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Diffstat (limited to '')
-rw-r--r-- | dom/security/nsCSPContext.h | 225 |
1 files changed, 225 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/dom/security/nsCSPContext.h b/dom/security/nsCSPContext.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..117db1a8ce --- /dev/null +++ b/dom/security/nsCSPContext.h @@ -0,0 +1,225 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */ +/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */ +/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#ifndef nsCSPContext_h___ +#define nsCSPContext_h___ + +#include "mozilla/dom/nsCSPUtils.h" +#include "mozilla/dom/SecurityPolicyViolationEvent.h" +#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_security.h" +#include "nsIChannel.h" +#include "nsIChannelEventSink.h" +#include "nsIContentSecurityPolicy.h" +#include "nsIInterfaceRequestor.h" +#include "nsIStreamListener.h" +#include "nsIWeakReferenceUtils.h" +#include "nsXPCOM.h" + +#define NS_CSPCONTEXT_CONTRACTID "@mozilla.org/cspcontext;1" +// 09d9ed1a-e5d4-4004-bfe0-27ceb923d9ac +#define NS_CSPCONTEXT_CID \ + { \ + 0x09d9ed1a, 0xe5d4, 0x4004, { \ + 0xbf, 0xe0, 0x27, 0xce, 0xb9, 0x23, 0xd9, 0xac \ + } \ + } + +class nsINetworkInterceptController; +class nsIEventTarget; +struct ConsoleMsgQueueElem; + +namespace mozilla { +namespace dom { +class Element; +} +namespace ipc { +class ContentSecurityPolicy; +} +} // namespace mozilla + +class nsCSPContext : public nsIContentSecurityPolicy { + public: + NS_DECL_ISUPPORTS + NS_DECL_NSICONTENTSECURITYPOLICY + NS_DECL_NSISERIALIZABLE + + protected: + virtual ~nsCSPContext(); + + public: + nsCSPContext(); + + static bool Equals(nsIContentSecurityPolicy* aCSP, + nsIContentSecurityPolicy* aOtherCSP); + + // Init a CSP from a different CSP + nsresult InitFromOther(nsCSPContext* otherContext); + + /** + * SetRequestContextWithDocument() needs to be called before the + * innerWindowID is initialized on the document. Use this function + * to call back to flush queued up console messages and initialize + * the innerWindowID. Node, If SetRequestContextWithPrincipal() was + * called then we do not have a innerWindowID anyway and hence + * we can not flush messages to the correct console. + */ + void flushConsoleMessages(); + + void logToConsole(const char* aName, const nsTArray<nsString>& aParams, + const nsAString& aSourceName, const nsAString& aSourceLine, + uint32_t aLineNumber, uint32_t aColumnNumber, + uint32_t aSeverityFlag); + + /** + * Construct SecurityPolicyViolationEventInit structure. + * + * @param aBlockedURI + * A nsIURI: the source of the violation. + * @param aOriginalUri + * The original URI if the blocked content is a redirect, else null + * @param aViolatedDirective + * the directive that was violated (string). + * @param aSourceFile + * name of the file containing the inline script violation + * @param aScriptSample + * a sample of the violating inline script + * @param aLineNum + * source line number of the violation (if available) + * @param aColumnNum + * source column number of the violation (if available) + * @param aViolationEventInit + * The output + */ + nsresult GatherSecurityPolicyViolationEventData( + nsIURI* aBlockedURI, const nsACString& aBlockedString, + nsIURI* aOriginalURI, nsAString& aViolatedDirective, + uint32_t aViolatedPolicyIndex, nsAString& aSourceFile, + nsAString& aScriptSample, uint32_t aLineNum, uint32_t aColumnNum, + mozilla::dom::SecurityPolicyViolationEventInit& aViolationEventInit); + + nsresult SendReports( + const mozilla::dom::SecurityPolicyViolationEventInit& aViolationEventInit, + uint32_t aViolatedPolicyIndex); + + nsresult FireViolationEvent( + mozilla::dom::Element* aTriggeringElement, + nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener, + const mozilla::dom::SecurityPolicyViolationEventInit& + aViolationEventInit); + + enum BlockedContentSource { + eUnknown, + eInline, + eEval, + eSelf, + }; + + nsresult AsyncReportViolation( + mozilla::dom::Element* aTriggeringElement, + nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener, nsIURI* aBlockedURI, + BlockedContentSource aBlockedContentSource, nsIURI* aOriginalURI, + const nsAString& aViolatedDirective, uint32_t aViolatedPolicyIndex, + const nsAString& aObserverSubject, const nsAString& aSourceFile, + const nsAString& aScriptSample, uint32_t aLineNum, uint32_t aColumnNum); + + // Hands off! Don't call this method unless you know what you + // are doing. It's only supposed to be called from within + // the principal destructor to avoid a tangling pointer. + void clearLoadingPrincipal() { mLoadingPrincipal = nullptr; } + + nsWeakPtr GetLoadingContext() { return mLoadingContext; } + + static uint32_t ScriptSampleMaxLength() { + return std::max( + mozilla::StaticPrefs::security_csp_reporting_script_sample_max_length(), + 0); + } + + void AddIPCPolicy(const mozilla::ipc::ContentSecurityPolicy& aPolicy); + void SerializePolicies( + nsTArray<mozilla::ipc::ContentSecurityPolicy>& aPolicies); + + private: + void EnsureIPCPoliciesRead(); + + bool permitsInternal(CSPDirective aDir, + mozilla::dom::Element* aTriggeringElement, + nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener, + nsIURI* aContentLocation, nsIURI* aOriginalURIIfRedirect, + const nsAString& aNonce, bool aSpecific, + bool aSendViolationReports, + bool aSendContentLocationInViolationReports, + bool aParserCreated); + + // helper to report inline script/style violations + void reportInlineViolation(CSPDirective aDirective, + mozilla::dom::Element* aTriggeringElement, + nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener, + const nsAString& aNonce, const nsAString& aContent, + const nsAString& aViolatedDirective, + uint32_t aViolatedPolicyIndex, + uint32_t aLineNumber, uint32_t aColumnNumber); + + nsString mReferrer; + uint64_t mInnerWindowID; // used for web console logging + bool mSkipAllowInlineStyleCheck; // used to allow Devtools to edit styles + // When deserializing an nsCSPContext instance, we initially just keep the + // policies unparsed. We will only reconstruct actual CSP policy instances + // when there's an attempt to use the CSP. Given a better way to serialize/ + // deserialize individual nsCSPPolicy objects, this performance + // optimization could go away. + nsTArray<mozilla::ipc::ContentSecurityPolicy> mIPCPolicies; + nsTArray<nsCSPPolicy*> mPolicies; + nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> mSelfURI; + nsCOMPtr<nsILoadGroup> mCallingChannelLoadGroup; + nsWeakPtr mLoadingContext; + nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> mLoadingPrincipal; + + // helper members used to queue up web console messages till + // the windowID becomes available. see flushConsoleMessages() + nsTArray<ConsoleMsgQueueElem> mConsoleMsgQueue; + bool mQueueUpMessages; + nsCOMPtr<nsIEventTarget> mEventTarget; +}; + +// Class that listens to violation report transmission and logs errors. +class CSPViolationReportListener : public nsIStreamListener { + public: + NS_DECL_NSISTREAMLISTENER + NS_DECL_NSIREQUESTOBSERVER + NS_DECL_ISUPPORTS + + public: + CSPViolationReportListener(); + + protected: + virtual ~CSPViolationReportListener(); +}; + +// The POST of the violation report (if it happens) should not follow +// redirects, per the spec. hence, we implement an nsIChannelEventSink +// with an object so we can tell XHR to abort if a redirect happens. +class CSPReportRedirectSink final : public nsIChannelEventSink, + public nsIInterfaceRequestor { + public: + NS_DECL_NSICHANNELEVENTSINK + NS_DECL_NSIINTERFACEREQUESTOR + NS_DECL_ISUPPORTS + + public: + CSPReportRedirectSink(); + + void SetInterceptController( + nsINetworkInterceptController* aInterceptController); + + protected: + virtual ~CSPReportRedirectSink(); + + private: + nsCOMPtr<nsINetworkInterceptController> mInterceptController; +}; + +#endif /* nsCSPContext_h___ */ |