/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ #include "nsISerializable.idl" #include "nsIContentPolicy.idl" interface nsIURI; interface nsIEventTarget; interface nsILoadInfo; interface nsIPrincipal; interface nsICSPEventListener; webidl Element; webidl Document; /** * nsIContentSecurityPolicy * Describes an XPCOM component used to model and enforce CSPs. Instances of * this class may have multiple policies within them, but there should only be * one of these per document/principal. */ %{C++ class nsCSPPolicy; %} [ptr] native CSPPolicyPtr(const nsCSPPolicy); [scriptable, builtinclass, uuid(1d632008-6c97-48ae-a51c-16e2daa0f4f6)] interface nsIContentSecurityPolicy : nsISerializable { /** * Directives supported by Content Security Policy. These are enums for * the CSPDirective type. * The NO_DIRECTIVE entry is used for checking default permissions and * returning failure when asking CSP which directive to check. * * NOTE: When implementing a new directive, you will need to add it here but also * add it to the CSPStrDirectives array in nsCSPUtils.h. */ cenum CSPDirective : 8 { NO_DIRECTIVE = 0, DEFAULT_SRC_DIRECTIVE = 1, SCRIPT_SRC_DIRECTIVE = 2, OBJECT_SRC_DIRECTIVE = 3, STYLE_SRC_DIRECTIVE = 4, IMG_SRC_DIRECTIVE = 5, MEDIA_SRC_DIRECTIVE = 6, FRAME_SRC_DIRECTIVE = 7, FONT_SRC_DIRECTIVE = 8, CONNECT_SRC_DIRECTIVE = 9, REPORT_URI_DIRECTIVE = 10, FRAME_ANCESTORS_DIRECTIVE = 11, REFLECTED_XSS_DIRECTIVE = 12, BASE_URI_DIRECTIVE = 13, FORM_ACTION_DIRECTIVE = 14, WEB_MANIFEST_SRC_DIRECTIVE = 15, UPGRADE_IF_INSECURE_DIRECTIVE = 16, CHILD_SRC_DIRECTIVE = 17, BLOCK_ALL_MIXED_CONTENT = 18, SANDBOX_DIRECTIVE = 19, WORKER_SRC_DIRECTIVE = 20, NAVIGATE_TO_DIRECTIVE = 21, }; /** * Accessor method for a read-only string version of the policy at a given * index. */ [binaryname(GetPolicyString)] AString getPolicy(in unsigned long index); /** * Accessor method for a read-only pointer the policy object at a given * index. Returns a null pointer if the index is larger than the current * policy count. */ [noscript,notxpcom,nostdcall] CSPPolicyPtr GetPolicy(in unsigned long index); /** * Returns the number of policies attached to this CSP instance. Useful with * getPolicy(). */ readonly attribute unsigned long policyCount; /** * Returns whether this policy uses the directive upgrade-insecure-requests. * Please note that upgrade-insecure-reqeusts also applies if the parent or * including document (context) makes use of the directive. */ readonly attribute bool upgradeInsecureRequests; /** * Returns whether this policy uses the directive block-all-mixed-content. * Please note that block-all-mixed-content takes presedence in case the * directive upgrade-insecure-requests is defined in the same policy and * will therefore block all mixed content without even trying to perform * an upgrade. */ readonly attribute bool blockAllMixedContent; /** * Returns whether this policy enforces the frame-ancestors directive. */ readonly attribute bool enforcesFrameAncestors; /** * Parse and install a CSP policy. * @param aPolicy * String representation of the policy * (e.g., header value, meta content) * @param reportOnly * Should this policy affect content, script and style processing or * just send reports if it is violated? * @param deliveredViaMetaTag * Indicates whether the policy was delivered via the meta tag. */ void appendPolicy(in AString policyString, in boolean reportOnly, in boolean deliveredViaMetaTag); /* * Whether this policy allows inline script or style. * @param aContentPolicyType Either TYPE_SCRIPT or TYPE_STYLESHEET * @param aNonce The nonce string to check against the policy * @param aParserCreated If the script element was created by the HTML Parser * @param aTriggeringElement The script element of the inline resource to * hash. It can be null. * @param aContentOfPseudoScript The content of the psuedo-script to compare * to hash (and compare to the hashes listed in * the policy) * @param aLineNumber The line number of the inline resource * (used for reporting) * @param aColumnNumber The column number of the inline resource * (used for reporting) * @return * Whether or not the effects of the inline style should be allowed * (block the rules if false). */ boolean getAllowsInline(in nsIContentSecurityPolicy_CSPDirective aDirective, in AString aNonce, in boolean aParserCreated, in Element aTriggeringElement, in nsICSPEventListener aCSPEventListener, in AString aContentOfPseudoScript, in unsigned long aLineNumber, in unsigned long aColumnNumber); /* * Whether this policy allows a navigation subject to the navigate-to * policy. * @param aURI The target URI * @param aIsFormSubmission True if the navigation was initiated by a form submission. This * is important since the form-action directive overrides navigate-to in that case. * @param aWasRedirect True if a redirect has happened. Important for path-sensitivity. * @param aEnforceWhitelist True if the whitelist of allowed targets must be enforced. If * this is true, the whitelist must be enforced even if 'unsafe-allow-redirects' is * used. If 'unsafe-allow-redirects' is not used then the whitelist is always enforced * @return * Whether or not the effects of the navigation is allowed */ boolean getAllowsNavigateTo(in nsIURI aURI, in boolean aIsFormSubmission, in boolean aWasRedirected, in boolean aEnforceWhitelist); /** * whether this policy allows eval and eval-like functions * such as setTimeout("code string", time). * @param shouldReportViolations * Whether or not the use of eval should be reported. * This function returns "true" when violating report-only policies, but * when any policy (report-only or otherwise) is violated, * shouldReportViolations is true as well. * @return * Whether or not the effects of the eval call should be allowed * (block the call if false). */ boolean getAllowsEval(out boolean shouldReportViolations); /** * Delegate method called by the service when the protected document is loaded. * Returns the union of all the sandbox flags contained in CSP policies. This is the most * restrictive interpretation of flags set in multiple policies. * See nsSandboxFlags.h for the possible flags. * * @return * sandbox flags or SANDBOXED_NONE if no sandbox directive exists */ uint32_t getCSPSandboxFlags(); /** * For each violated policy (of type violationType), log policy violation on * the Error Console and send a report to report-uris present in the violated * policies. * * @param violationType * one of the VIOLATION_TYPE_* constants, e.g. inline-script or eval * @param triggeringElement * the element that triggers this CSP violation. It can be null. * @param sourceFile * name of the source file containing the violation (if available) * @param contentSample * sample of the violating content (to aid debugging) * @param lineNum * source line number of the violation (if available) * @param columnNum * source column number of the violation (if available) * @param aNonce * (optional) If this is a nonce violation, include the nonce so we can * recheck to determine which policies were violated and send the * appropriate reports. * @param aContent * (optional) If this is a hash violation, include contents of the inline * resource in the question so we can recheck the hash in order to * determine which policies were violated and send the appropriate * reports. */ void logViolationDetails(in unsigned short violationType, in Element triggeringElement, in nsICSPEventListener aCSPEventListener, in AString sourceFile, in AString scriptSample, in int32_t lineNum, in int32_t columnNum, [optional] in AString nonce, [optional] in AString content); const unsigned short VIOLATION_TYPE_INLINE_SCRIPT = 1; const unsigned short VIOLATION_TYPE_EVAL = 2; const unsigned short VIOLATION_TYPE_INLINE_STYLE = 3; const unsigned short VIOLATION_TYPE_NONCE_SCRIPT = 4; const unsigned short VIOLATION_TYPE_NONCE_STYLE = 5; const unsigned short VIOLATION_TYPE_HASH_SCRIPT = 6; const unsigned short VIOLATION_TYPE_HASH_STYLE = 7; const unsigned short VIOLATION_TYPE_REQUIRE_SRI_FOR_STYLE = 8; const unsigned short VIOLATION_TYPE_REQUIRE_SRI_FOR_SCRIPT = 9; /** * Called after the CSP object is created to fill in appropriate request * context. Either use * * aDocument (preferred), or if no document is available, then provide * * aPrincipal, aSelfURI, aReferrer, aInnerWindowId explicitly. */ [must_use] void setRequestContextWithDocument(in Document aDocument); [must_use] void setRequestContextWithPrincipal(in nsIPrincipal aRequestPrincipal, in nsIURI aSelfURI, in AString aReferrer, in unsigned long long aInnerWindowId); /** * Get the various arguments needed to create a new request context for a CSP. */ [noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall] readonly attribute nsIPrincipal requestPrincipal; [noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall] readonly attribute nsIURI selfURI; [noscript] readonly attribute AString referrer; [noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall] readonly attribute unsigned long long innerWindowID; /** * Warning: Do not set that attribute unless you know exactly what you are doing! * * Primarily used to allow Devtools to edit inline styles! */ [noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall] attribute boolean skipAllowInlineStyleCheck; /** * Ensure we have a nsIEventTarget to use to label CSPReportSenderRunnable */ [noscript] void ensureEventTarget(in nsIEventTarget aEventTarget); /** * Verifies ancestry as permitted by the policy. * * NOTE: Calls to this may trigger violation reports when queried, so this * value should not be cached. * * @param aLoadInfo * The loadinfo of the channel containing the protected resource * @return * true if the frame's ancestors are all allowed by policy (except for * report-only policies, which will send reports and then return true * here when violated). */ boolean permitsAncestry(in nsILoadInfo aLoadInfo); /** * Checks if a specific directive permits loading of a URI. * * NOTE: Calls to this may trigger violation reports when queried, so the * return value should not be cached. * * @param aTriggeringElement * The element that triggers this CSP check. It can be null. * @param aURI * The URI about to be loaded or used. * @param aDir * The CSPDirective to query (see above constants *_DIRECTIVE). * @param aSpecific * If "true" and the directive is specified to fall back to "default-src" * when it's not explicitly provided, directivePermits will NOT try * default-src when the specific directive is not used. Setting this to * "false" allows CSP to fall back to default-src. This function * behaves the same for both values of canUseDefault when querying * directives that don't fall-back. * @return * Whether or not the provided URI is allowed by CSP under the given * directive. (block the pending operation if false). */ boolean permits(in Element aTriggeringElement, in nsICSPEventListener aCSPEventListener, in nsIURI aURI, in nsIContentSecurityPolicy_CSPDirective aDir, in boolean aSpecific); /** * Delegate method called by the service when sub-elements of the protected * document are being loaded. Given a bit of information about the request, * decides whether or not the policy is satisfied. * * Calls to this may trigger violation reports when queried, so * this value should not be cached. * * aOriginalURIIfRedirect must be passed only if this loading is the result * of a redirect. In this case, aOriginalURIIfRedirect must be the original * URL. */ short shouldLoad(in nsContentPolicyType aContentType, in nsICSPEventListener aCSPEventListener, in nsIURI aContentLocation, in nsIURI aOriginalURIIfRedirect, in bool aSendViolationReports, in AString aNonce, in boolean aParserCreated); %{ C++ // nsIObserver topic to fire when the policy encounters a violation. #define CSP_VIOLATION_TOPIC "csp-on-violate-policy" %} /** * Returns the CSP in JSON notation. */ AString toJSON(); }; typedef nsIContentSecurityPolicy_CSPDirective CSPDirective; /* Listener for security policy violation event */ [function, scriptable, uuid(c3163b14-3a8f-46dd-a4af-bd04680364cd)] interface nsICSPEventListener : nsISupports { // aJSON is the JSON format of SecurityPolicyViolationEventInit dictionary. void onCSPViolationEvent(in AString aJSON); };