1 files changed, 359 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSIOLayer.h b/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSIOLayer.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..beb0a67340
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSIOLayer.h
@@ -0,0 +1,359 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 2; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*-
+ *
+ * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#ifndef nsNSSIOLayer_h
+#define nsNSSIOLayer_h
+
+#include "CommonSocketControl.h"
+#include "mozilla/Assertions.h"
+#include "mozilla/TimeStamp.h"
+#include "mozilla/UniquePtr.h"
+#include "nsCOMPtr.h"
+#include "nsDataHashtable.h"
+#include "nsIProxyInfo.h"
+#include "nsISSLSocketControl.h"
+#include "nsNSSCertificate.h"
+#include "nsTHashtable.h"
+#include "sslt.h"
+
+namespace mozilla {
+class OriginAttributes;
+namespace psm {
+class SharedSSLState;
+}  // namespace psm
+}  // namespace mozilla
+
+using mozilla::OriginAttributes;
+
+class nsIObserver;
+
+class nsNSSSocketInfo final : public CommonSocketControl {
+ public:
+  nsNSSSocketInfo(mozilla::psm::SharedSSLState& aState, uint32_t providerFlags,
+                  uint32_t providerTlsFlags);
+
+  NS_DECL_ISUPPORTS_INHERITED
+
+  void SetForSTARTTLS(bool aForSTARTTLS);
+  bool GetForSTARTTLS();
+
+  nsresult GetFileDescPtr(PRFileDesc** aFilePtr);
+  nsresult SetFileDescPtr(PRFileDesc* aFilePtr);
+
+  bool IsHandshakePending() const { return mHandshakePending; }
+  void SetHandshakeNotPending() { mHandshakePending = false; }
+
+  void SetTLSVersionRange(SSLVersionRange range) { mTLSVersionRange = range; }
+  SSLVersionRange GetTLSVersionRange() const { return mTLSVersionRange; };
+
+  // From nsISSLSocketControl.
+  NS_IMETHOD ProxyStartSSL(void) override;
+  NS_IMETHOD StartTLS(void) override;
+  NS_IMETHOD SetNPNList(nsTArray<nsCString>& aNPNList) override;
+  NS_IMETHOD GetAlpnEarlySelection(nsACString& _retval) override;
+  NS_IMETHOD GetEarlyDataAccepted(bool* aEarlyDataAccepted) override;
+  NS_IMETHOD DriveHandshake(void) override;
+  using nsISSLSocketControl::GetKEAUsed;
+  NS_IMETHOD GetKEAUsed(int16_t* aKEAUsed) override;
+  NS_IMETHOD GetKEAKeyBits(uint32_t* aKEAKeyBits) override;
+  NS_IMETHOD GetProviderTlsFlags(uint32_t* aProviderTlsFlags) override;
+  NS_IMETHOD GetSSLVersionOffered(int16_t* aSSLVersionOffered) override;
+  NS_IMETHOD GetMACAlgorithmUsed(int16_t* aMACAlgorithmUsed) override;
+  bool GetDenyClientCert() override;
+  void SetDenyClientCert(bool aDenyClientCert) override;
+  NS_IMETHOD GetClientCert(nsIX509Cert** aClientCert) override;
+  NS_IMETHOD SetClientCert(nsIX509Cert* aClientCert) override;
+  NS_IMETHOD GetEsniTxt(nsACString& aEsniTxt) override;
+  NS_IMETHOD SetEsniTxt(const nsACString& aEsniTxt) override;
+  NS_IMETHOD GetEchConfig(nsACString& aEchConfig) override;
+  NS_IMETHOD SetEchConfig(const nsACString& aEchConfig) override;
+  NS_IMETHOD GetPeerId(nsACString& aResult) override;
+  NS_IMETHOD GetRetryEchConfig(nsACString& aEchConfig) override;
+
+  PRStatus CloseSocketAndDestroy();
+
+  void SetNegotiatedNPN(const char* value, uint32_t length);
+  void SetEarlyDataAccepted(bool aAccepted);
+
+  void SetHandshakeCompleted();
+  bool IsHandshakeCompleted() const { return mHandshakeCompleted; }
+  void NoteTimeUntilReady();
+
+  void SetFalseStartCallbackCalled() { mFalseStartCallbackCalled = true; }
+  void SetFalseStarted() { mFalseStarted = true; }
+
+  // Note that this is only valid *during* a handshake; at the end of the
+  // handshake, it gets reset back to false.
+  void SetFullHandshake() { mIsFullHandshake = true; }
+  bool IsFullHandshake() const { return mIsFullHandshake; }
+
+  bool GetJoined() { return mJoined; }
+  void SetSentClientCert() { mSentClientCert = true; }
+
+  uint32_t GetProviderTlsFlags() const { return mProviderTlsFlags; }
+
+  mozilla::psm::SharedSSLState& SharedState();
+
+  // XXX: These are only used on for diagnostic purposes
+  enum CertVerificationState {
+    before_cert_verification,
+    waiting_for_cert_verification,
+    after_cert_verification
+  };
+  void SetCertVerificationWaiting();
+  // Use errorCode == 0 to indicate success;
+  void SetCertVerificationResult(PRErrorCode errorCode) override;
+
+  // for logging only
+  PRBool IsWaitingForCertVerification() const {
+    return mCertVerificationState == waiting_for_cert_verification;
+  }
+  void AddPlaintextBytesRead(uint64_t val) { mPlaintextBytesRead += val; }
+
+  bool IsPreliminaryHandshakeDone() const { return mPreliminaryHandshakeDone; }
+  void SetPreliminaryHandshakeDone() { mPreliminaryHandshakeDone = true; }
+
+  void SetKEAUsed(uint16_t kea) { mKEAUsed = kea; }
+
+  void SetKEAKeyBits(uint32_t keaBits) { mKEAKeyBits = keaBits; }
+
+  void SetMACAlgorithmUsed(int16_t mac) { mMACAlgorithmUsed = mac; }
+
+  void SetShortWritePending(int32_t amount, unsigned char data) {
+    mIsShortWritePending = true;
+    mShortWriteOriginalAmount = amount;
+    mShortWritePendingByte = data;
+  }
+
+  bool IsShortWritePending() { return mIsShortWritePending; }
+
+  unsigned char const* GetShortWritePendingByteRef() {
+    return &mShortWritePendingByte;
+  }
+
+  int32_t ResetShortWritePending() {
+    mIsShortWritePending = false;
+    return mShortWriteOriginalAmount;
+  }
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+  // These helpers assert that the caller does try to send the same data
+  // as it was previously when we hit the short-write.  This is a measure
+  // to make sure we communicate correctly to the consumer.
+  void RememberShortWrittenBuffer(const unsigned char* data) {
+    mShortWriteBufferCheck =
+        mozilla::MakeUnique<char[]>(mShortWriteOriginalAmount);
+    memcpy(mShortWriteBufferCheck.get(), data, mShortWriteOriginalAmount);
+  }
+  void CheckShortWrittenBuffer(const unsigned char* data, int32_t amount) {
+    if (!mShortWriteBufferCheck) return;
+    MOZ_ASSERT(amount >= mShortWriteOriginalAmount,
+               "unexpected amount length after short write");
+    MOZ_ASSERT(
+        !memcmp(mShortWriteBufferCheck.get(), data, mShortWriteOriginalAmount),
+        "unexpected buffer content after short write");
+    mShortWriteBufferCheck = nullptr;
+  }
+#endif
+
+  void SetSharedOwningReference(mozilla::psm::SharedSSLState* ref);
+
+  nsresult SetResumptionTokenFromExternalCache();
+
+  void SetClientCertChain(mozilla::UniqueCERTCertList&& clientCertChain) {
+    mClientCertChain = std::move(clientCertChain);
+  }
+
+ protected:
+  virtual ~nsNSSSocketInfo();
+
+ private:
+  PRFileDesc* mFd;
+
+  CertVerificationState mCertVerificationState;
+
+  mozilla::psm::SharedSSLState& mSharedState;
+  bool mForSTARTTLS;
+  SSLVersionRange mTLSVersionRange;
+  bool mHandshakePending;
+  bool mPreliminaryHandshakeDone;  // after false start items are complete
+
+  nsresult ActivateSSL();
+
+  nsCString mEsniTxt;
+  nsCString mEchConfig;
+  nsCString mPeerId;
+  bool mEarlyDataAccepted;
+  bool mDenyClientCert;
+  bool mFalseStartCallbackCalled;
+  bool mFalseStarted;
+  bool mIsFullHandshake;
+  bool mNotedTimeUntilReady;
+
+  // True when SSL layer has indicated an "SSL short write", i.e. need
+  // to call on send one or more times to push all pending data to write.
+  bool mIsShortWritePending;
+
+  // These are only valid if mIsShortWritePending is true.
+  //
+  // Value of the last byte pending from the SSL short write that needs
+  // to be passed to subsequent calls to send to perform the flush.
+  unsigned char mShortWritePendingByte;
+
+  // Original amount of data the upper layer has requested to write to
+  // return after the successful flush.
+  int32_t mShortWriteOriginalAmount;
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+  mozilla::UniquePtr<char[]> mShortWriteBufferCheck;
+#endif
+
+  // mKEA* are used in false start and http/2 detetermination
+  // Values are from nsISSLSocketControl
+  int16_t mKEAUsed;
+  uint32_t mKEAKeyBits;
+  int16_t mMACAlgorithmUsed;
+
+  uint32_t mProviderTlsFlags;
+  mozilla::TimeStamp mSocketCreationTimestamp;
+  uint64_t mPlaintextBytesRead;
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> mClientCert;
+  // Regarding the client certificate message in the TLS handshake, RFC 5246
+  // (TLS 1.2) says:
+  //   If the certificate_authorities list in the certificate request
+  //   message was non-empty, one of the certificates in the certificate
+  //   chain SHOULD be issued by one of the listed CAs.
+  // (RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3) has a similar provision)
+  // These certificates may be known to gecko but not NSS (e.g. enterprise
+  // intermediates). In order to make these certificates discoverable to NSS
+  // so it can include them in the message, we cache them here as temporary
+  // certificates.
+  mozilla::UniqueCERTCertList mClientCertChain;
+
+  // if non-null this is a reference to the mSharedState (which is
+  // not an owning reference). If this is used, the info has a private
+  // state that does not share things like intolerance lists with the
+  // rest of the session. This is normally used when you have per
+  // socket tls flags overriding session wide defaults.
+  RefPtr<mozilla::psm::SharedSSLState> mOwningSharedRef;
+};
+
+// This class is used to store the needed information for invoking the client
+// cert selection UI.
+class ClientAuthInfo final {
+ public:
+  explicit ClientAuthInfo(const nsACString& hostName,
+                          const OriginAttributes& originAttributes,
+                          int32_t port, uint32_t providerFlags,
+                          uint32_t providerTlsFlags, nsIX509Cert* clientCert);
+  ~ClientAuthInfo() = default;
+  ClientAuthInfo(ClientAuthInfo&& aOther) noexcept;
+
+  const nsACString& HostName() const;
+  const OriginAttributes& OriginAttributesRef() const;
+  int32_t Port() const;
+  already_AddRefed<nsIX509Cert> GetClientCert() const;
+  uint32_t ProviderFlags() const;
+  uint32_t ProviderTlsFlags() const;
+
+ private:
+  ClientAuthInfo(const ClientAuthInfo&) = delete;
+  void operator=(const ClientAuthInfo&) = delete;
+
+  nsCString mHostName;
+  OriginAttributes mOriginAttributes;
+  int32_t mPort;
+  uint32_t mProviderFlags;
+  uint32_t mProviderTlsFlags;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> mClientCert;
+};
+
+class nsSSLIOLayerHelpers {
+ public:
+  explicit nsSSLIOLayerHelpers(uint32_t aTlsFlags = 0);
+  ~nsSSLIOLayerHelpers();
+
+  nsresult Init();
+  void Cleanup();
+
+  static bool nsSSLIOLayerInitialized;
+  static PRDescIdentity nsSSLIOLayerIdentity;
+  static PRDescIdentity nsSSLPlaintextLayerIdentity;
+  static PRIOMethods nsSSLIOLayerMethods;
+  static PRIOMethods nsSSLPlaintextLayerMethods;
+
+  bool mTreatUnsafeNegotiationAsBroken;
+
+  void setTreatUnsafeNegotiationAsBroken(bool broken);
+  bool treatUnsafeNegotiationAsBroken();
+
+ private:
+  struct IntoleranceEntry {
+    uint16_t tolerant;
+    uint16_t intolerant;
+    PRErrorCode intoleranceReason;
+
+    void AssertInvariant() const {
+      MOZ_ASSERT(intolerant == 0 || tolerant < intolerant);
+    }
+  };
+  nsDataHashtable<nsCStringHashKey, IntoleranceEntry> mTLSIntoleranceInfo;
+  // Sites that require insecure fallback to TLS 1.0, set by the pref
+  // security.tls.insecure_fallback_hosts, which is a comma-delimited
+  // list of domain names.
+  nsTHashtable<nsCStringHashKey> mInsecureFallbackSites;
+
+ public:
+  void rememberTolerantAtVersion(const nsACString& hostname, int16_t port,
+                                 uint16_t tolerant);
+  bool fallbackLimitReached(const nsACString& hostname, uint16_t intolerant);
+  bool rememberIntolerantAtVersion(const nsACString& hostname, int16_t port,
+                                   uint16_t intolerant, uint16_t minVersion,
+                                   PRErrorCode intoleranceReason);
+  void forgetIntolerance(const nsACString& hostname, int16_t port);
+  void adjustForTLSIntolerance(const nsACString& hostname, int16_t port,
+                               /*in/out*/ SSLVersionRange& range);
+  PRErrorCode getIntoleranceReason(const nsACString& hostname, int16_t port);
+
+  void clearStoredData();
+  void loadVersionFallbackLimit();
+  void setInsecureFallbackSites(const nsCString& str);
+  void initInsecureFallbackSites();
+  bool isPublic() const;
+  void removeInsecureFallbackSite(const nsACString& hostname, uint16_t port);
+  bool isInsecureFallbackSite(const nsACString& hostname);
+
+  uint16_t mVersionFallbackLimit;
+
+ private:
+  mozilla::Mutex mutex;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIObserver> mPrefObserver;
+  uint32_t mTlsFlags;
+};
+
+nsresult nsSSLIOLayerNewSocket(int32_t family, const char* host, int32_t port,
+                               nsIProxyInfo* proxy,
+                               const OriginAttributes& originAttributes,
+                               PRFileDesc** fd, nsISupports** securityInfo,
+                               bool forSTARTTLS, uint32_t flags,
+                               uint32_t tlsFlags);
+
+nsresult nsSSLIOLayerAddToSocket(int32_t family, const char* host, int32_t port,
+                                 nsIProxyInfo* proxy,
+                                 const OriginAttributes& originAttributes,
+                                 PRFileDesc* fd, nsISupports** securityInfo,
+                                 bool forSTARTTLS, uint32_t flags,
+                                 uint32_t tlsFlags);
+
+SECStatus DoGetClientAuthData(ClientAuthInfo&& info,
+                              const mozilla::UniqueCERTCertificate& serverCert,
+                              nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>>&& collectedCANames,
+                              mozilla::UniqueCERTCertificate& outCert,
+                              mozilla::UniqueSECKEYPrivateKey& outKey,
+                              mozilla::UniqueCERTCertList& outBuiltChain);
+
+#endif  // nsNSSIOLayer_h