (strncasecmp(arg, "ENVID=", 6) == 0) { /* RFC 3461 */ /* Sanitized by bounce server. */ if (state->ehlo_discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_DSN) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.7.1 DSN support is disabled"); return (-1); } if (dsn_envid || xtext_unquote(state->dsn_buf, arg + 6) == 0 || !allprint(STR(state->dsn_buf))) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad ENVID parameter syntax"); return (-1); } dsn_envid = 1; } else { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "555 5.5.4 Unsupported option: %s", arg); return (-1); } } /* Fix 20161205: show the envelope sender in reject logging. */ PUSH_STRING(saved_sender, state->sender, STR(state->addr_buf)); err = smtpd_check_size(state, state->msg_size); POP_STRING(saved_sender, state->sender); if (err != 0) { smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err); return (-1); } if (verp_delims && STR(state->addr_buf)[0] == 0) { smtpd_chat_reply(state, "503 5.5.4 Error: %s requires non-null sender", VERP_CMD); return (-1); } if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0) { const char *verify_sender; /* * XXX Don't reject the address when we're probed with our own * address verification sender address. Otherwise, some timeout or * some UCE block may result in mutual negative caching, making it * painful to get the mail through. Unfortunately we still have to * send the address to the Milters otherwise they may bail out with a * "missing recipient" protocol error. */ verify_sender = valid_verify_sender_addr(STR(state->addr_buf)); if (verify_sender != 0) vstring_strcpy(state->addr_buf, verify_sender); } if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0 && var_smtpd_delay_reject == 0 && (err = smtpd_check_mail(state, STR(state->addr_buf))) != 0) { /* XXX Reset access map side effects. */ mail_reset(state); smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err); return (-1); } if (state->milters != 0 && (state->saved_flags & MILTER_SKIP_FLAGS) == 0) { state->flags |= SMTPD_FLAG_NEED_MILTER_ABORT; PUSH_STRING(saved_sender, state->sender, STR(state->addr_buf)); err = milter_mail_event(state->milters, milter_argv(state, argc - 2, argv + 2)); if (err != 0) { /* Log reject etc. with correct sender information. */ err = check_milter_reply(state, err); } POP_STRING(saved_sender, state->sender); if (err != 0) { /* XXX Reset access map side effects. */ mail_reset(state); smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err); return (-1); } } if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0) { err = smtpd_check_rewrite(state); if (err != 0) { /* XXX Reset access map side effects. */ mail_reset(state); smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err); return (-1); } } /* * Historically, Postfix does not forbid 8-bit envelope localparts. * Changing this would be a compatibility break. That can't happen in the * foreseeable future. */ if ((var_strict_smtputf8 || warn_compat_break_smtputf8_enable) && (state->flags & SMTPD_FLAG_SMTPUTF8) == 0 && *STR(state->addr_buf) && !allascii(STR(state->addr_buf))) { if (var_strict_smtputf8) { smtpd_chat_reply(state, "553 5.6.7 Must declare SMTPUTF8 to " "send unicode address"); return (-1); } /* * Not: #ifndef NO_EAI. They must configure SMTPUTF8_ENABLE=no if a * warning message is logged, so that they don't suddenly start to * lose mail after Postfix is built with EAI support. */ if (warn_compat_break_smtputf8_enable) msg_info("using backwards-compatible default setting " VAR_SMTPUTF8_ENABLE "=no to accept non-ASCII sender " "address \"%s\" from %s", STR(state->addr_buf), state->namaddr); } /* * Check the queue file space, if applicable. The optional before-filter * speed-adjust buffers use disk space. However, we don't know if they * compete for storage space with the after-filter queue, so we can't * simply bump up the free space requirement to 2.5 * message_size_limit. */ if (!USE_SMTPD_PROXY(state) || (smtpd_proxy_opts & SMTPD_PROXY_FLAG_SPEED_ADJUST)) { if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0 && (err = smtpd_check_queue(state)) != 0) { /* XXX Reset access map side effects. */ mail_reset(state); smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err); return (-1); } } /* * No more early returns. The mail transaction is in progress. */ GETTIMEOFDAY(&state->arrival_time); state->sender = mystrdup(STR(state->addr_buf)); vstring_sprintf(state->instance, "%x.%lx.%lx.%x", var_pid, (unsigned long) state->arrival_time.tv_sec, (unsigned long) state->arrival_time.tv_usec, state->seqno++); if (verp_delims) state->verp_delims = mystrdup(verp_delims); if (dsn_envid) state->dsn_envid = mystrdup(STR(state->dsn_buf)); if (USE_SMTPD_PROXY(state)) state->proxy_mail = mystrdup(STR(state->buffer)); if (var_smtpd_delay_open == 0 && mail_open_stream(state) < 0) { /* XXX Reset access map side effects. */ mail_reset(state); return (-1); } smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250 2.1.0 Ok"); return (0); } /* mail_reset - reset MAIL command stuff */ static void mail_reset(SMTPD_STATE *state) { state->msg_size = 0; state->act_size = 0; state->flags &= SMTPD_MASK_MAIL_KEEP; /* * Unceremoniously close the pipe to the cleanup service. The cleanup * service will delete the queue file when it detects a premature * end-of-file condition on input. */ if (state->cleanup != 0) { mail_stream_cleanup(state->dest); state->dest = 0; state->cleanup = 0; } state->err = 0; if (state->queue_id != 0) { myfree(state->queue_id); state->queue_id = 0; } if (state->sender) { myfree(state->sender); state->sender = 0; } /* WeiYu Wu: need to undo milter_mail_event() state change. */ if (state->flags & SMTPD_FLAG_NEED_MILTER_ABORT) { milter_abort(state->milters); state->flags &= ~SMTPD_FLAG_NEED_MILTER_ABORT; } if (state->verp_delims) { myfree(state->verp_delims); state->verp_delims = 0; } if (state->proxy_mail) { myfree(state->proxy_mail); state->proxy_mail = 0; } if (state->saved_filter) { myfree(state->saved_filter); state->saved_filter = 0; } if (state->saved_redirect) { myfree(state->saved_redirect); state->saved_redirect = 0; } if (state->saved_bcc) { argv_free(state->saved_bcc); state->saved_bcc = 0; } state->saved_flags = 0; #ifdef DELAY_ACTION state->saved_delay = 0; #endif #ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH if (state->sasl_sender) smtpd_sasl_mail_reset(state); #endif state->discard = 0; VSTRING_RESET(state->instance); VSTRING_TERMINATE(state->instance); if (state->proxy) smtpd_proxy_free(state); if (state->xforward.flags) smtpd_xforward_reset(state); if (state->prepend) state->prepend = argv_free(state->prepend); if (state->dsn_envid) { myfree(state->dsn_envid); state->dsn_envid = 0; } if (state->milter_argv) { myfree((void *) state->milter_argv); state->milter_argv = 0; state->milter_argc = 0; } /* * BDAT. */ state->bdat_state = SMTPD_BDAT_STAT_NONE; if (state->bdat_get_stream) { (void) vstream_fclose(state->bdat_get_stream); state->bdat_get_stream = 0; } if (state->bdat_get_buffer) VSTRING_RESET(state->bdat_get_buffer); } /* rcpt_cmd - process RCPT TO command */ static int rcpt_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *argv) { SMTPD_PROXY *proxy; const char *err; int narg; char *arg; int rate; const char *dsn_orcpt_addr = 0; ssize_t dsn_orcpt_addr_len = 0; const char *dsn_orcpt_type = 0; int dsn_notify = 0; const char *coded_addr; const char *milter_err; /* * Sanity checks. * * XXX 2821 pedantism: Section 4.1.2 says that SMTP servers that receive a * command in which invalid character codes have been employed, and for * which there are no other reasons for rejection, MUST reject that * command with a 501 response. So much for the principle of "be liberal * in what you accept, be strict in what you send". */ if (!SMTPD_IN_MAIL_TRANSACTION(state)) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "503 5.5.1 Error: need MAIL command"); return (-1); } /* Don't accept RCPT after BDAT. */ if (SMTPD_PROCESSING_BDAT(state)) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "503 5.5.1 Error: RCPT after BDAT"); return (-1); } if (argc < 3 || strcasecmp(argv[1].strval, "to:") != 0) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Syntax: RCPT TO:
"); return (-1); } /* * XXX The client event count/rate control must be consistent in its use * of client address information in connect and disconnect events. For * now we exclude xclient authorized hosts from event count/rate control. */ if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0 && !xclient_allowed && anvil_clnt && var_smtpd_crcpt_limit > 0 && !namadr_list_match(hogger_list, state->name, state->addr) && anvil_clnt_rcpt(anvil_clnt, state->service, state->addr, &rate) == ANVIL_STAT_OK && rate > var_smtpd_crcpt_limit) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY; msg_warn("Recipient address rate limit exceeded: %d from %s for service %s", rate, state->namaddr, state->service); smtpd_chat_reply(state, "450 4.7.1 Error: too many recipients from %s", state->addr); return (-1); } if (argv[2].tokval == SMTPD_TOK_ERROR) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.1.3 Bad recipient address syntax"); return (-1); } if (extract_addr(state, argv + 2, REJECT_EMPTY_ADDR, var_strict_rfc821_env, state->flags & SMTPD_FLAG_SMTPUTF8) != 0) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.1.3 Bad recipient address syntax"); return (-1); } for (narg = 3; narg < argc; narg++) { arg = argv[narg].strval; if (strncasecmp(arg, "NOTIFY=", 7) == 0) { /* RFC 3461 */ /* Sanitized on input. */ if (state->ehlo_discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_DSN) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.7.1 DSN support is disabled"); return (-1); } if (dsn_notify || (dsn_notify = dsn_notify_mask(arg + 7)) == 0) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Error: Bad NOTIFY parameter syntax"); return (-1); } } else if (strncasecmp(arg, "ORCPT=", 6) == 0) { /* RFC 3461 */ /* Sanitized by bounce server. */ if (state->ehlo_discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_DSN) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.7.1 DSN support is disabled"); return (-1); } vstring_strcpy(state->dsn_orcpt_buf, arg + 6); if (dsn_orcpt_addr || (coded_addr = split_at(STR(state->dsn_orcpt_buf), ';')) == 0 || *(dsn_orcpt_type = STR(state->dsn_orcpt_buf)) == 0 || (strcasecmp(dsn_orcpt_type, "utf-8") == 0 ? uxtext_unquote(state->dsn_buf, coded_addr) == 0 : xtext_unquote(state->dsn_buf, coded_addr) == 0)) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Error: Bad ORCPT parameter syntax"); return (-1); } dsn_orcpt_addr = STR(state->dsn_buf); dsn_orcpt_addr_len = LEN(state->dsn_buf); } else { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "555 5.5.4 Unsupported option: %s", arg); return (-1); } } if (var_smtpd_rcpt_limit && state->rcpt_count >= var_smtpd_rcpt_limit) { smtpd_chat_reply(state, "452 4.5.3 Error: too many recipients"); if (state->rcpt_overshoot++ < var_smtpd_rcpt_overlim) return (0); state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY; return (-1); } /* * Historically, Postfix does not forbid 8-bit envelope localparts. * Changing this would be a compatibility break. That can't happen in the * foreseeable future. */ if ((var_strict_smtputf8 || warn_compat_break_smtputf8_enable) && (state->flags & SMTPD_FLAG_SMTPUTF8) == 0 && *STR(state->addr_buf) && !allascii(STR(state->addr_buf))) { if (var_strict_smtputf8) { smtpd_chat_reply(state, "553 5.6.7 Must declare SMTPUTF8 to " "send unicode address"); return (-1); } /* * Not: #ifndef NO_EAI. They must configure SMTPUTF8_ENABLE=no if a * warning message is logged, so that they don't suddenly start to * lose mail after Postfix is built with EAI support. */ if (warn_compat_break_smtputf8_enable) msg_info("using backwards-compatible default setting " VAR_SMTPUTF8_ENABLE "=no to accept non-ASCII recipient " "address \"%s\" from %s", STR(state->addr_buf), state->namaddr); } if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0) { const char *verify_sender; /* * XXX Don't reject the address when we're probed with our own * address verification sender address. Otherwise, some timeout or * some UCE block may result in mutual negative caching, making it * painful to get the mail through. Unfortunately we still have to * send the address to the Milters otherwise they may bail out with a * "missing recipient" protocol error. */ verify_sender = valid_verify_sender_addr(STR(state->addr_buf)); if (verify_sender != 0) { vstring_strcpy(state->addr_buf, verify_sender); err = 0; } else { err = smtpd_check_rcpt(state, STR(state->addr_buf)); } if (state->milters != 0 && (state->saved_flags & MILTER_SKIP_FLAGS) == 0) { PUSH_STRING(saved_rcpt, state->recipient, STR(state->addr_buf)); state->milter_reject_text = err; milter_err = milter_rcpt_event(state->milters, err == 0 ? MILTER_FLAG_NONE : MILTER_FLAG_WANT_RCPT_REJ, milter_argv(state, argc - 2, argv + 2)); if (err == 0 && milter_err != 0) { /* Log reject etc. with correct recipient information. */ err = check_milter_reply(state, milter_err); } POP_STRING(saved_rcpt, state->recipient); } if (err != 0) { smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err); return (-1); } } /* * Don't access the proxy, queue file, or queue file writer process until * we have a valid recipient address. */ if (state->proxy == 0 && state->cleanup == 0 && mail_open_stream(state) < 0) return (-1); /* * Proxy the recipient. OK, so we lied. If the real-time proxy rejects * the recipient then we can have a proxy connection without having * accepted a recipient. */ proxy = state->proxy; if (proxy != 0 && proxy->cmd(state, SMTPD_PROX_WANT_OK, "%s", STR(state->buffer)) != 0) { smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", STR(proxy->reply)); return (-1); } /* * Store the recipient. Remember the first one. * * Flush recipients to maintain a stiffer coupling with the next stage and * to better utilize parallelism. * * RFC 3461 Section 5.2.1: If the NOTIFY parameter was not supplied for a * recipient when the message was received, the NOTIFY parameter MUST NOT * be supplied for that recipient when the message is relayed. * * In other words, we can't simply make up our default NOTIFY value. We have * to remember whether the client sent any. * * RFC 3461 Section 5.2.1: If no ORCPT parameter was present when the * message was received, an ORCPT parameter MAY be added to the RCPT * command when the message is relayed. If an ORCPT parameter is added * by the relaying MTA, it MUST contain the recipient address from the * RCPT command used when the message was received by that MTA. * * In other words, it is OK to make up our own DSN original recipient when * the client didn't send one. Although the RFC mentions mail relaying * only, we also make up our own original recipient for the purpose of * final delivery. For now, we do this here, rather than on the fly. * * XXX We use REC_TYPE_ATTR for DSN-related recipient attributes even though * 1) REC_TYPE_ATTR is not meant for multiple instances of the same named * attribute, and 2) mixing REC_TYPE_ATTR with REC_TYPE_(not attr) * requires that we map attributes with rec_attr_map() in order to * simplify the recipient record processing loops in the cleanup and qmgr * servers. * * Another possibility, yet to be explored, is to leave the additional * recipient information in the queue file and just pass queue file * offsets along with the delivery request. This is a trade off between * memory allocation versus numeric conversion overhead. * * Since we have no record grouping mechanism, all recipient-specific * parameters must be sent to the cleanup server before the actual * recipient address. */ state->rcpt_count++; if (state->recipient == 0) state->recipient = mystrdup(STR(state->addr_buf)); if (state->cleanup) { /* Note: RFC(2)821 externalized address! */ if (dsn_orcpt_addr == 0) { dsn_orcpt_type = "rfc822"; dsn_orcpt_addr = argv[2].strval; dsn_orcpt_addr_len = strlen(argv[2].strval); if (dsn_orcpt_addr[0] == '<' && dsn_orcpt_addr[dsn_orcpt_addr_len - 1] == '>') { dsn_orcpt_addr += 1; dsn_orcpt_addr_len -= 2; } } if (dsn_notify) rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%d", MAIL_ATTR_DSN_NOTIFY, dsn_notify); rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%s;%.*s", MAIL_ATTR_DSN_ORCPT, dsn_orcpt_type, (int) dsn_orcpt_addr_len, dsn_orcpt_addr); rec_fputs(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_RCPT, STR(state->addr_buf)); vstream_fflush(state->cleanup); } smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250 2.1.5 Ok"); return (0); } /* rcpt_reset - reset RCPT stuff */ static void rcpt_reset(SMTPD_STATE *state) { if (state->recipient) { myfree(state->recipient); state->recipient = 0; } state->rcpt_count = 0; /* XXX Must flush the command history. */ state->rcpt_overshoot = 0; } #if 0 /* rfc2047_comment_encode - encode comment string */ static VSTRING *rfc2047_comment_encode(const char *str, const char *charset) { VSTRING *buf = vstring_alloc(30); const unsigned char *cp; int ch; /* * XXX This is problematic code. * * XXX Most of the RFC 2047 "especials" are not special in RFC*822 comments, * but we encode them anyway to avoid complaints. * * XXX In Received: header comments we enclose peer and issuer common names * with "" quotes (inherited from the Lutz Jaenicke patch). This is the * cause of several quirks. * * 1) We encode text that contains the " character, even though that * character is not special for RFC*822 comments. * * 2) We ignore the recommended limit of 75 characters per encoded word, * because long comments look ugly when folded in-between quotes. * * 3) We encode the enclosing quotes, to avoid producing invalid encoded * words. Microsoft abuses RFC 2047 encoding with attachment names, but * we have no information on what decoders do with malformed encoding in * comments. This means the comments are Jaenicke-compatible only after * decoding. */ #define ESPECIALS "()<>@,;:\"/[]?.=" /* Special in RFC 2047 */ #define QSPECIALS "_" ESPECIALS /* Special in RFC 2047 'Q' */ #define CSPECIALS "\\\"()" /* Special in our comments */ /* Don't encode if not needed. */ for (cp = (unsigned char *) str; /* see below */ ; ++cp) { if ((ch = *cp) == 0) { vstring_sprintf(buf, "\"%s\"", str); return (buf); } if (!ISPRINT(ch) || strchr(CSPECIALS, ch)) break; } /* * Use quoted-printable (like) encoding with spaces mapped to underscore. */ vstring_sprintf(buf, "=?%s?Q?=%02X", charset, '"'); for (cp = (unsigned char *) str; (ch = *cp) != 0; ++cp) { if (!ISPRINT(ch) || strchr(QSPECIALS CSPECIALS, ch)) { vstring_sprintf_append(buf, "=%02X", ch); } else if (ch == ' ') { VSTRING_ADDCH(buf, '_'); } else { VSTRING_ADDCH(buf, ch); } } vstring_sprintf_append(buf, "=%02X?=", '"'); return (buf); } #endif /* comment_sanitize - clean up comment string */ static void comment_sanitize(VSTRING *comment_string) { unsigned char *cp; int ch; int pc; /* * Postfix Received: headers can be configured to include a comment with * the CN (CommonName) of the peer and its issuer, or the login name of a * SASL authenticated user. To avoid problems with RFC 822 etc. syntax, * we limit this information to printable ASCII text, and neutralize * characters that affect comment parsing: the backslash and unbalanced * parentheses. */ for (pc = 0, cp = (unsigned char *) STR(comment_string); (ch = *cp) != 0; cp++) { if (!ISASCII(ch) || !ISPRINT(ch) || ch == '\\') { *cp = '?'; } else if (ch == '(') { pc++; } else if (ch == ')') { if (pc > 0) pc--; else *cp = '?'; } } while (pc-- > 0) VSTRING_ADDCH(comment_string, ')'); VSTRING_TERMINATE(comment_string); } static void common_pre_message_handling(SMTPD_STATE *state, int (*out_record) (VSTREAM *, int, const char *, ssize_t), int (*out_fprintf) (VSTREAM *, int, const char *,...), VSTREAM *out_stream, int out_error); static void receive_data_message(SMTPD_STATE *state, int (*out_record) (VSTREAM *, int, const char *, ssize_t), int (*out_fprintf) (VSTREAM *, int, const char *,...), VSTREAM *out_stream, int out_error); static int common_post_message_handling(SMTPD_STATE *state); /* data_cmd - process DATA command */ static int data_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *unused_argv) { SMTPD_PROXY *proxy; const char *err; int (*out_record) (VSTREAM *, int, const char *, ssize_t); int (*out_fprintf) (VSTREAM *, int, const char *,...); VSTREAM *out_stream; int out_error; /* * Sanity checks. With ESMTP command pipelining the client can send DATA * before all recipients are rejected, so don't report that as a protocol * error. */ if (SMTPD_PROCESSING_BDAT(state)) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "503 5.5.1 Error: DATA after BDAT"); return (-1); } if (state->rcpt_count == 0) { if (!SMTPD_IN_MAIL_TRANSACTION(state)) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "503 5.5.1 Error: need RCPT command"); } else { smtpd_chat_reply(state, "554 5.5.1 Error: no valid recipients"); } return (-1); } if (argc != 1) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Syntax: DATA"); return (-1); } if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0 && (err = smtpd_check_data(state)) != 0) { smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err); return (-1); } if (state->milters != 0 && (state->saved_flags & MILTER_SKIP_FLAGS) == 0 && (err = milter_data_event(state->milters)) != 0 && (err = check_milter_reply(state, err)) != 0) { smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err); return (-1); } proxy = state->proxy; if (proxy != 0 && proxy->cmd(state, SMTPD_PROX_WANT_MORE, "%s", STR(state->buffer)) != 0) { smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", STR(proxy->reply)); return (-1); } /* * One level of indirection to choose between normal or proxied * operation. We want to avoid massive code duplication within tons of * if-else clauses. */ if (proxy) { out_stream = proxy->stream; out_record = proxy->rec_put; out_fprintf = proxy->rec_fprintf; out_error = CLEANUP_STAT_PROXY; } else { out_stream = state->cleanup; out_record = rec_put; out_fprintf = rec_fprintf; out_error = CLEANUP_STAT_WRITE; } common_pre_message_handling(state, out_record, out_fprintf, out_stream, out_error); smtpd_chat_reply(state, "354 End data with ."); state->where = SMTPD_AFTER_DATA; receive_data_message(state, out_record, out_fprintf, out_stream, out_error); return common_post_message_handling(state); } /* common_pre_message_handling - finish envelope and open message segment */ static void common_pre_message_handling(SMTPD_STATE *state, int (*out_record) (VSTREAM *, int, const char *, ssize_t), int (*out_fprintf) (VSTREAM *, int, const char *,...), VSTREAM *out_stream, int out_error) { SMTPD_PROXY *proxy = state->proxy; char **cpp; const char *rfc3848_sess; const char *rfc3848_auth; const char *with_protocol = (state->flags & SMTPD_FLAG_SMTPUTF8) ? "UTF8SMTP" : state->protocol; #ifdef USE_TLS VSTRING *peer_CN; VSTRING *issuer_CN; #endif #ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH VSTRING *username; #endif /* * Flush out a first batch of access table actions that are delegated to * the cleanup server, and that may trigger before we accept the first * valid recipient. There will be more after end-of-data. * * Terminate the message envelope segment. Start the message content * segment, and prepend our own Received: header. If there is only one * recipient, list the recipient address. */ if (state->cleanup) { if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0) { if (state->milters != 0 && (state->saved_flags & MILTER_SKIP_FLAGS) == 0) /* Send actual smtpd_milters list. */ (void) milter_send(state->milters, state->cleanup); if (state->saved_flags) rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_FLGS, "%d", state->saved_flags); } rec_fputs(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_MESG, ""); } /* * PREPEND message headers above our own Received: header. */ if (state->prepend) for (cpp = state->prepend->argv; *cpp; cpp++) out_fprintf(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM, "%s", *cpp); /* * Suppress our own Received: header in the unlikely case that we are an * intermediate proxy. */ if (!proxy || state->xforward.flags == 0) { out_fprintf(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM, "Received: from %s (%s [%s])", state->helo_name ? state->helo_name : state->name, state->name, state->rfc_addr); #define VSTRING_STRDUP(s) vstring_strcpy(vstring_alloc(strlen(s) + 1), (s)) #ifdef USE_TLS if (var_smtpd_tls_received_header && state->tls_context) { int cont = 0; vstring_sprintf(state->buffer, "\t(using %s with cipher %s (%d/%d bits)", state->tls_context->protocol, state->tls_context->cipher_name, state->tls_context->cipher_usebits, state->tls_context->cipher_algbits); if (state->tls_context->kex_name && *state->tls_context->kex_name) { out_record(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM, STR(state->buffer), LEN(state->buffer)); vstring_sprintf(state->buffer, "\t key-exchange %s", state->tls_context->kex_name); if (state->tls_context->kex_curve && *state->tls_context->kex_curve) vstring_sprintf_append(state->buffer, " (%s)", state->tls_context->kex_curve); else if (state->tls_context->kex_bits > 0) vstring_sprintf_append(state->buffer, " (%d bits)", state->tls_context->kex_bits); cont = 1; } if (state->tls_context->srvr_sig_name && *state->tls_context->srvr_sig_name) { if (cont) { vstring_sprintf_append(state->buffer, " server-signature %s", state->tls_context->srvr_sig_name); } else { out_record(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM, STR(state->buffer), LEN(state->buffer)); vstring_sprintf(state->buffer, "\t server-signature %s", state->tls_context->srvr_sig_name); } if (state->tls_context->srvr_sig_curve && *state->tls_context->srvr_sig_curve) vstring_sprintf_append(state->buffer, " (%s)", state->tls_context->srvr_sig_curve); else if (state->tls_context->srvr_sig_bits > 0) vstring_sprintf_append(state->buffer, " (%d bits)", state->tls_context->srvr_sig_bits); if (state->tls_context->srvr_sig_dgst && *state->tls_context->srvr_sig_dgst) vstring_sprintf_append(state->buffer, " server-digest %s", state->tls_context->srvr_sig_dgst); } if (state->tls_context->clnt_sig_name && *state->tls_context->clnt_sig_name) { out_record(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM, STR(state->buffer), LEN(state->buffer)); vstring_sprintf(state->buffer, "\t client-signature %s", state->tls_context->clnt_sig_name); if (state->tls_context->clnt_sig_curve && *state->tls_context->clnt_sig_curve) vstring_sprintf_append(state->buffer, " (%s)", state->tls_context->clnt_sig_curve); else if (state->tls_context->clnt_sig_bits > 0) vstring_sprintf_append(state->buffer, " (%d bits)", state->tls_context->clnt_sig_bits); if (state->tls_context->clnt_sig_dgst && *state->tls_context->clnt_sig_dgst) vstring_sprintf_append(state->buffer, " client-digest %s", state->tls_context->clnt_sig_dgst); } out_fprintf(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM, "%s)", STR(state->buffer)); if (TLS_CERT_IS_PRESENT(state->tls_context)) { peer_CN = VSTRING_STRDUP(state->tls_context->peer_CN); comment_sanitize(peer_CN); issuer_CN = VSTRING_STRDUP(state->tls_context->issuer_CN ? state->tls_context->issuer_CN : ""); comment_sanitize(issuer_CN); out_fprintf(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM, "\t(Client CN \"%s\", Issuer \"%s\" (%s))", STR(peer_CN), STR(issuer_CN), TLS_CERT_IS_TRUSTED(state->tls_context) ? "verified OK" : "not verified"); vstring_free(issuer_CN); vstring_free(peer_CN); } else if (var_smtpd_tls_ask_ccert) out_fprintf(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM, "\t(Client did not present a certificate)"); else out_fprintf(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM, "\t(No client certificate requested)"); } /* RFC 3848 is defined for ESMTP only. */ if (state->tls_context != 0 && strcmp(state->protocol, MAIL_PROTO_ESMTP) == 0) rfc3848_sess = "S"; else #endif rfc3848_sess = ""; #ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH if (var_smtpd_sasl_auth_hdr && state->sasl_username) { username = VSTRING_STRDUP(state->sasl_username); comment_sanitize(username); out_fprintf(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM, "\t(Authenticated sender: %s)", STR(username)); vstring_free(username); } /* RFC 3848 is defined for ESMTP only. */ if (state->sasl_username && strcmp(state->protocol, MAIL_PROTO_ESMTP) == 0) rfc3848_auth = "A"; else #endif rfc3848_auth = ""; if (state->rcpt_count == 1 && state->recipient) { out_fprintf(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM, state->cleanup ? "\tby %s (%s) with %s%s%s id %s" : "\tby %s (%s) with %s%s%s", var_myhostname, var_mail_name, with_protocol, rfc3848_sess, rfc3848_auth, state->queue_id); quote_822_local(state->buffer, state->recipient); out_fprintf(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM, "\tfor <%s>; %s", STR(state->buffer), mail_date(state->arrival_time.tv_sec)); } else { out_fprintf(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM, state->cleanup ? "\tby %s (%s) with %s%s%s id %s;" : "\tby %s (%s) with %s%s%s;", var_myhostname, var_mail_name, with_protocol, rfc3848_sess, rfc3848_auth, state->queue_id); out_fprintf(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM, "\t%s", mail_date(state->arrival_time.tv_sec)); } #ifdef RECEIVED_ENVELOPE_FROM quote_822_local(state->buffer, state->sender); out_fprintf(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM, "\t(envelope-from %s)", STR(state->buffer)); #endif } } /* receive_data_message - finish envelope and open message segment */ static void receive_data_message(SMTPD_STATE *state, int (*out_record) (VSTREAM *, int, const char *, ssize_t), int (*out_fprintf) (VSTREAM *, int, const char *,...), VSTREAM *out_stream, int out_error) { SMTPD_PROXY *proxy = state->proxy; char *start; int len; int curr_rec_type; int prev_rec_type; int first = 1; int prev_got_bare_lf = 0; /* * Copy the message content. If the cleanup process has a problem, keep * reading until the remote stops sending, then complain. Produce typed * records from the SMTP stream so we can handle data that spans buffers. * * XXX Force an empty record when the queue file content begins with * whitespace, so that it won't be considered as being part of our own * Received: header. What an ugly Kluge. * * XXX Deal with UNIX-style From_ lines at the start of message content * because sendmail permits it. */ for (prev_rec_type = 0; /* void */ ; prev_rec_type = curr_rec_type, prev_got_bare_lf = smtp_got_bare_lf) { if (smtp_get(state->buffer, state->client, var_line_limit, SMTP_GET_FLAG_NONE) == '\n') curr_rec_type = REC_TYPE_NORM; else curr_rec_type = REC_TYPE_CONT; if (IS_BARE_LF_REPLY_REJECT(smtp_got_bare_lf)) state->err |= CLEANUP_STAT_BARE_LF; start = vstring_str(state->buffer); len = VSTRING_LEN(state->buffer); if (first) { if (strncmp(start + strspn(start, ">"), "From ", 5) == 0) { out_fprintf(out_stream, curr_rec_type, "X-Mailbox-Line: %s", start); continue; } first = 0; if (len > 0 && IS_SPACE_TAB(start[0])) out_record(out_stream, REC_TYPE_NORM, "", 0); } if (prev_rec_type != REC_TYPE_CONT && *start == '.') { if (len == 1 && IS_BARE_LF_WANT_STD_EOD(smtp_detect_bare_lf) && (smtp_got_bare_lf || prev_got_bare_lf)) /* Do not store or send to proxy filter. */ continue; if (proxy == 0 ? (++start, --len) == 0 : len == 1) break; } if (state->err == CLEANUP_STAT_OK) { if (ENFORCING_SIZE_LIMIT(var_message_limit) && var_message_limit - state->act_size < len + 2) { state->err = CLEANUP_STAT_SIZE; msg_warn("%s: queue file size limit exceeded", state->queue_id ? state->queue_id : "NOQUEUE"); } else { state->act_size += len + 2; if (out_record(out_stream, curr_rec_type, start, len) < 0) state->err = out_error; } } } state->where = SMTPD_AFTER_EOM; } /* common_post_message_handling - commit message or report error */ static int common_post_message_handling(SMTPD_STATE *state) { SMTPD_PROXY *proxy = state->proxy; const char *err; VSTRING *why = 0; int saved_err; const CLEANUP_STAT_DETAIL *detail; #define IS_SMTP_REJECT(s) \ (((s)[0] == '4' || (s)[0] == '5') \ && ISDIGIT((s)[1]) && ISDIGIT((s)[2]) \ && ((s)[3] == '\0' || (s)[3] == ' ' || (s)[3] == '-')) if (state->err == CLEANUP_STAT_OK && SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0 && (err = smtpd_check_eod(state)) != 0) { smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err); if (proxy) { smtpd_proxy_close(state); } else { mail_stream_cleanup(state->dest); state->dest = 0; state->cleanup = 0; } return (-1); } /* * Send the end of DATA and finish the proxy connection. Set the * CLEANUP_STAT_PROXY error flag in case of trouble. */ if (proxy) { if (state->err == CLEANUP_STAT_OK) { (void) proxy->cmd(state, SMTPD_PROX_WANT_ANY, "."); if (state->err == CLEANUP_STAT_OK && *STR(proxy->reply) != '2') state->err = CLEANUP_STAT_CONT; } } /* * Flush out access table actions that are delegated to the cleanup * server. There is similar code at the beginning of the DATA command. * * Send the end-of-segment markers and finish the queue file record stream. */ else { if (state->err == CLEANUP_STAT_OK) { rec_fputs(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_XTRA, ""); if (state->saved_filter) rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_FILT, "%s", state->saved_filter); if (state->saved_redirect) rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_RDR, "%s", state->saved_redirect); if (state->saved_bcc) { char **cpp; for (cpp = state->saved_bcc->argv; *cpp; cpp++) { rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_RCPT, "%s", *cpp); rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_ATTR, "%s=%d", MAIL_ATTR_DSN_NOTIFY, DSN_NOTIFY_NEVER); } } if (state->saved_flags) rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_FLGS, "%d", state->saved_flags); #ifdef DELAY_ACTION if (state->saved_delay) rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_DELAY, "%d", state->saved_delay); #endif if (vstream_ferror(state->cleanup)) state->err = CLEANUP_STAT_WRITE; } if (state->err == CLEANUP_STAT_OK) if (rec_fputs(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_END, "") < 0 || vstream_fflush(state->cleanup)) state->err = CLEANUP_STAT_WRITE; if (state->err == 0) { why = vstring_alloc(10); state->err = mail_stream_finish(state->dest, why); if (IS_SMTP_REJECT(STR(why))) printable_except(STR(why), ' ', "\r\n"); else printable(STR(why), ' '); } else mail_stream_cleanup(state->dest); state->dest = 0; state->cleanup = 0; } /* * XXX If we lose the cleanup server while it is editing a queue file, * the Postfix SMTP server will be out of sync with Milter applications. * Sending an ABORT to the Milters is not sufficient to restore * synchronization, because there may be any number of Milter replies * already in flight. Destroying and recreating the Milters (and faking * the connect and ehlo events) is too much trouble for testing and * maintenance. Workaround: force the Postfix SMTP server to hang up with * a 421 response in the rare case that the cleanup server breaks AND * that the remote SMTP client continues the session after end-of-data. * * XXX Should use something other than CLEANUP_STAT_WRITE when we lose * contact with the cleanup server. This requires changes to the * mail_stream module and its users (smtpd, qmqpd, perhaps sendmail). * * XXX See exception below in code that overrides state->access_denied for * compliance with RFC 2821 Sec 3.1. */ if (state->milters != 0 && (state->err & CLEANUP_STAT_WRITE) != 0) state->access_denied = mystrdup("421 4.3.0 Mail system error"); /* * Handle any errors. One message may suffer from multiple errors, so * complain only about the most severe error. Forgive any previous client * errors when a message was received successfully. * * See also: qmqpd.c */ if (state->err == CLEANUP_STAT_OK) { state->error_count = 0; state->error_mask = 0; state->junk_cmds = 0; if (proxy) smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", STR(proxy->reply)); else if (SMTPD_PROCESSING_BDAT(state)) smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250 2.0.0 Ok: %ld bytes queued as %s", (long) state->act_size, state->queue_id); else smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250 2.0.0 Ok: queued as %s", state->queue_id); } else if ((state->err & CLEANUP_STAT_BARE_LF) != 0) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; log_whatsup(state, "reject", "bare received"); smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%d 5.5.2 %s Error: bare received", var_smtpd_forbid_bare_lf_code, var_myhostname); } else if (why && IS_SMTP_REJECT(STR(why))) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", STR(why)); } else if ((state->err & CLEANUP_STAT_DEFER) != 0) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY; detail = cleanup_stat_detail(CLEANUP_STAT_DEFER); if (why && LEN(why) > 0) { /* Allow address-specific DSN status in header/body_checks. */ smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%d %s", detail->smtp, STR(why)); } else { smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%d %s Error: %s", detail->smtp, detail->dsn, detail->text); } } else if ((state->err & CLEANUP_STAT_BAD) != 0) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_SOFTWARE; detail = cleanup_stat_detail(CLEANUP_STAT_BAD); smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%d %s Error: internal error %d", detail->smtp, detail->dsn, state->err); } else if ((state->err & CLEANUP_STAT_SIZE) != 0) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_BOUNCE; detail = cleanup_stat_detail(CLEANUP_STAT_SIZE); smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%d %s Error: %s", detail->smtp, detail->dsn, detail->text); } else if ((state->err & CLEANUP_STAT_HOPS) != 0) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_BOUNCE; detail = cleanup_stat_detail(CLEANUP_STAT_HOPS); smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%d %s Error: %s", detail->smtp, detail->dsn, detail->text); } else if ((state->err & CLEANUP_STAT_CONT) != 0) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY; detail = cleanup_stat_detail(CLEANUP_STAT_CONT); if (proxy) { smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", STR(proxy->reply)); } else if (why && LEN(why) > 0) { /* Allow address-specific DSN status in header/body_checks. */ smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%d %s", detail->smtp, STR(why)); } else { smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%d %s Error: %s", detail->smtp, detail->dsn, detail->text); } } else if ((state->err & CLEANUP_STAT_WRITE) != 0) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_RESOURCE; detail = cleanup_stat_detail(CLEANUP_STAT_WRITE); smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%d %s Error: %s", detail->smtp, detail->dsn, detail->text); } else if ((state->err & CLEANUP_STAT_PROXY) != 0) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_SOFTWARE; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", STR(proxy->reply)); } else { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_SOFTWARE; detail = cleanup_stat_detail(CLEANUP_STAT_BAD); smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%d %s Error: internal error %d", detail->smtp, detail->dsn, state->err); } /* * By popular command: the proxy's end-of-data reply. */ if (proxy) msg_info("proxy-%s: %s: %s;%s", (state->err == CLEANUP_STAT_OK) ? "accept" : "reject", state->where, STR(proxy->reply), smtpd_whatsup(state)); /* * Cleanup. The client may send another MAIL command. */ saved_err = state->err; chat_reset(state, var_smtpd_hist_thrsh); mail_reset(state); rcpt_reset(state); if (why) vstring_free(why); return (saved_err); } /* skip_bdat - skip content and respond to BDAT error */ static int skip_bdat(SMTPD_STATE *state, off_t chunk_size, bool final_chunk, const char *format,...) { va_list ap; off_t done; off_t len; /* * Read and discard content from the remote SMTP client. TODO: drop the * connection in case of overload. */ for (done = 0; done < chunk_size; done += len) { if ((len = chunk_size - done) > VSTREAM_BUFSIZE) len = VSTREAM_BUFSIZE; smtp_fread_buf(state->buffer, len, state->client); } /* * Send the response to the remote SMTP client. */ va_start(ap, format); vsmtpd_chat_reply(state, format, ap); va_end(ap); /* * Reset state, or drop subsequent BDAT payloads until BDAT LAST or RSET. */ if (final_chunk) mail_reset(state); else state->bdat_state = SMTPD_BDAT_STAT_ERROR; return (-1); } /* bdat_cmd - process BDAT command */ static int bdat_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *argv) { SMTPD_PROXY *proxy; const char *err; off_t chunk_size; bool final_chunk; off_t done; off_t read_len; char *start; int len; int curr_rec_type; int (*out_record) (VSTREAM *, int, const char *, ssize_t); int (*out_fprintf) (VSTREAM *, int, const char *,...); VSTREAM *out_stream; int out_error; /* * Hang up if the BDAT command is disabled. The next input would be raw * message content and that would trigger lots of command errors. */ if (state->ehlo_discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_CHUNKING) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "521 5.5.1 Error: command not implemented"); return (-1); } /* * Hang up if the BDAT command is malformed. The next input would be raw * message content and that would trigger lots of command errors. */ if (argc < 2 || argc > 3 || !alldig(argv[1].strval) || (chunk_size = off_cvt_string(argv[1].strval)) < 0 || ((final_chunk = (argc == 3)) && strcasecmp(argv[2].strval, "LAST") != 0)) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; msg_warn("%s: malformed BDAT command syntax from %s: %.100s", state->queue_id ? state->queue_id : "NOQUEUE", state->namaddr, printable(vstring_str(state->buffer), '?')); smtpd_chat_reply(state, "521 5.5.4 Syntax: BDAT count [LAST]"); return (-1); } /* * Block abuse involving empty chunks (alternatively, we could count * "BDAT 0" as a "NOOP", but then we would have to refactor the code that * enforces the junk command limit). Clients that send a message as a * sequence of "BDAT 1" should not be a problem: the Postfix BDAT * implementation should be efficient enough to handle that. */ if (chunk_size == 0 && !final_chunk) { msg_warn("%s: null BDAT request from %s", state->queue_id ? state->queue_id : "NOQUEUE", state->namaddr); return skip_bdat(state, chunk_size, final_chunk, "551 5.7.1 Null BDAT request"); } /* * BDAT commands may be pipelined within a MAIL transaction. After a BDAT * request fails, keep accepting BDAT requests and skipping BDAT payloads * to maintain synchronization with the remote SMTP client, until the * client sends BDAT LAST or RSET. */ if (state->bdat_state == SMTPD_BDAT_STAT_ERROR) return skip_bdat(state, chunk_size, final_chunk, "551 5.0.0 Discarded %ld bytes after earlier error", (long) chunk_size); /* * Special handling for the first BDAT command in a MAIL transaction, * treating it as a kind of "DATA" command for the purpose of policy * evaluation. */ if (!SMTPD_PROCESSING_BDAT(state)) { /* * With ESMTP command pipelining a client may send BDAT before the * server has replied to all RCPT commands. For this reason we cannot * treat BDAT without valid recipients as a protocol error. Worse, * RFC 3030 does not discuss the role of BDAT commands in RFC 2920 * command groups (batches of commands that may be sent without * waiting for a response to each individual command). Therefore we * have to allow for clients that pipeline the entire SMTP session * after EHLO, including multiple MAIL transactions. */ if (state->rcpt_count == 0) { if (!SMTPD_IN_MAIL_TRANSACTION(state)) { /* TODO: maybe remove this from the DATA and BDAT handlers. */ state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; return skip_bdat(state, chunk_size, final_chunk, "503 5.5.1 Error: need RCPT command"); } else { return skip_bdat(state, chunk_size, final_chunk, "554 5.5.1 Error: no valid recipients"); } } if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0 && (err = smtpd_check_data(state)) != 0) { return skip_bdat(state, chunk_size, final_chunk, "%s", err); } if (state->milters != 0 && (state->saved_flags & MILTER_SKIP_FLAGS) == 0 && (err = milter_data_event(state->milters)) != 0 && (err = check_milter_reply(state, err)) != 0) { return skip_bdat(state, chunk_size, final_chunk, "%s", err); } proxy = state->proxy; if (proxy != 0 && proxy->cmd(state, SMTPD_PROX_WANT_MORE, SMTPD_CMD_DATA) != 0) { return skip_bdat(state, chunk_size, final_chunk, "%s", STR(proxy->reply)); } } /* Block too large chunks. */ if (ENFORCING_SIZE_LIMIT(var_message_limit) && state->act_size > var_message_limit - chunk_size) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY; msg_warn("%s: BDAT request from %s exceeds message size limit", state->queue_id ? state->queue_id : "NOQUEUE", state->namaddr); return skip_bdat(state, chunk_size, final_chunk, "552 5.3.4 Chunk exceeds message size limit"); } /* * One level of indirection to choose between normal or proxied * operation. We want to avoid massive code duplication within tons of * if-else clauses. TODO: store this in its own data structure, or in * SMTPD_STATE. */ proxy = state->proxy; if (proxy) { out_stream = proxy->stream; out_record = proxy->rec_put; out_fprintf = proxy->rec_fprintf; out_error = CLEANUP_STAT_PROXY; } else { out_stream = state->cleanup; out_record = rec_put; out_fprintf = rec_fprintf; out_error = CLEANUP_STAT_WRITE; } if (!SMTPD_PROCESSING_BDAT(state)) { common_pre_message_handling(state, out_record, out_fprintf, out_stream, out_error); if (state->bdat_get_buffer == 0) state->bdat_get_buffer = vstring_alloc(VSTREAM_BUFSIZE); else VSTRING_RESET(state->bdat_get_buffer); state->bdat_prev_rec_type = 0; } state->bdat_state = SMTPD_BDAT_STAT_OK; state->where = SMTPD_AFTER_BDAT; /* * Copy the message content. If the cleanup process has a problem, keep * reading until the remote stops sending, then complain. Produce typed * records from the SMTP stream so we can handle data that spans buffers. */ /* * Instead of reading the entire BDAT chunk into memory, read the chunk * one fragment at a time. The loops below always make one iteration, to * avoid code duplication for the "BDAT 0 LAST" case (empty chunk). */ done = 0; do { /* * Do not skip the smtp_fread_buf() call if read_len == 0. We still * need the side effects which include resetting the buffer write * position. Skipping the call would invalidate the buffer state. * * Caution: smtp_fread_buf() will long jump after EOF or timeout. */ if ((read_len = chunk_size - done) > VSTREAM_BUFSIZE) read_len = VSTREAM_BUFSIZE; smtp_fread_buf(state->buffer, read_len, state->client); state->bdat_get_stream = vstream_memreopen( state->bdat_get_stream, state->buffer, O_RDONLY); /* * Read lines from the fragment. The last line may continue in the * next fragment, or in the next chunk. */ do { if (smtp_get_noexcept(state->bdat_get_buffer, state->bdat_get_stream, var_line_limit, SMTP_GET_FLAG_APPEND) == '\n') { /* Stopped at end-of-line. */ curr_rec_type = REC_TYPE_NORM; } else if (!vstream_feof(state->bdat_get_stream)) { /* Stopped at var_line_limit. */ curr_rec_type = REC_TYPE_CONT; } else if (VSTRING_LEN(state->bdat_get_buffer) > 0 && final_chunk && read_len == chunk_size - done) { /* Stopped at final chunk end; handle missing end-of-line. */ curr_rec_type = REC_TYPE_NORM; } else { /* Stopped at fragment end; empty buffer or not at chunk end. */ /* Skip the out_record() and VSTRING_RESET() calls below. */ break; } if (IS_BARE_LF_REPLY_REJECT(smtp_got_bare_lf)) state->err |= CLEANUP_STAT_BARE_LF; start = vstring_str(state->bdat_get_buffer); len = VSTRING_LEN(state->bdat_get_buffer); if (state->err == CLEANUP_STAT_OK) { if (ENFORCING_SIZE_LIMIT(var_message_limit) && var_message_limit - state->act_size < len + 2) { state->err = CLEANUP_STAT_SIZE; msg_warn("%s: queue file size limit exceeded", state->queue_id ? state->queue_id : "NOQUEUE"); } else { state->act_size += len + 2; if (*start == '.' && proxy != 0 && state->bdat_prev_rec_type != REC_TYPE_CONT) if (out_record(out_stream, REC_TYPE_CONT, ".", 1) < 0) state->err = out_error; if (state->err == CLEANUP_STAT_OK && out_record(out_stream, curr_rec_type, vstring_str(state->bdat_get_buffer), VSTRING_LEN(state->bdat_get_buffer)) < 0) state->err = out_error; } } VSTRING_RESET(state->bdat_get_buffer); state->bdat_prev_rec_type = curr_rec_type; } while (!vstream_feof(state->bdat_get_stream)); done += read_len; } while (done < chunk_size); /* * Special handling for BDAT LAST (successful or unsuccessful). */ if (final_chunk) { state->where = SMTPD_AFTER_EOM; return common_post_message_handling(state); } /* * Unsuccessful non-final BDAT command. common_post_message_handling() * resets all MAIL transaction state including BDAT state. To avoid * useless error messages due to pipelined BDAT commands, enter the * SMTPD_BDAT_STAT_ERROR state to accept BDAT commands and skip BDAT * payloads. */ else if (state->err != CLEANUP_STAT_OK) { /* NOT: state->where = SMTPD_AFTER_EOM; */ (void) common_post_message_handling(state); state->bdat_state = SMTPD_BDAT_STAT_ERROR; return (-1); } /* * Successful non-final BDAT command. */ else { smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250 2.0.0 Ok: %ld bytes", (long) chunk_size); return (0); } } /* rset_cmd - process RSET */ static int rset_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *unused_argv) { /* * Sanity checks. */ if (argc != 1) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Syntax: RSET"); return (-1); } /* * Restore state to right after HELO/EHLO command. */ chat_reset(state, var_smtpd_hist_thrsh); mail_reset(state); rcpt_reset(state); smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250 2.0.0 Ok"); return (0); } /* noop_cmd - process NOOP */ static int noop_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *unused_argv) { /* * XXX 2821 incompatibility: Section 4.1.1.9 says that NOOP can have a * parameter string which is to be ignored. NOOP instructions with * parameters? Go figure. * * RFC 2821 violates RFC 821, which says that NOOP takes no parameters. */ #ifdef RFC821_SYNTAX /* * Sanity checks. */ if (argc != 1) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Syntax: NOOP"); return (-1); } #endif smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250 2.0.0 Ok"); return (0); } /* vrfy_cmd - process VRFY */ static int vrfy_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *argv) { const char *err = 0; int rate; int smtputf8 = 0; int saved_flags; /* * The SMTP standard (RFC 821) disallows unquoted special characters in * the VRFY argument. Common practice violates the standard, however. * Postfix accommodates common practice where it violates the standard. * * XXX Impedance mismatch! The SMTP command tokenizer preserves quoting, * whereas the recipient restrictions checks expect unquoted (internal) * address forms. Therefore we must parse out the address, or we must * stop doing recipient restriction checks and lose the opportunity to * say "user unknown" at the SMTP port. * * XXX 2821 incompatibility and brain damage: Section 4.5.1 requires that * VRFY is implemented. RFC 821 specifies that VRFY is optional. It gets * even worse: section 3.5.3 says that a 502 (command recognized but not * implemented) reply is not fully compliant. * * Thus, an RFC 2821 compliant implementation cannot refuse to supply * information in reply to VRFY queries. That is simply bogus. The only * reply we could supply is a generic 252 reply. This causes spammers to * add tons of bogus addresses to their mailing lists (spam harvesting by * trying out large lists of potential recipient names with VRFY). */ #define SLOPPY 0 if (var_disable_vrfy_cmd) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "502 5.5.1 VRFY command is disabled"); return (-1); } /* Fix 20140707: handle missing address. */ if (var_smtputf8_enable && (state->ehlo_discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_SMTPUTF8) == 0 && argc > 1 && strcasecmp(argv[argc - 1].strval, "SMTPUTF8") == 0) { argc--; /* RFC 6531 */ smtputf8 = 1; } if (argc < 2) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Syntax: VRFY address%s", var_smtputf8_enable ? " [SMTPUTF8]" : ""); return (-1); } /* * XXX The client event count/rate control must be consistent in its use * of client address information in connect and disconnect events. For * now we exclude xclient authorized hosts from event count/rate control. */ if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0 && !xclient_allowed && anvil_clnt && var_smtpd_crcpt_limit > 0 && !namadr_list_match(hogger_list, state->name, state->addr) && anvil_clnt_rcpt(anvil_clnt, state->service, state->addr, &rate) == ANVIL_STAT_OK && rate > var_smtpd_crcpt_limit) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY; msg_warn("Recipient address rate limit exceeded: %d from %s for service %s", rate, state->namaddr, state->service); smtpd_chat_reply(state, "450 4.7.1 Error: too many recipients from %s", state->addr); return (-1); } if (state->milters != 0 && (err = milter_other_event(state->milters)) != 0 && (err[0] == '5' || err[0] == '4')) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err); return (-1); } if (argc > 2) collapse_args(argc - 1, argv + 1); if (extract_addr(state, argv + 1, REJECT_EMPTY_ADDR, SLOPPY, smtputf8) != 0) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.1.3 Bad recipient address syntax"); return (-1); } /* Fix 20140707: Check the VRFY command. */ if (smtputf8 == 0 && var_strict_smtputf8) { if (*STR(state->addr_buf) && !allascii(STR(state->addr_buf))) { mail_reset(state); smtpd_chat_reply(state, "553 5.6.7 Must declare SMTPUTF8 to send unicode address"); return (-1); } } /* Use state->addr_buf, with the unquoted result from extract_addr() */ if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0) { /* Fix 20161206: allow UTF8 in smtpd_recipient_restrictions. */ saved_flags = state->flags; if (smtputf8) state->flags |= SMTPD_FLAG_SMTPUTF8; err = smtpd_check_rcpt(state, STR(state->addr_buf)); state->flags = saved_flags; if (err != 0) { smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err); return (-1); } } /* * XXX 2821 new feature: Section 3.5.1 requires that the VRFY response is * either "full name " or "user@domain". Postfix replies * with the string that was provided by the client, whether or not it is * in fully qualified domain form and the address is in <>. * * Reply code 250 is reserved for the case where the address is verified; * reply code 252 should be used when no definitive certainty exists. */ smtpd_chat_reply(state, "252 2.0.0 %s", argv[1].strval); return (0); } /* etrn_cmd - process ETRN command */ static int etrn_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *argv) { const char *err; /* * Sanity checks. */ if (var_helo_required && state->helo_name == 0) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "503 Error: send HELO/EHLO first"); return (-1); } if (state->milters != 0 && (err = milter_other_event(state->milters)) != 0 && (err[0] == '5' || err[0] == '4')) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err); return (-1); } if (SMTPD_IN_MAIL_TRANSACTION(state)) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "503 Error: MAIL transaction in progress"); return (-1); } if (argc != 2) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "500 Syntax: ETRN domain"); return (-1); } if (argv[1].strval[0] == '@' || argv[1].strval[0] == '#') argv[1].strval++; /* * As an extension to RFC 1985 we also allow an RFC 2821 address literal * enclosed in []. * * XXX There does not appear to be an ETRN parameter to indicate that the * domain name is UTF-8. */ if (!valid_hostname(argv[1].strval, DONT_GRIPE) && !valid_mailhost_literal(argv[1].strval, DONT_GRIPE)) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 Error: invalid parameter syntax"); return (-1); } /* * XXX The implementation borrows heavily from the code that implements * UCE restrictions. These typically return 450 or 550 when a request is * rejected. RFC 1985 requires that 459 be sent when the server refuses * to perform the request. */ if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state)) { msg_warn("do not use ETRN in \"sendmail -bs\" mode"); smtpd_chat_reply(state, "458 Unable to queue messages"); return (-1); } if ((err = smtpd_check_etrn(state, argv[1].strval)) != 0) { smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err); return (-1); } switch (flush_send_site(argv[1].strval)) { case FLUSH_STAT_OK: smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250 Queuing started"); return (0); case FLUSH_STAT_DENY: msg_warn("reject: ETRN %.100s... from %s", argv[1].strval, state->namaddr); smtpd_chat_reply(state, "459 <%s>: service unavailable", argv[1].strval); return (-1); case FLUSH_STAT_BAD: msg_warn("bad ETRN %.100s... from %s", argv[1].strval, state->namaddr); smtpd_chat_reply(state, "458 Unable to queue messages"); return (-1); default: msg_warn("unable to talk to fast flush service"); smtpd_chat_reply(state, "458 Unable to queue messages"); return (-1); } } /* quit_cmd - process QUIT command */ static int quit_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int unused_argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *unused_argv) { int out_pending = vstream_bufstat(state->client, VSTREAM_BST_OUT_PEND); /* * Don't bother checking the syntax. */ smtpd_chat_reply(state, "221 2.0.0 Bye"); /* * When the "." and quit replies are pipelined, make sure they are * flushed now, to avoid repeated mail deliveries in case of a crash in * the "clean up before disconnect" code. * * XXX When this was added in Postfix 2.1 we used vstream_fflush(). As of * Postfix 2.3 we use smtp_flush() for better error reporting. */ if (out_pending > 0) smtp_flush(state->client); return (0); } /* xclient_cmd - override SMTP client attributes */ static int xclient_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *argv) { SMTPD_TOKEN *argp; char *raw_value; char *attr_value; char *attr_name; int update_namaddr = 0; int name_status; static const NAME_CODE peer_codes[] = { XCLIENT_UNAVAILABLE, SMTPD_PEER_CODE_PERM, XCLIENT_TEMPORARY, SMTPD_PEER_CODE_TEMP, 0, SMTPD_PEER_CODE_OK, }; static const NAME_CODE proto_names[] = { MAIL_PROTO_SMTP, 1, MAIL_PROTO_ESMTP, 2, 0, -1, }; int got_helo = 0; int got_proto = 0; #ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH int got_login = 0; char *saved_username; #endif /* * Sanity checks. * * XXX The XCLIENT command will override its own access control, so that * connection count/rate restrictions can be correctly simulated. */ if (SMTPD_IN_MAIL_TRANSACTION(state)) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "503 5.5.1 Error: MAIL transaction in progress"); return (-1); } if (argc < 2) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Syntax: %s attribute=value...", XCLIENT_CMD); return (-1); } if (xclient_hosts && xclient_hosts->error) cant_permit_command(state, XCLIENT_CMD); if (!xclient_allowed) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "550 5.7.0 Error: insufficient authorization"); return (-1); } #define STREQ(x,y) (strcasecmp((x), (y)) == 0) /* * Initialize. */ if (state->expand_buf == 0) state->expand_buf = vstring_alloc(100); /* * Iterate over all attribute=value elements. */ for (argp = argv + 1; argp < argv + argc; argp++) { attr_name = argp->strval; if ((raw_value = split_at(attr_name, '=')) == 0 || *raw_value == 0) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Error: attribute=value expected"); return (-1); } if (strlen(raw_value) > 255) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Error: attribute value too long"); return (-1); } /* * Backwards compatibility: Postfix prior to version 2.3 does not * xtext encode attribute values. */ attr_value = xtext_unquote(state->expand_buf, raw_value) ? STR(state->expand_buf) : raw_value; /* * For safety's sake mask non-printable characters. We'll do more * specific censoring later. */ printable(attr_value, '?'); #define UPDATE_STR(s, v) do { \ const char *_v = (v); \ if (s) myfree(s); \ (s) = (_v) ? mystrdup(_v) : 0; \ } while(0) /* * NAME=substitute SMTP client hostname (and reverse/forward name, in * case of success). Also updates the client hostname lookup status * code. */ if (STREQ(attr_name, XCLIENT_NAME)) { name_status = name_code(peer_codes, NAME_CODE_FLAG_NONE, attr_value); if (name_status != SMTPD_PEER_CODE_OK) { attr_value = CLIENT_NAME_UNKNOWN; } else { /* XXX EAI */ if (!valid_hostname(attr_value, DONT_GRIPE)) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s syntax: %s", XCLIENT_NAME, attr_value); return (-1); } } state->name_status = name_status; UPDATE_STR(state->name, attr_value); update_namaddr = 1; if (name_status == SMTPD_PEER_CODE_OK) { UPDATE_STR(state->reverse_name, attr_value); state->reverse_name_status = name_status; } } /* * REVERSE_NAME=substitute SMTP client reverse hostname. Also updates * the client reverse hostname lookup status code. */ else if (STREQ(attr_name, XCLIENT_REVERSE_NAME)) { name_status = name_code(peer_codes, NAME_CODE_FLAG_NONE, attr_value); if (name_status != SMTPD_PEER_CODE_OK) { attr_value = CLIENT_NAME_UNKNOWN; } else { /* XXX EAI */ if (!valid_hostname(attr_value, DONT_GRIPE)) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s syntax: %s", XCLIENT_REVERSE_NAME, attr_value); return (-1); } } state->reverse_name_status = name_status; UPDATE_STR(state->reverse_name, attr_value); } /* * ADDR=substitute SMTP client network address. */ else if (STREQ(attr_name, XCLIENT_ADDR)) { if (STREQ(attr_value, XCLIENT_UNAVAILABLE)) { attr_value = CLIENT_ADDR_UNKNOWN; UPDATE_STR(state->addr, attr_value); UPDATE_STR(state->rfc_addr, attr_value); } else { neuter(attr_value, NEUTER_CHARACTERS, '?'); if (normalize_mailhost_addr(attr_value, &state->rfc_addr, &state->addr, &state->addr_family) < 0) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s syntax: %s", XCLIENT_ADDR, attr_value); return (-1); } } update_namaddr = 1; } /* * PORT=substitute SMTP client port number. */ else if (STREQ(attr_name, XCLIENT_PORT)) { if (STREQ(attr_value, XCLIENT_UNAVAILABLE)) { attr_value = CLIENT_PORT_UNKNOWN; } else { if (!alldig(attr_value) || strlen(attr_value) > sizeof("65535") - 1) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s syntax: %s", XCLIENT_PORT, attr_value); return (-1); } } UPDATE_STR(state->port, attr_value); update_namaddr = 1; } /* * HELO=substitute SMTP client HELO parameter. Censor special * characters that could mess up message headers. */ else if (STREQ(attr_name, XCLIENT_HELO)) { if (STREQ(attr_value, XCLIENT_UNAVAILABLE)) { attr_value = CLIENT_HELO_UNKNOWN; } else { if (strlen(attr_value) > VALID_HOSTNAME_LEN) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s syntax: %s", XCLIENT_HELO, attr_value); return (-1); } neuter(attr_value, NEUTER_CHARACTERS, '?'); } UPDATE_STR(state->helo_name, attr_value); got_helo = 1; } /* * PROTO=SMTP protocol name. */ else if (STREQ(attr_name, XCLIENT_PROTO)) { if (name_code(proto_names, NAME_CODE_FLAG_NONE, attr_value) < 0) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s syntax: %s", XCLIENT_PROTO, attr_value); return (-1); } UPDATE_STR(state->protocol, uppercase(attr_value)); got_proto = 1; } /* * LOGIN=sasl_username. Sets the authentication method as XCLIENT. * This can be used even if SASL authentication is turned off in * main.cf. We can't make it easier than that. */ #ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH else if (STREQ(attr_name, XCLIENT_LOGIN)) { if (STREQ(attr_value, XCLIENT_UNAVAILABLE) == 0) { smtpd_sasl_auth_extern(state, attr_value, XCLIENT_CMD); got_login = 1; } } #endif /* * DESTADDR=substitute SMTP server network address. */ else if (STREQ(attr_name, XCLIENT_DESTADDR)) { if (STREQ(attr_value, XCLIENT_UNAVAILABLE)) { attr_value = SERVER_ADDR_UNKNOWN; UPDATE_STR(state->dest_addr, attr_value); } else { #define NO_NORM_RFC_ADDR ((char **) 0) #define NO_NORM_ADDR_FAMILY ((int *) 0) neuter(attr_value, NEUTER_CHARACTERS, '?'); if (normalize_mailhost_addr(attr_value, NO_NORM_RFC_ADDR, &state->dest_addr, NO_NORM_ADDR_FAMILY) < 0) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s syntax: %s", XCLIENT_DESTADDR, attr_value); return (-1); } } /* XXX Require same address family as client address. */ } /* * DESTPORT=substitute SMTP server port number. */ else if (STREQ(attr_name, XCLIENT_DESTPORT)) { if (STREQ(attr_value, XCLIENT_UNAVAILABLE)) { attr_value = SERVER_PORT_UNKNOWN; } else { if (!alldig(attr_value) || strlen(attr_value) > sizeof("65535") - 1) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s syntax: %s", XCLIENT_DESTPORT, attr_value); return (-1); } } UPDATE_STR(state->dest_port, attr_value); } /* * Unknown attribute name. Complain. */ else { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s attribute name: %s", XCLIENT_CMD, attr_name); return (-1); } } /* * Update the combined name and address when either has changed. */ if (update_namaddr) { if (state->namaddr) myfree(state->namaddr); state->namaddr = SMTPD_BUILD_NAMADDRPORT(state->name, state->addr, state->port); } /* * XXX Compatibility: when the client issues XCLIENT then we have to go * back to initial server greeting stage, otherwise we can't correctly * simulate smtpd_client_restrictions (with smtpd_delay_reject=0) and * Milter connect restrictions. * * XXX Compatibility: for accurate simulation we must also reset the HELO * information. We keep the information if it was specified in the * XCLIENT command. * * XXX The client connection count/rate control must be consistent in its * use of client address information in connect and disconnect events. We * re-evaluate xclient so that we correctly simulate connection * concurrency and connection rate restrictions. * * XXX Duplicated from smtpd_proto(). */ xclient_allowed = namadr_list_match(xclient_hosts, state->name, state->addr); smtp_detect_bare_lf = (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE((state)) == 0 && bare_lf_mask && !namadr_list_match(bare_lf_excl, state->name, state->addr)) ? bare_lf_mask : 0; /* NOT: tls_reset() */ if (got_helo == 0) helo_reset(state); if (got_proto == 0 && strcasecmp(state->protocol, MAIL_PROTO_SMTP) != 0) { myfree(state->protocol); state->protocol = mystrdup(MAIL_PROTO_SMTP); } #ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH /* XXX What if they send the parameters via multiple commands? */ if (got_login == 0) smtpd_sasl_auth_reset(state); if (smtpd_sasl_is_active(state)) { if (got_login) saved_username = mystrdup(state->sasl_username); smtpd_sasl_deactivate(state); #ifdef USE_TLS if (state->tls_context != 0) /* TLS from XCLIENT proxy? */ smtpd_sasl_activate(state, VAR_SMTPD_SASL_TLS_OPTS, var_smtpd_sasl_tls_opts); else #endif smtpd_sasl_activate(state, VAR_SMTPD_SASL_OPTS, var_smtpd_sasl_opts); if (got_login) { smtpd_sasl_auth_extern(state, saved_username, XCLIENT_CMD); myfree(saved_username); } } #endif chat_reset(state, 0); mail_reset(state); rcpt_reset(state); if (state->milters) milter_disc_event(state->milters); /* Following duplicates the top-level connect/disconnect handler. */ teardown_milters(state); setup_milters(state); vstream_longjmp(state->client, SMTP_ERR_NONE); return (0); } /* xforward_cmd - forward logging attributes */ static int xforward_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *argv) { SMTPD_TOKEN *argp; char *raw_value; char *attr_value; char *attr_name; int updated = 0; static const NAME_CODE xforward_flags[] = { XFORWARD_NAME, SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_NAME, XFORWARD_ADDR, SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_ADDR, XFORWARD_PORT, SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_PORT, XFORWARD_PROTO, SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_PROTO, XFORWARD_HELO, SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_HELO, XFORWARD_IDENT, SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_IDENT, XFORWARD_DOMAIN, SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_DOMAIN, 0, 0, }; static const char *context_name[] = { MAIL_ATTR_RWR_LOCAL, /* Postfix internal form */ MAIL_ATTR_RWR_REMOTE, /* Postfix internal form */ }; static const NAME_CODE xforward_to_context[] = { XFORWARD_DOM_LOCAL, 0, /* XFORWARD representation */ XFORWARD_DOM_REMOTE, 1, /* XFORWARD representation */ 0, -1, }; int flag; int context_code; /* * Sanity checks. */ if (SMTPD_IN_MAIL_TRANSACTION(state)) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "503 5.5.1 Error: MAIL transaction in progress"); return (-1); } if (argc < 2) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Syntax: %s attribute=value...", XFORWARD_CMD); return (-1); } if (xforward_hosts && xforward_hosts->error) cant_permit_command(state, XFORWARD_CMD); if (!xforward_allowed) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "550 5.7.0 Error: insufficient authorization"); return (-1); } /* * Initialize. */ if (state->xforward.flags == 0) smtpd_xforward_preset(state); if (state->expand_buf == 0) state->expand_buf = vstring_alloc(100); /* * Iterate over all attribute=value elements. */ for (argp = argv + 1; argp < argv + argc; argp++) { attr_name = argp->strval; if ((raw_value = split_at(attr_name, '=')) == 0 || *raw_value == 0) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Error: attribute=value expected"); return (-1); } if (strlen(raw_value) > 255) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Error: attribute value too long"); return (-1); } /* * Backwards compatibility: Postfix prior to version 2.3 does not * xtext encode attribute values. */ attr_value = xtext_unquote(state->expand_buf, raw_value) ? STR(state->expand_buf) : raw_value; /* * For safety's sake mask non-printable characters. We'll do more * specific censoring later. */ printable(attr_value, '?'); flag = name_code(xforward_flags, NAME_CODE_FLAG_NONE, attr_name); switch (flag) { /* * NAME=up-stream host name, not necessarily in the DNS. Censor * special characters that could mess up message headers. */ case SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_NAME: if (STREQ(attr_value, XFORWARD_UNAVAILABLE)) { attr_value = CLIENT_NAME_UNKNOWN; } else { /* XXX EAI */ neuter(attr_value, NEUTER_CHARACTERS, '?'); if (!valid_hostname(attr_value, DONT_GRIPE)) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s syntax: %s", XFORWARD_NAME, attr_value); return (-1); } } UPDATE_STR(state->xforward.name, attr_value); break; /* * ADDR=up-stream host network address, not necessarily on the * Internet. Censor special characters that could mess up message * headers. */ case SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_ADDR: if (STREQ(attr_value, XFORWARD_UNAVAILABLE)) { attr_value = CLIENT_ADDR_UNKNOWN; UPDATE_STR(state->xforward.addr, attr_value); } else { neuter(attr_value, NEUTER_CHARACTERS, '?'); if (normalize_mailhost_addr(attr_value, &state->xforward.rfc_addr, &state->xforward.addr, NO_NORM_ADDR_FAMILY) < 0) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s syntax: %s", XFORWARD_ADDR, attr_value); return (-1); } } break; /* * PORT=up-stream port number. */ case SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_PORT: if (STREQ(attr_value, XFORWARD_UNAVAILABLE)) { attr_value = CLIENT_PORT_UNKNOWN; } else { if (!alldig(attr_value) || strlen(attr_value) > sizeof("65535") - 1) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s syntax: %s", XFORWARD_PORT, attr_value); return (-1); } } UPDATE_STR(state->xforward.port, attr_value); break; /* * HELO=hostname that the up-stream MTA introduced itself with * (not necessarily SMTP HELO). Censor special characters that * could mess up message headers. */ case SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_HELO: if (STREQ(attr_value, XFORWARD_UNAVAILABLE)) { attr_value = CLIENT_HELO_UNKNOWN; } else { neuter(attr_value, NEUTER_CHARACTERS, '?'); } UPDATE_STR(state->xforward.helo_name, attr_value); break; /* * PROTO=up-stream protocol, not necessarily SMTP or ESMTP. * Censor special characters that could mess up message headers. */ case SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_PROTO: if (STREQ(attr_value, XFORWARD_UNAVAILABLE)) { attr_value = CLIENT_PROTO_UNKNOWN; } else { if (strlen(attr_value) > 64) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s syntax: %s", XFORWARD_PROTO, attr_value); return (-1); } neuter(attr_value, NEUTER_CHARACTERS, '?'); } UPDATE_STR(state->xforward.protocol, attr_value); break; /* * IDENT=local message identifier on the up-stream MTA. Censor * special characters that could mess up logging or macro * expansions. */ case SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_IDENT: if (STREQ(attr_value, XFORWARD_UNAVAILABLE)) { attr_value = CLIENT_IDENT_UNKNOWN; } else { neuter(attr_value, NEUTER_CHARACTERS, '?'); } UPDATE_STR(state->xforward.ident, attr_value); break; /* * DOMAIN=local or remote. */ case SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_DOMAIN: if (STREQ(attr_value, XFORWARD_UNAVAILABLE)) attr_value = XFORWARD_DOM_LOCAL; if ((context_code = name_code(xforward_to_context, NAME_CODE_FLAG_NONE, attr_value)) < 0) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s syntax: %s", XFORWARD_DOMAIN, attr_value); return (-1); } UPDATE_STR(state->xforward.domain, context_name[context_code]); break; /* * Unknown attribute name. Complain. */ default: state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Bad %s attribute name: %s", XFORWARD_CMD, attr_name); return (-1); } updated |= flag; } state->xforward.flags |= updated; /* * Update the combined name and address when either has changed. Use only * the name when no address is available. */ if (updated & (SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_NAME | SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_ADDR | SMTPD_STATE_XFORWARD_PORT)) { if (state->xforward.namaddr) myfree(state->xforward.namaddr); state->xforward.namaddr = IS_AVAIL_CLIENT_ADDR(state->xforward.addr) ? SMTPD_BUILD_NAMADDRPORT(state->xforward.name, state->xforward.addr, state->xforward.port) : mystrdup(state->xforward.name); } smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250 2.0.0 Ok"); return (0); } /* chat_reset - notify postmaster and reset conversation log */ static void chat_reset(SMTPD_STATE *state, int threshold) { /* * Notify the postmaster if there were errors. This usually indicates a * client configuration problem, or that someone is trying nasty things. * Either is significant enough to bother the postmaster. XXX Can't * report problems when running in stand-alone mode: postmaster notices * require availability of the cleanup service. */ if (state->history != 0 && state->history->argc > threshold) { if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0 && (state->error_mask & state->notify_mask)) smtpd_chat_notify(state); state->error_mask = 0; smtpd_chat_reset(state); } } #ifdef USE_TLS /* smtpd_start_tls - turn on TLS or force disconnect */ static void smtpd_start_tls(SMTPD_STATE *state) { int rate; int cert_present; int requirecert; #ifdef USE_TLSPROXY /* * This is non-production code, for tlsproxy(8) load testing only. It * implements enough to enable some Postfix features that depend on TLS * encryption. * * To insert tlsproxy(8) between this process and the SMTP client, we swap * the file descriptors between the state->tlsproxy and state->client * VSTREAMS, so that we don't lose all the user-configurable * state->client attributes (such as longjump buffers or timeouts). * * As we implement tlsproxy support in the Postfix SMTP client we should * develop a usable abstraction that encapsulates this stream plumbing in * a library module. */ vstream_control(state->tlsproxy, CA_VSTREAM_CTL_DOUBLE, CA_VSTREAM_CTL_END); vstream_control(state->client, CA_VSTREAM_CTL_SWAP_FD(state->tlsproxy), CA_VSTREAM_CTL_END); (void) vstream_fclose(state->tlsproxy); /* direct-to-client stream! */ state->tlsproxy = 0; /* * After plumbing the plaintext stream, receive the TLS context object. * For this we must use the same VSTREAM buffer that we also use to * receive subsequent SMTP commands. The attribute protocol is robust * enough that an adversary cannot inject their own bogus TLS context * attributes into the stream. */ state->tls_context = tls_proxy_context_receive(state->client); /* * XXX Maybe it is better to send this information to tlsproxy(8) when * requesting service, effectively making a remote tls_server_start() * call. */ requirecert = (var_smtpd_tls_req_ccert && var_smtpd_enforce_tls); #else /* USE_TLSPROXY */ TLS_SERVER_START_PROPS props; static char *cipher_grade; static VSTRING *cipher_exclusions; /* * Wrapper mode uses a dedicated port and always requires TLS. * * XXX In non-wrapper mode, it is possible to require client certificate * verification without requiring TLS. Since certificates can be verified * only while TLS is turned on, this means that Postfix will happily * perform SMTP transactions when the client does not use the STARTTLS * command. For this reason, Postfix does not require client certificate * verification unless TLS is required. * * The cipher grade and exclusions don't change between sessions. Compute * just once and cache. */ #define ADD_EXCLUDE(vstr, str) \ do { \ if (*(str)) \ vstring_sprintf_append((vstr), "%s%s", \ VSTRING_LEN(vstr) ? " " : "", (str)); \ } while (0) if (cipher_grade == 0) { cipher_grade = var_smtpd_enforce_tls ? var_smtpd_tls_mand_ciph : var_smtpd_tls_ciph; cipher_exclusions = vstring_alloc(10); ADD_EXCLUDE(cipher_exclusions, var_smtpd_tls_excl_ciph); if (var_smtpd_enforce_tls) ADD_EXCLUDE(cipher_exclusions, var_smtpd_tls_mand_excl); if (ask_client_cert) ADD_EXCLUDE(cipher_exclusions, "aNULL"); } /* * Perform the TLS handshake now. Check the client certificate * requirements later, if necessary. */ requirecert = (var_smtpd_tls_req_ccert && var_smtpd_enforce_tls); state->tls_context = TLS_SERVER_START(&props, ctx = smtpd_tls_ctx, stream = state->client, fd = -1, timeout = var_smtpd_starttls_tmout, requirecert = requirecert, serverid = state->service, namaddr = state->namaddr, cipher_grade = cipher_grade, cipher_exclusions = STR(cipher_exclusions), mdalg = var_smtpd_tls_fpt_dgst); #endif /* USE_TLSPROXY */ /* * For new (i.e. not re-used) TLS sessions, increment the client's new * TLS session rate counter. We enforce the limit here only for human * factors reasons (reduce the WTF factor), even though it is too late to * save the CPU that was already burnt on PKI ops. The real safety * mechanism applies with future STARTTLS commands (or wrappermode * connections), prior to the SSL handshake. * * XXX The client event count/rate control must be consistent in its use of * client address information in connect and disconnect events. For now * we exclude xclient authorized hosts from event count/rate control. */ if (var_smtpd_cntls_limit > 0 && (state->tls_context == 0 || state->tls_context->session_reused == 0) && SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0 && !xclient_allowed && anvil_clnt && !namadr_list_match(hogger_list, state->name, state->addr) && anvil_clnt_newtls(anvil_clnt, state->service, state->addr, &rate) == ANVIL_STAT_OK && rate > var_smtpd_cntls_limit) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY; msg_warn("New TLS session rate limit exceeded: %d from %s for service %s", rate, state->namaddr, state->service); if (state->tls_context) smtpd_chat_reply(state, "421 4.7.0 %s Error: too many new TLS sessions from %s", var_myhostname, state->namaddr); /* XXX Use regular return to signal end of session. */ vstream_longjmp(state->client, SMTP_ERR_QUIET); } /* * When the TLS handshake fails, the conversation is in an unknown state. * There is nothing we can do except to disconnect from the client. */ if (state->tls_context == 0) vstream_longjmp(state->client, SMTP_ERR_EOF); /* * If we are requiring verified client certs, enforce the constraint * here. We have a usable TLS session with the client, so no need to * disable I/O, ... we can even be polite and send "421 ...". */ if (requirecert && TLS_CERT_IS_TRUSTED(state->tls_context) == 0) { /* * In non-wrappermode, fetch the next command (should be EHLO). Reply * with 421, then disconnect (as a side-effect of replying with 421). */ cert_present = TLS_CERT_IS_PRESENT(state->tls_context); msg_info("NOQUEUE: abort: TLS from %s: %s", state->namaddr, cert_present ? "Client certificate not trusted" : "No client certificate presented"); if (var_smtpd_tls_wrappermode == 0) smtpd_chat_query(state); smtpd_chat_reply(state, "421 4.7.1 %s Error: %s", var_myhostname, cert_present ? "Client certificate not trusted" : "No client certificate presented"); state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY; return; } /* * When TLS is turned on, we may offer AUTH methods that would not be * offered within a plain-text session. * * XXX Always refresh SASL the mechanism list after STARTTLS. Dovecot * responses may depend on whether the SMTP connection is encrypted. */ #ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH if (var_smtpd_sasl_enable) { /* Non-wrappermode, presumably. */ if (smtpd_sasl_is_active(state)) { smtpd_sasl_auth_reset(state); smtpd_sasl_deactivate(state); } /* Wrappermode and non-wrappermode. */ if (smtpd_sasl_is_active(state) == 0) smtpd_sasl_activate(state, VAR_SMTPD_SASL_TLS_OPTS, var_smtpd_sasl_tls_opts); } #endif } /* starttls_cmd - respond to STARTTLS */ static int starttls_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *unused_argv) { const char *err; int rate; if (argc != 1) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 5.5.4 Syntax: STARTTLS"); return (-1); } if (state->milters != 0 && (err = milter_other_event(state->milters)) != 0) { if (err[0] == '5') { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err); return (-1); } /* Sendmail compatibility: map 4xx into 454. */ else if (err[0] == '4') { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "454 4.3.0 Try again later"); return (-1); } } if (state->tls_context != 0) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "554 5.5.1 Error: TLS already active"); return (-1); } if (var_smtpd_use_tls == 0 || (state->ehlo_discard_mask & EHLO_MASK_STARTTLS)) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "502 5.5.1 Error: command not implemented"); return (-1); } #ifdef USE_TLSPROXY /* * Note: state->tlsproxy is left open when smtp_flush() calls longjmp(), * so we garbage-collect the VSTREAM in smtpd_state_reset(). */ #define PROXY_OPEN_FLAGS \ (TLS_PROXY_FLAG_ROLE_SERVER | TLS_PROXY_FLAG_SEND_CONTEXT) state->tlsproxy = tls_proxy_legacy_open(var_tlsproxy_service, PROXY_OPEN_FLAGS, state->client, state->addr, state->port, var_smtpd_tmout, state->service); if (state->tlsproxy == 0) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_SOFTWARE; /* RFC 3207 Section 4. */ smtpd_chat_reply(state, "454 4.7.0 TLS not available due to local problem"); return (-1); } #else /* USE_TLSPROXY */ if (smtpd_tls_ctx == 0) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_SOFTWARE; /* RFC 3207 Section 4. */ smtpd_chat_reply(state, "454 4.7.0 TLS not available due to local problem"); return (-1); } #endif /* USE_TLSPROXY */ /* * Enforce TLS handshake rate limit when this client negotiated too many * new TLS sessions in the recent past. * * XXX The client event count/rate control must be consistent in its use of * client address information in connect and disconnect events. For now * we exclude xclient authorized hosts from event count/rate control. */ if (var_smtpd_cntls_limit > 0 && SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0 && !xclient_allowed && anvil_clnt && !namadr_list_match(hogger_list, state->name, state->addr) && anvil_clnt_newtls_stat(anvil_clnt, state->service, state->addr, &rate) == ANVIL_STAT_OK && rate > var_smtpd_cntls_limit) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY; msg_warn("Refusing STARTTLS request from %s for service %s", state->namaddr, state->service); smtpd_chat_reply(state, "454 4.7.0 Error: too many new TLS sessions from %s", state->namaddr); #ifdef USE_TLSPROXY (void) vstream_fclose(state->tlsproxy); state->tlsproxy = 0; #endif return (-1); } smtpd_chat_reply(state, "220 2.0.0 Ready to start TLS"); /* Flush before we switch read/write routines or file descriptors. */ smtp_flush(state->client); /* At this point there must not be any pending plaintext. */ vstream_fpurge(state->client, VSTREAM_PURGE_BOTH); /* * Reset all inputs to the initial state. * * XXX RFC 2487 does not forbid the use of STARTTLS while mail transfer is * in progress, so we have to allow it even when it makes no sense. */ helo_reset(state); mail_reset(state); rcpt_reset(state); /* * Turn on TLS, using code that is shared with TLS wrapper mode. This * code does not return when the handshake fails. */ smtpd_start_tls(state); return (0); } /* tls_reset - undo STARTTLS */ static void tls_reset(SMTPD_STATE *state) { int failure = 0; /* * Don't waste time when we lost contact. */ if (state->tls_context) { if (vstream_feof(state->client) || vstream_ferror(state->client)) failure = 1; vstream_fflush(state->client); /* NOT: smtp_flush() */ #ifdef USE_TLSPROXY tls_proxy_context_free(state->tls_context); #else tls_server_stop(smtpd_tls_ctx, state->client, var_smtpd_starttls_tmout, failure, state->tls_context); #endif state->tls_context = 0; } } #endif #if !defined(USE_TLS) || !defined(USE_SASL_AUTH) /* unimpl_cmd - dummy for functionality that is not compiled in */ static int unimpl_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *unused_argv) { /* * When a connection is closed we want to log the request counts for * unimplemented STARTTLS or AUTH commands separately, instead of logging * those commands as "unknown". By handling unimplemented commands with * this dummy function, we avoid messing up the command processing loop. */ state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "502 5.5.1 Error: command not implemented"); return (-1); } #endif /* * The table of all SMTP commands that we know. Set the junk limit flag on * any command that can be repeated an arbitrary number of times without * triggering a tarpit delay of some sort. */ typedef struct SMTPD_CMD { char *name; int (*action) (SMTPD_STATE *, int, SMTPD_TOKEN *); int flags; int success_count; int total_count; } SMTPD_CMD; /* * Per RFC 2920: "In particular, the commands RSET, MAIL FROM, SEND FROM, * SOML FROM, SAML FROM, and RCPT TO can all appear anywhere in a pipelined * command group. The EHLO, DATA, VRFY, EXPN, TURN, QUIT, and NOOP commands * can only appear as the last command in a group". RFC 3030 allows BDAT * commands to be pipelined as well. */ #define SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LIMIT (1<<0) /* limit usage */ #define SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_PRE_TLS (1<<1) /* allow before STARTTLS */ #define SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LAST (1<<2) /* last in PIPELINING command group */ static SMTPD_CMD smtpd_cmd_table[] = { {SMTPD_CMD_HELO, helo_cmd, SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LIMIT | SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_PRE_TLS | SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LAST,}, {SMTPD_CMD_EHLO, ehlo_cmd, SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LIMIT | SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_PRE_TLS | SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LAST,}, {SMTPD_CMD_XCLIENT, xclient_cmd, SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_PRE_TLS}, {SMTPD_CMD_XFORWARD, xforward_cmd,}, #ifdef USE_TLS {SMTPD_CMD_STARTTLS, starttls_cmd, SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_PRE_TLS,}, #else {SMTPD_CMD_STARTTLS, unimpl_cmd, SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_PRE_TLS,}, #endif #ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH {SMTPD_CMD_AUTH, smtpd_sasl_auth_cmd_wrapper,}, #else {SMTPD_CMD_AUTH, unimpl_cmd,}, #endif {SMTPD_CMD_MAIL, mail_cmd,}, {SMTPD_CMD_RCPT, rcpt_cmd,}, {SMTPD_CMD_DATA, data_cmd, SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LAST,}, {SMTPD_CMD_BDAT, bdat_cmd,}, {SMTPD_CMD_RSET, rset_cmd, SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LIMIT,}, {SMTPD_CMD_NOOP, noop_cmd, SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LIMIT | SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_PRE_TLS | SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LAST,}, {SMTPD_CMD_VRFY, vrfy_cmd, SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LIMIT | SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LAST,}, {SMTPD_CMD_ETRN, etrn_cmd, SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LIMIT,}, {SMTPD_CMD_QUIT, quit_cmd, SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_PRE_TLS,}, {0,}, }; static STRING_LIST *smtpd_noop_cmds; static STRING_LIST *smtpd_forbid_cmds; /* smtpd_flag_ill_pipelining - flag pipelining protocol violation */ static int smtpd_flag_ill_pipelining(SMTPD_STATE *state) { /* * This code will not return after I/O error, timeout, or EOF. VSTREAM * exceptions must be enabled in advance with smtp_stream_setup(). */ if (vstream_peek(state->client) == 0 && peekfd(vstream_fileno(state->client)) > 0) (void) vstream_ungetc(state->client, smtp_fgetc(state->client)); if (vstream_peek(state->client) > 0) { if (state->expand_buf == 0) state->expand_buf = vstring_alloc(100); escape(state->expand_buf, vstream_peek_data(state->client), vstream_peek(state->client) < 100 ? vstream_peek(state->client) : 100); msg_info("improper command pipelining after %s from %s: %s", state->where, state->namaddr, STR(state->expand_buf)); state->flags |= SMTPD_FLAG_ILL_PIPELINING; return (1); } return (0); } /* smtpd_proto - talk the SMTP protocol */ static void smtpd_proto(SMTPD_STATE *state) { int argc; SMTPD_TOKEN *argv; SMTPD_CMD *cmdp; const char *ehlo_words; const char *err; int status; const char *cp; #ifdef USE_TLS int tls_rate; #endif /* * Print a greeting banner and run the state machine. Read SMTP commands * one line at a time. According to the standard, a sender or recipient * address could contain an escaped newline. I think this is perverse, * and anyone depending on this is really asking for trouble. * * In case of mail protocol trouble, the program jumps back to this place, * so that it can perform the necessary cleanup before talking to the * next client. The setjmp/longjmp primitives are like a sharp tool: use * with care. I would certainly recommend against the use of * setjmp/longjmp in programs that change privilege levels. * * In case of file system trouble the program terminates after logging the * error and after informing the client. In all other cases (out of * memory, panic) the error is logged, and the msg_cleanup() exit handler * cleans up, but no attempt is made to inform the client of the nature * of the problem. */ smtp_stream_setup(state->client, var_smtpd_tmout, var_smtpd_rec_deadline); while ((status = vstream_setjmp(state->client)) == SMTP_ERR_NONE) /* void */ ; switch (status) { default: msg_panic("smtpd_proto: unknown error reading from %s", state->namaddr); break; case SMTP_ERR_TIME: state->reason = REASON_TIMEOUT; if (vstream_setjmp(state->client) == 0) smtpd_chat_reply(state, "421 4.4.2 %s Error: timeout exceeded", var_myhostname); break; case SMTP_ERR_EOF: state->reason = REASON_LOST_CONNECTION; break; case SMTP_ERR_QUIET: break; case SMTP_ERR_DATA: msg_info("%s: reject: %s from %s: " "421 4.3.0 %s Server local data error", (state->queue_id ? state->queue_id : "NOQUEUE"), state->where, state->namaddr, var_myhostname); state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_DATA; if (vstream_setjmp(state->client) == 0) smtpd_chat_reply(state, "421 4.3.0 %s Server local data error", var_myhostname); break; case 0: /* * Don't bother doing anything if some pre-SMTP handshake (haproxy) * did not work out. */ if (state->flags & SMTPD_FLAG_HANGUP) { smtpd_chat_reply(state, "421 4.3.0 %s Server local error", var_myhostname); break; } /* * In TLS wrapper mode, turn on TLS using code that is shared with * the STARTTLS command. This code does not return when the handshake * fails. * * Enforce TLS handshake rate limit when this client negotiated too many * new TLS sessions in the recent past. * * XXX This means we don't complete a TLS handshake just to tell the * client that we don't provide service. TLS wrapper mode is * obsolete, so we don't have to provide perfect support. */ #ifdef USE_TLS if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0 && var_smtpd_tls_wrappermode && state->tls_context == 0) { #ifdef USE_TLSPROXY /* We garbage-collect the VSTREAM in smtpd_state_reset() */ state->tlsproxy = tls_proxy_legacy_open(var_tlsproxy_service, PROXY_OPEN_FLAGS, state->client, state->addr, state->port, var_smtpd_tmout, state->service); if (state->tlsproxy == 0) { msg_warn("Wrapper-mode request dropped from %s for service %s." " TLS context initialization failed. For details see" " earlier warnings in your logs.", state->namaddr, state->service); break; } #else /* USE_TLSPROXY */ if (smtpd_tls_ctx == 0) { msg_warn("Wrapper-mode request dropped from %s for service %s." " TLS context initialization failed. For details see" " earlier warnings in your logs.", state->namaddr, state->service); break; } #endif /* USE_TLSPROXY */ if (var_smtpd_cntls_limit > 0 && !xclient_allowed && anvil_clnt && !namadr_list_match(hogger_list, state->name, state->addr) && anvil_clnt_newtls_stat(anvil_clnt, state->service, state->addr, &tls_rate) == ANVIL_STAT_OK && tls_rate > var_smtpd_cntls_limit) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY; msg_warn("Refusing TLS service request from %s for service %s", state->namaddr, state->service); break; } smtpd_start_tls(state); } #endif /* * If the client spoke before the server sends the initial greeting, * raise a flag and log the content of the protocol violation. This * check MUST NOT apply to TLS wrappermode connections. */ if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0 && vstream_context(state->client) == 0 /* not postscreen */ && (state->flags & SMTPD_FLAG_ILL_PIPELINING) == 0 && smtpd_flag_ill_pipelining(state) && var_smtpd_forbid_unauth_pipe) { smtpd_chat_reply(state, "554 5.5.0 Error: SMTP protocol synchronization"); break; } /* * XXX The client connection count/rate control must be consistent in * its use of client address information in connect and disconnect * events. For now we exclude xclient authorized hosts from * connection count/rate control. * * XXX Must send connect/disconnect events to the anvil server even when * this service is not connection count or rate limited, otherwise it * will discard client message or recipient rate information too * early or too late. */ if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0 && !xclient_allowed && anvil_clnt && !namadr_list_match(hogger_list, state->name, state->addr) && anvil_clnt_connect(anvil_clnt, state->service, state->addr, &state->conn_count, &state->conn_rate) == ANVIL_STAT_OK) { if (var_smtpd_cconn_limit > 0 && state->conn_count > var_smtpd_cconn_limit) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY; msg_warn("Connection concurrency limit exceeded: %d from %s for service %s", state->conn_count, state->namaddr, state->service); smtpd_chat_reply(state, "421 4.7.0 %s Error: too many connections from %s", var_myhostname, state->addr); break; } if (var_smtpd_crate_limit > 0 && state->conn_rate > var_smtpd_crate_limit) { msg_warn("Connection rate limit exceeded: %d from %s for service %s", state->conn_rate, state->namaddr, state->service); smtpd_chat_reply(state, "421 4.7.0 %s Error: too many connections from %s", var_myhostname, state->addr); break; } } /* * Determine what server ESMTP features to suppress, typically to * avoid inter-operability problems. Moved up so we don't send 421 * immediately after sending the initial server response. */ if (ehlo_discard_maps == 0 || (ehlo_words = maps_find(ehlo_discard_maps, state->addr, 0)) == 0) ehlo_words = var_smtpd_ehlo_dis_words; state->ehlo_discard_mask = ehlo_mask(ehlo_words); /* XXX We use the real client for connect access control. */ if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0 && var_smtpd_delay_reject == 0 && (err = smtpd_check_client(state)) != 0) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY; state->access_denied = mystrdup(err); smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", state->access_denied); state->error_count++; } /* * RFC 2034: the text part of all 2xx, 4xx, and 5xx SMTP responses * other than the initial greeting and any response to HELO or EHLO * are prefaced with a status code as defined in RFC 3463. */ /* * XXX If a Milter rejects CONNECT, reply with 220 except in case of * hard reject or 421 (disconnect). The reply persists so it will * apply to MAIL FROM and to other commands such as AUTH, STARTTLS, * and VRFY. Note: after a Milter CONNECT reject, we must not reject * HELO or EHLO, but we do change the feature list that is announced * in the EHLO response. */ else { err = 0; if (state->milters != 0) { milter_macro_callback(state->milters, smtpd_milter_eval, (void *) state); if ((err = milter_conn_event(state->milters, state->name, state->addr, strcmp(state->port, CLIENT_PORT_UNKNOWN) ? state->port : "0", state->addr_family)) != 0) err = check_milter_reply(state, err); } if (err && err[0] == '5') { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "554 %s ESMTP not accepting connections", var_myhostname); state->error_count++; } else if (err && strncmp(err, "421", 3) == 0) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_POLICY; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "421 %s Service unavailable - try again later", var_myhostname); /* Not: state->error_count++; */ } else { smtpd_chat_reply(state, "220 %s", var_smtpd_banner); } } /* * SASL initialization for plaintext mode. * * XXX Backwards compatibility: allow AUTH commands when the AUTH * announcement is suppressed via smtpd_sasl_exceptions_networks. * * XXX Safety: don't enable SASL with "smtpd_tls_auth_only = yes" and * non-TLS build. */ #ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH if (var_smtpd_sasl_enable && smtpd_sasl_is_active(state) == 0 #ifdef USE_TLS && state->tls_context == 0 && !var_smtpd_tls_auth_only #else && var_smtpd_tls_auth_only == 0 #endif ) smtpd_sasl_activate(state, VAR_SMTPD_SASL_OPTS, var_smtpd_sasl_opts); #endif /* * The command read/execute loop. */ for (;;) { if (state->flags & SMTPD_FLAG_HANGUP) break; if (state->error_count >= var_smtpd_hard_erlim) { state->reason = REASON_ERROR_LIMIT; state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "421 4.7.0 %s Error: too many errors", var_myhostname); break; } watchdog_pat(); smtpd_chat_query(state); if (IS_BARE_LF_REPLY_REJECT(smtp_got_bare_lf)) { log_whatsup(state, "reject", "bare received"); state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%d 5.5.2 %s Error: bare received", var_smtpd_forbid_bare_lf_code, var_myhostname); break; } /* Safety: protect internal interfaces against malformed UTF-8. */ if (var_smtputf8_enable && valid_utf8_string(STR(state->buffer), LEN(state->buffer)) == 0) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "500 5.5.2 Error: bad UTF-8 syntax"); state->error_count++; continue; } /* Move into smtpd_chat_query() and update session transcript. */ if (smtpd_cmd_filter != 0) { for (cp = STR(state->buffer); *cp && IS_SPACE_TAB(*cp); cp++) /* void */ ; if ((cp = dict_get(smtpd_cmd_filter, cp)) != 0) { msg_info("%s: replacing command \"%.100s\" with \"%.100s\"", state->namaddr, STR(state->buffer), cp); vstring_strcpy(state->buffer, cp); } else if (smtpd_cmd_filter->error != 0) { msg_warn("%s:%s lookup error for \"%.100s\"", smtpd_cmd_filter->type, smtpd_cmd_filter->name, printable(STR(state->buffer), '?')); vstream_longjmp(state->client, SMTP_ERR_DATA); } } if ((argc = smtpd_token(vstring_str(state->buffer), &argv)) == 0) { state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; smtpd_chat_reply(state, "500 5.5.2 Error: bad syntax"); state->error_count++; continue; } /* Ignore smtpd_noop_cmds lookup errors. Non-critical feature. */ if (*var_smtpd_noop_cmds && string_list_match(smtpd_noop_cmds, argv[0].strval)) { smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250 2.0.0 Ok"); if (state->junk_cmds++ > var_smtpd_junk_cmd_limit) state->error_count++; continue; } for (cmdp = smtpd_cmd_table; cmdp->name != 0; cmdp++) if (strcasecmp(argv[0].strval, cmdp->name) == 0) break; cmdp->total_count += 1; /* Ignore smtpd_forbid_cmds lookup errors. Non-critical feature. */ if (cmdp->name == 0) { state->where = SMTPD_CMD_UNKNOWN; if (is_header(argv[0].strval) || (*var_smtpd_forbid_cmds && string_list_match(smtpd_forbid_cmds, argv[0].strval))) { msg_warn("non-SMTP command from %s: %.100s", state->namaddr, vstring_str(state->buffer)); smtpd_chat_reply(state, "221 2.7.0 Error: I can break rules, too. Goodbye."); break; } } /* XXX We use the real client for connect access control. */ if (state->access_denied && cmdp->action != quit_cmd) { /* XXX Exception for Milter override. */ if (strncmp(state->access_denied + 1, "21", 2) == 0) { smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", state->access_denied); continue; } smtpd_chat_reply(state, "503 5.7.0 Error: access denied for %s", state->namaddr); /* RFC 2821 Sec 3.1 */ state->error_count++; continue; } /* state->access_denied == 0 || cmdp->action == quit_cmd */ if (cmdp->name == 0) { if (state->milters != 0 && (err = milter_unknown_event(state->milters, argv[0].strval)) != 0 && (err = check_milter_reply(state, err)) != 0) { smtpd_chat_reply(state, "%s", err); } else smtpd_chat_reply(state, "502 5.5.2 Error: command not recognized"); state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL; state->error_count++; continue; } #ifdef USE_TLS if (var_smtpd_enforce_tls && !state->tls_context && (cmdp->flags & SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_PRE_TLS) == 0) { smtpd_chat_reply(state, "530 5.7.0 Must issue a STARTTLS command first"); state->error_count++; continue; } #endif state->where = cmdp->name; if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0 && (strcasecmp(state->protocol, MAIL_PROTO_ESMTP) != 0 || (cmdp->flags & SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LAST)) && (state->flags & SMTPD_FLAG_ILL_PIPELINING) == 0 && smtpd_flag_ill_pipelining(state) && var_smtpd_forbid_unauth_pipe) { smtpd_chat_reply(state, "554 5.5.0 Error: SMTP protocol synchronization"); break; } if (cmdp->action(state, argc, argv) != 0) state->error_count++; else cmdp->success_count += 1; if ((cmdp->flags & SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LIMIT) && state->junk_cmds++ > var_smtpd_junk_cmd_limit) state->error_count++; if (cmdp->action == quit_cmd) break; } break; } /* * XXX The client connection count/rate control must be consistent in its * use of client address information in connect and disconnect events. * For now we exclude xclient authorized hosts from connection count/rate * control. * * XXX Must send connect/disconnect events to the anvil server even when * this service is not connection count or rate limited, otherwise it * will discard client message or recipient rate information too early or * too late. */ if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0 && !xclient_allowed && anvil_clnt && !namadr_list_match(hogger_list, state->name, state->addr)) anvil_clnt_disconnect(anvil_clnt, state->service, state->addr); /* * Log abnormal session termination, in case postmaster notification has * been turned off. In the log, indicate the last recognized state before * things went wrong. Don't complain about clients that go away without * sending QUIT. Log the byte count after DATA to help diagnose MTU * troubles. */ if (state->reason && state->where) { if (strcmp(state->where, SMTPD_AFTER_DATA) == 0) { msg_info("%s after %s (%lu bytes) from %s", /* 2.5 compat */ state->reason, SMTPD_CMD_DATA, /* 2.5 compat */ (long) (state->act_size + vstream_peek(state->client)), state->namaddr); } else if (strcmp(state->where, SMTPD_AFTER_BDAT) == 0) { msg_info("%s after %s (%lu bytes) from %s", state->reason, SMTPD_CMD_BDAT, (long) (state->act_size + VSTRING_LEN(state->buffer) + VSTRING_LEN(state->bdat_get_buffer)), state->namaddr); } else if (strcmp(state->where, SMTPD_AFTER_EOM) || strcmp(state->reason, REASON_LOST_CONNECTION)) { msg_info("%s after %s from %s", state->reason, state->where, state->namaddr); } } /* * Cleanup whatever information the client gave us during the SMTP * dialog. * * XXX Duplicated in xclient_cmd(). */ #ifdef USE_TLS tls_reset(state); #endif helo_reset(state); #ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH smtpd_sasl_auth_reset(state); if (smtpd_sasl_is_active(state)) { smtpd_sasl_deactivate(state); } #endif chat_reset(state, 0); mail_reset(state); rcpt_reset(state); if (state->milters) milter_disc_event(state->milters); } /* smtpd_format_cmd_stats - format per-command statistics */ static char *smtpd_format_cmd_stats(VSTRING *buf) { SMTPD_CMD *cmdp; int all_success = 0; int all_total = 0; /* * Log the statistics. Note that this loop produces no output when no * command was received. We address that after the loop. */ VSTRING_RESET(buf); for (cmdp = smtpd_cmd_table; /* see below */ ; cmdp++) { if (cmdp->total_count > 0) { vstring_sprintf_append(buf, " %s=%d", cmdp->name ? cmdp->name : "unknown", cmdp->success_count); if (cmdp->success_count != cmdp->total_count) vstring_sprintf_append(buf, "/%d", cmdp->total_count); all_success += cmdp->success_count; all_total += cmdp->total_count; } if (cmdp->name == 0) break; } /* * Reset the per-command counters. * * Fix 20190621: the command counter resetting code was moved from the SMTP * protocol handler to this place, because the protocol handler was never * called after HaProxy handshake error, causing stale numbers to be * logged. */ for (cmdp = smtpd_cmd_table; /* see below */ ; cmdp++) { cmdp->success_count = cmdp->total_count = 0; if (cmdp->name == 0) break; } /* * Log total numbers, so that logfile analyzers will see something even * if the above loop produced no output. When no commands were received * log "0/0" to simplify the identification of abnormal sessions: any * statistics with [0-9]/ indicate that there was a problem. */ vstring_sprintf_append(buf, " commands=%d", all_success); if (all_success != all_total || all_total == 0) vstring_sprintf_append(buf, "/%d", all_total); return (lowercase(STR(buf))); } /* setup_milters - set up Milters after a connection is established */ static void setup_milters(SMTPD_STATE *state) { const char *milter_string; /* * Postcondition: either state->milters is set, or the * INPUT_TRANSP_MILTER flag is passed down-stream. */ if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) == 0 && (smtpd_input_transp_mask & INPUT_TRANSP_MILTER) == 0 && ((smtpd_milter_maps && (milter_string = maps_find(smtpd_milter_maps, state->addr, 0)) != 0) || *(milter_string = var_smtpd_milters) != 0) && strcasecmp(milter_string, SMTPD_MILTERS_DISABLE) != 0) { state->milters = milter_create(milter_string, var_milt_conn_time, var_milt_cmd_time, var_milt_msg_time, var_milt_protocol, var_milt_def_action, var_milt_conn_macros, var_milt_helo_macros, var_milt_mail_macros, var_milt_rcpt_macros, var_milt_data_macros, var_milt_eoh_macros, var_milt_eod_macros, var_milt_unk_macros, var_milt_macro_deflts); } /* * Safety: disable non_smtpd_milters when not sending our own mail filter * list. Otherwise the next stage could handle this message as a local * submission. */ if (state->milters == 0) smtpd_input_transp_mask |= INPUT_TRANSP_MILTER; } /* teardown_milters - release resources */ static void teardown_milters(SMTPD_STATE *state) { if (state->milters) { milter_free(state->milters); state->milters = 0; } smtpd_input_transp_mask = input_transp_mask(VAR_INPUT_TRANSP, var_input_transp); } /* smtpd_service - service one client */ static void smtpd_service(VSTREAM *stream, char *service, char **argv) { SMTPD_STATE state; /* * Sanity check. This service takes no command-line arguments. */ if (argv[0]) msg_fatal("unexpected command-line argument: %s", argv[0]); /* * For sanity, require that at least one of INET or INET6 is enabled. * Otherwise, we can't look up interface information, and we can't * convert names or addresses. */ if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE_STREAM(stream) == 0 && inet_proto_info()->ai_family_list[0] == 0) msg_fatal("all network protocols are disabled (%s = %s)", VAR_INET_PROTOCOLS, var_inet_protocols); /* * This routine runs when a client has connected to our network port, or * when the smtp server is run in stand-alone mode (input from pipe). * * Look up and sanitize the peer name, then initialize some connection- * specific state. When the name service is hosed, hostname lookup will * take a while. This is why I always run a local name server on critical * machines. */ smtpd_state_init(&state, stream, service); msg_info("connect from %s", state.namaddr); /* * Disable TLS when running in stand-alone mode via "sendmail -bs". */ if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE((&state))) { var_smtpd_use_tls = 0; var_smtpd_enforce_tls = 0; var_smtpd_tls_auth_only = 0; } /* * XCLIENT must not override its own access control. */ xclient_allowed = SMTPD_STAND_ALONE((&state)) == 0 && namadr_list_match(xclient_hosts, state.name, state.addr); /* * Overriding XFORWARD access control makes no sense, either. */ xforward_allowed = SMTPD_STAND_ALONE((&state)) == 0 && namadr_list_match(xforward_hosts, state.name, state.addr); /* * Reject or normalize bare LF, with compatibility exclusions. */ smtp_detect_bare_lf = (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE((&state)) == 0 && bare_lf_mask && !namadr_list_match(bare_lf_excl, state.name, state.addr)) ? bare_lf_mask : 0; /* * See if we need to turn on verbose logging for this client. */ debug_peer_check(state.name, state.addr); /* * Set up Milters, or disable Milters down-stream. */ setup_milters(&state); /* duplicates xclient_cmd */ /* * Provide the SMTP service. */ smtpd_proto(&state); /* * After the client has gone away, clean up whatever we have set up at * connection time. */ msg_info("disconnect from %s%s", state.namaddr, smtpd_format_cmd_stats(state.buffer)); teardown_milters(&state); /* duplicates xclient_cmd */ smtpd_state_reset(&state); debug_peer_restore(); } /* pre_accept - see if tables have changed */ static void pre_accept(char *unused_name, char **unused_argv) { const char *table; if ((table = dict_changed_name()) != 0) { msg_info("table %s has changed -- restarting", table); exit(0); } } /* pre_jail_init - pre-jail initialization */ static void pre_jail_init(char *unused_name, char **unused_argv) { /* * Initialize blacklist/etc. patterns before entering the chroot jail, in * case they specify a filename pattern. */ smtpd_noop_cmds = string_list_init(VAR_SMTPD_NOOP_CMDS, MATCH_FLAG_RETURN, var_smtpd_noop_cmds); smtpd_forbid_cmds = string_list_init(VAR_SMTPD_FORBID_CMDS, MATCH_FLAG_RETURN, var_smtpd_forbid_cmds); verp_clients = namadr_list_init(VAR_VERP_CLIENTS, MATCH_FLAG_RETURN, var_verp_clients); xclient_hosts = namadr_list_init(VAR_XCLIENT_HOSTS, MATCH_FLAG_RETURN, var_xclient_hosts); xforward_hosts = namadr_list_init(VAR_XFORWARD_HOSTS, MATCH_FLAG_RETURN, var_xforward_hosts); hogger_list = namadr_list_init(VAR_SMTPD_HOGGERS, MATCH_FLAG_RETURN | match_parent_style(VAR_SMTPD_HOGGERS), var_smtpd_hoggers); bare_lf_excl = namadr_list_init(VAR_SMTPD_FORBID_BARE_LF_EXCL, MATCH_FLAG_RETURN | match_parent_style(VAR_MYNETWORKS), var_smtpd_forbid_bare_lf_excl); if ((bare_lf_mask = name_code(bare_lf_mask_table, NAME_CODE_FLAG_NONE, var_smtpd_forbid_bare_lf)) < 0) msg_fatal("bad parameter value: '%s = %s'", VAR_SMTPD_FORBID_BARE_LF, var_smtpd_forbid_bare_lf); /* * Open maps before dropping privileges so we can read passwords etc. * * XXX We should not do this in stand-alone (sendmail -bs) mode, but we * can't use SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state) here. This means "sendmail -bs" * will try to connect to proxymap when invoked by root for mail * submission. To fix, we would have to pass stand-alone mode information * via different means. For now we have to tell people not to run mail * clients as root. */ if (getuid() == 0 || getuid() == var_owner_uid) smtpd_check_init(); smtpd_expand_init(); debug_peer_init(); if (var_smtpd_sasl_enable) #ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH smtpd_sasl_initialize(); if (*var_smtpd_sasl_exceptions_networks) sasl_exceptions_networks = namadr_list_init(VAR_SMTPD_SASL_EXCEPTIONS_NETWORKS, MATCH_FLAG_RETURN, var_smtpd_sasl_exceptions_networks); #else msg_warn("%s is true, but SASL support is not compiled in", VAR_SMTPD_SASL_ENABLE); #endif if (*var_smtpd_cmd_filter) smtpd_cmd_filter = dict_open(var_smtpd_cmd_filter, O_RDONLY, DICT_FLAG_LOCK | DICT_FLAG_FOLD_FIX); /* * XXX Temporary fix to pretend that we consistently implement TLS * security levels. We implement only a subset for now. If we implement * more levels, wrappermode should override only weaker TLS security * levels. * * Note: tls_level_lookup() logs no warning. */ if (!var_smtpd_tls_wrappermode && *var_smtpd_tls_level) { switch (tls_level_lookup(var_smtpd_tls_level)) { default: msg_fatal("Invalid TLS level \"%s\"", var_smtpd_tls_level); /* NOTREACHED */ break; case TLS_LEV_SECURE: case TLS_LEV_VERIFY: case TLS_LEV_FPRINT: msg_warn("%s: unsupported TLS level \"%s\", using \"encrypt\"", VAR_SMTPD_TLS_LEVEL, var_smtpd_tls_level); /* FALLTHROUGH */ case TLS_LEV_ENCRYPT: var_smtpd_enforce_tls = var_smtpd_use_tls = 1; break; case TLS_LEV_MAY: var_smtpd_enforce_tls = 0; var_smtpd_use_tls = 1; break; case TLS_LEV_NONE: var_smtpd_enforce_tls = var_smtpd_use_tls = 0; break; } } /* * With TLS wrapper mode, we run on a dedicated port and turn on TLS * before actually speaking the SMTP protocol. This implies TLS enforce * mode. * * With non-wrapper mode, TLS enforce mode implies that we don't advertise * AUTH before the client issues STARTTLS. */ var_smtpd_enforce_tls = var_smtpd_tls_wrappermode || var_smtpd_enforce_tls; var_smtpd_tls_auth_only = var_smtpd_tls_auth_only || var_smtpd_enforce_tls; var_smtpd_use_tls = var_smtpd_use_tls || var_smtpd_enforce_tls; /* * Keys can only be loaded when running with suitable permissions. When * called from "sendmail -bs" this is not the case, so we must not * announce STARTTLS support. */ if (getuid() == 0 || getuid() == var_owner_uid) { if (var_smtpd_use_tls) { #ifdef USE_TLS #ifndef USE_TLSPROXY TLS_SERVER_INIT_PROPS props; const char *cert_file; int have_server_cert; int no_server_cert_ok; int require_server_cert; /* * Can't use anonymous ciphers if we want client certificates. * Must use anonymous ciphers if we have no certificates. * * XXX: Ugh! Too many booleans! */ ask_client_cert = require_server_cert = (var_smtpd_tls_ask_ccert || (var_smtpd_enforce_tls && var_smtpd_tls_req_ccert)); if (strcasecmp(var_smtpd_tls_cert_file, "none") == 0) { no_server_cert_ok = 1; cert_file = ""; } else { no_server_cert_ok = 0; cert_file = var_smtpd_tls_cert_file; } have_server_cert = *cert_file != 0; have_server_cert |= *var_smtpd_tls_eccert_file != 0; have_server_cert |= *var_smtpd_tls_dcert_file != 0; if (*var_smtpd_tls_chain_files != 0) { if (!have_server_cert) have_server_cert = 1; else msg_warn("Both %s and one or more of the legacy " " %s, %s or %s are non-empty; the legacy " " parameters will be ignored", VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CHAIN_FILES, VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CERT_FILE, VAR_SMTPD_TLS_ECCERT_FILE, VAR_SMTPD_TLS_DCERT_FILE); } /* Some TLS configuration errors are not show stoppers. */ if (!have_server_cert && require_server_cert) msg_warn("Need a server cert to request client certs"); if (!var_smtpd_enforce_tls && var_smtpd_tls_req_ccert) msg_warn("Can't require client certs unless TLS is required"); /* After a show-stopper error, reply with 454 to STARTTLS. */ if (have_server_cert || (no_server_cert_ok && !require_server_cert)) { tls_pre_jail_init(TLS_ROLE_SERVER); /* * Large parameter lists are error-prone, so we emulate a * language feature that C does not have natively: named * parameter lists. */ smtpd_tls_ctx = TLS_SERVER_INIT(&props, log_param = VAR_SMTPD_TLS_LOGLEVEL, log_level = var_smtpd_tls_loglevel, verifydepth = var_smtpd_tls_ccert_vd, cache_type = TLS_MGR_SCACHE_SMTPD, set_sessid = var_smtpd_tls_set_sessid, chain_files = var_smtpd_tls_chain_files, cert_file = cert_file, key_file = var_smtpd_tls_key_file, dcert_file = var_smtpd_tls_dcert_file, dkey_file = var_smtpd_tls_dkey_file, eccert_file = var_smtpd_tls_eccert_file, eckey_file = var_smtpd_tls_eckey_file, CAfile = var_smtpd_tls_CAfile, CApath = var_smtpd_tls_CApath, dh1024_param_file = var_smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file, dh512_param_file = var_smtpd_tls_dh512_param_file, eecdh_grade = var_smtpd_tls_eecdh, protocols = var_smtpd_enforce_tls ? var_smtpd_tls_mand_proto : var_smtpd_tls_proto, ask_ccert = ask_client_cert, mdalg = var_smtpd_tls_fpt_dgst); } else { msg_warn("No server certs available. TLS won't be enabled"); } #endif /* USE_TLSPROXY */ #else msg_warn("TLS has been selected, but TLS support is not compiled in"); #endif } } /* * flush client. */ flush_init(); /* * EHLO keyword filter. */ if (*var_smtpd_ehlo_dis_maps) ehlo_discard_maps = maps_create(VAR_SMTPD_EHLO_DIS_MAPS, var_smtpd_ehlo_dis_maps, DICT_FLAG_LOCK); /* * Per-client Milter support. */ if (*var_smtpd_milter_maps) smtpd_milter_maps = maps_create(VAR_SMTPD_MILTER_MAPS, var_smtpd_milter_maps, DICT_FLAG_LOCK); /* * DNS reply filter. */ if (*var_smtpd_dns_re_filter) dns_rr_filter_compile(VAR_SMTPD_DNS_RE_FILTER, var_smtpd_dns_re_filter); /* * Reject footer. */ if (*var_smtpd_rej_ftr_maps) smtpd_chat_pre_jail_init(); } /* post_jail_init - post-jail initialization */ static void post_jail_init(char *unused_name, char **unused_argv) { /* * Initialize the receive transparency options: do we want unknown * recipient checks, address mapping, header_body_checks?. */ smtpd_input_transp_mask = input_transp_mask(VAR_INPUT_TRANSP, var_input_transp); /* * Initialize before-queue filter options: do we want speed-matching * support so that the entire message is received before we contact a * before-queue content filter? */ if (*var_smtpd_proxy_filt) smtpd_proxy_opts = smtpd_proxy_parse_opts(VAR_SMTPD_PROXY_OPTS, var_smtpd_proxy_opts); /* * Sanity checks. The queue_minfree value should be at least as large as * (process_limit * message_size_limit) but that is unpractical, so we * arbitrarily pick a small multiple of the per-message size limit. This * helps to avoid many unneeded (re)transmissions. */ if (ENFORCING_SIZE_LIMIT(var_queue_minfree) && ENFORCING_SIZE_LIMIT(var_message_limit) && var_queue_minfree / 1.5 < var_message_limit) msg_warn("%s(%lu) should be at least 1.5*%s(%lu)", VAR_QUEUE_MINFREE, (unsigned long) var_queue_minfree, VAR_MESSAGE_LIMIT, (unsigned long) var_message_limit); /* * Connection rate management. */ if (var_smtpd_crate_limit || var_smtpd_cconn_limit || var_smtpd_cmail_limit || var_smtpd_crcpt_limit || var_smtpd_cntls_limit || var_smtpd_cauth_limit) anvil_clnt = anvil_clnt_create(); } MAIL_VERSION_STAMP_DECLARE; /* main - the main program */ int main(int argc, char **argv) { static const CONFIG_NINT_TABLE nint_table[] = { VAR_SMTPD_SOFT_ERLIM, DEF_SMTPD_SOFT_ERLIM, &var_smtpd_soft_erlim, 1, 0, VAR_SMTPD_HARD_ERLIM, DEF_SMTPD_HARD_ERLIM, &var_smtpd_hard_erlim, 1, 0, VAR_SMTPD_JUNK_CMD, DEF_SMTPD_JUNK_CMD, &var_smtpd_junk_cmd_limit, 1, 0, VAR_VERIFY_POLL_COUNT, DEF_VERIFY_POLL_COUNT, &var_verify_poll_count, 1, 0, 0, }; static const CONFIG_INT_TABLE int_table[] = { VAR_SMTPD_RCPT_LIMIT, DEF_SMTPD_RCPT_LIMIT, &var_smtpd_rcpt_limit, 1, 0, VAR_UNK_CLIENT_CODE, DEF_UNK_CLIENT_CODE, &var_unk_client_code, 0, 0, VAR_BAD_NAME_CODE, DEF_BAD_NAME_CODE, &var_bad_name_code, 0, 0, VAR_UNK_NAME_CODE, DEF_UNK_NAME_CODE, &var_unk_name_code, 0, 0, VAR_UNK_ADDR_CODE, DEF_UNK_ADDR_CODE, &var_unk_addr_code, 0, 0, VAR_RELAY_CODE, DEF_RELAY_CODE, &var_relay_code, 0, 0, VAR_MAPS_RBL_CODE, DEF_MAPS_RBL_CODE, &var_maps_rbl_code, 0, 0, VAR_MAP_REJECT_CODE, DEF_MAP_REJECT_CODE, &var_map_reject_code, 0, 0, VAR_MAP_DEFER_CODE, DEF_MAP_DEFER_CODE, &var_map_defer_code, 0, 0, VAR_REJECT_CODE, DEF_REJECT_CODE, &var_reject_code, 0, 0, VAR_DEFER_CODE, DEF_DEFER_CODE, &var_defer_code, 0, 0, VAR_NON_FQDN_CODE, DEF_NON_FQDN_CODE, &var_non_fqdn_code, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_RCPT_OVERLIM, DEF_SMTPD_RCPT_OVERLIM, &var_smtpd_rcpt_overlim, 1, 0, VAR_SMTPD_HIST_THRSH, DEF_SMTPD_HIST_THRSH, &var_smtpd_hist_thrsh, 1, 0, VAR_UNV_FROM_RCODE, DEF_UNV_FROM_RCODE, &var_unv_from_rcode, 200, 599, VAR_UNV_RCPT_RCODE, DEF_UNV_RCPT_RCODE, &var_unv_rcpt_rcode, 200, 599, VAR_UNV_FROM_DCODE, DEF_UNV_FROM_DCODE, &var_unv_from_dcode, 200, 499, VAR_UNV_RCPT_DCODE, DEF_UNV_RCPT_DCODE, &var_unv_rcpt_dcode, 200, 499, VAR_MUL_RCPT_CODE, DEF_MUL_RCPT_CODE, &var_mul_rcpt_code, 0, 0, VAR_LOCAL_RCPT_CODE, DEF_LOCAL_RCPT_CODE, &var_local_rcpt_code, 0, 0, VAR_VIRT_ALIAS_CODE, DEF_VIRT_ALIAS_CODE, &var_virt_alias_code, 0, 0, VAR_VIRT_MAILBOX_CODE, DEF_VIRT_MAILBOX_CODE, &var_virt_mailbox_code, 0, 0, VAR_RELAY_RCPT_CODE, DEF_RELAY_RCPT_CODE, &var_relay_rcpt_code, 0, 0, VAR_PLAINTEXT_CODE, DEF_PLAINTEXT_CODE, &var_plaintext_code, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_FORBID_BARE_LF_CODE, DEF_SMTPD_FORBID_BARE_LF_CODE, &var_smtpd_forbid_bare_lf_code, 500, 599, VAR_SMTPD_CRATE_LIMIT, DEF_SMTPD_CRATE_LIMIT, &var_smtpd_crate_limit, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_CCONN_LIMIT, DEF_SMTPD_CCONN_LIMIT, &var_smtpd_cconn_limit, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_CMAIL_LIMIT, DEF_SMTPD_CMAIL_LIMIT, &var_smtpd_cmail_limit, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_CRCPT_LIMIT, DEF_SMTPD_CRCPT_LIMIT, &var_smtpd_crcpt_limit, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_CNTLS_LIMIT, DEF_SMTPD_CNTLS_LIMIT, &var_smtpd_cntls_limit, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_CAUTH_LIMIT, DEF_SMTPD_CAUTH_LIMIT, &var_smtpd_cauth_limit, 0, 0, #ifdef USE_TLS VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CCERT_VD, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CCERT_VD, &var_smtpd_tls_ccert_vd, 0, 0, #endif VAR_SMTPD_SASL_RESP_LIMIT, DEF_SMTPD_SASL_RESP_LIMIT, &var_smtpd_sasl_resp_limit, DEF_SMTPD_SASL_RESP_LIMIT, 0, VAR_SMTPD_POLICY_REQ_LIMIT, DEF_SMTPD_POLICY_REQ_LIMIT, &var_smtpd_policy_req_limit, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_POLICY_TRY_LIMIT, DEF_SMTPD_POLICY_TRY_LIMIT, &var_smtpd_policy_try_limit, 1, 0, 0, }; static const CONFIG_LONG_TABLE long_table[] = { VAR_QUEUE_MINFREE, DEF_QUEUE_MINFREE, &var_queue_minfree, 0, 0, 0, }; static const CONFIG_TIME_TABLE time_table[] = { VAR_SMTPD_TMOUT, DEF_SMTPD_TMOUT, &var_smtpd_tmout, 1, 0, VAR_SMTPD_ERR_SLEEP, DEF_SMTPD_ERR_SLEEP, &var_smtpd_err_sleep, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_PROXY_TMOUT, DEF_SMTPD_PROXY_TMOUT, &var_smtpd_proxy_tmout, 1, 0, VAR_VERIFY_POLL_DELAY, DEF_VERIFY_POLL_DELAY, &var_verify_poll_delay, 1, 0, VAR_SMTPD_POLICY_TMOUT, DEF_SMTPD_POLICY_TMOUT, &var_smtpd_policy_tmout, 1, 0, VAR_SMTPD_POLICY_IDLE, DEF_SMTPD_POLICY_IDLE, &var_smtpd_policy_idle, 1, 0, VAR_SMTPD_POLICY_TTL, DEF_SMTPD_POLICY_TTL, &var_smtpd_policy_ttl, 1, 0, #ifdef USE_TLS VAR_SMTPD_STARTTLS_TMOUT, DEF_SMTPD_STARTTLS_TMOUT, &var_smtpd_starttls_tmout, 1, 0, #endif VAR_MILT_CONN_TIME, DEF_MILT_CONN_TIME, &var_milt_conn_time, 1, 0, VAR_MILT_CMD_TIME, DEF_MILT_CMD_TIME, &var_milt_cmd_time, 1, 0, VAR_MILT_MSG_TIME, DEF_MILT_MSG_TIME, &var_milt_msg_time, 1, 0, VAR_VERIFY_SENDER_TTL, DEF_VERIFY_SENDER_TTL, &var_verify_sender_ttl, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_UPROXY_TMOUT, DEF_SMTPD_UPROXY_TMOUT, &var_smtpd_uproxy_tmout, 1, 0, VAR_SMTPD_POLICY_TRY_DELAY, DEF_SMTPD_POLICY_TRY_DELAY, &var_smtpd_policy_try_delay, 1, 0, 0, }; static const CONFIG_BOOL_TABLE bool_table[] = { VAR_HELO_REQUIRED, DEF_HELO_REQUIRED, &var_helo_required, VAR_SMTPD_DELAY_REJECT, DEF_SMTPD_DELAY_REJECT, &var_smtpd_delay_reject, VAR_STRICT_RFC821_ENV, DEF_STRICT_RFC821_ENV, &var_strict_rfc821_env, VAR_DISABLE_VRFY_CMD, DEF_DISABLE_VRFY_CMD, &var_disable_vrfy_cmd, VAR_ALLOW_UNTRUST_ROUTE, DEF_ALLOW_UNTRUST_ROUTE, &var_allow_untrust_route, VAR_SMTPD_SASL_ENABLE, DEF_SMTPD_SASL_ENABLE, &var_smtpd_sasl_enable, VAR_SMTPD_SASL_AUTH_HDR, DEF_SMTPD_SASL_AUTH_HDR, &var_smtpd_sasl_auth_hdr, VAR_BROKEN_AUTH_CLNTS, DEF_BROKEN_AUTH_CLNTS, &var_broken_auth_clients, VAR_SHOW_UNK_RCPT_TABLE, DEF_SHOW_UNK_RCPT_TABLE, &var_show_unk_rcpt_table, VAR_SMTPD_REJ_UNL_FROM, DEF_SMTPD_REJ_UNL_FROM, &var_smtpd_rej_unl_from, VAR_SMTPD_REJ_UNL_RCPT, DEF_SMTPD_REJ_UNL_RCPT, &var_smtpd_rej_unl_rcpt, VAR_SMTPD_USE_TLS, DEF_SMTPD_USE_TLS, &var_smtpd_use_tls, VAR_SMTPD_ENFORCE_TLS, DEF_SMTPD_ENFORCE_TLS, &var_smtpd_enforce_tls, VAR_SMTPD_TLS_WRAPPER, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_WRAPPER, &var_smtpd_tls_wrappermode, VAR_SMTPD_TLS_AUTH_ONLY, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_AUTH_ONLY, &var_smtpd_tls_auth_only, #ifdef USE_TLS VAR_SMTPD_TLS_ACERT, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_ACERT, &var_smtpd_tls_ask_ccert, VAR_SMTPD_TLS_RCERT, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_RCERT, &var_smtpd_tls_req_ccert, VAR_SMTPD_TLS_RECHEAD, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_RECHEAD, &var_smtpd_tls_received_header, VAR_SMTPD_TLS_SET_SESSID, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_SET_SESSID, &var_smtpd_tls_set_sessid, #endif VAR_SMTPD_PEERNAME_LOOKUP, DEF_SMTPD_PEERNAME_LOOKUP, &var_smtpd_peername_lookup, VAR_SMTPD_DELAY_OPEN, DEF_SMTPD_DELAY_OPEN, &var_smtpd_delay_open, VAR_SMTPD_CLIENT_PORT_LOG, DEF_SMTPD_CLIENT_PORT_LOG, &var_smtpd_client_port_log, VAR_SMTPD_FORBID_UNAUTH_PIPE, DEF_SMTPD_FORBID_UNAUTH_PIPE, &var_smtpd_forbid_unauth_pipe, 0, }; static const CONFIG_NBOOL_TABLE nbool_table[] = { VAR_SMTPD_REC_DEADLINE, DEF_SMTPD_REC_DEADLINE, &var_smtpd_rec_deadline, 0, }; static const CONFIG_STR_TABLE str_table[] = { VAR_SMTPD_BANNER, DEF_SMTPD_BANNER, &var_smtpd_banner, 1, 0, VAR_NOTIFY_CLASSES, DEF_NOTIFY_CLASSES, &var_notify_classes, 0, 0, VAR_CLIENT_CHECKS, DEF_CLIENT_CHECKS, &var_client_checks, 0, 0, VAR_HELO_CHECKS, DEF_HELO_CHECKS, &var_helo_checks, 0, 0, VAR_MAIL_CHECKS, DEF_MAIL_CHECKS, &var_mail_checks, 0, 0, VAR_RELAY_CHECKS, DEF_RELAY_CHECKS, &var_relay_checks, 0, 0, VAR_RCPT_CHECKS, DEF_RCPT_CHECKS, &var_rcpt_checks, 0, 0, VAR_ETRN_CHECKS, DEF_ETRN_CHECKS, &var_etrn_checks, 0, 0, VAR_DATA_CHECKS, DEF_DATA_CHECKS, &var_data_checks, 0, 0, VAR_EOD_CHECKS, DEF_EOD_CHECKS, &var_eod_checks, 0, 0, VAR_MAPS_RBL_DOMAINS, DEF_MAPS_RBL_DOMAINS, &var_maps_rbl_domains, 0, 0, VAR_RBL_REPLY_MAPS, DEF_RBL_REPLY_MAPS, &var_rbl_reply_maps, 0, 0, VAR_BOUNCE_RCPT, DEF_BOUNCE_RCPT, &var_bounce_rcpt, 1, 0, VAR_ERROR_RCPT, DEF_ERROR_RCPT, &var_error_rcpt, 1, 0, VAR_REST_CLASSES, DEF_REST_CLASSES, &var_rest_classes, 0, 0, VAR_CANONICAL_MAPS, DEF_CANONICAL_MAPS, &var_canonical_maps, 0, 0, VAR_SEND_CANON_MAPS, DEF_SEND_CANON_MAPS, &var_send_canon_maps, 0, 0, VAR_RCPT_CANON_MAPS, DEF_RCPT_CANON_MAPS, &var_rcpt_canon_maps, 0, 0, VAR_VIRT_ALIAS_MAPS, DEF_VIRT_ALIAS_MAPS, &var_virt_alias_maps, 0, 0, VAR_VIRT_MAILBOX_MAPS, DEF_VIRT_MAILBOX_MAPS, &var_virt_mailbox_maps, 0, 0, VAR_ALIAS_MAPS, DEF_ALIAS_MAPS, &var_alias_maps, 0, 0, VAR_LOCAL_RCPT_MAPS, DEF_LOCAL_RCPT_MAPS, &var_local_rcpt_maps, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_SASL_OPTS, DEF_SMTPD_SASL_OPTS, &var_smtpd_sasl_opts, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_SASL_PATH, DEF_SMTPD_SASL_PATH, &var_smtpd_sasl_path, 1, 0, VAR_SMTPD_SASL_SERVICE, DEF_SMTPD_SASL_SERVICE, &var_smtpd_sasl_service, 1, 0, VAR_CYRUS_CONF_PATH, DEF_CYRUS_CONF_PATH, &var_cyrus_conf_path, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_SASL_REALM, DEF_SMTPD_SASL_REALM, &var_smtpd_sasl_realm, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_SASL_EXCEPTIONS_NETWORKS, DEF_SMTPD_SASL_EXCEPTIONS_NETWORKS, &var_smtpd_sasl_exceptions_networks, 0, 0, VAR_FILTER_XPORT, DEF_FILTER_XPORT, &var_filter_xport, 0, 0, VAR_PERM_MX_NETWORKS, DEF_PERM_MX_NETWORKS, &var_perm_mx_networks, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_SND_AUTH_MAPS, DEF_SMTPD_SND_AUTH_MAPS, &var_smtpd_snd_auth_maps, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_NOOP_CMDS, DEF_SMTPD_NOOP_CMDS, &var_smtpd_noop_cmds, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_FORBID_CMDS, DEF_SMTPD_FORBID_CMDS, &var_smtpd_forbid_cmds, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_NULL_KEY, DEF_SMTPD_NULL_KEY, &var_smtpd_null_key, 0, 0, VAR_RELAY_RCPT_MAPS, DEF_RELAY_RCPT_MAPS, &var_relay_rcpt_maps, 0, 0, VAR_VERIFY_SENDER, DEF_VERIFY_SENDER, &var_verify_sender, 0, 0, VAR_VERP_CLIENTS, DEF_VERP_CLIENTS, &var_verp_clients, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_PROXY_FILT, DEF_SMTPD_PROXY_FILT, &var_smtpd_proxy_filt, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_PROXY_EHLO, DEF_SMTPD_PROXY_EHLO, &var_smtpd_proxy_ehlo, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_PROXY_OPTS, DEF_SMTPD_PROXY_OPTS, &var_smtpd_proxy_opts, 0, 0, VAR_INPUT_TRANSP, DEF_INPUT_TRANSP, &var_input_transp, 0, 0, VAR_XCLIENT_HOSTS, DEF_XCLIENT_HOSTS, &var_xclient_hosts, 0, 0, VAR_XFORWARD_HOSTS, DEF_XFORWARD_HOSTS, &var_xforward_hosts, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_HOGGERS, DEF_SMTPD_HOGGERS, &var_smtpd_hoggers, 0, 0, VAR_LOC_RWR_CLIENTS, DEF_LOC_RWR_CLIENTS, &var_local_rwr_clients, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_EHLO_DIS_WORDS, DEF_SMTPD_EHLO_DIS_WORDS, &var_smtpd_ehlo_dis_words, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_EHLO_DIS_MAPS, DEF_SMTPD_EHLO_DIS_MAPS, &var_smtpd_ehlo_dis_maps, 0, 0, #ifdef USE_TLS VAR_RELAY_CCERTS, DEF_RELAY_CCERTS, &var_smtpd_relay_ccerts, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_SASL_TLS_OPTS, DEF_SMTPD_SASL_TLS_OPTS, &var_smtpd_sasl_tls_opts, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CHAIN_FILES, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CHAIN_FILES, &var_smtpd_tls_chain_files, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CERT_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CERT_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_cert_file, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_TLS_KEY_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_KEY_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_key_file, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_TLS_DCERT_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_DCERT_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_dcert_file, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_TLS_DKEY_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_DKEY_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_dkey_file, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_TLS_ECCERT_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_ECCERT_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_eccert_file, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_TLS_ECKEY_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_ECKEY_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_eckey_file, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CA_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CA_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_CAfile, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CA_PATH, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CA_PATH, &var_smtpd_tls_CApath, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CIPH, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CIPH, &var_smtpd_tls_ciph, 1, 0, VAR_SMTPD_TLS_MAND_CIPH, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_MAND_CIPH, &var_smtpd_tls_mand_ciph, 1, 0, VAR_SMTPD_TLS_EXCL_CIPH, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_EXCL_CIPH, &var_smtpd_tls_excl_ciph, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_TLS_MAND_EXCL, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_MAND_EXCL, &var_smtpd_tls_mand_excl, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_TLS_PROTO, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_PROTO, &var_smtpd_tls_proto, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_TLS_MAND_PROTO, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_MAND_PROTO, &var_smtpd_tls_mand_proto, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_TLS_512_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_512_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_dh512_param_file, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_TLS_1024_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_1024_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_TLS_EECDH, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_EECDH, &var_smtpd_tls_eecdh, 1, 0, VAR_SMTPD_TLS_FPT_DGST, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_FPT_DGST, &var_smtpd_tls_fpt_dgst, 1, 0, VAR_SMTPD_TLS_LOGLEVEL, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_LOGLEVEL, &var_smtpd_tls_loglevel, 0, 0, #endif VAR_SMTPD_TLS_LEVEL, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_LEVEL, &var_smtpd_tls_level, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_SASL_TYPE, DEF_SMTPD_SASL_TYPE, &var_smtpd_sasl_type, 1, 0, VAR_SMTPD_MILTERS, DEF_SMTPD_MILTERS, &var_smtpd_milters, 0, 0, VAR_MILT_CONN_MACROS, DEF_MILT_CONN_MACROS, &var_milt_conn_macros, 0, 0, VAR_MILT_HELO_MACROS, DEF_MILT_HELO_MACROS, &var_milt_helo_macros, 0, 0, VAR_MILT_MAIL_MACROS, DEF_MILT_MAIL_MACROS, &var_milt_mail_macros, 0, 0, VAR_MILT_RCPT_MACROS, DEF_MILT_RCPT_MACROS, &var_milt_rcpt_macros, 0, 0, VAR_MILT_DATA_MACROS, DEF_MILT_DATA_MACROS, &var_milt_data_macros, 0, 0, VAR_MILT_EOH_MACROS, DEF_MILT_EOH_MACROS, &var_milt_eoh_macros, 0, 0, VAR_MILT_EOD_MACROS, DEF_MILT_EOD_MACROS, &var_milt_eod_macros, 0, 0, VAR_MILT_UNK_MACROS, DEF_MILT_UNK_MACROS, &var_milt_unk_macros, 0, 0, VAR_MILT_PROTOCOL, DEF_MILT_PROTOCOL, &var_milt_protocol, 1, 0, VAR_MILT_DEF_ACTION, DEF_MILT_DEF_ACTION, &var_milt_def_action, 1, 0, VAR_MILT_DAEMON_NAME, DEF_MILT_DAEMON_NAME, &var_milt_daemon_name, 1, 0, VAR_MILT_V, DEF_MILT_V, &var_milt_v, 1, 0, VAR_MILT_MACRO_DEFLTS, DEF_MILT_MACRO_DEFLTS, &var_milt_macro_deflts, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_MILTER_MAPS, DEF_SMTPD_MILTER_MAPS, &var_smtpd_milter_maps, 0, 0, VAR_STRESS, DEF_STRESS, &var_stress, 0, 0, VAR_UNV_FROM_WHY, DEF_UNV_FROM_WHY, &var_unv_from_why, 0, 0, VAR_UNV_RCPT_WHY, DEF_UNV_RCPT_WHY, &var_unv_rcpt_why, 0, 0, VAR_REJECT_TMPF_ACT, DEF_REJECT_TMPF_ACT, &var_reject_tmpf_act, 1, 0, VAR_UNK_NAME_TF_ACT, DEF_UNK_NAME_TF_ACT, &var_unk_name_tf_act, 1, 0, VAR_UNK_ADDR_TF_ACT, DEF_UNK_ADDR_TF_ACT, &var_unk_addr_tf_act, 1, 0, VAR_UNV_RCPT_TF_ACT, DEF_UNV_RCPT_TF_ACT, &var_unv_rcpt_tf_act, 1, 0, VAR_UNV_FROM_TF_ACT, DEF_UNV_FROM_TF_ACT, &var_unv_from_tf_act, 1, 0, VAR_SMTPD_CMD_FILTER, DEF_SMTPD_CMD_FILTER, &var_smtpd_cmd_filter, 0, 0, #ifdef USE_TLSPROXY VAR_TLSPROXY_SERVICE, DEF_TLSPROXY_SERVICE, &var_tlsproxy_service, 1, 0, #endif VAR_SMTPD_ACL_PERM_LOG, DEF_SMTPD_ACL_PERM_LOG, &var_smtpd_acl_perm_log, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_UPROXY_PROTO, DEF_SMTPD_UPROXY_PROTO, &var_smtpd_uproxy_proto, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_POLICY_DEF_ACTION, DEF_SMTPD_POLICY_DEF_ACTION, &var_smtpd_policy_def_action, 1, 0, VAR_SMTPD_POLICY_CONTEXT, DEF_SMTPD_POLICY_CONTEXT, &var_smtpd_policy_context, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_DNS_RE_FILTER, DEF_SMTPD_DNS_RE_FILTER, &var_smtpd_dns_re_filter, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_REJ_FTR_MAPS, DEF_SMTPD_REJ_FTR_MAPS, &var_smtpd_rej_ftr_maps, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_FORBID_BARE_LF_EXCL, DEF_SMTPD_FORBID_BARE_LF_EXCL, &var_smtpd_forbid_bare_lf_excl, 0, 0, VAR_SMTPD_FORBID_BARE_LF, DEF_SMTPD_FORBID_BARE_LF, &var_smtpd_forbid_bare_lf, 1, 0, 0, }; static const CONFIG_RAW_TABLE raw_table[] = { VAR_SMTPD_EXP_FILTER, DEF_SMTPD_EXP_FILTER, &var_smtpd_exp_filter, 1, 0, VAR_DEF_RBL_REPLY, DEF_DEF_RBL_REPLY, &var_def_rbl_reply, 1, 0, VAR_SMTPD_REJ_FOOTER, DEF_SMTPD_REJ_FOOTER, &var_smtpd_rej_footer, 0, 0, 0, }; /* * Fingerprint executables and core dumps. */ MAIL_VERSION_STAMP_ALLOCATE; /* * Pass control to the single-threaded service skeleton. */ single_server_main(argc, argv, smtpd_service, CA_MAIL_SERVER_NINT_TABLE(nint_table), CA_MAIL_SERVER_INT_TABLE(int_table), CA_MAIL_SERVER_LONG_TABLE(long_table), CA_MAIL_SERVER_STR_TABLE(str_table), CA_MAIL_SERVER_RAW_TABLE(raw_table), CA_MAIL_SERVER_BOOL_TABLE(bool_table), CA_MAIL_SERVER_NBOOL_TABLE(nbool_table), CA_MAIL_SERVER_TIME_TABLE(time_table), CA_MAIL_SERVER_PRE_INIT(pre_jail_init), CA_MAIL_SERVER_PRE_ACCEPT(pre_accept), CA_MAIL_SERVER_POST_INIT(post_jail_init), 0); }