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diff --git a/doc/arm/security.rst b/doc/arm/security.rst new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c17643b --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/arm/security.rst @@ -0,0 +1,228 @@ +.. Copyright (C) Internet Systems Consortium, Inc. ("ISC") +.. +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: MPL-2.0 +.. +.. This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public +.. License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this +.. file, you can obtain one at https://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. +.. +.. See the COPYRIGHT file distributed with this work for additional +.. information regarding copyright ownership. + +.. Security: + +BIND 9 Security Considerations +============================== + +.. _Access_Control_Lists: + +Access Control Lists +-------------------- + +Access Control Lists (ACLs) are address match lists that can be set up +and nicknamed for future use in ``allow-notify``, ``allow-query``, +``allow-query-on``, ``allow-recursion``, ``blackhole``, +``allow-transfer``, ``match-clients``, etc. + +ACLs give users finer control over who can access the +name server, without cluttering up configuration files with huge lists of +IP addresses. + +It is a *good idea* to use ACLs, and to control access. +Limiting access to the server by outside parties can help prevent +spoofing and denial of service (DoS) attacks against the server. + +ACLs match clients on the basis of up to three characteristics: 1) The +client's IP address; 2) the TSIG or SIG(0) key that was used to sign the +request, if any; and 3) an address prefix encoded in an EDNS +Client-Subnet option, if any. + +Here is an example of ACLs based on client addresses: + +:: + + // Set up an ACL named "bogusnets" that blocks + // RFC1918 space and some reserved space, which is + // commonly used in spoofing attacks. + acl bogusnets { + 0.0.0.0/8; 192.0.2.0/24; 224.0.0.0/3; + 10.0.0.0/8; 172.16.0.0/12; 192.168.0.0/16; + }; + + // Set up an ACL called our-nets. Replace this with the + // real IP numbers. + acl our-nets { x.x.x.x/24; x.x.x.x/21; }; + options { + ... + ... + allow-query { our-nets; }; + allow-recursion { our-nets; }; + ... + blackhole { bogusnets; }; + ... + }; + + zone "example.com" { + type primary; + file "m/example.com"; + allow-query { any; }; + }; + +This allows authoritative queries for ``example.com`` from any address, +but recursive queries only from the networks specified in ``our-nets``, +and no queries at all from the networks specified in ``bogusnets``. + +In addition to network addresses and prefixes, which are matched against +the source address of the DNS request, ACLs may include ``key`` +elements, which specify the name of a TSIG or SIG(0) key. + +When BIND 9 is built with GeoIP support, ACLs can also be used for +geographic access restrictions. This is done by specifying an ACL +element of the form: ``geoip db database field value``. + +The ``field`` parameter indicates which field to search for a match. Available fields +are ``country``, ``region``, ``city``, ``continent``, ``postal`` (postal code), +``metro`` (metro code), ``area`` (area code), ``tz`` (timezone), ``isp``, +``asnum``, and ``domain``. + +``value`` is the value to search for within the database. A string may be quoted +if it contains spaces or other special characters. An ``asnum`` search for +autonomous system number can be specified using the string "ASNNNN" or the +integer NNNN. If a ``country`` search is specified with a string that is two characters +long, it must be a standard ISO-3166-1 two-letter country code; otherwise, +it is interpreted as the full name of the country. Similarly, if +``region`` is the search term and the string is two characters long, it is treated as a +standard two-letter state or province abbreviation; otherwise, it is treated as the +full name of the state or province. + +The ``database`` field indicates which GeoIP database to search for a match. In +most cases this is unnecessary, because most search fields can only be found in +a single database. However, searches for ``continent`` or ``country`` can be +answered from either the ``city`` or ``country`` databases, so for these search +types, specifying a ``database`` forces the query to be answered from that +database and no other. If a ``database`` is not specified, these queries +are first answered from the ``city`` database if it is installed, and then from the ``country`` +database if it is installed. Valid database names are ``country``, +``city``, ``asnum``, ``isp``, and ``domain``. + +Some example GeoIP ACLs: + +:: + + geoip country US; + geoip country JP; + geoip db country country Canada; + geoip region WA; + geoip city "San Francisco"; + geoip region Oklahoma; + geoip postal 95062; + geoip tz "America/Los_Angeles"; + geoip org "Internet Systems Consortium"; + +ACLs use a "first-match" logic rather than "best-match"; if an address +prefix matches an ACL element, then that ACL is considered to have +matched even if a later element would have matched more specifically. +For example, the ACL ``{ 10/8; !10.0.0.1; }`` would actually match a +query from 10.0.0.1, because the first element indicates that the query +should be accepted, and the second element is ignored. + +When using "nested" ACLs (that is, ACLs included or referenced within +other ACLs), a negative match of a nested ACL tells the containing ACL to +continue looking for matches. This enables complex ACLs to be +constructed, in which multiple client characteristics can be checked at +the same time. For example, to construct an ACL which allows a query +only when it originates from a particular network *and* only when it is +signed with a particular key, use: + +:: + + allow-query { !{ !10/8; any; }; key example; }; + +Within the nested ACL, any address that is *not* in the 10/8 network +prefix is rejected, which terminates the processing of the ACL. +Any address that *is* in the 10/8 network prefix is accepted, but +this causes a negative match of the nested ACL, so the containing ACL +continues processing. The query is accepted if it is signed by +the key ``example``, and rejected otherwise. The ACL, then, only +matches when *both* conditions are true. + +.. _chroot_and_setuid: + +``Chroot`` and ``Setuid`` +------------------------- + +On Unix servers, it is possible to run BIND in a *chrooted* environment +(using the ``chroot()`` function) by specifying the ``-t`` option for +``named``. This can help improve system security by placing BIND in a +"sandbox," which limits the damage done if a server is compromised. + +Another useful feature in the Unix version of BIND is the ability to run +the daemon as an unprivileged user (``-u`` user). We suggest running +as an unprivileged user when using the ``chroot`` feature. + +Here is an example command line to load BIND in a ``chroot`` sandbox, +``/var/named``, and to run ``named`` ``setuid`` to user 202: + +``/usr/local/sbin/named -u 202 -t /var/named`` + +.. _chroot: + +The ``chroot`` Environment +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +For a ``chroot`` environment to work properly in a particular +directory (for example, ``/var/named``), the +environment must include everything BIND needs to run. From BIND's +point of view, ``/var/named`` is the root of the filesystem; +the values of options like ``directory`` and ``pid-file`` +must be adjusted to account for this. + +Unlike with earlier versions of BIND, +``named`` does *not* typically need to be compiled statically, nor do shared libraries need to be installed under the new +root. However, depending on the operating system, it may be necessary to set +up locations such as ``/dev/zero``, ``/dev/random``, ``/dev/log``, and +``/etc/localtime``. + +.. _setuid: + +Using the ``setuid`` Function +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Prior to running the ``named`` daemon, use the ``touch`` utility (to +change file access and modification times) or the ``chown`` utility (to +set the user id and/or group id) on files where BIND should +write. + +.. note:: + + If the ``named`` daemon is running as an unprivileged user, it + cannot bind to new restricted ports if the server is + reloaded. + +.. _dynamic_update_security: + +Dynamic Update Security +----------------------- + +Access to the dynamic update facility should be strictly limited. In +earlier versions of BIND, the only way to do this was based on the IP +address of the host requesting the update, by listing an IP address or +network prefix in the ``allow-update`` zone option. This method is +insecure, since the source address of the update UDP packet is easily +forged. Also note that if the IP addresses allowed by the +``allow-update`` option include the address of a secondary server which +performs forwarding of dynamic updates, the primary can be trivially +attacked by sending the update to the secondary, which forwards it to +the primary with its own source IP address - causing the primary to approve +it without question. + +For these reasons, we strongly recommend that updates be +cryptographically authenticated by means of transaction signatures +(TSIG). That is, the ``allow-update`` option should list only TSIG key +names, not IP addresses or network prefixes. Alternatively, the +``update-policy`` option can be used. + +Some sites choose to keep all dynamically updated DNS data in a +subdomain and delegate that subdomain to a separate zone. This way, the +top-level zone containing critical data, such as the IP addresses of +public web and mail servers, need not allow dynamic updates at all. |