Adding upstream version 2:2.3.7.upstream/2%2.3.7upstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

2 files changed, 1252 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c b/lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bf20b69
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1131 @@
+/*
+ * TCRYPT (TrueCrypt-compatible) and VeraCrypt volume handling
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2021 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include "libcryptsetup.h"
+#include "tcrypt.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+/* TCRYPT PBKDF variants */
+static const struct {
+	unsigned int legacy:1;
+	unsigned int veracrypt:1;
+	const char *name;
+	const char *hash;
+	unsigned int iterations;
+	uint32_t veracrypt_pim_const;
+	uint32_t veracrypt_pim_mult;
+} tcrypt_kdf[] = {
+	{ 0, 0, "pbkdf2", "ripemd160",   2000, 0, 0 },
+	{ 0, 0, "pbkdf2", "ripemd160",   1000, 0, 0 },
+	{ 0, 0, "pbkdf2", "sha512",      1000, 0, 0 },
+	{ 0, 0, "pbkdf2", "whirlpool",   1000, 0, 0 },
+	{ 1, 0, "pbkdf2", "sha1",        2000, 0, 0 },
+	{ 0, 1, "pbkdf2", "sha512",    500000, 15000, 1000 },
+	{ 0, 1, "pbkdf2", "whirlpool", 500000, 15000, 1000 },
+	{ 0, 1, "pbkdf2", "sha256",    500000, 15000, 1000 }, // VeraCrypt 1.0f
+	{ 0, 1, "pbkdf2", "sha256",    200000,     0, 2048 }, // boot only
+	{ 0, 1, "pbkdf2", "ripemd160", 655331, 15000, 1000 },
+	{ 0, 1, "pbkdf2", "ripemd160", 327661,     0, 2048 }, // boot only
+	{ 0, 1, "pbkdf2", "stribog512",500000, 15000, 1000 },
+//	{ 0, 1, "pbkdf2", "stribog512",200000,     0, 2048 }, // boot only
+	{ 0, 0,     NULL,        NULL,      0,     0,    0 }
+};
+
+struct tcrypt_alg {
+		const char *name;
+		unsigned int key_size;
+		unsigned int iv_size;
+		unsigned int key_offset;
+		unsigned int iv_offset; /* or tweak key offset */
+		unsigned int key_extra_size;
+};
+
+struct tcrypt_algs {
+	unsigned int legacy:1;
+	unsigned int chain_count;
+	unsigned int chain_key_size;
+	const char *long_name;
+	const char *mode;
+	struct tcrypt_alg cipher[3];
+};
+
+/* TCRYPT cipher variants */
+static struct tcrypt_algs tcrypt_cipher[] = {
+/* XTS mode */
+{0,1,64,"aes","xts-plain64",
+	{{"aes",    64,16,0,32,0}}},
+{0,1,64,"serpent","xts-plain64",
+	{{"serpent",64,16,0,32,0}}},
+{0,1,64,"twofish","xts-plain64",
+	{{"twofish",64,16,0,32,0}}},
+{0,2,128,"twofish-aes","xts-plain64",
+	{{"twofish",64,16, 0,64,0},
+	 {"aes",    64,16,32,96,0}}},
+{0,3,192,"serpent-twofish-aes","xts-plain64",
+	{{"serpent",64,16, 0, 96,0},
+	 {"twofish",64,16,32,128,0},
+	 {"aes",    64,16,64,160,0}}},
+{0,2,128,"aes-serpent","xts-plain64",
+	{{"aes",    64,16, 0,64,0},
+	 {"serpent",64,16,32,96,0}}},
+{0,3,192,"aes-twofish-serpent","xts-plain64",
+	{{"aes",    64,16, 0, 96,0},
+	 {"twofish",64,16,32,128,0},
+	 {"serpent",64,16,64,160,0}}},
+{0,2,128,"serpent-twofish","xts-plain64",
+	{{"serpent",64,16, 0,64,0},
+	 {"twofish",64,16,32,96,0}}},
+{0,1,64,"camellia","xts-plain64",
+	{{"camellia",    64,16,0,32,0}}},
+{0,1,64,"kuznyechik","xts-plain64",
+	{{"kuznyechik",  64,16,0,32,0}}},
+{0,2,128,"kuznyechik-camellia","xts-plain64",
+	{{"kuznyechik",64,16, 0,64,0},
+	 {"camellia",  64,16,32,96,0}}},
+{0,2,128,"twofish-kuznyechik","xts-plain64",
+	{{"twofish",   64,16, 0,64,0},
+	 {"kuznyechik",64,16,32,96,0}}},
+{0,2,128,"serpent-camellia","xts-plain64",
+	{{"serpent",   64,16, 0,64,0},
+	 {"camellia",  64,16,32,96,0}}},
+{0,2,128,"aes-kuznyechik","xts-plain64",
+	{{"aes",       64,16, 0,64,0},
+	 {"kuznyechik",64,16,32,96,0}}},
+{0,3,192,"camellia-serpent-kuznyechik","xts-plain64",
+	{{"camellia",  64,16, 0, 96,0},
+	 {"serpent",   64,16,32,128,0},
+	 {"kuznyechik",64,16,64,160,0}}},
+
+/* LRW mode */
+{0,1,48,"aes","lrw-benbi",
+	{{"aes",    48,16,32,0,0}}},
+{0,1,48,"serpent","lrw-benbi",
+	{{"serpent",48,16,32,0,0}}},
+{0,1,48,"twofish","lrw-benbi",
+	{{"twofish",48,16,32,0,0}}},
+{0,2,96,"twofish-aes","lrw-benbi",
+	{{"twofish",48,16,32,0,0},
+	 {"aes",    48,16,64,0,0}}},
+{0,3,144,"serpent-twofish-aes","lrw-benbi",
+	{{"serpent",48,16,32,0,0},
+	 {"twofish",48,16,64,0,0},
+	 {"aes",    48,16,96,0,0}}},
+{0,2,96,"aes-serpent","lrw-benbi",
+	{{"aes",    48,16,32,0,0},
+	 {"serpent",48,16,64,0,0}}},
+{0,3,144,"aes-twofish-serpent","lrw-benbi",
+	{{"aes",    48,16,32,0,0},
+	 {"twofish",48,16,64,0,0},
+	 {"serpent",48,16,96,0,0}}},
+{0,2,96,"serpent-twofish", "lrw-benbi",
+	{{"serpent",48,16,32,0,0},
+	 {"twofish",48,16,64,0,0}}},
+
+/* Kernel LRW block size is fixed to 16 bytes for GF(2^128)
+ * thus cannot be used with blowfish where block is 8 bytes.
+ * There also no GF(2^64) support.
+{1,1,64,"blowfish_le","lrw-benbi",
+	 {{"blowfish_le",64,8,32,0,0}}},
+{1,2,112,"blowfish_le-aes","lrw-benbi",
+	 {{"blowfish_le",64, 8,32,0,0},
+	  {"aes",        48,16,88,0,0}}},
+{1,3,160,"serpent-blowfish_le-aes","lrw-benbi",
+	  {{"serpent",    48,16, 32,0,0},
+	   {"blowfish_le",64, 8, 64,0,0},
+	   {"aes",        48,16,120,0,0}}},*/
+
+/*
+ * CBC + "outer" CBC (both with whitening)
+ * chain_key_size: alg_keys_bytes + IV_seed_bytes + whitening_bytes
+ */
+{1,1,32+16+16,"aes","cbc-tcw",
+	{{"aes",    32,16,32,0,32}}},
+{1,1,32+16+16,"serpent","cbc-tcw",
+	{{"serpent",32,16,32,0,32}}},
+{1,1,32+16+16,"twofish","cbc-tcw",
+	{{"twofish",32,16,32,0,32}}},
+{1,2,64+16+16,"twofish-aes","cbci-tcrypt",
+	{{"twofish",32,16,32,0,0},
+	 {"aes",    32,16,64,0,32}}},
+{1,3,96+16+16,"serpent-twofish-aes","cbci-tcrypt",
+	{{"serpent",32,16,32,0,0},
+	 {"twofish",32,16,64,0,0},
+	 {"aes",    32,16,96,0,32}}},
+{1,2,64+16+16,"aes-serpent","cbci-tcrypt",
+	{{"aes",    32,16,32,0,0},
+	 {"serpent",32,16,64,0,32}}},
+{1,3,96+16+16,"aes-twofish-serpent", "cbci-tcrypt",
+	{{"aes",    32,16,32,0,0},
+	 {"twofish",32,16,64,0,0},
+	 {"serpent",32,16,96,0,32}}},
+{1,2,64+16+16,"serpent-twofish", "cbci-tcrypt",
+	{{"serpent",32,16,32,0,0},
+	 {"twofish",32,16,64,0,32}}},
+{1,1,16+8+16,"cast5","cbc-tcw",
+	{{"cast5",   16,8,32,0,24}}},
+{1,1,24+8+16,"des3_ede","cbc-tcw",
+	{{"des3_ede",24,8,32,0,24}}},
+{1,1,56+8+16,"blowfish_le","cbc-tcrypt",
+	{{"blowfish_le",56,8,32,0,24}}},
+{1,2,88+16+16,"blowfish_le-aes","cbc-tcrypt",
+	{{"blowfish_le",56, 8,32,0,0},
+	 {"aes",        32,16,88,0,32}}},
+{1,3,120+16+16,"serpent-blowfish_le-aes","cbc-tcrypt",
+	{{"serpent",    32,16, 32,0,0},
+	 {"blowfish_le",56, 8, 64,0,0},
+	 {"aes",        32,16,120,0,32}}},
+{}
+};
+
+static int TCRYPT_hdr_from_disk(struct crypt_device *cd,
+				struct tcrypt_phdr *hdr,
+				struct crypt_params_tcrypt *params,
+				int kdf_index, int cipher_index)
+{
+	uint32_t crc32;
+	size_t size;
+
+	/* Check CRC32 of header */
+	size = TCRYPT_HDR_LEN - sizeof(hdr->d.keys) - sizeof(hdr->d.header_crc32);
+	crc32 = crypt_crc32(~0, (unsigned char*)&hdr->d, size) ^ ~0;
+	if (be16_to_cpu(hdr->d.version) > 3 &&
+	    crc32 != be32_to_cpu(hdr->d.header_crc32)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "TCRYPT header CRC32 mismatch.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* Check CRC32 of keys */
+	crc32 = crypt_crc32(~0, (unsigned char*)hdr->d.keys, sizeof(hdr->d.keys)) ^ ~0;
+	if (crc32 != be32_to_cpu(hdr->d.keys_crc32)) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "TCRYPT keys CRC32 mismatch.");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* Convert header to cpu format */
+	hdr->d.version  =  be16_to_cpu(hdr->d.version);
+	hdr->d.version_tc = be16_to_cpu(hdr->d.version_tc);
+
+	hdr->d.keys_crc32 = be32_to_cpu(hdr->d.keys_crc32);
+
+	hdr->d.hidden_volume_size = be64_to_cpu(hdr->d.hidden_volume_size);
+	hdr->d.volume_size        = be64_to_cpu(hdr->d.volume_size);
+
+	hdr->d.mk_offset = be64_to_cpu(hdr->d.mk_offset);
+	if (!hdr->d.mk_offset)
+		hdr->d.mk_offset = 512;
+
+	hdr->d.mk_size = be64_to_cpu(hdr->d.mk_size);
+
+	hdr->d.flags = be32_to_cpu(hdr->d.flags);
+
+	hdr->d.sector_size = be32_to_cpu(hdr->d.sector_size);
+	if (!hdr->d.sector_size)
+		hdr->d.sector_size = 512;
+
+	hdr->d.header_crc32 = be32_to_cpu(hdr->d.header_crc32);
+
+	/* Set params */
+	params->passphrase = NULL;
+	params->passphrase_size = 0;
+	params->hash_name  = tcrypt_kdf[kdf_index].hash;
+	params->key_size = tcrypt_cipher[cipher_index].chain_key_size;
+	params->cipher = tcrypt_cipher[cipher_index].long_name;
+	params->mode = tcrypt_cipher[cipher_index].mode;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Kernel implements just big-endian version of blowfish, hack it here
+ */
+static void TCRYPT_swab_le(char *buf)
+{
+	uint32_t *l = (uint32_t*)&buf[0];
+	uint32_t *r = (uint32_t*)&buf[4];
+	*l = swab32(*l);
+	*r = swab32(*r);
+}
+
+static int decrypt_blowfish_le_cbc(struct tcrypt_alg *alg,
+				   const char *key, char *buf)
+{
+	int bs = alg->iv_size;
+	char iv[bs], iv_old[bs];
+	struct crypt_cipher *cipher = NULL;
+	int i, j, r;
+
+	assert(bs == 2*sizeof(uint32_t));
+
+	r = crypt_cipher_init(&cipher, "blowfish", "ecb",
+			      &key[alg->key_offset], alg->key_size);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	memcpy(iv, &key[alg->iv_offset], alg->iv_size);
+	for (i = 0; i < TCRYPT_HDR_LEN; i += bs) {
+		memcpy(iv_old, &buf[i], bs);
+		TCRYPT_swab_le(&buf[i]);
+		r = crypt_cipher_decrypt(cipher, &buf[i], &buf[i],
+					  bs, NULL, 0);
+		TCRYPT_swab_le(&buf[i]);
+		if (r < 0)
+			break;
+		for (j = 0; j < bs; j++)
+			buf[i + j] ^= iv[j];
+		memcpy(iv, iv_old, bs);
+	}
+
+	crypt_cipher_destroy(cipher);
+	crypt_safe_memzero(iv, bs);
+	crypt_safe_memzero(iv_old, bs);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static void TCRYPT_remove_whitening(char *buf, const char *key)
+{
+	int j;
+
+	for (j = 0; j < TCRYPT_HDR_LEN; j++)
+		buf[j] ^= key[j % 8];
+}
+
+static void TCRYPT_copy_key(struct tcrypt_alg *alg, const char *mode,
+			     char *out_key, const char *key)
+{
+	int ks2;
+	if (!strncmp(mode, "xts", 3)) {
+		ks2 = alg->key_size / 2;
+		memcpy(out_key, &key[alg->key_offset], ks2);
+		memcpy(&out_key[ks2], &key[alg->iv_offset], ks2);
+	} else if (!strncmp(mode, "lrw", 3)) {
+		ks2 = alg->key_size - TCRYPT_LRW_IKEY_LEN;
+		memcpy(out_key, &key[alg->key_offset], ks2);
+		memcpy(&out_key[ks2], key, TCRYPT_LRW_IKEY_LEN);
+	} else if (!strncmp(mode, "cbc", 3)) {
+		memcpy(out_key, &key[alg->key_offset], alg->key_size);
+		/* IV + whitening */
+		memcpy(&out_key[alg->key_size], &key[alg->iv_offset],
+		       alg->key_extra_size);
+	}
+}
+
+static int TCRYPT_decrypt_hdr_one(struct tcrypt_alg *alg, const char *mode,
+				   const char *key,struct tcrypt_phdr *hdr)
+{
+	char backend_key[TCRYPT_HDR_KEY_LEN];
+	char iv[TCRYPT_HDR_IV_LEN] = {};
+	char mode_name[MAX_CIPHER_LEN + 1];
+	struct crypt_cipher *cipher;
+	char *c, *buf = (char*)&hdr->e;
+	int r;
+
+	/* Remove IV if present */
+	mode_name[MAX_CIPHER_LEN] = '\0';
+	strncpy(mode_name, mode, MAX_CIPHER_LEN);
+	c = strchr(mode_name, '-');
+	if (c)
+		*c = '\0';
+
+	if (!strncmp(mode, "lrw", 3))
+		iv[alg->iv_size - 1] = 1;
+	else if (!strncmp(mode, "cbc", 3)) {
+		TCRYPT_remove_whitening(buf, &key[8]);
+		if (!strcmp(alg->name, "blowfish_le"))
+			return decrypt_blowfish_le_cbc(alg, key, buf);
+		memcpy(iv, &key[alg->iv_offset], alg->iv_size);
+	}
+
+	TCRYPT_copy_key(alg, mode, backend_key, key);
+	r = crypt_cipher_init(&cipher, alg->name, mode_name,
+			      backend_key, alg->key_size);
+	if (!r) {
+		r = crypt_cipher_decrypt(cipher, buf, buf, TCRYPT_HDR_LEN,
+					 iv, alg->iv_size);
+		crypt_cipher_destroy(cipher);
+	}
+
+	crypt_safe_memzero(backend_key, sizeof(backend_key));
+	crypt_safe_memzero(iv, TCRYPT_HDR_IV_LEN);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * For chained ciphers and CBC mode we need "outer" decryption.
+ * Backend doesn't provide this, so implement it here directly using ECB.
+ */
+static int TCRYPT_decrypt_cbci(struct tcrypt_algs *ciphers,
+				const char *key, struct tcrypt_phdr *hdr)
+{
+	struct crypt_cipher *cipher[ciphers->chain_count];
+	unsigned int bs = ciphers->cipher[0].iv_size;
+	char *buf = (char*)&hdr->e, iv[bs], iv_old[bs];
+	unsigned int i, j;
+	int r = -EINVAL;
+
+	TCRYPT_remove_whitening(buf, &key[8]);
+
+	memcpy(iv, &key[ciphers->cipher[0].iv_offset], bs);
+
+	/* Initialize all ciphers in chain in ECB mode */
+	for (j = 0; j < ciphers->chain_count; j++)
+		cipher[j] = NULL;
+	for (j = 0; j < ciphers->chain_count; j++) {
+		r = crypt_cipher_init(&cipher[j], ciphers->cipher[j].name, "ecb",
+				      &key[ciphers->cipher[j].key_offset],
+				      ciphers->cipher[j].key_size);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Implements CBC with chained ciphers in loop inside */
+	for (i = 0; i < TCRYPT_HDR_LEN; i += bs) {
+		memcpy(iv_old, &buf[i], bs);
+		for (j = ciphers->chain_count; j > 0; j--) {
+			r = crypt_cipher_decrypt(cipher[j - 1], &buf[i], &buf[i],
+						  bs, NULL, 0);
+			if (r < 0)
+				goto out;
+		}
+		for (j = 0; j < bs; j++)
+			buf[i + j] ^= iv[j];
+		memcpy(iv, iv_old, bs);
+	}
+out:
+	for (j = 0; j < ciphers->chain_count; j++)
+		if (cipher[j])
+			crypt_cipher_destroy(cipher[j]);
+
+	crypt_safe_memzero(iv, bs);
+	crypt_safe_memzero(iv_old, bs);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int TCRYPT_decrypt_hdr(struct crypt_device *cd, struct tcrypt_phdr *hdr,
+			       const char *key, uint32_t flags)
+{
+	struct tcrypt_phdr hdr2;
+	int i, j, r = -EINVAL;
+
+	for (i = 0; tcrypt_cipher[i].chain_count; i++) {
+		if (!(flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_LEGACY_MODES) && tcrypt_cipher[i].legacy)
+			continue;
+		log_dbg(cd, "TCRYPT:  trying cipher %s-%s",
+			tcrypt_cipher[i].long_name, tcrypt_cipher[i].mode);
+
+		memcpy(&hdr2.e, &hdr->e, TCRYPT_HDR_LEN);
+
+		if (!strncmp(tcrypt_cipher[i].mode, "cbci", 4))
+			r = TCRYPT_decrypt_cbci(&tcrypt_cipher[i], key, &hdr2);
+		else for (j = tcrypt_cipher[i].chain_count - 1; j >= 0 ; j--) {
+			if (!tcrypt_cipher[i].cipher[j].name)
+				continue;
+			r = TCRYPT_decrypt_hdr_one(&tcrypt_cipher[i].cipher[j],
+					    tcrypt_cipher[i].mode, key, &hdr2);
+			if (r < 0)
+				break;
+		}
+
+		if (r < 0) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "TCRYPT:   returned error %d, skipped.", r);
+			if (r == -ENOTSUP)
+				break;
+			r = -ENOENT;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (!strncmp(hdr2.d.magic, TCRYPT_HDR_MAGIC, TCRYPT_HDR_MAGIC_LEN)) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "TCRYPT: Signature magic detected.");
+			memcpy(&hdr->e, &hdr2.e, TCRYPT_HDR_LEN);
+			r = i;
+			break;
+		}
+		if ((flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_VERA_MODES) &&
+		     !strncmp(hdr2.d.magic, VCRYPT_HDR_MAGIC, TCRYPT_HDR_MAGIC_LEN)) {
+			log_dbg(cd, "TCRYPT: Signature magic detected (Veracrypt).");
+			memcpy(&hdr->e, &hdr2.e, TCRYPT_HDR_LEN);
+			r = i;
+			break;
+		}
+		r = -EPERM;
+	}
+
+	crypt_safe_memzero(&hdr2, sizeof(hdr2));
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int TCRYPT_pool_keyfile(struct crypt_device *cd,
+				unsigned char pool[VCRYPT_KEY_POOL_LEN],
+				const char *keyfile, int keyfiles_pool_length)
+{
+	unsigned char *data;
+	int i, j, fd, data_size, r = -EIO;
+	uint32_t crc;
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "TCRYPT: using keyfile %s.", keyfile);
+
+	data = malloc(TCRYPT_KEYFILE_LEN);
+	if (!data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	memset(data, 0, TCRYPT_KEYFILE_LEN);
+
+	fd = open(keyfile, O_RDONLY);
+	if (fd < 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Failed to open key file."));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	data_size = read_buffer(fd, data, TCRYPT_KEYFILE_LEN);
+	close(fd);
+	if (data_size < 0) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Error reading keyfile %s."), keyfile);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0, j = 0, crc = ~0U; i < data_size; i++) {
+		crc = crypt_crc32(crc, &data[i], 1);
+		pool[j++] += (unsigned char)(crc >> 24);
+		pool[j++] += (unsigned char)(crc >> 16);
+		pool[j++] += (unsigned char)(crc >>  8);
+		pool[j++] += (unsigned char)(crc);
+		j %= keyfiles_pool_length;
+	}
+	r = 0;
+out:
+	crypt_safe_memzero(&crc, sizeof(crc));
+	crypt_safe_memzero(data, TCRYPT_KEYFILE_LEN);
+	free(data);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int TCRYPT_init_hdr(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			   struct tcrypt_phdr *hdr,
+			   struct crypt_params_tcrypt *params)
+{
+	unsigned char pwd[VCRYPT_KEY_POOL_LEN] = {};
+	size_t passphrase_size, max_passphrase_size;
+	char *key;
+	unsigned int i, skipped = 0, iterations;
+	int r = -EPERM, keyfiles_pool_length;
+
+	if (posix_memalign((void*)&key, crypt_getpagesize(), TCRYPT_HDR_KEY_LEN))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_VERA_MODES &&
+	    params->passphrase_size > TCRYPT_KEY_POOL_LEN) {
+		/* Really. Keyfile pool length depends on passphrase size in Veracrypt. */
+		max_passphrase_size = VCRYPT_KEY_POOL_LEN;
+		keyfiles_pool_length = VCRYPT_KEY_POOL_LEN;
+	} else {
+		max_passphrase_size = TCRYPT_KEY_POOL_LEN;
+		keyfiles_pool_length = TCRYPT_KEY_POOL_LEN;
+	}
+
+	if (params->keyfiles_count)
+		passphrase_size = max_passphrase_size;
+	else
+		passphrase_size = params->passphrase_size;
+
+	if (params->passphrase_size > max_passphrase_size) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Maximum TCRYPT passphrase length (%zu) exceeded."),
+			      max_passphrase_size);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Calculate pool content from keyfiles */
+	for (i = 0; i < params->keyfiles_count; i++) {
+		r = TCRYPT_pool_keyfile(cd, pwd, params->keyfiles[i], keyfiles_pool_length);
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* If provided password, combine it with pool */
+	for (i = 0; i < params->passphrase_size; i++)
+		pwd[i] += params->passphrase[i];
+
+	for (i = 0; tcrypt_kdf[i].name; i++) {
+		if (!(params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_LEGACY_MODES) && tcrypt_kdf[i].legacy)
+			continue;
+		if (!(params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_VERA_MODES) && tcrypt_kdf[i].veracrypt)
+			continue;
+		if ((params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_VERA_MODES) && params->veracrypt_pim) {
+			/* Do not try TrueCrypt modes if we have PIM value */
+			if (!tcrypt_kdf[i].veracrypt)
+				continue;
+			/* adjust iterations to given PIM cmdline parameter */
+			iterations = tcrypt_kdf[i].veracrypt_pim_const +
+				    (tcrypt_kdf[i].veracrypt_pim_mult * params->veracrypt_pim);
+		} else
+			iterations = tcrypt_kdf[i].iterations;
+
+		/* Derive header key */
+		log_dbg(cd, "TCRYPT: trying KDF: %s-%s-%d%s.",
+			tcrypt_kdf[i].name, tcrypt_kdf[i].hash, tcrypt_kdf[i].iterations,
+			params->veracrypt_pim && tcrypt_kdf[i].veracrypt ? "-PIM" : "");
+		r = crypt_pbkdf(tcrypt_kdf[i].name, tcrypt_kdf[i].hash,
+				(char*)pwd, passphrase_size,
+				hdr->salt, TCRYPT_HDR_SALT_LEN,
+				key, TCRYPT_HDR_KEY_LEN,
+				iterations, 0, 0);
+		if (r < 0) {
+			log_verbose(cd, _("PBKDF2 hash algorithm %s not available, skipping."),
+				      tcrypt_kdf[i].hash);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/* Decrypt header */
+		r = TCRYPT_decrypt_hdr(cd, hdr, key, params->flags);
+		if (r == -ENOENT) {
+			skipped++;
+			r = -EPERM;
+		}
+		if (r != -EPERM)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	if ((r < 0 && r != -EPERM && skipped && skipped == i) || r == -ENOTSUP) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Required kernel crypto interface not available."));
+#ifdef ENABLE_AF_ALG
+		log_err(cd, _("Ensure you have algif_skcipher kernel module loaded."));
+#endif
+	}
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = TCRYPT_hdr_from_disk(cd, hdr, params, i, r);
+	if (!r) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "TCRYPT: Magic: %s, Header version: %d, req. %d, sector %d"
+			", mk_offset %" PRIu64 ", hidden_size %" PRIu64
+			", volume size %" PRIu64, tcrypt_kdf[i].veracrypt ?
+			VCRYPT_HDR_MAGIC : TCRYPT_HDR_MAGIC,
+			(int)hdr->d.version, (int)hdr->d.version_tc, (int)hdr->d.sector_size,
+			hdr->d.mk_offset, hdr->d.hidden_volume_size, hdr->d.volume_size);
+		log_dbg(cd, "TCRYPT: Header cipher %s-%s, key size %zu",
+			params->cipher, params->mode, params->key_size);
+	}
+out:
+	crypt_safe_memzero(pwd, TCRYPT_KEY_POOL_LEN);
+	if (key)
+		crypt_safe_memzero(key, TCRYPT_HDR_KEY_LEN);
+	free(key);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int TCRYPT_read_phdr(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		     struct tcrypt_phdr *hdr,
+		     struct crypt_params_tcrypt *params)
+{
+	struct device *base_device = NULL, *device = crypt_metadata_device(cd);
+	ssize_t hdr_size = sizeof(struct tcrypt_phdr);
+	char *base_device_path;
+	int devfd, r;
+
+	assert(sizeof(struct tcrypt_phdr) == 512);
+
+	log_dbg(cd, "Reading TCRYPT header of size %zu bytes from device %s.",
+		hdr_size, device_path(device));
+
+	if (params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_SYSTEM_HEADER &&
+	    crypt_dev_is_partition(device_path(device))) {
+		base_device_path = crypt_get_base_device(device_path(device));
+
+		log_dbg(cd, "Reading TCRYPT system header from device %s.", base_device_path ?: "?");
+		if (!base_device_path)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		r = device_alloc(cd, &base_device, base_device_path);
+		free(base_device_path);
+		if (r < 0)
+			return r;
+		devfd = device_open(cd, base_device, O_RDONLY);
+	} else
+		devfd = device_open(cd, device, O_RDONLY);
+
+	if (devfd < 0) {
+		device_free(cd, base_device);
+		log_err(cd, _("Cannot open device %s."), device_path(device));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	r = -EIO;
+	if (params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_SYSTEM_HEADER) {
+		if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
+			device_alignment(device), hdr, hdr_size,
+			TCRYPT_HDR_SYSTEM_OFFSET) == hdr_size) {
+			r = TCRYPT_init_hdr(cd, hdr, params);
+		}
+	} else if (params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_HIDDEN_HEADER) {
+		if (params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_BACKUP_HEADER) {
+			if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
+				device_alignment(device), hdr, hdr_size,
+				TCRYPT_HDR_HIDDEN_OFFSET_BCK) == hdr_size)
+				r = TCRYPT_init_hdr(cd, hdr, params);
+		} else {
+			if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
+				device_alignment(device), hdr, hdr_size,
+				TCRYPT_HDR_HIDDEN_OFFSET) == hdr_size)
+				r = TCRYPT_init_hdr(cd, hdr, params);
+			if (r && read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
+				device_alignment(device), hdr, hdr_size,
+				TCRYPT_HDR_HIDDEN_OFFSET_OLD) == hdr_size)
+				r = TCRYPT_init_hdr(cd, hdr, params);
+		}
+	} else if (params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_BACKUP_HEADER) {
+		if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
+			device_alignment(device), hdr, hdr_size,
+			TCRYPT_HDR_OFFSET_BCK) == hdr_size)
+			r = TCRYPT_init_hdr(cd, hdr, params);
+	} else if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
+			device_alignment(device), hdr, hdr_size, 0) == hdr_size)
+		r = TCRYPT_init_hdr(cd, hdr, params);
+
+	device_free(cd, base_device);
+	if (r < 0)
+		memset(hdr, 0, sizeof (*hdr));
+	return r;
+}
+
+static struct tcrypt_algs *TCRYPT_get_algs(const char *cipher, const char *mode)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (!cipher || !mode)
+		return NULL;
+
+	for (i = 0; tcrypt_cipher[i].chain_count; i++)
+		if (!strcmp(tcrypt_cipher[i].long_name, cipher) &&
+		    !strcmp(tcrypt_cipher[i].mode, mode))
+		    return &tcrypt_cipher[i];
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+int TCRYPT_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		     const char *name,
+		     struct tcrypt_phdr *hdr,
+		     struct crypt_params_tcrypt *params,
+		     uint32_t flags)
+{
+	char dm_name[PATH_MAX], dm_dev_name[PATH_MAX], cipher_spec[MAX_CIPHER_LEN*2+1];
+	char *part_path;
+	unsigned int i;
+	int r;
+	uint32_t req_flags, dmc_flags;
+	struct tcrypt_algs *algs;
+	enum devcheck device_check;
+	uint64_t offset = crypt_get_data_offset(cd);
+	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+	struct device  *ptr_dev = crypt_data_device(cd), *device = NULL, *part_device = NULL;
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd = {
+		.flags = flags
+	};
+
+	if (!hdr->d.version) {
+		log_dbg(cd, "TCRYPT: this function is not supported without encrypted header load.");
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+	}
+
+	if (hdr->d.sector_size % SECTOR_SIZE) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Activation is not supported for %d sector size."),
+			hdr->d.sector_size);
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+	}
+
+	if (strstr(params->mode, "-tcrypt")) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Kernel does not support activation for this TCRYPT legacy mode."));
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+	}
+
+	if (strstr(params->mode, "-tcw"))
+		req_flags = DM_TCW_SUPPORTED;
+	else
+		req_flags = DM_PLAIN64_SUPPORTED;
+
+	algs = TCRYPT_get_algs(params->cipher, params->mode);
+	if (!algs)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_SYSTEM_HEADER)
+		dmd.size = 0;
+	else if (params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_HIDDEN_HEADER)
+		dmd.size = hdr->d.hidden_volume_size / SECTOR_SIZE;
+	else
+		dmd.size = hdr->d.volume_size / SECTOR_SIZE;
+
+	if (dmd.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SHARED)
+		device_check = DEV_OK;
+	else
+		device_check = DEV_EXCL;
+
+	if ((params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_SYSTEM_HEADER) &&
+	     !crypt_dev_is_partition(device_path(crypt_data_device(cd)))) {
+		part_path = crypt_get_partition_device(device_path(crypt_data_device(cd)),
+						       crypt_get_data_offset(cd), dmd.size);
+		if (part_path) {
+			if (!device_alloc(cd, &part_device, part_path)) {
+				log_verbose(cd, _("Activating TCRYPT system encryption for partition %s."),
+					    part_path);
+				ptr_dev = part_device;
+				offset = 0;
+			}
+			free(part_path);
+		} else
+			/*
+			 * System encryption use the whole device mapping, there can
+			 * be active partitions.
+			 */
+			device_check = DEV_OK;
+	}
+
+	r = device_block_adjust(cd, ptr_dev, device_check,
+				offset, &dmd.size, &dmd.flags);
+	if (r)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* From here, key size for every cipher must be the same */
+	vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(algs->cipher[0].key_size +
+				    algs->cipher[0].key_extra_size, NULL);
+	if (!vk) {
+		r = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	for (i = algs->chain_count; i > 0; i--) {
+		if (i == 1) {
+			dm_name[sizeof(dm_name)-1] = '\0';
+			strncpy(dm_name, name, sizeof(dm_name)-1);
+			dmd.flags = flags;
+		} else {
+			snprintf(dm_name, sizeof(dm_name), "%s_%d", name, i-1);
+			dmd.flags = flags | CRYPT_ACTIVATE_PRIVATE;
+		}
+
+		TCRYPT_copy_key(&algs->cipher[i-1], algs->mode,
+				vk->key, hdr->d.keys);
+
+		if (algs->chain_count != i) {
+			snprintf(dm_dev_name, sizeof(dm_dev_name), "%s/%s_%d",
+				 dm_get_dir(), name, i);
+			r = device_alloc(cd, &device, dm_dev_name);
+			if (r)
+				break;
+			ptr_dev = device;
+			offset = 0;
+		}
+
+		r = snprintf(cipher_spec, sizeof(cipher_spec), "%s-%s", algs->cipher[i-1].name, algs->mode);
+		if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(cipher_spec)) {
+			r = -ENOMEM;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		r = dm_crypt_target_set(&dmd.segment, 0, dmd.size, ptr_dev, vk,
+				cipher_spec, crypt_get_iv_offset(cd), offset,
+				crypt_get_integrity(cd),
+				crypt_get_integrity_tag_size(cd),
+				crypt_get_sector_size(cd));
+		if (r)
+			break;
+
+		log_dbg(cd, "Trying to activate TCRYPT device %s using cipher %s.",
+			dm_name, dmd.segment.u.crypt.cipher);
+		r = dm_create_device(cd, dm_name, CRYPT_TCRYPT, &dmd);
+
+		dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+		device_free(cd, device);
+		device = NULL;
+
+		if (r)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	if (r < 0 &&
+	    (dm_flags(cd, DM_CRYPT, &dmc_flags) || ((dmc_flags & req_flags) != req_flags))) {
+		log_err(cd, _("Kernel does not support TCRYPT compatible mapping."));
+		r = -ENOTSUP;
+	}
+
+out:
+	crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
+	device_free(cd, device);
+	device_free(cd, part_device);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int TCRYPT_remove_one(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+		      const char *base_uuid, int index, uint32_t flags)
+{
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd;
+	char dm_name[PATH_MAX];
+	int r;
+
+	if (snprintf(dm_name, sizeof(dm_name), "%s_%d", name, index) < 0)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	r = dm_status_device(cd, dm_name);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	r = dm_query_device(cd, dm_name, DM_ACTIVE_UUID, &dmd);
+	if (!r && !strncmp(dmd.uuid, base_uuid, strlen(base_uuid)))
+		r = dm_remove_device(cd, dm_name, flags);
+
+	free(CONST_CAST(void*)dmd.uuid);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int TCRYPT_deactivate(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, uint32_t flags)
+{
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd;
+	int r;
+
+	r = dm_query_device(cd, name, DM_ACTIVE_UUID, &dmd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+	if (!dmd.uuid)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	r = dm_remove_device(cd, name, flags);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = TCRYPT_remove_one(cd, name, dmd.uuid, 1, flags);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = TCRYPT_remove_one(cd, name, dmd.uuid, 2, flags);
+out:
+	free(CONST_CAST(void*)dmd.uuid);
+	return (r == -ENODEV) ? 0 : r;
+}
+
+static int TCRYPT_status_one(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+			     const char *base_uuid, int index,
+			     size_t *key_size, char *cipher,
+			     struct tcrypt_phdr *tcrypt_hdr,
+			     struct device **device)
+{
+	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd;
+	struct dm_target *tgt = &dmd.segment;
+	char dm_name[PATH_MAX], *c;
+	int r;
+
+	if (snprintf(dm_name, sizeof(dm_name), "%s_%d", name, index) < 0)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	r = dm_status_device(cd, dm_name);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+
+	r = dm_query_device(cd, dm_name, DM_ACTIVE_DEVICE |
+					  DM_ACTIVE_UUID |
+					  DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_CIPHER |
+					  DM_ACTIVE_CRYPT_KEYSIZE, &dmd);
+	if (r < 0)
+		return r;
+	if (!single_segment(&dmd) || tgt->type != DM_CRYPT) {
+		r = -ENOTSUP;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = 0;
+
+	if (!strncmp(dmd.uuid, base_uuid, strlen(base_uuid))) {
+		if ((c = strchr(tgt->u.crypt.cipher, '-')))
+			*c = '\0';
+		strcat(cipher, "-");
+		strncat(cipher, tgt->u.crypt.cipher, MAX_CIPHER_LEN);
+		*key_size += tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength;
+		tcrypt_hdr->d.mk_offset = tgt->u.crypt.offset * SECTOR_SIZE;
+		device_free(cd, *device);
+		MOVE_REF(*device, tgt->data_device);
+	} else
+		r = -ENODEV;
+out:
+	dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+	free(CONST_CAST(void*)dmd.uuid);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int TCRYPT_init_by_name(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+			const char *uuid,
+			const struct dm_target *tgt,
+			struct device **device,
+			struct crypt_params_tcrypt *tcrypt_params,
+			struct tcrypt_phdr *tcrypt_hdr)
+{
+	struct tcrypt_algs *algs;
+	char cipher[MAX_CIPHER_LEN * 4], mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN+1], *tmp;
+	size_t key_size;
+	int r;
+
+	memset(tcrypt_params, 0, sizeof(*tcrypt_params));
+	memset(tcrypt_hdr, 0, sizeof(*tcrypt_hdr));
+	tcrypt_hdr->d.sector_size = SECTOR_SIZE;
+	tcrypt_hdr->d.mk_offset = tgt->u.crypt.offset * SECTOR_SIZE;
+
+	strncpy(cipher, tgt->u.crypt.cipher, MAX_CIPHER_LEN);
+	tmp = strchr(cipher, '-');
+	if (!tmp)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	*tmp = '\0';
+	mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN] = '\0';
+	strncpy(mode, ++tmp, MAX_CIPHER_LEN);
+
+	key_size = tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength;
+	r = TCRYPT_status_one(cd, name, uuid, 1, &key_size,
+			      cipher, tcrypt_hdr, device);
+	if (!r)
+		r = TCRYPT_status_one(cd, name, uuid, 2, &key_size,
+				      cipher, tcrypt_hdr, device);
+
+	if (r < 0 && r != -ENODEV)
+		return r;
+
+	algs = TCRYPT_get_algs(cipher, mode);
+	if (!algs || key_size != algs->chain_key_size)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	tcrypt_params->key_size = algs->chain_key_size;
+	tcrypt_params->cipher = algs->long_name;
+	tcrypt_params->mode = algs->mode;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+uint64_t TCRYPT_get_data_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
+				 struct tcrypt_phdr *hdr,
+				 struct crypt_params_tcrypt *params)
+{
+	uint64_t size;
+
+	/* No real header loaded, initialized by active device */
+	if (!hdr->d.version)
+		goto hdr_offset;
+
+	/* Mapping through whole device, not partition! */
+	if (params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_SYSTEM_HEADER) {
+		if (crypt_dev_is_partition(device_path(crypt_data_device(cd))))
+			return 0;
+		goto hdr_offset;
+	}
+
+	if (params->mode && !strncmp(params->mode, "xts", 3)) {
+		if (hdr->d.version < 3)
+			return 1;
+
+		if (params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_HIDDEN_HEADER) {
+			if (hdr->d.version > 3)
+				return (hdr->d.mk_offset / SECTOR_SIZE);
+			if (device_size(crypt_metadata_device(cd), &size) < 0)
+				return 0;
+			return (size - hdr->d.hidden_volume_size +
+				(TCRYPT_HDR_HIDDEN_OFFSET_OLD)) / SECTOR_SIZE;
+		}
+		goto hdr_offset;
+	}
+
+	if (params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_HIDDEN_HEADER) {
+		if (device_size(crypt_metadata_device(cd), &size) < 0)
+			return 0;
+		return (size - hdr->d.hidden_volume_size +
+			(TCRYPT_HDR_HIDDEN_OFFSET_OLD)) / SECTOR_SIZE;
+	}
+
+hdr_offset:
+	return hdr->d.mk_offset / SECTOR_SIZE;
+}
+
+uint64_t TCRYPT_get_iv_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			      struct tcrypt_phdr *hdr,
+			      struct crypt_params_tcrypt *params)
+{
+	uint64_t iv_offset;
+
+	if (params->mode && !strncmp(params->mode, "xts", 3))
+		iv_offset = TCRYPT_get_data_offset(cd, hdr, params);
+	else if (params->mode && !strncmp(params->mode, "lrw", 3))
+		iv_offset = 0;
+	else
+		iv_offset = hdr->d.mk_offset / SECTOR_SIZE;
+
+	if (params->flags & CRYPT_TCRYPT_SYSTEM_HEADER)
+		iv_offset += crypt_dev_partition_offset(device_path(crypt_data_device(cd)));
+
+	return iv_offset;
+}
+
+int TCRYPT_get_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			  struct tcrypt_phdr *hdr,
+			  struct crypt_params_tcrypt *params,
+			  struct volume_key **vk)
+{
+	struct tcrypt_algs *algs;
+	unsigned int i, key_index;
+
+	if (!hdr->d.version) {
+		log_err(cd, _("This function is not supported without TCRYPT header load."));
+		return -ENOTSUP;
+	}
+
+	algs = TCRYPT_get_algs(params->cipher, params->mode);
+	if (!algs)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	*vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(params->key_size, NULL);
+	if (!*vk)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	for (i = 0, key_index = 0; i < algs->chain_count; i++) {
+		TCRYPT_copy_key(&algs->cipher[i], algs->mode,
+				&(*vk)->key[key_index], hdr->d.keys);
+		key_index += algs->cipher[i].key_size;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int TCRYPT_dump(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		struct tcrypt_phdr *hdr,
+		struct crypt_params_tcrypt *params)
+{
+	log_std(cd, "%s header information for %s\n",
+		hdr->d.magic[0] == 'T' ? "TCRYPT" : "VERACRYPT",
+		device_path(crypt_metadata_device(cd)));
+	if (hdr->d.version) {
+		log_std(cd, "Version:       \t%d\n", hdr->d.version);
+		log_std(cd, "Driver req.:\t%x.%x\n", hdr->d.version_tc >> 8,
+						    hdr->d.version_tc & 0xFF);
+
+		log_std(cd, "Sector size:\t%" PRIu32 "\n", hdr->d.sector_size);
+		log_std(cd, "MK offset:\t%" PRIu64 "\n", hdr->d.mk_offset);
+		log_std(cd, "PBKDF2 hash:\t%s\n", params->hash_name);
+	}
+	log_std(cd, "Cipher chain:\t%s\n", params->cipher);
+	log_std(cd, "Cipher mode:\t%s\n", params->mode);
+	log_std(cd, "MK bits:       \t%zu\n", params->key_size * 8);
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.h b/lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ff12cbd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/tcrypt/tcrypt.h
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+/*
+ * TCRYPT (TrueCrypt-compatible)  header definition
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2021 Milan Broz
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CRYPTSETUP_TCRYPT_H
+#define _CRYPTSETUP_TCRYPT_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#define TCRYPT_HDR_SALT_LEN 64
+#define TCRYPT_HDR_IV_LEN   16
+#define TCRYPT_HDR_LEN     448
+#define TCRYPT_HDR_KEY_LEN 192
+#define TCRYPT_HDR_MAGIC "TRUE"
+#define VCRYPT_HDR_MAGIC "VERA"
+#define TCRYPT_HDR_MAGIC_LEN 4
+
+#define TCRYPT_HDR_HIDDEN_OFFSET_OLD -1536
+#define TCRYPT_HDR_HIDDEN_OFFSET 65536
+
+#define TCRYPT_HDR_HIDDEN_OFFSET_BCK -65536
+#define TCRYPT_HDR_OFFSET_BCK -131072
+
+#define TCRYPT_HDR_SYSTEM_OFFSET 31744
+
+#define TCRYPT_LRW_IKEY_LEN 16
+#define TCRYPT_KEY_POOL_LEN 64
+#define VCRYPT_KEY_POOL_LEN 128
+#define TCRYPT_KEYFILE_LEN  1048576
+
+#define TCRYPT_HDR_FLAG_SYSTEM    (1 << 0)
+#define TCRYPT_HDR_FLAG_NONSYSTEM (1 << 1)
+
+struct tcrypt_phdr {
+	char salt[TCRYPT_HDR_SALT_LEN];
+
+	/* encrypted part, TCRYPT_HDR_LEN bytes */
+	union {
+	struct __attribute__((__packed__)) {
+		char     magic[TCRYPT_HDR_MAGIC_LEN];
+		uint16_t version;
+		uint16_t version_tc;
+		uint32_t keys_crc32;
+		uint64_t _reserved1[2]; /* data/header ctime */
+		uint64_t hidden_volume_size;
+		uint64_t volume_size;
+		uint64_t mk_offset;
+		uint64_t mk_size;
+		uint32_t flags;
+		uint32_t sector_size;
+		uint8_t  _reserved2[120];
+		uint32_t header_crc32;
+		char     keys[256];
+	} d;
+	char e[TCRYPT_HDR_LEN];
+	};
+} __attribute__((__packed__));
+
+struct crypt_device;
+struct crypt_params_tcrypt;
+struct crypt_dm_active_device;
+struct dm_target;
+struct volume_key;
+struct device;
+
+int TCRYPT_read_phdr(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		     struct tcrypt_phdr *hdr,
+		     struct crypt_params_tcrypt *params);
+
+int TCRYPT_init_by_name(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name,
+			const char *uuid,
+			const struct dm_target *tgt,
+			struct device **device,
+			struct crypt_params_tcrypt *tcrypt_params,
+			struct tcrypt_phdr *tcrypt_hdr);
+
+int TCRYPT_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		     const char *name,
+		     struct tcrypt_phdr *hdr,
+		     struct crypt_params_tcrypt *params,
+		     uint32_t flags);
+
+int TCRYPT_deactivate(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		      const char *name,
+		      uint32_t flags);
+
+uint64_t TCRYPT_get_data_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
+				struct tcrypt_phdr *hdr,
+				struct crypt_params_tcrypt *params);
+
+uint64_t TCRYPT_get_iv_offset(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			      struct tcrypt_phdr *hdr,
+			      struct crypt_params_tcrypt *params);
+
+int TCRYPT_get_volume_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+			  struct tcrypt_phdr *hdr,
+			  struct crypt_params_tcrypt *params,
+			  struct volume_key **vk);
+
+int TCRYPT_dump(struct crypt_device *cd,
+		struct tcrypt_phdr *hdr,
+		struct crypt_params_tcrypt *params);
+
+#endif