summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.c')
-rw-r--r--src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.c1058
1 files changed, 1058 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.c b/src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..129f5fc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1058 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <mntent.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "sd-device.h"
+
+#include "alloc-util.h"
+#include "ask-password-api.h"
+#include "cryptsetup-keyfile.h"
+#include "cryptsetup-pkcs11.h"
+#include "cryptsetup-util.h"
+#include "device-util.h"
+#include "escape.h"
+#include "fileio.h"
+#include "fs-util.h"
+#include "fstab-util.h"
+#include "hexdecoct.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "main-func.h"
+#include "memory-util.h"
+#include "mount-util.h"
+#include "nulstr-util.h"
+#include "parse-util.h"
+#include "path-util.h"
+#include "pkcs11-util.h"
+#include "pretty-print.h"
+#include "string-util.h"
+#include "strv.h"
+
+/* internal helper */
+#define ANY_LUKS "LUKS"
+/* as in src/cryptsetup.h */
+#define CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE 512
+#define CRYPT_MAX_SECTOR_SIZE 4096
+
+static const char *arg_type = NULL; /* ANY_LUKS, CRYPT_LUKS1, CRYPT_LUKS2, CRYPT_TCRYPT, CRYPT_BITLK or CRYPT_PLAIN */
+static char *arg_cipher = NULL;
+static unsigned arg_key_size = 0;
+static unsigned arg_sector_size = CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE;
+static int arg_key_slot = CRYPT_ANY_SLOT;
+static unsigned arg_keyfile_size = 0;
+static uint64_t arg_keyfile_offset = 0;
+static bool arg_keyfile_erase = false;
+static bool arg_try_empty_password = false;
+static char *arg_hash = NULL;
+static char *arg_header = NULL;
+static unsigned arg_tries = 3;
+static bool arg_readonly = false;
+static bool arg_verify = false;
+static bool arg_discards = false;
+static bool arg_same_cpu_crypt = false;
+static bool arg_submit_from_crypt_cpus = false;
+static bool arg_no_read_workqueue = false;
+static bool arg_no_write_workqueue = false;
+static bool arg_tcrypt_hidden = false;
+static bool arg_tcrypt_system = false;
+static bool arg_tcrypt_veracrypt = false;
+static char **arg_tcrypt_keyfiles = NULL;
+static uint64_t arg_offset = 0;
+static uint64_t arg_skip = 0;
+static usec_t arg_timeout = USEC_INFINITY;
+static char *arg_pkcs11_uri = NULL;
+
+STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_cipher, freep);
+STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_hash, freep);
+STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_header, freep);
+STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tcrypt_keyfiles, strv_freep);
+STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_pkcs11_uri, freep);
+
+/* Options Debian's crypttab knows we don't:
+
+ check=
+ checkargs=
+ noearly
+ loud
+ quiet
+ keyscript=
+ initramfs
+*/
+
+static int parse_one_option(const char *option) {
+ const char *val;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(option);
+
+ /* Handled outside of this tool */
+ if (STR_IN_SET(option, "noauto", "auto", "nofail", "fail", "_netdev", "keyfile-timeout"))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (startswith(option, "keyfile-timeout="))
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((val = startswith(option, "cipher="))) {
+ r = free_and_strdup(&arg_cipher, val);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ } else if ((val = startswith(option, "size="))) {
+
+ r = safe_atou(val, &arg_key_size);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (arg_key_size % 8) {
+ log_error("size= not a multiple of 8, ignoring.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ arg_key_size /= 8;
+
+ } else if ((val = startswith(option, "sector-size="))) {
+
+ r = safe_atou(val, &arg_sector_size);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (arg_sector_size % 2) {
+ log_error("sector-size= not a multiple of 2, ignoring.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (arg_sector_size < CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE || arg_sector_size > CRYPT_MAX_SECTOR_SIZE) {
+ log_error("sector-size= is outside of %u and %u, ignoring.", CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE, CRYPT_MAX_SECTOR_SIZE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ } else if ((val = startswith(option, "key-slot=")) ||
+ (val = startswith(option, "keyslot="))) {
+
+ arg_type = ANY_LUKS;
+ r = safe_atoi(val, &arg_key_slot);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tcrypt-keyfile="))) {
+
+ arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT;
+ if (path_is_absolute(val)) {
+ if (strv_extend(&arg_tcrypt_keyfiles, val) < 0)
+ return log_oom();
+ } else
+ log_error("Key file path \"%s\" is not absolute. Ignoring.", val);
+
+ } else if ((val = startswith(option, "keyfile-size="))) {
+
+ r = safe_atou(val, &arg_keyfile_size);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ } else if ((val = startswith(option, "keyfile-offset="))) {
+
+ r = safe_atou64(val, &arg_keyfile_offset);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ } else if ((val = startswith(option, "keyfile-erase="))) {
+
+ r = parse_boolean(val);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ arg_keyfile_erase = r;
+
+ } else if (streq(option, "keyfile-erase"))
+ arg_keyfile_erase = true;
+
+ else if ((val = startswith(option, "hash="))) {
+ r = free_and_strdup(&arg_hash, val);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ } else if ((val = startswith(option, "header="))) {
+ arg_type = ANY_LUKS;
+
+ if (!path_is_absolute(val))
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
+ "Header path \"%s\" is not absolute, refusing.", val);
+
+ if (arg_header)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
+ "Duplicate header= option, refusing.");
+
+ arg_header = strdup(val);
+ if (!arg_header)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tries="))) {
+
+ r = safe_atou(val, &arg_tries);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ } else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "readonly", "read-only"))
+ arg_readonly = true;
+ else if (streq(option, "verify"))
+ arg_verify = true;
+ else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "allow-discards", "discard"))
+ arg_discards = true;
+ else if (streq(option, "same-cpu-crypt"))
+ arg_same_cpu_crypt = true;
+ else if (streq(option, "submit-from-crypt-cpus"))
+ arg_submit_from_crypt_cpus = true;
+ else if (streq(option, "no-read-workqueue"))
+ arg_no_read_workqueue = true;
+ else if (streq(option, "no-write-workqueue"))
+ arg_no_write_workqueue = true;
+ else if (streq(option, "luks"))
+ arg_type = ANY_LUKS;
+/* since cryptsetup 2.3.0 (Feb 2020) */
+#ifdef CRYPT_BITLK
+ else if (streq(option, "bitlk"))
+ arg_type = CRYPT_BITLK;
+#endif
+ else if (streq(option, "tcrypt"))
+ arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT;
+ else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "tcrypt-hidden", "tcrypthidden")) {
+ arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT;
+ arg_tcrypt_hidden = true;
+ } else if (streq(option, "tcrypt-system")) {
+ arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT;
+ arg_tcrypt_system = true;
+ } else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "tcrypt-veracrypt", "veracrypt")) {
+ arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT;
+ arg_tcrypt_veracrypt = true;
+ } else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "plain", "swap", "tmp") ||
+ startswith(option, "tmp="))
+ arg_type = CRYPT_PLAIN;
+ else if ((val = startswith(option, "timeout="))) {
+
+ r = parse_sec_fix_0(val, &arg_timeout);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ } else if ((val = startswith(option, "offset="))) {
+
+ r = safe_atou64(val, &arg_offset);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s: %m", option);
+
+ } else if ((val = startswith(option, "skip="))) {
+
+ r = safe_atou64(val, &arg_skip);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s: %m", option);
+
+ } else if ((val = startswith(option, "pkcs11-uri="))) {
+
+ if (!pkcs11_uri_valid(val))
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "pkcs11-uri= parameter expects a PKCS#11 URI, refusing");
+
+ r = free_and_strdup(&arg_pkcs11_uri, val);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ } else if ((val = startswith(option, "try-empty-password="))) {
+
+ r = parse_boolean(val);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ arg_try_empty_password = r;
+
+ } else if (streq(option, "try-empty-password"))
+ arg_try_empty_password = true;
+
+ else if (!streq(option, "x-initrd.attach"))
+ log_warning("Encountered unknown /etc/crypttab option '%s', ignoring.", option);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int parse_options(const char *options) {
+ assert(options);
+
+ for (;;) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *word = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ r = extract_first_word(&options, &word, ",", EXTRACT_DONT_COALESCE_SEPARATORS | EXTRACT_UNESCAPE_SEPARATORS);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse options: %m");
+ if (r == 0)
+ break;
+
+ r = parse_one_option(word);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ /* sanity-check options */
+ if (arg_type && !streq(arg_type, CRYPT_PLAIN)) {
+ if (arg_offset != 0)
+ log_warning("offset= ignored with type %s", arg_type);
+ if (arg_skip != 0)
+ log_warning("skip= ignored with type %s", arg_type);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static char* disk_description(const char *path) {
+ static const char name_fields[] =
+ "ID_PART_ENTRY_NAME\0"
+ "DM_NAME\0"
+ "ID_MODEL_FROM_DATABASE\0"
+ "ID_MODEL\0";
+
+ _cleanup_(sd_device_unrefp) sd_device *device = NULL;
+ const char *i, *name;
+ struct stat st;
+
+ assert(path);
+
+ if (stat(path, &st) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (!S_ISBLK(st.st_mode))
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (sd_device_new_from_devnum(&device, 'b', st.st_rdev) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ NULSTR_FOREACH(i, name_fields)
+ if (sd_device_get_property_value(device, i, &name) >= 0 &&
+ !isempty(name))
+ return strdup(name);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static char *disk_mount_point(const char *label) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *device = NULL;
+ _cleanup_endmntent_ FILE *f = NULL;
+ struct mntent *m;
+
+ /* Yeah, we don't support native systemd unit files here for now */
+
+ device = strjoin("/dev/mapper/", label);
+ if (!device)
+ return NULL;
+
+ f = setmntent(fstab_path(), "re");
+ if (!f)
+ return NULL;
+
+ while ((m = getmntent(f)))
+ if (path_equal(m->mnt_fsname, device))
+ return strdup(m->mnt_dir);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static char *friendly_disk_name(const char *src, const char *vol) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *description = NULL, *mount_point = NULL;
+ char *name_buffer = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(src);
+ assert(vol);
+
+ description = disk_description(src);
+ mount_point = disk_mount_point(vol);
+
+ /* If the description string is simply the volume name, then let's not show this twice */
+ if (description && streq(vol, description))
+ description = mfree(description);
+
+ if (mount_point && description)
+ r = asprintf(&name_buffer, "%s (%s) on %s", description, vol, mount_point);
+ else if (mount_point)
+ r = asprintf(&name_buffer, "%s on %s", vol, mount_point);
+ else if (description)
+ r = asprintf(&name_buffer, "%s (%s)", description, vol);
+ else
+ return strdup(vol);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return name_buffer;
+}
+
+static int get_password(
+ const char *vol,
+ const char *src,
+ usec_t until,
+ bool accept_cached,
+ char ***ret) {
+
+ _cleanup_free_ char *friendly = NULL, *text = NULL, *disk_path = NULL;
+ _cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **passwords = NULL;
+ char **p, *id;
+ int r = 0;
+
+ assert(vol);
+ assert(src);
+ assert(ret);
+
+ friendly = friendly_disk_name(src, vol);
+ if (!friendly)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ if (asprintf(&text, "Please enter passphrase for disk %s:", friendly) < 0)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ disk_path = cescape(src);
+ if (!disk_path)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ id = strjoina("cryptsetup:", disk_path);
+
+ r = ask_password_auto(text, "drive-harddisk", id, "cryptsetup", until,
+ ASK_PASSWORD_PUSH_CACHE | (accept_cached*ASK_PASSWORD_ACCEPT_CACHED),
+ &passwords);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to query password: %m");
+
+ if (arg_verify) {
+ _cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **passwords2 = NULL;
+
+ assert(strv_length(passwords) == 1);
+
+ if (asprintf(&text, "Please enter passphrase for disk %s (verification):", friendly) < 0)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ id = strjoina("cryptsetup-verification:", disk_path);
+
+ r = ask_password_auto(text, "drive-harddisk", id, "cryptsetup", until, ASK_PASSWORD_PUSH_CACHE, &passwords2);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to query verification password: %m");
+
+ assert(strv_length(passwords2) == 1);
+
+ if (!streq(passwords[0], passwords2[0]))
+ return log_warning_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN),
+ "Passwords did not match, retrying.");
+ }
+
+ strv_uniq(passwords);
+
+ STRV_FOREACH(p, passwords) {
+ char *c;
+
+ if (strlen(*p)+1 >= arg_key_size)
+ continue;
+
+ /* Pad password if necessary */
+ c = new(char, arg_key_size);
+ if (!c)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ strncpy(c, *p, arg_key_size);
+ free_and_replace(*p, c);
+ }
+
+ *ret = TAKE_PTR(passwords);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int attach_tcrypt(
+ struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *name,
+ const char *key_file,
+ const void *key_data,
+ size_t key_data_size,
+ char **passwords,
+ uint32_t flags) {
+
+ int r = 0;
+ _cleanup_free_ char *passphrase = NULL;
+ struct crypt_params_tcrypt params = {
+ .flags = CRYPT_TCRYPT_LEGACY_MODES,
+ .keyfiles = (const char **)arg_tcrypt_keyfiles,
+ .keyfiles_count = strv_length(arg_tcrypt_keyfiles)
+ };
+
+ assert(cd);
+ assert(name);
+ assert(key_file || key_data || !strv_isempty(passwords));
+
+ if (arg_pkcs11_uri)
+ /* Ask for a regular password */
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN),
+ "Sorry, but tcrypt devices are currently not supported in conjunction with pkcs11 support.");
+
+ if (arg_tcrypt_hidden)
+ params.flags |= CRYPT_TCRYPT_HIDDEN_HEADER;
+
+ if (arg_tcrypt_system)
+ params.flags |= CRYPT_TCRYPT_SYSTEM_HEADER;
+
+ if (arg_tcrypt_veracrypt)
+ params.flags |= CRYPT_TCRYPT_VERA_MODES;
+
+ if (key_data) {
+ params.passphrase = key_data;
+ params.passphrase_size = key_data_size;
+ } else {
+ if (key_file) {
+ r = read_one_line_file(key_file, &passphrase);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_error_errno(r, "Failed to read password file '%s': %m", key_file);
+ return -EAGAIN; /* log with the actual error, but return EAGAIN */
+ }
+
+ params.passphrase = passphrase;
+ } else
+ params.passphrase = passwords[0];
+
+ params.passphrase_size = strlen(params.passphrase);
+ }
+
+ r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_TCRYPT, &params);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ if (r == -EPERM) {
+ if (key_data)
+ log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate using discovered key. (Key not correct?)");
+
+ if (key_file)
+ log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate using password file '%s'. (Key data not correct?)", key_file);
+
+ return -EAGAIN; /* log the actual error, but return EAGAIN */
+ }
+
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to load tcrypt superblock on device %s: %m", crypt_get_device_name(cd));
+ }
+
+ r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, NULL, 0, flags);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate tcrypt device %s: %m", crypt_get_device_name(cd));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk(
+ struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *name,
+ const char *key_file,
+ const void *key_data,
+ size_t key_data_size,
+ char **passwords,
+ uint32_t flags,
+ usec_t until) {
+
+ int r = 0;
+ bool pass_volume_key = false;
+
+ assert(cd);
+ assert(name);
+
+ if ((!arg_type && !crypt_get_type(cd)) || streq_ptr(arg_type, CRYPT_PLAIN)) {
+ struct crypt_params_plain params = {
+ .offset = arg_offset,
+ .skip = arg_skip,
+ .sector_size = arg_sector_size,
+ };
+ const char *cipher, *cipher_mode;
+ _cleanup_free_ char *truncated_cipher = NULL;
+
+ if (arg_hash) {
+ /* plain isn't a real hash type. it just means "use no hash" */
+ if (!streq(arg_hash, "plain"))
+ params.hash = arg_hash;
+ } else if (!key_file)
+ /* for CRYPT_PLAIN, the behaviour of cryptsetup
+ * package is to not hash when a key file is provided */
+ params.hash = "ripemd160";
+
+ if (arg_cipher) {
+ size_t l;
+
+ l = strcspn(arg_cipher, "-");
+ truncated_cipher = strndup(arg_cipher, l);
+ if (!truncated_cipher)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ cipher = truncated_cipher;
+ cipher_mode = arg_cipher[l] ? arg_cipher+l+1 : "plain";
+ } else {
+ cipher = "aes";
+ cipher_mode = "cbc-essiv:sha256";
+ }
+
+ /* for CRYPT_PLAIN limit reads from keyfile to key length, and ignore keyfile-size */
+ arg_keyfile_size = arg_key_size;
+
+ /* In contrast to what the name crypt_format() might suggest this doesn't actually format
+ * anything, it just configures encryption parameters when used for plain mode. */
+ r = crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_PLAIN, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, NULL, arg_keyfile_size, &params);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Loading of cryptographic parameters failed: %m");
+
+ /* hash == NULL implies the user passed "plain" */
+ pass_volume_key = (params.hash == NULL);
+ }
+
+ log_info("Set cipher %s, mode %s, key size %i bits for device %s.",
+ crypt_get_cipher(cd),
+ crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd),
+ crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd)*8,
+ crypt_get_device_name(cd));
+
+ if (arg_pkcs11_uri) {
+ _cleanup_(sd_device_monitor_unrefp) sd_device_monitor *monitor = NULL;
+ _cleanup_(sd_event_unrefp) sd_event *event = NULL;
+ _cleanup_free_ void *decrypted_key = NULL;
+ _cleanup_free_ char *friendly = NULL;
+ size_t decrypted_key_size = 0;
+
+ if (!key_file && !key_data)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "PKCS#11 mode selected but no key file specified, refusing.");
+
+ friendly = friendly_disk_name(crypt_get_device_name(cd), name);
+ if (!friendly)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ for (;;) {
+ bool processed = false;
+
+ r = decrypt_pkcs11_key(
+ friendly,
+ arg_pkcs11_uri,
+ key_file, arg_keyfile_size, arg_keyfile_offset,
+ key_data, key_data_size,
+ until,
+ &decrypted_key, &decrypted_key_size);
+ if (r >= 0)
+ break;
+ if (r != -EAGAIN) /* EAGAIN means: token not found */
+ return r;
+
+ if (!monitor) {
+ /* We didn't find the token. In this case, watch for it via udev. Let's
+ * create an event loop and monitor first. */
+
+ assert(!event);
+
+ r = sd_event_default(&event);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to allocate event loop: %m");
+
+ r = sd_device_monitor_new(&monitor);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to allocate device monitor: %m");
+
+ r = sd_device_monitor_filter_add_match_tag(monitor, "security-device");
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to configure device monitor: %m");
+
+ r = sd_device_monitor_attach_event(monitor, event);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to attach device monitor: %m");
+
+ r = sd_device_monitor_start(monitor, NULL, NULL);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to start device monitor: %m");
+
+ log_notice("Security token %s not present for unlocking volume %s, please plug it in.",
+ arg_pkcs11_uri, friendly);
+
+ /* Let's immediately rescan in case the token appeared in the time we needed
+ * to create and configure the monitor */
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ for (;;) {
+ /* Wait for one event, and then eat all subsequent events until there are no
+ * further ones */
+ r = sd_event_run(event, processed ? 0 : UINT64_MAX);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to run event loop: %m");
+ if (r == 0)
+ break;
+
+ processed = true;
+ }
+
+ log_debug("Got one or more potentially relevant udev events, rescanning PKCS#11...");
+ }
+
+ if (pass_volume_key)
+ r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, decrypted_key, decrypted_key_size, flags);
+ else {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *base64_encoded = NULL;
+
+ /* Before using this key as passphrase we base64 encode it. Why? For compatibility
+ * with homed's PKCS#11 hookup: there we want to use the key we acquired through
+ * PKCS#11 for other authentication/decryption mechanisms too, and some of them do
+ * not not take arbitrary binary blobs, but require NUL-terminated strings — most
+ * importantly UNIX password hashes. Hence, for compatibility we want to use a string
+ * without embedded NUL here too, and that's easiest to generate from a binary blob
+ * via base64 encoding. */
+
+ r = base64mem(decrypted_key, decrypted_key_size, &base64_encoded);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, arg_key_slot, base64_encoded, strlen(base64_encoded), flags);
+ }
+ if (r == -EPERM) {
+ log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with PKCS#11 decrypted key. (Key incorrect?)");
+ return -EAGAIN; /* log actual error, but return EAGAIN */
+ }
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with PKCS#11 acquired key: %m");
+
+ } else if (key_data) {
+ if (pass_volume_key)
+ r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, key_data, key_data_size, flags);
+ else
+ r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, arg_key_slot, key_data, key_data_size, flags);
+ if (r == -EPERM) {
+ log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate. (Key incorrect?)");
+ return -EAGAIN; /* Log actual error, but return EAGAIN */
+ }
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate: %m");
+
+ } else if (key_file) {
+ r = crypt_activate_by_keyfile_device_offset(cd, name, arg_key_slot, key_file, arg_keyfile_size, arg_keyfile_offset, flags);
+ if (r == -EPERM) {
+ log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with key file '%s'. (Key data incorrect?)", key_file);
+ return -EAGAIN; /* Log actual error, but return EAGAIN */
+ }
+ if (r == -EINVAL) {
+ log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with key file '%s'. (Key file missing?)", key_file);
+ return -EAGAIN; /* Log actual error, but return EAGAIN */
+ }
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with key file '%s': %m", key_file);
+
+ } else {
+ char **p;
+
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ STRV_FOREACH(p, passwords) {
+ if (pass_volume_key)
+ r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, *p, arg_key_size, flags);
+ else
+ r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, arg_key_slot, *p, strlen(*p), flags);
+ if (r >= 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (r == -EPERM) {
+ log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with specified passphrase. (Passphrase incorrect?)");
+ return -EAGAIN; /* log actual error, but return EAGAIN */
+ }
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with specified passphrase: %m");
+ }
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int help(void) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *link = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ r = terminal_urlify_man("systemd-cryptsetup@.service", "8", &link);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ printf("%s attach VOLUME SOURCEDEVICE [PASSWORD] [OPTIONS]\n"
+ "%s detach VOLUME\n\n"
+ "Attaches or detaches an encrypted block device.\n"
+ "\nSee the %s for details.\n"
+ , program_invocation_short_name
+ , program_invocation_short_name
+ , link
+ );
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static uint32_t determine_flags(void) {
+ uint32_t flags = 0;
+
+ if (arg_readonly)
+ flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY;
+
+ if (arg_discards)
+ flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS;
+
+ if (arg_same_cpu_crypt)
+ flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT;
+
+ if (arg_submit_from_crypt_cpus)
+ flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS;
+
+ if (arg_no_read_workqueue)
+ flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE;
+
+ if (arg_no_write_workqueue)
+ flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE;
+
+#ifdef CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SERIALIZE_MEMORY_HARD_PBKDF
+ /* Try to decrease the risk of OOM event if memory hard key derivation function is in use */
+ /* https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/issues/446/ */
+ flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SERIALIZE_MEMORY_HARD_PBKDF;
+#endif
+
+ return flags;
+}
+
+static void remove_and_erasep(const char **p) {
+ int r;
+
+ if (!*p)
+ return;
+
+ r = unlinkat_deallocate(AT_FDCWD, *p, UNLINK_ERASE);
+ if (r < 0 && r != -ENOENT)
+ log_warning_errno(r, "Unable to erase key file '%s', ignoring: %m", *p);
+}
+
+static int run(int argc, char *argv[]) {
+ _cleanup_(crypt_freep) struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ if (argc <= 1)
+ return help();
+
+ if (argc < 3)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
+ "This program requires at least two arguments.");
+
+ log_setup_service();
+
+ cryptsetup_enable_logging(cd);
+
+ umask(0022);
+
+ if (streq(argv[1], "attach")) {
+ uint32_t flags = 0;
+ unsigned tries;
+ usec_t until;
+ crypt_status_info status;
+ _cleanup_(remove_and_erasep) const char *destroy_key_file = NULL;
+ const char *key_file = NULL;
+ _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *key_data = NULL;
+ size_t key_data_size = 0;
+
+ /* Arguments: systemd-cryptsetup attach VOLUME SOURCE-DEVICE [PASSWORD] [OPTIONS] */
+
+ if (argc < 4)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "attach requires at least two arguments.");
+
+ if (!filename_is_valid(argv[2]))
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Volume name '%s' is not valid.", argv[2]);
+
+ if (argc >= 5 && !STR_IN_SET(argv[4], "", "-", "none")) {
+ if (path_is_absolute(argv[4]))
+ key_file = argv[4];
+ else
+ log_warning("Password file path '%s' is not absolute. Ignoring.", argv[4]);
+ }
+
+ if (argc >= 6 && !STR_IN_SET(argv[5], "", "-", "none")) {
+ r = parse_options(argv[5]);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ log_debug("%s %s ← %s type=%s cipher=%s", __func__,
+ argv[2], argv[3], strempty(arg_type), strempty(arg_cipher));
+
+ /* A delicious drop of snake oil */
+ (void) mlockall(MCL_FUTURE);
+
+ if (!key_file) {
+ const char *fn;
+
+ /* If a key file is not explicitly specified, search for a key in a well defined
+ * search path, and load it. */
+
+ fn = strjoina(argv[2], ".key");
+ r = load_key_file(fn,
+ STRV_MAKE("/etc/cryptsetup-keys.d", "/run/cryptsetup-keys.d"),
+ 0, 0, /* Note we leave arg_keyfile_offset/arg_keyfile_size as something that only applies to arg_keyfile! */
+ &key_data, &key_data_size);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ if (r > 0)
+ log_debug("Automatically discovered key for volume '%s'.", argv[2]);
+ } else if (arg_keyfile_erase)
+ destroy_key_file = key_file; /* let's get this baby erased when we leave */
+
+ if (arg_header) {
+ log_debug("LUKS header: %s", arg_header);
+ r = crypt_init(&cd, arg_header);
+ } else
+ r = crypt_init(&cd, argv[3]);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "crypt_init() failed: %m");
+
+ cryptsetup_enable_logging(cd);
+
+ status = crypt_status(cd, argv[2]);
+ if (IN_SET(status, CRYPT_ACTIVE, CRYPT_BUSY)) {
+ log_info("Volume %s already active.", argv[2]);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ flags = determine_flags();
+
+ if (arg_timeout == USEC_INFINITY)
+ until = 0;
+ else
+ until = now(CLOCK_MONOTONIC) + arg_timeout;
+
+ arg_key_size = (arg_key_size > 0 ? arg_key_size : (256 / 8));
+
+ if (key_file) {
+ struct stat st;
+
+ /* Ideally we'd do this on the open fd, but since this is just a
+ * warning it's OK to do this in two steps. */
+ if (stat(key_file, &st) >= 0 && S_ISREG(st.st_mode) && (st.st_mode & 0005))
+ log_warning("Key file %s is world-readable. This is not a good idea!", key_file);
+ }
+
+ if (!arg_type || STR_IN_SET(arg_type, ANY_LUKS, CRYPT_LUKS1, CRYPT_LUKS2)) {
+ r = crypt_load(cd, !arg_type || streq(arg_type, ANY_LUKS) ? CRYPT_LUKS : arg_type, NULL);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to load LUKS superblock on device %s: %m", crypt_get_device_name(cd));
+
+ if (arg_header) {
+ r = crypt_set_data_device(cd, argv[3]);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to set LUKS data device %s: %m", argv[3]);
+ }
+
+ /* Tokens are available in LUKS2 only, but it is ok to call (and fail) with LUKS1. */
+ if (!key_file && !key_data) {
+ r = crypt_activate_by_token(cd, argv[2], CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN, NULL, flags);
+ if (r >= 0) {
+ log_debug("Volume %s activated with LUKS token id %i.", argv[2], r);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ log_debug_errno(r, "Token activation unsuccessful for device %s: %m", crypt_get_device_name(cd));
+ }
+ }
+
+/* since cryptsetup 2.3.0 (Feb 2020) */
+#ifdef CRYPT_BITLK
+ if (streq_ptr(arg_type, CRYPT_BITLK)) {
+ r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_BITLK, NULL);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to load Bitlocker superblock on device %s: %m", crypt_get_device_name(cd));
+ }
+#endif
+
+ for (tries = 0; arg_tries == 0 || tries < arg_tries; tries++) {
+ _cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **passwords = NULL;
+
+ /* When we were able to acquire multiple keys, let's always process them in this order:
+ *
+ * 1. A key acquired via PKCS#11 token
+ * 2. The discovered key: i.e. key_data + key_data_size
+ * 3. The configured key: i.e. key_file + arg_keyfile_offset + arg_keyfile_size
+ * 4. The empty password, in case arg_try_empty_password is set
+ * 5. We enquire the user for a password
+ */
+
+ if (!key_file && !key_data && !arg_pkcs11_uri) {
+
+ if (arg_try_empty_password) {
+ /* Hmm, let's try an empty password now, but only once */
+ arg_try_empty_password = false;
+
+ key_data = strdup("");
+ if (!key_data)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ key_data_size = 0;
+ } else {
+ /* Ask the user for a passphrase only as last resort, if we have
+ * nothing else to check for */
+
+ r = get_password(argv[2], argv[3], until, tries == 0 && !arg_verify, &passwords);
+ if (r == -EAGAIN)
+ continue;
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (streq_ptr(arg_type, CRYPT_TCRYPT))
+ r = attach_tcrypt(cd, argv[2], key_file, key_data, key_data_size, passwords, flags);
+ else
+ r = attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk(cd, argv[2], key_file, key_data, key_data_size, passwords, flags, until);
+ if (r >= 0)
+ break;
+ if (r != -EAGAIN)
+ return r;
+
+ /* Key not correct? Let's try again! */
+
+ key_file = NULL;
+ key_data = erase_and_free(key_data);
+ key_data_size = 0;
+ arg_pkcs11_uri = mfree(arg_pkcs11_uri);
+ }
+
+ if (arg_tries != 0 && tries >= arg_tries)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EPERM), "Too many attempts to activate; giving up.");
+
+ } else if (streq(argv[1], "detach")) {
+
+ if (!filename_is_valid(argv[2]))
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Volume name '%s' is not valid.", argv[2]);
+
+ r = crypt_init_by_name(&cd, argv[2]);
+ if (r == -ENODEV) {
+ log_info("Volume %s already inactive.", argv[2]);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "crypt_init_by_name() failed: %m");
+
+ cryptsetup_enable_logging(cd);
+
+ r = crypt_deactivate(cd, argv[2]);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to deactivate: %m");
+
+ } else
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Unknown verb %s.", argv[1]);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+DEFINE_MAIN_FUNCTION(run);
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-11-29 16:16:07 +0000