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-rw-r--r--lib/bitlk/bitlk.c1382
1 files changed, 1382 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/bitlk/bitlk.c b/lib/bitlk/bitlk.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8846660
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/bitlk/bitlk.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1382 @@
+/*
+ * BITLK (BitLocker-compatible) volume handling
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2019-2021 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2019-2021 Milan Broz
+ * Copyright (C) 2019-2021 Vojtech Trefny
+ *
+ * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <uuid/uuid.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <iconv.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include "bitlk.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+#define BITLK_BOOTCODE_V1 "\xeb\x52\x90"
+#define BITLK_BOOTCODE_V2 "\xeb\x58\x90"
+#define BITLK_SIGNATURE "-FVE-FS-"
+#define BITLK_SIGNATURE_TOGO "MSWIN4.1"
+#define BITLK_HEADER_METADATA_OFFSET 160
+#define BITLK_HEADER_METADATA_OFFSET_TOGO 424
+
+/* FVE metadata header is split into two parts */
+#define BITLK_FVE_METADATA_BLOCK_HEADER_LEN 64
+#define BITLK_FVE_METADATA_HEADER_LEN 48
+#define BITLK_FVE_METADATA_HEADERS_LEN BITLK_FVE_METADATA_BLOCK_HEADER_LEN + BITLK_FVE_METADATA_HEADER_LEN
+
+/* total size of the FVE area (64 KiB) */
+#define BITLK_FVE_METADATA_SIZE 64 * 1024
+
+#define BITLK_ENTRY_HEADER_LEN 8
+#define BITLK_VMK_HEADER_LEN 28
+
+#define BITLK_OPEN_KEY_METADATA_LEN 12
+
+#define BITLK_RECOVERY_KEY_LEN 55
+#define BITLK_RECOVERY_PARTS 8
+#define BITLK_RECOVERY_PART_LEN 6
+
+#define BITLK_BEK_FILE_HEADER_LEN 48
+#define BITLK_STARTUP_KEY_HEADER_LEN 24
+
+#define BITLK_KDF_HASH "sha256"
+#define BITLK_KDF_ITERATION_COUNT 0x100000
+
+/* maximum number of segments for the DM device */
+#define MAX_BITLK_SEGMENTS 10
+
+/* January 1, 1970 as MS file time */
+#define EPOCH_AS_FILETIME 116444736000000000
+#define HUNDREDS_OF_NANOSECONDS 10000000
+
+/* not available in older version of libuuid */
+#ifndef UUID_STR_LEN
+#define UUID_STR_LEN 37
+#endif
+
+/* known types of GUIDs from the BITLK superblock */
+const uint8_t BITLK_GUID_NORMAL[16] = { 0x3b, 0xd6, 0x67, 0x49, 0x29, 0x2e, 0xd8, 0x4a,
+ 0x83, 0x99, 0xf6, 0xa3, 0x39, 0xe3, 0xd0, 0x01 };
+const uint8_t BITLK_GUID_EOW[16] = { 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xa8, 0x92, 0x80, 0xdd, 0x0e, 0x4d,
+ 0x9e, 0x4e, 0xb1, 0xe3, 0x28, 0x4e, 0xae, 0xd8 };
+
+/* taken from libfdisk gpt.c -- TODO: this is a good candidate for adding to libuuid */
+struct bitlk_guid {
+ uint32_t time_low;
+ uint16_t time_mid;
+ uint16_t time_hi_and_version;
+ uint8_t clock_seq_hi;
+ uint8_t clock_seq_low;
+ uint8_t node[6];
+} __attribute__ ((packed));
+
+static void swap_guid(struct bitlk_guid *guid) {
+ guid->time_low = swab32(guid->time_low);
+ guid->time_mid = swab16(guid->time_mid);
+ guid->time_hi_and_version = swab16(guid->time_hi_and_version);
+}
+
+static void guid_to_string(struct bitlk_guid *guid, char *out) {
+ swap_guid(guid);
+ uuid_unparse((unsigned char *) guid, out);
+}
+
+typedef enum {
+ BITLK_SEGTYPE_CRYPT,
+ BITLK_SEGTYPE_ZERO,
+} BitlkSegmentType;
+
+struct segment {
+ uint64_t offset;
+ uint64_t length;
+ uint64_t iv_offset;
+ BitlkSegmentType type;
+};
+
+struct bitlk_signature {
+ uint8_t boot_code[3];
+ uint8_t signature[8];
+ uint16_t sector_size;
+} __attribute__ ((packed));
+
+struct bitlk_superblock {
+ struct bitlk_guid guid;
+ uint64_t fve_offset[3];
+} __attribute__ ((packed));
+
+struct bitlk_fve_metadata {
+ /* FVE metadata block header */
+ uint8_t signature[8];
+ uint16_t fve_size;
+ uint16_t fve_version;
+ uint16_t curr_state;
+ uint16_t next_state;
+ uint64_t volume_size;
+ uint32_t unknown2;
+ uint32_t volume_header_size;
+ uint64_t fve_offset[3];
+ uint64_t volume_header_offset;
+ /* FVE metadata header */
+ uint32_t metadata_size;
+ uint32_t metadata_version;
+ uint32_t metadata_header_size;
+ uint32_t metada_size_copy;
+ struct bitlk_guid guid;
+ uint32_t next_nonce;
+ uint16_t encryption;
+ uint16_t unknown3;
+ uint64_t creation_time;
+} __attribute__ ((packed));
+
+struct bitlk_entry_header_block {
+ uint64_t offset;
+ uint64_t size;
+} __attribute__ ((packed));
+
+struct bitlk_entry_vmk {
+ struct bitlk_guid guid;
+ uint8_t modified[8];
+ uint16_t _unknown;
+ uint16_t protection;
+} __attribute__ ((packed));
+
+struct bitlk_kdf_data {
+ char last_sha256[32];
+ char initial_sha256[32];
+ char salt[16];
+ uint64_t count;
+};
+
+struct bitlk_bek_header {
+ uint32_t metadata_size;
+ uint32_t metadata_version;
+ uint32_t metadata_header_size;
+ uint32_t metada_size_copy;
+ struct bitlk_guid guid;
+ uint32_t next_nonce;
+ uint16_t encryption;
+ uint16_t unknown;
+ uint64_t creation_time;
+} __attribute__ ((packed));
+
+static BITLKVMKProtection get_vmk_protection(uint16_t protection)
+{
+ switch (protection) {
+ case 0x0000:
+ return BITLK_PROTECTION_CLEAR_KEY;
+ case 0x0100:
+ return BITLK_PROTECTION_TPM;
+ case 0x0200:
+ return BITLK_PROTECTION_STARTUP_KEY;
+ case 0x0500:
+ return BITLK_PROTECTION_TPM_PIN;
+ case 0x0800:
+ return BITLK_PROTECTION_RECOVERY_PASSPHRASE;
+ case 0x1000:
+ return BITLK_PROTECTION_SMART_CARD;
+ case 0x2000:
+ return BITLK_PROTECTION_PASSPHRASE;
+ default:
+ return BITLK_PROTECTION_UNKNOWN;
+ }
+}
+
+static const char* get_vmk_protection_string(BITLKVMKProtection protection)
+{
+ switch (protection) {
+ case BITLK_PROTECTION_CLEAR_KEY:
+ return "VMK protected with clear key";
+ case BITLK_PROTECTION_TPM:
+ return "VMK protected with TPM";
+ case BITLK_PROTECTION_STARTUP_KEY:
+ return "VMK protected with startup key";
+ case BITLK_PROTECTION_TPM_PIN:
+ return "VMK protected with TPM and PIN";
+ case BITLK_PROTECTION_PASSPHRASE:
+ return "VMK protected with passphrase";
+ case BITLK_PROTECTION_RECOVERY_PASSPHRASE:
+ return "VMK protected with recovery passphrase";
+ case BITLK_PROTECTION_SMART_CARD:
+ return "VMK protected with smart card";
+ default:
+ return "VMK with unknown protection";
+ }
+}
+
+static const char* get_bitlk_type_string(BITLKEncryptionType type)
+{
+ switch (type)
+ {
+ case BITLK_ENCRYPTION_TYPE_NORMAL:
+ return "normal";
+ case BITLK_ENCRYPTION_TYPE_EOW:
+ return "encrypt-on-write";
+ default:
+ return "unknown";
+ }
+}
+
+/* TODO -- move to some utils file */
+static void hexprint(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *d, int n, const char *sep)
+{
+ int i;
+ for(i = 0; i < n; i++)
+ log_std(cd, "%02hhx%s", (const char)d[i], sep);
+}
+
+static uint64_t filetime_to_unixtime(uint64_t time)
+{
+ return (time - EPOCH_AS_FILETIME) / HUNDREDS_OF_NANOSECONDS;
+}
+
+static int convert_to_utf8(struct crypt_device *cd, uint8_t *input, size_t inlen, char **out)
+{
+ char *outbuf = NULL;
+ iconv_t ic;
+ size_t ic_inlen = inlen;
+ size_t ic_outlen = inlen;
+ char *ic_outbuf = NULL;
+ size_t r = 0;
+
+ outbuf = malloc(inlen);
+ if (outbuf == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ memset(outbuf, 0, inlen);
+ ic_outbuf = outbuf;
+
+ ic = iconv_open("UTF-8", "UTF-16LE");
+ r = iconv(ic, (char **) &input, &ic_inlen, &ic_outbuf, &ic_outlen);
+ iconv_close(ic);
+
+ if (r == 0)
+ *out = strdup(outbuf);
+ else {
+ *out = NULL;
+ log_dbg(cd, "Failed to convert volume description: %s", strerror(errno));
+ r = 0;
+ }
+
+ free(outbuf);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int passphrase_to_utf16(struct crypt_device *cd, char *input, size_t inlen, char **out)
+{
+ char *outbuf = NULL;
+ iconv_t ic;
+ size_t ic_inlen = inlen;
+ size_t ic_outlen = inlen * 2;
+ char *ic_outbuf = NULL;
+ size_t r = 0;
+
+ if (inlen == 0)
+ return r;
+
+ outbuf = crypt_safe_alloc(inlen * 2);
+ if (outbuf == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ memset(outbuf, 0, inlen * 2);
+ ic_outbuf = outbuf;
+
+ ic = iconv_open("UTF-16LE", "UTF-8");
+ r = iconv(ic, &input, &ic_inlen, &ic_outbuf, &ic_outlen);
+ iconv_close(ic);
+
+ if (r == 0) {
+ *out = outbuf;
+ } else {
+ *out = NULL;
+ crypt_safe_free(outbuf);
+ log_dbg(cd, "Failed to convert passphrase: %s", strerror(errno));
+ r = -errno;
+ }
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int parse_vmk_entry(struct crypt_device *cd, uint8_t *data, int start, int end, struct bitlk_vmk **vmk)
+{
+ uint16_t key_entry_size = 0;
+ uint16_t key_entry_type = 0;
+ uint16_t key_entry_value = 0;
+ size_t key_size = 0;
+ char *string = NULL;
+ const char *key = NULL;
+ struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+ bool supported = false;
+
+ /* only passphrase or recovery passphrase vmks are supported (can be used to activate) */
+ supported = (*vmk)->protection == BITLK_PROTECTION_PASSPHRASE ||
+ (*vmk)->protection == BITLK_PROTECTION_RECOVERY_PASSPHRASE ||
+ (*vmk)->protection == BITLK_PROTECTION_STARTUP_KEY;
+
+ while (end - start > 2) {
+ /* size of this entry */
+ memcpy(&key_entry_size, data + start, sizeof(key_entry_size));
+ key_entry_size = le16_to_cpu(key_entry_size);
+ if (key_entry_size == 0)
+ break;
+
+ /* type and value of this entry */
+ memcpy(&key_entry_type, data + start + sizeof(key_entry_size), sizeof(key_entry_type));
+ memcpy(&key_entry_value,
+ data + start + sizeof(key_entry_size) + sizeof(key_entry_type),
+ sizeof(key_entry_value));
+ key_entry_type = le16_to_cpu(key_entry_type);
+ key_entry_value = le16_to_cpu(key_entry_value);
+
+ if (key_entry_type != BITLK_ENTRY_TYPE_PROPERTY) {
+ if (supported) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Unexpected metadata entry type '%u' found when parsing supported Volume Master Key."), key_entry_type);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ } else {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Unexpected metadata entry type '%u' found when parsing unsupported VMK.", key_entry_type);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* stretch key with salt, skip 4 B (encryption method of the stretch key) */
+ if (key_entry_value == BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_STRETCH_KEY)
+ memcpy((*vmk)->salt,
+ data + start + BITLK_ENTRY_HEADER_LEN + 4,
+ sizeof((*vmk)->salt));
+ /* AES-CCM encrypted key */
+ else if (key_entry_value == BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_ENCRYPTED_KEY) {
+ /* nonce */
+ memcpy((*vmk)->nonce,
+ data + start + BITLK_ENTRY_HEADER_LEN,
+ sizeof((*vmk)->nonce));
+ /* MAC tag */
+ memcpy((*vmk)->mac_tag,
+ data + start + BITLK_ENTRY_HEADER_LEN + BITLK_NONCE_SIZE,
+ sizeof((*vmk)->mac_tag));
+ /* AES-CCM encrypted key */
+ key_size = key_entry_size - (BITLK_ENTRY_HEADER_LEN + BITLK_NONCE_SIZE + BITLK_VMK_MAC_TAG_SIZE);
+ key = (const char *) data + start + BITLK_ENTRY_HEADER_LEN + BITLK_NONCE_SIZE + BITLK_VMK_MAC_TAG_SIZE;
+ vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(key_size, key);
+ if (vk == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ crypt_volume_key_add_next(&((*vmk)->vk), vk);
+ /* clear key for a partially decrypted volume */
+ } else if (key_entry_value == BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_KEY) {
+ /* We currently don't want to support opening a partially decrypted
+ * device so we don't need to store this key.
+ *
+ * key_size = key_entry_size - (BITLK_ENTRY_HEADER_LEN + 4);
+ * key = (const char *) data + start + BITLK_ENTRY_HEADER_LEN + 4;
+ * vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(key_size, key);
+ * if (vk == NULL)
+ * return -ENOMEM;
+ * crypt_volume_key_add_next(&((*vmk)->vk), vk);
+ */
+ log_dbg(cd, "Skipping clear key metadata entry.");
+ /* unknown timestamps in recovery protected VMK */
+ } else if (key_entry_value == BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_RECOVERY_TIME) {
+ ;
+ } else if (key_entry_value == BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_STRING) {
+ if (convert_to_utf8(cd, data + start + BITLK_ENTRY_HEADER_LEN, key_entry_size - BITLK_ENTRY_HEADER_LEN, &string) < 0) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Invalid string found when parsing Volume Master Key."));
+ free(string);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ } else if ((*vmk)->name != NULL) {
+ if (supported) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Unexpected string ('%s') found when parsing supported Volume Master Key."), string);
+ free(string);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ log_dbg(cd, "Unexpected string ('%s') found when parsing unsupported VMK.", string);
+ free(string);
+ string = NULL;
+ } else {
+ /* Assume that strings in VMK are the name of the VMK */
+ (*vmk)->name = string;
+ string = NULL;
+ }
+ /* no idea what this is, lets hope it's not important */
+ } else if (key_entry_value == BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_USE_KEY && (*vmk)->protection == BITLK_PROTECTION_STARTUP_KEY) {
+ ;
+ } else {
+ if (supported) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Unexpected metadata entry value '%u' found when parsing supported Volume Master Key."), key_entry_value);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ } else {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Unexpected metadata entry value '%u' found when parsing unsupported VMK.", key_entry_value);
+ }
+ }
+
+ start += key_entry_size;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void BITLK_bitlk_fvek_free(struct bitlk_fvek *fvek)
+{
+ if (!fvek)
+ return;
+
+ crypt_free_volume_key(fvek->vk);
+ free(fvek);
+}
+
+void BITLK_bitlk_vmk_free(struct bitlk_vmk *vmk)
+{
+ struct bitlk_vmk *vmk_next = NULL;
+
+ while (vmk) {
+ if (vmk->guid)
+ free(vmk->guid);
+ if (vmk->name)
+ free(vmk->name);
+ crypt_free_volume_key(vmk->vk);
+ vmk_next = vmk->next;
+ free(vmk);
+ vmk = vmk_next;
+ }
+}
+
+void BITLK_bitlk_metadata_free(struct bitlk_metadata *metadata)
+{
+ if (!metadata)
+ return;
+
+ free(metadata->guid);
+ if (metadata->description)
+ free(metadata->description);
+ BITLK_bitlk_vmk_free(metadata->vmks);
+ BITLK_bitlk_fvek_free(metadata->fvek);
+}
+
+int BITLK_read_sb(struct crypt_device *cd, struct bitlk_metadata *params)
+{
+ int devfd;
+ struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(cd);
+ struct bitlk_signature sig = {};
+ struct bitlk_superblock sb = {};
+ struct bitlk_fve_metadata fve = {};
+ struct bitlk_entry_vmk entry_vmk = {};
+ uint8_t *fve_entries = NULL;
+ uint32_t fve_metadata_size = 0;
+ int fve_offset = 0;
+ char guid_buf[UUID_STR_LEN] = {0};
+ uint16_t entry_size = 0;
+ uint16_t entry_type = 0;
+ int i = 0;
+ int r = 0;
+ int start = 0;
+ int end = 0;
+ size_t key_size = 0;
+ const char *key = NULL;
+
+ struct bitlk_vmk *vmk = NULL;
+ struct bitlk_vmk *vmk_p = params->vmks;
+
+ devfd = device_open(cd, crypt_data_device(cd), O_RDONLY);
+ if (devfd < 0) {
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* read and check the signature */
+ if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
+ device_alignment(device), &sig, sizeof(sig), 0) != sizeof(sig)) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Failed to read BITLK signature from %s."), device_path(device));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(sig.signature, BITLK_SIGNATURE, sizeof(sig.signature)) == 0) {
+ params->togo = false;
+ fve_offset = BITLK_HEADER_METADATA_OFFSET;
+ } else if (memcmp(sig.signature, BITLK_SIGNATURE_TOGO, sizeof(sig.signature)) == 0) {
+ params->togo = true;
+ fve_offset = BITLK_HEADER_METADATA_OFFSET_TOGO;
+ } else {
+ log_err(cd, _("Invalid or unknown signature for BITLK device."));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(sig.boot_code, BITLK_BOOTCODE_V1, sizeof(sig.boot_code)) == 0) {
+ log_err(cd, _("BITLK version 1 is currently not supported."));
+ r = -ENOTSUP;
+ goto out;
+ } else if (memcmp(sig.boot_code, BITLK_BOOTCODE_V2, sizeof(sig.boot_code)) == 0)
+ ;
+ else {
+ log_err(cd, _("Invalid or unknown boot signature for BITLK device."));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ params->sector_size = le16_to_cpu(sig.sector_size);
+ if (params->sector_size == 0) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Got sector size 0, assuming 512.");
+ params->sector_size = SECTOR_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ if (!(params->sector_size == 512 || params->sector_size == 4096)) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Unsupported sector size %" PRIu16 "."), params->sector_size);
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* read GUID and FVE metadata offsets */
+ if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
+ device_alignment(device), &sb, sizeof(sb), fve_offset) != sizeof(sb)) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Failed to read BITLK header from %s."), device_path(device));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* get encryption "type" based on the GUID from BITLK superblock */
+ if (memcmp(&sb.guid, BITLK_GUID_NORMAL, 16) == 0)
+ params->type = BITLK_ENCRYPTION_TYPE_NORMAL;
+ else if (memcmp(&sb.guid, BITLK_GUID_EOW, 16) == 0)
+ params->type = BITLK_ENCRYPTION_TYPE_EOW;
+ else
+ params->type = BITLK_ENCRYPTION_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+ log_dbg(cd, "BITLK type from GUID: %s.", get_bitlk_type_string(params->type));
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
+ params->metadata_offset[i] = le64_to_cpu(sb.fve_offset[i]);
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Reading BITLK FVE metadata of size %zu on device %s, offset %" PRIu64 ".",
+ sizeof(fve), device_path(device), params->metadata_offset[0]);
+
+ /* read FVE metadata from the first metadata area */
+ if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
+ device_alignment(device), &fve, sizeof(fve), params->metadata_offset[0]) != sizeof(fve) ||
+ memcmp(fve.signature, BITLK_SIGNATURE, sizeof(fve.signature)) ||
+ le16_to_cpu(fve.fve_version) != 2) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Failed to read BITLK FVE metadata from %s."), device_path(device));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* check encryption state for the device */
+ params->state = true;
+ if (le16_to_cpu(fve.curr_state) != BITLK_STATE_NORMAL || le16_to_cpu(fve.next_state) != BITLK_STATE_NORMAL) {
+ params->state = false;
+ log_dbg(cd, "Unknown/unsupported state detected. Current state: %"PRIu16", next state: %"PRIu16".",
+ le16_to_cpu(fve.curr_state), le16_to_cpu(fve.next_state));
+ }
+
+ params->metadata_version = le16_to_cpu(fve.fve_version);
+ fve_metadata_size = le32_to_cpu(fve.metadata_size);
+
+ switch (le16_to_cpu(fve.encryption)) {
+ /* AES-CBC with Elephant difuser */
+ case 0x8000:
+ params->key_size = 256;
+ params->cipher = "aes";
+ params->cipher_mode = "cbc-elephant";
+ break;
+ case 0x8001:
+ params->key_size = 512;
+ params->cipher = "aes";
+ params->cipher_mode = "cbc-elephant";
+ break;
+ /* AES-CBC */
+ case 0x8002:
+ params->key_size = 128;
+ params->cipher = "aes";
+ params->cipher_mode = "cbc-eboiv";
+ break;
+ case 0x8003:
+ params->key_size = 256;
+ params->cipher = "aes";
+ params->cipher_mode = "cbc-eboiv";
+ break;
+ /* AES-XTS */
+ case 0x8004:
+ params->key_size = 256;
+ params->cipher = "aes";
+ params->cipher_mode = "xts-plain64";
+ break;
+ case 0x8005:
+ params->key_size = 512;
+ params->cipher = "aes";
+ params->cipher_mode = "xts-plain64";
+ break;
+ default:
+ log_err(cd, _("Unknown or unsupported encryption type."));
+ params->key_size = 0;
+ params->cipher = NULL;
+ params->cipher_mode = NULL;
+ r = -ENOTSUP;
+ goto out;
+ };
+
+ /* device GUID */
+ guid_to_string(&fve.guid, guid_buf);
+ params->guid = strdup(guid_buf);
+ if (!params->guid) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ params->creation_time = filetime_to_unixtime(le64_to_cpu(fve.creation_time));
+
+ /* read and parse all FVE metadata entries */
+ fve_entries = malloc(fve_metadata_size - BITLK_FVE_METADATA_HEADER_LEN);
+ if (!fve_entries) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memset(fve_entries, 0, (fve_metadata_size - BITLK_FVE_METADATA_HEADER_LEN));
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Reading BITLK FVE metadata entries of size %" PRIu32 " on device %s, offset %" PRIu64 ".",
+ fve_metadata_size - BITLK_FVE_METADATA_HEADER_LEN, device_path(device),
+ params->metadata_offset[0] + BITLK_FVE_METADATA_HEADERS_LEN);
+
+ if (read_lseek_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(cd, device),
+ device_alignment(device), fve_entries, fve_metadata_size - BITLK_FVE_METADATA_HEADER_LEN,
+ params->metadata_offset[0] + BITLK_FVE_METADATA_HEADERS_LEN) != (ssize_t)(fve_metadata_size - BITLK_FVE_METADATA_HEADER_LEN)) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Failed to read BITLK metadata entries from %s."), device_path(device));
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ end = fve_metadata_size - BITLK_FVE_METADATA_HEADER_LEN;
+ while (end - start > 2) {
+ /* size of this entry */
+ memcpy(&entry_size, fve_entries + start, sizeof(entry_size));
+ entry_size = le16_to_cpu(entry_size);
+ if (entry_size == 0)
+ break;
+
+ /* type of this entry */
+ memcpy(&entry_type, fve_entries + start + sizeof(entry_size), sizeof(entry_type));
+ entry_type = le16_to_cpu(entry_type);
+
+ /* VMK */
+ if (entry_type == BITLK_ENTRY_TYPE_VMK) {
+ /* skip first four variables in the entry (entry size, type, value and version) */
+ memcpy(&entry_vmk,
+ fve_entries + start + BITLK_ENTRY_HEADER_LEN,
+ sizeof(entry_vmk));
+
+ vmk = malloc(sizeof(struct bitlk_vmk));
+ if (!vmk) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memset(vmk, 0, sizeof(struct bitlk_vmk));
+
+ guid_to_string(&entry_vmk.guid, guid_buf);
+ vmk->guid = strdup (guid_buf);
+
+ vmk->name = NULL;
+
+ vmk->protection = get_vmk_protection(le16_to_cpu(entry_vmk.protection));
+
+ /* more data in another entry list */
+ r = parse_vmk_entry(cd, fve_entries,
+ start + BITLK_ENTRY_HEADER_LEN + BITLK_VMK_HEADER_LEN,
+ start + entry_size, &vmk);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ BITLK_bitlk_vmk_free(vmk);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (params->vmks == NULL)
+ params->vmks = vmk;
+ else
+ vmk_p->next = vmk;
+
+ vmk_p = vmk;
+ vmk = vmk->next;
+ /* FVEK */
+ } else if (entry_type == BITLK_ENTRY_TYPE_FVEK) {
+ params->fvek = malloc(sizeof(struct bitlk_fvek));
+ if (!params->fvek) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(params->fvek->nonce,
+ fve_entries + start + BITLK_ENTRY_HEADER_LEN,
+ sizeof(params->fvek->nonce));
+ /* MAC tag */
+ memcpy(params->fvek->mac_tag,
+ fve_entries + start + BITLK_ENTRY_HEADER_LEN + BITLK_NONCE_SIZE,
+ sizeof(params->fvek->mac_tag));
+ /* AES-CCM encrypted key */
+ key_size = entry_size - (BITLK_ENTRY_HEADER_LEN + BITLK_NONCE_SIZE + BITLK_VMK_MAC_TAG_SIZE);
+ key = (const char *) fve_entries + start + BITLK_ENTRY_HEADER_LEN + BITLK_NONCE_SIZE + BITLK_VMK_MAC_TAG_SIZE;
+ params->fvek->vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(key_size, key);
+ if (params->fvek->vk == NULL) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* volume header info (location and size) */
+ } else if (entry_type == BITLK_ENTRY_TYPE_VOLUME_HEADER) {
+ struct bitlk_entry_header_block entry_header;
+ memcpy(&entry_header,
+ fve_entries + start + BITLK_ENTRY_HEADER_LEN,
+ sizeof(entry_header));
+ params->volume_header_offset = le64_to_cpu(entry_header.offset);
+ params->volume_header_size = le64_to_cpu(entry_header.size);
+ /* volume description (utf-16 string) */
+ } else if (entry_type == BITLK_ENTRY_TYPE_DESCRIPTION) {
+ r = convert_to_utf8(cd, fve_entries + start + BITLK_ENTRY_HEADER_LEN,
+ entry_size - BITLK_ENTRY_HEADER_LEN,
+ &(params->description));
+ if (r < 0) {
+ BITLK_bitlk_vmk_free(vmk);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ start += entry_size;
+ }
+
+out:
+ if (fve_entries)
+ free(fve_entries);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int BITLK_dump(struct crypt_device *cd, struct device *device, struct bitlk_metadata *params)
+{
+ struct volume_key *vk_p;
+ struct bitlk_vmk *vmk_p;
+ int next_id = 0;
+ int i = 0;
+
+ log_std(cd, "Info for BITLK%s device %s.\n", params->togo ? " To Go" : "", device_path(device));
+ log_std(cd, "Version: \t%u\n", params->metadata_version);
+ log_std(cd, "GUID: \t%s\n", params->guid);
+ log_std(cd, "Sector size: \t%u [bytes]\n", params->sector_size);
+ log_std(cd, "Created: \t%s", ctime((time_t *)&(params->creation_time)));
+ log_std(cd, "Description: \t%s\n", params->description);
+ log_std(cd, "Cipher name: \t%s\n", params->cipher);
+ log_std(cd, "Cipher mode: \t%s\n", params->cipher_mode);
+ log_std(cd, "Cipher key: \t%u bits\n", params->key_size);
+
+ log_std(cd, "\n");
+
+ log_std(cd, "Keyslots:\n");
+ vmk_p = params->vmks;
+ while (vmk_p) {
+ log_std(cd, " %d: VMK\n", next_id);
+ if (vmk_p->name != NULL) {
+ log_std(cd, "\tName: \t%s\n", vmk_p->name);
+ }
+ log_std(cd, "\tGUID: \t%s\n", vmk_p->guid);
+ log_std(cd, "\tProtection: \t%s\n", get_vmk_protection_string (vmk_p->protection));
+ log_std(cd, "\tSalt: \t");
+ hexprint(cd, (const char *) vmk_p->salt, 16, "");
+ log_std(cd, "\n");
+
+ vk_p = vmk_p->vk;
+ while (vk_p) {
+ log_std(cd, "\tKey data size:\t%zu [bytes]\n", vk_p->keylength);
+ vk_p = vk_p->next;
+ }
+ vmk_p = vmk_p->next;
+ next_id++;
+ }
+
+ log_std(cd, " %d: FVEK\n", next_id);
+ log_std(cd, "\tKey data size:\t%zu [bytes]\n", params->fvek->vk->keylength);
+
+ log_std(cd, "\n");
+
+ log_std(cd, "Metadata segments:\n");
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+ log_std(cd, " %d: FVE metadata area\n", i);
+ log_std(cd, "\tOffset: \t%" PRIu64 " [bytes]\n", params->metadata_offset[i]);
+ log_std(cd, "\tSize: \t%d [bytes]\n", BITLK_FVE_METADATA_SIZE);
+ }
+
+ log_std(cd, " %d: Volume header\n", i);
+ log_std(cd, "\tOffset: \t%" PRIu64 " [bytes]\n", params->volume_header_offset);
+ log_std(cd, "\tSize: \t%" PRIu64 " [bytes]\n", params->volume_header_size);
+ log_std(cd, "\tCipher: \t%s-%s\n", params->cipher, params->cipher_mode);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* check if given passphrase can be a recovery key (has right format) and convert it */
+static int get_recovery_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *password,
+ size_t passwordLen,
+ struct volume_key **rc_key)
+{
+ unsigned int i, j = 0;
+ uint16_t parts[BITLK_RECOVERY_PARTS] = {0};
+ char part_str[BITLK_RECOVERY_PART_LEN + 1] = {0};
+ long part_num = 0;
+
+ /* check the passphrase it should be:
+ - 55 characters
+ - 8 groups of 6 divided by '-'
+ - each part is a number dividable by 11
+ */
+ if (passwordLen != BITLK_RECOVERY_KEY_LEN) {
+ if (passwordLen == BITLK_RECOVERY_KEY_LEN + 1 && password[passwordLen - 1] == '\n') {
+ /* looks like a recovery key with an extra newline, possibly from a key file */
+ passwordLen--;
+ log_dbg(cd, "Possible extra EOL stripped from the recovery key.");
+ } else
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ for (i = BITLK_RECOVERY_PART_LEN; i < passwordLen; i += BITLK_RECOVERY_PART_LEN + 1) {
+ if (password[i] != '-')
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0, j = 0; i < passwordLen; i += BITLK_RECOVERY_PART_LEN + 1, j++) {
+ strncpy(part_str, password + i, BITLK_RECOVERY_PART_LEN);
+
+ errno = 0;
+ part_num = strtol(part_str, NULL, 10);
+ if ((errno == ERANGE && (part_num == LONG_MAX || part_num == LONG_MIN)) ||
+ (errno != 0 && part_num == 0))
+ return -errno;
+
+ if (part_num % 11 != 0)
+ return 0;
+ parts[j] = cpu_to_le16(part_num / 11);
+ }
+
+ *rc_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(16, (const char*) parts);
+ if (*rc_key == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int parse_external_key_entry(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *data, int start, int end, struct volume_key **vk)
+{
+ uint16_t key_entry_size = 0;
+ uint16_t key_entry_type = 0;
+ uint16_t key_entry_value = 0;
+ size_t key_size = 0;
+ const char *key = NULL;
+
+ while (end - start > 2) {
+ /* size of this entry */
+ memcpy(&key_entry_size, data + start, sizeof(key_entry_size));
+ key_entry_size = le16_to_cpu(key_entry_size);
+ if (key_entry_size == 0)
+ break;
+
+ /* type and value of this entry */
+ memcpy(&key_entry_type, data + start + sizeof(key_entry_size), sizeof(key_entry_type));
+ memcpy(&key_entry_value,
+ data + start + sizeof(key_entry_size) + sizeof(key_entry_type),
+ sizeof(key_entry_value));
+ key_entry_type = le16_to_cpu(key_entry_type);
+ key_entry_value = le16_to_cpu(key_entry_value);
+
+ /* only properties should be in this entry */
+ if (key_entry_type != BITLK_ENTRY_TYPE_PROPERTY) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Unexpected metadata entry type '%u' found when parsing external key."), key_entry_type);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (key_entry_value == BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_KEY) {
+ key_size = key_entry_size - (BITLK_ENTRY_HEADER_LEN + 4);
+ key = (const char *) data + start + BITLK_ENTRY_HEADER_LEN + 4;
+ *vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(key_size, key);
+ if (*vk == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+ /* optional "ExternalKey" string, we can safely ignore it */
+ } else if (key_entry_value == BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_STRING)
+ ;
+ else {
+ log_err(cd, _("Unexpected metadata entry value '%u' found when parsing external key."), key_entry_value);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ start += key_entry_size;
+ }
+
+ /* if we got here we failed to parse the metadata */
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/* check if given passphrase can be a startup key (has right format) and convert it */
+static int get_startup_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *password,
+ size_t passwordLen,
+ const struct bitlk_vmk *vmk,
+ struct volume_key **su_key)
+{
+ struct bitlk_bek_header bek_header = {0};
+ char guid_buf[UUID_STR_LEN] = {0};
+
+ uint16_t key_entry_size = 0;
+ uint16_t key_entry_type = 0;
+ uint16_t key_entry_value = 0;
+
+ if (passwordLen < BITLK_BEK_FILE_HEADER_LEN)
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ memcpy(&bek_header, password, BITLK_BEK_FILE_HEADER_LEN);
+
+ /* metadata should contain GUID of the VMK this startup key is used for */
+ guid_to_string(&bek_header.guid, guid_buf);
+ if (strcmp(guid_buf, vmk->guid) == 0)
+ log_dbg(cd, "Found matching startup key for VMK %s", vmk->guid);
+ else
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (bek_header.metadata_version != 1) {
+ log_err(cd, "Unsupported BEK metadata version %" PRIu32 "", bek_header.metadata_version);
+ return -ENOTSUP;
+ }
+
+ if (bek_header.metadata_size != passwordLen) {
+ log_err(cd, "Unexpected BEK metadata size %" PRIu32 " does not match BEK file length", bek_header.metadata_size);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* we are expecting exactly one metadata entry starting immediately after the header */
+ memcpy(&key_entry_size, password + BITLK_BEK_FILE_HEADER_LEN, sizeof(key_entry_size));
+ key_entry_size = le16_to_cpu(key_entry_size);
+ if (key_entry_size < BITLK_ENTRY_HEADER_LEN) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Unexpected metadata entry size %" PRIu16 " when parsing BEK file", key_entry_size);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* type and value of this entry */
+ memcpy(&key_entry_type, password + BITLK_BEK_FILE_HEADER_LEN + sizeof(key_entry_size), sizeof(key_entry_type));
+ memcpy(&key_entry_value,
+ password + BITLK_BEK_FILE_HEADER_LEN + sizeof(key_entry_size) + sizeof(key_entry_type),
+ sizeof(key_entry_value));
+ key_entry_type = le16_to_cpu(key_entry_type);
+ key_entry_value = le16_to_cpu(key_entry_value);
+
+ if (key_entry_type == BITLK_ENTRY_TYPE_STARTUP_KEY && key_entry_value == BITLK_ENTRY_VALUE_EXTERNAL_KEY) {
+ return parse_external_key_entry(cd, password,
+ BITLK_BEK_FILE_HEADER_LEN + BITLK_ENTRY_HEADER_LEN + BITLK_STARTUP_KEY_HEADER_LEN,
+ passwordLen, su_key);
+ } else {
+ log_err(cd, _("Unexpected metadata entry found when parsing startup key."));
+ log_dbg(cd, "Entry type: %u, entry value: %u", key_entry_type, key_entry_value);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+}
+
+static int bitlk_kdf(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *password,
+ size_t passwordLen,
+ bool recovery,
+ const uint8_t *salt,
+ struct volume_key **vk)
+{
+ struct bitlk_kdf_data kdf = {};
+ struct crypt_hash *hd = NULL;
+ int len = 0;
+ char *utf16Password = NULL;
+ int i = 0;
+ int r = 0;
+
+ memcpy(kdf.salt, salt, 16);
+
+ r = crypt_hash_init(&hd, BITLK_KDF_HASH);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ len = crypt_hash_size(BITLK_KDF_HASH);
+ if (len < 0) {
+ crypt_hash_destroy(hd);
+ return len;
+ }
+
+ if (!recovery) {
+ /* passphrase: convert to UTF-16 first, then sha256(sha256(pw)) */
+ r = passphrase_to_utf16(cd, CONST_CAST(char*)password, passwordLen, &utf16Password);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ crypt_hash_write(hd, utf16Password, passwordLen * 2);
+ r = crypt_hash_final(hd, kdf.initial_sha256, len);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ crypt_hash_write(hd, kdf.initial_sha256, len);
+ r = crypt_hash_final(hd, kdf.initial_sha256, len);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ /* recovery passphrase: already converted in #get_recovery_key, now just sha256(rpw) */
+ crypt_hash_write(hd, password, passwordLen);
+ r = crypt_hash_final(hd, kdf.initial_sha256, len);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < BITLK_KDF_ITERATION_COUNT; i++) {
+ crypt_hash_write(hd, (const char*) &kdf, sizeof(kdf));
+ r = crypt_hash_final(hd, kdf.last_sha256, len);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out;
+ kdf.count = cpu_to_le64(le64_to_cpu(kdf.count) + 1);
+ }
+
+ *vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(len, kdf.last_sha256);
+
+out:
+ crypt_safe_free(utf16Password);
+ if (hd)
+ crypt_hash_destroy(hd);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int decrypt_key(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ struct volume_key **vk,
+ struct volume_key *enc_key,
+ struct volume_key *key,
+ const uint8_t *tag, size_t tag_size,
+ const uint8_t *iv, size_t iv_size,
+ bool is_fvek)
+{
+ char *outbuf;
+ int r;
+ uint16_t key_size = 0;
+
+ outbuf = crypt_safe_alloc(enc_key->keylength);
+ if (!outbuf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ r = crypt_bitlk_decrypt_key(key->key, key->keylength, enc_key->key, outbuf, enc_key->keylength,
+ (const char*)iv, iv_size, (const char*)tag, tag_size);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ if (r == -ENOTSUP)
+ log_err(cd, _("This operation is not supported."));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* key_data has it's size as part of the metadata */
+ memcpy(&key_size, outbuf, 2);
+ key_size = le16_to_cpu(key_size);
+ if (enc_key->keylength != key_size) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Unexpected key data size."));
+ log_dbg(cd, "Expected key data size: %zu, got %" PRIu16 "", enc_key->keylength, key_size);
+
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (is_fvek && strcmp(crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd), "cbc-elephant") == 0 &&
+ crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd) == 32) {
+ /* 128bit AES-CBC with Elephant -- key size is 256 bit (2 keys) but key data is 512 bits,
+ data: 16B CBC key, 16B empty, 16B elephant key, 16B empty */
+ memcpy(outbuf + 16 + BITLK_OPEN_KEY_METADATA_LEN,
+ outbuf + 2 * 16 + BITLK_OPEN_KEY_METADATA_LEN, 16);
+ key_size = 32 + BITLK_OPEN_KEY_METADATA_LEN;
+ }
+
+
+ *vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(key_size - BITLK_OPEN_KEY_METADATA_LEN,
+ (const char *)(outbuf + BITLK_OPEN_KEY_METADATA_LEN));
+ r = *vk ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
+out:
+ crypt_safe_free(outbuf);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int BITLK_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *name,
+ const char *password,
+ size_t passwordLen,
+ const struct bitlk_metadata *params,
+ uint32_t flags)
+{
+ int r = 0;
+ int i = 0;
+ int j = 0;
+ int min = 0;
+ int num_segments = 0;
+ struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd = {
+ .flags = flags,
+ };
+ struct dm_target *next_segment = NULL;
+ struct volume_key *open_vmk_key = NULL;
+ struct volume_key *open_fvek_key = NULL;
+ struct volume_key *vmk_dec_key = NULL;
+ struct volume_key *recovery_key = NULL;
+ const struct bitlk_vmk *next_vmk = NULL;
+ struct segment segments[MAX_BITLK_SEGMENTS] = {};
+ struct segment temp;
+ uint64_t next_start = 0;
+ uint64_t next_end = 0;
+ uint64_t last_segment = 0;
+ uint32_t dmt_flags;
+
+ if (!params->state) {
+ log_err(cd, _("This BITLK device is in an unsupported state and cannot be activated."));
+ r = -ENOTSUP;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (params->type != BITLK_ENCRYPTION_TYPE_NORMAL) {
+ log_err(cd, _("BITLK devices with type '%s' cannot be activated."), get_bitlk_type_string(params->type));
+ r = -ENOTSUP;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ next_vmk = params->vmks;
+ while (next_vmk) {
+ if (next_vmk->protection == BITLK_PROTECTION_PASSPHRASE) {
+ r = bitlk_kdf(cd, password, passwordLen, false, next_vmk->salt, &vmk_dec_key);
+ if (r) {
+ /* something wrong happened, but we still want to check other key slots */
+ next_vmk = next_vmk->next;
+ continue;
+ }
+ } else if (next_vmk->protection == BITLK_PROTECTION_RECOVERY_PASSPHRASE) {
+ r = get_recovery_key(cd, password, passwordLen, &recovery_key);
+ if (r) {
+ /* something wrong happened, but we still want to check other key slots */
+ next_vmk = next_vmk->next;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (recovery_key == NULL) {
+ /* r = 0 but no key -> given passphrase is not a recovery passphrase */
+ r = -EPERM;
+ next_vmk = next_vmk->next;
+ continue;
+ }
+ log_dbg(cd, "Trying to use given password as a recovery key.");
+ r = bitlk_kdf(cd, recovery_key->key, recovery_key->keylength,
+ true, next_vmk->salt, &vmk_dec_key);
+ crypt_free_volume_key(recovery_key);
+ if (r)
+ return r;
+ } else if (next_vmk->protection == BITLK_PROTECTION_STARTUP_KEY) {
+ r = get_startup_key(cd, password, passwordLen, next_vmk, &vmk_dec_key);
+ if (r) {
+ next_vmk = next_vmk->next;
+ continue;
+ }
+ log_dbg(cd, "Trying to use external key found in provided password.");
+ } else {
+ /* only passphrase, recovery passphrase and startup key VMKs supported right now */
+ log_dbg(cd, "Skipping %s", get_vmk_protection_string(next_vmk->protection));
+ next_vmk = next_vmk->next;
+ if (r == 0)
+ /* we need to set error code in case we have only unsupported VMKs */
+ r = -ENOTSUP;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Trying to decrypt %s.", get_vmk_protection_string(next_vmk->protection));
+ r = decrypt_key(cd, &open_vmk_key, next_vmk->vk, vmk_dec_key,
+ next_vmk->mac_tag, BITLK_VMK_MAC_TAG_SIZE,
+ next_vmk->nonce, BITLK_NONCE_SIZE, false);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Failed to decrypt VMK using provided passphrase.");
+ crypt_free_volume_key(vmk_dec_key);
+ if (r == -ENOTSUP)
+ return r;
+ next_vmk = next_vmk->next;
+ continue;
+ }
+ crypt_free_volume_key(vmk_dec_key);
+
+ r = decrypt_key(cd, &open_fvek_key, params->fvek->vk, open_vmk_key,
+ params->fvek->mac_tag, BITLK_VMK_MAC_TAG_SIZE,
+ params->fvek->nonce, BITLK_NONCE_SIZE, true);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Failed to decrypt FVEK using VMK.");
+ crypt_free_volume_key(open_vmk_key);
+ if (r == -ENOTSUP)
+ return r;
+ } else {
+ crypt_free_volume_key(open_vmk_key);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ next_vmk = next_vmk->next;
+ }
+
+ if (r) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "No more VMKs to try.");
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ /* Password verify only */
+ if (!name) {
+ crypt_free_volume_key(open_fvek_key);
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ next_vmk = params->vmks;
+ while (next_vmk) {
+ if (next_vmk->protection == BITLK_PROTECTION_CLEAR_KEY) {
+ crypt_free_volume_key(open_fvek_key);
+ log_err(cd, _("Activation of partially decrypted BITLK device is not supported."));
+ return -ENOTSUP;
+ }
+ next_vmk = next_vmk->next;
+ }
+
+ r = device_block_adjust(cd, crypt_data_device(cd), DEV_EXCL,
+ 0, &dmd.size, &dmd.flags);
+ if (r) {
+ crypt_free_volume_key(open_fvek_key);
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ /* there will be always 4 dm-zero segments: 3x metadata, 1x FS header */
+ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+ segments[num_segments].offset = params->metadata_offset[i] / SECTOR_SIZE;
+ segments[num_segments].length = BITLK_FVE_METADATA_SIZE / SECTOR_SIZE;
+ segments[num_segments].iv_offset = 0;
+ segments[num_segments].type = BITLK_SEGTYPE_ZERO;
+ num_segments++;
+ }
+ segments[num_segments].offset = params->volume_header_offset / SECTOR_SIZE;
+ segments[num_segments].length = params->volume_header_size / SECTOR_SIZE;
+ segments[num_segments].iv_offset = 0;
+ segments[num_segments].type = BITLK_SEGTYPE_ZERO;
+ num_segments++;
+
+ /* filesystem header (moved from the special location) */
+ segments[num_segments].offset = 0;
+ segments[num_segments].length = params->volume_header_size / SECTOR_SIZE;
+ segments[num_segments].iv_offset = params->volume_header_offset / SECTOR_SIZE;
+ segments[num_segments].type = BITLK_SEGTYPE_CRYPT;
+ num_segments++;
+
+ /* now fill gaps between the dm-zero segments with dm-crypt */
+ last_segment = params->volume_header_size / SECTOR_SIZE;
+ while (true) {
+ next_start = dmd.size;
+ next_end = dmd.size;
+
+ /* start of the next segment: end of the first existing segment after the last added */
+ for (i = 0; i < num_segments; i++)
+ if (segments[i].offset + segments[i].length < next_start && segments[i].offset + segments[i].length >= last_segment)
+ next_start = segments[i].offset + segments[i].length;
+
+ /* end of the next segment: start of the next segment after start we found above */
+ for (i = 0; i < num_segments; i++)
+ if (segments[i].offset < next_end && segments[i].offset >= next_start)
+ next_end = segments[i].offset;
+
+ /* two zero segments next to each other, just bump the last_segment
+ so the algorithm moves */
+ if (next_end - next_start == 0) {
+ last_segment = next_end + 1;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ segments[num_segments].offset = next_start;
+ segments[num_segments].length = next_end - next_start;
+ segments[num_segments].iv_offset = next_start;
+ segments[num_segments].type = BITLK_SEGTYPE_CRYPT;
+ last_segment = next_end;
+ num_segments++;
+
+ if (next_end == dmd.size)
+ break;
+
+ if (num_segments == 10) {
+ log_dbg(cd, "Failed to calculate number of dm-crypt segments for open.");
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* device mapper needs the segment sorted */
+ for (i = 0; i < num_segments - 1; i++) {
+ min = i;
+ for (j = i + 1; j < num_segments; j++)
+ if (segments[j].offset < segments[min].offset)
+ min = j;
+
+ if (min != i) {
+ temp.offset = segments[min].offset;
+ temp.length = segments[min].length;
+ temp.iv_offset = segments[min].iv_offset;
+ temp.type = segments[min].type;
+
+ segments[min].offset = segments[i].offset;
+ segments[min].length = segments[i].length;
+ segments[min].iv_offset = segments[i].iv_offset;
+ segments[min].type = segments[i].type;
+
+ segments[i].offset = temp.offset;
+ segments[i].length = temp.length;
+ segments[i].iv_offset = temp.iv_offset;
+ segments[i].type = temp.type;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (params->sector_size != SECTOR_SIZE)
+ dmd.flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_IV_LARGE_SECTORS;
+
+ r = dm_targets_allocate(&dmd.segment, num_segments);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+ next_segment = &dmd.segment;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_segments; i++) {
+ if (segments[i].type == BITLK_SEGTYPE_ZERO)
+ r = dm_zero_target_set(next_segment,
+ segments[i].offset,
+ segments[i].length);
+ else if (segments[i].type == BITLK_SEGTYPE_CRYPT)
+ r = dm_crypt_target_set(next_segment,
+ segments[i].offset,
+ segments[i].length,
+ crypt_data_device(cd),
+ open_fvek_key,
+ crypt_get_cipher_spec(cd),
+ segments[i].iv_offset,
+ segments[i].iv_offset,
+ NULL, 0,
+ params->sector_size);
+ if (r)
+ goto out;
+
+ next_segment = next_segment->next;
+ }
+
+ log_dbg(cd, "Trying to activate BITLK on device %s%s%s.",
+ device_path(crypt_data_device(cd)), name ? " with name " :"", name ?: "");
+
+ r = dm_create_device(cd, name, CRYPT_BITLK, &dmd);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ dm_flags(cd, DM_CRYPT, &dmt_flags);
+ if (!strcmp(params->cipher_mode, "cbc-eboiv") && !(dmt_flags & DM_BITLK_EBOIV_SUPPORTED)) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot activate device, kernel dm-crypt is missing support for BITLK IV."));
+ r = -ENOTSUP;
+ }
+ if (!strcmp(params->cipher_mode, "cbc-elephant") && !(dmt_flags & DM_BITLK_ELEPHANT_SUPPORTED)) {
+ log_err(cd, _("Cannot activate device, kernel dm-crypt is missing support for BITLK Elephant diffuser."));
+ r = -ENOTSUP;
+ }
+ }
+out:
+ dm_targets_free(cd, &dmd);
+ crypt_free_volume_key(open_fvek_key);
+ return r;
+}
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-11-28 11:26:37 +0000