Adding upstream version 2:2.3.7.upstream/2%2.3.7upstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 6110 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/lib/setup.c b/lib/setup.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..376b920
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/setup.c
@@ -0,0 +1,6110 @@
+/*
+ * libcryptsetup - cryptsetup library
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2007 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009-2021 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
+ * of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <sys/utsname.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include "libcryptsetup.h"
+#include "luks.h"
+#include "luks2.h"
+#include "loopaes.h"
+#include "verity.h"
+#include "tcrypt.h"
+#include "integrity.h"
+#include "bitlk.h"
+#include "utils_device_locking.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+#define CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED	(1 << 0)
+#define CRYPT_CD_QUIET		(1 << 1)
+
+struct crypt_device {
+	char *type;
+
+	struct device *device;
+	struct device *metadata_device;
+
+	struct volume_key *volume_key;
+	int rng_type;
+	uint32_t compatibility;
+	struct crypt_pbkdf_type pbkdf;
+
+	/* global context scope settings */
+	unsigned key_in_keyring:1;
+
+	uint64_t data_offset;
+	uint64_t metadata_size; /* Used in LUKS2 format */
+	uint64_t keyslots_size; /* Used in LUKS2 format */
+
+	/* Workaround for OOM during parallel activation (like in systemd) */
+	bool memory_hard_pbkdf_lock_enabled;
+	struct crypt_lock_handle *pbkdf_memory_hard_lock;
+
+	// FIXME: private binary headers and access it properly
+	// through sub-library (LUKS1, TCRYPT)
+
+	union {
+	struct { /* used in CRYPT_LUKS1 */
+		struct luks_phdr hdr;
+		char *cipher_spec;
+	} luks1;
+	struct { /* used in CRYPT_LUKS2 */
+		struct luks2_hdr hdr;
+		char cipher[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];	  /* only for compatibility */
+		char cipher_mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN]; /* only for compatibility */
+		char *keyslot_cipher;
+		unsigned int keyslot_key_size;
+		struct luks2_reencrypt *rh;
+	} luks2;
+	struct { /* used in CRYPT_PLAIN */
+		struct crypt_params_plain hdr;
+		char *cipher_spec;
+		char *cipher;
+		const char *cipher_mode;
+		unsigned int key_size;
+	} plain;
+	struct { /* used in CRYPT_LOOPAES */
+		struct crypt_params_loopaes hdr;
+		char *cipher_spec;
+		char *cipher;
+		const char *cipher_mode;
+		unsigned int key_size;
+	} loopaes;
+	struct { /* used in CRYPT_VERITY */
+		struct crypt_params_verity hdr;
+		const char *root_hash;
+		unsigned int root_hash_size;
+		char *uuid;
+		struct device *fec_device;
+	} verity;
+	struct { /* used in CRYPT_TCRYPT */
+		struct crypt_params_tcrypt params;
+		struct tcrypt_phdr hdr;
+	} tcrypt;
+	struct { /* used in CRYPT_INTEGRITY */
+		struct crypt_params_integrity params;
+		struct volume_key *journal_mac_key;
+		struct volume_key *journal_crypt_key;
+		uint32_t sb_flags;
+	} integrity;
+	struct { /* used in CRYPT_BITLK */
+		struct bitlk_metadata params;
+		char *cipher_spec;
+	} bitlk;
+	struct { /* used if initialized without header by name */
+		char *active_name;
+		/* buffers, must refresh from kernel on every query */
+		char cipher_spec[MAX_CIPHER_LEN*2+1];
+		char cipher[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
+		const char *cipher_mode;
+		unsigned int key_size;
+	} none;
+	} u;
+
+	/* callbacks definitions */
+	void (*log)(int level, const char *msg, void *usrptr);
+	void *log_usrptr;
+	int (*confirm)(const char *msg, void *usrptr);
+	void *confirm_usrptr;
+};
+
+/* Just to suppress redundant messages about crypto backend */
+static int _crypto_logged = 0;
+
+/* Log helper */
+static void (*_default_log)(int level, const char *msg, void *usrptr) = NULL;
+static int _debug_level = 0;
+
+/* Library can do metadata locking  */
+static int _metadata_locking = 1;
+
+/* Library scope detection for kernel keyring support */
+static int _kernel_keyring_supported;
+
+/* Library allowed to use kernel keyring for loading VK in kernel crypto layer */
+static int _vk_via_keyring = 1;
+
+void crypt_set_debug_level(int level)
+{
+	_debug_level = level;
+}
+
+int crypt_get_debug_level(void)
+{
+	return _debug_level;
+}
+
+void crypt_log(struct crypt_device *cd, int level, const char *msg)
+{
+	if (!msg)
+		return;
+
+	if (level < _debug_level)
+		return;
+
+	if (cd && cd->log)
+		cd->log(level, msg, cd->log_usrptr);
+	else if (_default_log)
+		_default_log(level, msg, NULL);
+	/* Default to stdout/stderr if there is no callback. */
+	else
+		fprintf(level == CRYPT_LOG_ERROR ? stderr : stdout, "%s", msg);
+}
+
+__attribute__((format(printf, 5, 6)))
+void logger(struct crypt_device *cd, int level, const char *file,
+	    int line, const char *format, ...)
+{
+	va_list argp;
+	char target[LOG_MAX_LEN + 2];
+	int len;
+
+	va_start(argp, format);
+
+	len = vsnprintf(&target[0], LOG_MAX_LEN, format, argp);
+	if (len > 0 && len < LOG_MAX_LEN) {
+		/* All verbose and error messages in tools end with EOL. */
+		if (level == CRYPT_LOG_VERBOSE || level == CRYPT_LOG_ERROR ||
+		    level == CRYPT_LOG_DEBUG || level == CRYPT_LOG_DEBUG_JSON)
+			strncat(target, "\n", LOG_MAX_LEN);
+
+		crypt_log(cd, level, target);
+	}
+
+	va_end(argp);
+}
+
+static const char *mdata_device_path(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	return device_path(cd->metadata_device ?: cd->device);
+}
+
+static const char *data_device_path(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	return device_path(cd->device);
+}
+
+/* internal only */
+struct device *crypt_metadata_device(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	return cd->metadata_device ?: cd->device;
+}
+
+struct device *crypt_data_device(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	return cd->device;
+}
+
+int init_crypto(struct crypt_device *ctx)
+{
+	struct utsname uts;
+	int r;
+
+	r = crypt_random_init(ctx);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_err(ctx, _("Cannot initialize crypto RNG backend."));
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	r = crypt_backend_init();
+	if (r < 0)
+		log_err(ctx, _("Cannot initialize crypto backend."));
+
+	if (!r && !_crypto_logged) {
+		log_dbg(ctx, "Crypto backend (%s) initialized in cryptsetup library version %s.",
+			crypt_backend_version(), PACKAGE_VERSION);
+		if (!uname(&uts))
+			log_dbg(ctx, "Detected kernel %s %s %s.",
+				uts.sysname, uts.release, uts.machine);
+		_crypto_logged = 1;
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int process_key(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *hash_name,
+		       size_t key_size, const char *pass, size_t passLen,
+		       struct volume_key **vk)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (!key_size)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	*vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(key_size, NULL);
+	if (!*vk)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (hash_name) {
+		r = crypt_plain_hash(cd, hash_name, (*vk)->key, key_size, pass, passLen);
+		if (r < 0) {
+			if (r == -ENOENT)
+				log_err(cd, _("Hash algorithm %s not supported."),
+					hash_name);
+			else
+				log_err(cd, _("Key processing error (using hash %s)."),
+					hash_name);
+			crypt_free_volume_key(*vk);
+			*vk = NULL;
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	} else if (passLen > key_size) {
+		memcpy((*vk)->key, pass, key_size);
+	} else {
+		memcpy((*vk)->key, pass, passLen);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int isPLAIN(const char *type)
+{
+	return (type && !strcmp(CRYPT_PLAIN, type));
+}
+
+static int isLUKS1(const char *type)
+{
+	return (type && !strcmp(CRYPT_LUKS1, type));
+}
+
+static int isLUKS2(const char *type)
+{
+	return (type && !strcmp(CRYPT_LUKS2, type));
+}
+
+static int isLUKS(const char *type)
+{
+	return (isLUKS2(type) || isLUKS1(type));
+}
+
+static int isLOOPAES(const char *type)
+{
+	return (type && !strcmp(CRYPT_LOOPAES, type));
+}
+
+static int isVERITY(const char *type)
+{
+	return (type && !strcmp(CRYPT_VERITY, type));
+}
+
+static int isTCRYPT(const char *type)
+{
+	return (type && !strcmp(CRYPT_TCRYPT, type));
+}
+
+static int isINTEGRITY(const char *type)
+{
+	return (type && !strcmp(CRYPT_INTEGRITY, type));
+}
+
+static int isBITLK(const char *type)
+{
+	return (type && !strcmp(CRYPT_BITLK, type));
+}
+
+static int _onlyLUKS(struct crypt_device *cd, uint32_t cdflags)
+{
+	int r = 0;
+
+	if (cd && !cd->type) {
+		if (!(cdflags & CRYPT_CD_QUIET))
+			log_err(cd, _("Cannot determine device type. Incompatible activation of device?"));
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (!cd || !isLUKS(cd->type)) {
+		if (!(cdflags & CRYPT_CD_QUIET))
+			log_err(cd, _("This operation is supported only for LUKS device."));
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (r || (cdflags & CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED) || isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		return r;
+
+	return LUKS2_unmet_requirements(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, 0, cdflags & CRYPT_CD_QUIET);
+}
+
+static int onlyLUKS(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	return _onlyLUKS(cd, 0);
+}
+
+static int _onlyLUKS2(struct crypt_device *cd, uint32_t cdflags, uint32_t mask)
+{
+	int r = 0;
+
+	if (cd && !cd->type) {
+		if (!(cdflags & CRYPT_CD_QUIET))
+			log_err(cd, _("Cannot determine device type. Incompatible activation of device?"));
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (!cd || !isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+		if (!(cdflags & CRYPT_CD_QUIET))
+			log_err(cd, _("This operation is supported only for LUKS2 device."));
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (r || (cdflags & CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED))
+		return r;
+
+	return LUKS2_unmet_requirements(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, mask, cdflags & CRYPT_CD_QUIET);
+}
+
+/* Internal only */
+int onlyLUKS2(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	return _onlyLUKS2(cd, 0, 0);
+}
+
+/* Internal only */
+int onlyLUKS2mask(struct crypt_device *cd, uint32_t mask)
+{
+	return _onlyLUKS2(cd, 0, mask);
+}
+
+static void crypt_set_null_type(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (!cd->type)
+		return;
+
+	free(cd->type);
+	cd->type = NULL;
+	cd->u.none.active_name = NULL;
+	cd->data_offset = 0;
+	cd->metadata_size = 0;
+	cd->keyslots_size = 0;
+}
+
+static void crypt_reset_null_type(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (cd->type)
+		return;
+
+	free(cd->u.none.active_name);
+	cd->u.none.active_name = NULL;
+}
+
+/* keyslot helpers */
+static int keyslot_verify_or_find_empty(struct crypt_device *cd, int *keyslot)
+{
+	crypt_keyslot_info ki;
+
+	if (*keyslot == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT) {
+		if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+			*keyslot = LUKS_keyslot_find_empty(&cd->u.luks1.hdr);
+		else
+			*keyslot = LUKS2_keyslot_find_empty(&cd->u.luks2.hdr);
+		if (*keyslot < 0) {
+			log_err(cd, _("All key slots full."));
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		ki = LUKS_keyslot_info(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, *keyslot);
+	else
+		ki = LUKS2_keyslot_info(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, *keyslot);
+	switch (ki) {
+		case CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID:
+			log_err(cd, _("Key slot %d is invalid, please select between 0 and %d."),
+				*keyslot, LUKS_NUMKEYS - 1);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		case CRYPT_SLOT_INACTIVE:
+			break;
+		default:
+			log_err(cd, _("Key slot %d is full, please select another one."),
+				*keyslot);
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Selected keyslot %d.", *keyslot);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * compares UUIDs returned by device-mapper (striped by cryptsetup) and uuid in header
+ */
+int crypt_uuid_cmp(const char *dm_uuid, const char *hdr_uuid)
+{
+	int i, j;
+	char *str;
+
+	if (!dm_uuid || !hdr_uuid)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	str = strchr(dm_uuid, '-');
+	if (!str)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	for (i = 0, j = 1; hdr_uuid[i]; i++) {
+		if (hdr_uuid[i] == '-')
+			continue;
+
+		if (!str[j] || str[j] == '-')
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		if (str[j] != hdr_uuid[i])
+			return -EINVAL;
+		j++;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * compares type of active device to provided string (only if there is no explicit type)
+ */
+static int crypt_uuid_type_cmp(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *type)
+{
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd;
+	size_t len;
+	int r;
+
+	/* Must user header-on-disk if we know type here */
+	if (cd->type || !cd->u.none.active_name)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Checking if active device %s without header has UUID type %s.",
+		cd->u.none.active_name, type);
+
+	r = dm_query_device(cd, cd->u.none.active_name, DM_ACTIVE_UUID, &dmd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	r = -ENODEV;
+	len = strlen(type);
+	if (dmd.uuid && strlen(dmd.uuid) > len &&
+	    !strncmp(dmd.uuid, type, len) && dmd.uuid[len] == '-')
+		r = 0;
+
+	free(CONST_CAST(void*)dmd.uuid);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int PLAIN_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		     const char *name,
+		     struct volume_key *vk,
+		     uint64_t size,
+		     uint32_t flags)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd = {
+		.flags = flags,
+		.size = size,
+	};
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Trying to activate PLAIN device %s using cipher %s.",
+		name, crypt_get_cipher_spec(cd));
+
+	if (MISALIGNED(size, device_block_size(cd, crypt_data_device(cd)) >> SECTOR_SHIFT)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Device size is not aligned to device logical block size."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	r = dm_crypt_target_set(&dmd.segment, 0, dmd.size, crypt_data_device(cd),
+			vk, crypt_get_cipher_spec(cd), crypt_get_iv_offset(cd),
+			crypt_get_data_offset(cd), crypt_get_integrity(cd),
+			crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd), crypt_get_sector_size(cd));
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	r = create_or_reload_device(cd, name, CRYPT_PLAIN, &dmd);
+
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_confirm(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *msg)
+{
+	if (!cd || !cd->confirm)
+		return 1;
+	else
+		return cd->confirm(msg, cd->confirm_usrptr);
+}
+
+void crypt_set_log_callback(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	void (*log)(int level, const char *msg, void *usrptr),
+	void *usrptr)
+{
+	if (!cd)
+		_default_log = log;
+	else {
+		cd->log = log;
+		cd->log_usrptr = usrptr;
+	}
+}
+
+void crypt_set_confirm_callback(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int (*confirm)(const char *msg, void *usrptr),
+	void *usrptr)
+{
+	if (cd) {
+		cd->confirm = confirm;
+		cd->confirm_usrptr = usrptr;
+	}
+}
+
+const char *crypt_get_dir(void)
+{
+	return dm_get_dir();
+}
+
+int crypt_init(struct crypt_device **cd, const char *device)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *h = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!cd)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(NULL, "Allocating context for crypt device %s.", device ?: "(none)");
+#if !HAVE_DECL_O_CLOEXEC
+	log_dbg(NULL, "Running without O_CLOEXEC.");
+#endif
+
+	if (!(h = malloc(sizeof(struct crypt_device))))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	memset(h, 0, sizeof(*h));
+
+	r = device_alloc(NULL, &h->device, device);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto bad;
+
+	dm_backend_init(NULL);
+
+	h->rng_type = crypt_random_default_key_rng();
+
+	*cd = h;
+	return 0;
+bad:
+	device_free(NULL, h->device);
+	free(h);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int crypt_check_data_device_size(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	int r;
+	uint64_t size, size_min;
+
+	/* Check data device size, require at least header or one sector */
+	size_min = crypt_get_data_offset(cd) << SECTOR_SHIFT ?: SECTOR_SIZE;
+
+	r = device_size(cd->device, &size);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (size < size_min) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Header detected but device %s is too small."),
+			device_path(cd->device));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _crypt_set_data_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *device)
+{
+	struct device *dev = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	r = device_alloc(cd, &dev, device);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (!cd->metadata_device) {
+		cd->metadata_device = cd->device;
+	} else
+		device_free(cd, cd->device);
+
+	cd->device = dev;
+
+	return crypt_check_data_device_size(cd);
+}
+
+int crypt_set_data_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *device)
+{
+	/* metadata device must be set */
+	if (!cd || !cd->device || !device)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Setting ciphertext data device to %s.", device ?: "(none)");
+
+	if (!isLUKS1(cd->type) && !isLUKS2(cd->type) && !isVERITY(cd->type) &&
+	    !isINTEGRITY(cd->type) && !isTCRYPT(cd->type)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("This operation is not supported for this device type."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (isLUKS2(cd->type) && crypt_get_luks2_reencrypt(cd)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Illegal operation with reencryption in-progress."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return _crypt_set_data_device(cd, device);
+}
+
+int crypt_init_data_device(struct crypt_device **cd, const char *device, const char *data_device)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (!cd)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = crypt_init(cd, device);
+	if (r || !data_device || !strcmp(device, data_device))
+		return r;
+
+	log_dbg(NULL, "Setting ciphertext data device to %s.", data_device);
+	r = _crypt_set_data_device(*cd, data_device);
+	if (r) {
+		crypt_free(*cd);
+		*cd = NULL;
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+
+/* internal only */
+struct crypt_pbkdf_type *crypt_get_pbkdf(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	return &cd->pbkdf;
+}
+
+/*
+ * crypt_load() helpers
+ */
+static int _crypt_load_luks2(struct crypt_device *cd, int reload, int repair)
+{
+	int r;
+	char *type = NULL;
+	struct luks2_hdr hdr2 = {};
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "%soading LUKS2 header (repair %sabled).", reload ? "Rel" : "L", repair ? "en" : "dis");
+
+	r = LUKS2_hdr_read(cd, &hdr2, repair);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	if (!reload && !(type = strdup(CRYPT_LUKS2))) {
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (verify_pbkdf_params(cd, &cd->pbkdf)) {
+		r = init_pbkdf_type(cd, NULL, CRYPT_LUKS2);
+		if (r)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (reload) {
+		LUKS2_hdr_free(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr);
+		free(cd->u.luks2.keyslot_cipher);
+	} else
+		cd->type = type;
+
+	r = 0;
+	memcpy(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, &hdr2, sizeof(hdr2));
+	cd->u.luks2.keyslot_cipher = NULL;
+	cd->u.luks2.rh = NULL;
+
+out:
+	if (r) {
+		free(type);
+		LUKS2_hdr_free(cd, &hdr2);
+	}
+	return r;
+}
+
+static void _luks2_reload(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (!cd || !isLUKS2(cd->type))
+		return;
+
+	(void) _crypt_load_luks2(cd, 1, 0);
+}
+
+static int _crypt_load_luks(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *requested_type,
+			    int require_header, int repair)
+{
+	char *cipher_spec;
+	struct luks_phdr hdr = {};
+	int r, version;
+
+	r = init_crypto(cd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	/* This will return 0 if primary LUKS2 header is damaged */
+	version = LUKS2_hdr_version_unlocked(cd, NULL);
+
+	if ((isLUKS1(requested_type) && version == 2) ||
+	    (isLUKS2(requested_type) && version == 1))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (requested_type)
+		version = 0;
+
+	if (isLUKS1(requested_type) || version == 1) {
+		if (cd->type && isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Context is already initialized to type %s", cd->type);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		if (verify_pbkdf_params(cd, &cd->pbkdf)) {
+			r = init_pbkdf_type(cd, NULL, CRYPT_LUKS1);
+			if (r)
+				return r;
+		}
+
+		r = LUKS_read_phdr(&hdr, require_header, repair, cd);
+		if (r)
+			goto out;
+
+		if (!cd->type && !(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_LUKS1))) {
+			r = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		/* Set hash to the same as in the loaded header */
+		if (!cd->pbkdf.hash || strcmp(cd->pbkdf.hash, hdr.hashSpec)) {
+			free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->pbkdf.hash);
+			cd->pbkdf.hash = strdup(hdr.hashSpec);
+			if (!cd->pbkdf.hash) {
+				r = -ENOMEM;
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (asprintf(&cipher_spec, "%s-%s", hdr.cipherName, hdr.cipherMode) < 0) {
+			r = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		free(cd->u.luks1.cipher_spec);
+		cd->u.luks1.cipher_spec = cipher_spec;
+
+		memcpy(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, &hdr, sizeof(hdr));
+	} else if (isLUKS2(requested_type) || version == 2 || version == 0) {
+		if (cd->type && isLUKS1(cd->type)) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Context is already initialized to type %s", cd->type);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Current LUKS2 repair just overrides blkid probes
+		 * and perform auto-recovery if possible. This is safe
+		 * unless future LUKS2 repair code do something more
+		 * sophisticated. In such case we would need to check
+		 * for LUKS2 requirements and decide if it's safe to
+		 * perform repair.
+		 */
+		r =  _crypt_load_luks2(cd, cd->type != NULL, repair);
+	} else {
+		if (version > 2)
+			log_err(cd, _("Unsupported LUKS version %d."), version);
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	}
+out:
+	crypt_safe_memzero(&hdr, sizeof(hdr));
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _crypt_load_tcrypt(struct crypt_device *cd, struct crypt_params_tcrypt *params)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (!params)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = init_crypto(cd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	memcpy(&cd->u.tcrypt.params, params, sizeof(*params));
+
+	r = TCRYPT_read_phdr(cd, &cd->u.tcrypt.hdr, &cd->u.tcrypt.params);
+
+	cd->u.tcrypt.params.passphrase = NULL;
+	cd->u.tcrypt.params.passphrase_size = 0;
+	cd->u.tcrypt.params.keyfiles = NULL;
+	cd->u.tcrypt.params.keyfiles_count = 0;
+	cd->u.tcrypt.params.veracrypt_pim = 0;
+
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (!cd->type && !(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_TCRYPT)))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _crypt_load_verity(struct crypt_device *cd, struct crypt_params_verity *params)
+{
+	int r;
+	size_t sb_offset = 0;
+
+	r = init_crypto(cd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (params && params->flags & CRYPT_VERITY_NO_HEADER)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (params)
+		sb_offset = params->hash_area_offset;
+
+	r = VERITY_read_sb(cd, sb_offset, &cd->u.verity.uuid, &cd->u.verity.hdr);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	//FIXME: use crypt_free
+	if (!cd->type && !(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_VERITY))) {
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_name);
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.hdr.salt);
+		free(cd->u.verity.uuid);
+		crypt_safe_memzero(&cd->u.verity.hdr, sizeof(cd->u.verity.hdr));
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if (params)
+		cd->u.verity.hdr.flags = params->flags;
+
+	/* Hash availability checked in sb load */
+	cd->u.verity.root_hash_size = crypt_hash_size(cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_name);
+	if (cd->u.verity.root_hash_size > 4096)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (params && params->data_device &&
+	    (r = crypt_set_data_device(cd, params->data_device)) < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (params && params->fec_device) {
+		r = device_alloc(cd, &cd->u.verity.fec_device, params->fec_device);
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
+		cd->u.verity.hdr.fec_area_offset = params->fec_area_offset;
+		cd->u.verity.hdr.fec_roots = params->fec_roots;
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _crypt_load_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd,
+				 struct crypt_params_integrity *params)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	r = init_crypto(cd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	r = INTEGRITY_read_sb(cd, &cd->u.integrity.params, &cd->u.integrity.sb_flags);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	// FIXME: add checks for fields in integrity sb vs params
+
+	if (params) {
+		cd->u.integrity.params.journal_watermark = params->journal_watermark;
+		cd->u.integrity.params.journal_commit_time = params->journal_commit_time;
+		cd->u.integrity.params.buffer_sectors = params->buffer_sectors;
+		// FIXME: check ENOMEM
+		if (params->integrity)
+			cd->u.integrity.params.integrity = strdup(params->integrity);
+		cd->u.integrity.params.integrity_key_size = params->integrity_key_size;
+		if (params->journal_integrity)
+			cd->u.integrity.params.journal_integrity = strdup(params->journal_integrity);
+		if (params->journal_crypt)
+			cd->u.integrity.params.journal_crypt = strdup(params->journal_crypt);
+
+		if (params->journal_crypt_key) {
+			cd->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key =
+				crypt_alloc_volume_key(params->journal_crypt_key_size,
+						       params->journal_crypt_key);
+			if (!cd->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key)
+				return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+		if (params->journal_integrity_key) {
+			cd->u.integrity.journal_mac_key =
+				crypt_alloc_volume_key(params->journal_integrity_key_size,
+						       params->journal_integrity_key);
+			if (!cd->u.integrity.journal_mac_key)
+				return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!cd->type && !(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_INTEGRITY))) {
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.integrity.params.integrity);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int _crypt_load_bitlk(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			     struct bitlk_metadata *params)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	r = init_crypto(cd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	r = BITLK_read_sb(cd, &cd->u.bitlk.params);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (asprintf(&cd->u.bitlk.cipher_spec, "%s-%s",
+		     cd->u.bitlk.params.cipher, cd->u.bitlk.params.cipher_mode) < 0) {
+		cd->u.bitlk.cipher_spec = NULL;
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if (!cd->type && !(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_BITLK)))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_load(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	       const char *requested_type,
+	       void *params)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (!cd)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Trying to load %s crypt type from device %s.",
+		requested_type ?: "any", mdata_device_path(cd) ?: "(none)");
+
+	if (!crypt_metadata_device(cd))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	crypt_reset_null_type(cd);
+	cd->data_offset = 0;
+	cd->metadata_size = 0;
+	cd->keyslots_size = 0;
+
+	if (!requested_type || isLUKS1(requested_type) || isLUKS2(requested_type)) {
+		if (cd->type && !isLUKS1(cd->type) && !isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Context is already initialized to type %s", cd->type);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		r = _crypt_load_luks(cd, requested_type, 1, 0);
+	} else if (isVERITY(requested_type)) {
+		if (cd->type && !isVERITY(cd->type)) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Context is already initialized to type %s", cd->type);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		r = _crypt_load_verity(cd, params);
+	} else if (isTCRYPT(requested_type)) {
+		if (cd->type && !isTCRYPT(cd->type)) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Context is already initialized to type %s", cd->type);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		r = _crypt_load_tcrypt(cd, params);
+	} else if (isINTEGRITY(requested_type)) {
+		if (cd->type && !isINTEGRITY(cd->type)) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Context is already initialized to type %s", cd->type);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		r = _crypt_load_integrity(cd, params);
+	} else if (isBITLK(requested_type)) {
+		if (cd->type && !isBITLK(cd->type)) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Context is already initialized to type %s", cd->type);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		r = _crypt_load_bitlk(cd, params);
+	} else
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * crypt_init() helpers
+ */
+static int _init_by_name_crypt_none(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	int r;
+	char _mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd;
+	struct dm_target *tgt = &dmd.segment;
+
+	if (cd->type || !cd->u.none.active_name)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = dm_query_device(cd, cd->u.none.active_name,
+			DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_CIPHER |
+			DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE, &dmd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+	if (!single_segment(&dmd) || tgt->type != DM_CRYPT)
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	if (r >= 0)
+		r = crypt_parse_name_and_mode(tgt->u.crypt.cipher,
+					      cd->u.none.cipher, NULL,
+					      _mode);
+
+	if (!r) {
+		r = snprintf(cd->u.none.cipher_spec, sizeof(cd->u.none.cipher_spec),
+			 "%s-%s", cd->u.none.cipher, _mode);
+		if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(cd->u.none.cipher_spec))
+			r = -EINVAL;
+		else {
+			cd->u.none.cipher_mode = cd->u.none.cipher_spec + strlen(cd->u.none.cipher) + 1;
+			cd->u.none.key_size = tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength;
+			r = 0;
+		}
+	}
+
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static const char *LUKS_UUID(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (!cd)
+		return NULL;
+	else if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.luks1.hdr.uuid;
+	else if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.luks2.hdr.uuid;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static void crypt_free_type(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (isPLAIN(cd->type)) {
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.plain.hdr.hash);
+		free(cd->u.plain.cipher);
+		free(cd->u.plain.cipher_spec);
+	} else if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+		LUKS2_reencrypt_free(cd, cd->u.luks2.rh);
+		LUKS2_hdr_free(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr);
+		free(cd->u.luks2.keyslot_cipher);
+	} else if (isLUKS1(cd->type)) {
+		free(cd->u.luks1.cipher_spec);
+	} else if (isLOOPAES(cd->type)) {
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.loopaes.hdr.hash);
+		free(cd->u.loopaes.cipher);
+		free(cd->u.loopaes.cipher_spec);
+	} else if (isVERITY(cd->type)) {
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_name);
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.hdr.data_device);
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_device);
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.hdr.fec_device);
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.hdr.salt);
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.root_hash);
+		free(cd->u.verity.uuid);
+		device_free(cd, cd->u.verity.fec_device);
+	} else if (isINTEGRITY(cd->type)) {
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.integrity.params.integrity);
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.integrity.params.journal_integrity);
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.integrity.params.journal_crypt);
+		crypt_free_volume_key(cd->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key);
+		crypt_free_volume_key(cd->u.integrity.journal_mac_key);
+	} else if (isBITLK(cd->type)) {
+		free(cd->u.bitlk.cipher_spec);
+		BITLK_bitlk_metadata_free(&cd->u.bitlk.params);
+	} else if (!cd->type) {
+		free(cd->u.none.active_name);
+		cd->u.none.active_name = NULL;
+	}
+
+	crypt_set_null_type(cd);
+}
+
+static int _init_by_name_crypt(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+	bool found = false;
+	char **dep, *cipher_spec = NULL, cipher[MAX_CIPHER_LEN], cipher_mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN], deps_uuid_prefix[40], *deps[MAX_DM_DEPS+1] = {};
+	const char *dev, *namei;
+	int key_nums, r;
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd, dmdi = {}, dmdep = {};
+	struct dm_target *tgt = &dmd.segment, *tgti = &dmdi.segment;
+
+	r = dm_query_device(cd, name,
+			DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE |
+			DM_ACTIVE_UUID |
+			DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_CIPHER |
+			DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE, &dmd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (tgt->type != DM_CRYPT && tgt->type != DM_LINEAR) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Unsupported device table detected in %s.", name);
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (dmd.uuid) {
+		r = snprintf(deps_uuid_prefix, sizeof(deps_uuid_prefix), CRYPT_SUBDEV "-%.32s", dmd.uuid + 6);
+		if (r < 0 || (size_t)r != (sizeof(deps_uuid_prefix) - 1))
+			r = -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (r >= 0) {
+		r = dm_device_deps(cd, name, deps_uuid_prefix, deps, ARRAY_SIZE(deps));
+		if (r)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = crypt_parse_name_and_mode(tgt->type == DM_LINEAR ? "null" : tgt->u.crypt.cipher, cipher,
+				      &key_nums, cipher_mode);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Cannot parse cipher and mode from active device.");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	dep = deps;
+
+	if (tgt->type == DM_CRYPT && tgt->u.crypt.integrity && (namei = device_dm_name(tgt->data_device))) {
+		r = dm_query_device(cd, namei, DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE, &dmdi);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+		if (!single_segment(&dmdi) || tgti->type != DM_INTEGRITY) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Unsupported device table detected in %s.", namei);
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (!cd->metadata_device) {
+			device_free(cd, cd->device);
+			MOVE_REF(cd->device, tgti->data_device);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* do not try to lookup LUKS2 header in detached header mode */
+	if (dmd.uuid && !cd->metadata_device && !found) {
+		while (*dep && !found) {
+			r = dm_query_device(cd, *dep, DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE, &dmdep);
+			if (r < 0)
+				goto out;
+
+			tgt = &dmdep.segment;
+
+			while (tgt && !found) {
+				dev = device_path(tgt->data_device);
+				if (!dev) {
+					tgt = tgt->next;
+					continue;
+				}
+				if (!strstr(dev, dm_get_dir()) ||
+				    !crypt_string_in(dev + strlen(dm_get_dir()) + 1, deps, ARRAY_SIZE(deps))) {
+					device_free(cd, cd->device);
+					MOVE_REF(cd->device, tgt->data_device);
+					found = true;
+				}
+				tgt = tgt->next;
+			}
+			dep++;
+			dm_targets_free(cd, &dmdep);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (asprintf(&cipher_spec, "%s-%s", cipher, cipher_mode) < 0) {
+		cipher_spec = NULL;
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	tgt = &dmd.segment;
+	r = 0;
+
+	if (isPLAIN(cd->type) && single_segment(&dmd) && tgt->type == DM_CRYPT) {
+		cd->u.plain.hdr.hash = NULL; /* no way to get this */
+		cd->u.plain.hdr.offset = tgt->u.crypt.offset;
+		cd->u.plain.hdr.skip = tgt->u.crypt.iv_offset;
+		cd->u.plain.hdr.sector_size = tgt->u.crypt.sector_size;
+		cd->u.plain.key_size = tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength;
+		cd->u.plain.cipher = strdup(cipher);
+		MOVE_REF(cd->u.plain.cipher_spec, cipher_spec);
+		cd->u.plain.cipher_mode = cd->u.plain.cipher_spec + strlen(cipher) + 1;
+	} else if (isLOOPAES(cd->type) && single_segment(&dmd) && tgt->type == DM_CRYPT) {
+		cd->u.loopaes.hdr.offset = tgt->u.crypt.offset;
+		cd->u.loopaes.cipher = strdup(cipher);
+		MOVE_REF(cd->u.loopaes.cipher_spec, cipher_spec);
+		cd->u.loopaes.cipher_mode = cd->u.loopaes.cipher_spec + strlen(cipher) + 1;
+		/* version 3 uses last key for IV */
+		if (tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength % key_nums)
+			key_nums++;
+		cd->u.loopaes.key_size = tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength / key_nums;
+	} else if (isLUKS1(cd->type) || isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+		if (crypt_metadata_device(cd)) {
+			r = _crypt_load_luks(cd, cd->type, 0, 0);
+			if (r < 0) {
+				log_dbg(cd, "LUKS device header does not match active device.");
+				crypt_set_null_type(cd);
+				device_close(cd, cd->metadata_device);
+				device_close(cd, cd->device);
+				r = 0;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			/* check whether UUIDs match each other */
+			r = crypt_uuid_cmp(dmd.uuid, LUKS_UUID(cd));
+			if (r < 0) {
+				log_dbg(cd, "LUKS device header uuid: %s mismatches DM returned uuid %s",
+					LUKS_UUID(cd), dmd.uuid);
+				crypt_free_type(cd);
+				r = 0;
+				goto out;
+			}
+		} else {
+			log_dbg(cd, "LUKS device header not available.");
+			crypt_set_null_type(cd);
+			r = 0;
+		}
+	} else if (isTCRYPT(cd->type) && single_segment(&dmd) && tgt->type == DM_CRYPT) {
+		r = TCRYPT_init_by_name(cd, name, dmd.uuid, tgt, &cd->device,
+					&cd->u.tcrypt.params, &cd->u.tcrypt.hdr);
+	} else if (isBITLK(cd->type)) {
+		r = _crypt_load_bitlk(cd, NULL);
+		if (r < 0) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "BITLK device header not available.");
+			crypt_set_null_type(cd);
+			r = 0;
+		}
+	}
+out:
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmdi);
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmdep);
+	free(CONST_CAST(void*)dmd.uuid);
+	free(cipher_spec);
+	dep = deps;
+	while (*dep)
+		free(*dep++);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _init_by_name_verity(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd;
+	struct dm_target *tgt = &dmd.segment;
+	int r;
+
+	r = dm_query_device(cd, name,
+				DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE |
+				DM_ACTIVE_VERITY_HASH_DEVICE |
+				DM_ACTIVE_VERITY_ROOT_HASH |
+				DM_ACTIVE_VERITY_PARAMS, &dmd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+	if (!single_segment(&dmd) || tgt->type != DM_VERITY) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Unsupported device table detected in %s.", name);
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (r > 0)
+		r = 0;
+
+	if (isVERITY(cd->type)) {
+		cd->u.verity.uuid = NULL; // FIXME
+		cd->u.verity.hdr.flags = CRYPT_VERITY_NO_HEADER; //FIXME
+		cd->u.verity.hdr.data_size = tgt->u.verity.vp->data_size;
+		cd->u.verity.root_hash_size = tgt->u.verity.root_hash_size;
+		MOVE_REF(cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_name, tgt->u.verity.vp->hash_name);
+		cd->u.verity.hdr.data_device = NULL;
+		cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_device = NULL;
+		cd->u.verity.hdr.data_block_size = tgt->u.verity.vp->data_block_size;
+		cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_block_size = tgt->u.verity.vp->hash_block_size;
+		cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_area_offset = tgt->u.verity.hash_offset;
+		cd->u.verity.hdr.fec_area_offset = tgt->u.verity.fec_offset;
+		cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_type = tgt->u.verity.vp->hash_type;
+		cd->u.verity.hdr.flags = tgt->u.verity.vp->flags;
+		cd->u.verity.hdr.salt_size = tgt->u.verity.vp->salt_size;
+		MOVE_REF(cd->u.verity.hdr.salt, tgt->u.verity.vp->salt);
+		MOVE_REF(cd->u.verity.hdr.fec_device, tgt->u.verity.vp->fec_device);
+		cd->u.verity.hdr.fec_roots = tgt->u.verity.vp->fec_roots;
+		MOVE_REF(cd->u.verity.fec_device, tgt->u.verity.fec_device);
+		MOVE_REF(cd->metadata_device, tgt->u.verity.hash_device);
+		MOVE_REF(cd->u.verity.root_hash, tgt->u.verity.root_hash);
+	}
+out:
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _init_by_name_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd;
+	struct dm_target *tgt = &dmd.segment;
+	int r;
+
+	r = dm_query_device(cd, name, DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE |
+				      DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEY |
+				      DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE |
+				      DM_ACTIVE_INTEGRITY_PARAMS, &dmd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+	if (!single_segment(&dmd) || tgt->type != DM_INTEGRITY) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Unsupported device table detected in %s.", name);
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (r > 0)
+		r = 0;
+
+	if (isINTEGRITY(cd->type)) {
+		cd->u.integrity.params.tag_size = tgt->u.integrity.tag_size;
+		cd->u.integrity.params.sector_size = tgt->u.integrity.sector_size;
+		cd->u.integrity.params.journal_size = tgt->u.integrity.journal_size;
+		cd->u.integrity.params.journal_watermark = tgt->u.integrity.journal_watermark;
+		cd->u.integrity.params.journal_commit_time = tgt->u.integrity.journal_commit_time;
+		cd->u.integrity.params.interleave_sectors = tgt->u.integrity.interleave_sectors;
+		cd->u.integrity.params.buffer_sectors = tgt->u.integrity.buffer_sectors;
+		MOVE_REF(cd->u.integrity.params.integrity, tgt->u.integrity.integrity);
+		MOVE_REF(cd->u.integrity.params.journal_integrity, tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity);
+		MOVE_REF(cd->u.integrity.params.journal_crypt, tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt);
+
+		if (tgt->u.integrity.vk)
+			cd->u.integrity.params.integrity_key_size = tgt->u.integrity.vk->keylength;
+		if (tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key)
+			cd->u.integrity.params.journal_integrity_key_size = tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key->keylength;
+		if (tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key)
+			cd->u.integrity.params.integrity_key_size = tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key->keylength;
+		MOVE_REF(cd->metadata_device, tgt->u.integrity.meta_device);
+	}
+out:
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_init_by_name_and_header(struct crypt_device **cd,
+				  const char *name,
+				  const char *header_device)
+{
+	crypt_status_info ci;
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd;
+	struct dm_target *tgt = &dmd.segment;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!cd || !name)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(NULL, "Allocating crypt device context by device %s.", name);
+
+	ci = crypt_status(NULL, name);
+	if (ci == CRYPT_INVALID)
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	if (ci < CRYPT_ACTIVE) {
+		log_err(NULL, _("Device %s is not active."), name);
+		return -ENODEV;
+	}
+
+	r = dm_query_device(NULL, name, DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE | DM_ACTIVE_UUID, &dmd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	*cd = NULL;
+
+	if (header_device) {
+		r = crypt_init(cd, header_device);
+	} else {
+		r = crypt_init(cd, device_path(tgt->data_device));
+
+		/* Underlying device disappeared but mapping still active */
+		if (!tgt->data_device || r == -ENOTBLK)
+			log_verbose(NULL, _("Underlying device for crypt device %s disappeared."),
+				    name);
+
+		/* Underlying device is not readable but crypt mapping exists */
+		if (r == -ENOTBLK)
+			r = crypt_init(cd, NULL);
+	}
+
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (dmd.uuid) {
+		if (!strncmp(CRYPT_PLAIN, dmd.uuid, sizeof(CRYPT_PLAIN)-1))
+			(*cd)->type = strdup(CRYPT_PLAIN);
+		else if (!strncmp(CRYPT_LOOPAES, dmd.uuid, sizeof(CRYPT_LOOPAES)-1))
+			(*cd)->type = strdup(CRYPT_LOOPAES);
+		else if (!strncmp(CRYPT_LUKS1, dmd.uuid, sizeof(CRYPT_LUKS1)-1))
+			(*cd)->type = strdup(CRYPT_LUKS1);
+		else if (!strncmp(CRYPT_LUKS2, dmd.uuid, sizeof(CRYPT_LUKS2)-1))
+			(*cd)->type = strdup(CRYPT_LUKS2);
+		else if (!strncmp(CRYPT_VERITY, dmd.uuid, sizeof(CRYPT_VERITY)-1))
+			(*cd)->type = strdup(CRYPT_VERITY);
+		else if (!strncmp(CRYPT_TCRYPT, dmd.uuid, sizeof(CRYPT_TCRYPT)-1))
+			(*cd)->type = strdup(CRYPT_TCRYPT);
+		else if (!strncmp(CRYPT_INTEGRITY, dmd.uuid, sizeof(CRYPT_INTEGRITY)-1))
+			(*cd)->type = strdup(CRYPT_INTEGRITY);
+		else if (!strncmp(CRYPT_BITLK, dmd.uuid, sizeof(CRYPT_BITLK)-1))
+			(*cd)->type = strdup(CRYPT_BITLK);
+		else
+			log_dbg(NULL, "Unknown UUID set, some parameters are not set.");
+	} else
+		log_dbg(NULL, "Active device has no UUID set, some parameters are not set.");
+
+	if (header_device) {
+		r = crypt_set_data_device(*cd, device_path(tgt->data_device));
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Try to initialize basic parameters from active device */
+
+	if (tgt->type == DM_CRYPT || tgt->type == DM_LINEAR)
+		r = _init_by_name_crypt(*cd, name);
+	else if (tgt->type == DM_VERITY)
+		r = _init_by_name_verity(*cd, name);
+	else if (tgt->type == DM_INTEGRITY)
+		r = _init_by_name_integrity(*cd, name);
+out:
+	if (r < 0) {
+		crypt_free(*cd);
+		*cd = NULL;
+	} else if (!(*cd)->type) {
+		/* For anonymous device (no header found) remember initialized name */
+		(*cd)->u.none.active_name = strdup(name);
+	}
+
+	free(CONST_CAST(void*)dmd.uuid);
+	dm_targets_free(NULL, &dmd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_init_by_name(struct crypt_device **cd, const char *name)
+{
+	return crypt_init_by_name_and_header(cd, name, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * crypt_format() helpers
+ */
+static int _crypt_format_plain(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			       const char *cipher,
+			       const char *cipher_mode,
+			       const char *uuid,
+			       size_t volume_key_size,
+			       struct crypt_params_plain *params)
+{
+	unsigned int sector_size = params ? params->sector_size : SECTOR_SIZE;
+	uint64_t dev_size;
+
+	if (!cipher || !cipher_mode) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Invalid plain crypt parameters."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (volume_key_size > 1024) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Invalid key size."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (uuid) {
+		log_err(cd, _("UUID is not supported for this crypt type."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (cd->metadata_device) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Detached metadata device is not supported for this crypt type."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* For compatibility with old params structure */
+	if (!sector_size)
+		sector_size = SECTOR_SIZE;
+
+	if (sector_size < SECTOR_SIZE || sector_size > MAX_SECTOR_SIZE ||
+	    NOTPOW2(sector_size)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Unsupported encryption sector size."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (sector_size > SECTOR_SIZE && !device_size(cd->device, &dev_size)) {
+		if (params && params->offset)
+			dev_size -= (params->offset * SECTOR_SIZE);
+		if (dev_size % sector_size) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Device size is not aligned to requested sector size."));
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_PLAIN)))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	cd->u.plain.key_size = volume_key_size;
+	cd->volume_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size, NULL);
+	if (!cd->volume_key)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (asprintf(&cd->u.plain.cipher_spec, "%s-%s", cipher, cipher_mode) < 0) {
+		cd->u.plain.cipher_spec = NULL;
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	cd->u.plain.cipher = strdup(cipher);
+	cd->u.plain.cipher_mode = cd->u.plain.cipher_spec + strlen(cipher) + 1;
+
+	if (params && params->hash)
+		cd->u.plain.hdr.hash = strdup(params->hash);
+
+	cd->u.plain.hdr.offset = params ? params->offset : 0;
+	cd->u.plain.hdr.skip = params ? params->skip : 0;
+	cd->u.plain.hdr.size = params ? params->size : 0;
+	cd->u.plain.hdr.sector_size = sector_size;
+
+	if (!cd->u.plain.cipher)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int _crypt_format_luks1(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			       const char *cipher,
+			       const char *cipher_mode,
+			       const char *uuid,
+			       const char *volume_key,
+			       size_t volume_key_size,
+			       struct crypt_params_luks1 *params)
+{
+	int r;
+	unsigned long required_alignment = DEFAULT_DISK_ALIGNMENT;
+	unsigned long alignment_offset = 0;
+	uint64_t dev_size;
+
+	if (!cipher || !cipher_mode)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!crypt_metadata_device(cd)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Can't format LUKS without device."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (params && cd->data_offset && params->data_alignment &&
+	   (cd->data_offset % params->data_alignment)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Requested data alignment is not compatible with data offset."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (!(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_LUKS1)))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (volume_key)
+		cd->volume_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size,
+						      volume_key);
+	else
+		cd->volume_key = crypt_generate_volume_key(cd, volume_key_size);
+
+	if (!cd->volume_key)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (verify_pbkdf_params(cd, &cd->pbkdf)) {
+		r = init_pbkdf_type(cd, NULL, CRYPT_LUKS1);
+		if (r)
+			return r;
+	}
+
+	if (params && params->hash && strcmp(params->hash, cd->pbkdf.hash)) {
+		free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->pbkdf.hash);
+		cd->pbkdf.hash = strdup(params->hash);
+		if (!cd->pbkdf.hash)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if (params && params->data_device) {
+		if (!cd->metadata_device)
+			cd->metadata_device = cd->device;
+		else
+			device_free(cd, cd->device);
+		cd->device = NULL;
+		if (device_alloc(cd, &cd->device, params->data_device) < 0)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if (params && cd->metadata_device) {
+		/* For detached header the alignment is used directly as data offset */
+		if (!cd->data_offset)
+			cd->data_offset = params->data_alignment;
+		required_alignment = params->data_alignment * SECTOR_SIZE;
+	} else if (params && params->data_alignment) {
+		required_alignment = params->data_alignment * SECTOR_SIZE;
+	} else
+		device_topology_alignment(cd, cd->device,
+				       &required_alignment,
+				       &alignment_offset, DEFAULT_DISK_ALIGNMENT);
+
+	r = LUKS_check_cipher(cd, volume_key_size, cipher, cipher_mode);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	r = LUKS_generate_phdr(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, cd->volume_key, cipher, cipher_mode,
+			       cd->pbkdf.hash, uuid,
+			       cd->data_offset * SECTOR_SIZE,
+			       alignment_offset, required_alignment, cd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	r = device_check_access(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd), DEV_EXCL);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (!device_size(crypt_data_device(cd), &dev_size) &&
+	    dev_size < (crypt_get_data_offset(cd) * SECTOR_SIZE))
+		log_std(cd, _("WARNING: Data offset is outside of currently available data device.\n"));
+
+	if (asprintf(&cd->u.luks1.cipher_spec, "%s-%s", cipher, cipher_mode) < 0) {
+		cd->u.luks1.cipher_spec = NULL;
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	r = LUKS_wipe_header_areas(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, cd);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		free(cd->u.luks1.cipher_spec);
+		log_err(cd, _("Cannot wipe header on device %s."),
+			mdata_device_path(cd));
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	r = LUKS_write_phdr(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, cd);
+	if (r)
+		free(cd->u.luks1.cipher_spec);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _crypt_format_luks2(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			       const char *cipher,
+			       const char *cipher_mode,
+			       const char *uuid,
+			       const char *volume_key,
+			       size_t volume_key_size,
+			       struct crypt_params_luks2 *params)
+{
+	int r, integrity_key_size = 0;
+	unsigned long required_alignment = DEFAULT_DISK_ALIGNMENT;
+	unsigned long alignment_offset = 0;
+	unsigned int sector_size = params ? params->sector_size : SECTOR_SIZE;
+	const char *integrity = params ? params->integrity : NULL;
+	uint64_t dev_size;
+	uint32_t dmc_flags;
+
+	cd->u.luks2.hdr.jobj = NULL;
+	cd->u.luks2.keyslot_cipher = NULL;
+
+	if (!cipher || !cipher_mode)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!crypt_metadata_device(cd)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Can't format LUKS without device."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (params && cd->data_offset && params->data_alignment &&
+	   (cd->data_offset % params->data_alignment)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Requested data alignment is not compatible with data offset."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (sector_size < SECTOR_SIZE || sector_size > MAX_SECTOR_SIZE ||
+	    NOTPOW2(sector_size)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Unsupported encryption sector size."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	if (sector_size != SECTOR_SIZE && !dm_flags(cd, DM_CRYPT, &dmc_flags) &&
+	    !(dmc_flags & DM_SECTOR_SIZE_SUPPORTED))
+		log_std(cd, _("WARNING: The device activation will fail, dm-crypt is missing "
+			      "support for requested encryption sector size.\n"));
+
+	if (integrity) {
+		if (params->integrity_params) {
+			/* Standalone dm-integrity must not be used */
+			if (params->integrity_params->integrity ||
+			    params->integrity_params->integrity_key_size)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			/* FIXME: journal encryption and MAC is here not yet supported */
+			if (params->integrity_params->journal_crypt ||
+			params->integrity_params->journal_integrity)
+				return -ENOTSUP;
+		}
+		if (!INTEGRITY_tag_size(cd, integrity, cipher, cipher_mode)) {
+			if (!strcmp(integrity, "none"))
+				integrity = NULL;
+			else
+				return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		integrity_key_size = INTEGRITY_key_size(cd, integrity);
+		if ((integrity_key_size < 0) || (integrity_key_size >= (int)volume_key_size)) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Volume key is too small for encryption with integrity extensions."));
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	r = device_check_access(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd), DEV_EXCL);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (!(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_LUKS2)))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (volume_key)
+		cd->volume_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size,
+						      volume_key);
+	else
+		cd->volume_key = crypt_generate_volume_key(cd, volume_key_size);
+
+	if (!cd->volume_key)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (params && params->pbkdf)
+		r = crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, params->pbkdf);
+	else if (verify_pbkdf_params(cd, &cd->pbkdf))
+		r = init_pbkdf_type(cd, NULL, CRYPT_LUKS2);
+
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (params && params->data_device) {
+		if (!cd->metadata_device)
+			cd->metadata_device = cd->device;
+		else
+			device_free(cd, cd->device);
+		cd->device = NULL;
+		if (device_alloc(cd, &cd->device, params->data_device) < 0)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if (params && cd->metadata_device) {
+		/* For detached header the alignment is used directly as data offset */
+		if (!cd->data_offset)
+			cd->data_offset = params->data_alignment;
+		required_alignment = params->data_alignment * SECTOR_SIZE;
+	} else if (params && params->data_alignment) {
+		required_alignment = params->data_alignment * SECTOR_SIZE;
+	} else
+		device_topology_alignment(cd, cd->device,
+				       &required_alignment,
+				       &alignment_offset, DEFAULT_DISK_ALIGNMENT);
+
+	/* FIXME: allow this later also for normal ciphers (check AF_ALG availability. */
+	if (integrity && !integrity_key_size) {
+		r = crypt_cipher_check_kernel(cipher, cipher_mode, integrity, volume_key_size);
+		if (r < 0) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Cipher %s-%s (key size %zd bits) is not available."),
+				cipher, cipher_mode, volume_key_size * 8);
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if ((!integrity || integrity_key_size) && !crypt_cipher_wrapped_key(cipher, cipher_mode) &&
+	    !INTEGRITY_tag_size(cd, NULL, cipher, cipher_mode)) {
+		r = LUKS_check_cipher(cd, volume_key_size - integrity_key_size,
+				      cipher, cipher_mode);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = LUKS2_generate_hdr(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, cd->volume_key,
+			       cipher, cipher_mode,
+			       integrity, uuid,
+			       sector_size,
+			       cd->data_offset * SECTOR_SIZE,
+			       alignment_offset,
+			       required_alignment,
+			       cd->metadata_size, cd->keyslots_size);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = device_size(crypt_data_device(cd), &dev_size);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (dev_size < (crypt_get_data_offset(cd) * SECTOR_SIZE))
+		log_std(cd, _("WARNING: Data offset is outside of currently available data device.\n"));
+
+	if (cd->metadata_size && (cd->metadata_size != LUKS2_metadata_size(&cd->u.luks2.hdr)))
+		log_std(cd, _("WARNING: LUKS2 metadata size changed to %" PRIu64 " bytes.\n"),
+			LUKS2_metadata_size(&cd->u.luks2.hdr));
+
+	if (cd->keyslots_size && (cd->keyslots_size != LUKS2_keyslots_size(&cd->u.luks2.hdr)))
+		log_std(cd, _("WARNING: LUKS2 keyslots area size changed to %" PRIu64 " bytes.\n"),
+			LUKS2_keyslots_size(&cd->u.luks2.hdr));
+
+	if (!integrity && sector_size > SECTOR_SIZE) {
+		dev_size -= (crypt_get_data_offset(cd) * SECTOR_SIZE);
+		if (dev_size % sector_size) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Device size is not aligned to requested sector size."));
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (params && (params->label || params->subsystem)) {
+		r = LUKS2_hdr_labels(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr,
+				     params->label, params->subsystem, 0);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = LUKS2_wipe_header_areas(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, cd->metadata_device != NULL);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Cannot wipe header on device %s."),
+			mdata_device_path(cd));
+		if (dev_size < LUKS2_hdr_and_areas_size(&cd->u.luks2.hdr))
+			log_err(cd, _("Device %s is too small."), device_path(crypt_metadata_device(cd)));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Wipe integrity superblock and create integrity superblock */
+	if (crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd)) {
+		r = crypt_wipe_device(cd, crypt_data_device(cd), CRYPT_WIPE_ZERO,
+				      crypt_get_data_offset(cd) * SECTOR_SIZE,
+				      8 * SECTOR_SIZE, 8 * SECTOR_SIZE, NULL, NULL);
+		if (r < 0) {
+			if (r == -EBUSY)
+				log_err(cd, _("Cannot format device %s in use."),
+					data_device_path(cd));
+			else if (r == -EACCES) {
+				log_err(cd, _("Cannot format device %s, permission denied."),
+					data_device_path(cd));
+				r = -EINVAL;
+			} else
+				log_err(cd, _("Cannot wipe header on device %s."),
+					data_device_path(cd));
+
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		r = INTEGRITY_format(cd, params ? params->integrity_params : NULL, NULL, NULL);
+		if (r)
+			log_err(cd, _("Cannot format integrity for device %s."),
+				data_device_path(cd));
+	}
+
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* override sequence id check with format */
+	r = LUKS2_hdr_write_force(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		if (r == -EBUSY)
+			log_err(cd, _("Cannot format device %s in use."),
+				mdata_device_path(cd));
+		else if (r == -EACCES) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Cannot format device %s, permission denied."),
+				mdata_device_path(cd));
+			r = -EINVAL;
+		} else
+			log_err(cd, _("Cannot format device %s."),
+				mdata_device_path(cd));
+	}
+
+out:
+	if (r)
+		LUKS2_hdr_free(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _crypt_format_loopaes(struct crypt_device *cd,
+				 const char *cipher,
+				 const char *uuid,
+				 size_t volume_key_size,
+				 struct crypt_params_loopaes *params)
+{
+	if (!crypt_metadata_device(cd)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Can't format LOOPAES without device."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (volume_key_size > 1024) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Invalid key size."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (uuid) {
+		log_err(cd, _("UUID is not supported for this crypt type."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (cd->metadata_device) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Detached metadata device is not supported for this crypt type."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (!(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_LOOPAES)))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	cd->u.loopaes.key_size = volume_key_size;
+
+	cd->u.loopaes.cipher = strdup(cipher ?: DEFAULT_LOOPAES_CIPHER);
+
+	if (params && params->hash)
+		cd->u.loopaes.hdr.hash = strdup(params->hash);
+
+	cd->u.loopaes.hdr.offset = params ? params->offset : 0;
+	cd->u.loopaes.hdr.skip = params ? params->skip : 0;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int _crypt_format_verity(struct crypt_device *cd,
+				 const char *uuid,
+				 struct crypt_params_verity *params)
+{
+	int r = 0, hash_size;
+	uint64_t data_device_size, hash_blocks_size;
+	struct device *fec_device = NULL;
+	char *fec_device_path = NULL, *hash_name = NULL, *root_hash = NULL, *salt = NULL;
+
+	if (!crypt_metadata_device(cd)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Can't format VERITY without device."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (!params)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!params->data_device && !cd->metadata_device)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (params->hash_type > VERITY_MAX_HASH_TYPE) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Unsupported VERITY hash type %d."), params->hash_type);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (VERITY_BLOCK_SIZE_OK(params->data_block_size) ||
+	    VERITY_BLOCK_SIZE_OK(params->hash_block_size)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Unsupported VERITY block size."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (MISALIGNED_512(params->hash_area_offset)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Unsupported VERITY hash offset."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (MISALIGNED_512(params->fec_area_offset)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Unsupported VERITY FEC offset."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (!(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_VERITY)))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (params->data_device) {
+		r = crypt_set_data_device(cd, params->data_device);
+		if (r)
+			return r;
+	}
+
+	if (!params->data_size) {
+		r = device_size(cd->device, &data_device_size);
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
+
+		cd->u.verity.hdr.data_size = data_device_size / params->data_block_size;
+	} else
+		cd->u.verity.hdr.data_size = params->data_size;
+
+	if (device_is_identical(crypt_metadata_device(cd), crypt_data_device(cd)) > 0 &&
+	   (cd->u.verity.hdr.data_size * params->data_block_size) > params->hash_area_offset) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Data area overlaps with hash area."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	hash_size = crypt_hash_size(params->hash_name);
+	if (hash_size <= 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Hash algorithm %s not supported."),
+			params->hash_name);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	cd->u.verity.root_hash_size = hash_size;
+
+	if (params->fec_device) {
+		fec_device_path = strdup(params->fec_device);
+		if (!fec_device_path)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		r = device_alloc(cd, &fec_device, params->fec_device);
+		if (r < 0) {
+			r = -ENOMEM;
+			goto err;
+		}
+
+		hash_blocks_size = VERITY_hash_blocks(cd, params) * params->hash_block_size;
+		if (device_is_identical(crypt_metadata_device(cd), fec_device) > 0 &&
+		    (params->hash_area_offset + hash_blocks_size) > params->fec_area_offset) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Hash area overlaps with FEC area."));
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			goto err;
+		}
+
+		if (device_is_identical(crypt_data_device(cd), fec_device) > 0 &&
+		    (cd->u.verity.hdr.data_size * params->data_block_size) > params->fec_area_offset) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Data area overlaps with FEC area."));
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			goto err;
+		}
+	}
+
+	root_hash = malloc(cd->u.verity.root_hash_size);
+	hash_name = strdup(params->hash_name);
+	salt = malloc(params->salt_size);
+
+	if (!root_hash || !hash_name || !salt) {
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	cd->u.verity.hdr.flags = params->flags;
+	cd->u.verity.root_hash = root_hash;
+	cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_name = hash_name;
+	cd->u.verity.hdr.data_device = NULL;
+	cd->u.verity.fec_device = fec_device;
+	cd->u.verity.hdr.fec_device = fec_device_path;
+	cd->u.verity.hdr.fec_roots = params->fec_roots;
+	cd->u.verity.hdr.data_block_size = params->data_block_size;
+	cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_block_size = params->hash_block_size;
+	cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_area_offset = params->hash_area_offset;
+	cd->u.verity.hdr.fec_area_offset = params->fec_area_offset;
+	cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_type = params->hash_type;
+	cd->u.verity.hdr.flags = params->flags;
+	cd->u.verity.hdr.salt_size = params->salt_size;
+	cd->u.verity.hdr.salt = salt;
+
+	if (params->salt)
+		memcpy(salt, params->salt, params->salt_size);
+	else
+		r = crypt_random_get(cd, salt, params->salt_size, CRYPT_RND_SALT);
+	if (r)
+		goto err;
+
+	if (params->flags & CRYPT_VERITY_CREATE_HASH) {
+		r = VERITY_create(cd, &cd->u.verity.hdr,
+				  cd->u.verity.root_hash, cd->u.verity.root_hash_size);
+		if (!r && params->fec_device)
+			r = VERITY_FEC_process(cd, &cd->u.verity.hdr, cd->u.verity.fec_device, 0, NULL);
+		if (r)
+			goto err;
+	}
+
+	if (!(params->flags & CRYPT_VERITY_NO_HEADER)) {
+		if (uuid) {
+			if (!(cd->u.verity.uuid = strdup(uuid)))
+				r = -ENOMEM;
+		} else
+			r = VERITY_UUID_generate(cd, &cd->u.verity.uuid);
+
+		if (!r)
+			r = VERITY_write_sb(cd, cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_area_offset,
+					    cd->u.verity.uuid,
+					    &cd->u.verity.hdr);
+	}
+
+err:
+	if (r) {
+		device_free(cd, fec_device);
+		free(root_hash);
+		free(hash_name);
+		free(fec_device_path);
+		free(salt);
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _crypt_format_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd,
+				   const char *uuid,
+				   struct crypt_params_integrity *params)
+{
+	int r;
+	uint32_t integrity_tag_size;
+	char *integrity = NULL, *journal_integrity = NULL, *journal_crypt = NULL;
+	struct volume_key *journal_crypt_key = NULL, *journal_mac_key = NULL;
+
+	if (!params)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (uuid) {
+		log_err(cd, _("UUID is not supported for this crypt type."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	r = device_check_access(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd), DEV_EXCL);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	/* Wipe first 8 sectors - fs magic numbers etc. */
+	r = crypt_wipe_device(cd, crypt_metadata_device(cd), CRYPT_WIPE_ZERO, 0,
+			      8 * SECTOR_SIZE, 8 * SECTOR_SIZE, NULL, NULL);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Cannot wipe header on device %s."),
+			mdata_device_path(cd));
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	if (!(cd->type = strdup(CRYPT_INTEGRITY)))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (params->journal_crypt_key) {
+		journal_crypt_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(params->journal_crypt_key_size,
+							   params->journal_crypt_key);
+		if (!journal_crypt_key)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if (params->journal_integrity_key) {
+		journal_mac_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(params->journal_integrity_key_size,
+							 params->journal_integrity_key);
+		if (!journal_mac_key) {
+			r = -ENOMEM;
+			goto err;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (params->integrity && !(integrity = strdup(params->integrity))) {
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+		goto err;
+	}
+	if (params->journal_integrity && !(journal_integrity = strdup(params->journal_integrity))) {
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+		goto err;
+	}
+	if (params->journal_crypt && !(journal_crypt = strdup(params->journal_crypt))) {
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	integrity_tag_size = INTEGRITY_hash_tag_size(integrity);
+	if (integrity_tag_size > 0 && params->tag_size && integrity_tag_size != params->tag_size)
+		log_std(cd, _("WARNING: Requested tag size %d bytes differs from %s size output (%d bytes).\n"),
+			params->tag_size, integrity, integrity_tag_size);
+
+	if (params->tag_size)
+		integrity_tag_size = params->tag_size;
+
+	cd->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key = journal_crypt_key;
+	cd->u.integrity.journal_mac_key = journal_mac_key;
+	cd->u.integrity.params.journal_size = params->journal_size;
+	cd->u.integrity.params.journal_watermark = params->journal_watermark;
+	cd->u.integrity.params.journal_commit_time = params->journal_commit_time;
+	cd->u.integrity.params.interleave_sectors = params->interleave_sectors;
+	cd->u.integrity.params.buffer_sectors = params->buffer_sectors;
+	cd->u.integrity.params.sector_size = params->sector_size;
+	cd->u.integrity.params.tag_size = integrity_tag_size;
+	cd->u.integrity.params.integrity = integrity;
+	cd->u.integrity.params.journal_integrity = journal_integrity;
+	cd->u.integrity.params.journal_crypt = journal_crypt;
+
+	r = INTEGRITY_format(cd, params, cd->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key, cd->u.integrity.journal_mac_key);
+	if (r)
+		log_err(cd, _("Cannot format integrity for device %s."),
+			mdata_device_path(cd));
+err:
+	if (r) {
+		crypt_free_volume_key(journal_crypt_key);
+		crypt_free_volume_key(journal_mac_key);
+		free(integrity);
+		free(journal_integrity);
+		free(journal_crypt);
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_format(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *type,
+	const char *cipher,
+	const char *cipher_mode,
+	const char *uuid,
+	const char *volume_key,
+	size_t volume_key_size,
+	void *params)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (!cd || !type)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (cd->type) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Context already formatted as %s.", cd->type);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Formatting device %s as type %s.", mdata_device_path(cd) ?: "(none)", type);
+
+	crypt_reset_null_type(cd);
+
+	r = init_crypto(cd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (isPLAIN(type))
+		r = _crypt_format_plain(cd, cipher, cipher_mode,
+					uuid, volume_key_size, params);
+	else if (isLUKS1(type))
+		r = _crypt_format_luks1(cd, cipher, cipher_mode,
+					uuid, volume_key, volume_key_size, params);
+	else if (isLUKS2(type))
+		r = _crypt_format_luks2(cd, cipher, cipher_mode,
+					uuid, volume_key, volume_key_size, params);
+	else if (isLOOPAES(type))
+		r = _crypt_format_loopaes(cd, cipher, uuid, volume_key_size, params);
+	else if (isVERITY(type))
+		r = _crypt_format_verity(cd, uuid, params);
+	else if (isINTEGRITY(type))
+		r = _crypt_format_integrity(cd, uuid, params);
+	else {
+		log_err(cd, _("Unknown crypt device type %s requested."), type);
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (r < 0) {
+		crypt_set_null_type(cd);
+		crypt_free_volume_key(cd->volume_key);
+		cd->volume_key = NULL;
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_repair(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		 const char *requested_type,
+		 void *params __attribute__((unused)))
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (!cd)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Trying to repair %s crypt type from device %s.",
+		requested_type ?: "any", mdata_device_path(cd) ?: "(none)");
+
+	if (!crypt_metadata_device(cd))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (requested_type && !isLUKS(requested_type))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Load with repair */
+	r = _crypt_load_luks(cd, requested_type, 1, 1);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	/* cd->type and header must be set in context */
+	r = crypt_check_data_device_size(cd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		crypt_set_null_type(cd);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* compare volume keys */
+static int _compare_volume_keys(struct volume_key *svk, unsigned skeyring_only, struct volume_key *tvk, unsigned tkeyring_only)
+{
+	if (!svk && !tvk)
+		return 0;
+	else if (!svk || !tvk)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (svk->keylength != tvk->keylength)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (!skeyring_only && !tkeyring_only)
+		return memcmp(svk->key, tvk->key, svk->keylength);
+
+	if (svk->key_description && tvk->key_description)
+		return strcmp(svk->key_description, tvk->key_description);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int _compare_device_types(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			       const struct crypt_dm_active_device *src,
+			       const struct crypt_dm_active_device *tgt)
+{
+	if (!tgt->uuid) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Missing device uuid in target device.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (isLUKS2(cd->type) && !strncmp("INTEGRITY-", tgt->uuid, strlen("INTEGRITY-"))) {
+		if (crypt_uuid_cmp(tgt->uuid, src->uuid)) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "LUKS UUID mismatch.");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	} else if (isLUKS(cd->type)) {
+		if (!src->uuid || strncmp(cd->type, tgt->uuid, strlen(cd->type)) ||
+		    crypt_uuid_cmp(tgt->uuid, src->uuid)) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "LUKS UUID mismatch.");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	} else if (isPLAIN(cd->type) || isLOOPAES(cd->type)) {
+		if (strncmp(cd->type, tgt->uuid, strlen(cd->type))) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Unexpected uuid prefix %s in target device.", tgt->uuid);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	} else {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Unsupported device type %s for reload.", cd->type ?: "<empty>");
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int _compare_crypt_devices(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			       const struct dm_target *src,
+			       const struct dm_target *tgt)
+{
+	/* for crypt devices keys are mandatory */
+	if (!src->u.crypt.vk || !tgt->u.crypt.vk)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* CIPHER checks */
+	if (!src->u.crypt.cipher || !tgt->u.crypt.cipher)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (strcmp(src->u.crypt.cipher, tgt->u.crypt.cipher)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Cipher specs do not match.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength == 0 && crypt_is_cipher_null(tgt->u.crypt.cipher))
+		log_dbg(cd, "Existing device uses cipher null. Skipping key comparison.");
+	else if (_compare_volume_keys(src->u.crypt.vk, 0, tgt->u.crypt.vk, tgt->u.crypt.vk->key_description != NULL)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Keys in context and target device do not match.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (crypt_strcmp(src->u.crypt.integrity, tgt->u.crypt.integrity)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Integrity parameters do not match.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (src->u.crypt.offset      != tgt->u.crypt.offset ||
+	    src->u.crypt.sector_size != tgt->u.crypt.sector_size ||
+	    src->u.crypt.iv_offset   != tgt->u.crypt.iv_offset ||
+	    src->u.crypt.tag_size    != tgt->u.crypt.tag_size) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Integer parameters do not match.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (device_is_identical(src->data_device, tgt->data_device) <= 0) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Data devices do not match.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int _compare_integrity_devices(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			       const struct dm_target *src,
+			       const struct dm_target *tgt)
+{
+	/*
+	 * some parameters may be implicit (and set in dm-integrity ctor)
+	 *
+	 *	journal_size
+	 *	journal_watermark
+	 *	journal_commit_time
+	 *	buffer_sectors
+	 *	interleave_sectors
+	 */
+
+	/* check remaining integer values that makes sense */
+	if (src->u.integrity.tag_size	  != tgt->u.integrity.tag_size ||
+	    src->u.integrity.offset	  != tgt->u.integrity.offset   ||
+	    src->u.integrity.sector_size  != tgt->u.integrity.sector_size) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Integer parameters do not match.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (crypt_strcmp(src->u.integrity.integrity,	     tgt->u.integrity.integrity) ||
+	    crypt_strcmp(src->u.integrity.journal_integrity, tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity) ||
+	    crypt_strcmp(src->u.integrity.journal_crypt,     tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Journal parameters do not match.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* unfortunately dm-integrity doesn't support keyring */
+	if (_compare_volume_keys(src->u.integrity.vk, 0, tgt->u.integrity.vk, 0) ||
+	    _compare_volume_keys(src->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key, 0, tgt->u.integrity.journal_integrity_key, 0) ||
+	    _compare_volume_keys(src->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key, 0, tgt->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key, 0)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Journal keys do not match.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* unsupported underneath dm-crypt with auth. encryption */
+	if (src->u.integrity.meta_device || tgt->u.integrity.meta_device)
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+
+	if (src->size != tgt->size) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Device size parameters do not match.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (device_is_identical(src->data_device, tgt->data_device) <= 0) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Data devices do not match.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_compare_dm_devices(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			       const struct crypt_dm_active_device *src,
+			       const struct crypt_dm_active_device *tgt)
+{
+	int r;
+	const struct dm_target *s, *t;
+
+	if (!src || !tgt)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = _compare_device_types(cd, src, tgt);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	s = &src->segment;
+	t = &tgt->segment;
+
+	while (s || t) {
+		if (!s || !t) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "segments count mismatch.");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		if (s->type != t->type) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "segment type mismatch.");
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		switch (s->type) {
+		case DM_CRYPT:
+			r = _compare_crypt_devices(cd, s, t);
+			break;
+		case DM_INTEGRITY:
+			r = _compare_integrity_devices(cd, s, t);
+			break;
+		case DM_LINEAR:
+			r = (s->u.linear.offset == t->u.linear.offset) ? 0 : -EINVAL;
+			break;
+		default:
+			r = -ENOTSUP;
+		}
+
+		if (r)
+			break;
+
+		s = s->next;
+		t = t->next;
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _reload_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+			  struct crypt_dm_active_device *sdmd)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device tdmd;
+	struct dm_target *src, *tgt = &tdmd.segment;
+
+	if (!cd || !cd->type || !name || !(sdmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = dm_query_device(cd, name, DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE | DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_CIPHER |
+				  DM_ACTIVE_UUID | DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE |
+				  DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEY, &tdmd);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Device %s is not active."), name);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (!single_segment(&tdmd) || tgt->type != DM_CRYPT || tgt->u.crypt.tag_size) {
+		r = -ENOTSUP;
+		log_err(cd, _("Unsupported parameters on device %s."), name);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = crypt_compare_dm_devices(cd, sdmd, &tdmd);
+	if (r) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Mismatching parameters on device %s."), name);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	src = &sdmd->segment;
+
+	/* Changing read only flag for active device makes no sense */
+	if (tdmd.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY)
+		sdmd->flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY;
+	else
+		sdmd->flags &= ~CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY;
+
+	if (sdmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) {
+		r = crypt_volume_key_set_description(tgt->u.crypt.vk, src->u.crypt.vk->key_description);
+		if (r)
+			goto out;
+	} else {
+		crypt_free_volume_key(tgt->u.crypt.vk);
+		tgt->u.crypt.vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(src->u.crypt.vk->keylength, src->u.crypt.vk->key);
+		if (!tgt->u.crypt.vk) {
+			r = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	r = device_block_adjust(cd, src->data_device, DEV_OK,
+				src->u.crypt.offset, &sdmd->size, NULL);
+	if (r)
+		goto out;
+
+	tdmd.flags = sdmd->flags;
+	tgt->size = tdmd.size = sdmd->size;
+
+	r = dm_reload_device(cd, name, &tdmd, 0, 1);
+out:
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &tdmd);
+	free(CONST_CAST(void*)tdmd.uuid);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _reload_device_with_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name,
+	const char *iname,
+	const char *ipath,
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device *sdmd,
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device *sdmdi)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device tdmd, tdmdi = {};
+	struct dm_target *src, *srci, *tgt = &tdmd.segment, *tgti = &tdmdi.segment;
+	struct device *data_device = NULL;
+
+	if (!cd || !cd->type || !name || !iname || !(sdmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = dm_query_device(cd, name, DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE | DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_CIPHER |
+				  DM_ACTIVE_UUID | DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE |
+				  DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEY, &tdmd);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Device %s is not active."), name);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (!single_segment(&tdmd) || tgt->type != DM_CRYPT || !tgt->u.crypt.tag_size) {
+		r = -ENOTSUP;
+		log_err(cd, _("Unsupported parameters on device %s."), name);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = dm_query_device(cd, iname, DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE | DM_ACTIVE_UUID, &tdmdi);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Device %s is not active."), iname);
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (!single_segment(&tdmdi) || tgti->type != DM_INTEGRITY) {
+		r = -ENOTSUP;
+		log_err(cd, _("Unsupported parameters on device %s."), iname);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = crypt_compare_dm_devices(cd, sdmdi, &tdmdi);
+	if (r) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Mismatching parameters on device %s."), iname);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	src = &sdmd->segment;
+	srci = &sdmdi->segment;
+
+	r = device_alloc(cd, &data_device, ipath);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = device_block_adjust(cd, srci->data_device, DEV_OK,
+				srci->u.integrity.offset, &sdmdi->size, NULL);
+	if (r)
+		goto out;
+
+	src->data_device = data_device;
+
+	r = crypt_compare_dm_devices(cd, sdmd, &tdmd);
+	if (r) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Crypt devices mismatch."));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Changing read only flag for active device makes no sense */
+	if (tdmd.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY)
+		sdmd->flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY;
+	else
+		sdmd->flags &= ~CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY;
+
+	if (tdmdi.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY)
+		sdmdi->flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY;
+	else
+		sdmdi->flags &= ~CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY;
+
+	if (sdmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) {
+		r = crypt_volume_key_set_description(tgt->u.crypt.vk, src->u.crypt.vk->key_description);
+		if (r)
+			goto out;
+	} else {
+		crypt_free_volume_key(tgt->u.crypt.vk);
+		tgt->u.crypt.vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(src->u.crypt.vk->keylength, src->u.crypt.vk->key);
+		if (!tgt->u.crypt.vk) {
+			r = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	r = device_block_adjust(cd, src->data_device, DEV_OK,
+				src->u.crypt.offset, &sdmd->size, NULL);
+	if (r)
+		goto out;
+
+	tdmd.flags = sdmd->flags;
+	tdmd.size = sdmd->size;
+
+	if ((r = dm_reload_device(cd, iname, sdmdi, 0, 0))) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to reload device %s."), iname);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = dm_reload_device(cd, name, &tdmd, 0, 0))) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to reload device %s."), name);
+		goto err_clear;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = dm_suspend_device(cd, name, 0))) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to suspend device %s."), name);
+		goto err_clear;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = dm_suspend_device(cd, iname, 0))) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to suspend device %s."), iname);
+		goto err_clear;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = dm_resume_device(cd, iname, act2dmflags(sdmdi->flags)))) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to resume device %s."), iname);
+		goto err_clear;
+	}
+
+	r = dm_resume_device(cd, name, act2dmflags(tdmd.flags));
+	if (!r)
+		goto out;
+
+	/*
+	 * This is worst case scenario. We have active underlying dm-integrity device with
+	 * new table but dm-crypt resume failed for some reason. Tear everything down and
+	 * burn it for good.
+	 */
+
+	log_err(cd, _("Fatal error while reloading device %s (on top of device %s)."), name, iname);
+
+	if (dm_error_device(cd, name))
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to switch device %s to dm-error."), name);
+	if (dm_error_device(cd, iname))
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to switch device %s to dm-error."), iname);
+	goto out;
+
+err_clear:
+	dm_clear_device(cd, name);
+	dm_clear_device(cd, iname);
+
+	if (dm_status_suspended(cd, name) > 0)
+		dm_resume_device(cd, name, 0);
+	if (dm_status_suspended(cd, iname) > 0)
+		dm_resume_device(cd, iname, 0);
+out:
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &tdmd);
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &tdmdi);
+	free(CONST_CAST(void*)tdmdi.uuid);
+	free(CONST_CAST(void*)tdmd.uuid);
+	device_free(cd, data_device);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_resize(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, uint64_t new_size)
+{
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmdq, dmd = {};
+	struct dm_target *tgt = &dmdq.segment;
+	int r;
+
+	/*
+	 * FIXME: Also with LUKS2 we must not allow resize when there's
+	 *	  explicit size stored in metadata (length != "dynamic")
+	 */
+
+	/* Device context type must be initialized */
+	if (!cd || !cd->type || !name)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (isTCRYPT(cd->type) || isBITLK(cd->type)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("This operation is not supported for this device type."));
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+	}
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Resizing device %s to %" PRIu64 " sectors.", name, new_size);
+
+	r = dm_query_device(cd, name, DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE | DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEY, &dmdq);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Device %s is not active."), name);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	if (!single_segment(&dmdq) || tgt->type != DM_CRYPT) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Unsupported device table detected in %s.", name);
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((dmdq.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) && !crypt_key_in_keyring(cd)) {
+		r = -EPERM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (crypt_key_in_keyring(cd)) {
+		if (!isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		r = LUKS2_key_description_by_segment(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr,
+					tgt->u.crypt.vk, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
+		if (r)
+			goto out;
+
+		dmdq.flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY;
+	}
+
+	if (crypt_loop_device(crypt_get_device_name(cd))) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Trying to resize underlying loop device %s.",
+			crypt_get_device_name(cd));
+		/* Here we always use default size not new_size */
+		if (crypt_loop_resize(crypt_get_device_name(cd)))
+			log_err(cd, _("Cannot resize loop device."));
+	}
+
+	r = device_block_adjust(cd, crypt_data_device(cd), DEV_OK,
+				crypt_get_data_offset(cd), &new_size, &dmdq.flags);
+	if (r)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (MISALIGNED(new_size, tgt->u.crypt.sector_size >> SECTOR_SHIFT)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Device size is not aligned to requested sector size."));
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (MISALIGNED(new_size, device_block_size(cd, crypt_data_device(cd)) >> SECTOR_SHIFT)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Device size is not aligned to device logical block size."));
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	dmd.uuid = crypt_get_uuid(cd);
+	dmd.size = new_size;
+	dmd.flags = dmdq.flags | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH;
+	r = dm_crypt_target_set(&dmd.segment, 0, new_size, crypt_data_device(cd),
+			tgt->u.crypt.vk, crypt_get_cipher_spec(cd),
+			crypt_get_iv_offset(cd), crypt_get_data_offset(cd),
+			crypt_get_integrity(cd), crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd),
+			crypt_get_sector_size(cd));
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (new_size == dmdq.size) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Device has already requested size %" PRIu64
+			" sectors.", dmdq.size);
+		r = 0;
+	} else {
+		if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
+			r = -ENOTSUP;
+		else if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+			r = LUKS2_unmet_requirements(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, 0, 0);
+		if (!r)
+			r = _reload_device(cd, name, &dmd);
+	}
+out:
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmdq);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_set_uuid(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *uuid)
+{
+	const char *active_uuid;
+	int r;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "%s device uuid.", uuid ? "Setting new" : "Refreshing");
+
+	if ((r = onlyLUKS(cd)))
+		return r;
+
+	active_uuid = crypt_get_uuid(cd);
+
+	if (uuid && active_uuid && !strncmp(uuid, active_uuid, UUID_STRING_L)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "UUID is the same as requested (%s) for device %s.",
+			uuid, mdata_device_path(cd));
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (uuid)
+		log_dbg(cd, "Requested new UUID change to %s for %s.", uuid, mdata_device_path(cd));
+	else
+		log_dbg(cd, "Requested new UUID refresh for %s.", mdata_device_path(cd));
+
+	if (!crypt_confirm(cd, _("Do you really want to change UUID of device?")))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		return LUKS_hdr_uuid_set(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, uuid, cd);
+	else
+		return LUKS2_hdr_uuid(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, uuid);
+}
+
+int crypt_set_label(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *label, const char *subsystem)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Setting new labels.");
+
+	if ((r = onlyLUKS2(cd)))
+		return r;
+
+	return LUKS2_hdr_labels(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, label, subsystem, 1);
+}
+
+int crypt_header_backup(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			const char *requested_type,
+			const char *backup_file)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (requested_type && !isLUKS(requested_type))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!backup_file)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Load with repair */
+	r = _crypt_load_luks(cd, requested_type, 1, 0);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Requested header backup of device %s (%s) to "
+		"file %s.", mdata_device_path(cd), requested_type ?: "any type", backup_file);
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type) && (!requested_type || isLUKS1(requested_type)))
+		r = LUKS_hdr_backup(backup_file, cd);
+	else if (isLUKS2(cd->type) && (!requested_type || isLUKS2(requested_type)))
+		r = LUKS2_hdr_backup(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, backup_file);
+	else
+		r = -EINVAL;
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_header_restore(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			 const char *requested_type,
+			 const char *backup_file)
+{
+	struct luks_phdr hdr1;
+	struct luks2_hdr hdr2;
+	int r, version;
+
+	if (requested_type && !isLUKS(requested_type))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!cd || (cd->type && !isLUKS(cd->type)) || !backup_file)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = init_crypto(cd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Requested header restore to device %s (%s) from "
+		"file %s.", mdata_device_path(cd), requested_type ?: "any type", backup_file);
+
+	version = LUKS2_hdr_version_unlocked(cd, backup_file);
+	if (!version ||
+	   (requested_type && version == 1 && !isLUKS1(requested_type)) ||
+	   (requested_type && version == 2 && !isLUKS2(requested_type))) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Header backup file does not contain compatible LUKS header."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	memset(&hdr2, 0, sizeof(hdr2));
+
+	if (!cd->type) {
+		if (version == 1)
+			r = LUKS_hdr_restore(backup_file, &hdr1, cd);
+		else
+			r = LUKS2_hdr_restore(cd, &hdr2, backup_file);
+
+		crypt_safe_memzero(&hdr1, sizeof(hdr1));
+		crypt_safe_memzero(&hdr2, sizeof(hdr2));
+	} else if (isLUKS2(cd->type) && (!requested_type || isLUKS2(requested_type))) {
+		r = LUKS2_hdr_restore(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, backup_file);
+		if (r)
+			_luks2_reload(cd);
+	} else if (isLUKS1(cd->type) && (!requested_type || isLUKS1(requested_type)))
+		r = LUKS_hdr_restore(backup_file, &cd->u.luks1.hdr, cd);
+	else
+		r = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!r)
+		r = _crypt_load_luks(cd, version == 1 ? CRYPT_LUKS1 : CRYPT_LUKS2, 1, 1);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+void crypt_free(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (!cd)
+		return;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Releasing crypt device %s context.", mdata_device_path(cd));
+
+	dm_backend_exit(cd);
+	crypt_free_volume_key(cd->volume_key);
+
+	crypt_free_type(cd);
+
+	device_free(cd, cd->device);
+	device_free(cd, cd->metadata_device);
+
+	free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->pbkdf.type);
+	free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->pbkdf.hash);
+
+	/* Some structures can contain keys (TCRYPT), wipe it */
+	crypt_safe_memzero(cd, sizeof(*cd));
+	free(cd);
+}
+
+static char *crypt_get_device_key_description(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+	char *desc = NULL;
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd;
+	struct dm_target *tgt = &dmd.segment;
+
+	if (dm_query_device(cd, name, DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEY | DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE, &dmd) < 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (single_segment(&dmd) && tgt->type == DM_CRYPT &&
+	    (dmd.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) && tgt->u.crypt.vk->key_description)
+		desc = strdup(tgt->u.crypt.vk->key_description);
+
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+
+	return desc;
+}
+
+int crypt_suspend(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		  const char *name)
+{
+	char *key_desc;
+	crypt_status_info ci;
+	int r;
+	uint32_t dmflags = DM_SUSPEND_WIPE_KEY;
+
+	/* FIXME: check context uuid matches the dm-crypt device uuid (onlyLUKS branching) */
+
+	if (!cd || !name)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Suspending volume %s.", name);
+
+	if (cd->type)
+		r = onlyLUKS(cd);
+	else {
+		r = crypt_uuid_type_cmp(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1);
+		if (r < 0)
+			r = crypt_uuid_type_cmp(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2);
+		if (r < 0)
+			log_err(cd, _("This operation is supported only for LUKS device."));
+	}
+
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	ci = crypt_status(NULL, name);
+	if (ci < CRYPT_ACTIVE) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Volume %s is not active."), name);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	dm_backend_init(cd);
+
+	r = dm_status_suspended(cd, name);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (r) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Volume %s is already suspended."), name);
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	key_desc = crypt_get_device_key_description(cd, name);
+
+	/* we can't simply wipe wrapped keys */
+	if (crypt_cipher_wrapped_key(crypt_get_cipher(cd), crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd)))
+		dmflags &= ~DM_SUSPEND_WIPE_KEY;
+
+	r = dm_suspend_device(cd, name, dmflags);
+	if (r == -ENOTSUP)
+		log_err(cd, _("Suspend is not supported for device %s."), name);
+	else if (r)
+		log_err(cd, _("Error during suspending device %s."), name);
+	else
+		crypt_drop_keyring_key_by_description(cd, key_desc, LOGON_KEY);
+	free(key_desc);
+out:
+	dm_backend_exit(cd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* key must be properly verified */
+static int resume_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		struct volume_key *vk,
+		const char *name)
+{
+	int digest, r;
+	struct volume_key *zerokey = NULL;
+
+	if (crypt_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher_spec(cd))) {
+		zerokey = crypt_alloc_volume_key(0, NULL);
+		if (!zerokey)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		vk = zerokey;
+	} else if (crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd)) {
+		/* LUKS2 path only */
+		digest = LUKS2_digest_by_segment(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
+		if (digest < 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		r = LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_digest(cd,
+					&cd->u.luks2.hdr, vk, digest);
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
+	}
+
+	r = dm_resume_and_reinstate_key(cd, name, vk);
+
+	if (r == -ENOTSUP)
+		log_err(cd, _("Resume is not supported for device %s."), name);
+	else if (r)
+		log_err(cd, _("Error during resuming device %s."), name);
+
+	if (r < 0)
+		crypt_drop_keyring_key(cd, vk);
+
+	crypt_free_volume_key(zerokey);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_resume_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			       const char *name,
+			       int keyslot,
+			       const char *passphrase,
+			       size_t passphrase_size)
+{
+	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	/* FIXME: check context uuid matches the dm-crypt device uuid */
+
+	if (!passphrase || !name)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Resuming volume %s.", name);
+
+	if ((r = onlyLUKS(cd)))
+		return r;
+
+	r = dm_status_suspended(cd, name);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (!r) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Volume %s is not suspended."), name);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		r = LUKS_open_key_with_hdr(keyslot, passphrase, passphrase_size,
+					   &cd->u.luks1.hdr, &vk, cd);
+	else
+		r = LUKS2_keyslot_open(cd, keyslot, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, passphrase, passphrase_size, &vk);
+
+	if  (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	keyslot = r;
+
+	r = resume_by_volume_key(cd, vk, name);
+
+	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+	return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
+}
+
+int crypt_resume_by_keyfile_device_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
+					  const char *name,
+					  int keyslot,
+					  const char *keyfile,
+					  size_t keyfile_size,
+					  uint64_t keyfile_offset)
+{
+	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+	char *passphrase_read = NULL;
+	size_t passphrase_size_read;
+	int r;
+
+	/* FIXME: check context uuid matches the dm-crypt device uuid */
+
+	if (!name || !keyfile)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Resuming volume %s.", name);
+
+	if ((r = onlyLUKS(cd)))
+		return r;
+
+	r = dm_status_suspended(cd, name);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (!r) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Volume %s is not suspended."), name);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	r = crypt_keyfile_device_read(cd, keyfile,
+				      &passphrase_read, &passphrase_size_read,
+				      keyfile_offset, keyfile_size, 0);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		r = LUKS_open_key_with_hdr(keyslot, passphrase_read, passphrase_size_read,
+					   &cd->u.luks1.hdr, &vk, cd);
+	else
+		r = LUKS2_keyslot_open(cd, keyslot, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, passphrase_read, passphrase_size_read, &vk);
+
+	crypt_safe_free(passphrase_read);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	keyslot = r;
+
+	r = resume_by_volume_key(cd, vk, name);
+
+	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+	return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
+}
+
+int crypt_resume_by_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			    const char *name,
+			    int keyslot,
+			    const char *keyfile,
+			    size_t keyfile_size)
+{
+	return crypt_resume_by_keyfile_device_offset(cd, name, keyslot,
+					      keyfile, keyfile_size, 0);
+}
+
+int crypt_resume_by_keyfile_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
+				   const char *name,
+				   int keyslot,
+				   const char *keyfile,
+				   size_t keyfile_size,
+				   size_t keyfile_offset)
+{
+	return crypt_resume_by_keyfile_device_offset(cd, name, keyslot,
+				      keyfile, keyfile_size, keyfile_offset);
+}
+
+int crypt_resume_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name,
+	const char *volume_key,
+	size_t volume_key_size)
+{
+	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!name || !volume_key)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Resuming volume %s by volume key.", name);
+
+	if ((r = onlyLUKS(cd)))
+		return r;
+
+	r = dm_status_suspended(cd, name);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (!r) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Volume %s is not suspended."), name);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size, volume_key);
+	if (!vk)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		r = LUKS_verify_volume_key(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, vk);
+	else if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+		r = LUKS2_digest_verify_by_segment(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, vk);
+	else
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	if (r == -EPERM || r == -ENOENT)
+		log_err(cd, _("Volume key does not match the volume."));
+
+	if (r >= 0)
+		r = resume_by_volume_key(cd, vk, name);
+
+	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Keyslot manipulation
+ */
+int crypt_keyslot_add_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot, // -1 any
+	const char *passphrase,
+	size_t passphrase_size,
+	const char *new_passphrase,
+	size_t new_passphrase_size)
+{
+	int digest, r, active_slots;
+	struct luks2_keyslot_params params;
+	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Adding new keyslot, existing passphrase %sprovided,"
+		"new passphrase %sprovided.",
+		passphrase ? "" : "not ", new_passphrase  ? "" : "not ");
+
+	if ((r = onlyLUKS(cd)))
+		return r;
+
+	if (!passphrase || !new_passphrase)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = keyslot_verify_or_find_empty(cd, &keyslot);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		active_slots = LUKS_keyslot_active_count(&cd->u.luks1.hdr);
+	else
+		active_slots = LUKS2_keyslot_active_count(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
+	if (active_slots == 0) {
+		/* No slots used, try to use pre-generated key in header */
+		if (cd->volume_key) {
+			vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(cd->volume_key->keylength, cd->volume_key->key);
+			r = vk ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
+		} else {
+			log_err(cd, _("Cannot add key slot, all slots disabled and no volume key provided."));
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	} else if (active_slots < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	else {
+		/* Passphrase provided, use it to unlock existing keyslot */
+		if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+			r = LUKS_open_key_with_hdr(CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, passphrase,
+						   passphrase_size, &cd->u.luks1.hdr, &vk, cd);
+		else
+			r = LUKS2_keyslot_open(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, passphrase,
+						passphrase_size, &vk);
+	}
+
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		r = LUKS_set_key(keyslot, CONST_CAST(char*)new_passphrase,
+				 new_passphrase_size, &cd->u.luks1.hdr, vk, cd);
+	else {
+		r = LUKS2_digest_verify_by_segment(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, vk);
+		digest = r;
+
+		if (r >= 0)
+			r = LUKS2_keyslot_params_default(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, &params);
+
+		if (r >= 0)
+			r = LUKS2_digest_assign(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, digest, 1, 0);
+
+		if (r >= 0)
+			r = LUKS2_keyslot_store(cd,  &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot,
+						CONST_CAST(char*)new_passphrase,
+						new_passphrase_size, vk, &params);
+	}
+
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = 0;
+out:
+	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		_luks2_reload(cd);
+		return r;
+	}
+	return keyslot;
+}
+
+int crypt_keyslot_change_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot_old,
+	int keyslot_new,
+	const char *passphrase,
+	size_t passphrase_size,
+	const char *new_passphrase,
+	size_t new_passphrase_size)
+{
+	int digest = -1, r;
+	struct luks2_keyslot_params params;
+	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+
+	if (!passphrase || !new_passphrase)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Changing passphrase from old keyslot %d to new %d.",
+		keyslot_old, keyslot_new);
+
+	if ((r = onlyLUKS(cd)))
+		return r;
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		r = LUKS_open_key_with_hdr(keyslot_old, passphrase, passphrase_size,
+					   &cd->u.luks1.hdr, &vk, cd);
+	else if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+		r = LUKS2_keyslot_open(cd, keyslot_old, CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT, passphrase, passphrase_size, &vk);
+		/* will fail for keyslots w/o digest. fix if supported in a future */
+		if (r >= 0) {
+			digest = LUKS2_digest_by_keyslot(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, r);
+			if (digest < 0)
+				r = -EINVAL;
+		}
+	} else
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (keyslot_old != CRYPT_ANY_SLOT && keyslot_old != r) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Keyslot mismatch.");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	keyslot_old = r;
+
+	if (keyslot_new == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT) {
+		if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+			keyslot_new = LUKS_keyslot_find_empty(&cd->u.luks1.hdr);
+		else if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+			keyslot_new = LUKS2_keyslot_find_empty(&cd->u.luks2.hdr);
+		if (keyslot_new < 0)
+			keyslot_new = keyslot_old;
+	}
+	log_dbg(cd, "Key change, old slot %d, new slot %d.", keyslot_old, keyslot_new);
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type)) {
+		if (keyslot_old == keyslot_new) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Key slot %d is going to be overwritten.", keyslot_old);
+			(void)crypt_keyslot_destroy(cd, keyslot_old);
+		}
+		r = LUKS_set_key(keyslot_new, new_passphrase, new_passphrase_size,
+				 &cd->u.luks1.hdr, vk, cd);
+	} else if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+		r = LUKS2_keyslot_params_default(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, &params);
+		if (r)
+			goto out;
+
+		if (keyslot_old != keyslot_new) {
+			r = LUKS2_digest_assign(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot_new, digest, 1, 0);
+			if (r < 0)
+				goto out;
+			r = LUKS2_token_assignment_copy(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot_old, keyslot_new, 0);
+			if (r < 0)
+				goto out;
+		} else {
+			log_dbg(cd, "Key slot %d is going to be overwritten.", keyslot_old);
+			/* FIXME: improve return code so that we can detect area is damaged */
+			r = LUKS2_keyslot_wipe(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot_old, 1);
+			if (r) {
+				/* (void)crypt_keyslot_destroy(cd, keyslot_old); */
+				r = -EINVAL;
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+
+		r = LUKS2_keyslot_store(cd,  &cd->u.luks2.hdr,
+					keyslot_new, new_passphrase,
+					new_passphrase_size, vk, &params);
+	} else
+		r = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (r >= 0 && keyslot_old != keyslot_new)
+		r = crypt_keyslot_destroy(cd, keyslot_old);
+
+	if (r < 0)
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to swap new key slot."));
+out:
+	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		_luks2_reload(cd);
+		return r;
+	}
+	return keyslot_new;
+}
+
+int crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_device_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *keyfile,
+	size_t keyfile_size,
+	uint64_t keyfile_offset,
+	const char *new_keyfile,
+	size_t new_keyfile_size,
+	uint64_t new_keyfile_offset)
+{
+	int digest, r, active_slots;
+	size_t passwordLen, new_passwordLen;
+	struct luks2_keyslot_params params;
+	char *password = NULL, *new_password = NULL;
+	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+
+	if (!keyfile || !new_keyfile)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Adding new keyslot, existing keyfile %s, new keyfile %s.",
+		keyfile, new_keyfile);
+
+	if ((r = onlyLUKS(cd)))
+		return r;
+
+	r = keyslot_verify_or_find_empty(cd, &keyslot);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		active_slots = LUKS_keyslot_active_count(&cd->u.luks1.hdr);
+	else
+		active_slots = LUKS2_keyslot_active_count(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
+	if (active_slots == 0) {
+		/* No slots used, try to use pre-generated key in header */
+		if (cd->volume_key) {
+			vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(cd->volume_key->keylength, cd->volume_key->key);
+			r = vk ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
+		} else {
+			log_err(cd, _("Cannot add key slot, all slots disabled and no volume key provided."));
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	} else {
+		r = crypt_keyfile_device_read(cd, keyfile,
+				       &password, &passwordLen,
+				       keyfile_offset, keyfile_size, 0);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+
+		if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+			r = LUKS_open_key_with_hdr(CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, password, passwordLen,
+						   &cd->u.luks1.hdr, &vk, cd);
+		else
+			r = LUKS2_keyslot_open(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, password, passwordLen, &vk);
+	}
+
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = crypt_keyfile_device_read(cd, new_keyfile,
+			       &new_password, &new_passwordLen,
+			       new_keyfile_offset, new_keyfile_size, 0);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		r = LUKS_set_key(keyslot, new_password, new_passwordLen,
+				 &cd->u.luks1.hdr, vk, cd);
+	else {
+		r = LUKS2_digest_verify_by_segment(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, vk);
+		digest = r;
+
+		if (r >= 0)
+			r = LUKS2_keyslot_params_default(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, &params);
+
+		if (r >= 0)
+			r = LUKS2_digest_assign(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, digest, 1, 0);
+
+		if (r >= 0)
+			r = LUKS2_keyslot_store(cd,  &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot,
+						new_password, new_passwordLen, vk, &params);
+	}
+out:
+	crypt_safe_free(password);
+	crypt_safe_free(new_password);
+	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		_luks2_reload(cd);
+		return r;
+	}
+	return keyslot;
+}
+
+int crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *keyfile,
+	size_t keyfile_size,
+	const char *new_keyfile,
+	size_t new_keyfile_size)
+{
+	return crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_device_offset(cd, keyslot,
+				keyfile, keyfile_size, 0,
+				new_keyfile, new_keyfile_size, 0);
+}
+
+int crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *keyfile,
+	size_t keyfile_size,
+	size_t keyfile_offset,
+	const char *new_keyfile,
+	size_t new_keyfile_size,
+	size_t new_keyfile_offset)
+{
+	return crypt_keyslot_add_by_keyfile_device_offset(cd, keyslot,
+				keyfile, keyfile_size, keyfile_offset,
+				new_keyfile, new_keyfile_size, new_keyfile_offset);
+}
+
+int crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *volume_key,
+	size_t volume_key_size,
+	const char *passphrase,
+	size_t passphrase_size)
+{
+	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!passphrase)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Adding new keyslot %d using volume key.", keyslot);
+
+	if ((r = onlyLUKS(cd)))
+		return r;
+
+	if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+		return crypt_keyslot_add_by_key(cd, keyslot,
+				volume_key, volume_key_size, passphrase,
+				passphrase_size, 0);
+
+	r = keyslot_verify_or_find_empty(cd, &keyslot);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (volume_key)
+		vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size, volume_key);
+	else if (cd->volume_key)
+		vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(cd->volume_key->keylength, cd->volume_key->key);
+
+	if (!vk)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	r = LUKS_verify_volume_key(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, vk);
+	if (r < 0)
+		log_err(cd, _("Volume key does not match the volume."));
+	else
+		r = LUKS_set_key(keyslot, passphrase, passphrase_size,
+			&cd->u.luks1.hdr, vk, cd);
+
+	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+	return (r < 0) ? r : keyslot;
+}
+
+int crypt_keyslot_destroy(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot)
+{
+	crypt_keyslot_info ki;
+	int r;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Destroying keyslot %d.", keyslot);
+
+	if ((r = _onlyLUKS(cd, CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED)))
+		return r;
+
+	ki = crypt_keyslot_status(cd, keyslot);
+	if (ki == CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Key slot %d is invalid."), keyslot);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type)) {
+		if (ki == CRYPT_SLOT_INACTIVE) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Keyslot %d is not active."), keyslot);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		return LUKS_del_key(keyslot, &cd->u.luks1.hdr, cd);
+	}
+
+	return LUKS2_keyslot_wipe(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, 0);
+}
+
+static int _check_header_data_overlap(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+	if (!name || !isLUKS(cd->type))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (device_is_identical(crypt_data_device(cd), crypt_metadata_device(cd)) <= 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* FIXME: check real header size */
+	if (crypt_get_data_offset(cd) == 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Device header overlaps with data area."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int check_devices(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, const char *iname, uint32_t *flags)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (!flags || !name)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (iname) {
+		r = dm_status_device(cd, iname);
+		if (r >= 0 && !(*flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH))
+			return -EBUSY;
+		if (r < 0 && r != -ENODEV)
+			return r;
+		if (r == -ENODEV)
+			*flags &= ~CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH;
+	}
+
+	r = dm_status_device(cd, name);
+	if (r >= 0 && !(*flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH))
+		return -EBUSY;
+	if (r < 0 && r != -ENODEV)
+		return r;
+	if (r == -ENODEV)
+		*flags &= ~CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int _create_device_with_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *type, const char *name, const char *iname,
+	const char *ipath, struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd,
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmdi)
+{
+	int r;
+	enum devcheck device_check;
+	struct dm_target *tgt;
+	struct device *device = NULL;
+
+	if (!single_segment(dmd))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	tgt = &dmd->segment;
+	if (tgt->type != DM_CRYPT)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	device_check = dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SHARED ? DEV_OK : DEV_EXCL;
+
+	r = INTEGRITY_activate_dmd_device(cd, iname, CRYPT_INTEGRITY, dmdi, 0);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	r = device_alloc(cd, &device, ipath);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+	tgt->data_device = device;
+
+	r = device_block_adjust(cd, tgt->data_device, device_check,
+				tgt->u.crypt.offset, &dmd->size, &dmd->flags);
+
+	if (!r)
+		r = dm_create_device(cd, name, type, dmd);
+out:
+	if (r < 0)
+		dm_remove_device(cd, iname, 0);
+
+	device_free(cd, device);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int kernel_keyring_support(void)
+{
+	static unsigned _checked = 0;
+
+	if (!_checked) {
+		_kernel_keyring_supported = keyring_check();
+		_checked = 1;
+	}
+
+	return _kernel_keyring_supported;
+}
+
+static int dmcrypt_keyring_bug(void)
+{
+	uint64_t kversion;
+
+	if (kernel_version(&kversion))
+		return 1;
+	return kversion < version(4,15,0,0);
+}
+
+int create_or_reload_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+		     const char *type, struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd)
+{
+	int r;
+	enum devcheck device_check;
+	struct dm_target *tgt;
+
+	if (!type || !name || !single_segment(dmd))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	tgt = &dmd->segment;
+	if (tgt->type != DM_CRYPT)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* drop CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH flag if any device is inactive */
+	r = check_devices(cd, name, NULL, &dmd->flags);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	if (dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH)
+		r = _reload_device(cd, name, dmd);
+	else {
+		device_check = dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SHARED ? DEV_OK : DEV_EXCL;
+
+		r = device_block_adjust(cd, tgt->data_device, device_check,
+					tgt->u.crypt.offset, &dmd->size, &dmd->flags);
+		if (!r) {
+			tgt->size = dmd->size;
+			r = dm_create_device(cd, name, type, dmd);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int create_or_reload_device_with_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+		     const char *type, struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmd,
+		     struct crypt_dm_active_device *dmdi)
+{
+	int r;
+	const char *iname = NULL;
+	char *ipath = NULL;
+
+	if (!type || !name || !dmd || !dmdi)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (asprintf(&ipath, "%s/%s_dif", dm_get_dir(), name) < 0)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	iname = ipath + strlen(dm_get_dir()) + 1;
+
+	/* drop CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH flag if any device is inactive */
+	r = check_devices(cd, name, iname, &dmd->flags);
+	if (r)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (dmd->flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH)
+		r = _reload_device_with_integrity(cd, name, iname, ipath, dmd, dmdi);
+	else
+		r = _create_device_with_integrity(cd, type, name, iname, ipath, dmd, dmdi);
+out:
+	free(ipath);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* See fixmes in _open_and_activate_luks2 */
+int update_reencryption_flag(struct crypt_device *cd, int enable, bool commit);
+
+/* TODO: This function should 1:1 with pre-reencryption code */
+static int _open_and_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *name,
+	const char *passphrase,
+	size_t passphrase_size,
+	uint32_t flags)
+{
+	bool use_keyring;
+	int r;
+	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+
+	r = LUKS2_keyslot_open(cd, keyslot,
+			       (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_UNBOUND_KEY) ?
+			       CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT : CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT,
+			       passphrase, passphrase_size, &vk);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+	keyslot = r;
+
+	if (!crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd))
+		use_keyring = false;
+	else
+		use_keyring = ((name && !crypt_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd))) ||
+			       (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY));
+
+	if (use_keyring) {
+		r = LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_keyslot(cd,
+				&cd->u.luks2.hdr, vk, keyslot);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+		flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY;
+	}
+
+	if (name)
+		r = LUKS2_activate(cd, name, vk, flags);
+out:
+	if (r < 0)
+		crypt_drop_keyring_key(cd, vk);
+	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+
+	return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
+}
+
+#if USE_LUKS2_REENCRYPTION
+static int load_all_keys(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, struct volume_key *vks)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct volume_key *vk = vks;
+
+	while (vk) {
+		r = LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_digest(cd, hdr, vk, crypt_volume_key_get_id(vk));
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
+		vk = crypt_volume_key_next(vk);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int _open_all_keys(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *passphrase,
+	size_t passphrase_size,
+	uint32_t flags,
+	struct volume_key **vks)
+{
+	int r, segment;
+	struct volume_key *_vks = NULL;
+	crypt_reencrypt_info ri = LUKS2_reencrypt_status(hdr);
+
+	segment = (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_UNBOUND_KEY) ? CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT : CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT;
+
+	switch (ri) {
+	case CRYPT_REENCRYPT_NONE:
+		r = LUKS2_keyslot_open(cd, keyslot, segment, passphrase, passphrase_size, &_vks);
+		break;
+	case CRYPT_REENCRYPT_CLEAN:
+	case CRYPT_REENCRYPT_CRASH:
+		if (segment == CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT)
+			r = LUKS2_keyslot_open(cd, keyslot, segment, passphrase,
+					       passphrase_size, &_vks);
+		else
+			r = LUKS2_keyslot_open_all_segments(cd, keyslot,
+					keyslot, passphrase, passphrase_size,
+					&_vks);
+		break;
+	default:
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (keyslot == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT)
+		keyslot = r;
+
+	if (r >= 0 && (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY))
+		r = load_all_keys(cd, hdr, _vks);
+
+	if (r >= 0 && vks)
+		MOVE_REF(*vks, _vks);
+
+	if (r < 0)
+		crypt_drop_keyring_key(cd, _vks);
+	crypt_free_volume_key(_vks);
+
+	return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
+}
+
+static int _open_and_activate_reencrypt_device(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *name,
+	const char *passphrase,
+	size_t passphrase_size,
+	uint32_t flags)
+{
+	bool dynamic_size;
+	crypt_reencrypt_info ri;
+	uint64_t minimal_size, device_size;
+	struct volume_key *vks = NULL;
+	int r = 0;
+	struct crypt_lock_handle *reencrypt_lock = NULL;
+
+	if (crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd))
+		flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY;
+
+	r = LUKS2_reencrypt_lock(cd, &reencrypt_lock);
+	if (r) {
+		if (r == -EBUSY)
+			log_err(cd, _("Reencryption in-progress. Cannot activate device."));
+		else
+			log_err(cd, _("Failed to get reencryption lock."));
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL)))
+		goto err;
+
+	ri = LUKS2_reencrypt_status(hdr);
+
+	if (ri == CRYPT_REENCRYPT_CRASH) {
+		r = LUKS2_reencrypt_locked_recovery_by_passphrase(cd, keyslot,
+				keyslot, passphrase, passphrase_size, flags, &vks);
+		if (r < 0) {
+			log_err(cd, _("LUKS2 reencryption recovery failed."));
+			goto err;
+		}
+		keyslot = r;
+
+		ri = LUKS2_reencrypt_status(hdr);
+	}
+
+	/* recovery finished reencryption or it's already finished */
+	if (ri == CRYPT_REENCRYPT_NONE) {
+		crypt_drop_keyring_key(cd, vks);
+		crypt_free_volume_key(vks);
+		LUKS2_reencrypt_unlock(cd, reencrypt_lock);
+		return _open_and_activate(cd, keyslot, name, passphrase, passphrase_size, flags);
+	}
+
+	if (ri > CRYPT_REENCRYPT_CLEAN) {
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	if (LUKS2_get_data_size(hdr, &minimal_size, &dynamic_size))
+		goto err;
+
+	if (!vks) {
+		r = _open_all_keys(cd, hdr, keyslot, passphrase, passphrase_size, flags, &vks);
+		if (r >= 0)
+			keyslot = r;
+	}
+
+	if (r >= 0) {
+		r = LUKS2_reencrypt_digest_verify(cd, hdr, vks);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto err;
+	}
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Entering clean reencryption state mode.");
+
+	if (r >= 0)
+		r = LUKS2_reencrypt_check_device_size(cd, hdr, minimal_size, &device_size, true, dynamic_size);
+
+	if (r >= 0)
+		r = LUKS2_activate_multi(cd, name, vks, device_size >> SECTOR_SHIFT, flags);
+err:
+	LUKS2_reencrypt_unlock(cd, reencrypt_lock);
+	if (r < 0)
+		crypt_drop_keyring_key(cd, vks);
+	crypt_free_volume_key(vks);
+
+	return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Activation/deactivation of a device
+ */
+static int _open_and_activate_luks2(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *name,
+	const char *passphrase,
+	size_t passphrase_size,
+	uint32_t flags)
+{
+	crypt_reencrypt_info ri;
+	int r, rv;
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr = &cd->u.luks2.hdr;
+	struct volume_key *vks = NULL;
+
+	ri = LUKS2_reencrypt_status(hdr);
+	if (ri == CRYPT_REENCRYPT_INVALID)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (ri > CRYPT_REENCRYPT_NONE) {
+		if (name)
+			r = _open_and_activate_reencrypt_device(cd, hdr, keyslot, name, passphrase,
+					passphrase_size, flags);
+		else {
+			r = _open_all_keys(cd, hdr, keyslot, passphrase,
+					   passphrase_size, flags, &vks);
+			if (r < 0)
+				return r;
+
+			rv = LUKS2_reencrypt_digest_verify(cd, hdr, vks);
+			crypt_free_volume_key(vks);
+			if (rv < 0)
+				return rv;
+		}
+	} else
+		r = _open_and_activate(cd, keyslot, name, passphrase,
+				passphrase_size, flags);
+
+	return r;
+}
+#else
+static int _open_and_activate_luks2(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *name,
+	const char *passphrase,
+	size_t passphrase_size,
+	uint32_t flags)
+{
+	crypt_reencrypt_info ri;
+
+	ri = LUKS2_reencrypt_status(&cd->u.luks2.hdr);
+	if (ri == CRYPT_REENCRYPT_INVALID)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (ri > CRYPT_REENCRYPT_NONE) {
+		log_err(cd, _("This operation is not supported for this device type."));
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+	}
+
+	return _open_and_activate(cd, keyslot, name, passphrase, passphrase_size, flags);
+}
+#endif
+
+static int _activate_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *passphrase,
+	size_t passphrase_size,
+	uint32_t flags)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+
+	if ((flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) && !crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if ((flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_UNBOUND_KEY) && name)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = _check_header_data_overlap(cd, name);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SERIALIZE_MEMORY_HARD_PBKDF)
+		cd->memory_hard_pbkdf_lock_enabled = true;
+
+	/* plain, use hashed passphrase */
+	if (isPLAIN(cd->type)) {
+		r = -EINVAL;
+		if (!name)
+			goto out;
+
+		r = process_key(cd, cd->u.plain.hdr.hash,
+				cd->u.plain.key_size,
+				passphrase, passphrase_size, &vk);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+
+		r = PLAIN_activate(cd, name, vk, cd->u.plain.hdr.size, flags);
+		keyslot = 0;
+	} else if (isLUKS1(cd->type)) {
+		r = LUKS_open_key_with_hdr(keyslot, passphrase,
+					   passphrase_size, &cd->u.luks1.hdr, &vk, cd);
+		if (r >= 0) {
+			keyslot = r;
+			if (name)
+				r = LUKS1_activate(cd, name, vk, flags);
+		}
+	} else if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+		r = _open_and_activate_luks2(cd, keyslot, name, passphrase, passphrase_size, flags);
+		keyslot = r;
+	} else if (isBITLK(cd->type)) {
+		r = BITLK_activate(cd, name, passphrase, passphrase_size,
+				   &cd->u.bitlk.params, flags);
+		keyslot = 0;
+	} else {
+		log_err(cd, _("Device type is not properly initialized."));
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	}
+out:
+	if (r < 0)
+		crypt_drop_keyring_key(cd, vk);
+	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+
+	cd->memory_hard_pbkdf_lock_enabled = false;
+
+	return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
+}
+
+static int _activate_loopaes(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name,
+	char *buffer,
+	size_t buffer_size,
+	uint32_t flags)
+{
+	int r;
+	unsigned int key_count = 0;
+	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+
+	r = LOOPAES_parse_keyfile(cd, &vk, cd->u.loopaes.hdr.hash, &key_count,
+				  buffer, buffer_size);
+
+	if (!r && name)
+		r = LOOPAES_activate(cd, name, cd->u.loopaes.cipher, key_count,
+				     vk, flags);
+
+	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int _activate_check_status(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, unsigned reload)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (!name)
+		return 0;
+
+	r = dm_status_device(cd, name);
+
+	if (r >= 0 && reload)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (r >= 0 || r == -EEXIST) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Device %s already exists."), name);
+		return -EEXIST;
+	}
+
+	if (r == -ENODEV)
+		return 0;
+
+	log_err(cd, _("Cannot use device %s, name is invalid or still in use."), name);
+	return r;
+}
+
+// activation/deactivation of device mapping
+int crypt_activate_by_passphrase(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *passphrase,
+	size_t passphrase_size,
+	uint32_t flags)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (!cd || !passphrase || (!name && (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "%s volume %s [keyslot %d] using passphrase.",
+		name ? "Activating" : "Checking", name ?: "passphrase",
+		keyslot);
+
+	r = _activate_check_status(cd, name, flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	return _activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, keyslot, passphrase, passphrase_size, flags);
+}
+
+int crypt_activate_by_keyfile_device_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *keyfile,
+	size_t keyfile_size,
+	uint64_t keyfile_offset,
+	uint32_t flags)
+{
+	char *passphrase_read = NULL;
+	size_t passphrase_size_read;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!cd || !keyfile ||
+	    ((flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) && !crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "%s volume %s [keyslot %d] using keyfile %s.",
+		name ? "Activating" : "Checking", name ?: "passphrase", keyslot, keyfile);
+
+	r = _activate_check_status(cd, name, flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	r = crypt_keyfile_device_read(cd, keyfile,
+				&passphrase_read, &passphrase_size_read,
+				keyfile_offset, keyfile_size, 0);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (isLOOPAES(cd->type))
+		r = _activate_loopaes(cd, name, passphrase_read, passphrase_size_read, flags);
+	else
+		r = _activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, keyslot, passphrase_read, passphrase_size_read, flags);
+
+out:
+	crypt_safe_free(passphrase_read);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_activate_by_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *keyfile,
+	size_t keyfile_size,
+	uint32_t flags)
+{
+	return crypt_activate_by_keyfile_device_offset(cd, name, keyslot, keyfile,
+					keyfile_size, 0, flags);
+}
+
+int crypt_activate_by_keyfile_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *keyfile,
+	size_t keyfile_size,
+	size_t keyfile_offset,
+	uint32_t flags)
+{
+	return crypt_activate_by_keyfile_device_offset(cd, name, keyslot, keyfile,
+					keyfile_size, keyfile_offset, flags);
+}
+int crypt_activate_by_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name,
+	const char *volume_key,
+	size_t volume_key_size,
+	uint32_t flags)
+{
+	bool use_keyring;
+	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!cd ||
+	    ((flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) && !crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "%s volume %s by volume key.", name ? "Activating" : "Checking",
+		name ?: "");
+
+	r = _activate_check_status(cd, name, flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	r = _check_header_data_overlap(cd, name);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	/* use key directly, no hash */
+	if (isPLAIN(cd->type)) {
+		if (!name)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		if (!volume_key || !volume_key_size || volume_key_size != cd->u.plain.key_size) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Incorrect volume key specified for plain device."));
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size, volume_key);
+		if (!vk)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		r = PLAIN_activate(cd, name, vk, cd->u.plain.hdr.size, flags);
+	} else if (isLUKS1(cd->type)) {
+		/* If key is not provided, try to use internal key */
+		if (!volume_key) {
+			if (!cd->volume_key) {
+				log_err(cd, _("Volume key does not match the volume."));
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+			volume_key_size = cd->volume_key->keylength;
+			volume_key = cd->volume_key->key;
+		}
+
+		vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size, volume_key);
+		if (!vk)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		r = LUKS_verify_volume_key(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, vk);
+
+		if (r == -EPERM)
+			log_err(cd, _("Volume key does not match the volume."));
+
+		if (!r && name)
+			r = LUKS1_activate(cd, name, vk, flags);
+	} else if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+		/* If key is not provided, try to use internal key */
+		if (!volume_key) {
+			if (!cd->volume_key) {
+				log_err(cd, _("Volume key does not match the volume."));
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+			volume_key_size = cd->volume_key->keylength;
+			volume_key = cd->volume_key->key;
+		}
+
+		vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size, volume_key);
+		if (!vk)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		r = LUKS2_digest_verify_by_segment(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, vk);
+		if (r == -EPERM || r == -ENOENT)
+			log_err(cd, _("Volume key does not match the volume."));
+		if (r > 0)
+			r = 0;
+
+		if (!crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd))
+			use_keyring = false;
+		else
+			use_keyring = (name && !crypt_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd))) || (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY);
+
+		if (!r && use_keyring) {
+			r = LUKS2_key_description_by_segment(cd,
+				&cd->u.luks2.hdr, vk, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
+			if (!r)
+				r = crypt_volume_key_load_in_keyring(cd, vk);
+			if (!r)
+				flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY;
+		}
+
+		if (!r && name)
+			r = LUKS2_activate(cd, name, vk, flags);
+	} else if (isVERITY(cd->type)) {
+		r = crypt_activate_by_signed_key(cd, name, volume_key, volume_key_size, NULL, 0, flags);
+	} else if (isTCRYPT(cd->type)) {
+		if (!name)
+			return 0;
+		r = TCRYPT_activate(cd, name, &cd->u.tcrypt.hdr,
+				    &cd->u.tcrypt.params, flags);
+	} else if (isINTEGRITY(cd->type)) {
+		if (!name)
+			return 0;
+		if (volume_key) {
+			vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size, volume_key);
+			if (!vk)
+				return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+		r = INTEGRITY_activate(cd, name, &cd->u.integrity.params, vk,
+				       cd->u.integrity.journal_crypt_key,
+				       cd->u.integrity.journal_mac_key, flags,
+				       cd->u.integrity.sb_flags);
+	} else {
+		log_err(cd, _("Device type is not properly initialized."));
+		r = -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (r < 0)
+		crypt_drop_keyring_key(cd, vk);
+	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_activate_by_signed_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name,
+	const char *volume_key,
+	size_t volume_key_size,
+	const char *signature,
+	size_t signature_size,
+	uint32_t flags)
+{
+	char description[512];
+	int r;
+
+	if (!cd || !isVERITY(cd->type))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!volume_key || !volume_key_size || (!name && signature)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Incorrect root hash specified for verity device."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "%s volume %s by %skey.", name ? "Activating" : "Checking", name ?: "", signature ? "signed " : "");
+
+	if (cd->u.verity.hdr.flags & CRYPT_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_SIGNATURE && !signature) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Root hash signature required."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	r = _activate_check_status(cd, name, flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (signature && !kernel_keyring_support()) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Kernel keyring missing: required for passing signature to kernel."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* volume_key == root hash */
+	free(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.root_hash);
+	cd->u.verity.root_hash = NULL;
+
+	if (signature) {
+		r = snprintf(description, sizeof(description)-1, "cryptsetup:%s%s%s",
+			     crypt_get_uuid(cd) ?: "", crypt_get_uuid(cd) ? "-" : "", name);
+		if (r < 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		log_dbg(cd, "Adding signature into keyring %s", description);
+		r = keyring_add_key_in_thread_keyring(USER_KEY, description, signature, signature_size);
+		if (r) {
+			log_err(cd, _("Failed to load key in kernel keyring."));
+			return r;
+		}
+	}
+
+	r = VERITY_activate(cd, name, volume_key, volume_key_size,
+			    signature ? description : NULL,
+			    cd->u.verity.fec_device,
+			    &cd->u.verity.hdr, flags | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY);
+
+	if (!r) {
+		cd->u.verity.root_hash_size = volume_key_size;
+		cd->u.verity.root_hash = malloc(volume_key_size);
+		if (cd->u.verity.root_hash)
+			memcpy(CONST_CAST(void*)cd->u.verity.root_hash, volume_key, volume_key_size);
+	}
+
+	if (signature)
+		crypt_drop_keyring_key_by_description(cd, description, USER_KEY);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_deactivate_by_name(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, uint32_t flags)
+{
+	struct crypt_device *fake_cd = NULL;
+	struct luks2_hdr *hdr2 = NULL;
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd = {};
+	int r;
+	uint32_t get_flags = DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE | DM_ACTIVE_UUID | DM_ACTIVE_HOLDERS;
+
+	if (!name)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Deactivating volume %s.", name);
+
+	if (!cd) {
+		r = crypt_init_by_name(&fake_cd, name);
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
+		cd = fake_cd;
+	}
+
+	/* skip holders detection and early abort when some flags raised */
+	if (flags & (CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_FORCE | CRYPT_DEACTIVATE_DEFERRED))
+		get_flags &= ~DM_ACTIVE_HOLDERS;
+
+	switch (crypt_status(cd, name)) {
+		case CRYPT_ACTIVE:
+		case CRYPT_BUSY:
+			r = dm_query_device(cd, name, get_flags, &dmd);
+			if (r >= 0) {
+				if (dmd.holders) {
+					log_err(cd, _("Device %s is still in use."), name);
+					r = -EBUSY;
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+
+			if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+				hdr2 = crypt_get_hdr(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2);
+
+			if ((dmd.uuid && !strncmp(CRYPT_LUKS2, dmd.uuid, sizeof(CRYPT_LUKS2)-1)) || hdr2)
+				r = LUKS2_deactivate(cd, name, hdr2, &dmd, flags);
+			else if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
+				r = TCRYPT_deactivate(cd, name, flags);
+			else
+				r = dm_remove_device(cd, name, flags);
+			if (r < 0 && crypt_status(cd, name) == CRYPT_BUSY) {
+				log_err(cd, _("Device %s is still in use."), name);
+				r = -EBUSY;
+			}
+			break;
+		case CRYPT_INACTIVE:
+			log_err(cd, _("Device %s is not active."), name);
+			r = -ENODEV;
+			break;
+		default:
+			log_err(cd, _("Invalid device %s."), name);
+			r = -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+	free(CONST_CAST(void*)dmd.uuid);
+	crypt_free(fake_cd);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_deactivate(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+	return crypt_deactivate_by_name(cd, name, 0);
+}
+
+int crypt_get_active_device(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+			    struct crypt_active_device *cad)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd, dmdi = {};
+	const char *namei = NULL;
+	struct dm_target *tgt = &dmd.segment;
+	uint64_t min_offset = UINT64_MAX;
+
+	if (!cd || !name || !cad)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = dm_query_device(cd, name, DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE, &dmd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	/* For LUKS2 with integrity we need flags from underlying dm-integrity */
+	if (isLUKS2(cd->type) && crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd) && single_segment(&dmd)) {
+		namei = device_dm_name(tgt->data_device);
+		if (namei && dm_query_device(cd, namei, 0, &dmdi) >= 0)
+			dmd.flags |= dmdi.flags;
+	}
+
+	if (cd && isTCRYPT(cd->type)) {
+		cad->offset	= TCRYPT_get_data_offset(cd, &cd->u.tcrypt.hdr, &cd->u.tcrypt.params);
+		cad->iv_offset	= TCRYPT_get_iv_offset(cd, &cd->u.tcrypt.hdr, &cd->u.tcrypt.params);
+	} else {
+		while (tgt) {
+			if (tgt->type == DM_CRYPT && (min_offset > tgt->u.crypt.offset)) {
+				min_offset = tgt->u.crypt.offset;
+				cad->iv_offset = tgt->u.crypt.iv_offset;
+			} else if (tgt->type == DM_INTEGRITY && (min_offset > tgt->u.integrity.offset)) {
+				min_offset = tgt->u.integrity.offset;
+				cad->iv_offset = 0;
+			} else if (tgt->type == DM_LINEAR && (min_offset > tgt->u.linear.offset)) {
+				min_offset = tgt->u.linear.offset;
+				cad->iv_offset = 0;
+			}
+			tgt = tgt->next;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (min_offset != UINT64_MAX)
+		cad->offset = min_offset;
+
+	cad->size	= dmd.size;
+	cad->flags	= dmd.flags;
+
+	r = 0;
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmdi);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+uint64_t crypt_get_active_integrity_failures(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd;
+	uint64_t failures = 0;
+
+	if (!name)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* FIXME: LUKS2 / dm-crypt does not provide this count. */
+	if (dm_query_device(cd, name, 0, &dmd) < 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (single_segment(&dmd) && dmd.segment.type == DM_INTEGRITY)
+		(void)dm_status_integrity_failures(cd, name, &failures);
+
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+
+	return failures;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Volume key handling
+ */
+int crypt_volume_key_get(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot,
+	char *volume_key,
+	size_t *volume_key_size,
+	const char *passphrase,
+	size_t passphrase_size)
+{
+	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+	int key_len, r = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!cd || !volume_key || !volume_key_size || (!isTCRYPT(cd->type) && !isVERITY(cd->type) && !passphrase))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (isLUKS2(cd->type) && keyslot != CRYPT_ANY_SLOT)
+		key_len = LUKS2_get_keyslot_stored_key_size(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot);
+	else
+		key_len = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
+
+	if (key_len < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (key_len > (int)*volume_key_size) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Volume key buffer too small."));
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if (isPLAIN(cd->type) && cd->u.plain.hdr.hash) {
+		r = process_key(cd, cd->u.plain.hdr.hash, key_len,
+				passphrase, passphrase_size, &vk);
+		if (r < 0)
+			log_err(cd, _("Cannot retrieve volume key for plain device."));
+	} else if (isLUKS1(cd->type)) {
+		r = LUKS_open_key_with_hdr(keyslot, passphrase,
+					passphrase_size, &cd->u.luks1.hdr, &vk, cd);
+	} else if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+		r = LUKS2_keyslot_open(cd, keyslot,
+				keyslot == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT ? CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT : CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT,
+				passphrase, passphrase_size, &vk);
+	} else if (isTCRYPT(cd->type)) {
+		r = TCRYPT_get_volume_key(cd, &cd->u.tcrypt.hdr, &cd->u.tcrypt.params, &vk);
+	} else if (isVERITY(cd->type)) {
+		/* volume_key == root hash */
+		if (cd->u.verity.root_hash) {
+			memcpy(volume_key, cd->u.verity.root_hash, cd->u.verity.root_hash_size);
+			*volume_key_size = cd->u.verity.root_hash_size;
+			r = 0;
+		} else
+			log_err(cd, _("Cannot retrieve root hash for verity device."));
+	} else
+		log_err(cd, _("This operation is not supported for %s crypt device."), cd->type ?: "(none)");
+
+	if (r >= 0 && vk) {
+		memcpy(volume_key, vk->key, vk->keylength);
+		*volume_key_size = vk->keylength;
+	}
+
+	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_volume_key_verify(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *volume_key,
+	size_t volume_key_size)
+{
+	struct volume_key *vk;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = _onlyLUKS(cd, CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED)))
+		return r;
+
+	vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size, volume_key);
+	if (!vk)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		r = LUKS_verify_volume_key(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, vk);
+	else if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+		r = LUKS2_digest_verify_by_segment(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, vk);
+	else
+		r = -EINVAL;
+
+
+	if (r == -EPERM)
+		log_err(cd, _("Volume key does not match the volume."));
+
+	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+
+	return r >= 0 ? 0 : r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * RNG and memory locking
+ */
+void crypt_set_rng_type(struct crypt_device *cd, int rng_type)
+{
+	if (!cd)
+		return;
+
+	switch (rng_type) {
+	case CRYPT_RNG_URANDOM:
+	case CRYPT_RNG_RANDOM:
+		log_dbg(cd, "RNG set to %d (%s).", rng_type, rng_type ? "random" : "urandom");
+		cd->rng_type = rng_type;
+	}
+}
+
+int crypt_get_rng_type(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (!cd)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return cd->rng_type;
+}
+
+int crypt_memory_lock(struct crypt_device *cd, int lock)
+{
+	return lock ? crypt_memlock_inc(cd) : crypt_memlock_dec(cd);
+}
+
+void crypt_set_compatibility(struct crypt_device *cd, uint32_t flags)
+{
+	if (cd)
+		cd->compatibility = flags;
+}
+
+uint32_t crypt_get_compatibility(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (cd)
+		return cd->compatibility;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reporting
+ */
+crypt_status_info crypt_status(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (!name)
+		return CRYPT_INVALID;
+
+	if (!cd)
+		dm_backend_init(cd);
+
+	r = dm_status_device(cd, name);
+
+	if (!cd)
+		dm_backend_exit(cd);
+
+	if (r < 0 && r != -ENODEV)
+		return CRYPT_INVALID;
+
+	if (r == 0)
+		return CRYPT_ACTIVE;
+
+	if (r > 0)
+		return CRYPT_BUSY;
+
+	return CRYPT_INACTIVE;
+}
+
+static void hexprint(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *d, int n, const char *sep)
+{
+	int i;
+	for(i = 0; i < n; i++)
+		log_std(cd, "%02hhx%s", (const char)d[i], sep);
+}
+
+static int _luks_dump(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	log_std(cd, "LUKS header information for %s\n\n", mdata_device_path(cd));
+	log_std(cd, "Version:       \t%" PRIu16 "\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.version);
+	log_std(cd, "Cipher name:   \t%s\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.cipherName);
+	log_std(cd, "Cipher mode:   \t%s\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.cipherMode);
+	log_std(cd, "Hash spec:     \t%s\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.hashSpec);
+	log_std(cd, "Payload offset:\t%" PRIu32 "\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.payloadOffset);
+	log_std(cd, "MK bits:       \t%" PRIu32 "\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyBytes * 8);
+	log_std(cd, "MK digest:     \t");
+	hexprint(cd, cd->u.luks1.hdr.mkDigest, LUKS_DIGESTSIZE, " ");
+	log_std(cd, "\n");
+	log_std(cd, "MK salt:       \t");
+	hexprint(cd, cd->u.luks1.hdr.mkDigestSalt, LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, " ");
+	log_std(cd, "\n               \t");
+	hexprint(cd, cd->u.luks1.hdr.mkDigestSalt+LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, " ");
+	log_std(cd, "\n");
+	log_std(cd, "MK iterations: \t%" PRIu32 "\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.mkDigestIterations);
+	log_std(cd, "UUID:          \t%s\n\n", cd->u.luks1.hdr.uuid);
+	for(i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; i++) {
+		if(cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyblock[i].active == LUKS_KEY_ENABLED) {
+			log_std(cd, "Key Slot %d: ENABLED\n",i);
+			log_std(cd, "\tIterations:         \t%" PRIu32 "\n",
+				cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyblock[i].passwordIterations);
+			log_std(cd, "\tSalt:               \t");
+			hexprint(cd, cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyblock[i].passwordSalt,
+				 LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, " ");
+			log_std(cd, "\n\t                      \t");
+			hexprint(cd, cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyblock[i].passwordSalt +
+				 LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, LUKS_SALTSIZE/2, " ");
+			log_std(cd, "\n");
+
+			log_std(cd, "\tKey material offset:\t%" PRIu32 "\n",
+				cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset);
+			log_std(cd, "\tAF stripes:            \t%" PRIu32 "\n",
+				cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyblock[i].stripes);
+		}
+		else
+			log_std(cd, "Key Slot %d: DISABLED\n", i);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int _verity_dump(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	log_std(cd, "VERITY header information for %s\n", mdata_device_path(cd));
+	log_std(cd, "UUID:            \t%s\n", cd->u.verity.uuid ?: "");
+	log_std(cd, "Hash type:       \t%u\n", cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_type);
+	log_std(cd, "Data blocks:     \t%" PRIu64 "\n", cd->u.verity.hdr.data_size);
+	log_std(cd, "Data block size: \t%u\n", cd->u.verity.hdr.data_block_size);
+	log_std(cd, "Hash block size: \t%u\n", cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_block_size);
+	log_std(cd, "Hash algorithm:  \t%s\n", cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_name);
+	log_std(cd, "Salt:            \t");
+	if (cd->u.verity.hdr.salt_size)
+		hexprint(cd, cd->u.verity.hdr.salt, cd->u.verity.hdr.salt_size, "");
+	else
+		log_std(cd, "-");
+	log_std(cd, "\n");
+	if (cd->u.verity.root_hash) {
+		log_std(cd, "Root hash:      \t");
+		hexprint(cd, cd->u.verity.root_hash, cd->u.verity.root_hash_size, "");
+		log_std(cd, "\n");
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_dump(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (!cd)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		return _luks_dump(cd);
+	else if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+		return LUKS2_hdr_dump(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr);
+	else if (isVERITY(cd->type))
+		return _verity_dump(cd);
+	else if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
+		return TCRYPT_dump(cd, &cd->u.tcrypt.hdr, &cd->u.tcrypt.params);
+	else if (isINTEGRITY(cd->type))
+		return INTEGRITY_dump(cd, crypt_data_device(cd), 0);
+	else if (isBITLK(cd->type))
+		return BITLK_dump(cd, crypt_data_device(cd), &cd->u.bitlk.params);
+
+	log_err(cd, _("Dump operation is not supported for this device type."));
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/* internal only */
+const char *crypt_get_cipher_spec(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (!cd)
+		return NULL;
+	else if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+		return LUKS2_get_cipher(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
+	else if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.luks1.cipher_spec;
+	else if (isPLAIN(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.plain.cipher_spec;
+	else if (isLOOPAES(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.loopaes.cipher_spec;
+	else if (isBITLK(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.bitlk.cipher_spec;
+	else if (!cd->type && !_init_by_name_crypt_none(cd))
+		return cd->u.none.cipher_spec;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *crypt_get_cipher(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (!cd)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (isPLAIN(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.plain.cipher;
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.luks1.hdr.cipherName;
+
+	if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+		if (crypt_parse_name_and_mode(LUKS2_get_cipher(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT),
+					      cd->u.luks2.cipher, NULL, cd->u.luks2.cipher_mode))
+			return NULL;
+		return cd->u.luks2.cipher;
+	}
+
+	if (isLOOPAES(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.loopaes.cipher;
+
+	if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.tcrypt.params.cipher;
+
+	if (isBITLK(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.bitlk.params.cipher;
+
+	if (!cd->type && !_init_by_name_crypt_none(cd))
+		return cd->u.none.cipher;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *crypt_get_cipher_mode(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (!cd)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (isPLAIN(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.plain.cipher_mode;
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.luks1.hdr.cipherMode;
+
+	if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+		if (crypt_parse_name_and_mode(LUKS2_get_cipher(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT),
+					      cd->u.luks2.cipher, NULL, cd->u.luks2.cipher_mode))
+			return NULL;
+		return cd->u.luks2.cipher_mode;
+	}
+
+	if (isLOOPAES(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.loopaes.cipher_mode;
+
+	if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.tcrypt.params.mode;
+
+	if (isBITLK(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.bitlk.params.cipher_mode;
+
+	if (!cd->type && !_init_by_name_crypt_none(cd))
+		return cd->u.none.cipher_mode;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/* INTERNAL only */
+const char *crypt_get_integrity(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (!cd)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (isINTEGRITY(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.integrity.params.integrity;
+
+	if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+		return LUKS2_get_integrity(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/* INTERNAL only */
+int crypt_get_integrity_key_size(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (isINTEGRITY(cd->type))
+		return INTEGRITY_key_size(cd, crypt_get_integrity(cd));
+
+	if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+		return INTEGRITY_key_size(cd, crypt_get_integrity(cd));
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* INTERNAL only */
+int crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (isINTEGRITY(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.integrity.params.tag_size;
+
+	if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+		return INTEGRITY_tag_size(cd, crypt_get_integrity(cd),
+					  crypt_get_cipher(cd),
+					  crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_get_sector_size(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (!cd)
+		return SECTOR_SIZE;
+
+	if (isPLAIN(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.plain.hdr.sector_size;
+
+	if (isINTEGRITY(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.integrity.params.sector_size;
+
+	if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+		return LUKS2_get_sector_size(&cd->u.luks2.hdr);
+
+	return SECTOR_SIZE;
+}
+
+const char *crypt_get_uuid(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (!cd)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.luks1.hdr.uuid;
+
+	if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.luks2.hdr.uuid;
+
+	if (isVERITY(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.verity.uuid;
+
+	if (isBITLK(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.bitlk.params.guid;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *crypt_get_device_name(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	const char *path;
+
+	if (!cd)
+		return NULL;
+
+	path = device_block_path(cd->device);
+	if (!path)
+		path = device_path(cd->device);
+
+	return path;
+}
+
+const char *crypt_get_metadata_device_name(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	const char *path;
+
+	if (!cd || !cd->metadata_device)
+		return NULL;
+
+	path = device_block_path(cd->metadata_device);
+	if (!path)
+		path = device_path(cd->metadata_device);
+
+	return path;
+}
+
+int crypt_get_volume_key_size(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (!cd)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (isPLAIN(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.plain.key_size;
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyBytes;
+
+	if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+		r = LUKS2_get_volume_key_size(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
+		if (r < 0 && cd->volume_key)
+			r = cd->volume_key->keylength;
+		return r < 0 ? 0 : r;
+	}
+
+	if (isLOOPAES(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.loopaes.key_size;
+
+	if (isVERITY(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.verity.root_hash_size;
+
+	if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.tcrypt.params.key_size;
+
+	if (isBITLK(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.bitlk.params.key_size / 8;
+
+	if (!cd->type && !_init_by_name_crypt_none(cd))
+		return cd->u.none.key_size;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_keyslot_get_key_size(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot)
+{
+	if (!cd || !isLUKS(cd->type))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (keyslot < 0 || keyslot >= crypt_keyslot_max(cd->type))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.luks1.hdr.keyBytes;
+
+	if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+		return LUKS2_get_keyslot_stored_key_size(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot);
+
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+int crypt_keyslot_set_encryption(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *cipher,
+	size_t key_size)
+{
+	char *tmp;
+
+	if (!cd || !cipher || ! key_size || !isLUKS2(cd->type))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (LUKS2_keyslot_cipher_incompatible(cd, cipher))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	tmp = strdup(cipher);
+	free(cd->u.luks2.keyslot_cipher);
+	cd->u.luks2.keyslot_cipher = tmp;
+	if (!cd->u.luks2.keyslot_cipher)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	cd->u.luks2.keyslot_key_size = key_size;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+const char *crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot, size_t *key_size)
+{
+	const char *cipher;
+
+	if (!cd || !isLUKS(cd->type) || !key_size)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type)) {
+		if (keyslot != CRYPT_ANY_SLOT &&
+		    LUKS_keyslot_info(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, keyslot) < CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE)
+			return NULL;
+		*key_size = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
+		return cd->u.luks1.cipher_spec;
+	}
+
+	if (keyslot != CRYPT_ANY_SLOT)
+		return LUKS2_get_keyslot_cipher(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, key_size);
+
+	/* Keyslot encryption was set through crypt_keyslot_set_encryption() */
+	if (cd->u.luks2.keyslot_cipher) {
+		*key_size = cd->u.luks2.keyslot_key_size;
+		return cd->u.luks2.keyslot_cipher;
+	}
+
+	/* Try to reuse volume encryption parameters */
+	cipher =  LUKS2_get_cipher(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
+	if (!LUKS2_keyslot_cipher_incompatible(cd, cipher)) {
+		*key_size = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
+		if (*key_size)
+			return cipher;
+	}
+
+	/* Fallback to default LUKS2 keyslot encryption */
+	*key_size = DEFAULT_LUKS2_KEYSLOT_KEYBITS / 8;
+	return DEFAULT_LUKS2_KEYSLOT_CIPHER;
+}
+
+int crypt_keyslot_get_pbkdf(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot, struct crypt_pbkdf_type *pbkdf)
+{
+	if (!cd || !pbkdf || keyslot == CRYPT_ANY_SLOT)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		return LUKS_keyslot_pbkdf(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, keyslot, pbkdf);
+	else if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+		return LUKS2_keyslot_pbkdf(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, pbkdf);
+
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+int crypt_set_data_offset(struct crypt_device *cd, uint64_t data_offset)
+{
+	if (!cd)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (data_offset % (MAX_SECTOR_SIZE >> SECTOR_SHIFT)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Data offset is not multiple of %u bytes."), MAX_SECTOR_SIZE);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	cd->data_offset = data_offset;
+	log_dbg(cd, "Data offset set to %" PRIu64 " (512-byte) sectors.", data_offset);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_set_metadata_size(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	uint64_t metadata_size,
+	uint64_t keyslots_size)
+{
+	if (!cd)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (cd->type && !isLUKS2(cd->type))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (metadata_size && LUKS2_check_metadata_area_size(metadata_size))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (keyslots_size && LUKS2_check_keyslots_area_size(keyslots_size))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	cd->metadata_size = metadata_size;
+	cd->keyslots_size = keyslots_size;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_get_metadata_size(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	uint64_t *metadata_size,
+	uint64_t *keyslots_size)
+{
+	uint64_t msize, ksize;
+
+	if (!cd)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!cd->type) {
+		msize = cd->metadata_size;
+		ksize = cd->keyslots_size;
+	} else if (isLUKS1(cd->type)) {
+		msize = LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS;
+		ksize = LUKS_device_sectors(&cd->u.luks1.hdr) * SECTOR_SIZE - msize;
+	} else if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+		msize = LUKS2_metadata_size(&cd->u.luks2.hdr);
+		ksize = LUKS2_keyslots_size(&cd->u.luks2.hdr);
+	} else
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (metadata_size)
+		*metadata_size = msize;
+	if (keyslots_size)
+		*keyslots_size = ksize;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+uint64_t crypt_get_data_offset(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (!cd)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (isPLAIN(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.plain.hdr.offset;
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.luks1.hdr.payloadOffset;
+
+	if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+		return LUKS2_get_data_offset(&cd->u.luks2.hdr);
+
+	if (isLOOPAES(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.loopaes.hdr.offset;
+
+	if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
+		return TCRYPT_get_data_offset(cd, &cd->u.tcrypt.hdr, &cd->u.tcrypt.params);
+
+	if (isBITLK(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.bitlk.params.volume_header_size / SECTOR_SIZE;
+
+	return cd->data_offset;
+}
+
+uint64_t crypt_get_iv_offset(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (!cd)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (isPLAIN(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.plain.hdr.skip;
+
+	if (isLOOPAES(cd->type))
+		return cd->u.loopaes.hdr.skip;
+
+	if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
+		return TCRYPT_get_iv_offset(cd, &cd->u.tcrypt.hdr, &cd->u.tcrypt.params);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+crypt_keyslot_info crypt_keyslot_status(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot)
+{
+	if (_onlyLUKS(cd, CRYPT_CD_QUIET | CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED) < 0)
+		return CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID;
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		return LUKS_keyslot_info(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, keyslot);
+	else if(isLUKS2(cd->type))
+		return LUKS2_keyslot_info(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot);
+
+	return CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID;
+}
+
+int crypt_keyslot_max(const char *type)
+{
+	if (type && isLUKS1(type))
+		return LUKS_NUMKEYS;
+
+	if (type && isLUKS2(type))
+		return LUKS2_KEYSLOTS_MAX;
+
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+int crypt_keyslot_area(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot,
+	uint64_t *offset,
+	uint64_t *length)
+{
+	if (_onlyLUKS(cd, CRYPT_CD_QUIET | CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED) || !offset || !length)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+		return LUKS2_keyslot_area(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, offset, length);
+
+	return LUKS_keyslot_area(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, keyslot, offset, length);
+}
+
+crypt_keyslot_priority crypt_keyslot_get_priority(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot)
+{
+	if (_onlyLUKS(cd, CRYPT_CD_QUIET | CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED))
+		return CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_INVALID;
+
+	if (keyslot < 0 || keyslot >= crypt_keyslot_max(cd->type))
+		return CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_INVALID;
+
+	if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+		return LUKS2_keyslot_priority_get(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot);
+
+	return CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_NORMAL;
+}
+
+int crypt_keyslot_set_priority(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot, crypt_keyslot_priority priority)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Setting keyslot %d to priority %d.", keyslot, priority);
+
+	if (priority == CRYPT_SLOT_PRIORITY_INVALID)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (keyslot < 0 || keyslot >= crypt_keyslot_max(cd->type))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if ((r = onlyLUKS2(cd)))
+		return r;
+
+	return LUKS2_keyslot_priority_set(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, priority, 1);
+}
+
+const char *crypt_get_type(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	return cd ? cd->type : NULL;
+}
+
+const char *crypt_get_default_type(void)
+{
+	return DEFAULT_LUKS_FORMAT;
+}
+
+int crypt_get_verity_info(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct crypt_params_verity *vp)
+{
+	if (!cd || !isVERITY(cd->type) || !vp)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	vp->data_device = device_path(cd->device);
+	vp->hash_device = mdata_device_path(cd);
+	vp->fec_device  = device_path(cd->u.verity.fec_device);
+	vp->fec_area_offset = cd->u.verity.hdr.fec_area_offset;
+	vp->fec_roots = cd->u.verity.hdr.fec_roots;
+	vp->hash_name = cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_name;
+	vp->salt = cd->u.verity.hdr.salt;
+	vp->salt_size = cd->u.verity.hdr.salt_size;
+	vp->data_block_size = cd->u.verity.hdr.data_block_size;
+	vp->hash_block_size = cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_block_size;
+	vp->data_size = cd->u.verity.hdr.data_size;
+	vp->hash_area_offset = cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_area_offset;
+	vp->hash_type = cd->u.verity.hdr.hash_type;
+	vp->flags = cd->u.verity.hdr.flags & (CRYPT_VERITY_NO_HEADER | CRYPT_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_SIGNATURE);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_get_integrity_info(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	struct crypt_params_integrity *ip)
+{
+	if (!cd || !ip)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (isINTEGRITY(cd->type)) {
+		ip->journal_size = cd->u.integrity.params.journal_size;
+		ip->journal_watermark = cd->u.integrity.params.journal_watermark;
+		ip->journal_commit_time = cd->u.integrity.params.journal_commit_time;
+		ip->interleave_sectors = cd->u.integrity.params.interleave_sectors;
+		ip->tag_size = cd->u.integrity.params.tag_size;
+		ip->sector_size = cd->u.integrity.params.sector_size;
+		ip->buffer_sectors = cd->u.integrity.params.buffer_sectors;
+
+		ip->integrity = cd->u.integrity.params.integrity;
+		ip->integrity_key_size = crypt_get_integrity_key_size(cd);
+
+		ip->journal_integrity = cd->u.integrity.params.journal_integrity;
+		ip->journal_integrity_key_size = cd->u.integrity.params.journal_integrity_key_size;
+		ip->journal_integrity_key = NULL;
+
+		ip->journal_crypt = cd->u.integrity.params.journal_crypt;
+		ip->journal_crypt_key_size = cd->u.integrity.params.journal_crypt_key_size;
+		ip->journal_crypt_key = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	} else if (isLUKS2(cd->type)) {
+		ip->journal_size = 0; // FIXME
+		ip->journal_watermark = 0; // FIXME
+		ip->journal_commit_time = 0; // FIXME
+		ip->interleave_sectors = 0; // FIXME
+		ip->sector_size = crypt_get_sector_size(cd);
+		ip->buffer_sectors = 0; // FIXME
+
+		ip->integrity = LUKS2_get_integrity(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
+		ip->integrity_key_size = crypt_get_integrity_key_size(cd);
+		ip->tag_size = INTEGRITY_tag_size(cd, ip->integrity, crypt_get_cipher(cd), crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd));
+
+		ip->journal_integrity = NULL;
+		ip->journal_integrity_key_size = 0;
+		ip->journal_integrity_key = NULL;
+
+		ip->journal_crypt = NULL;
+		ip->journal_crypt_key_size = 0;
+		ip->journal_crypt_key = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return -ENOTSUP;
+}
+
+int crypt_convert(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		  const char *type,
+		  void *params)
+{
+	struct luks_phdr hdr1;
+	struct luks2_hdr hdr2;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!type)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Converting LUKS device to type %s", type);
+
+	if ((r = onlyLUKS(cd)))
+		return r;
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type) && isLUKS2(type))
+		r = LUKS2_luks1_to_luks2(cd, &cd->u.luks1.hdr, &hdr2);
+	else if (isLUKS2(cd->type) && isLUKS1(type))
+		r = LUKS2_luks2_to_luks1(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, &hdr1);
+	else
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (r < 0) {
+		/* in-memory header may be invalid after failed conversion */
+		_luks2_reload(cd);
+		if (r == -EBUSY)
+			log_err(cd, _("Cannot convert device %s which is still in use."), mdata_device_path(cd));
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	crypt_free_type(cd);
+
+	return crypt_load(cd, type, params);
+}
+
+/* Internal access function to header pointer */
+void *crypt_get_hdr(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *type)
+{
+	/* If requested type differs, ignore it */
+	if (strcmp(cd->type, type))
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (isPLAIN(cd->type))
+		return &cd->u.plain;
+
+	if (isLUKS1(cd->type))
+		return &cd->u.luks1.hdr;
+
+	if (isLUKS2(cd->type))
+		return &cd->u.luks2.hdr;
+
+	if (isLOOPAES(cd->type))
+		return &cd->u.loopaes;
+
+	if (isVERITY(cd->type))
+		return &cd->u.verity;
+
+	if (isTCRYPT(cd->type))
+		return &cd->u.tcrypt;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/* internal only */
+struct luks2_reencrypt *crypt_get_luks2_reencrypt(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	return cd->u.luks2.rh;
+}
+
+/* internal only */
+void crypt_set_luks2_reencrypt(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_reencrypt *rh)
+{
+	cd->u.luks2.rh = rh;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Token handling
+ */
+int crypt_activate_by_token(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	const char *name, int token, void *usrptr, uint32_t flags)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "%s volume %s using token %d.",
+		name ? "Activating" : "Checking", name ?: "passphrase", token);
+
+	if ((r = _onlyLUKS2(cd, CRYPT_CD_QUIET | CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED, 0)))
+		return r;
+
+	if ((flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) && !crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if ((flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_UNBOUND_KEY) && name)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (token == CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN)
+		return LUKS2_token_open_and_activate_any(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, name, flags);
+
+	return LUKS2_token_open_and_activate(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, token, name, flags, usrptr);
+}
+
+int crypt_token_json_get(struct crypt_device *cd, int token, const char **json)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (!json)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Requesting JSON for token %d.", token);
+
+	if ((r = _onlyLUKS2(cd, CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED, 0)))
+		return r;
+
+	return LUKS2_token_json_get(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, token, json) ?: token;
+}
+
+int crypt_token_json_set(struct crypt_device *cd, int token, const char *json)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Updating JSON for token %d.", token);
+
+	if ((r = onlyLUKS2(cd)))
+		return r;
+
+	return LUKS2_token_create(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, token, json, 1);
+}
+
+crypt_token_info crypt_token_status(struct crypt_device *cd, int token, const char **type)
+{
+	if (_onlyLUKS2(cd, CRYPT_CD_QUIET | CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED, 0))
+		return CRYPT_TOKEN_INVALID;
+
+	return LUKS2_token_status(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, token, type);
+}
+
+int crypt_token_luks2_keyring_get(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int token,
+	struct crypt_token_params_luks2_keyring *params)
+{
+	crypt_token_info token_info;
+	const char *type;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!params)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Requesting LUKS2 keyring token %d.", token);
+
+	if ((r = _onlyLUKS2(cd, CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED, 0)))
+		return r;
+
+	token_info = LUKS2_token_status(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, token, &type);
+	switch (token_info) {
+	case CRYPT_TOKEN_INVALID:
+		log_dbg(cd, "Token %d is invalid.", token);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	case CRYPT_TOKEN_INACTIVE:
+		log_dbg(cd, "Token %d is inactive.", token);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	case CRYPT_TOKEN_INTERNAL:
+		if (!strcmp(type, LUKS2_TOKEN_KEYRING))
+			break;
+		/* Fall through */
+	case CRYPT_TOKEN_INTERNAL_UNKNOWN:
+	case CRYPT_TOKEN_EXTERNAL:
+	case CRYPT_TOKEN_EXTERNAL_UNKNOWN:
+		log_dbg(cd, "Token %d has unexpected type %s.", token, type);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return LUKS2_builtin_token_get(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, token, LUKS2_TOKEN_KEYRING, params);
+}
+
+int crypt_token_luks2_keyring_set(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int token,
+	const struct crypt_token_params_luks2_keyring *params)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (!params)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Creating new LUKS2 keyring token (%d).", token);
+
+	if ((r = onlyLUKS2(cd)))
+		return r;
+
+	return LUKS2_builtin_token_create(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, token, LUKS2_TOKEN_KEYRING, params, 1);
+}
+
+int crypt_token_assign_keyslot(struct crypt_device *cd, int token, int keyslot)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = onlyLUKS2(cd)))
+		return r;
+
+	return LUKS2_token_assign(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, token, 1, 1);
+}
+
+int crypt_token_unassign_keyslot(struct crypt_device *cd, int token, int keyslot)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = onlyLUKS2(cd)))
+		return r;
+
+	return LUKS2_token_assign(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, token, 0, 1);
+}
+
+int crypt_token_is_assigned(struct crypt_device *cd, int token, int keyslot)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = _onlyLUKS2(cd, CRYPT_CD_QUIET | CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED, 0)))
+		return r;
+
+	return LUKS2_token_is_assigned(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, token);
+}
+
+/* Internal only */
+int crypt_metadata_locking_enabled(void)
+{
+	return _metadata_locking;
+}
+
+int crypt_metadata_locking(struct crypt_device *cd, int enable)
+{
+	if (enable && !_metadata_locking)
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	_metadata_locking = enable ? 1 : 0;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int crypt_persistent_flags_set(struct crypt_device *cd, crypt_flags_type type, uint32_t flags)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = onlyLUKS2(cd)))
+		return r;
+
+	if (type == CRYPT_FLAGS_ACTIVATION)
+		return LUKS2_config_set_flags(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, flags);
+
+	if (type == CRYPT_FLAGS_REQUIREMENTS)
+		return LUKS2_config_set_requirements(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, flags, true);
+
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+int crypt_persistent_flags_get(struct crypt_device *cd, crypt_flags_type type, uint32_t *flags)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (!flags)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if ((r = _onlyLUKS2(cd, CRYPT_CD_UNRESTRICTED, 0)))
+		return r;
+
+	if (type == CRYPT_FLAGS_ACTIVATION)
+		return LUKS2_config_get_flags(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, flags);
+
+	if (type == CRYPT_FLAGS_REQUIREMENTS)
+		return LUKS2_config_get_requirements(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, flags);
+
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int update_volume_key_segment_digest(struct crypt_device *cd, struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int digest, int commit)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	/* Remove any assignments in memory */
+	r = LUKS2_digest_segment_assign(cd, hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, CRYPT_ANY_DIGEST, 0, 0);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	/* Assign it to the specific digest */
+	return LUKS2_digest_segment_assign(cd, hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, digest, 1, commit);
+}
+
+static int verify_and_update_segment_digest(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot,
+		const char *volume_key, size_t volume_key_size,
+		const char *password, size_t password_size)
+{
+	int digest, r;
+	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+
+	if (keyslot < 0 || (volume_key && !volume_key_size))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (volume_key)
+		vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size, volume_key);
+	else {
+		r = LUKS2_keyslot_open(cd, keyslot, CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT, password, password_size, &vk);
+		if (r != keyslot) {
+			r = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!vk)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* check volume_key (param) digest matches keyslot digest */
+	r = LUKS2_digest_verify(cd, hdr, vk, keyslot);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+	digest = r;
+
+	/* nothing to do, volume key in keyslot is already assigned to default segment */
+	r = LUKS2_digest_verify_by_segment(cd, hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, vk);
+	if (r >= 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* FIXME: check new volume key is usable with current default segment */
+
+	r = update_volume_key_segment_digest(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, digest, 1);
+	if (r)
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to assign keyslot %u as the new volume key."), keyslot);
+out:
+	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+	return r < 0 ? r : keyslot;
+}
+
+
+int crypt_keyslot_add_by_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+	int keyslot,
+	const char *volume_key,
+	size_t volume_key_size,
+	const char *passphrase,
+	size_t passphrase_size,
+	uint32_t flags)
+{
+	int digest, r;
+	struct luks2_keyslot_params params;
+	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+
+	if (!passphrase || ((flags & CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_NO_SEGMENT) &&
+			    (flags & CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_SET)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Adding new keyslot %d with volume key %sassigned to a crypt segment.",
+		keyslot, flags & CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_NO_SEGMENT ? "un" : "");
+
+	if ((r = onlyLUKS2(cd)))
+		return r;
+
+	/* new volume key assignment */
+	if ((flags & CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_SET) && crypt_keyslot_status(cd, keyslot) > CRYPT_SLOT_INACTIVE)
+		return verify_and_update_segment_digest(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr,
+			keyslot, volume_key, volume_key_size, passphrase, passphrase_size);
+
+	r = keyslot_verify_or_find_empty(cd, &keyslot);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (volume_key)
+		vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(volume_key_size, volume_key);
+	else if (flags & CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_NO_SEGMENT)
+		vk = crypt_generate_volume_key(cd, volume_key_size);
+	else if (cd->volume_key)
+		vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(cd->volume_key->keylength, cd->volume_key->key);
+	else
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!vk)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* if key matches volume key digest tear down new vk flag */
+	digest = LUKS2_digest_verify_by_segment(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT, vk);
+	if (digest >= 0)
+		flags &= ~CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_SET;
+
+	/* if key matches any existing digest, do not create new digest */
+	if (digest < 0 && (flags & CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_DIGEST_REUSE))
+		digest = LUKS2_digest_any_matching(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, vk);
+
+	/* no segment flag or new vk flag requires new key digest */
+	if (flags & (CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_NO_SEGMENT | CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_SET)) {
+		if (digest < 0 || !(flags & CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_DIGEST_REUSE))
+			digest = LUKS2_digest_create(cd, "pbkdf2", &cd->u.luks2.hdr, vk);
+	}
+
+	r = digest;
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Volume key does not match the volume."));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = LUKS2_keyslot_params_default(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, &params);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to initialize default LUKS2 keyslot parameters."));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = LUKS2_digest_assign(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, digest, 1, 0);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to assign keyslot %d to digest."), keyslot);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = LUKS2_keyslot_store(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot,
+				passphrase, passphrase_size, vk, &params);
+
+	if (r >= 0 && (flags & CRYPT_VOLUME_KEY_SET))
+		r = update_volume_key_segment_digest(cd, &cd->u.luks2.hdr, digest, 1);
+out:
+	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		_luks2_reload(cd);
+		return r;
+	}
+	return keyslot;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Keyring handling
+ */
+
+int crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	uint32_t dmc_flags;
+
+	/* dm backend must be initialized */
+	if (!cd || !isLUKS2(cd->type))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!_vk_via_keyring || !kernel_keyring_support())
+		return 0;
+
+	if (dm_flags(cd, DM_CRYPT, &dmc_flags))
+		return dmcrypt_keyring_bug() ? 0 : 1;
+
+	return (dmc_flags & DM_KERNEL_KEYRING_SUPPORTED);
+}
+
+int crypt_volume_key_keyring(struct crypt_device *cd, int enable)
+{
+	_vk_via_keyring = enable ? 1 : 0;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* internal only */
+int crypt_volume_key_load_in_keyring(struct crypt_device *cd, struct volume_key *vk)
+{
+	int r;
+	const char *type_name = key_type_name(LOGON_KEY);
+
+	if (!vk || !cd || !type_name)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!vk->key_description) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "Invalid key description");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Loading key (%zu bytes, type %s) in thread keyring.", vk->keylength, type_name);
+
+	r = keyring_add_key_in_thread_keyring(LOGON_KEY, vk->key_description, vk->key, vk->keylength);
+	if (r) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "keyring_add_key_in_thread_keyring failed (error %d)", r);
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to load key in kernel keyring."));
+	} else
+		crypt_set_key_in_keyring(cd, 1);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* internal only */
+int crypt_key_in_keyring(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	return cd ? cd->key_in_keyring : 0;
+}
+
+/* internal only */
+void crypt_set_key_in_keyring(struct crypt_device *cd, unsigned key_in_keyring)
+{
+	if (!cd)
+		return;
+
+	cd->key_in_keyring = key_in_keyring;
+}
+
+/* internal only */
+void crypt_drop_keyring_key_by_description(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *key_description, key_type_t ktype)
+{
+	int r;
+	const char *type_name = key_type_name(ktype);
+
+	if (!key_description || !type_name)
+		return;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Requesting keyring %s key for revoke and unlink.", type_name);
+
+	r = keyring_revoke_and_unlink_key(ktype, key_description);
+	if (r)
+		log_dbg(cd, "keyring_revoke_and_unlink_key failed (error %d)", r);
+	crypt_set_key_in_keyring(cd, 0);
+}
+
+/* internal only */
+void crypt_drop_keyring_key(struct crypt_device *cd, struct volume_key *vks)
+{
+	struct volume_key *vk = vks;
+
+	while (vk) {
+		crypt_drop_keyring_key_by_description(cd, vk->key_description, LOGON_KEY);
+		vk = crypt_volume_key_next(vk);
+	}
+}
+
+int crypt_activate_by_keyring(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			      const char *name,
+			      const char *key_description,
+			      int keyslot,
+			      uint32_t flags)
+{
+	char *passphrase;
+	size_t passphrase_size;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!cd || !key_description)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "%s volume %s [keyslot %d] using passphrase in keyring.",
+		name ? "Activating" : "Checking", name ?: "passphrase", keyslot);
+
+	if (!kernel_keyring_support()) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Kernel keyring is not supported by the kernel."));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	r = _activate_check_status(cd, name, flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_REFRESH);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	r = keyring_get_passphrase(key_description, &passphrase, &passphrase_size);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to read passphrase from keyring (error %d)."), r);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	r = _activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, keyslot, passphrase, passphrase_size, flags);
+
+	crypt_safe_memzero(passphrase, passphrase_size);
+	free(passphrase);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Workaround for serialization of parallel activation and memory-hard PBKDF
+ * In specific situation (systemd activation) this causes OOM killer activation.
+ * For now, let's provide this ugly way to serialize unlocking of devices.
+ */
+int crypt_serialize_lock(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (!cd->memory_hard_pbkdf_lock_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Taking global memory-hard access serialization lock.");
+	if (crypt_write_lock(cd, "memory-hard-access", true, &cd->pbkdf_memory_hard_lock)) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to acquire global memory-hard access serialization lock."));
+		cd->pbkdf_memory_hard_lock = NULL;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void crypt_serialize_unlock(struct crypt_device *cd)
+{
+	if (!cd->memory_hard_pbkdf_lock_enabled)
+		return;
+
+	crypt_unlock_internal(cd, cd->pbkdf_memory_hard_lock);
+	cd->pbkdf_memory_hard_lock = NULL;
+}
+
+crypt_reencrypt_info crypt_reencrypt_status(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		struct crypt_params_reencrypt *params)
+{
+	if (!cd || !isLUKS2(cd->type))
+		return CRYPT_REENCRYPT_NONE;
+
+	if (_onlyLUKS2(cd, CRYPT_CD_QUIET, CRYPT_REQUIREMENT_ONLINE_REENCRYPT))
+		return CRYPT_REENCRYPT_INVALID;
+
+	return LUKS2_reencrypt_get_params(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, params);
+}
+
+static void __attribute__((destructor)) libcryptsetup_exit(void)
+{
+	crypt_backend_destroy();
+	crypt_random_exit();
+}