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-rw-r--r--src/home/home-util.c135
1 files changed, 135 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/home/home-util.c b/src/home/home-util.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cd971b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/home/home-util.c
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
+
+#include "dns-domain.h"
+#include "home-util.h"
+#include "libcrypt-util.h"
+#include "memory-util.h"
+#include "path-util.h"
+#include "string-util.h"
+#include "strv.h"
+#include "user-util.h"
+
+bool suitable_user_name(const char *name) {
+
+ /* Checks whether the specified name is suitable for management via homed. Note that client-side
+ * we usually validate with the simple valid_user_group_name(), while server-side we are a bit more
+ * restrictive, so that we can change the rules server-side without having to update things
+ * client-side too. */
+
+ if (!valid_user_group_name(name, 0))
+ return false;
+
+ /* We generally rely on NSS to tell us which users not to care for, but let's filter out some
+ * particularly well-known users. */
+ if (STR_IN_SET(name,
+ "root",
+ "nobody",
+ NOBODY_USER_NAME, NOBODY_GROUP_NAME))
+ return false;
+
+ /* Let's also defend our own namespace, as well as Debian's (unwritten?) logic of prefixing system
+ * users with underscores. */
+ if (STARTSWITH_SET(name, "systemd-", "_"))
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+int suitable_realm(const char *realm) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *normalized = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ /* Similar to the above: let's validate the realm a bit stricter server-side than client side */
+
+ r = dns_name_normalize(realm, 0, &normalized); /* this also checks general validity */
+ if (r == -EINVAL)
+ return 0;
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if (!streq(realm, normalized)) /* is this normalized? */
+ return false;
+
+ if (dns_name_is_root(realm)) /* Don't allow top level domain */
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+int suitable_image_path(const char *path) {
+
+ return !empty_or_root(path) &&
+ path_is_valid(path) &&
+ path_is_absolute(path);
+}
+
+bool supported_fstype(const char *fstype) {
+ /* Limit the set of supported file systems a bit, as protection against little tested kernel file
+ * systems. Also, we only support the resize ioctls for these file systems. */
+ return STR_IN_SET(fstype, "ext4", "btrfs", "xfs");
+}
+
+int split_user_name_realm(const char *t, char **ret_user_name, char **ret_realm) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *user_name = NULL, *realm = NULL;
+ const char *c;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(t);
+ assert(ret_user_name);
+ assert(ret_realm);
+
+ c = strchr(t, '@');
+ if (!c) {
+ user_name = strdup(t);
+ if (!user_name)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ } else {
+ user_name = strndup(t, c - t);
+ if (!user_name)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ realm = strdup(c + 1);
+ if (!realm)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ if (!suitable_user_name(user_name))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (realm) {
+ r = suitable_realm(realm);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ if (r == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ *ret_user_name = TAKE_PTR(user_name);
+ *ret_realm = TAKE_PTR(realm);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int bus_message_append_secret(sd_bus_message *m, UserRecord *secret) {
+ _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *formatted = NULL;
+ JsonVariant *v;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(m);
+ assert(secret);
+
+ if (!FLAGS_SET(secret->mask, USER_RECORD_SECRET))
+ return sd_bus_message_append(m, "s", "{}");
+
+ v = json_variant_by_key(secret->json, "secret");
+ if (!v)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ r = json_variant_format(v, 0, &formatted);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ (void) sd_bus_message_sensitive(m);
+
+ return sd_bus_message_append(m, "s", formatted);
+}