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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-27 17:44:12 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-27 17:44:12 +0000
commit1be69c2c660b70ac2f4de2a5326e27e3e60eb82d (patch)
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Adding upstream version 2:2.3.7.upstream/2%2.3.7upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
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+Cryptsetup 2.0.1 Release Notes
+==============================
+Stable and bug-fix release with experimental features.
+
+This version introduces a new on-disk LUKS2 format.
+
+The legacy LUKS (referenced as LUKS1) will be fully supported
+forever as well as a traditional and fully backward compatible format.
+
+Please note that authenticated disk encryption, non-cryptographic
+data integrity protection (dm-integrity), use of Argon2 Password-Based
+Key Derivation Function and the LUKS2 on-disk format itself are new
+features and can contain some bugs.
+
+To provide all security features of authenticated encryption we need
+a better nonce-reuse resistant algorithm in the kernel (see note below).
+For now, please use authenticated encryption as an experimental feature.
+
+Please do not use LUKS2 without properly configured backup or in
+production systems that need to be compatible with older systems.
+
+Changes since version 2.0.0
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+* To store volume key into kernel keyring, kernel 4.15 with dm-crypt 1.18.1
+ is required. If a volume key is stored in keyring (LUKS2 only),
+ the dm-crypt v1.15.0 through v1.18.0 contains a serious bug that may cause
+ data corruption for ciphers with ESSIV.
+ (The key for ESSIV is zeroed because of code misplacement.)
+ This bug is not present for LUKS1 or any other IVs used in LUKS modes.
+ This change is not visible to the user (except dmsetup output).
+
+* Increase maximum allowed PBKDF memory-cost limit to 4 GiB.
+ The Argon2 PBKDF uses 1GiB by default; this is also limited by the amount
+ of physical memory available (maximum is half of the physical memory).
+
+* Use /run/cryptsetup as default for cryptsetup locking dir.
+ There were problems with sharing /run/lock with lockdev, and in the early
+ boot, the directory was missing.
+ The directory can be changed with --with-luks2-lock-path and
+ --with-luks2-lock-dir-perms configure switches.
+
+* Introduce new 64-bit byte-offset *keyfile_device_offset functions.
+
+ The keyfile interface was designed, well, for keyfiles. Unfortunately,
+ there are user cases where a keyfile can be placed on a device, and
+ size_t offset can overflow on 32-bit systems.
+
+ New set of functions that allow 64-bit offsets even on 32bit systems
+ are now available:
+
+ - crypt_resume_by_keyfile_device_offset
+ - crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_device_offset
+ - crypt_activate_by_keyfile_device_offset
+ - crypt_keyfile_device_read
+
+ The new functions have added the _device_ in name.
+ Old functions are just internal wrappers around these.
+
+ Also cryptsetup --keyfile-offset and --new-keyfile-offset now allows
+ 64-bit offsets as parameters.
+
+* Add error hint for wrongly formatted cipher strings in LUKS1 and
+ properly fail in luksFormat if cipher format is missing required IV.
+ For now, crypto API quietly used cipher without IV if a cipher
+ algorithm without IV specification was used (e.g., aes-xts).
+ This caused fail later during activation.
+
+* Configure check for a recent Argon2 lib to support mandatory Argon2id.
+
+* Fix for the cryptsetup-reencrypt static build if pwquality is enabled.
+
+* Update LUKS1 standard doc (https links in the bibliography).
+
+
+Unfinished things & TODO for next releases
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+* There will be better documentation and examples.
+
+* There will be some more formal definition of the threat model for integrity
+ protection. (And a link to some papers discussing integrity protection,
+ once it is, hopefully, accepted and published.)
+
+* Offline re-encrypt tool LUKS2 support is currently limited.
+ There will be online LUKS2 re-encryption tool in future.
+
+* Authenticated encryption will use new algorithms from CAESAR competition
+ (https://competitions.cr.yp.to/caesar.html) once these algorithms are
+ available in the kernel (more on this later).
+ NOTE: Currently available authenticated modes (GCM, Chacha20-poly1305)
+ in the kernel have too small 96-bit nonces that are problematic with
+ randomly generated IVs (the collision probability is not negligible).
+ For the GCM, nonce collision is a fatal problem.
+
+* Authenticated encryption do not set encryption for a dm-integrity journal.
+
+ While it does not influence data confidentiality or integrity protection,
+ an attacker can get some more information from data journal or cause that
+ system will corrupt sectors after journal replay. (That corruption will be
+ detected though.)
+
+* There are examples of user-defined tokens inside misc/luks2_keyslot_example
+ directory (like a simple external program that uses libssh to unlock LUKS2
+ using remote keyfile).
+
+* The python binding (pycryptsetup) contains only basic functionality for LUKS1
+ (it is not updated for new features) and will be deprecated soon in favor
+ of python bindings to the libblockdev library (that can already handle LUKS1
+ devices).