Adding upstream version 247.3.upstream/247.3upstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 1058 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.c b/src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..129f5fc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1058 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <mntent.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "sd-device.h"
+
+#include "alloc-util.h"
+#include "ask-password-api.h"
+#include "cryptsetup-keyfile.h"
+#include "cryptsetup-pkcs11.h"
+#include "cryptsetup-util.h"
+#include "device-util.h"
+#include "escape.h"
+#include "fileio.h"
+#include "fs-util.h"
+#include "fstab-util.h"
+#include "hexdecoct.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "main-func.h"
+#include "memory-util.h"
+#include "mount-util.h"
+#include "nulstr-util.h"
+#include "parse-util.h"
+#include "path-util.h"
+#include "pkcs11-util.h"
+#include "pretty-print.h"
+#include "string-util.h"
+#include "strv.h"
+
+/* internal helper */
+#define ANY_LUKS "LUKS"
+/* as in src/cryptsetup.h */
+#define CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE 512
+#define CRYPT_MAX_SECTOR_SIZE 4096
+
+static const char *arg_type = NULL; /* ANY_LUKS, CRYPT_LUKS1, CRYPT_LUKS2, CRYPT_TCRYPT, CRYPT_BITLK or CRYPT_PLAIN */
+static char *arg_cipher = NULL;
+static unsigned arg_key_size = 0;
+static unsigned arg_sector_size = CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE;
+static int arg_key_slot = CRYPT_ANY_SLOT;
+static unsigned arg_keyfile_size = 0;
+static uint64_t arg_keyfile_offset = 0;
+static bool arg_keyfile_erase = false;
+static bool arg_try_empty_password = false;
+static char *arg_hash = NULL;
+static char *arg_header = NULL;
+static unsigned arg_tries = 3;
+static bool arg_readonly = false;
+static bool arg_verify = false;
+static bool arg_discards = false;
+static bool arg_same_cpu_crypt = false;
+static bool arg_submit_from_crypt_cpus = false;
+static bool arg_no_read_workqueue = false;
+static bool arg_no_write_workqueue = false;
+static bool arg_tcrypt_hidden = false;
+static bool arg_tcrypt_system = false;
+static bool arg_tcrypt_veracrypt = false;
+static char **arg_tcrypt_keyfiles = NULL;
+static uint64_t arg_offset = 0;
+static uint64_t arg_skip = 0;
+static usec_t arg_timeout = USEC_INFINITY;
+static char *arg_pkcs11_uri = NULL;
+
+STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_cipher, freep);
+STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_hash, freep);
+STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_header, freep);
+STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tcrypt_keyfiles, strv_freep);
+STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_pkcs11_uri, freep);
+
+/* Options Debian's crypttab knows we don't:
+
+    check=
+    checkargs=
+    noearly
+    loud
+    quiet
+    keyscript=
+    initramfs
+*/
+
+static int parse_one_option(const char *option) {
+        const char *val;
+        int r;
+
+        assert(option);
+
+        /* Handled outside of this tool */
+        if (STR_IN_SET(option, "noauto", "auto", "nofail", "fail", "_netdev", "keyfile-timeout"))
+                return 0;
+
+        if (startswith(option, "keyfile-timeout="))
+                return 0;
+
+        if ((val = startswith(option, "cipher="))) {
+                r = free_and_strdup(&arg_cipher, val);
+                if (r < 0)
+                        return log_oom();
+
+        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "size="))) {
+
+                r = safe_atou(val, &arg_key_size);
+                if (r < 0) {
+                        log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
+                        return 0;
+                }
+
+                if (arg_key_size % 8) {
+                        log_error("size= not a multiple of 8, ignoring.");
+                        return 0;
+                }
+
+                arg_key_size /= 8;
+
+        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "sector-size="))) {
+
+                r = safe_atou(val, &arg_sector_size);
+                if (r < 0) {
+                        log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
+                        return 0;
+                }
+
+                if (arg_sector_size % 2) {
+                        log_error("sector-size= not a multiple of 2, ignoring.");
+                        return 0;
+                }
+
+                if (arg_sector_size < CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE || arg_sector_size > CRYPT_MAX_SECTOR_SIZE) {
+                        log_error("sector-size= is outside of %u and %u, ignoring.", CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE, CRYPT_MAX_SECTOR_SIZE);
+                        return 0;
+                }
+
+        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "key-slot=")) ||
+                   (val = startswith(option, "keyslot="))) {
+
+                arg_type = ANY_LUKS;
+                r = safe_atoi(val, &arg_key_slot);
+                if (r < 0) {
+                        log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
+                        return 0;
+                }
+
+        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tcrypt-keyfile="))) {
+
+                arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT;
+                if (path_is_absolute(val)) {
+                        if (strv_extend(&arg_tcrypt_keyfiles, val) < 0)
+                                return log_oom();
+                } else
+                        log_error("Key file path \"%s\" is not absolute. Ignoring.", val);
+
+        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "keyfile-size="))) {
+
+                r = safe_atou(val, &arg_keyfile_size);
+                if (r < 0) {
+                        log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
+                        return 0;
+                }
+
+        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "keyfile-offset="))) {
+
+                r = safe_atou64(val, &arg_keyfile_offset);
+                if (r < 0) {
+                        log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
+                        return 0;
+                }
+
+        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "keyfile-erase="))) {
+
+                r = parse_boolean(val);
+                if (r < 0) {
+                        log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
+                        return 0;
+                }
+
+                arg_keyfile_erase = r;
+
+        } else if (streq(option, "keyfile-erase"))
+                arg_keyfile_erase = true;
+
+        else if ((val = startswith(option, "hash="))) {
+                r = free_and_strdup(&arg_hash, val);
+                if (r < 0)
+                        return log_oom();
+
+        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "header="))) {
+                arg_type = ANY_LUKS;
+
+                if (!path_is_absolute(val))
+                        return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
+                                               "Header path \"%s\" is not absolute, refusing.", val);
+
+                if (arg_header)
+                        return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
+                                               "Duplicate header= option, refusing.");
+
+                arg_header = strdup(val);
+                if (!arg_header)
+                        return log_oom();
+
+        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tries="))) {
+
+                r = safe_atou(val, &arg_tries);
+                if (r < 0) {
+                        log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
+                        return 0;
+                }
+
+        } else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "readonly", "read-only"))
+                arg_readonly = true;
+        else if (streq(option, "verify"))
+                arg_verify = true;
+        else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "allow-discards", "discard"))
+                arg_discards = true;
+        else if (streq(option, "same-cpu-crypt"))
+                arg_same_cpu_crypt = true;
+        else if (streq(option, "submit-from-crypt-cpus"))
+                arg_submit_from_crypt_cpus = true;
+        else if (streq(option, "no-read-workqueue"))
+                arg_no_read_workqueue = true;
+        else if (streq(option, "no-write-workqueue"))
+                arg_no_write_workqueue = true;
+        else if (streq(option, "luks"))
+                arg_type = ANY_LUKS;
+/* since cryptsetup 2.3.0 (Feb 2020) */
+#ifdef CRYPT_BITLK
+        else if (streq(option, "bitlk"))
+                arg_type = CRYPT_BITLK;
+#endif
+        else if (streq(option, "tcrypt"))
+                arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT;
+        else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "tcrypt-hidden", "tcrypthidden")) {
+                arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT;
+                arg_tcrypt_hidden = true;
+        } else if (streq(option, "tcrypt-system")) {
+                arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT;
+                arg_tcrypt_system = true;
+        } else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "tcrypt-veracrypt", "veracrypt")) {
+                arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT;
+                arg_tcrypt_veracrypt = true;
+        } else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "plain", "swap", "tmp") ||
+                   startswith(option, "tmp="))
+                arg_type = CRYPT_PLAIN;
+        else if ((val = startswith(option, "timeout="))) {
+
+                r = parse_sec_fix_0(val, &arg_timeout);
+                if (r < 0) {
+                        log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
+                        return 0;
+                }
+
+        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "offset="))) {
+
+                r = safe_atou64(val, &arg_offset);
+                if (r < 0)
+                        return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s: %m", option);
+
+        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "skip="))) {
+
+                r = safe_atou64(val, &arg_skip);
+                if (r < 0)
+                        return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s: %m", option);
+
+        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "pkcs11-uri="))) {
+
+                if (!pkcs11_uri_valid(val))
+                        return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "pkcs11-uri= parameter expects a PKCS#11 URI, refusing");
+
+                r = free_and_strdup(&arg_pkcs11_uri, val);
+                if (r < 0)
+                        return log_oom();
+
+        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "try-empty-password="))) {
+
+                r = parse_boolean(val);
+                if (r < 0) {
+                        log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
+                        return 0;
+                }
+
+                arg_try_empty_password = r;
+
+        } else if (streq(option, "try-empty-password"))
+                arg_try_empty_password = true;
+
+        else if (!streq(option, "x-initrd.attach"))
+                log_warning("Encountered unknown /etc/crypttab option '%s', ignoring.", option);
+
+        return 0;
+}
+
+static int parse_options(const char *options) {
+        assert(options);
+
+        for (;;) {
+                _cleanup_free_ char *word = NULL;
+                int r;
+
+                r = extract_first_word(&options, &word, ",", EXTRACT_DONT_COALESCE_SEPARATORS | EXTRACT_UNESCAPE_SEPARATORS);
+                if (r < 0)
+                        return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse options: %m");
+                if (r == 0)
+                        break;
+
+                r = parse_one_option(word);
+                if (r < 0)
+                        return r;
+        }
+
+        /* sanity-check options */
+        if (arg_type && !streq(arg_type, CRYPT_PLAIN)) {
+                if (arg_offset != 0)
+                      log_warning("offset= ignored with type %s", arg_type);
+                if (arg_skip != 0)
+                      log_warning("skip= ignored with type %s", arg_type);
+        }
+
+        return 0;
+}
+
+static char* disk_description(const char *path) {
+        static const char name_fields[] =
+                "ID_PART_ENTRY_NAME\0"
+                "DM_NAME\0"
+                "ID_MODEL_FROM_DATABASE\0"
+                "ID_MODEL\0";
+
+        _cleanup_(sd_device_unrefp) sd_device *device = NULL;
+        const char *i, *name;
+        struct stat st;
+
+        assert(path);
+
+        if (stat(path, &st) < 0)
+                return NULL;
+
+        if (!S_ISBLK(st.st_mode))
+                return NULL;
+
+        if (sd_device_new_from_devnum(&device, 'b', st.st_rdev) < 0)
+                return NULL;
+
+        NULSTR_FOREACH(i, name_fields)
+                if (sd_device_get_property_value(device, i, &name) >= 0 &&
+                    !isempty(name))
+                        return strdup(name);
+
+        return NULL;
+}
+
+static char *disk_mount_point(const char *label) {
+        _cleanup_free_ char *device = NULL;
+        _cleanup_endmntent_ FILE *f = NULL;
+        struct mntent *m;
+
+        /* Yeah, we don't support native systemd unit files here for now */
+
+        device = strjoin("/dev/mapper/", label);
+        if (!device)
+                return NULL;
+
+        f = setmntent(fstab_path(), "re");
+        if (!f)
+                return NULL;
+
+        while ((m = getmntent(f)))
+                if (path_equal(m->mnt_fsname, device))
+                        return strdup(m->mnt_dir);
+
+        return NULL;
+}
+
+static char *friendly_disk_name(const char *src, const char *vol) {
+        _cleanup_free_ char *description = NULL, *mount_point = NULL;
+        char *name_buffer = NULL;
+        int r;
+
+        assert(src);
+        assert(vol);
+
+        description = disk_description(src);
+        mount_point = disk_mount_point(vol);
+
+        /* If the description string is simply the volume name, then let's not show this twice */
+        if (description && streq(vol, description))
+                description = mfree(description);
+
+        if (mount_point && description)
+                r = asprintf(&name_buffer, "%s (%s) on %s", description, vol, mount_point);
+        else if (mount_point)
+                r = asprintf(&name_buffer, "%s on %s", vol, mount_point);
+        else if (description)
+                r = asprintf(&name_buffer, "%s (%s)", description, vol);
+        else
+                return strdup(vol);
+        if (r < 0)
+                return NULL;
+
+        return name_buffer;
+}
+
+static int get_password(
+                const char *vol,
+                const char *src,
+                usec_t until,
+                bool accept_cached,
+                char ***ret) {
+
+        _cleanup_free_ char *friendly = NULL, *text = NULL, *disk_path = NULL;
+        _cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **passwords = NULL;
+        char **p, *id;
+        int r = 0;
+
+        assert(vol);
+        assert(src);
+        assert(ret);
+
+        friendly = friendly_disk_name(src, vol);
+        if (!friendly)
+                return log_oom();
+
+        if (asprintf(&text, "Please enter passphrase for disk %s:", friendly) < 0)
+                return log_oom();
+
+        disk_path = cescape(src);
+        if (!disk_path)
+                return log_oom();
+
+        id = strjoina("cryptsetup:", disk_path);
+
+        r = ask_password_auto(text, "drive-harddisk", id, "cryptsetup", until,
+                              ASK_PASSWORD_PUSH_CACHE | (accept_cached*ASK_PASSWORD_ACCEPT_CACHED),
+                              &passwords);
+        if (r < 0)
+                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to query password: %m");
+
+        if (arg_verify) {
+                _cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **passwords2 = NULL;
+
+                assert(strv_length(passwords) == 1);
+
+                if (asprintf(&text, "Please enter passphrase for disk %s (verification):", friendly) < 0)
+                        return log_oom();
+
+                id = strjoina("cryptsetup-verification:", disk_path);
+
+                r = ask_password_auto(text, "drive-harddisk", id, "cryptsetup", until, ASK_PASSWORD_PUSH_CACHE, &passwords2);
+                if (r < 0)
+                        return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to query verification password: %m");
+
+                assert(strv_length(passwords2) == 1);
+
+                if (!streq(passwords[0], passwords2[0]))
+                        return log_warning_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN),
+                                                 "Passwords did not match, retrying.");
+        }
+
+        strv_uniq(passwords);
+
+        STRV_FOREACH(p, passwords) {
+                char *c;
+
+                if (strlen(*p)+1 >= arg_key_size)
+                        continue;
+
+                /* Pad password if necessary */
+                c = new(char, arg_key_size);
+                if (!c)
+                        return log_oom();
+
+                strncpy(c, *p, arg_key_size);
+                free_and_replace(*p, c);
+        }
+
+        *ret = TAKE_PTR(passwords);
+
+        return 0;
+}
+
+static int attach_tcrypt(
+                struct crypt_device *cd,
+                const char *name,
+                const char *key_file,
+                const void *key_data,
+                size_t key_data_size,
+                char **passwords,
+                uint32_t flags) {
+
+        int r = 0;
+        _cleanup_free_ char *passphrase = NULL;
+        struct crypt_params_tcrypt params = {
+                .flags = CRYPT_TCRYPT_LEGACY_MODES,
+                .keyfiles = (const char **)arg_tcrypt_keyfiles,
+                .keyfiles_count = strv_length(arg_tcrypt_keyfiles)
+        };
+
+        assert(cd);
+        assert(name);
+        assert(key_file || key_data || !strv_isempty(passwords));
+
+        if (arg_pkcs11_uri)
+                /* Ask for a regular password */
+                return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN),
+                                       "Sorry, but tcrypt devices are currently not supported in conjunction with pkcs11 support.");
+
+        if (arg_tcrypt_hidden)
+                params.flags |= CRYPT_TCRYPT_HIDDEN_HEADER;
+
+        if (arg_tcrypt_system)
+                params.flags |= CRYPT_TCRYPT_SYSTEM_HEADER;
+
+        if (arg_tcrypt_veracrypt)
+                params.flags |= CRYPT_TCRYPT_VERA_MODES;
+
+        if (key_data) {
+                params.passphrase = key_data;
+                params.passphrase_size = key_data_size;
+        } else {
+                if (key_file) {
+                        r = read_one_line_file(key_file, &passphrase);
+                        if (r < 0) {
+                                log_error_errno(r, "Failed to read password file '%s': %m", key_file);
+                                return -EAGAIN; /* log with the actual error, but return EAGAIN */
+                        }
+
+                        params.passphrase = passphrase;
+                } else
+                        params.passphrase = passwords[0];
+
+                params.passphrase_size = strlen(params.passphrase);
+        }
+
+        r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_TCRYPT, &params);
+        if (r < 0) {
+                if (r == -EPERM) {
+                        if (key_data)
+                                log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate using discovered key. (Key not correct?)");
+
+                        if (key_file)
+                                log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate using password file '%s'. (Key data not correct?)", key_file);
+
+                        return -EAGAIN; /* log the actual error, but return EAGAIN */
+                }
+
+                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to load tcrypt superblock on device %s: %m", crypt_get_device_name(cd));
+        }
+
+        r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, NULL, 0, flags);
+        if (r < 0)
+                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate tcrypt device %s: %m", crypt_get_device_name(cd));
+
+        return 0;
+}
+
+static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk(
+                struct crypt_device *cd,
+                const char *name,
+                const char *key_file,
+                const void *key_data,
+                size_t key_data_size,
+                char **passwords,
+                uint32_t flags,
+                usec_t until) {
+
+        int r = 0;
+        bool pass_volume_key = false;
+
+        assert(cd);
+        assert(name);
+
+        if ((!arg_type && !crypt_get_type(cd)) || streq_ptr(arg_type, CRYPT_PLAIN)) {
+                struct crypt_params_plain params = {
+                        .offset = arg_offset,
+                        .skip = arg_skip,
+                        .sector_size = arg_sector_size,
+                };
+                const char *cipher, *cipher_mode;
+                _cleanup_free_ char *truncated_cipher = NULL;
+
+                if (arg_hash) {
+                        /* plain isn't a real hash type. it just means "use no hash" */
+                        if (!streq(arg_hash, "plain"))
+                                params.hash = arg_hash;
+                } else if (!key_file)
+                        /* for CRYPT_PLAIN, the behaviour of cryptsetup
+                         * package is to not hash when a key file is provided */
+                        params.hash = "ripemd160";
+
+                if (arg_cipher) {
+                        size_t l;
+
+                        l = strcspn(arg_cipher, "-");
+                        truncated_cipher = strndup(arg_cipher, l);
+                        if (!truncated_cipher)
+                                return log_oom();
+
+                        cipher = truncated_cipher;
+                        cipher_mode = arg_cipher[l] ? arg_cipher+l+1 : "plain";
+                } else {
+                        cipher = "aes";
+                        cipher_mode = "cbc-essiv:sha256";
+                }
+
+                /* for CRYPT_PLAIN limit reads from keyfile to key length, and ignore keyfile-size */
+                arg_keyfile_size = arg_key_size;
+
+                /* In contrast to what the name crypt_format() might suggest this doesn't actually format
+                 * anything, it just configures encryption parameters when used for plain mode. */
+                r = crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_PLAIN, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, NULL, arg_keyfile_size, &params);
+                if (r < 0)
+                        return log_error_errno(r, "Loading of cryptographic parameters failed: %m");
+
+                /* hash == NULL implies the user passed "plain" */
+                pass_volume_key = (params.hash == NULL);
+        }
+
+        log_info("Set cipher %s, mode %s, key size %i bits for device %s.",
+                 crypt_get_cipher(cd),
+                 crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd),
+                 crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd)*8,
+                 crypt_get_device_name(cd));
+
+        if (arg_pkcs11_uri) {
+                _cleanup_(sd_device_monitor_unrefp) sd_device_monitor *monitor = NULL;
+                _cleanup_(sd_event_unrefp) sd_event *event = NULL;
+                _cleanup_free_ void *decrypted_key = NULL;
+                _cleanup_free_ char *friendly = NULL;
+                size_t decrypted_key_size = 0;
+
+                if (!key_file && !key_data)
+                        return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "PKCS#11 mode selected but no key file specified, refusing.");
+
+                friendly = friendly_disk_name(crypt_get_device_name(cd), name);
+                if (!friendly)
+                        return log_oom();
+
+                for (;;) {
+                        bool processed = false;
+
+                        r = decrypt_pkcs11_key(
+                                        friendly,
+                                        arg_pkcs11_uri,
+                                        key_file, arg_keyfile_size, arg_keyfile_offset,
+                                        key_data, key_data_size,
+                                        until,
+                                        &decrypted_key, &decrypted_key_size);
+                        if (r >= 0)
+                                break;
+                        if (r != -EAGAIN) /* EAGAIN means: token not found */
+                                return r;
+
+                        if (!monitor) {
+                                /* We didn't find the token. In this case, watch for it via udev. Let's
+                                 * create an event loop and monitor first. */
+
+                                assert(!event);
+
+                                r = sd_event_default(&event);
+                                if (r < 0)
+                                        return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to allocate event loop: %m");
+
+                                r = sd_device_monitor_new(&monitor);
+                                if (r < 0)
+                                        return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to allocate device monitor: %m");
+
+                                r = sd_device_monitor_filter_add_match_tag(monitor, "security-device");
+                                if (r < 0)
+                                        return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to configure device monitor: %m");
+
+                                r = sd_device_monitor_attach_event(monitor, event);
+                                if (r < 0)
+                                        return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to attach device monitor: %m");
+
+                                r = sd_device_monitor_start(monitor, NULL, NULL);
+                                if (r < 0)
+                                        return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to start device monitor: %m");
+
+                                log_notice("Security token %s not present for unlocking volume %s, please plug it in.",
+                                           arg_pkcs11_uri, friendly);
+
+                                /* Let's immediately rescan in case the token appeared in the time we needed
+                                 * to create and configure the monitor */
+                                continue;
+                        }
+
+                        for (;;) {
+                                /* Wait for one event, and then eat all subsequent events until there are no
+                                 * further ones */
+                                r = sd_event_run(event, processed ? 0 : UINT64_MAX);
+                                if (r < 0)
+                                        return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to run event loop: %m");
+                                if (r == 0)
+                                        break;
+
+                                processed = true;
+                        }
+
+                        log_debug("Got one or more potentially relevant udev events, rescanning PKCS#11...");
+                }
+
+                if (pass_volume_key)
+                        r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, decrypted_key, decrypted_key_size, flags);
+                else {
+                        _cleanup_free_ char *base64_encoded = NULL;
+
+                        /* Before using this key as passphrase we base64 encode it. Why? For compatibility
+                         * with homed's PKCS#11 hookup: there we want to use the key we acquired through
+                         * PKCS#11 for other authentication/decryption mechanisms too, and some of them do
+                         * not not take arbitrary binary blobs, but require NUL-terminated strings — most
+                         * importantly UNIX password hashes. Hence, for compatibility we want to use a string
+                         * without embedded NUL here too, and that's easiest to generate from a binary blob
+                         * via base64 encoding. */
+
+                        r = base64mem(decrypted_key, decrypted_key_size, &base64_encoded);
+                        if (r < 0)
+                                return log_oom();
+
+                        r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, arg_key_slot, base64_encoded, strlen(base64_encoded), flags);
+                }
+                if (r == -EPERM) {
+                        log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with PKCS#11 decrypted key. (Key incorrect?)");
+                        return -EAGAIN; /* log actual error, but return EAGAIN */
+                }
+                if (r < 0)
+                        return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with PKCS#11 acquired key: %m");
+
+        } else if (key_data) {
+                if (pass_volume_key)
+                        r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, key_data, key_data_size, flags);
+                else
+                        r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, arg_key_slot, key_data, key_data_size, flags);
+                if (r == -EPERM) {
+                        log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate. (Key incorrect?)");
+                        return -EAGAIN; /* Log actual error, but return EAGAIN */
+                }
+                if (r < 0)
+                        return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate: %m");
+
+        } else if (key_file) {
+                r = crypt_activate_by_keyfile_device_offset(cd, name, arg_key_slot, key_file, arg_keyfile_size, arg_keyfile_offset, flags);
+                if (r == -EPERM) {
+                        log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with key file '%s'. (Key data incorrect?)", key_file);
+                        return -EAGAIN; /* Log actual error, but return EAGAIN */
+                }
+                if (r == -EINVAL) {
+                        log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with key file '%s'. (Key file missing?)", key_file);
+                        return -EAGAIN; /* Log actual error, but return EAGAIN */
+                }
+                if (r < 0)
+                        return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with key file '%s': %m", key_file);
+
+        } else {
+                char **p;
+
+                r = -EINVAL;
+                STRV_FOREACH(p, passwords) {
+                        if (pass_volume_key)
+                                r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, *p, arg_key_size, flags);
+                        else
+                                r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, arg_key_slot, *p, strlen(*p), flags);
+                        if (r >= 0)
+                                break;
+                }
+                if (r == -EPERM) {
+                        log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with specified passphrase. (Passphrase incorrect?)");
+                        return -EAGAIN; /* log actual error, but return EAGAIN */
+                }
+                if (r < 0)
+                        return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with specified passphrase: %m");
+        }
+
+        return r;
+}
+
+static int help(void) {
+        _cleanup_free_ char *link = NULL;
+        int r;
+
+        r = terminal_urlify_man("systemd-cryptsetup@.service", "8", &link);
+        if (r < 0)
+                return log_oom();
+
+        printf("%s attach VOLUME SOURCEDEVICE [PASSWORD] [OPTIONS]\n"
+               "%s detach VOLUME\n\n"
+               "Attaches or detaches an encrypted block device.\n"
+               "\nSee the %s for details.\n"
+               , program_invocation_short_name
+               , program_invocation_short_name
+               , link
+        );
+
+        return 0;
+}
+
+static uint32_t determine_flags(void) {
+        uint32_t flags = 0;
+
+        if (arg_readonly)
+                flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY;
+
+        if (arg_discards)
+                flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS;
+
+        if (arg_same_cpu_crypt)
+                flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT;
+
+        if (arg_submit_from_crypt_cpus)
+                flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS;
+
+        if (arg_no_read_workqueue)
+                flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE;
+
+        if (arg_no_write_workqueue)
+                flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE;
+
+#ifdef CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SERIALIZE_MEMORY_HARD_PBKDF
+        /* Try to decrease the risk of OOM event if memory hard key derivation function is in use */
+        /* https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/issues/446/ */
+        flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SERIALIZE_MEMORY_HARD_PBKDF;
+#endif
+
+        return flags;
+}
+
+static void remove_and_erasep(const char **p) {
+        int r;
+
+        if (!*p)
+                return;
+
+        r = unlinkat_deallocate(AT_FDCWD, *p, UNLINK_ERASE);
+        if (r < 0 && r != -ENOENT)
+                log_warning_errno(r, "Unable to erase key file '%s', ignoring: %m", *p);
+}
+
+static int run(int argc, char *argv[]) {
+        _cleanup_(crypt_freep) struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+        int r;
+
+        if (argc <= 1)
+                return help();
+
+        if (argc < 3)
+                return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
+                                       "This program requires at least two arguments.");
+
+        log_setup_service();
+
+        cryptsetup_enable_logging(cd);
+
+        umask(0022);
+
+        if (streq(argv[1], "attach")) {
+                uint32_t flags = 0;
+                unsigned tries;
+                usec_t until;
+                crypt_status_info status;
+                _cleanup_(remove_and_erasep) const char *destroy_key_file = NULL;
+                const char *key_file = NULL;
+                _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *key_data = NULL;
+                size_t key_data_size = 0;
+
+                /* Arguments: systemd-cryptsetup attach VOLUME SOURCE-DEVICE [PASSWORD] [OPTIONS] */
+
+                if (argc < 4)
+                        return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "attach requires at least two arguments.");
+
+                if (!filename_is_valid(argv[2]))
+                        return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Volume name '%s' is not valid.", argv[2]);
+
+                if (argc >= 5 && !STR_IN_SET(argv[4], "", "-", "none")) {
+                        if (path_is_absolute(argv[4]))
+                                key_file = argv[4];
+                        else
+                                log_warning("Password file path '%s' is not absolute. Ignoring.", argv[4]);
+                }
+
+                if (argc >= 6 && !STR_IN_SET(argv[5], "", "-", "none")) {
+                        r = parse_options(argv[5]);
+                        if (r < 0)
+                                return r;
+                }
+
+                log_debug("%s %s ← %s type=%s cipher=%s", __func__,
+                          argv[2], argv[3], strempty(arg_type), strempty(arg_cipher));
+
+                /* A delicious drop of snake oil */
+                (void) mlockall(MCL_FUTURE);
+
+                if (!key_file) {
+                        const char *fn;
+
+                        /* If a key file is not explicitly specified, search for a key in a well defined
+                         * search path, and load it. */
+
+                        fn = strjoina(argv[2], ".key");
+                        r = load_key_file(fn,
+                                          STRV_MAKE("/etc/cryptsetup-keys.d", "/run/cryptsetup-keys.d"),
+                                          0, 0,  /* Note we leave arg_keyfile_offset/arg_keyfile_size as something that only applies to arg_keyfile! */
+                                          &key_data, &key_data_size);
+                        if (r < 0)
+                                return r;
+                        if (r > 0)
+                                log_debug("Automatically discovered key for volume '%s'.", argv[2]);
+                } else if (arg_keyfile_erase)
+                        destroy_key_file = key_file; /* let's get this baby erased when we leave */
+
+                if (arg_header) {
+                        log_debug("LUKS header: %s", arg_header);
+                        r = crypt_init(&cd, arg_header);
+                } else
+                        r = crypt_init(&cd, argv[3]);
+                if (r < 0)
+                        return log_error_errno(r, "crypt_init() failed: %m");
+
+                cryptsetup_enable_logging(cd);
+
+                status = crypt_status(cd, argv[2]);
+                if (IN_SET(status, CRYPT_ACTIVE, CRYPT_BUSY)) {
+                        log_info("Volume %s already active.", argv[2]);
+                        return 0;
+                }
+
+                flags = determine_flags();
+
+                if (arg_timeout == USEC_INFINITY)
+                        until = 0;
+                else
+                        until = now(CLOCK_MONOTONIC) + arg_timeout;
+
+                arg_key_size = (arg_key_size > 0 ? arg_key_size : (256 / 8));
+
+                if (key_file) {
+                        struct stat st;
+
+                        /* Ideally we'd do this on the open fd, but since this is just a
+                         * warning it's OK to do this in two steps. */
+                        if (stat(key_file, &st) >= 0 && S_ISREG(st.st_mode) && (st.st_mode & 0005))
+                                log_warning("Key file %s is world-readable. This is not a good idea!", key_file);
+                }
+
+                if (!arg_type || STR_IN_SET(arg_type, ANY_LUKS, CRYPT_LUKS1, CRYPT_LUKS2)) {
+                        r = crypt_load(cd, !arg_type || streq(arg_type, ANY_LUKS) ? CRYPT_LUKS : arg_type, NULL);
+                        if (r < 0)
+                                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to load LUKS superblock on device %s: %m", crypt_get_device_name(cd));
+
+                        if (arg_header) {
+                                r = crypt_set_data_device(cd, argv[3]);
+                                if (r < 0)
+                                        return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to set LUKS data device %s: %m", argv[3]);
+                        }
+
+                        /* Tokens are available in LUKS2 only, but it is ok to call (and fail) with LUKS1. */
+                        if (!key_file && !key_data) {
+                                r = crypt_activate_by_token(cd, argv[2], CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN, NULL, flags);
+                                if (r >= 0) {
+                                        log_debug("Volume %s activated with LUKS token id %i.", argv[2], r);
+                                        return 0;
+                                }
+
+                                log_debug_errno(r, "Token activation unsuccessful for device %s: %m", crypt_get_device_name(cd));
+                        }
+                }
+
+/* since cryptsetup 2.3.0 (Feb 2020) */
+#ifdef CRYPT_BITLK
+                if (streq_ptr(arg_type, CRYPT_BITLK)) {
+                        r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_BITLK, NULL);
+                        if (r < 0)
+                                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to load Bitlocker superblock on device %s: %m", crypt_get_device_name(cd));
+                }
+#endif
+
+                for (tries = 0; arg_tries == 0 || tries < arg_tries; tries++) {
+                        _cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **passwords = NULL;
+
+                        /* When we were able to acquire multiple keys, let's always process them in this order:
+                         *
+                         *    1. A key acquired via PKCS#11 token
+                         *    2. The discovered key: i.e. key_data + key_data_size
+                         *    3. The configured key: i.e. key_file + arg_keyfile_offset + arg_keyfile_size
+                         *    4. The empty password, in case arg_try_empty_password is set
+                         *    5. We enquire the user for a password
+                         */
+
+                        if (!key_file && !key_data && !arg_pkcs11_uri) {
+
+                                if (arg_try_empty_password) {
+                                        /* Hmm, let's try an empty password now, but only once */
+                                        arg_try_empty_password = false;
+
+                                        key_data = strdup("");
+                                        if (!key_data)
+                                                return log_oom();
+
+                                        key_data_size = 0;
+                                } else {
+                                        /* Ask the user for a passphrase only as last resort, if we have
+                                         * nothing else to check for */
+
+                                        r = get_password(argv[2], argv[3], until, tries == 0 && !arg_verify, &passwords);
+                                        if (r == -EAGAIN)
+                                                continue;
+                                        if (r < 0)
+                                                return r;
+                                }
+                        }
+
+                        if (streq_ptr(arg_type, CRYPT_TCRYPT))
+                                r = attach_tcrypt(cd, argv[2], key_file, key_data, key_data_size, passwords, flags);
+                        else
+                                r = attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk(cd, argv[2], key_file, key_data, key_data_size, passwords, flags, until);
+                        if (r >= 0)
+                                break;
+                        if (r != -EAGAIN)
+                                return r;
+
+                        /* Key not correct? Let's try again! */
+
+                        key_file = NULL;
+                        key_data = erase_and_free(key_data);
+                        key_data_size = 0;
+                        arg_pkcs11_uri = mfree(arg_pkcs11_uri);
+                }
+
+                if (arg_tries != 0 && tries >= arg_tries)
+                        return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EPERM), "Too many attempts to activate; giving up.");
+
+        } else if (streq(argv[1], "detach")) {
+
+                if (!filename_is_valid(argv[2]))
+                        return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Volume name '%s' is not valid.", argv[2]);
+
+                r = crypt_init_by_name(&cd, argv[2]);
+                if (r == -ENODEV) {
+                        log_info("Volume %s already inactive.", argv[2]);
+                        return 0;
+                }
+                if (r < 0)
+                        return log_error_errno(r, "crypt_init_by_name() failed: %m");
+
+                cryptsetup_enable_logging(cd);
+
+                r = crypt_deactivate(cd, argv[2]);
+                if (r < 0)
+                        return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to deactivate: %m");
+
+        } else
+                return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Unknown verb %s.", argv[1]);
+
+        return 0;
+}
+
+DEFINE_MAIN_FUNCTION(run);