Adding upstream version 2:2.3.7.upstream/2%2.3.7upstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 3165 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/lib/libdevmapper.c b/lib/libdevmapper.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..62e084f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/libdevmapper.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3165 @@
+/*
+ * libdevmapper - device-mapper backend for cryptsetup
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2021 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <libdevmapper.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <uuid/uuid.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H
+# include <sys/sysmacros.h>     /* for major, minor */
+#endif
+#include <assert.h>
+#include "internal.h"
+
+#define DM_UUID_LEN		129
+#define DM_BY_ID_PREFIX		"dm-uuid-"
+#define DM_BY_ID_PREFIX_LEN	8
+#define DM_UUID_PREFIX		"CRYPT-"
+#define DM_UUID_PREFIX_LEN	6
+#define DM_CRYPT_TARGET		"crypt"
+#define DM_VERITY_TARGET	"verity"
+#define DM_INTEGRITY_TARGET	"integrity"
+#define DM_LINEAR_TARGET	"linear"
+#define DM_ERROR_TARGET         "error"
+#define DM_ZERO_TARGET		"zero"
+#define RETRY_COUNT		5
+
+/* Set if DM target versions were probed */
+static bool _dm_ioctl_checked = false;
+static bool _dm_crypt_checked = false;
+static bool _dm_verity_checked = false;
+static bool _dm_integrity_checked = false;
+
+static int _quiet_log = 0;
+static uint32_t _dm_flags = 0;
+
+static struct crypt_device *_context = NULL;
+static int _dm_use_count = 0;
+
+/* Check if we have DM flag to instruct kernel to force wipe buffers */
+#if !HAVE_DECL_DM_TASK_SECURE_DATA
+static int dm_task_secure_data(struct dm_task *dmt) { return 1; }
+#endif
+
+/* Compatibility for old device-mapper without udev support */
+#if HAVE_DECL_DM_UDEV_DISABLE_DISK_RULES_FLAG
+#define CRYPT_TEMP_UDEV_FLAGS	DM_UDEV_DISABLE_SUBSYSTEM_RULES_FLAG | \
+				DM_UDEV_DISABLE_DISK_RULES_FLAG | \
+				DM_UDEV_DISABLE_OTHER_RULES_FLAG
+#define _dm_task_set_cookie	dm_task_set_cookie
+#define _dm_udev_wait		dm_udev_wait
+#else
+#define CRYPT_TEMP_UDEV_FLAGS	0
+static int _dm_task_set_cookie(struct dm_task *dmt, uint32_t *cookie, uint16_t flags) { return 0; }
+static int _dm_udev_wait(uint32_t cookie) { return 0; };
+#endif
+
+static int _dm_use_udev(void)
+{
+#ifdef USE_UDEV /* cannot be enabled if devmapper is too old */
+	return dm_udev_get_sync_support();
+#else
+	return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+__attribute__((format(printf, 4, 5)))
+static void set_dm_error(int level,
+			 const char *file __attribute__((unused)),
+			 int line __attribute__((unused)),
+			 const char *f, ...)
+{
+	char *msg = NULL;
+	va_list va;
+
+	va_start(va, f);
+	if (vasprintf(&msg, f, va) > 0) {
+		if (level < 4 && !_quiet_log) {
+			log_err(_context, "%s", msg);
+		} else {
+			/* We do not use DM visual stack backtrace here */
+			if (strncmp(msg, "<backtrace>", 11))
+				log_dbg(_context, "%s", msg);
+		}
+	}
+	free(msg);
+	va_end(va);
+}
+
+static int _dm_satisfies_version(unsigned target_maj, unsigned target_min, unsigned target_patch,
+				 unsigned actual_maj, unsigned actual_min, unsigned actual_patch)
+{
+	if (actual_maj > target_maj)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (actual_maj == target_maj && actual_min > target_min)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (actual_maj == target_maj && actual_min == target_min && actual_patch >= target_patch)
+		return 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void _dm_set_crypt_compat(struct crypt_device *cd,
+				 unsigned crypt_maj,
+				 unsigned crypt_min,
+				 unsigned crypt_patch)
+{
+	if (_dm_crypt_checked || crypt_maj == 0)
+		return;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Detected dm-crypt version %i.%i.%i.",
+		crypt_maj, crypt_min, crypt_patch);
+
+	if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 2, 0, crypt_maj, crypt_min, crypt_patch))
+		_dm_flags |= DM_KEY_WIPE_SUPPORTED;
+	else
+		log_dbg(cd, "Suspend and resume disabled, no wipe key support.");
+
+	if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 10, 0, crypt_maj, crypt_min, crypt_patch))
+		_dm_flags |= DM_LMK_SUPPORTED;
+
+	/* not perfect, 2.6.33 supports with 1.7.0 */
+	if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 8, 0, crypt_maj, crypt_min, crypt_patch))
+		_dm_flags |= DM_PLAIN64_SUPPORTED;
+
+	if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 11, 0, crypt_maj, crypt_min, crypt_patch))
+		_dm_flags |= DM_DISCARDS_SUPPORTED;
+
+	if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 13, 0, crypt_maj, crypt_min, crypt_patch))
+		_dm_flags |= DM_TCW_SUPPORTED;
+
+	if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 14, 0, crypt_maj, crypt_min, crypt_patch)) {
+		_dm_flags |= DM_SAME_CPU_CRYPT_SUPPORTED;
+		_dm_flags |= DM_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS_SUPPORTED;
+	}
+
+	if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 18, 1, crypt_maj, crypt_min, crypt_patch))
+		_dm_flags |= DM_KERNEL_KEYRING_SUPPORTED;
+
+	if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 17, 0, crypt_maj, crypt_min, crypt_patch)) {
+		_dm_flags |= DM_SECTOR_SIZE_SUPPORTED;
+		_dm_flags |= DM_CAPI_STRING_SUPPORTED;
+	}
+
+	if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 19, 0, crypt_maj, crypt_min, crypt_patch))
+		_dm_flags |= DM_BITLK_EBOIV_SUPPORTED;
+
+	if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 20, 0, crypt_maj, crypt_min, crypt_patch))
+		_dm_flags |= DM_BITLK_ELEPHANT_SUPPORTED;
+
+	if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 22, 0, crypt_maj, crypt_min, crypt_patch))
+		_dm_flags |= DM_CRYPT_NO_WORKQUEUE_SUPPORTED;
+
+	_dm_crypt_checked = true;
+}
+
+static void _dm_set_verity_compat(struct crypt_device *cd,
+				  unsigned verity_maj,
+				  unsigned verity_min,
+				  unsigned verity_patch)
+{
+	if (_dm_verity_checked || verity_maj == 0)
+		return;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Detected dm-verity version %i.%i.%i.",
+		verity_maj, verity_min, verity_patch);
+
+	_dm_flags |= DM_VERITY_SUPPORTED;
+
+	/*
+	 * ignore_corruption, restart_on corruption is available since 1.2 (kernel 4.1)
+	 * ignore_zero_blocks since 1.3 (kernel 4.5)
+	 * (but some dm-verity targets 1.2 don't support it)
+	 * FEC is added in 1.3 as well.
+	 * Check at most once is added in 1.4 (kernel 4.17).
+	 */
+	if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 3, 0, verity_maj, verity_min, verity_patch)) {
+		_dm_flags |= DM_VERITY_ON_CORRUPTION_SUPPORTED;
+		_dm_flags |= DM_VERITY_FEC_SUPPORTED;
+	}
+
+	if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 5, 0, verity_maj, verity_min, verity_patch))
+		_dm_flags |= DM_VERITY_SIGNATURE_SUPPORTED;
+
+	if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 7, 0, verity_maj, verity_min, verity_patch))
+		_dm_flags |= DM_VERITY_PANIC_CORRUPTION_SUPPORTED;
+
+	_dm_verity_checked = true;
+}
+
+static void _dm_set_integrity_compat(struct crypt_device *cd,
+				     unsigned integrity_maj,
+				     unsigned integrity_min,
+				     unsigned integrity_patch)
+{
+	if (_dm_integrity_checked || integrity_maj == 0)
+		return;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Detected dm-integrity version %i.%i.%i.",
+		integrity_maj, integrity_min, integrity_patch);
+
+	_dm_flags |= DM_INTEGRITY_SUPPORTED;
+
+	if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 2, 0, integrity_maj, integrity_min, integrity_patch))
+		_dm_flags |= DM_INTEGRITY_RECALC_SUPPORTED;
+
+	if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 3, 0, integrity_maj, integrity_min, integrity_patch))
+		_dm_flags |= DM_INTEGRITY_BITMAP_SUPPORTED;
+
+	if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 4, 0, integrity_maj, integrity_min, integrity_patch))
+		_dm_flags |= DM_INTEGRITY_FIX_PADDING_SUPPORTED;
+
+	if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 6, 0, integrity_maj, integrity_min, integrity_patch))
+		_dm_flags |= DM_INTEGRITY_DISCARDS_SUPPORTED;
+
+	if (_dm_satisfies_version(1, 7, 0, integrity_maj, integrity_min, integrity_patch))
+		_dm_flags |= DM_INTEGRITY_FIX_HMAC_SUPPORTED;
+
+	_dm_integrity_checked = true;
+}
+
+/* We use this for loading target module */
+static void _dm_check_target(dm_target_type target_type)
+{
+#if HAVE_DECL_DM_DEVICE_GET_TARGET_VERSION
+	struct dm_task *dmt;
+	const char *target_name = NULL;
+
+	if (!(_dm_flags & DM_GET_TARGET_VERSION_SUPPORTED))
+		return;
+
+	if (target_type == DM_CRYPT)
+		target_name = DM_CRYPT_TARGET;
+	else if (target_type == DM_VERITY)
+		target_name = DM_VERITY_TARGET;
+	else if (target_type == DM_INTEGRITY)
+		target_name = DM_INTEGRITY_TARGET;
+	else
+		return;
+
+	if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(DM_DEVICE_GET_TARGET_VERSION)))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!dm_task_set_name(dmt, target_name))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!dm_task_run(dmt))
+		goto out;
+out:
+	if (dmt)
+		dm_task_destroy(dmt);
+#endif
+}
+
+static int _dm_check_versions(struct crypt_device *cd, dm_target_type target_type)
+{
+	struct dm_task *dmt;
+	struct dm_versions *target, *last_target;
+	char dm_version[16];
+	unsigned dm_maj, dm_min, dm_patch;
+	int r = 0;
+
+	if ((target_type == DM_CRYPT	 && _dm_crypt_checked) ||
+	    (target_type == DM_VERITY    && _dm_verity_checked) ||
+	    (target_type == DM_INTEGRITY && _dm_integrity_checked) ||
+	    (target_type == DM_LINEAR) || (target_type == DM_ZERO) ||
+	    (_dm_crypt_checked && _dm_verity_checked && _dm_integrity_checked))
+		return 1;
+
+	/* Shut up DM while checking */
+	_quiet_log = 1;
+
+	_dm_check_target(target_type);
+
+	/* FIXME: add support to DM so it forces crypt target module load here */
+	if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(DM_DEVICE_LIST_VERSIONS)))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!dm_task_run(dmt))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!dm_task_get_driver_version(dmt, dm_version, sizeof(dm_version)))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!_dm_ioctl_checked) {
+		if (sscanf(dm_version, "%u.%u.%u", &dm_maj, &dm_min, &dm_patch) != 3)
+			goto out;
+		log_dbg(cd, "Detected dm-ioctl version %u.%u.%u.", dm_maj, dm_min, dm_patch);
+
+		if (_dm_satisfies_version(4, 20, 0, dm_maj, dm_min, dm_patch))
+			_dm_flags |= DM_SECURE_SUPPORTED;
+#if HAVE_DECL_DM_TASK_DEFERRED_REMOVE
+		if (_dm_satisfies_version(4, 27, 0, dm_maj, dm_min, dm_patch))
+			_dm_flags |= DM_DEFERRED_SUPPORTED;
+#endif
+#if HAVE_DECL_DM_DEVICE_GET_TARGET_VERSION
+		if (_dm_satisfies_version(4, 41, 0, dm_maj, dm_min, dm_patch))
+			_dm_flags |= DM_GET_TARGET_VERSION_SUPPORTED;
+#endif
+	}
+
+	target = dm_task_get_versions(dmt);
+	do {
+		last_target = target;
+		if (!strcmp(DM_CRYPT_TARGET, target->name)) {
+			_dm_set_crypt_compat(cd, (unsigned)target->version[0],
+					     (unsigned)target->version[1],
+					     (unsigned)target->version[2]);
+		} else if (!strcmp(DM_VERITY_TARGET, target->name)) {
+			_dm_set_verity_compat(cd, (unsigned)target->version[0],
+					      (unsigned)target->version[1],
+					      (unsigned)target->version[2]);
+		} else if (!strcmp(DM_INTEGRITY_TARGET, target->name)) {
+			_dm_set_integrity_compat(cd, (unsigned)target->version[0],
+						 (unsigned)target->version[1],
+						 (unsigned)target->version[2]);
+		}
+		target = (struct dm_versions *)((char *) target + target->next);
+	} while (last_target != target);
+
+	r = 1;
+	if (!_dm_ioctl_checked)
+		log_dbg(cd, "Device-mapper backend running with UDEV support %sabled.",
+			_dm_use_udev() ? "en" : "dis");
+
+	_dm_ioctl_checked = true;
+out:
+	if (dmt)
+		dm_task_destroy(dmt);
+
+	_quiet_log = 0;
+	return r;
+}
+
+int dm_flags(struct crypt_device *cd, dm_target_type target, uint32_t *flags)
+{
+	_dm_check_versions(cd, target);
+	*flags = _dm_flags;
+
+	if (target == DM_UNKNOWN &&
+	    _dm_crypt_checked && _dm_verity_checked && _dm_integrity_checked)
+		return 0;
+
+	if ((target == DM_CRYPT	    && _dm_crypt_checked) ||
+	    (target == DM_VERITY    && _dm_verity_checked) ||
+	    (target == DM_INTEGRITY && _dm_integrity_checked) ||
+	    (target == DM_LINEAR) || (target == DM_ZERO)) /* nothing to check */
+		return 0;
+
+	return -ENODEV;
+}
+
+/* This doesn't run any kernel checks, just set up userspace libdevmapper */
+void dm_backend_init(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (!_dm_use_count++) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Initialising device-mapper backend library.");
+		dm_log_init(set_dm_error);
+		dm_log_init_verbose(10);
+	}
+}
+
+void dm_backend_exit(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (_dm_use_count && (!--_dm_use_count)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Releasing device-mapper backend.");
+		dm_log_init_verbose(0);
+		dm_log_init(NULL);
+		dm_lib_release();
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * libdevmapper is not context friendly, switch context on every DM call.
+ * FIXME: this is not safe if called in parallel but neither is DM lib.
+ */
+static int dm_init_context(struct crypt_device *cd, dm_target_type target)
+{
+	_context = cd;
+	if (!_dm_check_versions(cd, target)) {
+		if (getuid() || geteuid())
+			log_err(cd, _("Cannot initialize device-mapper, "
+				      "running as non-root user."));
+		else
+			log_err(cd, _("Cannot initialize device-mapper. "
+				      "Is dm_mod kernel module loaded?"));
+		_context = NULL;
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+static void dm_exit_context(void)
+{
+	_context = NULL;
+}
+
+/* Return path to DM device */
+char *dm_device_path(const char *prefix, int major, int minor)
+{
+	struct dm_task *dmt;
+	const char *name;
+	char path[PATH_MAX];
+
+	if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(DM_DEVICE_STATUS)))
+		return NULL;
+	if (!dm_task_set_minor(dmt, minor) ||
+	    !dm_task_set_major(dmt, major) ||
+	    !dm_task_no_flush(dmt) ||
+	    !dm_task_run(dmt) ||
+	    !(name = dm_task_get_name(dmt))) {
+		dm_task_destroy(dmt);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s%s", prefix ?: "", name) < 0)
+		path[0] = '\0';
+
+	dm_task_destroy(dmt);
+
+	return strdup(path);
+}
+
+char *dm_device_name(const char *path)
+{
+	struct stat st;
+
+	if (stat(path, &st) < 0 || !S_ISBLK(st.st_mode))
+		return NULL;
+
+	return dm_device_path(NULL, major(st.st_rdev), minor(st.st_rdev));
+}
+
+static void hex_key(char *hexkey, size_t key_size, const char *key)
+{
+	unsigned i;
+
+	for(i = 0; i < key_size; i++)
+		sprintf(&hexkey[i * 2], "%02x", (unsigned char)key[i]);
+}
+
+static size_t int_log10(uint64_t x)
+{
+	uint64_t r = 0;
+	for (x /= 10; x > 0; x /= 10)
+		r++;
+	return r;
+}
+
+#define CLEN    64   /* 2*MAX_CIPHER_LEN */
+#define CLENS  "63"  /* for sscanf length + '\0' */
+#define CAPIL  144   /* should be enough to fit whole capi string */
+#define CAPIS "143"  /* for sscanf of crypto API string + 16  + \0 */
+
+static int cipher_c2dm(const char *org_c, const char *org_i, unsigned tag_size,
+		       char *c_dm, int c_dm_size,
+		       char *i_dm, int i_dm_size)
+{
+	int c_size = 0, i_size = 0, i;
+	char cipher[CLEN], mode[CLEN], iv[CLEN+1], tmp[CLEN];
+	char capi[CAPIL];
+
+	if (!c_dm || !c_dm_size || !i_dm || !i_dm_size)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	i = sscanf(org_c, "%" CLENS "[^-]-%" CLENS "s", cipher, tmp);
+	if (i != 2)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	i = sscanf(tmp, "%" CLENS "[^-]-%" CLENS "s", mode, iv);
+	if (i == 1) {
+		memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
+		strncpy(iv, mode, sizeof(iv)-1);
+		*mode = '\0';
+		if (snprintf(capi, sizeof(capi), "%s", cipher) < 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	} else if (i == 2) {
+		if (snprintf(capi, sizeof(capi), "%s(%s)", mode, cipher) < 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	} else
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!org_i) {
+		/* legacy mode: CIPHER-MODE-IV*/
+		i_size = snprintf(i_dm, i_dm_size, "%s", "");
+		c_size = snprintf(c_dm, c_dm_size, "%s", org_c);
+	} else if (!strcmp(org_i, "none")) {
+		/* IV only: capi:MODE(CIPHER)-IV */
+		i_size = snprintf(i_dm, i_dm_size, " integrity:%u:none", tag_size);
+		c_size = snprintf(c_dm, c_dm_size, "capi:%s-%s", capi, iv);
+	} else if (!strcmp(org_i, "aead") && !strcmp(mode, "ccm")) {
+		/* CCM AEAD: capi:rfc4309(MODE(CIPHER))-IV */
+		i_size = snprintf(i_dm, i_dm_size, " integrity:%u:aead", tag_size);
+		c_size = snprintf(c_dm, c_dm_size, "capi:rfc4309(%s)-%s", capi, iv);
+	} else if (!strcmp(org_i, "aead")) {
+		/* AEAD: capi:MODE(CIPHER))-IV */
+		i_size = snprintf(i_dm, i_dm_size, " integrity:%u:aead", tag_size);
+		c_size = snprintf(c_dm, c_dm_size, "capi:%s-%s", capi, iv);
+	} else if (!strcmp(org_i, "poly1305")) {
+		/* POLY1305 AEAD: capi:rfc7539(MODE(CIPHER),POLY1305)-IV */
+		i_size = snprintf(i_dm, i_dm_size, " integrity:%u:aead", tag_size);
+		c_size = snprintf(c_dm, c_dm_size, "capi:rfc7539(%s,poly1305)-%s", capi, iv);
+	} else {
+		/* other AEAD: capi:authenc(<AUTH>,MODE(CIPHER))-IV */
+		i_size = snprintf(i_dm, i_dm_size, " integrity:%u:aead", tag_size);
+		c_size = snprintf(c_dm, c_dm_size, "capi:authenc(%s,%s)-%s", org_i, capi, iv);
+	}
+
+	if (c_size < 0 || c_size == c_dm_size)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (i_size < 0 || i_size == i_dm_size)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cipher_dm2c(char **org_c, char **org_i, const char *c_dm, const char *i_dm)
+{
+	char cipher[CLEN], mode[CLEN], iv[CLEN], auth[CLEN];
+	char tmp[CAPIL], dmcrypt_tmp[CAPIL*2], capi[CAPIL+1];
+	size_t len;
+	int i;
+
+	if (!c_dm)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* legacy mode */
+	if (strncmp(c_dm, "capi:", 4)) {
+		if (!(*org_c = strdup(c_dm)))
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		*org_i = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* modes with capi: prefix */
+	i = sscanf(c_dm, "capi:%" CAPIS "[^-]-%" CLENS "s", tmp, iv);
+	if (i != 2)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	len = strlen(tmp);
+	if (len < 2)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (tmp[len-1] == ')')
+		tmp[len-1] = '\0';
+
+	if (sscanf(tmp, "rfc4309(%" CAPIS "s", capi) == 1) {
+		if (!(*org_i = strdup("aead")))
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	} else if (sscanf(tmp, "rfc7539(%" CAPIS "[^,],%" CLENS "s", capi, auth) == 2) {
+		if (!(*org_i = strdup(auth)))
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	} else if (sscanf(tmp, "authenc(%" CLENS "[^,],%" CAPIS "s", auth, capi) == 2) {
+		if (!(*org_i = strdup(auth)))
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	} else {
+		if (i_dm) {
+			if (!(*org_i = strdup(i_dm)))
+				return -ENOMEM;
+		} else
+			*org_i = NULL;
+		memset(capi, 0, sizeof(capi));
+		strncpy(capi, tmp, sizeof(capi)-1);
+	}
+
+	i = sscanf(capi, "%" CLENS "[^(](%" CLENS "[^)])", mode, cipher);
+	if (i == 2)
+		i = snprintf(dmcrypt_tmp, sizeof(dmcrypt_tmp), "%s-%s-%s", cipher, mode, iv);
+	else
+		i = snprintf(dmcrypt_tmp, sizeof(dmcrypt_tmp), "%s-%s", capi, iv);
+	if (i < 0 || (size_t)i >= sizeof(dmcrypt_tmp)) {
+		free(*org_i);
+		*org_i = NULL;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (!(*org_c = strdup(dmcrypt_tmp))) {
+		free(*org_i);
+		*org_i = NULL;
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static char *_uf(char *buf, size_t buf_size, const char *s, unsigned u)
+{
+	size_t r = snprintf(buf, buf_size, " %s:%u", s, u);
+	assert(r > 0 && r < buf_size);
+	return buf;
+}
+
+/* https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMCrypt */
+static char *get_dm_crypt_params(const struct dm_target *tgt, uint32_t flags)
+{
+	int r, max_size, null_cipher = 0, num_options = 0, keystr_len = 0;
+	char *params = NULL, *hexkey = NULL;
+	char sector_feature[32], features[512], integrity_dm[256], cipher_dm[256];
+
+	if (!tgt)
+		return NULL;
+
+	r = cipher_c2dm(tgt->u.crypt.cipher, tgt->u.crypt.integrity, tgt->u.crypt.tag_size,
+			cipher_dm, sizeof(cipher_dm), integrity_dm, sizeof(integrity_dm));
+	if (r < 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS)
+		num_options++;
+	if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT)
+		num_options++;
+	if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS)
+		num_options++;
+	if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE)
+		num_options++;
+	if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE)
+		num_options++;
+	if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IV_LARGE_SECTORS)
+		num_options++;
+	if (tgt->u.crypt.integrity)
+		num_options++;
+	if (tgt->u.crypt.sector_size != SECTOR_SIZE)
+		num_options++;
+
+	if (num_options) { /* MAX length  int32 + 15 + 15 + 23 + 18 + 19 + 17 + 13 + int32 + integrity_str */
+		r = snprintf(features, sizeof(features), " %d%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s", num_options,
+		(flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS) ? " allow_discards" : "",
+		(flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT) ? " same_cpu_crypt" : "",
+		(flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS) ? " submit_from_crypt_cpus" : "",
+		(flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE) ? " no_read_workqueue" : "",
+		(flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE) ? " no_write_workqueue" : "",
+		(flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IV_LARGE_SECTORS) ? " iv_large_sectors" : "",
+		(tgt->u.crypt.sector_size != SECTOR_SIZE) ?
+			_uf(sector_feature, sizeof(sector_feature), "sector_size", tgt->u.crypt.sector_size) : "",
+		integrity_dm);
+		if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(features))
+			goto out;
+	} else
+		*features = '\0';
+
+	if (crypt_is_cipher_null(cipher_dm))
+		null_cipher = 1;
+
+	if (null_cipher)
+		hexkey = crypt_safe_alloc(2);
+	else if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) {
+		keystr_len = strlen(tgt->u.crypt.vk->key_description) + int_log10(tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength) + 10;
+		hexkey = crypt_safe_alloc(keystr_len);
+	} else
+		hexkey = crypt_safe_alloc(tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength * 2 + 1);
+
+	if (!hexkey)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (null_cipher)
+		strncpy(hexkey, "-", 2);
+	else if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) {
+		r = snprintf(hexkey, keystr_len, ":%zu:logon:%s", tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength, tgt->u.crypt.vk->key_description);
+		if (r < 0 || r >= keystr_len)
+			goto out;
+	} else
+		hex_key(hexkey, tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength, tgt->u.crypt.vk->key);
+
+	max_size = strlen(hexkey) + strlen(cipher_dm) +
+		   strlen(device_block_path(tgt->data_device)) +
+		   strlen(features) + 64;
+	params = crypt_safe_alloc(max_size);
+	if (!params)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = snprintf(params, max_size, "%s %s %" PRIu64 " %s %" PRIu64 "%s",
+		     cipher_dm, hexkey, tgt->u.crypt.iv_offset,
+		     device_block_path(tgt->data_device), tgt->u.crypt.offset,
+		     features);
+	if (r < 0 || r >= max_size) {
+		crypt_safe_free(params);
+		params = NULL;
+	}
+out:
+	crypt_safe_free(hexkey);
+	return params;
+}
+
+/* https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMVerity */
+static char *get_dm_verity_params(const struct dm_target *tgt, uint32_t flags)
+{
+	int max_size, max_fec_size, max_verify_size, r, num_options = 0;
+	struct crypt_params_verity *vp;
+	char *params = NULL, *hexroot = NULL, *hexsalt = NULL;
+	char features[256], *fec_features = NULL, *verity_verify_args = NULL;
+
+	if (!tgt || !tgt->u.verity.vp)
+		return NULL;
+
+	vp = tgt->u.verity.vp;
+
+	/* These flags are not compatible */
+	if ((flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION) &&
+	    (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PANIC_ON_CORRUPTION))
+		flags &= ~CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION;
+	if ((flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_CORRUPTION) &&
+	    (flags & (CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION|CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PANIC_ON_CORRUPTION)))
+		flags &= ~CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_CORRUPTION;
+
+	if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_CORRUPTION)
+		num_options++;
+	if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION)
+		num_options++;
+	if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PANIC_ON_CORRUPTION)
+		num_options++;
+	if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_ZERO_BLOCKS)
+		num_options++;
+	if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_CHECK_AT_MOST_ONCE)
+		num_options++;
+
+	max_fec_size = (tgt->u.verity.fec_device ? strlen(device_block_path(tgt->u.verity.fec_device)) : 0) + 256;
+	fec_features = crypt_safe_alloc(max_fec_size);
+	if (!fec_features)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (tgt->u.verity.fec_device) {  /* MAX length 21 + path + 11 + int64 + 12 + int64 + 11 + int32 */
+		num_options += 8;
+		r = snprintf(fec_features, max_fec_size,
+			 " use_fec_from_device %s fec_start %" PRIu64 " fec_blocks %" PRIu64 " fec_roots %" PRIu32,
+			 device_block_path(tgt->u.verity.fec_device), tgt->u.verity.fec_offset,
+			 tgt->u.verity.fec_blocks, vp->fec_roots);
+		if (r < 0 || r >= max_fec_size)
+			goto out;
+	} else
+		*fec_features = '\0';
+
+	max_verify_size = (tgt->u.verity.root_hash_sig_key_desc ? strlen(tgt->u.verity.root_hash_sig_key_desc) : 0) + 32;
+	verity_verify_args = crypt_safe_alloc(max_verify_size);
+	if (!verity_verify_args)
+		goto out;
+	if (tgt->u.verity.root_hash_sig_key_desc) {  /* MAX length 24 + key_str */
+		num_options += 2;
+		r = snprintf(verity_verify_args, max_verify_size,
+				" root_hash_sig_key_desc %s", tgt->u.verity.root_hash_sig_key_desc);
+		if (r < 0 || r >= max_verify_size)
+			goto out;
+	} else
+		*verity_verify_args = '\0';
+
+	if (num_options) {  /* MAX length int32 + 18 + 22 + 20 + 19 + 19 */
+		r = snprintf(features, sizeof(features), " %d%s%s%s%s%s", num_options,
+		(flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_CORRUPTION) ? " ignore_corruption" : "",
+		(flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION) ? " restart_on_corruption" : "",
+		(flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PANIC_ON_CORRUPTION) ? " panic_on_corruption" : "",
+		(flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_ZERO_BLOCKS) ? " ignore_zero_blocks" : "",
+		(flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_CHECK_AT_MOST_ONCE) ? " check_at_most_once" : "");
+		if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(features))
+			goto out;
+	} else
+		*features = '\0';
+
+	hexroot = crypt_safe_alloc(tgt->u.verity.root_hash_size * 2 + 1);
+	if (!hexroot)
+		goto out;
+	hex_key(hexroot, tgt->u.verity.root_hash_size, tgt->u.verity.root_hash);
+
+	hexsalt = crypt_safe_alloc(vp->salt_size ? vp->salt_size * 2 + 1 : 2);
+	if (!hexsalt)
+		goto out;
+	if (vp->salt_size)
+		hex_key(hexsalt, vp->salt_size, vp->salt);
+	else
+		strncpy(hexsalt, "-", 2);
+
+	max_size = strlen(hexroot) + strlen(hexsalt) +
+		   strlen(device_block_path(tgt->data_device)) +
+		   strlen(device_block_path(tgt->u.verity.hash_device)) +
+		   strlen(vp->hash_name) + strlen(features) + strlen(fec_features) + 128 +
+		   strlen(verity_verify_args);
+
+	params = crypt_safe_alloc(max_size);
+	if (!params)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = snprintf(params, max_size,
+		     "%u %s %s %u %u %" PRIu64 " %" PRIu64 " %s %s %s%s%s%s",
+		     vp->hash_type, device_block_path(tgt->data_device),
+		     device_block_path(tgt->u.verity.hash_device),
+		     vp->data_block_size, vp->hash_block_size,
+		     vp->data_size, tgt->u.verity.hash_offset,
+		     vp->hash_name, hexroot, hexsalt, features, fec_features,
+		     verity_verify_args);
+	if (r < 0 || r >= max_size) {
+		crypt_safe_free(params);
+		params = NULL;
+	}
+out:
+	crypt_safe_free(fec_features);
+	crypt_safe_free(verity_verify_args);
+	crypt_safe_free(hexroot);
+	crypt_safe_free(hexsalt);
+	return params;
+}
+
+static char *get_dm_integrity_params(const struct dm_target *tgt, uint32_t flags)
+{
+	int r, max_size, max_integrity, max_journal_integrity, max_journal_crypt, num_options = 0;
+	char *params_out = NULL, *params, *hexkey, mode, feature[6][32];
+	char *features, *integrity, *journal_integrity, *journal_crypt;
+
+	if (!tgt)
+		return NULL;
+
+	max_integrity = (tgt->u.integrity.integrity && tgt->u.integrity.vk ? tgt->u.integrity.vk->keylength * 2 : 0) +
+		(tgt->u.integrity.integrity ? strlen(tgt->u.integrity.integrity) : 0) + 32;
+	max_journal_integrity = (tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity && tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key ?
+		tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key->keylength * 2 : 0) +
+		(tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity ? strlen(tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity) : 0) + 32;
+	max_journal_crypt = (tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt && tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key ?
+		tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key->keylength * 2 : 0) +
+		(tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt ? strlen(tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt) : 0) + 32;
+	max_size = strlen(device_block_path(tgt->data_device)) +
+		(tgt->u.integrity.meta_device ? strlen(device_block_path(tgt->u.integrity.meta_device)) : 0) +
+		max_integrity + max_journal_integrity + max_journal_crypt + 512;
+
+	params = crypt_safe_alloc(max_size);
+	features = crypt_safe_alloc(max_size);
+	integrity = crypt_safe_alloc(max_integrity);
+	journal_integrity = crypt_safe_alloc(max_journal_integrity);
+	journal_crypt = crypt_safe_alloc(max_journal_crypt);
+	if (!params || !features || !integrity || !journal_integrity || !journal_crypt)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (tgt->u.integrity.integrity) { /* MAX length 16 + str_integrity +  str_key */
+		num_options++;
+
+		if (tgt->u.integrity.vk) {
+			hexkey = crypt_safe_alloc(tgt->u.integrity.vk->keylength * 2 + 1);
+			if (!hexkey)
+				goto out;
+			hex_key(hexkey, tgt->u.integrity.vk->keylength, tgt->u.integrity.vk->key);
+		} else
+			hexkey = NULL;
+
+		r = snprintf(integrity, max_integrity, " internal_hash:%s%s%s",
+			 tgt->u.integrity.integrity, hexkey ? ":" : "", hexkey ?: "");
+		crypt_safe_free(hexkey);
+		if (r < 0 || r >= max_integrity)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity) { /* MAX length 14 + str_journal_integrity + str_key */
+		num_options++;
+
+		if (tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key) {
+			hexkey = crypt_safe_alloc(tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key->keylength * 2 + 1);
+			if (!hexkey)
+				goto out;
+			hex_key(hexkey, tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key->keylength,
+				tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key->key);
+		} else
+			hexkey = NULL;
+
+		r = snprintf(journal_integrity, max_journal_integrity, " journal_mac:%s%s%s",
+			 tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity, hexkey ? ":" : "", hexkey ?: "");
+		crypt_safe_free(hexkey);
+		if (r < 0 || r >= max_journal_integrity)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt) { /* MAX length 15 + str_journal_crypt + str_key */
+		num_options++;
+
+		if (tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key) {
+			hexkey = crypt_safe_alloc(tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key->keylength * 2 + 1);
+			if (!hexkey)
+				goto out;
+			hex_key(hexkey, tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key->keylength,
+				tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key->key);
+		} else
+			hexkey = NULL;
+
+		r = snprintf(journal_crypt, max_journal_crypt, " journal_crypt:%s%s%s",
+			 tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt, hexkey ? ":" : "", hexkey ?: "");
+		crypt_safe_free(hexkey);
+		if (r < 0 || r >= max_journal_crypt)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (tgt->u.integrity.journal_size)
+		num_options++;
+	if (tgt->u.integrity.journal_watermark)
+		num_options++;
+	if (tgt->u.integrity.journal_commit_time)
+		num_options++;
+	if (tgt->u.integrity.interleave_sectors)
+		num_options++;
+	if (tgt->u.integrity.sector_size)
+		num_options++;
+	if (tgt->u.integrity.buffer_sectors)
+		num_options++;
+	if (tgt->u.integrity.fix_padding)
+		num_options++;
+	if (tgt->u.integrity.fix_hmac)
+		num_options++;
+	if (tgt->u.integrity.legacy_recalc)
+		num_options++;
+	if (tgt->u.integrity.meta_device)
+		num_options++;
+	if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECALCULATE)
+		num_options++;
+	if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS)
+		num_options++;
+
+	r = snprintf(features, max_size, "%d%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s", num_options,
+		tgt->u.integrity.journal_size ? _uf(feature[0], sizeof(feature[0]), /* MAX length 17 + int32 */
+			"journal_sectors", (unsigned)(tgt->u.integrity.journal_size / SECTOR_SIZE)) : "",
+		tgt->u.integrity.journal_watermark ? _uf(feature[1], sizeof(feature[1]), /* MAX length 19 + int32 */
+			 /* bitmap overloaded values */
+			 (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL_BITMAP) ? "sectors_per_bit" : "journal_watermark",
+			 tgt->u.integrity.journal_watermark) : "",
+		tgt->u.integrity.journal_commit_time ? _uf(feature[2], sizeof(feature[2]), /* MAX length 23 + int32 */
+			 /* bitmap overloaded values */
+			 (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL_BITMAP) ? "bitmap_flush_interval" : "commit_time",
+			 tgt->u.integrity.journal_commit_time) : "",
+		tgt->u.integrity.interleave_sectors ? _uf(feature[3], sizeof(feature[3]), /* MAX length 20 + int32 */
+			"interleave_sectors", tgt->u.integrity.interleave_sectors) : "",
+		tgt->u.integrity.sector_size ? _uf(feature[4], sizeof(feature[4]), /* MAX length 12 + int32 */
+			"block_size", tgt->u.integrity.sector_size) : "",
+		tgt->u.integrity.buffer_sectors ? _uf(feature[5], sizeof(feature[5]), /* MAX length 16 + int32 */
+			"buffer_sectors", tgt->u.integrity.buffer_sectors) : "",
+		tgt->u.integrity.integrity ? integrity : "",
+		tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity ? journal_integrity : "",
+		tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt ? journal_crypt : "",
+		tgt->u.integrity.fix_padding ?  " fix_padding" : "", /* MAX length 12 */
+		tgt->u.integrity.fix_hmac ?  " fix_hmac" : "", /* MAX length 9 */
+		tgt->u.integrity.legacy_recalc ? " legacy_recalculate" : "", /* MAX length 19 */
+		flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECALCULATE ? " recalculate" : "", /* MAX length 12 */
+		flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS ? " allow_discards" : "", /* MAX length 15 */
+		tgt->u.integrity.meta_device ? " meta_device:" : "", /* MAX length 13 + str_device */
+		tgt->u.integrity.meta_device ? device_block_path(tgt->u.integrity.meta_device) : "");
+	if (r < 0 || r >= max_size)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL_BITMAP)
+		mode = 'B';
+	else if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECOVERY)
+		mode = 'R';
+	else if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL)
+		mode = 'D';
+	else
+		mode = 'J';
+
+	r = snprintf(params, max_size, "%s %" PRIu64 " %d %c %s",
+		     device_block_path(tgt->data_device), tgt->u.integrity.offset,
+		     tgt->u.integrity.tag_size, mode, features);
+	if (r < 0 || r >= max_size)
+		goto out;
+
+	params_out = params;
+out:
+	crypt_safe_free(features);
+	crypt_safe_free(integrity);
+	crypt_safe_free(journal_integrity);
+	crypt_safe_free(journal_crypt);
+	if (!params_out)
+		crypt_safe_free(params);
+
+	return params_out;
+}
+
+static char *get_dm_linear_params(const struct dm_target *tgt, uint32_t flags)
+{
+	char *params;
+	int r;
+	int max_size = strlen(device_block_path(tgt->data_device)) + int_log10(tgt->u.linear.offset) + 3;
+
+	params = crypt_safe_alloc(max_size);
+	if (!params)
+		return NULL;
+
+	r = snprintf(params, max_size, "%s %" PRIu64,
+		     device_block_path(tgt->data_device), tgt->u.linear.offset);
+
+	if (r < 0 || r >= max_size) {
+		crypt_safe_free(params);
+		params = NULL;
+	}
+
+	return params;
+}
+
+static char *get_dm_zero_params(const struct dm_target *tgt, uint32_t flags)
+{
+	char *params = crypt_safe_alloc(1);
+	if (!params)
+		return NULL;
+
+	params[0] = 0;
+	return params;
+}
+
+/* DM helpers */
+static int _dm_remove(const char *name, int udev_wait, int deferred)
+{
+	int r = 0;
+	struct dm_task *dmt;
+	uint32_t cookie = 0;
+
+	if (!_dm_use_udev())
+		udev_wait = 0;
+
+	if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(DM_DEVICE_REMOVE)))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!dm_task_set_name(dmt, name))
+		goto out;
+
+#if HAVE_DECL_DM_TASK_RETRY_REMOVE
+	if (!dm_task_retry_remove(dmt))
+		goto out;
+#endif
+#if HAVE_DECL_DM_TASK_DEFERRED_REMOVE
+	if (deferred && !dm_task_deferred_remove(dmt))
+		goto out;
+#endif
+	if (udev_wait && !_dm_task_set_cookie(dmt, &cookie, DM_UDEV_DISABLE_LIBRARY_FALLBACK))
+		goto out;
+
+	r = dm_task_run(dmt);
+
+	if (udev_wait)
+		(void)_dm_udev_wait(cookie);
+out:
+	dm_task_destroy(dmt);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _dm_simple(int task, const char *name, uint32_t dmflags)
+{
+	int r = 0;
+	struct dm_task *dmt;
+
+	if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(task)))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (name && !dm_task_set_name(dmt, name))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (task == DM_DEVICE_SUSPEND &&
+	    (dmflags & DM_SUSPEND_SKIP_LOCKFS) && !dm_task_skip_lockfs(dmt))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (task == DM_DEVICE_SUSPEND &&
+	    (dmflags & DM_SUSPEND_NOFLUSH) && !dm_task_no_flush(dmt))
+		goto out;
+
+	r = dm_task_run(dmt);
+out:
+	dm_task_destroy(dmt);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _dm_resume_device(const char *name, uint32_t flags);
+
+static int _error_device(const char *name, size_t size)
+{
+	struct dm_task *dmt;
+	int r = 0;
+
+	if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(DM_DEVICE_RELOAD)))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!dm_task_set_name(dmt, name))
+		goto error;
+
+	if (!dm_task_add_target(dmt, UINT64_C(0), size, "error", ""))
+		goto error;
+
+	if (!dm_task_set_ro(dmt))
+		goto error;
+
+	if (!dm_task_no_open_count(dmt))
+		goto error;
+
+	if (!dm_task_run(dmt))
+		goto error;
+
+	if (_dm_resume_device(name, 0)) {
+		_dm_simple(DM_DEVICE_CLEAR, name, 0);
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	r = 1;
+
+error:
+	dm_task_destroy(dmt);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int dm_error_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd;
+
+	if (!name)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (dm_init_context(cd, DM_UNKNOWN))
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+
+	if ((dm_query_device(cd, name, 0, &dmd) >= 0) && _error_device(name, dmd.size))
+		r = 0;
+	else
+		r = -EINVAL;
+
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+
+	dm_exit_context();
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int dm_clear_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (!name)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (dm_init_context(cd, DM_UNKNOWN))
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+
+	if (_dm_simple(DM_DEVICE_CLEAR, name, 0))
+		r = 0;
+	else
+		r = -EINVAL;
+
+	dm_exit_context();
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int dm_remove_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, uint32_t flags)
+{
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd = {};
+	int r = -EINVAL;
+	int retries = (flags & CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_FORCE) ? RETRY_COUNT : 1;
+	int deferred = (flags & CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_DEFERRED) ? 1 : 0;
+	int error_target = 0;
+	uint32_t dmt_flags;
+
+	if (!name)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (dm_init_context(cd, DM_UNKNOWN))
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+
+	if (deferred && !dm_flags(cd, DM_UNKNOWN, &dmt_flags) && !(dmt_flags & DM_DEFERRED_SUPPORTED)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Requested deferred flag is not supported."));
+		dm_exit_context();
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+	}
+
+	do {
+		r = _dm_remove(name, 1, deferred) ? 0 : -EINVAL;
+		if (--retries && r) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "WARNING: other process locked internal device %s, %s.",
+				name, retries ? "retrying remove" : "giving up");
+			sleep(1);
+			if ((flags & CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_FORCE) && !error_target) {
+				/* If force flag is set, replace device with error, read-only target.
+				 * it should stop processes from reading it and also removed underlying
+				 * device from mapping, so it is usable again.
+				 * Anyway, if some process try to read temporary cryptsetup device,
+				 * it is bug - no other process should try touch it (e.g. udev).
+				 */
+				if (!dm_query_device(cd, name, 0, &dmd)) {
+					_error_device(name, dmd.size);
+					error_target = 1;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	} while (r == -EINVAL && retries);
+
+	dm_task_update_nodes();
+	dm_exit_context();
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+#define UUID_LEN 37 /* 36 + \0, libuuid ... */
+/*
+ * UUID has format: CRYPT-<devicetype>-[<uuid>-]<device name>
+ * CRYPT-PLAIN-name
+ * CRYPT-LUKS1-00000000000000000000000000000000-name
+ * CRYPT-TEMP-name
+ */
+static int dm_prepare_uuid(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, const char *type,
+			    const char *uuid, char *buf, size_t buflen)
+{
+	char *ptr, uuid2[UUID_LEN] = {0};
+	uuid_t uu;
+	int i = 0;
+
+	/* Remove '-' chars */
+	if (uuid) {
+		if (uuid_parse(uuid, uu) < 0) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Requested UUID %s has invalid format.", uuid);
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		for (ptr = uuid2, i = 0; i < UUID_LEN; i++)
+			if (uuid[i] != '-') {
+				*ptr = uuid[i];
+				ptr++;
+			}
+	}
+
+	i = snprintf(buf, buflen, DM_UUID_PREFIX "%s%s%s%s%s",
+		type ?: "", type ? "-" : "",
+		uuid2[0] ? uuid2 : "", uuid2[0] ? "-" : "",
+		name);
+	if (i < 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "DM-UUID is %s", buf);
+	if ((size_t)i >= buflen)
+		log_err(cd, _("DM-UUID for device %s was truncated."), name);
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+int lookup_dm_dev_by_uuid(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *uuid, const char *type)
+{
+	int r;
+	char *c;
+	char dev_uuid[DM_UUID_LEN + DM_BY_ID_PREFIX_LEN] = DM_BY_ID_PREFIX;
+
+	if (!dm_prepare_uuid(cd, "", type, uuid, dev_uuid + DM_BY_ID_PREFIX_LEN, DM_UUID_LEN))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	c = strrchr(dev_uuid, '-');
+	if (!c)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* cut of dm name */
+	*c = '\0';
+
+	r = lookup_by_disk_id(dev_uuid);
+	if (r == -ENOENT) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Search by disk id not available. Using sysfs instead.");
+		r = lookup_by_sysfs_uuid_field(dev_uuid + DM_BY_ID_PREFIX_LEN, DM_UUID_LEN);
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _add_dm_targets(struct dm_task *dmt, struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd)
+{
+	const char *target;
+	struct dm_target *tgt = &dmd->segment;
+
+	do {
+		switch (tgt->type) {
+		case DM_CRYPT:
+			target = DM_CRYPT_TARGET;
+			break;
+		case DM_VERITY:
+			target = DM_VERITY_TARGET;
+			break;
+		case DM_INTEGRITY:
+			target = DM_INTEGRITY_TARGET;
+			break;
+		case DM_LINEAR:
+			target = DM_LINEAR_TARGET;
+			break;
+		case DM_ZERO:
+			target = DM_ZERO_TARGET;
+			break;
+		default:
+			return -ENOTSUP;
+		}
+
+		if (!dm_task_add_target(dmt, tgt->offset, tgt->size, target, tgt->params))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		tgt = tgt->next;
+	} while (tgt);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void _destroy_dm_targets_params(struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd)
+{
+	struct dm_target *t = &dmd->segment;
+
+	do {
+		crypt_safe_free(t->params);
+		t->params = NULL;
+		t = t->next;
+	} while (t);
+}
+
+static int _create_dm_targets_params(struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct dm_target *tgt = &dmd->segment;
+
+	do {
+		if (tgt->type == DM_CRYPT)
+			tgt->params = get_dm_crypt_params(tgt, dmd->flags);
+		else if (tgt->type == DM_VERITY)
+			tgt->params = get_dm_verity_params(tgt, dmd->flags);
+		else if (tgt->type == DM_INTEGRITY)
+			tgt->params = get_dm_integrity_params(tgt, dmd->flags);
+		else if (tgt->type == DM_LINEAR)
+			tgt->params = get_dm_linear_params(tgt, dmd->flags);
+		else if (tgt->type == DM_ZERO)
+			tgt->params = get_dm_zero_params(tgt, dmd->flags);
+		else {
+			r = -ENOTSUP;
+			goto err;
+		}
+
+		if (!tgt->params) {
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			goto err;
+		}
+		tgt = tgt->next;
+	} while (tgt);
+
+	return 0;
+err:
+	_destroy_dm_targets_params(dmd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static bool dm_device_exists(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+	int r = dm_status_device(cd, name);
+	return (r >= 0 || r == -EEXIST);
+}
+
+static int _dm_create_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, const char *type,
+			     const char *uuid, struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd)
+{
+	struct dm_task *dmt = NULL;
+	struct dm_info dmi;
+	char dev_uuid[DM_UUID_LEN] = {0};
+	int r = -EINVAL;
+	uint32_t cookie = 0, read_ahead = 0;
+	uint16_t udev_flags = DM_UDEV_DISABLE_LIBRARY_FALLBACK;
+
+	if (dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PRIVATE)
+		udev_flags |= CRYPT_TEMP_UDEV_FLAGS;
+
+	/* All devices must have DM_UUID, only resize on old device is exception */
+	if (!dm_prepare_uuid(cd, name, type, dmd->uuid, dev_uuid, sizeof(dev_uuid)))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(DM_DEVICE_CREATE)))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!dm_task_set_name(dmt, name))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!dm_task_set_uuid(dmt, dev_uuid))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!dm_task_secure_data(dmt))
+		goto out;
+	if ((dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY) && !dm_task_set_ro(dmt))
+		goto out;
+
+	r = _create_dm_targets_params(dmd);
+	if (r)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = _add_dm_targets(dmt, dmd);
+	if (r)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = -EINVAL;
+
+#ifdef DM_READ_AHEAD_MINIMUM_FLAG
+	if (device_read_ahead(dmd->segment.data_device, &read_ahead) &&
+	    !dm_task_set_read_ahead(dmt, read_ahead, DM_READ_AHEAD_MINIMUM_FLAG))
+		goto out;
+#endif
+	if (_dm_use_udev() && !_dm_task_set_cookie(dmt, &cookie, udev_flags))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!dm_task_run(dmt)) {
+		if (dm_device_exists(cd, name))
+			r = -EEXIST;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (dm_task_get_info(dmt, &dmi))
+		r = 0;
+
+	if (_dm_use_udev()) {
+		(void)_dm_udev_wait(cookie);
+		cookie = 0;
+	}
+
+	if (r < 0)
+		_dm_remove(name, 1, 0);
+
+out:
+	if (cookie && _dm_use_udev())
+		(void)_dm_udev_wait(cookie);
+
+	if (dmt)
+		dm_task_destroy(dmt);
+
+	dm_task_update_nodes();
+
+	/* If code just loaded target module, update versions */
+	_dm_check_versions(cd, dmd->segment.type);
+
+	_destroy_dm_targets_params(dmd);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _dm_resume_device(const char *name, uint32_t dmflags)
+{
+	struct dm_task *dmt;
+	int r = -EINVAL;
+	uint32_t cookie = 0;
+	uint16_t udev_flags = DM_UDEV_DISABLE_LIBRARY_FALLBACK;
+
+	if (dmflags & DM_RESUME_PRIVATE)
+		udev_flags |= CRYPT_TEMP_UDEV_FLAGS;
+
+	if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(DM_DEVICE_RESUME)))
+		return r;
+
+	if (!dm_task_set_name(dmt, name))
+		goto out;
+
+	if ((dmflags & DM_SUSPEND_SKIP_LOCKFS) && !dm_task_skip_lockfs(dmt))
+		goto out;
+
+	if ((dmflags & DM_SUSPEND_NOFLUSH) && !dm_task_no_flush(dmt))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (_dm_use_udev() && !_dm_task_set_cookie(dmt, &cookie, udev_flags))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (dm_task_run(dmt))
+		r = 0;
+out:
+	if (cookie && _dm_use_udev())
+		(void)_dm_udev_wait(cookie);
+
+	dm_task_destroy(dmt);
+
+	dm_task_update_nodes();
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _dm_reload_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+			     struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd)
+{
+	int r = -EINVAL;
+	struct dm_task *dmt = NULL;
+	uint32_t read_ahead = 0;
+
+	/* All devices must have DM_UUID, only resize on old device is exception */
+	if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(DM_DEVICE_RELOAD)))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!dm_task_set_name(dmt, name))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!dm_task_secure_data(dmt))
+		goto out;
+	if ((dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY) && !dm_task_set_ro(dmt))
+		goto out;
+
+	r = _create_dm_targets_params(dmd);
+	if (r)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = _add_dm_targets(dmt, dmd);
+	if (r)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = -EINVAL;
+
+#ifdef DM_READ_AHEAD_MINIMUM_FLAG
+	if (device_read_ahead(dmd->segment.data_device, &read_ahead) &&
+	    !dm_task_set_read_ahead(dmt, read_ahead, DM_READ_AHEAD_MINIMUM_FLAG))
+		goto out;
+#endif
+
+	if (dm_task_run(dmt))
+		r = 0;
+out:
+	if (dmt)
+		dm_task_destroy(dmt);
+
+	/* If code just loaded target module, update versions */
+	_dm_check_versions(cd, dmd->segment.type);
+
+	_destroy_dm_targets_params(dmd);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static void crypt_free_verity_params(struct crypt_params_verity *vp)
+{
+	if (!vp)
+		return;
+
+	free(CONST_CAST(void*)vp->hash_name);
+	free(CONST_CAST(void*)vp->data_device);
+	free(CONST_CAST(void*)vp->hash_device);
+	free(CONST_CAST(void*)vp->fec_device);
+	free(CONST_CAST(void*)vp->salt);
+	free(vp);
+}
+
+static void _dm_target_free_query_path(struct crypt_device *cd, struct dm_target *tgt)
+{
+	switch(tgt->type) {
+	case DM_CRYPT:
+		crypt_free_volume_key(tgt->u.crypt.vk);
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)tgt->u.crypt.cipher);
+		break;
+	case DM_INTEGRITY:
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)tgt->u.integrity.integrity);
+		crypt_free_volume_key(tgt->u.integrity.vk);
+
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity);
+		crypt_free_volume_key(tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key);
+
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt);
+		crypt_free_volume_key(tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key);
+
+		device_free(cd, tgt->u.integrity.meta_device);
+		break;
+	case DM_VERITY:
+		crypt_free_verity_params(tgt->u.verity.vp);
+		device_free(cd, tgt->u.verity.hash_device);
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)tgt->u.verity.root_hash);
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)tgt->u.verity.root_hash_sig_key_desc);
+		/* fall through */
+	case DM_LINEAR:
+		/* fall through */
+	case DM_ERROR:
+		/* fall through */
+	case DM_ZERO:
+		break;
+	default:
+		log_err(cd, _("Unknown dm target type."));
+		return;
+	}
+
+	device_free(cd, tgt->data_device);
+}
+
+static void _dm_target_erase(struct crypt_device *cd, struct dm_target *tgt)
+{
+	if (tgt->direction == TARGET_QUERY)
+		_dm_target_free_query_path(cd, tgt);
+
+	if (tgt->type == DM_CRYPT)
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)tgt->u.crypt.integrity);
+}
+
+void dm_targets_free(struct crypt_device *cd, struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd)
+{
+	struct dm_target *t = &dmd->segment, *next = t->next;
+
+	_dm_target_erase(cd, t);
+
+	while (next) {
+		t = next;
+		next = t->next;
+		_dm_target_erase(cd, t);
+		free(t);
+	}
+
+	memset(&dmd->segment, 0, sizeof(dmd->segment));
+}
+
+int dm_targets_allocate(struct dm_target *first, unsigned count)
+{
+	if (!first || first->next || !count)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	while (--count) {
+		first->next = crypt_zalloc(sizeof(*first));
+		if (!first->next)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		first = first->next;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int check_retry(struct crypt_device *cd, uint32_t *dmd_flags, uint32_t dmt_flags)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	/* If discard not supported try to load without discard */
+	if ((*dmd_flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS) &&
+	    !(dmt_flags & DM_DISCARDS_SUPPORTED)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Discard/TRIM is not supported");
+		*dmd_flags = *dmd_flags & ~CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS;
+		ret = 1;
+	}
+
+	/* If kernel keyring is not supported load key directly in dm-crypt */
+	if ((*dmd_flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) &&
+	    !(dmt_flags & DM_KERNEL_KEYRING_SUPPORTED)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "dm-crypt does not support kernel keyring");
+		*dmd_flags = *dmd_flags & ~CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY;
+		ret = 1;
+	}
+
+	/* Drop performance options if not supported */
+	if ((*dmd_flags & (CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS)) &&
+	    !(dmt_flags & (DM_SAME_CPU_CRYPT_SUPPORTED | DM_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS_SUPPORTED))) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "dm-crypt does not support performance options");
+		*dmd_flags = *dmd_flags & ~(CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS);
+		ret = 1;
+	}
+
+	/* Drop no workqueue options if not supported */
+	if ((*dmd_flags & (CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE)) &&
+	    !(dmt_flags & DM_CRYPT_NO_WORKQUEUE_SUPPORTED)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "dm-crypt does not support performance options");
+		*dmd_flags = *dmd_flags & ~(CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE);
+		ret = 1;
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int dm_create_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+		     const char *type,
+		     struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd)
+{
+	uint32_t dmt_flags = 0;
+	int r = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!type || !dmd)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (dm_init_context(cd, dmd->segment.type))
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+
+	r = _dm_create_device(cd, name, type, dmd->uuid, dmd);
+
+	if (r < 0 && dm_flags(cd, dmd->segment.type, &dmt_flags))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (r && (dmd->segment.type == DM_CRYPT || dmd->segment.type == DM_LINEAR || dmd->segment.type == DM_ZERO) &&
+		check_retry(cd, &dmd->flags, dmt_flags)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Retrying open without incompatible options.");
+		r = _dm_create_device(cd, name, type, dmd->uuid, dmd);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Print warning if activating dm-crypt cipher_null device unless it's reencryption helper or
+	 * keyslot encryption helper device (LUKS1 cipher_null devices).
+	 */
+	if (!r && !(dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PRIVATE) && single_segment(dmd) && dmd->segment.type == DM_CRYPT &&
+	    crypt_is_cipher_null(dmd->segment.u.crypt.cipher))
+		log_dbg(cd, "Activated dm-crypt device with cipher_null. Device is not encrypted.");
+
+	if (r == -EINVAL &&
+	    dmd->flags & (CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT|CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS) &&
+	    !(dmt_flags & (DM_SAME_CPU_CRYPT_SUPPORTED|DM_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS_SUPPORTED)))
+		log_err(cd, _("Requested dm-crypt performance options are not supported."));
+
+	if (r == -EINVAL &&
+	    dmd->flags & (CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE) &&
+	    !(dmt_flags & DM_CRYPT_NO_WORKQUEUE_SUPPORTED))
+		log_err(cd, _("Requested dm-crypt performance options are not supported."));
+
+	if (r == -EINVAL && dmd->flags & (CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_CORRUPTION|
+					  CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION|
+					  CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_ZERO_BLOCKS|
+					  CRYPT_ACTIVATE_CHECK_AT_MOST_ONCE) &&
+	    !(dmt_flags & DM_VERITY_ON_CORRUPTION_SUPPORTED))
+		log_err(cd, _("Requested dm-verity data corruption handling options are not supported."));
+
+	if (r == -EINVAL && dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PANIC_ON_CORRUPTION &&
+	    !(dmt_flags & DM_VERITY_PANIC_CORRUPTION_SUPPORTED))
+		log_err(cd, _("Requested dm-verity data corruption handling options are not supported."));
+
+	if (r == -EINVAL && dmd->segment.type == DM_VERITY &&
+	    dmd->segment.u.verity.fec_device && !(dmt_flags & DM_VERITY_FEC_SUPPORTED))
+		log_err(cd, _("Requested dm-verity FEC options are not supported."));
+
+	if (r == -EINVAL && dmd->segment.type == DM_CRYPT) {
+		if (dmd->segment.u.crypt.integrity && !(dmt_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_SUPPORTED))
+			log_err(cd, _("Requested data integrity options are not supported."));
+		if (dmd->segment.u.crypt.sector_size != SECTOR_SIZE && !(dmt_flags & DM_SECTOR_SIZE_SUPPORTED))
+			log_err(cd, _("Requested sector_size option is not supported."));
+	}
+
+	if (r == -EINVAL && dmd->segment.type == DM_INTEGRITY && (dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECALCULATE) &&
+	    !(dmt_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_RECALC_SUPPORTED))
+		log_err(cd, _("Requested automatic recalculation of integrity tags is not supported."));
+
+	if (r == -EINVAL && dmd->segment.type == DM_INTEGRITY && (dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS) &&
+	    !(dmt_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_DISCARDS_SUPPORTED))
+		log_err(cd, _("Discard/TRIM is not supported."));
+
+	if (r == -EINVAL && dmd->segment.type == DM_INTEGRITY && (dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL_BITMAP) &&
+	    !(dmt_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_BITMAP_SUPPORTED))
+		log_err(cd, _("Requested dm-integrity bitmap mode is not supported."));
+out:
+	dm_exit_context();
+	return r;
+}
+
+int dm_reload_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+		     struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd, uint32_t dmflags, unsigned resume)
+{
+	int r;
+	uint32_t dmt_flags;
+
+	if (!dmd)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (dm_init_context(cd, dmd->segment.type))
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+
+	if (dm_flags(cd, DM_INTEGRITY, &dmt_flags) || !(dmt_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_RECALC_SUPPORTED))
+		dmd->flags &= ~CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECALCULATE;
+
+	r = _dm_reload_device(cd, name, dmd);
+
+	if (r == -EINVAL && (dmd->segment.type == DM_CRYPT || dmd->segment.type == DM_LINEAR)) {
+		if ((dmd->flags & (CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT|CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS)) &&
+		    !dm_flags(cd, DM_CRYPT, &dmt_flags) && !(dmt_flags & (DM_SAME_CPU_CRYPT_SUPPORTED | DM_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS_SUPPORTED)))
+			log_err(cd, _("Requested dm-crypt performance options are not supported."));
+		if ((dmd->flags & (CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE)) &&
+		    !dm_flags(cd, DM_CRYPT, &dmt_flags) && !(dmt_flags & DM_CRYPT_NO_WORKQUEUE_SUPPORTED))
+			log_err(cd, _("Requested dm-crypt performance options are not supported."));
+		if ((dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS) &&
+		    !dm_flags(cd, DM_CRYPT, &dmt_flags) && !(dmt_flags & DM_DISCARDS_SUPPORTED))
+			log_err(cd, _("Discard/TRIM is not supported."));
+		if ((dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS) &&
+		    !dm_flags(cd, DM_INTEGRITY, &dmt_flags) && !(dmt_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_DISCARDS_SUPPORTED))
+			log_err(cd, _("Discard/TRIM is not supported."));
+	}
+
+	if (!r && resume)
+		r = _dm_resume_device(name, dmflags | act2dmflags(dmd->flags));
+
+	dm_exit_context();
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int dm_status_dmi(const char *name, struct dm_info *dmi,
+			  const char *target, char **status_line)
+{
+	struct dm_task *dmt;
+	uint64_t start, length;
+	char *target_type, *params = NULL;
+	int r = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(DM_DEVICE_STATUS)))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!dm_task_no_flush(dmt))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!dm_task_set_name(dmt, name))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!dm_task_run(dmt))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!dm_task_get_info(dmt, dmi))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!dmi->exists) {
+		r = -ENODEV;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = -EEXIST;
+	dm_get_next_target(dmt, NULL, &start, &length,
+			   &target_type, &params);
+
+	if (!target_type || start != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (target && strcmp(target_type, target))
+		goto out;
+
+	/* for target == NULL check all supported */
+	if (!target && (strcmp(target_type, DM_CRYPT_TARGET) &&
+			strcmp(target_type, DM_VERITY_TARGET) &&
+			strcmp(target_type, DM_INTEGRITY_TARGET) &&
+			strcmp(target_type, DM_LINEAR_TARGET) &&
+			strcmp(target_type, DM_ZERO_TARGET) &&
+			strcmp(target_type, DM_ERROR_TARGET)))
+		goto out;
+	r = 0;
+out:
+	if (!r && status_line && !(*status_line = strdup(params)))
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (dmt)
+		dm_task_destroy(dmt);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int dm_status_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct dm_info dmi;
+	struct stat st;
+
+	/* libdevmapper is too clever and handles
+	 * path argument differently with error.
+	 * Fail early here if parameter is non-existent path.
+	 */
+	if (strchr(name, '/') && stat(name, &st) < 0)
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	if (dm_init_context(cd, DM_UNKNOWN))
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+	r = dm_status_dmi(name, &dmi, NULL, NULL);
+	dm_exit_context();
+
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	return (dmi.open_count > 0) ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+int dm_status_suspended(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct dm_info dmi;
+
+	if (dm_init_context(cd, DM_UNKNOWN))
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+	r = dm_status_dmi(name, &dmi, NULL, NULL);
+	dm_exit_context();
+
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	return dmi.suspended ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+static int _dm_status_verity_ok(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct dm_info dmi;
+	char *status_line = NULL;
+
+	r = dm_status_dmi(name, &dmi, DM_VERITY_TARGET, &status_line);
+	if (r < 0 || !status_line) {
+		free(status_line);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Verity volume %s status is %s.", name, status_line ?: "");
+	r = status_line[0] == 'V' ? 1 : 0;
+	free(status_line);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int dm_status_verity_ok(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (dm_init_context(cd, DM_VERITY))
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+	r = _dm_status_verity_ok(cd, name);
+	dm_exit_context();
+	return r;
+}
+
+int dm_status_integrity_failures(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, uint64_t *count)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct dm_info dmi;
+	char *status_line = NULL;
+
+	if (dm_init_context(cd, DM_INTEGRITY))
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+
+	r = dm_status_dmi(name, &dmi, DM_INTEGRITY_TARGET, &status_line);
+	if (r < 0 || !status_line) {
+		free(status_line);
+		dm_exit_context();
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Integrity volume %s failure status is %s.", name, status_line ?: "");
+	*count = strtoull(status_line, NULL, 10);
+	free(status_line);
+	dm_exit_context();
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* FIXME use hex wrapper, user val wrappers for line parsing */
+static int _dm_target_query_crypt(struct crypt_device *cd, uint32_t get_flags,
+				  char *params, struct dm_target *tgt,
+				  uint32_t *act_flags)
+{
+	uint64_t val64;
+	char *rcipher, *rintegrity, *key_, *rdevice, *endp, buffer[3], *arg, *key_desc;
+	unsigned int i, val;
+	int r;
+	size_t key_size;
+	struct device *data_device = NULL;
+	char *cipher = NULL, *integrity = NULL;
+	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+
+	tgt->type = DM_CRYPT;
+	tgt->direction = TARGET_QUERY;
+	tgt->u.crypt.sector_size = SECTOR_SIZE;
+
+	r = -EINVAL;
+
+	rcipher = strsep(&params, " ");
+	rintegrity = NULL;
+
+	/* skip */
+	key_ = strsep(&params, " ");
+	if (!params)
+		goto err;
+	val64 = strtoull(params, &params, 10);
+	if (*params != ' ')
+		goto err;
+	params++;
+
+	tgt->u.crypt.iv_offset = val64;
+
+	/* device */
+	rdevice = strsep(&params, " ");
+	if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE) {
+		arg = crypt_lookup_dev(rdevice);
+		r = device_alloc(cd, &data_device, arg);
+		free(arg);
+		if (r < 0 && r != -ENOTBLK)
+			goto err;
+	}
+
+	r = -EINVAL;
+
+	/*offset */
+	if (!params)
+		goto err;
+	val64 = strtoull(params, &params, 10);
+	tgt->u.crypt.offset = val64;
+
+	tgt->u.crypt.tag_size = 0;
+
+	/* Features section, available since crypt target version 1.11 */
+	if (*params) {
+		if (*params != ' ')
+			goto err;
+		params++;
+
+		/* Number of arguments */
+		val64 = strtoull(params, &params, 10);
+		if (*params != ' ')
+			goto err;
+		params++;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < val64; i++) {
+			if (!params)
+				goto err;
+			arg = strsep(&params, " ");
+			if (!strcasecmp(arg, "allow_discards"))
+				*act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS;
+			else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "same_cpu_crypt"))
+				*act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT;
+			else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "submit_from_crypt_cpus"))
+				*act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS;
+			else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "no_read_workqueue"))
+				*act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE;
+			else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "no_write_workqueue"))
+				*act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE;
+			else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "iv_large_sectors"))
+				*act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IV_LARGE_SECTORS;
+			else if (sscanf(arg, "integrity:%u:", &val) == 1) {
+				tgt->u.crypt.tag_size = val;
+				rintegrity = strchr(arg + strlen("integrity:"), ':');
+				if (!rintegrity)
+					goto err;
+				rintegrity++;
+			} else if (sscanf(arg, "sector_size:%u", &val) == 1) {
+				tgt->u.crypt.sector_size = val;
+			} else /* unknown option */
+				goto err;
+		}
+
+		/* All parameters should be processed */
+		if (params)
+			goto err;
+	}
+
+	/* cipher */
+	if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_CIPHER) {
+		r = cipher_dm2c(CONST_CAST(char**)&cipher,
+				CONST_CAST(char**)&integrity,
+				rcipher, rintegrity);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto err;
+	}
+
+	r = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (key_[0] == ':')
+		*act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY;
+
+	if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE) {
+		/* we will trust kernel the key_string is in expected format */
+		if (key_[0] == ':') {
+			if (sscanf(key_ + 1, "%zu", &key_size) != 1)
+				goto err;
+		} else
+			key_size = strlen(key_) / 2;
+
+		vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(key_size, NULL);
+		if (!vk) {
+			r = -ENOMEM;
+			goto err;
+		}
+
+		if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEY) {
+			if (key_[0] == ':') {
+				/* :<key_size>:<key_type>:<key_description> */
+				key_desc = NULL;
+				endp = strpbrk(key_ + 1, ":");
+				if (endp)
+					key_desc = strpbrk(endp + 1, ":");
+				if (!key_desc) {
+					r = -ENOMEM;
+					goto err;
+				}
+				key_desc++;
+				crypt_volume_key_set_description(vk, key_desc);
+			} else {
+				buffer[2] = '\0';
+				for(i = 0; i < vk->keylength; i++) {
+					memcpy(buffer, &key_[i * 2], 2);
+					vk->key[i] = strtoul(buffer, &endp, 16);
+					if (endp != &buffer[2]) {
+						r = -EINVAL;
+						goto err;
+					}
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	memset(key_, 0, strlen(key_));
+
+	if (cipher)
+		tgt->u.crypt.cipher = cipher;
+	if (integrity)
+		tgt->u.crypt.integrity = integrity;
+	if (data_device)
+		tgt->data_device = data_device;
+	if (vk)
+		tgt->u.crypt.vk = vk;
+	return 0;
+err:
+	free(cipher);
+	free(integrity);
+	device_free(cd, data_device);
+	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _dm_target_query_verity(struct crypt_device *cd,
+				   uint32_t get_flags,
+			           char *params,
+			           struct dm_target *tgt,
+				   uint32_t *act_flags)
+{
+	struct crypt_params_verity *vp = NULL;
+	uint32_t val32;
+	uint64_t val64;
+	ssize_t len;
+	char *str, *str2, *arg;
+	unsigned int i, features;
+	int r;
+	struct device *data_device = NULL, *hash_device = NULL, *fec_device = NULL;
+	char *hash_name = NULL, *root_hash = NULL, *salt = NULL, *fec_dev_str = NULL;
+	char *root_hash_sig_key_desc = NULL;
+
+	if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_VERITY_PARAMS) {
+		vp = crypt_zalloc(sizeof(*vp));
+		if (!vp)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	tgt->type = DM_VERITY;
+	tgt->direction = TARGET_QUERY;
+	tgt->u.verity.vp = vp;
+
+	/* version */
+	val32 = strtoul(params, &params, 10);
+	if (*params != ' ')
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (vp)
+		vp->hash_type = val32;
+	params++;
+
+	/* data device */
+	str = strsep(&params, " ");
+	if (!params)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE) {
+		str2 = crypt_lookup_dev(str);
+		r = device_alloc(cd, &data_device, str2);
+		free(str2);
+		if (r < 0 && r != -ENOTBLK)
+			return r;
+	}
+
+	r = -EINVAL;
+
+	/* hash device */
+	str = strsep(&params, " ");
+	if (!params)
+		goto err;
+	if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_VERITY_HASH_DEVICE) {
+		str2 = crypt_lookup_dev(str);
+		r = device_alloc(cd, &hash_device, str2);
+		free(str2);
+		if (r < 0 && r != -ENOTBLK)
+			goto err;
+	}
+
+	r = -EINVAL;
+
+	/* data block size*/
+	val32 = strtoul(params, &params, 10);
+	if (*params != ' ')
+		goto err;
+	if (vp)
+		vp->data_block_size = val32;
+	params++;
+
+	/* hash block size */
+	val32 = strtoul(params, &params, 10);
+	if (*params != ' ')
+		goto err;
+	if (vp)
+		vp->hash_block_size = val32;
+	params++;
+
+	/* data blocks */
+	val64 = strtoull(params, &params, 10);
+	if (*params != ' ')
+		goto err;
+	if (vp)
+		vp->data_size = val64;
+	params++;
+
+	/* hash start */
+	val64 = strtoull(params, &params, 10);
+	if (*params != ' ')
+		goto err;
+	tgt->u.verity.hash_offset = val64;
+	params++;
+
+	/* hash algorithm */
+	str = strsep(&params, " ");
+	if (!params)
+		goto err;
+	if (vp) {
+		hash_name = strdup(str);
+		if (!hash_name) {
+			r = -ENOMEM;
+			goto err;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* root digest */
+	str = strsep(&params, " ");
+	if (!params)
+		goto err;
+	len = crypt_hex_to_bytes(str, &str2, 0);
+	if (len < 0) {
+		r = len;
+		goto err;
+	}
+	tgt->u.verity.root_hash_size = len;
+	if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_VERITY_ROOT_HASH)
+		root_hash = str2;
+	else
+		free(str2);
+
+	/* salt */
+	str = strsep(&params, " ");
+	if (vp) {
+		if (!strcmp(str, "-")) {
+			vp->salt_size = 0;
+			vp->salt = NULL;
+		} else {
+			len = crypt_hex_to_bytes(str, &str2, 0);
+			if (len < 0) {
+				r = len;
+				goto err;
+			}
+			vp->salt_size = len;
+			salt = str2;
+		}
+	}
+
+	r = -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Features section, available since verity target version 1.3 */
+	if (params) {
+		/* Number of arguments */
+		val64 = strtoull(params, &params, 10);
+		if (*params != ' ')
+			goto err;
+		params++;
+
+		features = (int)val64;
+		for (i = 0; i < features; i++) {
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			if (!params)
+				goto err;
+			arg = strsep(&params, " ");
+			if (!strcasecmp(arg, "ignore_corruption"))
+				*act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_CORRUPTION;
+			else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "restart_on_corruption"))
+				*act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RESTART_ON_CORRUPTION;
+			else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "panic_on_corruption"))
+				*act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PANIC_ON_CORRUPTION;
+			else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "ignore_zero_blocks"))
+				*act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IGNORE_ZERO_BLOCKS;
+			else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "check_at_most_once"))
+				*act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_CHECK_AT_MOST_ONCE;
+			else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "use_fec_from_device")) {
+				str = strsep(&params, " ");
+				str2 = crypt_lookup_dev(str);
+				if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_VERITY_HASH_DEVICE) {
+					r = device_alloc(cd, &fec_device, str2);
+					if (r < 0 && r != -ENOTBLK) {
+						free(str2);
+						goto err;
+					}
+				}
+				if (vp) {
+					free(fec_dev_str);
+					fec_dev_str = str2;
+				} else
+					free(str2);
+				i++;
+			} else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "fec_start")) {
+				val64 = strtoull(params, &params, 10);
+				if (*params)
+					params++;
+				tgt->u.verity.fec_offset = val64;
+				if (vp)
+					vp->fec_area_offset = val64 * vp->hash_block_size;
+				i++;
+			} else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "fec_blocks")) {
+				val64 = strtoull(params, &params, 10);
+				if (*params)
+					params++;
+				tgt->u.verity.fec_blocks = val64;
+				i++;
+			} else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "fec_roots")) {
+				val32 = strtoul(params, &params, 10);
+				if (*params)
+					params++;
+				if (vp)
+					vp->fec_roots = val32;
+				i++;
+			} else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "root_hash_sig_key_desc")) {
+				str = strsep(&params, " ");
+				if (!str)
+					goto err;
+				if (!root_hash_sig_key_desc) {
+					root_hash_sig_key_desc = strdup(str);
+					if (!root_hash_sig_key_desc) {
+						r = -ENOMEM;
+						goto err;
+					}
+				}
+				i++;
+				if (vp)
+					vp->flags |= CRYPT_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_SIGNATURE;
+			} else /* unknown option */
+				goto err;
+		}
+
+		/* All parameters should be processed */
+		if (params && *params) {
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			goto err;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (data_device)
+		tgt->data_device = data_device;
+	if (hash_device)
+		tgt->u.verity.hash_device = hash_device;
+	if (fec_device)
+		tgt->u.verity.fec_device = fec_device;
+	if (root_hash)
+		tgt->u.verity.root_hash = root_hash;
+	if (vp && hash_name)
+		vp->hash_name = hash_name;
+	if (vp && salt)
+		vp->salt = salt;
+	if (vp && fec_dev_str)
+		vp->fec_device = fec_dev_str;
+	if (root_hash_sig_key_desc)
+		tgt->u.verity.root_hash_sig_key_desc = root_hash_sig_key_desc;
+
+	return 0;
+err:
+	device_free(cd, data_device);
+	device_free(cd, hash_device);
+	device_free(cd, fec_device);
+	free(root_hash_sig_key_desc);
+	free(root_hash);
+	free(hash_name);
+	free(salt);
+	free(fec_dev_str);
+	free(vp);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _dm_target_query_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			     uint32_t get_flags,
+			     char *params,
+			     struct dm_target *tgt,
+			     uint32_t *act_flags)
+{
+	uint32_t val32;
+	uint64_t val64;
+	char c, *str, *str2, *arg;
+	unsigned int i, features, val;
+	ssize_t len;
+	int r;
+	struct device *data_device = NULL, *meta_device = NULL;
+	char *integrity = NULL, *journal_crypt = NULL, *journal_integrity = NULL;
+	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+
+	tgt->type = DM_INTEGRITY;
+	tgt->direction = TARGET_QUERY;
+
+	/* data device */
+	str = strsep(&params, " ");
+	if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE) {
+		str2 = crypt_lookup_dev(str);
+		r = device_alloc(cd, &data_device, str2);
+		free(str2);
+		if (r < 0 && r != -ENOTBLK)
+			return r;
+	}
+
+	r = -EINVAL;
+
+	/*offset */
+	if (!params)
+		goto err;
+	val64 = strtoull(params, &params, 10);
+	if (!*params || *params != ' ')
+		goto err;
+	tgt->u.integrity.offset = val64;
+
+	/* tag size*/
+	val32 = strtoul(params, &params, 10);
+	tgt->u.integrity.tag_size = val32;
+	if (!*params || *params != ' ')
+		goto err;
+
+	/* journal */
+	c = toupper(*(++params));
+	if (!*params || *(++params) != ' ' || (c != 'D' && c != 'J' && c != 'R' && c != 'B'))
+		goto err;
+	if (c == 'D')
+		*act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL;
+	if (c == 'R')
+		*act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECOVERY;
+	if (c == 'B') {
+		*act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL;
+		*act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_JOURNAL_BITMAP;
+	}
+
+	tgt->u.integrity.sector_size = SECTOR_SIZE;
+
+	/* Features section */
+	if (params) {
+		/* Number of arguments */
+		val64 = strtoull(params, &params, 10);
+		if (*params != ' ')
+			goto err;
+		params++;
+
+		features = (int)val64;
+		for (i = 0; i < features; i++) {
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			if (!params)
+				goto err;
+			arg = strsep(&params, " ");
+			if (sscanf(arg, "journal_sectors:%u", &val) == 1)
+				tgt->u.integrity.journal_size = val * SECTOR_SIZE;
+			else if (sscanf(arg, "journal_watermark:%u", &val) == 1)
+				tgt->u.integrity.journal_watermark = val;
+			else if (sscanf(arg, "sectors_per_bit:%" PRIu64, &val64) == 1) {
+				if (val64 > UINT_MAX)
+					goto err;
+				/* overloaded value for bitmap mode */
+				tgt->u.integrity.journal_watermark = (unsigned int)val64;
+			} else if (sscanf(arg, "commit_time:%u", &val) == 1)
+				tgt->u.integrity.journal_commit_time = val;
+			else if (sscanf(arg, "bitmap_flush_interval:%u", &val) == 1)
+				/* overloaded value for bitmap mode */
+				tgt->u.integrity.journal_commit_time = val;
+			else if (sscanf(arg, "interleave_sectors:%u", &val) == 1)
+				tgt->u.integrity.interleave_sectors = val;
+			else if (sscanf(arg, "block_size:%u", &val) == 1)
+				tgt->u.integrity.sector_size = val;
+			else if (sscanf(arg, "buffer_sectors:%u", &val) == 1)
+				tgt->u.integrity.buffer_sectors = val;
+			else if (!strncmp(arg, "internal_hash:", 14) && !integrity) {
+				str = &arg[14];
+				arg = strsep(&str, ":");
+				if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_INTEGRITY_PARAMS) {
+					integrity = strdup(arg);
+					if (!integrity) {
+						r = -ENOMEM;
+						goto err;
+					}
+				}
+
+				if (str) {
+					len = crypt_hex_to_bytes(str, &str2, 1);
+					if (len < 0) {
+						r = len;
+						goto err;
+					}
+
+					r = 0;
+					if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEY) {
+						vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(len, str2);
+						if (!vk)
+							r = -ENOMEM;
+					} else if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE) {
+						vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(len, NULL);
+						if (!vk)
+							r = -ENOMEM;
+					}
+					crypt_safe_free(str2);
+					if (r < 0)
+						goto err;
+				}
+			} else if (!strncmp(arg, "meta_device:", 12) && !meta_device) {
+				if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE) {
+					str = crypt_lookup_dev(&arg[12]);
+					r = device_alloc(cd, &meta_device, str);
+					free(str);
+					if (r < 0 && r != -ENOTBLK)
+						goto err;
+				}
+			} else if (!strncmp(arg, "journal_crypt:", 14) && !journal_crypt) {
+				str = &arg[14];
+				arg = strsep(&str, ":");
+				if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_INTEGRITY_PARAMS) {
+					journal_crypt = strdup(arg);
+					if (!journal_crypt) {
+						r = -ENOMEM;
+						goto err;
+					}
+				}
+			} else if (!strncmp(arg, "journal_mac:", 12) && !journal_integrity) {
+				str = &arg[12];
+				arg = strsep(&str, ":");
+				if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_INTEGRITY_PARAMS) {
+					journal_integrity = strdup(arg);
+					if (!journal_integrity) {
+						r = -ENOMEM;
+						goto err;
+					}
+				}
+			} else if (!strcmp(arg, "recalculate")) {
+				*act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_RECALCULATE;
+			} else if (!strcmp(arg, "fix_padding")) {
+				tgt->u.integrity.fix_padding = true;
+			} else if (!strcmp(arg, "fix_hmac")) {
+				tgt->u.integrity.fix_hmac = true;
+			} else if (!strcmp(arg, "legacy_recalculate")) {
+				tgt->u.integrity.legacy_recalc = true;
+			} else if (!strcmp(arg, "allow_discards")) {
+				*act_flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS;
+			} else /* unknown option */
+				goto err;
+		}
+
+		/* All parameters should be processed */
+		if (params && *params) {
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			goto err;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (data_device)
+		tgt->data_device = data_device;
+	if (meta_device)
+		tgt->u.integrity.meta_device = meta_device;
+	if (integrity)
+		tgt->u.integrity.integrity = integrity;
+	if (journal_crypt)
+		tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt = journal_crypt;
+	if (journal_integrity)
+		tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity = journal_integrity;
+	if (vk)
+		tgt->u.integrity.vk = vk;
+	return 0;
+err:
+	device_free(cd, data_device);
+	device_free(cd, meta_device);
+	free(integrity);
+	free(journal_crypt);
+	free(journal_integrity);
+	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _dm_target_query_linear(struct crypt_device *cd, struct dm_target *tgt,
+				   uint32_t get_flags, char *params)
+{
+	uint64_t val64;
+	char *rdevice, *arg;
+	int r;
+	struct device *device = NULL;
+
+	/* device */
+	rdevice = strsep(&params, " ");
+	if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE) {
+		arg = crypt_lookup_dev(rdevice);
+		r = device_alloc(cd, &device, arg);
+		free(arg);
+		if (r < 0 && r != -ENOTBLK)
+			return r;
+	}
+
+	r = -EINVAL;
+
+	/*offset */
+	if (!params)
+		goto err;
+	val64 = strtoull(params, &params, 10);
+
+	/* params should be empty now */
+	if (*params)
+		goto err;
+
+	tgt->type = DM_LINEAR;
+	tgt->direction = TARGET_QUERY;
+	tgt->data_device = device;
+	tgt->u.linear.offset = val64;
+
+	return 0;
+err:
+	device_free(cd, device);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _dm_target_query_error(struct crypt_device *cd, struct dm_target *tgt)
+{
+	tgt->type = DM_ERROR;
+	tgt->direction = TARGET_QUERY;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int _dm_target_query_zero(struct crypt_device *cd, struct dm_target *tgt)
+{
+	tgt->type = DM_ZERO;
+	tgt->direction = TARGET_QUERY;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * on error retval has to be negative
+ *
+ * also currently any _dm_target_query fn does not perform cleanup on error
+ */
+static int dm_target_query(struct crypt_device *cd, struct dm_target *tgt, const uint64_t *start,
+		    const uint64_t *length, const char *target_type,
+		    char *params, uint32_t get_flags, uint32_t *act_flags)
+{
+	int r = -ENOTSUP;
+
+	if (!strcmp(target_type, DM_CRYPT_TARGET))
+		r = _dm_target_query_crypt(cd, get_flags, params, tgt, act_flags);
+	else if (!strcmp(target_type, DM_VERITY_TARGET))
+		r = _dm_target_query_verity(cd, get_flags, params, tgt, act_flags);
+	else if (!strcmp(target_type, DM_INTEGRITY_TARGET))
+		r = _dm_target_query_integrity(cd, get_flags, params, tgt, act_flags);
+	else if (!strcmp(target_type, DM_LINEAR_TARGET))
+		r = _dm_target_query_linear(cd, tgt, get_flags, params);
+	else if (!strcmp(target_type, DM_ERROR_TARGET))
+		r = _dm_target_query_error(cd, tgt);
+	else if (!strcmp(target_type, DM_ZERO_TARGET))
+		r = _dm_target_query_zero(cd, tgt);
+
+	if (!r) {
+		tgt->offset = *start;
+		tgt->size = *length;
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _dm_query_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+		    uint32_t get_flags, struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd)
+{
+	struct dm_target *t;
+	struct dm_task *dmt;
+	struct dm_info dmi;
+	uint64_t start, length;
+	char *target_type, *params;
+	const char *tmp_uuid;
+	void *next = NULL;
+	int r = -EINVAL;
+
+	t = &dmd->segment;
+
+	if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(DM_DEVICE_TABLE)))
+		return r;
+	if (!dm_task_secure_data(dmt))
+		goto out;
+	if (!dm_task_set_name(dmt, name))
+		goto out;
+	r = -ENODEV;
+	if (!dm_task_run(dmt))
+		goto out;
+
+	r = -EINVAL;
+	if (!dm_task_get_info(dmt, &dmi))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!dmi.exists) {
+		r = -ENODEV;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (dmi.target_count <= 0) {
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Never allow to return empty key */
+	if ((get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEY) && dmi.suspended) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Cannot read volume key while suspended.");
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = dm_targets_allocate(&dmd->segment, dmi.target_count);
+	if (r)
+		goto out;
+
+	do {
+		next = dm_get_next_target(dmt, next, &start, &length,
+	                                  &target_type, &params);
+
+		r = dm_target_query(cd, t, &start, &length, target_type, params, get_flags, &dmd->flags);
+		if (!r && t->type == DM_VERITY) {
+			r = _dm_status_verity_ok(cd, name);
+			if (r == 0)
+				dmd->flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_CORRUPTED;
+		}
+
+		if (r < 0) {
+			if (r != -ENOTSUP)
+				log_err(cd, _("Failed to query dm-%s segment."), target_type);
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		dmd->size += length;
+		t = t->next;
+	} while (next && t);
+
+	if (dmi.read_only)
+		dmd->flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY;
+
+	if (dmi.suspended)
+		dmd->flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUSPENDED;
+
+	tmp_uuid = dm_task_get_uuid(dmt);
+	if (!tmp_uuid)
+		dmd->flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_UUID;
+	else if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_UUID) {
+		if (!strncmp(tmp_uuid, DM_UUID_PREFIX, DM_UUID_PREFIX_LEN))
+			dmd->uuid = strdup(tmp_uuid + DM_UUID_PREFIX_LEN);
+	}
+
+	dmd->holders = 0;
+#if (HAVE_DECL_DM_DEVICE_HAS_HOLDERS && HAVE_DECL_DM_DEVICE_HAS_MOUNTED_FS)
+	if (get_flags & DM_ACTIVE_HOLDERS)
+		dmd->holders = (dm_device_has_mounted_fs(dmi.major, dmi.minor) ||
+				dm_device_has_holders(dmi.major, dmi.minor));
+#endif
+
+	r = (dmi.open_count > 0);
+out:
+	if (dmt)
+		dm_task_destroy(dmt);
+
+	if (r < 0)
+		dm_targets_free(cd, dmd);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int dm_query_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+		    uint32_t get_flags, struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (!dmd)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	memset(dmd, 0, sizeof(*dmd));
+
+	if (dm_init_context(cd, DM_UNKNOWN))
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+
+	r = _dm_query_device(cd, name, get_flags, dmd);
+
+	dm_exit_context();
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _process_deps(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *prefix, struct dm_deps *deps, char **names, size_t names_offset, size_t names_length)
+{
+#if HAVE_DECL_DM_DEVICE_GET_NAME
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd;
+	char dmname[PATH_MAX];
+	unsigned i;
+	int r, major, minor, count = 0;
+
+	if (!prefix || !deps)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < deps->count; i++) {
+		major = major(deps->device[i]);
+		if (!dm_is_dm_major(major))
+			continue;
+
+		minor = minor(deps->device[i]);
+		if (!dm_device_get_name(major, minor, 0, dmname, PATH_MAX))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		memset(&dmd, 0, sizeof(dmd));
+		r = _dm_query_device(cd, dmname, DM_ACTIVE_UUID, &dmd);
+		if (r < 0)
+			continue;
+
+		if (!dmd.uuid ||
+		    strncmp(prefix, dmd.uuid, strlen(prefix)) ||
+		    crypt_string_in(dmname, names, names_length))
+			*dmname = '\0';
+
+		dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)dmd.uuid);
+
+		if ((size_t)count >= (names_length - names_offset))
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		if (*dmname && !(names[names_offset + count++] = strdup(dmname)))
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	return count;
+#else
+	return -EINVAL;
+#endif
+}
+
+int dm_device_deps(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, const char *prefix, char **names, size_t names_length)
+{
+	struct dm_task *dmt;
+	struct dm_info dmi;
+	struct dm_deps *deps;
+	int r = -EINVAL;
+	size_t i, last = 0, offset = 0;
+
+	if (!name || !names_length || !names)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (dm_init_context(cd, DM_UNKNOWN))
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+
+	while (name) {
+		if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(DM_DEVICE_DEPS)))
+			goto out;
+		if (!dm_task_set_name(dmt, name))
+			goto out;
+
+		r = -ENODEV;
+		if (!dm_task_run(dmt))
+			goto out;
+
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		if (!dm_task_get_info(dmt, &dmi))
+			goto out;
+		if (!(deps = dm_task_get_deps(dmt)))
+			goto out;
+
+		r = -ENODEV;
+		if (!dmi.exists)
+			goto out;
+
+		r = _process_deps(cd, prefix, deps, names, offset, names_length - 1);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+
+		dm_task_destroy(dmt);
+		dmt = NULL;
+
+		offset += r;
+		name = names[last++];
+	}
+
+	r = 0;
+out:
+	if (r < 0) {
+		for (i = 0; i < names_length - 1; i++)
+			free(names[i]);
+		*names = NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (dmt)
+		dm_task_destroy(dmt);
+
+	dm_exit_context();
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _dm_message(const char *name, const char *msg)
+{
+	int r = 0;
+	struct dm_task *dmt;
+
+	if (!(dmt = dm_task_create(DM_DEVICE_TARGET_MSG)))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!dm_task_secure_data(dmt))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (name && !dm_task_set_name(dmt, name))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!dm_task_set_sector(dmt, (uint64_t) 0))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!dm_task_set_message(dmt, msg))
+		goto out;
+
+	r = dm_task_run(dmt);
+out:
+	dm_task_destroy(dmt);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int dm_suspend_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, uint32_t dmflags)
+{
+	uint32_t dmt_flags;
+	int r = -ENOTSUP;
+
+	if (dm_init_context(cd, DM_UNKNOWN))
+		return r;
+
+	if (dmflags & DM_SUSPEND_WIPE_KEY) {
+		if (dm_flags(cd, DM_CRYPT, &dmt_flags))
+			goto out;
+
+		if (!(dmt_flags & DM_KEY_WIPE_SUPPORTED))
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!_dm_simple(DM_DEVICE_SUSPEND, name, dmflags))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (dmflags & DM_SUSPEND_WIPE_KEY) {
+		if (!_dm_message(name, "key wipe")) {
+			_dm_resume_device(name, 0);
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	r = 0;
+out:
+	dm_exit_context();
+	return r;
+}
+
+int dm_resume_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, uint32_t dmflags)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (dm_init_context(cd, DM_UNKNOWN))
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+
+	r = _dm_resume_device(name, dmflags);
+
+	dm_exit_context();
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int dm_resume_and_reinstate_key(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+				const struct volume_key *vk)
+{
+	uint32_t dmt_flags;
+	int msg_size;
+	char *msg = NULL;
+	int r = -ENOTSUP;
+
+	if (dm_init_context(cd, DM_CRYPT) || dm_flags(cd, DM_CRYPT, &dmt_flags))
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+
+	if (!(dmt_flags & DM_KEY_WIPE_SUPPORTED))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!vk->keylength)
+		msg_size = 11; // key set -
+	else if (vk->key_description)
+		msg_size = strlen(vk->key_description) + int_log10(vk->keylength) + 18;
+	else
+		msg_size = vk->keylength * 2 + 10; // key set <key>
+
+	msg = crypt_safe_alloc(msg_size);
+	if (!msg) {
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	strcpy(msg, "key set ");
+	if (!vk->keylength)
+		snprintf(msg + 8, msg_size - 8, "-");
+	else if (vk->key_description)
+		snprintf(msg + 8, msg_size - 8, ":%zu:logon:%s", vk->keylength, vk->key_description);
+	else
+		hex_key(&msg[8], vk->keylength, vk->key);
+
+	if (!_dm_message(name, msg) ||
+	    _dm_resume_device(name, 0)) {
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	r = 0;
+out:
+	crypt_safe_free(msg);
+	dm_exit_context();
+	return r;
+}
+
+const char *dm_get_dir(void)
+{
+	return dm_dir();
+}
+
+int dm_is_dm_device(int major)
+{
+	return dm_is_dm_major((uint32_t)major);
+}
+
+int dm_is_dm_kernel_name(const char *name)
+{
+	return strncmp(name, "dm-", 3) ? 0 : 1;
+}
+
+int dm_crypt_target_set(struct dm_target *tgt, uint64_t seg_offset, uint64_t seg_size,
+	struct device *data_device, struct volume_key *vk, const char *cipher,
+	uint64_t iv_offset, uint64_t data_offset, const char *integrity, uint32_t tag_size,
+	uint32_t sector_size)
+{
+	int r = -EINVAL;
+
+	/* free on error */
+	char *dm_integrity = NULL;
+
+	if (tag_size) {
+		/* Space for IV metadata only */
+		dm_integrity = strdup(integrity ?: "none");
+		if (!dm_integrity) {
+			r = -ENOMEM;
+			goto err;
+		}
+	}
+
+	tgt->data_device = data_device;
+
+	tgt->type = DM_CRYPT;
+	tgt->direction = TARGET_SET;
+	tgt->u.crypt.vk = vk;
+	tgt->offset = seg_offset;
+	tgt->size = seg_size;
+
+	tgt->u.crypt.cipher = cipher;
+	tgt->u.crypt.integrity = dm_integrity;
+	tgt->u.crypt.iv_offset = iv_offset;
+	tgt->u.crypt.offset = data_offset;
+	tgt->u.crypt.tag_size = tag_size;
+	tgt->u.crypt.sector_size = sector_size;
+
+	return 0;
+err:
+	free(dm_integrity);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int dm_verity_target_set(struct dm_target *tgt, uint64_t seg_offset, uint64_t seg_size,
+	struct device *data_device, struct device *hash_device, struct device *fec_device,
+	const char *root_hash, uint32_t root_hash_size, const char* root_hash_sig_key_desc,
+	uint64_t hash_offset_block, uint64_t fec_blocks, struct crypt_params_verity *vp)
+{
+	if (!data_device || !hash_device || !vp)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	tgt->type = DM_VERITY;
+	tgt->direction = TARGET_SET;
+	tgt->offset = seg_offset;
+	tgt->size = seg_size;
+	tgt->data_device = data_device;
+
+	tgt->u.verity.hash_device = hash_device;
+	tgt->u.verity.fec_device = fec_device;
+	tgt->u.verity.root_hash = root_hash;
+	tgt->u.verity.root_hash_size = root_hash_size;
+	tgt->u.verity.root_hash_sig_key_desc = root_hash_sig_key_desc;
+	tgt->u.verity.hash_offset = hash_offset_block;
+	tgt->u.verity.fec_offset = vp->fec_area_offset / vp->hash_block_size;
+	tgt->u.verity.fec_blocks = fec_blocks;
+	tgt->u.verity.vp = vp;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int dm_integrity_target_set(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			struct dm_target *tgt, uint64_t seg_offset, uint64_t seg_size,
+			struct device *meta_device,
+		        struct device *data_device, uint64_t tag_size, uint64_t offset,
+			uint32_t sector_size, struct volume_key *vk,
+			struct volume_key *journal_crypt_key, struct volume_key *journal_mac_key,
+			const struct crypt_params_integrity *ip)
+{
+	uint32_t dmi_flags;
+
+	if (!data_device)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	_dm_check_versions(cd, DM_INTEGRITY);
+
+	tgt->type = DM_INTEGRITY;
+	tgt->direction = TARGET_SET;
+	tgt->offset = seg_offset;
+	tgt->size = seg_size;
+	tgt->data_device = data_device;
+	if (meta_device != data_device)
+		tgt->u.integrity.meta_device = meta_device;
+	tgt->u.integrity.tag_size = tag_size;
+	tgt->u.integrity.offset = offset;
+	tgt->u.integrity.sector_size = sector_size;
+
+	tgt->u.integrity.vk = vk;
+	tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key = journal_crypt_key;
+	tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key = journal_mac_key;
+
+	if (!dm_flags(cd, DM_INTEGRITY, &dmi_flags) &&
+	    (dmi_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_FIX_PADDING_SUPPORTED) &&
+	    !(crypt_get_compatibility(cd) & CRYPT_COMPAT_LEGACY_INTEGRITY_PADDING))
+		tgt->u.integrity.fix_padding = true;
+
+	if (!dm_flags(cd, DM_INTEGRITY, &dmi_flags) &&
+	    (dmi_flags & DM_INTEGRITY_FIX_HMAC_SUPPORTED) &&
+	    !(crypt_get_compatibility(cd) & CRYPT_COMPAT_LEGACY_INTEGRITY_HMAC))
+		tgt->u.integrity.fix_hmac = true;
+
+	/* This flag can be backported, just try to set it always */
+	if (crypt_get_compatibility(cd) & CRYPT_COMPAT_LEGACY_INTEGRITY_RECALC)
+		tgt->u.integrity.legacy_recalc = true;
+
+	if (ip) {
+		tgt->u.integrity.journal_size = ip->journal_size;
+		tgt->u.integrity.journal_watermark = ip->journal_watermark;
+		tgt->u.integrity.journal_commit_time = ip->journal_commit_time;
+		tgt->u.integrity.interleave_sectors = ip->interleave_sectors;
+		tgt->u.integrity.buffer_sectors = ip->buffer_sectors;
+		tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity = ip->journal_integrity;
+		tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt = ip->journal_crypt;
+		tgt->u.integrity.integrity = ip->integrity;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int dm_linear_target_set(struct dm_target *tgt, uint64_t seg_offset, uint64_t seg_size,
+	struct device *data_device, uint64_t data_offset)
+{
+	if (!data_device)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	tgt->type = DM_LINEAR;
+	tgt->direction = TARGET_SET;
+	tgt->offset = seg_offset;
+	tgt->size = seg_size;
+	tgt->data_device = data_device;
+
+	tgt->u.linear.offset = data_offset;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int dm_zero_target_set(struct dm_target *tgt, uint64_t seg_offset, uint64_t seg_size)
+{
+	tgt->type = DM_ZERO;
+	tgt->direction = TARGET_SET;
+	tgt->offset = seg_offset;
+	tgt->size = seg_size;
+
+	return 0;
+}