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| -rw-r--r-- | docs/bug-mgmt/processes/doc-requests.rst | 44 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | docs/bug-mgmt/processes/fixing-security-bugs.rst | 159 | ||||
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| -rw-r--r-- | docs/bug-mgmt/processes/regressions.rst | 64 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | docs/bug-mgmt/processes/security-approval.rst | 219 | ||||
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diff --git a/docs/bug-mgmt/processes/accessibility-review.md b/docs/bug-mgmt/processes/accessibility-review.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..413eb8e6c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/bug-mgmt/processes/accessibility-review.md @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +# Accessibility Review + +## Introduction +At Mozilla, accessibility is a fundamental part of our mission to ensure the +internet is "open and accessible to all," helping to empower people, regardless +of their abilities, to contribute to the common good. Accessibility Review is a +service provided by the Mozilla Accessibility team to review features and +changes to ensure they are accessible to and inclusive of people with +disabilities. + +## Do I Need Accessibility Review? +You should consider requesting accessibility review if you aren't certain +whether your change is accessible to people with disabilities. Accessibility +review is optional, but it is strongly encouraged if you are introducing new +user interface or are significantly redesigning existing user interface. + +## When Should I Request Accessibility Review? +Generally, it's best to request accessibility review as early as possible, even +during the product requirements or UI design stage. Particularly for more +complex user interfaces, accessibility is much easier when incorporated into the +design, rather than attempting to retro-fit accessibility after the +implementation is well underway. + +The accessibility team has developed the [Mozilla Accessibility Release +Guidelines](https://wiki.mozilla.org/Accessibility/Guidelines) which outline +what is needed to make user interfaces accessible. To make accessibility review +faster, you may wish to try to verify and implement these guidelines prior to +requesting accessibility review. + +The deadline for accessibility review requests is Friday of the first week of +nightly builds for the release in which the feature/change is expected to ship. +This is the same date as the PI Request deadline. + +## How Do I Request Accessibility Review? +You request accessibility review by setting the a11y-review flag to "requested" +on a bug in Bugzilla and filling in the template that appears in the comment +field. For features spanning several bugs, you may wish to file a new, dedicated +bug for the accessibility review. Otherwise, particularly for smaller changes, +you may do this on an existing bug. Note that if you file a new bug, you will +need to submit the bug and then edit it to set the flag. + +## Questions? +If you have any questions, please don't hesitate to contact the Accessibility +team: + +* \#accessibility on + [Matrix](https://matrix.to/#/!jmuErVonajdNMbgdeY:mozilla.org?via=mozilla.org&via=matrix.org) + or Slack +* Email: accessibility@mozilla.com diff --git a/docs/bug-mgmt/processes/doc-requests.rst b/docs/bug-mgmt/processes/doc-requests.rst new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b725e10747 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/bug-mgmt/processes/doc-requests.rst @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +User documentation requests +=========================== + +If you are working on a change (bugfix, enhancement, or feature) which +would benefit from user-facing documentation, please use the +``user-doc-firefox`` flag to request it. + +This flag can be modified by anyone with ``EDITBUGS`` privileges. + +.. figure:: /public/images/sumo-flag.png + :alt: Image of flag in tracking section of bug + + Image of flag in tracking section of bug + +The default value of the flag is ``---``. + +If the bug needs user-facing documentation, set the flag to +``docs-needed``. This flag will be monitored by the support.mozilla.org +(SUMO) team. + +Once the docs are ready to be published, set the flag to +``docs-completed``. + +If it’s determined that documentation is not need after setting the flag +to ``docs-needed``, update the flag to ``none-needed`` so we know that +it’s been reviewed. + +Summary +------- + +=========== == ============== +From To +=========== == ============== +— to none-needed +— to docs-needed +docs-needed to none-needed +docs-needed to docs-completed +=========== == ============== + +Notes +----- + +A flag is used instead of the old keywords because flags can be +restricted to a subset of products and components. diff --git a/docs/bug-mgmt/processes/fixing-security-bugs.rst b/docs/bug-mgmt/processes/fixing-security-bugs.rst new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..075cf7d65a --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/bug-mgmt/processes/fixing-security-bugs.rst @@ -0,0 +1,159 @@ +Fixing Security Bugs +==================== + +A bug has been reported as security-sensitive in Bugzilla and received a +security rating. + +If this bug is private - which is most likely for a reported security +bug - **the process for patching is slightly different than the usual +process for fixing a bug**. + +Here are security guidelines to follow if you’re involved in reviewing, +testing and landing a security patch. See +:ref:`Security Bug Approval Process` +for more details about how to request sec-approval and land the patch. + +Keeping private information private +----------------------------------- + +A security-sensitive bug in Bugzilla means that all information about +the bug except its ID number are hidden. This includes the title, +comments, reporter, assignee and CC’d people. + +A security-sensitive bug usually remains private until a fix is shipped +in a new release, **and after a certain amount of time to ensure that a +maximum number of users updated their version of Firefox**. Bugs are +usually made public after 6 months and a couple of releases. + +From the moment a security bug has been privately reported to the moment +a fix is shipped and the bug is set public, all information about that +bug need to be handled carefully in order to avoid an unmitigated +vulnerability to be known and exploited out there before we release a +fix (0-day). + +During a normal process, information about the nature of bug can be +accessed through: + +- Bug comments (Bugzilla, GitHub issue) +- Commit message (visible on Bugzilla, tree check-ins and test servers) +- Code comments +- Test cases +- Bug content can potentially be discussed on public IRC/Slack channels + and mailing list emails. + +When patching for a security bug, you’ll need to be mindful about what +type of information you share and where. + +In commit messages +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +People are watching code check-ins, so we want to avoid sharing +information which would disclose or help finding a vulnerability too +easily before we shipped the fix to our users. This includes: + +- The **nature of the vulnerability** (overflow, use-after-free, XSS, + CSP bypass...) +- **Ways to trigger and exploit that vulnerability** + - In commit messages, code comments and test cases. +- The fact that a bug / commit is security-related: + + - **Trigger words** in the commit message or code comments such as "security", "exploitable" or the nature of a security vulnerability (overflow, use-after-free…) + - **Security approver’s name** in a commit message. +- The Firefox versions and components affected by the vulnerability. +- Patches with an obvious fix. + +In Bugzilla and other public channels +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +In addition to commits, you’ll need to be mindful of not disclosing +sensitive information about the bug in public places, such as Bugzilla: + +- **Do not add public bugs in the “duplicate”, “depends on”, “blocks” + or “see also” section if these bugs could give hints about the nature + of the security issue.** + + - Mention the bugs in comment of the private bug instead. +- Do not comment sensitive information in public related bugs. +- Also be careful about who you give bug access to: **double check + before CC’ing the wrong person or alias**. + +On IRC, Slack channels, GitHub issues, mailing lists: If you need to +discuss about a security bug, use a private channel (protected with a +password or with proper right access management) + +During Development +------------------ + +Testing sec-high and sec-critical bugs +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Pushing to Try servers requires Level 1 Commit access but **content +viewing is publicly accessible**. + +As much as possible, **do not push to Try servers**. Testing should be +done locally before checkin in order to prevent public disclosing of the +bug. + +If you need to push to Try servers, make sure your tests don’t disclose +what the vulnerability is about or how to trigger it. Do not mention +anywhere it is security related. + +Obfuscating a security patch +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +If your security patch looks obvious because of the code it contains +(e.g. a one-line fix), or if you really need to push to Try servers, +**consider integrating your security-related patch to non-security work +in the same area**. And/or pretend it is related to something else, like +some performance improvement or a correctness fix. **Definitely don't +include the bug number in the commit message.** This will help making +the security issue less easily identifiable. (The absolute ban against +"Security through Obscurity" is in relation to cryptographic systems. In +other situations you still can't *rely* on obscurity but it can +sometimes buy you a little time. In this context we need to get the +fixes into the hands of our users faster than attackers can weaponize +and deploy attacks and a little extra time can help.) + +Requesting sec-approval +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +See :ref:`Security Bug Approval Process` +for more details + +Landing tests +~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Tests can be landed **after the release has gone live** and **not before +at least 4 weeks following that release**. + +The exception is if a security issue has never been shipped in a release +build and has been fixed in all development branches. + +Making a security bug public +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +This is the responsibility of the security management team. + +Essentials +---------- + +- **Do not disclose any information about the vulnerability before a + release with a fix has gone live for enough time for users to update + their software**. + + - This includes code comments, commit messages, tests, public + communication channels. + +- If any doubt: '''request sec-approval? ''' +- If any doubt: **needinfo security folks**. +- **If there’s no rating, assume the worst and treat the bug as + sec-critical**. + +Documentation & Contacts +------------------------ + +- :ref:`Normal process for submitting a patch <How to submit a patch>` +- `How to file a security bug <https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Fileabug>`__ +- `Handling Mozilla security bugs (policy) <https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/security-group/bugs/>`__ +- `Security Bug Approval Process <security-approval>`__ +- `Contacting the Security team(s) at Mozilla: <https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security>`__ diff --git a/docs/bug-mgmt/processes/labels.rst b/docs/bug-mgmt/processes/labels.rst new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0af3b6ef03 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/bug-mgmt/processes/labels.rst @@ -0,0 +1,155 @@ +GitHub Metadata Recommendations +=============================== + +To have better consistency with code and task tracking among Mozilla +Central, Bugzilla, and GitHub, we request that you use a common set of +labels in your projects. Benefits of improved consistency in our +conventions include: + +- Consistency makes measurement of processes simpler across the + organization +- Consistency makes it easier to write re-usable process tools +- Consistency increases clarity for those than need to work across + different repositories and bug trackers +- Consistency reduces friction around engineering mobility between + projects + +We recommend creating sets of labels in your project to do this. + +Bug types +--------- + +In Bugzilla bugs are distinguished by type: ``defect``, ``enhancement``, +and ``tasks``. Use a label to make this distinction in your project. + +Statuses +-------- + +Bugs in GitHub issues have two states: closed and open. Bugzilla has a +richer set of states. + +When you close a bug, add a label indicating `the +resolution <https://wiki.mozilla.org/BMO/UserGuide/BugStatuses#Resolutions>`__. + +- ``fixed`` + + - A change set for the bug has been landed in Mozilla-Central + - A GitHub issue could be closed, but the change set has not + landed so it would be still considered open from the + Bugzilla point of view + +- ``invalid`` + + - The problem described is not a bug. + +- ``incomplete`` + + - The problem is vaguely described with no steps to reproduce, or is + a support request. + +- ``wontfix`` + + - The problem described is a bug which will never be fixed. + +- ``duplicate`` + + - The problem is a duplicate of an existing bug. Be sure to link the + bug this is a duplicate of. + +- ``worksforme`` + + - All attempts at reproducing this bug were futile, and reading the + code produces no clues as to why the described behavior would + occur. + +Severities (Required) +--------------------- + +The triage process for Firefox bugs in Bugzilla requires a non default +value of a bug's :ref:`Severity (definitions) <Defect Severity>`. + +Release Status Flags +------------------------------- + +Open Firefox bugs may also have :ref:`status flags <Release Status Flags>` +(``status_firefoxNN``) set for Nightly, Beta, Release, or ESR. + +Priorities +---------- + +Firefox projects in Bugzilla can use the :ref:`priority field <Priority Definitions>` +to indicate when a bug will be worked on. + +Keywords +-------- + +In GitHub issues metadata is either a label or the bug’s open/closed +state. + +Some Bugzilla metadata behaves like labels, but you need to be careful +with how you use it in order not to confuse QA. + +Regressions +~~~~~~~~~~~ + +In Bugzilla, the ``regression`` keyword indicates a regression in +existing behavior introduced by a code change. + +When a bug is labeled as a regression in GitHub does it imply the +regression is in the code module in GitHub, or the module that’s landed +in Mozilla Central? Using the label ``regression-internal`` will signal +QA that the regression is internal to your development cycle, and not +one introduced into the Mozilla Central tree. + +If it is not clear which pull request caused the regression, add the +``regressionwindow-wanted`` label. + +Other Keywords +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Other useful labels include ``enhancement`` to distinguish feature +requests, and ``good first issue`` to signal to contributors (`along +with adequate +documentation <http://blog.humphd.org/why-good-first-bugs-often-arent/>`__.) + +Summary +------- + +To represent Bugzilla fields, use labels following this scheme. + +- Bug types + + - ``defect``, ``enhancement``, ``task`` + +- Resolution statuses + + - ``invalid``, ``duplicate``, ``incomplete``, ``worksforme``, + ``wontfix`` + +- Regressions + + - ``regression``, ``regressionwindow-wanted``, + ``regression-internal`` + + +- :ref:`Severity <Defect Severity>` (required) + + - ``S1``, ``S2``, ``S3``, ``S4``, ``N/A`` (reserved for bugs + of type ``task`` or ``enhancement``) + +- :ref:`Status flags <Firefox Status Flags>` + + - ``status_firefoxNN:<status>`` + (example ``status_firefox77:affected``) + +- :ref:`Priority <Priority Definitions>` + + - ``P1``, ``P2``, ``P3``, ``P5`` + +- Other keywords + + - ``good first bug``, ``perf``, &etc. + + +You may already have a set of tags, so do an edit to convert them +or use `the GitHub settings app <https://github.com/probot/settings>`__. diff --git a/docs/bug-mgmt/processes/regressions.rst b/docs/bug-mgmt/processes/regressions.rst new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..991771f38d --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/bug-mgmt/processes/regressions.rst @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +How to Mark Regressions +======================= + +Regressions +----------- + +For regression bugs in Mozilla-Central, our policy is to tag the bug as +a regression, identify the commits which caused the regression, then +mark the bugs associated with those commits as causing the regression. + +What is a regression? +--------------------- + +A regression is a bug (in our scheme a ``defect``) introduced by a +`changeset <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Changeset>`__. + +- Bug 101 *fixes* Bug 100 with Change Set A +- Bug 102 *reported which describes previously correct behavior now not + happening* +- Bug 102 *investigated and found to be introduced by Change Set A* + +Marking a Regression Bug +------------------------ + +These things are true about regressions: + +- **Bug Type** is ``defect`` +- **Keywords** include ``regression`` +- **Status_FirefoxNN** is ``affected`` for each version (in current + nightly, beta, and release) of Firefox in which the bug was found +- The bug’s description covers previously working behavior which is no + longer working [ed. I need a better phrase for this] + +Until the change set which caused the regression has been found through +`mozregression <https://mozilla.github.io/mozregression/>`__ or another +bisection tool, the bug should also have the ``regressionwindow-wanted`` +keyword. + +Once the change set which caused the regression has been identified, +remove the ``regressionwindow-wanted`` keyword and set the **Regressed +By** field to the id of the bug associated with the change set. + +Setting the **Regressed By** field will update the **Regresses** field +in the other bug. + +Set a needinfo for the author of the regressing patch asking them to fix +or revert the regression. + +Previous Method +--------------- + +Previously we over-loaded the **Blocks** and **Blocked By** fields to +track the regression, setting **Blocks** to the id of the bug associated +with the change set causing the regression, and using the +``regression``, ``regressionwindow-wanted`` keywords and the status +flags as described above. + +This made it difficult to understand what was a dependency and what was +a regression when looking at dependency trees in Bugzilla. + +FAQs +---- + +*To be written* diff --git a/docs/bug-mgmt/processes/security-approval.rst b/docs/bug-mgmt/processes/security-approval.rst new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e8148525ab --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/bug-mgmt/processes/security-approval.rst @@ -0,0 +1,219 @@ +Security Bug Approval Process +============================= + +How to fix a core-security bug in Firefox - developer guidelines +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +Follow these security guidelines if you’re involved in reviewing, +testing and landing a security patch: +:ref:`Fixing Security Bugs`. + +Purpose: don't 0-day ourselves +------------------------------ + +People watch our check-ins. They may be able to start exploiting our +users before we can get an update out to them if + +- the patch is an obvious security fix (bounds check, kungFuDeathGrip, + etc.) +- the check-in comment says "security fix" or includes trigger words + like "exploitable", "vulnerable", "overflow", "injection", "use after + free", etc. +- comments in the code mention those types of things or how someone + could abuse the bug +- the check-in contains testcases that show exactly how to trigger the + vulnerability + +Principle: assume the worst +--------------------------- + +- If there's no rating we assume it could be critical +- If we don't know the regression range we assume it needs porting to + all supported branches + +Process for Security Bugs (Developer Perspective) +------------------------------------------------- + +Filing / Managing Bugs +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +- Try whenever possible to file security bugs marked as such when + filing, instead of filing them as open bugs and then closing later. + This is not always possible, but attention to this, especially when + filing from crash-stats, is helpful. +- Avoid linking it to non-security bugs with Blocks, Depends, + Regressions, or See Also, especially if those bugs may give a hint to + the sort of security issue involved. Mention the bug in a comment on + the security bug instead. We can always fill in the links later after + the fix has shipped. + +Developing the Patch +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +- Comments in the code should not mention a security issue is being + fixed. Don’t paint a picture or an arrow pointing to security issues + any more than the code changes already do. +- Avoid linking it to non-security bugs with Blocks, Depends, or See + Also, especially if those bugs may give a hint to the sort of + security issue involved. Mention the bug in a comment on the security + bug instead. We can always fill in the links later after the fix has + shipped. +- Do not push to Try servers if possible: this exposes the security + issues for these critical and high rated bugs to public viewing. In + an ideal case, testing of patches is done locally before final + check-in to mozilla-central. +- If pushing to Try servers is necessary, **do not include the bug + number in the patch**. Ideally, do not include tests in the push as + the tests can illustrate the exact nature of the security problem + frequently. +- If you must push to Try servers, with or without tests, try to + obfuscate what this patch is for. Try to push it with other, + non-security work, in the same area. + +Request review of the patch in the same process as normal. After the +patch has received an r+ you will request sec-approval. See +:ref:`Fixing Security Bugs` +for more examples/details of these points. + +On Requesting sec-approval +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +For security bugs with no sec- severity rating assume the worst and +follow the rules for sec-critical. During the sec-approval process we +will notice it has not been rated and rate it during the process. + +Core-security bug fixes can be landed by a developer without any +explicit approval if: + +| **A)** The bug has a sec-low, sec-moderate, sec-other, or sec-want + rating. +| **or** +| **B)** The bug is a recent regression on mozilla-central. This means + +- A specific regressing check-in has been identified +- The developer can (**and has**) marked the status flags for ESR, + Beta, and Aurora as "unaffected" +- We have not shipped this vulnerability in anything other than a + nightly build + +If it meets the above criteria, check that patch in. + +Otherwise, if the bug has a patch \*and\* is sec-high or sec-critical, +the developer should prepare the patch for sec-approval. This entails: + +- Commit should occur without specific mention of security, security + bugs, or sec-approvers if possible. While comprehensive commit + messages are generally encouraged; they should be omitted for + security bugs and instead be posted in the bug (which will eventually + become public.) +- Separate out tests into a separate commit. **Do not commit tests when + checking in** when the security bug fix is initially checked-in. + **Remember we don’t want to 0-day ourselves!** + + - Tests should only be checked in later, after an official Firefox + release that contains the fix has gone live and not for at least + four weeks following that release. For example, if Firefox 53 + contains a fix for a security issue that affects the world and is + then fixed in 54, tests for this fix should not be checked in + until four weeks after 54 goes live. The exception to this is if + there is a security issue that hasn’t shipped in a release build + and it is being fixed on multiple development branches (such as + mozilla-central and beta). Since the security problem was never + released to the world, once the bug is fixed in all affected + places, tests can be checked in to the various branches. + - There are two main techniques for remembering to check in the + tests later: + + - clone the sec bug into a hidden "task" bug "land tests for bug + xxxxx" and assign to yourself. It should get a "sec-other" + keyword rating. + - Or, set the "in-testsuite" flag to "?", and later set it to "+" + when the tests get checked in. + +Following that, set the sec-approval flag to '?' on the patch when it is +ready to be checked into mozilla-central (or elsewhere if it is branch +only). + +If developers are unsure about a bug and it has a patch ready, just +request sec-approval anyway and move on. Don't overthink it! + +An automatic nomination comment will be added to bugzilla when +sec-approval is set to '?'. The questions in this need to be filled out +as best as possible when sec-approval is requested for the patch. + +It is as follows (courtesy of Dan Veditz):: + + [Security approval request comment] + How easily can the security issue be deduced from the patch? + Do comments in the patch, the check-in comment, or tests included in + the patch paint a bulls-eye on the security problem? + Which older supported branches are affected by this flaw? + If not all supported branches, which bug introduced the flaw? + Do you have backports for the affected branches? If not, how + different, hard to create, and risky will they be? + How likely is this patch to cause regressions; how much testing does + it need? + +This is similar to the ESR approval nomination form and is meant to help +us evaluate the risks around approving the patch for checkin. + +When the bug is approved for landing, the sec-approval flag will be set +to '+' with a comment from the approver to land the patch. At that +point, land it according to instructions provided.. + +This will allow us to control when we can land security bugs without +exposing them too early and to make sure they get landed on the various +branches. + +If you have any questions or are unsure about anything in this document +contact us on Slack in the #security channel or the current +sec-approvers Dan Veditz and Tom Ritter. + +Process for Security Bugs (sec-approver Perspective) +---------------------------------------------------- + +The security assurance team and release management will have their own +process for approving bugs: + +#. The Security assurance team goes through sec-approval ? bugs daily + and approves low risk fixes for central (if early in cycle). + Developers can also ping the Security Assurance Team (specifically + Tom Ritter & Dan Veditz) in #security on Slack when important. + + #. If a bug lacks a security-rating one should be assigned - possibly + in coordination with the (other member of) the Security Assurance + Team + +#. Security team marks tracking flags to ? for all affected versions + when approved for central. (This allows release management to decide + whether to uplift to branches just like always.) +#. Weekly security/release management triage meeting goes through + sec-approval + and ? bugs where beta and ESR is affected, ? bugs with + higher risk (sec-high and sec-critical), or ? bugs near end of cycle. + +Options for sec-approval including a logical combination of the +following: + +- Separate out the test and comments in the code into a followup commit + we will commit later. +- Remove the commit message and place it in the bug or comments in a + followup commit. +- Please land it bundled in with another commit +- Land today +- Land today, land the tests after +- Land closer to the release date +- Land in Nightly to assess stability +- Land today and request uplift to all branches +- Request uplift to all branches and we'll land as close to shipping as + permitted +- Chemspill time + +The decision process for which of these to choose is perceived risk on +multiple axes: + +- ease of exploitation +- reverse engineering risk +- stability risk + +The most common choice is: not much stability risk, not an immediate RE +risk, moderate to high difficulty of exploitation: "land whenever"
\ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/bug-mgmt/processes/shared-bug-queues.rst b/docs/bug-mgmt/processes/shared-bug-queues.rst new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..dc2df9bbf9 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/bug-mgmt/processes/shared-bug-queues.rst @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +Shared Bug Queues +================= + +Reviewers for change sets can be suggested at the product and component +level, but only the person who has been asked to review code will be +notified. + +Realizing that Bugzilla users can *watch* other users, `Chris +Cooper <https://mozillians.org/en-US/u/coop/>`__ came up with the idea +of having `a shared reviews alias for review +requests <http://coopcoopbware.tumblr.com/post/170952242320/experiments-in-productivity-the-shared-bug-queue>`__. + +If you want to watch a particular part of the tree in Mozilla Central, +then `use the Herald +tool <https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/book/phabricator/article/herald/>`__. + +Process +------- + +1. Create a new bugzilla.mozilla.com account for an address which can + receive mail. + Use the ``name+extension@domain.tld`` trick such as + ``jmozillian+reviews@mozilla.com`` to create a unique address +2. Respond to the email sent by Bugzilla and set a password on the + account +3. `Open a bug <https://mzl.la/2Mg8Sli>`__ to convert the account to a + bot and make it the shared review queue for your component +4. BMO administrator updates the email address of the new account to the + ``@mozilla.bugs`` address +5. BMO administrator updates the default reviewer for the component + requested and sets it to the shared review account +6. Reviewers `follow the shared review account in + bugzilla <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/userprefs.cgi?tab=email>`__ +7. Reviewers get notified when shared review account is ``r?``\ ed |