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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-27 09:59:15 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-27 09:59:15 +0000
commit8de1ee1b2b676b0d07586f0752750dd6b0fb7511 (patch)
treedd46fd7dc3863045696cd0e48032d8a36fa0daf5 /g10/mainproc.c
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadgnupg2-8de1ee1b2b676b0d07586f0752750dd6b0fb7511.tar.xz
gnupg2-8de1ee1b2b676b0d07586f0752750dd6b0fb7511.zip
Adding upstream version 2.2.27.upstream/2.2.27upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'g10/mainproc.c')
-rw-r--r--g10/mainproc.c2808
1 files changed, 2808 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/g10/mainproc.c b/g10/mainproc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..762fc79
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/mainproc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2808 @@
+/* mainproc.c - handle packets
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2009 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2013-2014 Werner Koch
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 g10 Code GmbH
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+#include "gpg.h"
+#include "../common/util.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "../common/iobuf.h"
+#include "options.h"
+#include "keydb.h"
+#include "filter.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "../common/status.h"
+#include "../common/i18n.h"
+#include "trustdb.h"
+#include "keyserver-internal.h"
+#include "photoid.h"
+#include "../common/mbox-util.h"
+#include "call-dirmngr.h"
+#include "../common/compliance.h"
+
+/* Put an upper limit on nested packets. The 32 is an arbitrary
+ value, a much lower should actually be sufficient. */
+#define MAX_NESTING_DEPTH 32
+
+
+/* An object to build a list of keyid related info. */
+struct kidlist_item
+{
+ struct kidlist_item *next;
+ u32 kid[2];
+ int pubkey_algo;
+ int reason;
+};
+
+
+/*
+ * Object to hold the processing context.
+ */
+typedef struct mainproc_context *CTX;
+struct mainproc_context
+{
+ ctrl_t ctrl;
+ struct mainproc_context *anchor; /* May be useful in the future. */
+ PKT_public_key *last_pubkey;
+ PKT_user_id *last_user_id;
+ md_filter_context_t mfx;
+ int sigs_only; /* Process only signatures and reject all other stuff. */
+ int encrypt_only; /* Process only encryption messages. */
+
+ /* Name of the file with the complete signature or the file with the
+ detached signature. This is currently only used to deduce the
+ file name of the data file if that has not been given. */
+ const char *sigfilename;
+
+ /* A structure to describe the signed data in case of a detached
+ signature. */
+ struct
+ {
+ /* A file descriptor of the signed data. Only used if not -1. */
+ int data_fd;
+ /* A list of filenames with the data files or NULL. This is only
+ used if DATA_FD is -1. */
+ strlist_t data_names;
+ /* Flag to indicated that either one of the next previous fields
+ is used. This is only needed for better readability. */
+ int used;
+ } signed_data;
+
+ DEK *dek;
+ int last_was_session_key;
+ kbnode_t list; /* The current list of packets. */
+ iobuf_t iobuf; /* Used to get the filename etc. */
+ int trustletter; /* Temporary usage in list_node. */
+ ulong symkeys; /* Number of symmetrically encrypted session keys. */
+ struct kidlist_item *pkenc_list; /* List of encryption packets. */
+ int seen_pkt_encrypted_aead; /* PKT_ENCRYPTED_AEAD packet seen. */
+ struct {
+ unsigned int sig_seen:1; /* Set to true if a signature packet
+ has been seen. */
+ unsigned int data:1; /* Any data packet seen */
+ unsigned int uncompress_failed:1;
+ } any;
+};
+
+
+/* Counter with the number of literal data packets seen. Note that
+ * this is also bumped at the end of an encryption. This counter is
+ * used for a basic consistency check of a received PGP message. */
+static int literals_seen;
+
+
+/*** Local prototypes. ***/
+static int do_proc_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, CTX c, iobuf_t a);
+static void list_node (CTX c, kbnode_t node);
+static void proc_tree (CTX c, kbnode_t node);
+
+
+/*** Functions. ***/
+
+/* Reset the literal data counter. This is required to setup a new
+ * decryption or verification context. */
+void
+reset_literals_seen(void)
+{
+ literals_seen = 0;
+}
+
+
+static void
+release_list( CTX c )
+{
+ proc_tree (c, c->list);
+ release_kbnode (c->list);
+ while (c->pkenc_list)
+ {
+ struct kidlist_item *tmp = c->pkenc_list->next;
+ xfree (c->pkenc_list);
+ c->pkenc_list = tmp;
+ }
+ c->pkenc_list = NULL;
+ c->list = NULL;
+ c->any.data = 0;
+ c->any.uncompress_failed = 0;
+ c->last_was_session_key = 0;
+ c->seen_pkt_encrypted_aead = 0;
+ xfree (c->dek);
+ c->dek = NULL;
+}
+
+
+static int
+add_onepass_sig (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+ kbnode_t node;
+
+ if (c->list) /* Add another packet. */
+ add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
+ else /* Insert the first one. */
+ c->list = node = new_kbnode (pkt);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+
+static int
+add_gpg_control (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+ if ( pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START )
+ {
+ /* New clear text signature.
+ * Process the last one and reset everything */
+ release_list(c);
+ }
+
+ if (c->list) /* Add another packet. */
+ add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
+ else /* Insert the first one. */
+ c->list = new_kbnode (pkt);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+
+static int
+add_user_id (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+ if (!c->list)
+ {
+ log_error ("orphaned user ID\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
+ return 1;
+}
+
+
+static int
+add_subkey (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+ if (!c->list)
+ {
+ log_error ("subkey w/o mainkey\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
+ return 1;
+}
+
+
+static int
+add_ring_trust (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+ if (!c->list)
+ {
+ log_error ("ring trust w/o key\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
+ return 1;
+}
+
+
+static int
+add_signature (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+ kbnode_t node;
+
+ c->any.sig_seen = 1;
+ if (pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE && !c->list)
+ {
+ /* This is the first signature for the following datafile.
+ * GPG does not write such packets; instead it always uses
+ * onepass-sig packets. The drawback of PGP's method
+ * of prepending the signature to the data is
+ * that it is not possible to make a signature from data read
+ * from stdin. (GPG is able to read PGP stuff anyway.) */
+ node = new_kbnode (pkt);
+ c->list = node;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ else if (!c->list)
+ return 0; /* oops (invalid packet sequence)*/
+ else if (!c->list->pkt)
+ BUG(); /* so nicht */
+
+ /* Add a new signature node item at the end. */
+ node = new_kbnode (pkt);
+ add_kbnode (c->list, node);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+
+static gpg_error_t
+symkey_decrypt_seskey (DEK *dek, byte *seskey, size_t slen)
+{
+ gpg_error_t err;
+ gcry_cipher_hd_t hd;
+ enum gcry_cipher_modes ciphermode;
+ unsigned int noncelen, keylen;
+
+ if (dek->use_aead)
+ {
+ err = openpgp_aead_algo_info (dek->use_aead, &ciphermode, &noncelen);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ciphermode = GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB;
+ noncelen = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Check that the session key has a size of 16 to 32 bytes. */
+ if ((dek->use_aead && (slen < (noncelen + 16 + 16)
+ || slen > (noncelen + 32 + 16)))
+ || (!dek->use_aead && (slen < 17 || slen > 33)))
+ {
+ log_error ( _("weird size for an encrypted session key (%d)\n"),
+ (int)slen);
+ return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY);
+ }
+
+ err = openpgp_cipher_open (&hd, dek->algo, ciphermode, 1);
+ if (!err)
+ err = gcry_cipher_setkey (hd, dek->key, dek->keylen);
+ if (!err)
+ err = gcry_cipher_setiv (hd, noncelen? seskey : NULL, noncelen);
+ if (err)
+ goto leave;
+
+ if (dek->use_aead)
+ {
+ byte ad[4];
+
+ ad[0] = (0xc0 | PKT_SYMKEY_ENC);
+ ad[1] = 5;
+ ad[2] = dek->algo;
+ ad[3] = dek->use_aead;
+ err = gcry_cipher_authenticate (hd, ad, 4);
+ if (err)
+ goto leave;
+ gcry_cipher_final (hd);
+ keylen = slen - noncelen - 16;
+ err = gcry_cipher_decrypt (hd, seskey+noncelen, keylen, NULL, 0);
+ if (err)
+ goto leave;
+ err = gcry_cipher_checktag (hd, seskey+noncelen+keylen, 16);
+ if (err)
+ goto leave;
+ /* Now we replace the dek components with the real session key to
+ * decrypt the contents of the sequencing packet. */
+ if (keylen > DIM(dek->key))
+ {
+ err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE);
+ goto leave;
+ }
+ dek->keylen = keylen;
+ memcpy (dek->key, seskey + noncelen, dek->keylen);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ gcry_cipher_decrypt (hd, seskey, slen, NULL, 0);
+
+ /* Here we can only test whether the algo given in decrypted
+ * session key is a valid OpenPGP algo. With 11 defined
+ * symmetric algorithms we will miss 4.3% of wrong passphrases
+ * here. The actual checking is done later during bulk
+ * decryption; we can't bring this check forward easily. We
+ * need to use the GPG_ERR_CHECKSUM so that we won't run into
+ * the gnupg < 2.2 bug compatible case which would terminate the
+ * process on GPG_ERR_CIPHER_ALGO. Note that with AEAD (above)
+ * we will have a reliable test here. */
+ if (openpgp_cipher_test_algo (seskey[0])
+ || openpgp_cipher_get_algo_keylen (seskey[0]) != slen - 1)
+ {
+ err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CHECKSUM);
+ goto leave;
+ }
+
+ /* Now we replace the dek components with the real session key to
+ * decrypt the contents of the sequencing packet. */
+ keylen = slen-1;
+ if (keylen > DIM(dek->key))
+ {
+ err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE);
+ goto leave;
+ }
+ dek->algo = seskey[0];
+ dek->keylen = slen-1;
+ memcpy (dek->key, seskey + 1, dek->keylen);
+ }
+
+ /*log_hexdump( "thekey", dek->key, dek->keylen );*/
+
+ leave:
+ gcry_cipher_close (hd);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static void
+proc_symkey_enc (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+ gpg_error_t err;
+ PKT_symkey_enc *enc;
+
+ enc = pkt->pkt.symkey_enc;
+ if (!enc)
+ log_error ("invalid symkey encrypted packet\n");
+ else if(!c->dek)
+ {
+ int algo = enc->cipher_algo;
+ const char *s = openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo);
+ const char *a = (enc->aead_algo ? openpgp_aead_algo_name (enc->aead_algo)
+ /**/ : "CFB");
+
+ if (!openpgp_cipher_test_algo (algo))
+ {
+ if (!opt.quiet)
+ {
+ /* Note: TMPSTR is only used to avoid i18n changes. */
+ char *tmpstr = xstrconcat (s, ".", a, NULL);
+ if (enc->seskeylen)
+ log_info (_("%s encrypted session key\n"), tmpstr);
+ else
+ log_info (_("%s encrypted data\n"), tmpstr);
+ xfree (tmpstr);
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ log_error (_("encrypted with unknown algorithm %d\n"), algo);
+
+ if (openpgp_md_test_algo (enc->s2k.hash_algo))
+ {
+ log_error(_("passphrase generated with unknown digest"
+ " algorithm %d\n"),enc->s2k.hash_algo);
+ s = NULL;
+ }
+
+ c->last_was_session_key = 2;
+ if (!s || opt.list_only)
+ goto leave;
+
+ if (opt.override_session_key)
+ {
+ c->dek = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c->dek);
+ if (get_override_session_key (c->dek, opt.override_session_key))
+ {
+ xfree (c->dek);
+ c->dek = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ c->dek = passphrase_to_dek (algo, &enc->s2k, 0, 0, NULL, NULL);
+ if (c->dek)
+ {
+ c->dek->symmetric = 1;
+ c->dek->use_aead = enc->aead_algo;
+
+ /* FIXME: This doesn't work perfectly if a symmetric key
+ comes before a public key in the message - if the
+ user doesn't know the passphrase, then there is a
+ chance that the "decrypted" algorithm will happen to
+ be a valid one, which will make the returned dek
+ appear valid, so we won't try any public keys that
+ come later. */
+ if (enc->seskeylen)
+ {
+ err = symkey_decrypt_seskey (c->dek,
+ enc->seskey, enc->seskeylen);
+ if (err)
+ {
+ log_info ("decryption of the symmetrically encrypted"
+ " session key failed: %s\n",
+ gpg_strerror (err));
+ if (gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY
+ && gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_CHECKSUM)
+ log_fatal ("process terminated to be bug compatible\n");
+ if (c->dek->s2k_cacheid[0])
+ {
+ if (opt.debug)
+ log_debug ("cleared passphrase cached with ID:"
+ " %s\n", c->dek->s2k_cacheid);
+ passphrase_clear_cache (c->dek->s2k_cacheid);
+ }
+ xfree (c->dek);
+ c->dek = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ leave:
+ c->symkeys++;
+ free_packet (pkt, NULL);
+}
+
+
+static void
+proc_pubkey_enc (ctrl_t ctrl, CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+ PKT_pubkey_enc *enc;
+ int result = 0;
+
+ /* Check whether the secret key is available and store in this case. */
+ c->last_was_session_key = 1;
+ enc = pkt->pkt.pubkey_enc;
+ /*printf("enc: encrypted by a pubkey with keyid %08lX\n", enc->keyid[1] );*/
+ /* Hmmm: why do I have this algo check here - anyway there is
+ * function to check it. */
+ if (opt.verbose)
+ log_info (_("public key is %s\n"), keystr (enc->keyid));
+
+ if (is_status_enabled())
+ {
+ char buf[50];
+ /* FIXME: For ECC support we need to map the OpenPGP algo number
+ to the Libgcrypt defined one. This is due a chicken-egg
+ problem: We need to have code in Libgcrypt for a new
+ algorithm so to implement a proposed new algorithm before the
+ IANA will finally assign an OpenPGP identifier. */
+ snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%08lX%08lX %d 0",
+ (ulong)enc->keyid[0], (ulong)enc->keyid[1], enc->pubkey_algo);
+ write_status_text (STATUS_ENC_TO, buf);
+ }
+
+ if (!opt.list_only && opt.override_session_key)
+ {
+ /* It does not make much sense to store the session key in
+ * secure memory because it has already been passed on the
+ * command line and the GCHQ knows about it. */
+ c->dek = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c->dek);
+ result = get_override_session_key (c->dek, opt.override_session_key);
+ if (result)
+ {
+ xfree (c->dek);
+ c->dek = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E
+ || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH
+ || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA
+ || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_E
+ || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL)
+ {
+ /* Note that we also allow type 20 Elgamal keys for decryption.
+ There are still a couple of those keys in active use as a
+ subkey. */
+
+ /* FIXME: Store this all in a list and process it later so that
+ we can prioritize what key to use. This gives a better user
+ experience if wildcard keyids are used. */
+ if (!c->dek && ((!enc->keyid[0] && !enc->keyid[1])
+ || opt.try_all_secrets
+ || have_secret_key_with_kid (enc->keyid)))
+ {
+ if(opt.list_only)
+ result = GPG_ERR_MISSING_ACTION; /* fixme: Use better error code. */
+ else
+ {
+ c->dek = xmalloc_secure_clear (sizeof *c->dek);
+ if ((result = get_session_key (ctrl, enc, c->dek)))
+ {
+ /* Error: Delete the DEK. */
+ xfree (c->dek);
+ c->dek = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ result = GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY;
+ }
+ else
+ result = GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
+
+ if (1)
+ {
+ /* Store it for later display. */
+ struct kidlist_item *x = xmalloc (sizeof *x);
+ x->kid[0] = enc->keyid[0];
+ x->kid[1] = enc->keyid[1];
+ x->pubkey_algo = enc->pubkey_algo;
+ x->reason = result;
+ x->next = c->pkenc_list;
+ c->pkenc_list = x;
+
+ if (!result && opt.verbose > 1)
+ log_info (_("public key encrypted data: good DEK\n"));
+ }
+
+ free_packet(pkt, NULL);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Print the list of public key encrypted packets which we could
+ * not decrypt.
+ */
+static void
+print_pkenc_list (ctrl_t ctrl, struct kidlist_item *list, int failed)
+{
+ for (; list; list = list->next)
+ {
+ PKT_public_key *pk;
+ const char *algstr;
+
+ if (failed && !list->reason)
+ continue;
+ if (!failed && list->reason)
+ continue;
+
+ algstr = openpgp_pk_algo_name (list->pubkey_algo);
+ pk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pk);
+
+ if (!algstr)
+ algstr = "[?]";
+ pk->pubkey_algo = list->pubkey_algo;
+ if (!get_pubkey (ctrl, pk, list->kid))
+ {
+ char *p;
+ log_info (_("encrypted with %u-bit %s key, ID %s, created %s\n"),
+ nbits_from_pk (pk), algstr, keystr_from_pk(pk),
+ strtimestamp (pk->timestamp));
+ p = get_user_id_native (ctrl, list->kid);
+ log_printf (_(" \"%s\"\n"), p);
+ xfree (p);
+ }
+ else
+ log_info (_("encrypted with %s key, ID %s\n"),
+ algstr, keystr(list->kid));
+
+ free_public_key (pk);
+
+ if (gpg_err_code (list->reason) == GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY)
+ {
+ if (is_status_enabled())
+ {
+ char buf[20];
+ snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%08lX%08lX",
+ (ulong)list->kid[0], (ulong)list->kid[1]);
+ write_status_text (STATUS_NO_SECKEY, buf);
+ }
+ }
+ else if (gpg_err_code (list->reason) == GPG_ERR_MISSING_ACTION)
+ {
+ /* Not tested for secret key due to --list-only mode. */
+ }
+ else if (list->reason)
+ {
+ log_info (_("public key decryption failed: %s\n"),
+ gpg_strerror (list->reason));
+ if (gpg_err_source (list->reason) == GPG_ERR_SOURCE_SCD
+ && gpg_err_code (list->reason) == GPG_ERR_INV_ID)
+ print_further_info ("a reason might be a card with replaced keys");
+ write_status_error ("pkdecrypt_failed", list->reason);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+
+static void
+proc_encrypted (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+ int result = 0;
+ int early_plaintext = literals_seen;
+
+ if (pkt->pkttype == PKT_ENCRYPTED_AEAD)
+ c->seen_pkt_encrypted_aead = 1;
+
+ if (early_plaintext)
+ {
+ log_info (_("WARNING: multiple plaintexts seen\n"));
+ write_status_errcode ("decryption.early_plaintext", GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA);
+ /* We fail only later so that we can print some more info first. */
+ }
+
+ if (!opt.quiet)
+ {
+ if (c->symkeys>1)
+ log_info (_("encrypted with %lu passphrases\n"), c->symkeys);
+ else if (c->symkeys == 1)
+ log_info (_("encrypted with 1 passphrase\n"));
+ print_pkenc_list (c->ctrl, c->pkenc_list, 1 );
+ print_pkenc_list (c->ctrl, c->pkenc_list, 0 );
+ }
+
+ /* FIXME: Figure out the session key by looking at all pkenc packets. */
+
+ write_status (STATUS_BEGIN_DECRYPTION);
+
+ /*log_debug("dat: %sencrypted data\n", c->dek?"":"conventional ");*/
+ if (opt.list_only)
+ result = -1;
+ else if (!c->dek && !c->last_was_session_key)
+ {
+ int algo;
+ STRING2KEY s2kbuf;
+ STRING2KEY *s2k = NULL;
+ int canceled;
+
+ if (opt.override_session_key)
+ {
+ c->dek = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c->dek);
+ result = get_override_session_key (c->dek, opt.override_session_key);
+ if (result)
+ {
+ xfree (c->dek);
+ c->dek = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* Assume this is old style conventional encrypted data. */
+ algo = opt.def_cipher_algo;
+ if (algo)
+ log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"),
+ openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo));
+ else if (openpgp_cipher_test_algo (CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA))
+ {
+ algo = opt.def_cipher_algo;
+ if (!algo)
+ algo = opt.s2k_cipher_algo;
+ log_info (_("IDEA cipher unavailable, "
+ "optimistically attempting to use %s instead\n"),
+ openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ algo = CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA;
+ if (!opt.s2k_digest_algo)
+ {
+ /* If no digest is given we assume SHA-1. */
+ s2kbuf.mode = 0;
+ s2kbuf.hash_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;
+ s2k = &s2kbuf;
+ }
+ log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"), "IDEA");
+ }
+
+ c->dek = passphrase_to_dek (algo, s2k, 0, 0, NULL, &canceled);
+ if (c->dek)
+ c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1;
+ else if (canceled)
+ result = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CANCELED);
+ else
+ result = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PASSPHRASE);
+ }
+ }
+ else if (!c->dek)
+ result = GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY;
+
+ /* Compute compliance with CO_DE_VS. */
+ if (!result && is_status_enabled ()
+ /* Symmetric encryption and asymmetric encryption voids compliance. */
+ && (c->symkeys != !!c->pkenc_list )
+ /* Overriding session key voids compliance. */
+ && !opt.override_session_key
+ /* Check symmetric cipher. */
+ && gnupg_cipher_is_compliant (CO_DE_VS, c->dek->algo,
+ GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB))
+ {
+ struct kidlist_item *i;
+ int compliant = 1;
+ PKT_public_key *pk = xmalloc (sizeof *pk);
+
+ if ( !(c->pkenc_list || c->symkeys) )
+ log_debug ("%s: where else did the session key come from?\n", __func__);
+
+ /* Now check that every key used to encrypt the session key is
+ * compliant. */
+ for (i = c->pkenc_list; i && compliant; i = i->next)
+ {
+ memset (pk, 0, sizeof *pk);
+ pk->pubkey_algo = i->pubkey_algo;
+ if (get_pubkey (c->ctrl, pk, i->kid) != 0
+ || ! gnupg_pk_is_compliant (CO_DE_VS, pk->pubkey_algo, 0,
+ pk->pkey, nbits_from_pk (pk), NULL))
+ compliant = 0;
+ release_public_key_parts (pk);
+ }
+
+ xfree (pk);
+
+ if (compliant)
+ write_status_strings (STATUS_DECRYPTION_COMPLIANCE_MODE,
+ gnupg_status_compliance_flag (CO_DE_VS),
+ NULL);
+
+ }
+
+
+ if (!result)
+ result = decrypt_data (c->ctrl, c, pkt->pkt.encrypted, c->dek );
+
+ /* Trigger the deferred error. */
+ if (!result && early_plaintext)
+ result = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA);
+
+ if (result == -1)
+ ;
+ else if (!result
+ && !opt.ignore_mdc_error
+ && !pkt->pkt.encrypted->mdc_method
+ && !pkt->pkt.encrypted->aead_algo)
+ {
+ /* The message has been decrypted but does not carry an MDC.
+ * The option --ignore-mdc-error has also not been used. To
+ * avoid attacks changing an MDC message to a non-MDC message,
+ * we fail here. */
+ log_error (_("WARNING: message was not integrity protected\n"));
+ if (!pkt->pkt.encrypted->mdc_method
+ && (openpgp_cipher_get_algo_blklen (c->dek->algo) == 8
+ || c->dek->algo == CIPHER_ALGO_TWOFISH))
+ {
+ /* Before 2.2.8 we did not fail hard for a missing MDC if
+ * one of the old ciphers where used. Although these cases
+ * are rare in practice we print a hint on how to decrypt
+ * such messages. */
+ log_string
+ (GPGRT_LOG_INFO,
+ _("Hint: If this message was created before the year 2003 it is\n"
+ "likely that this message is legitimate. This is because back\n"
+ "then integrity protection was not widely used.\n"));
+ log_info (_("Use the option '%s' to decrypt anyway.\n"),
+ "--ignore-mdc-error");
+ write_status_errcode ("nomdc_with_legacy_cipher",
+ GPG_ERR_DECRYPT_FAILED);
+ }
+ log_info (_("decryption forced to fail!\n"));
+ write_status (STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ }
+ else if (!result || (gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE
+ && !pkt->pkt.encrypted->aead_algo
+ && opt.ignore_mdc_error))
+ {
+ /* All is fine or for an MDC message the MDC failed but the
+ * --ignore-mdc-error option is active. For compatibility
+ * reasons we issue GOODMDC also for AEAD messages. */
+ write_status (STATUS_DECRYPTION_OKAY);
+ if (opt.verbose > 1)
+ log_info(_("decryption okay\n"));
+
+ if (pkt->pkt.encrypted->aead_algo)
+ write_status (STATUS_GOODMDC);
+ else if (pkt->pkt.encrypted->mdc_method && !result)
+ write_status (STATUS_GOODMDC);
+ else
+ log_info (_("WARNING: message was not integrity protected\n"));
+ }
+ else if (gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE
+ || gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_TRUNCATED)
+ {
+ glo_ctrl.lasterr = result;
+ log_error (_("WARNING: encrypted message has been manipulated!\n"));
+ write_status (STATUS_BADMDC);
+ write_status (STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if ((gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY
+ || gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_CHECKSUM
+ || gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_CIPHER_ALGO)
+ && *c->dek->s2k_cacheid != '\0')
+ {
+ if (opt.debug)
+ log_debug ("cleared passphrase cached with ID: %s\n",
+ c->dek->s2k_cacheid);
+ passphrase_clear_cache (c->dek->s2k_cacheid);
+ }
+ glo_ctrl.lasterr = result;
+ write_status (STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ log_error (_("decryption failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (result));
+ /* Hmmm: does this work when we have encrypted using multiple
+ * ways to specify the session key (symmmetric and PK). */
+ }
+
+ xfree (c->dek);
+ c->dek = NULL;
+ free_packet (pkt, NULL);
+ c->last_was_session_key = 0;
+ write_status (STATUS_END_DECRYPTION);
+
+ /* Bump the counter even if we have not seen a literal data packet
+ * inside an encryption container. This acts as a sentinel in case
+ * a misplace extra literal data packets follows after this
+ * encrypted packet. */
+ literals_seen++;
+}
+
+
+static int
+have_seen_pkt_encrypted_aead( CTX c )
+{
+ CTX cc;
+
+ for (cc = c; cc; cc = cc->anchor)
+ {
+ if (cc->seen_pkt_encrypted_aead)
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static void
+proc_plaintext( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
+{
+ PKT_plaintext *pt = pkt->pkt.plaintext;
+ int any, clearsig, rc;
+ kbnode_t n;
+
+ /* This is a literal data packet. Bumb a counter for later checks. */
+ literals_seen++;
+
+ if (pt->namelen == 8 && !memcmp( pt->name, "_CONSOLE", 8))
+ log_info (_("Note: sender requested \"for-your-eyes-only\"\n"));
+ else if (opt.verbose)
+ {
+ /* We don't use print_utf8_buffer because that would require a
+ * string change which we don't want in 2.2. It is also not
+ * clear whether the filename is always utf-8 encoded. */
+ char *tmp = make_printable_string (pt->name, pt->namelen, 0);
+ log_info (_("original file name='%.*s'\n"), (int)strlen (tmp), tmp);
+ xfree (tmp);
+ }
+
+ free_md_filter_context (&c->mfx);
+ if (gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md, 0, 0))
+ BUG ();
+ /* fixme: we may need to push the textfilter if we have sigclass 1
+ * and no armoring - Not yet tested
+ * Hmmm, why don't we need it at all if we have sigclass 1
+ * Should we assume that plaintext in mode 't' has always sigclass 1??
+ * See: Russ Allbery's mail 1999-02-09
+ */
+ any = clearsig = 0;
+ for (n=c->list; n; n = n->next )
+ {
+ if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG)
+ {
+ /* The onepass signature case. */
+ if (n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo)
+ {
+ if (!opt.skip_verify)
+ gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md,
+ n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo);
+
+ any = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
+ && n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START)
+ {
+ /* The clearsigned message case. */
+ size_t datalen = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->datalen;
+ const byte *data = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data;
+
+ /* Check that we have at least the sigclass and one hash. */
+ if (datalen < 2)
+ log_fatal ("invalid control packet CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START\n");
+ /* Note that we don't set the clearsig flag for not-dash-escaped
+ * documents. */
+ clearsig = (*data == 0x01);
+ for (data++, datalen--; datalen; datalen--, data++)
+ if (!opt.skip_verify)
+ gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, *data);
+ any = 1;
+ break; /* Stop here as one-pass signature packets are not
+ expected. */
+ }
+ else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
+ {
+ /* The SIG+LITERAL case that PGP used to use. */
+ if (!opt.skip_verify)
+ gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, n->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo);
+ any = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!any && !opt.skip_verify && !have_seen_pkt_encrypted_aead(c))
+ {
+ /* This is for the old GPG LITERAL+SIG case. It's not legal
+ according to 2440, so hopefully it won't come up that often.
+ There is no good way to specify what algorithms to use in
+ that case, so these there are the historical answer. */
+ gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160);
+ gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1);
+ }
+ if (DBG_HASHING)
+ {
+ gcry_md_debug (c->mfx.md, "verify");
+ if (c->mfx.md2)
+ gcry_md_debug (c->mfx.md2, "verify2");
+ }
+
+ rc=0;
+
+ if (literals_seen > 1)
+ {
+ log_info (_("WARNING: multiple plaintexts seen\n"));
+
+ if (!opt.flags.allow_multiple_messages)
+ {
+ write_status_text (STATUS_ERROR, "proc_pkt.plaintext 89_BAD_DATA");
+ log_inc_errorcount ();
+ rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNEXPECTED);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!rc)
+ {
+ /* It we are in --verify mode, we do not want to output the
+ * signed text. However, if --output is also used we do what
+ * has been requested and write out the signed data. */
+ rc = handle_plaintext (pt, &c->mfx,
+ (opt.outfp || opt.outfile)? 0 : c->sigs_only,
+ clearsig);
+ if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_EACCES && !c->sigs_only)
+ {
+ /* Can't write output but we hash it anyway to check the
+ signature. */
+ rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, 1, clearsig );
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (rc)
+ log_error ("handle plaintext failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
+
+ free_packet (pkt, NULL);
+ c->last_was_session_key = 0;
+
+ /* We add a marker control packet instead of the plaintext packet.
+ * This is so that we can later detect invalid packet sequences. */
+ n = new_kbnode (create_gpg_control (CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK, NULL, 0));
+ if (c->list)
+ add_kbnode (c->list, n);
+ else
+ c->list = n;
+}
+
+
+static int
+proc_compressed_cb (iobuf_t a, void *info)
+{
+ if ( ((CTX)info)->signed_data.used
+ && ((CTX)info)->signed_data.data_fd != -1)
+ return proc_signature_packets_by_fd (((CTX)info)->ctrl, info, a,
+ ((CTX)info)->signed_data.data_fd);
+ else
+ return proc_signature_packets (((CTX)info)->ctrl, info, a,
+ ((CTX)info)->signed_data.data_names,
+ ((CTX)info)->sigfilename );
+}
+
+
+static int
+proc_encrypt_cb (iobuf_t a, void *info )
+{
+ CTX c = info;
+ return proc_encryption_packets (c->ctrl, info, a );
+}
+
+
+static int
+proc_compressed (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+ PKT_compressed *zd = pkt->pkt.compressed;
+ int rc;
+
+ /*printf("zip: compressed data packet\n");*/
+ if (c->sigs_only)
+ rc = handle_compressed (c->ctrl, c, zd, proc_compressed_cb, c);
+ else if( c->encrypt_only )
+ rc = handle_compressed (c->ctrl, c, zd, proc_encrypt_cb, c);
+ else
+ rc = handle_compressed (c->ctrl, c, zd, NULL, NULL);
+
+ if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA)
+ {
+ if (!c->any.uncompress_failed)
+ {
+ CTX cc;
+
+ for (cc=c; cc; cc = cc->anchor)
+ cc->any.uncompress_failed = 1;
+ log_error ("uncompressing failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
+ }
+ }
+ else if (rc)
+ log_error ("uncompressing failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
+
+ free_packet (pkt, NULL);
+ c->last_was_session_key = 0;
+ return rc;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Check the signature. If R_PK is not NULL a copy of the public key
+ * used to verify the signature will be stored there, or NULL if not
+ * found. If FORCED_PK is not NULL, this public key is used to verify
+ * _data signatures_ and no key lookup is done. Returns: 0 = valid
+ * signature or an error code
+ */
+static int
+do_check_sig (CTX c, kbnode_t node,
+ PKT_public_key *forced_pk, int *is_selfsig,
+ int *is_expkey, int *is_revkey, PKT_public_key **r_pk)
+{
+ PKT_signature *sig;
+ gcry_md_hd_t md = NULL;
+ gcry_md_hd_t md2 = NULL;
+ gcry_md_hd_t md_good = NULL;
+ int algo, rc;
+
+ if (r_pk)
+ *r_pk = NULL;
+
+ log_assert (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE);
+ if (is_selfsig)
+ *is_selfsig = 0;
+ sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+
+ algo = sig->digest_algo;
+ rc = openpgp_md_test_algo (algo);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (sig->sig_class == 0x00)
+ {
+ if (c->mfx.md)
+ {
+ if (gcry_md_copy (&md, c->mfx.md ))
+ BUG ();
+ }
+ else /* detached signature */
+ {
+ /* check_signature() will enable the md. */
+ if (gcry_md_open (&md, 0, 0 ))
+ BUG ();
+ }
+ }
+ else if (sig->sig_class == 0x01)
+ {
+ /* How do we know that we have to hash the (already hashed) text
+ in canonical mode ??? (calculating both modes???) */
+ if (c->mfx.md)
+ {
+ if (gcry_md_copy (&md, c->mfx.md ))
+ BUG ();
+ if (c->mfx.md2 && gcry_md_copy (&md2, c->mfx.md2))
+ BUG ();
+ }
+ else /* detached signature */
+ {
+ log_debug ("Do we really need this here?");
+ /* check_signature() will enable the md*/
+ if (gcry_md_open (&md, 0, 0 ))
+ BUG ();
+ if (gcry_md_open (&md2, 0, 0 ))
+ BUG ();
+ }
+ }
+ else if ((sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10
+ || sig->sig_class == 0x18
+ || sig->sig_class == 0x1f
+ || sig->sig_class == 0x20
+ || sig->sig_class == 0x28
+ || sig->sig_class == 0x30)
+ {
+ if (c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+ || c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
+ {
+ return check_key_signature (c->ctrl, c->list, node, is_selfsig);
+ }
+ else if (sig->sig_class == 0x20)
+ {
+ log_error (_("standalone revocation - "
+ "use \"gpg --import\" to apply\n"));
+ return GPG_ERR_NOT_PROCESSED;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ log_error ("invalid root packet for sigclass %02x\n", sig->sig_class);
+ return GPG_ERR_SIG_CLASS;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ return GPG_ERR_SIG_CLASS;
+
+ /* We only get here if we are checking the signature of a binary
+ (0x00) or text document (0x01). */
+ rc = check_signature2 (c->ctrl, sig, md,
+ forced_pk,
+ NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey, r_pk);
+ if (! rc)
+ md_good = md;
+ else if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE && md2)
+ {
+ PKT_public_key *pk2;
+
+ rc = check_signature2 (c->ctrl, sig, md2,
+ forced_pk,
+ NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey,
+ r_pk? &pk2 : NULL);
+ if (!rc)
+ {
+ md_good = md2;
+ if (r_pk)
+ {
+ free_public_key (*r_pk);
+ *r_pk = pk2;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (md_good)
+ {
+ unsigned char *buffer = gcry_md_read (md_good, sig->digest_algo);
+ sig->digest_len = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (map_md_openpgp_to_gcry (algo));
+ memcpy (sig->digest, buffer, sig->digest_len);
+ }
+
+ gcry_md_close (md);
+ gcry_md_close (md2);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+
+static void
+print_userid (PACKET *pkt)
+{
+ if (!pkt)
+ BUG();
+
+ if (pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID)
+ {
+ es_printf ("ERROR: unexpected packet type %d", pkt->pkttype );
+ return;
+ }
+ if (opt.with_colons)
+ {
+ if (pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
+ es_printf("%u %lu",
+ pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs,
+ pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_len);
+ else
+ es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+ pkt->pkt.user_id->len, ":", NULL);
+ }
+ else
+ print_utf8_buffer (es_stdout, pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+ pkt->pkt.user_id->len );
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * List the keyblock in a user friendly way
+ */
+static void
+list_node (CTX c, kbnode_t node)
+{
+ if (!node)
+ ;
+ else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+ || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
+ {
+ PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+
+ if (opt.with_colons)
+ {
+ u32 keyid[2];
+
+ keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
+ if (pk->flags.primary)
+ c->trustletter = (opt.fast_list_mode
+ ? 0
+ : get_validity_info
+ (c->ctrl,
+ node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+ ? node : NULL,
+ pk, NULL));
+ es_printf ("%s:", pk->flags.primary? "pub":"sub" );
+ if (c->trustletter)
+ es_putc (c->trustletter, es_stdout);
+ es_printf (":%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s::",
+ nbits_from_pk( pk ),
+ pk->pubkey_algo,
+ (ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1],
+ colon_datestr_from_pk( pk ),
+ colon_strtime (pk->expiredate) );
+ if (pk->flags.primary && !opt.fast_list_mode)
+ es_putc (get_ownertrust_info (c->ctrl, pk, 1), es_stdout);
+ es_putc (':', es_stdout);
+ es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ print_key_line (c->ctrl, es_stdout, pk, 0);
+ }
+
+ if (opt.keyid_format == KF_NONE && !opt.with_colons)
+ ; /* Already printed. */
+ else if ((pk->flags.primary && opt.fingerprint) || opt.fingerprint > 1)
+ print_fingerprint (c->ctrl, NULL, pk, 0);
+
+ if (pk->flags.primary)
+ {
+ int kl = opt.keyid_format == KF_NONE? 0 : keystrlen ();
+
+ /* Now list all userids with their signatures. */
+ for (node = node->next; node; node = node->next)
+ {
+ if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
+ {
+ list_node (c, node );
+ }
+ else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
+ {
+ if (opt.with_colons)
+ es_printf ("%s:::::::::",
+ node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data?"uat":"uid");
+ else
+ es_printf ("uid%*s",
+ kl + (opt.legacy_list_mode? 9:11),
+ "" );
+ print_userid (node->pkt);
+ if (opt.with_colons)
+ es_putc (':', es_stdout);
+ es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
+ }
+ else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
+ {
+ list_node(c, node );
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY
+ || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
+ {
+
+ log_debug ("FIXME: No way to print secret key packets here\n");
+ /* fixme: We may use a function to turn a secret key packet into
+ a public key one and use that here. */
+ }
+ else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
+ {
+ PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+ int is_selfsig = 0;
+ int rc2 = 0;
+ size_t n;
+ char *p;
+ int sigrc = ' ';
+
+ if (!opt.verbose)
+ return;
+
+ if (sig->sig_class == 0x20 || sig->sig_class == 0x30)
+ es_fputs ("rev", es_stdout);
+ else
+ es_fputs ("sig", es_stdout);
+ if (opt.check_sigs)
+ {
+ fflush (stdout);
+ rc2 = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, &is_selfsig, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ switch (gpg_err_code (rc2))
+ {
+ case 0: sigrc = '!'; break;
+ case GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE: sigrc = '-'; break;
+ case GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY:
+ case GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_PUBKEY: sigrc = '?'; break;
+ default: sigrc = '%'; break;
+ }
+ }
+ else /* Check whether this is a self signature. */
+ {
+ u32 keyid[2];
+
+ if (c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+ || c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY )
+ {
+ keyid_from_pk (c->list->pkt->pkt.public_key, keyid);
+
+ if (keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1])
+ is_selfsig = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (opt.with_colons)
+ {
+ es_putc (':', es_stdout);
+ if (sigrc != ' ')
+ es_putc (sigrc, es_stdout);
+ es_printf ("::%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:", sig->pubkey_algo,
+ (ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1],
+ colon_datestr_from_sig (sig),
+ colon_expirestr_from_sig (sig));
+
+ if (sig->trust_depth || sig->trust_value)
+ es_printf ("%d %d",sig->trust_depth,sig->trust_value);
+ es_putc (':', es_stdout);
+
+ if (sig->trust_regexp)
+ es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, sig->trust_regexp,
+ strlen (sig->trust_regexp), ":", NULL);
+ es_putc (':', es_stdout);
+ }
+ else
+ es_printf ("%c %s %s ",
+ sigrc, keystr (sig->keyid), datestr_from_sig(sig));
+ if (sigrc == '%')
+ es_printf ("[%s] ", gpg_strerror (rc2) );
+ else if (sigrc == '?')
+ ;
+ else if (is_selfsig)
+ {
+ if (opt.with_colons)
+ es_putc (':', es_stdout);
+ es_fputs (sig->sig_class == 0x18? "[keybind]":"[selfsig]", es_stdout);
+ if (opt.with_colons)
+ es_putc (':', es_stdout);
+ }
+ else if (!opt.fast_list_mode)
+ {
+ p = get_user_id (c->ctrl, sig->keyid, &n, NULL);
+ es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, p, n,
+ opt.with_colons?":":NULL, NULL );
+ xfree (p);
+ }
+ if (opt.with_colons)
+ es_printf (":%02x%c:", sig->sig_class, sig->flags.exportable?'x':'l');
+ es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
+ }
+ else
+ log_error ("invalid node with packet of type %d\n", node->pkt->pkttype);
+}
+
+
+int
+proc_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *anchor, iobuf_t a )
+{
+ int rc;
+ CTX c = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c);
+
+ c->ctrl = ctrl;
+ c->anchor = anchor;
+ rc = do_proc_packets (ctrl, c, a);
+ xfree (c);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+
+int
+proc_signature_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *anchor, iobuf_t a,
+ strlist_t signedfiles, const char *sigfilename )
+{
+ CTX c = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c);
+ int rc;
+
+ c->ctrl = ctrl;
+ c->anchor = anchor;
+ c->sigs_only = 1;
+
+ c->signed_data.data_fd = -1;
+ c->signed_data.data_names = signedfiles;
+ c->signed_data.used = !!signedfiles;
+
+ c->sigfilename = sigfilename;
+ rc = do_proc_packets (ctrl, c, a);
+
+ /* If we have not encountered any signature we print an error
+ messages, send a NODATA status back and return an error code.
+ Using log_error is required because verify_files does not check
+ error codes for each file but we want to terminate the process
+ with an error. */
+ if (!rc && !c->any.sig_seen)
+ {
+ write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "4");
+ log_error (_("no signature found\n"));
+ rc = GPG_ERR_NO_DATA;
+ }
+
+ /* Propagate the signature seen flag upward. Do this only on success
+ so that we won't issue the nodata status several times. */
+ if (!rc && c->anchor && c->any.sig_seen)
+ c->anchor->any.sig_seen = 1;
+
+ xfree (c);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+
+int
+proc_signature_packets_by_fd (ctrl_t ctrl,
+ void *anchor, iobuf_t a, int signed_data_fd )
+{
+ int rc;
+ CTX c;
+
+ c = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *c);
+ if (!c)
+ return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
+
+ c->ctrl = ctrl;
+ c->anchor = anchor;
+ c->sigs_only = 1;
+
+ c->signed_data.data_fd = signed_data_fd;
+ c->signed_data.data_names = NULL;
+ c->signed_data.used = (signed_data_fd != -1);
+
+ rc = do_proc_packets (ctrl, c, a);
+
+ /* If we have not encountered any signature we print an error
+ messages, send a NODATA status back and return an error code.
+ Using log_error is required because verify_files does not check
+ error codes for each file but we want to terminate the process
+ with an error. */
+ if (!rc && !c->any.sig_seen)
+ {
+ write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "4");
+ log_error (_("no signature found\n"));
+ rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_DATA);
+ }
+
+ /* Propagate the signature seen flag upward. Do this only on success
+ so that we won't issue the nodata status several times. */
+ if (!rc && c->anchor && c->any.sig_seen)
+ c->anchor->any.sig_seen = 1;
+
+ xfree ( c );
+ return rc;
+}
+
+
+int
+proc_encryption_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *anchor, iobuf_t a )
+{
+ CTX c = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c);
+ int rc;
+
+ c->ctrl = ctrl;
+ c->anchor = anchor;
+ c->encrypt_only = 1;
+ rc = do_proc_packets (ctrl, c, a);
+ xfree (c);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+
+static int
+check_nesting (CTX c)
+{
+ int level;
+
+ for (level=0; c; c = c->anchor)
+ level++;
+
+ if (level > MAX_NESTING_DEPTH)
+ {
+ log_error ("input data with too deeply nested packets\n");
+ write_status_text (STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "1");
+ return GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int
+do_proc_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, CTX c, iobuf_t a)
+{
+ PACKET *pkt;
+ struct parse_packet_ctx_s parsectx;
+ int rc = 0;
+ int any_data = 0;
+ int newpkt;
+
+ rc = check_nesting (c);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ pkt = xmalloc( sizeof *pkt );
+ c->iobuf = a;
+ init_packet(pkt);
+ init_parse_packet (&parsectx, a);
+ while ((rc=parse_packet (&parsectx, pkt)) != -1)
+ {
+ any_data = 1;
+ if (rc)
+ {
+ free_packet (pkt, &parsectx);
+ /* Stop processing when an invalid packet has been encountered
+ * but don't do so when we are doing a --list-packets. */
+ if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET
+ && opt.list_packets == 0)
+ break;
+ continue;
+ }
+ newpkt = -1;
+ if (opt.list_packets)
+ {
+ switch (pkt->pkttype)
+ {
+ case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc (ctrl, c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc (c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
+ case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC:
+ case PKT_ENCRYPTED_AEAD:proc_encrypted (c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed (c, pkt); break;
+ default: newpkt = 0; break;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (c->sigs_only)
+ {
+ switch (pkt->pkttype)
+ {
+ case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
+ case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
+ case PKT_USER_ID:
+ case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC:
+ case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC:
+ case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
+ case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC:
+ case PKT_ENCRYPTED_AEAD:
+ write_status_text( STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "0" );
+ rc = GPG_ERR_UNEXPECTED;
+ goto leave;
+
+ case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature (c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext (c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed (c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig (c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control (c, pkt); break;
+ default: newpkt = 0; break;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (c->encrypt_only)
+ {
+ switch (pkt->pkttype)
+ {
+ case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
+ case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
+ case PKT_USER_ID:
+ write_status_text (STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "0");
+ rc = GPG_ERR_UNEXPECTED;
+ goto leave;
+
+ case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature (c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc (c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc (ctrl, c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
+ case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC:
+ case PKT_ENCRYPTED_AEAD: proc_encrypted (c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext (c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed (c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig (c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control (c, pkt); break;
+ default: newpkt = 0; break;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ switch (pkt->pkttype)
+ {
+ case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
+ case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
+ release_list (c);
+ c->list = new_kbnode (pkt);
+ newpkt = 1;
+ break;
+ case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY:
+ case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY:
+ newpkt = add_subkey (c, pkt);
+ break;
+ case PKT_USER_ID: newpkt = add_user_id (c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature (c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc (ctrl, c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc (c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
+ case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC:
+ case PKT_ENCRYPTED_AEAD: proc_encrypted (c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext (c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed (c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig (c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break;
+ case PKT_RING_TRUST: newpkt = add_ring_trust (c, pkt); break;
+ default: newpkt = 0; break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (rc)
+ goto leave;
+
+ /* This is a very ugly construct and frankly, I don't remember why
+ * I used it. Adding the MDC check here is a hack.
+ * The right solution is to initiate another context for encrypted
+ * packet and not to reuse the current one ... It works right
+ * when there is a compression packet between which adds just
+ * an extra layer.
+ * Hmmm: Rewrite this whole module here??
+ */
+ if (pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE && pkt->pkttype != PKT_MDC)
+ c->any.data = (pkt->pkttype == PKT_PLAINTEXT);
+
+ if (newpkt == -1)
+ ;
+ else if (newpkt)
+ {
+ pkt = xmalloc (sizeof *pkt);
+ init_packet (pkt);
+ }
+ else
+ free_packet (pkt, &parsectx);
+ }
+
+ if (rc == GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET)
+ write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "3");
+
+ if (any_data)
+ rc = 0;
+ else if (rc == -1)
+ write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "2");
+
+
+ leave:
+ release_list (c);
+ xfree(c->dek);
+ free_packet (pkt, &parsectx);
+ deinit_parse_packet (&parsectx);
+ xfree (pkt);
+ free_md_filter_context (&c->mfx);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+
+/* Helper for pka_uri_from_sig to parse the to-be-verified address out
+ of the notation data. */
+static pka_info_t *
+get_pka_address (PKT_signature *sig)
+{
+ pka_info_t *pka = NULL;
+ struct notation *nd,*notation;
+
+ notation=sig_to_notation(sig);
+
+ for(nd=notation;nd;nd=nd->next)
+ {
+ if(strcmp(nd->name,"pka-address@gnupg.org")!=0)
+ continue; /* Not the notation we want. */
+
+ /* For now we only use the first valid PKA notation. In future
+ we might want to keep additional PKA notations in a linked
+ list. */
+ if (is_valid_mailbox (nd->value))
+ {
+ pka = xmalloc (sizeof *pka + strlen(nd->value));
+ pka->valid = 0;
+ pka->checked = 0;
+ pka->uri = NULL;
+ strcpy (pka->email, nd->value);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ free_notation(notation);
+
+ return pka;
+}
+
+
+/* Return the URI from a DNS PKA record. If this record has already
+ be retrieved for the signature we merely return it; if not we go
+ out and try to get that DNS record. */
+static const char *
+pka_uri_from_sig (CTX c, PKT_signature *sig)
+{
+ if (!sig->flags.pka_tried)
+ {
+ log_assert (!sig->pka_info);
+ sig->flags.pka_tried = 1;
+ sig->pka_info = get_pka_address (sig);
+ if (sig->pka_info)
+ {
+ char *url;
+ unsigned char *fpr;
+ size_t fprlen;
+
+ if (!gpg_dirmngr_get_pka (c->ctrl, sig->pka_info->email,
+ &fpr, &fprlen, &url))
+ {
+ if (fpr && fprlen == sizeof sig->pka_info->fpr)
+ {
+ memcpy (sig->pka_info->fpr, fpr, fprlen);
+ if (url)
+ {
+ sig->pka_info->valid = 1;
+ if (!*url)
+ xfree (url);
+ else
+ sig->pka_info->uri = url;
+ url = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ xfree (fpr);
+ xfree (url);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return sig->pka_info? sig->pka_info->uri : NULL;
+}
+
+
+/* Return true if the AKL has the WKD method specified. */
+static int
+akl_has_wkd_method (void)
+{
+ struct akl *akl;
+
+ for (akl = opt.auto_key_locate; akl; akl = akl->next)
+ if (akl->type == AKL_WKD)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+/* Return the ISSUER fingerprint buffer and its lenbgth at R_LEN.
+ * Returns NULL if not available. The returned buffer is valid as
+ * long as SIG is not modified. */
+const byte *
+issuer_fpr_raw (PKT_signature *sig, size_t *r_len)
+{
+ const byte *p;
+ size_t n;
+
+ p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER_FPR, &n);
+ if (p && n == 21 && p[0] == 4)
+ {
+ *r_len = n - 1;
+ return p+1;
+ }
+ *r_len = 0;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+
+/* Return the ISSUER fingerprint string in human readable format if
+ * available. Caller must release the string. */
+/* FIXME: Move to another file. */
+char *
+issuer_fpr_string (PKT_signature *sig)
+{
+ const byte *p;
+ size_t n;
+
+ p = issuer_fpr_raw (sig, &n);
+ return p? bin2hex (p, n, NULL) : NULL;
+}
+
+
+static void
+print_good_bad_signature (int statno, const char *keyid_str, kbnode_t un,
+ PKT_signature *sig, int rc)
+{
+ char *p;
+
+ write_status_text_and_buffer (statno, keyid_str,
+ un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name:"[?]",
+ un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len:3,
+ -1);
+
+ if (un)
+ p = utf8_to_native (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+ un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len, 0);
+ else
+ p = xstrdup ("[?]");
+
+ if (rc)
+ log_info (_("BAD signature from \"%s\""), p);
+ else if (sig->flags.expired)
+ log_info (_("Expired signature from \"%s\""), p);
+ else
+ log_info (_("Good signature from \"%s\""), p);
+
+ xfree (p);
+}
+
+
+static int
+check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t node)
+{
+ PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+ const char *astr;
+ int rc;
+ int is_expkey = 0;
+ int is_revkey = 0;
+ char *issuer_fpr = NULL;
+ PKT_public_key *pk = NULL; /* The public key for the signature or NULL. */
+ kbnode_t included_keyblock = NULL;
+
+ if (opt.skip_verify)
+ {
+ log_info(_("signature verification suppressed\n"));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Check that the message composition is valid.
+ *
+ * Per RFC-2440bis (-15) allowed:
+ *
+ * S{1,n} -- detached signature.
+ * S{1,n} P -- old style PGP2 signature
+ * O{1,n} P S{1,n} -- standard OpenPGP signature.
+ * C P S{1,n} -- cleartext signature.
+ *
+ *
+ * O = One-Pass Signature packet.
+ * S = Signature packet.
+ * P = OpenPGP Message packet (Encrypted | Compressed | Literal)
+ * (Note that the current rfc2440bis draft also allows
+ * for a signed message but that does not work as it
+ * introduces ambiguities.)
+ * We keep track of these packages using the marker packet
+ * CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK.
+ * C = Marker packet for cleartext signatures.
+ *
+ * We reject all other messages.
+ *
+ * Actually we are calling this too often, i.e. for verification of
+ * each message but better have some duplicate work than to silently
+ * introduce a bug here.
+ */
+ {
+ kbnode_t n;
+ int n_onepass, n_sig;
+
+/* log_debug ("checking signature packet composition\n"); */
+/* dump_kbnode (c->list); */
+
+ n = c->list;
+ log_assert (n);
+ if ( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE )
+ {
+ /* This is either "S{1,n}" case (detached signature) or
+ "S{1,n} P" (old style PGP2 signature). */
+ for (n = n->next; n; n = n->next)
+ if (n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE)
+ break;
+ if (!n)
+ ; /* Okay, this is a detached signature. */
+ else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
+ && (n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
+ == CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK) )
+ {
+ if (n->next)
+ goto ambiguous; /* We only allow one P packet. */
+ }
+ else
+ goto ambiguous;
+ }
+ else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG)
+ {
+ /* This is the "O{1,n} P S{1,n}" case (standard signature). */
+ for (n_onepass=1, n = n->next;
+ n && n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG; n = n->next)
+ n_onepass++;
+ if (!n || !(n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
+ && (n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
+ == CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK)))
+ goto ambiguous;
+ for (n_sig=0, n = n->next;
+ n && n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE; n = n->next)
+ n_sig++;
+ if (!n_sig)
+ goto ambiguous;
+
+ /* If we wanted to disallow multiple sig verification, we'd do
+ something like this:
+
+ if (n && !opt.allow_multisig_verification)
+ goto ambiguous;
+
+ However, now that we have --allow-multiple-messages, this
+ can stay allowable as we can't get here unless multiple
+ messages (i.e. multiple literals) are allowed. */
+
+ if (n_onepass != n_sig)
+ {
+ log_info ("number of one-pass packets does not match "
+ "number of signature packets\n");
+ goto ambiguous;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
+ && n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START )
+ {
+ /* This is the "C P S{1,n}" case (clear text signature). */
+ n = n->next;
+ if (!n || !(n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
+ && (n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
+ == CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK)))
+ goto ambiguous;
+ for (n_sig=0, n = n->next;
+ n && n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE; n = n->next)
+ n_sig++;
+ if (n || !n_sig)
+ goto ambiguous;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ambiguous:
+ log_error(_("can't handle this ambiguous signature data\n"));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (sig->signers_uid)
+ write_status_buffer (STATUS_NEWSIG,
+ sig->signers_uid, strlen (sig->signers_uid), 0);
+ else
+ write_status_text (STATUS_NEWSIG, NULL);
+
+ astr = openpgp_pk_algo_name ( sig->pubkey_algo );
+ issuer_fpr = issuer_fpr_string (sig);
+
+ if (issuer_fpr)
+ {
+ log_info (_("Signature made %s\n"), asctimestamp(sig->timestamp));
+ log_info (_(" using %s key %s\n"),
+ astr? astr: "?", issuer_fpr);
+
+ }
+ else if (!keystrlen () || keystrlen () > 8)
+ {
+ log_info (_("Signature made %s\n"), asctimestamp(sig->timestamp));
+ log_info (_(" using %s key %s\n"),
+ astr? astr: "?", keystr(sig->keyid));
+ }
+ else /* Legacy format. */
+ log_info (_("Signature made %s using %s key ID %s\n"),
+ asctimestamp(sig->timestamp), astr? astr: "?",
+ keystr(sig->keyid));
+
+ /* In verbose mode print the signers UID. */
+ if (sig->signers_uid)
+ log_info (_(" issuer \"%s\"\n"), sig->signers_uid);
+
+ rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk);
+
+ /* If the key is not found but the signature includes a key block we
+ * use that key block for verification and on success import it. */
+ if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY
+ && sig->flags.key_block
+ && opt.flags.auto_key_import)
+ {
+ PKT_public_key *included_pk;
+ const byte *kblock;
+ size_t kblock_len;
+
+ included_pk = xcalloc (1, sizeof *included_pk);
+ kblock = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_BLOCK, &kblock_len);
+ if (kblock && kblock_len > 1
+ && !get_pubkey_from_buffer (c->ctrl, included_pk,
+ kblock+1, kblock_len-1,
+ sig->keyid, &included_keyblock))
+ {
+ rc = do_check_sig (c, node, included_pk,
+ NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk);
+ if (!rc)
+ {
+ /* The keyblock has been verified, we now import it. */
+ rc = import_included_key_block (c->ctrl, included_keyblock);
+ }
+
+ }
+ free_public_key (included_pk);
+ }
+
+ /* If the key isn't found, check for a preferred keyserver. Note
+ * that this is only done if honor-keyserver-url has been set. We
+ * test for this in the loop so that we can show info about the
+ * preferred keyservers. */
+ if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY
+ && sig->flags.pref_ks)
+ {
+ const byte *p;
+ int seq = 0;
+ size_t n;
+ int any_pref_ks = 0;
+
+ while ((p=enum_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS,&n,&seq,NULL)))
+ {
+ /* According to my favorite copy editor, in English grammar,
+ you say "at" if the key is located on a web page, but
+ "from" if it is located on a keyserver. I'm not going to
+ even try to make two strings here :) */
+ log_info(_("Key available at: ") );
+ print_utf8_buffer (log_get_stream(), p, n);
+ log_printf ("\n");
+ any_pref_ks = 1;
+
+ if ((opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE)
+ && (opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_HONOR_KEYSERVER_URL))
+ {
+ struct keyserver_spec *spec;
+
+ spec = parse_preferred_keyserver (sig);
+ if (spec)
+ {
+ int res;
+
+ if (DBG_LOOKUP)
+ log_debug ("trying auto-key-retrieve method %s\n",
+ "Pref-KS");
+
+ free_public_key (pk);
+ pk = NULL;
+ glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
+ res = keyserver_import_keyid (c->ctrl, sig->keyid,spec, 1);
+ glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
+ if (!res)
+ rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL,
+ NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk);
+ else if (DBG_LOOKUP)
+ log_debug ("lookup via %s failed: %s\n", "Pref-KS",
+ gpg_strerror (res));
+ free_keyserver_spec (spec);
+
+ if (!rc)
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (any_pref_ks
+ && (opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE)
+ && !(opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_HONOR_KEYSERVER_URL))
+ log_info (_("Note: Use '%s' to make use of this info\n"),
+ "--keyserver-option honor-keyserver-url");
+ }
+
+ /* If the above methods didn't work, our next try is to retrieve the
+ * key from the WKD. This requires that WKD is in the AKL and the
+ * Signer's UID is in the signature. */
+ if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY
+ && (opt.keyserver_options.options & KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE)
+ && !opt.flags.disable_signer_uid
+ && akl_has_wkd_method ()
+ && sig->signers_uid)
+ {
+ int res;
+
+ if (DBG_LOOKUP)
+ log_debug ("trying auto-key-retrieve method %s\n", "WKD");
+ free_public_key (pk);
+ pk = NULL;
+ glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
+ res = keyserver_import_wkd (c->ctrl, sig->signers_uid, 1, NULL, NULL);
+ glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
+ /* Fixme: If the fingerprint is embedded in the signature,
+ * compare it to the fingerprint of the returned key. */
+ if (!res)
+ rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk);
+ else if (DBG_LOOKUP)
+ log_debug ("lookup via %s failed: %s\n", "WKD", gpg_strerror (res));
+ }
+
+ /* If the avove methods didn't work, our next try is to use the URI
+ * from a DNS PKA record. This is a legacy method which will
+ * eventually be removed. */
+ if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY
+ && (opt.keyserver_options.options & KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE)
+ && (opt.keyserver_options.options & KEYSERVER_HONOR_PKA_RECORD))
+ {
+ const char *uri = pka_uri_from_sig (c, sig);
+
+ if (uri)
+ {
+ /* FIXME: We might want to locate the key using the
+ fingerprint instead of the keyid. */
+ int res;
+ struct keyserver_spec *spec;
+
+ spec = parse_keyserver_uri (uri, 1);
+ if (spec)
+ {
+ if (DBG_LOOKUP)
+ log_debug ("trying auto-key-retrieve method %s\n", "PKA");
+
+ free_public_key (pk);
+ pk = NULL;
+ glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
+ res = keyserver_import_keyid (c->ctrl, sig->keyid, spec, 1);
+ glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
+ free_keyserver_spec (spec);
+ if (!res)
+ rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL,
+ NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk);
+ else if (DBG_LOOKUP)
+ log_debug ("lookup via %s failed: %s\n", "PKA",
+ gpg_strerror (res));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* If the above methods didn't work, our next try is to locate
+ * the key via its fingerprint from a keyserver. This requires
+ * that the signers fingerprint is encoded in the signature. */
+ if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY
+ && (opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE)
+ && keyserver_any_configured (c->ctrl))
+ {
+ int res;
+ const byte *p;
+ size_t n;
+
+ p = issuer_fpr_raw (sig, &n);
+ if (p)
+ {
+ /* v4 packet with a SHA-1 fingerprint. */
+ if (DBG_LOOKUP)
+ log_debug ("trying auto-key-retrieve method %s\n", "KS");
+
+ free_public_key (pk);
+ pk = NULL;
+ glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
+ res = keyserver_import_fprint (c->ctrl, p, n, opt.keyserver, 1);
+ glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
+ if (!res)
+ rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL,
+ NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk);
+ else if (DBG_LOOKUP)
+ log_debug ("lookup via %s failed: %s\n", "KS", gpg_strerror (res));
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!rc || gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE)
+ {
+ kbnode_t un, keyblock;
+ int count = 0;
+ int statno;
+ char keyid_str[50];
+ PKT_public_key *mainpk = NULL;
+
+ if (rc)
+ statno = STATUS_BADSIG;
+ else if (sig->flags.expired)
+ statno = STATUS_EXPSIG;
+ else if (is_expkey)
+ statno = STATUS_EXPKEYSIG;
+ else if(is_revkey)
+ statno = STATUS_REVKEYSIG;
+ else
+ statno = STATUS_GOODSIG;
+
+ /* FIXME: We should have the public key in PK and thus the
+ * keyblock has already been fetched. Thus we could use the
+ * fingerprint or PK itself to lookup the entire keyblock. That
+ * would best be done with a cache. */
+ if (included_keyblock)
+ {
+ keyblock = included_keyblock;
+ included_keyblock = NULL;
+ }
+ else
+ keyblock = get_pubkeyblock_for_sig (c->ctrl, sig);
+
+ snprintf (keyid_str, sizeof keyid_str, "%08lX%08lX [uncertain] ",
+ (ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1]);
+
+ /* Find and print the primary user ID along with the
+ "Good|Expired|Bad signature" line. */
+ for (un=keyblock; un; un = un->next)
+ {
+ int valid;
+
+ if (un->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
+ {
+ mainpk = un->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID)
+ continue;
+ if (!un->pkt->pkt.user_id->created)
+ continue;
+ if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.revoked)
+ continue;
+ if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.expired)
+ continue;
+ if (!un->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.primary)
+ continue;
+ /* We want the textual primary user ID here */
+ if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
+ continue;
+
+ log_assert (mainpk);
+
+ /* Since this is just informational, don't actually ask the
+ user to update any trust information. (Note: we register
+ the signature later.) Because print_good_bad_signature
+ does not print a LF we need to compute the validity
+ before calling that function. */
+ if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY))
+ valid = get_validity (c->ctrl, keyblock, mainpk,
+ un->pkt->pkt.user_id, NULL, 0);
+ else
+ valid = 0; /* Not used. */
+
+ keyid_str[17] = 0; /* cut off the "[uncertain]" part */
+
+ print_good_bad_signature (statno, keyid_str, un, sig, rc);
+
+ if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY))
+ log_printf (" [%s]\n",trust_value_to_string(valid));
+ else
+ log_printf ("\n");
+
+ count++;
+ }
+
+ log_assert (mainpk);
+
+ /* In case we did not found a valid textual userid above
+ we print the first user id packet or a "[?]" instead along
+ with the "Good|Expired|Bad signature" line. */
+ if (!count)
+ {
+ /* Try for an invalid textual userid */
+ for (un=keyblock; un; un = un->next)
+ {
+ if (un->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
+ && !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Try for any userid at all */
+ if (!un)
+ {
+ for (un=keyblock; un; un = un->next)
+ {
+ if (un->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (opt.trust_model==TM_ALWAYS || !un)
+ keyid_str[17] = 0; /* cut off the "[uncertain]" part */
+
+ print_good_bad_signature (statno, keyid_str, un, sig, rc);
+
+ if (opt.trust_model != TM_ALWAYS && un)
+ log_printf (" %s",_("[uncertain]") );
+ log_printf ("\n");
+ }
+
+ /* If we have a good signature and already printed
+ * the primary user ID, print all the other user IDs */
+ if (count
+ && !rc
+ && !(opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_PRIMARY_UID_ONLY))
+ {
+ char *p;
+ for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next)
+ {
+ if (un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID)
+ continue;
+ if ((un->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.revoked
+ || un->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.expired)
+ && !(opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS))
+ continue;
+ /* Skip textual primary user ids which we printed above. */
+ if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.primary
+ && !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data )
+ continue;
+
+ /* If this user id has attribute data, print that. */
+ if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
+ {
+ dump_attribs (un->pkt->pkt.user_id, mainpk);
+
+ if (opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS)
+ show_photos (c->ctrl,
+ un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attribs,
+ un->pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs,
+ mainpk ,un->pkt->pkt.user_id);
+ }
+
+ p = utf8_to_native (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+ un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len, 0);
+ log_info (_(" aka \"%s\""), p);
+ xfree (p);
+
+ if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY))
+ {
+ const char *valid;
+
+ if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.revoked)
+ valid = _("revoked");
+ else if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.expired)
+ valid = _("expired");
+ else
+ /* Since this is just informational, don't
+ actually ask the user to update any trust
+ information. */
+ valid = (trust_value_to_string
+ (get_validity (c->ctrl, keyblock, mainpk,
+ un->pkt->pkt.user_id, NULL, 0)));
+ log_printf (" [%s]\n",valid);
+ }
+ else
+ log_printf ("\n");
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* For good signatures print notation data. */
+ if (!rc)
+ {
+ if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS))
+ show_policy_url (sig, 0, 1);
+ else
+ show_policy_url (sig, 0, 2);
+
+ if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS))
+ show_keyserver_url (sig, 0, 1);
+ else
+ show_keyserver_url (sig, 0, 2);
+
+ if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_NOTATIONS))
+ show_notation
+ (sig, 0, 1,
+ (((opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS)?1:0)
+ + ((opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS)?2:0)));
+ else
+ show_notation (sig, 0, 2, 0);
+ }
+
+ /* For good signatures print the VALIDSIG status line. */
+ if (!rc && is_status_enabled () && pk)
+ {
+ char pkhex[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*2+1];
+ char mainpkhex[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*2+1];
+
+ hexfingerprint (pk, pkhex, sizeof pkhex);
+ hexfingerprint (mainpk, mainpkhex, sizeof mainpkhex);
+
+ /* TODO: Replace the reserved '0' in the field below with
+ bits for status flags (policy url, notation, etc.). */
+ write_status_printf (STATUS_VALIDSIG,
+ "%s %s %lu %lu %d 0 %d %d %02X %s",
+ pkhex,
+ strtimestamp (sig->timestamp),
+ (ulong)sig->timestamp,
+ (ulong)sig->expiredate,
+ sig->version, sig->pubkey_algo,
+ sig->digest_algo,
+ sig->sig_class,
+ mainpkhex);
+ }
+
+ /* Print compliance warning for Good signatures. */
+ if (!rc && pk && !opt.quiet
+ && !gnupg_pk_is_compliant (opt.compliance, pk->pubkey_algo, 0,
+ pk->pkey, nbits_from_pk (pk), NULL))
+ {
+ log_info (_("WARNING: This key is not suitable for signing"
+ " in %s mode\n"),
+ gnupg_compliance_option_string (opt.compliance));
+ }
+
+ /* For good signatures compute and print the trust information.
+ Note that in the Tofu trust model this may ask the user on
+ how to resolve a conflict. */
+ if (!rc)
+ {
+ if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_PKA_LOOKUPS))
+ pka_uri_from_sig (c, sig); /* Make sure PKA info is available. */
+ rc = check_signatures_trust (c->ctrl, sig);
+ }
+
+ /* Print extra information about the signature. */
+ if (sig->flags.expired)
+ {
+ log_info (_("Signature expired %s\n"), asctimestamp(sig->expiredate));
+ rc = GPG_ERR_GENERAL; /* Need a better error here? */
+ }
+ else if (sig->expiredate)
+ log_info (_("Signature expires %s\n"), asctimestamp(sig->expiredate));
+
+ if (opt.verbose)
+ {
+ char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];
+
+ if (pk)
+ pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf);
+ else
+ *pkstrbuf = 0;
+
+ log_info (_("%s signature, digest algorithm %s%s%s\n"),
+ sig->sig_class==0x00?_("binary"):
+ sig->sig_class==0x01?_("textmode"):_("unknown"),
+ gcry_md_algo_name (sig->digest_algo),
+ *pkstrbuf?_(", key algorithm "):"", pkstrbuf);
+ }
+
+ /* Print final warnings. */
+ if (!rc && !c->signed_data.used)
+ {
+ /* Signature is basically good but we test whether the
+ deprecated command
+ gpg --verify FILE.sig
+ was used instead of
+ gpg --verify FILE.sig FILE
+ to verify a detached signature. If we figure out that a
+ data file with a matching name exists, we print a warning.
+
+ The problem is that the first form would also verify a
+ standard signature. This behavior could be used to
+ create a made up .sig file for a tarball by creating a
+ standard signature from a valid detached signature packet
+ (for example from a signed git tag). Then replace the
+ sig file on the FTP server along with a changed tarball.
+ Using the first form the verify command would correctly
+ verify the signature but don't even consider the tarball. */
+ kbnode_t n;
+ char *dfile;
+
+ dfile = get_matching_datafile (c->sigfilename);
+ if (dfile)
+ {
+ for (n = c->list; n; n = n->next)
+ if (n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE)
+ break;
+ if (n)
+ {
+ /* Not only signature packets in the tree thus this
+ is not a detached signature. */
+ log_info (_("WARNING: not a detached signature; "
+ "file '%s' was NOT verified!\n"), dfile);
+ }
+ xfree (dfile);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Compute compliance with CO_DE_VS. */
+ if (pk && is_status_enabled ()
+ && gnupg_pk_is_compliant (CO_DE_VS, pk->pubkey_algo, 0, pk->pkey,
+ nbits_from_pk (pk), NULL)
+ && gnupg_digest_is_compliant (CO_DE_VS, sig->digest_algo))
+ write_status_strings (STATUS_VERIFICATION_COMPLIANCE_MODE,
+ gnupg_status_compliance_flag (CO_DE_VS),
+ NULL);
+
+ free_public_key (pk);
+ pk = NULL;
+ release_kbnode( keyblock );
+ if (rc)
+ g10_errors_seen = 1;
+ if (opt.batch && rc)
+ g10_exit (1);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ write_status_printf (STATUS_ERRSIG, "%08lX%08lX %d %d %02x %lu %d %s",
+ (ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1],
+ sig->pubkey_algo, sig->digest_algo,
+ sig->sig_class, (ulong)sig->timestamp,
+ gpg_err_code (rc),
+ issuer_fpr? issuer_fpr:"-");
+ if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY)
+ {
+ write_status_printf (STATUS_NO_PUBKEY, "%08lX%08lX",
+ (ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1]);
+ }
+ if (gpg_err_code (rc) != GPG_ERR_NOT_PROCESSED)
+ log_error (_("Can't check signature: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
+ }
+
+ free_public_key (pk);
+ release_kbnode (included_keyblock);
+ xfree (issuer_fpr);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Process the tree which starts at node
+ */
+static void
+proc_tree (CTX c, kbnode_t node)
+{
+ kbnode_t n1;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (opt.list_packets || opt.list_only)
+ return;
+
+ /* We must skip our special plaintext marker packets here because
+ they may be the root packet. These packets are only used in
+ additional checks and skipping them here doesn't matter. */
+ while (node
+ && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
+ && node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK)
+ {
+ node = node->next;
+ }
+ if (!node)
+ return;
+
+ c->trustletter = ' ';
+ if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+ || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
+ {
+ merge_keys_and_selfsig (c->ctrl, node);
+ list_node (c, node);
+ }
+ else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)
+ {
+ merge_keys_and_selfsig (c->ctrl, node);
+ list_node (c, node);
+ }
+ else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG)
+ {
+ /* Check all signatures. */
+ if (!c->any.data)
+ {
+ int use_textmode = 0;
+
+ free_md_filter_context (&c->mfx);
+ /* Prepare to create all requested message digests. */
+ rc = gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md, 0, 0);
+ if (rc)
+ goto hash_err;
+
+ /* Fixme: why looking for the signature packet and not the
+ one-pass packet? */
+ for (n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode (n1, PKT_SIGNATURE));)
+ gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo);
+
+ if (n1 && n1->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->sig_class == 0x01)
+ use_textmode = 1;
+
+ /* Ask for file and hash it. */
+ if (c->sigs_only)
+ {
+ if (c->signed_data.used && c->signed_data.data_fd != -1)
+ rc = hash_datafile_by_fd (c->mfx.md, NULL,
+ c->signed_data.data_fd,
+ use_textmode);
+ else
+ rc = hash_datafiles (c->mfx.md, NULL,
+ c->signed_data.data_names,
+ c->sigfilename,
+ use_textmode);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ rc = ask_for_detached_datafile (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
+ iobuf_get_real_fname (c->iobuf),
+ use_textmode);
+ }
+
+ hash_err:
+ if (rc)
+ {
+ log_error ("can't hash datafile: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (c->signed_data.used)
+ {
+ log_error (_("not a detached signature\n"));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ for (n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode (n1, PKT_SIGNATURE));)
+ check_sig_and_print (c, n1);
+
+ }
+ else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
+ && node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START)
+ {
+ /* Clear text signed message. */
+ if (!c->any.data)
+ {
+ log_error ("cleartext signature without data\n");
+ return;
+ }
+ else if (c->signed_data.used)
+ {
+ log_error (_("not a detached signature\n"));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ for (n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode (n1, PKT_SIGNATURE));)
+ check_sig_and_print (c, n1);
+
+ }
+ else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
+ {
+ PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+ int multiple_ok = 1;
+
+ n1 = find_next_kbnode (node, PKT_SIGNATURE);
+ if (n1)
+ {
+ byte class = sig->sig_class;
+ byte hash = sig->digest_algo;
+
+ for (; n1; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE)))
+ {
+ /* We can't currently handle multiple signatures of
+ * different classes (we'd pretty much have to run a
+ * different hash context for each), but if they are all
+ * the same and it is detached signature, we make an
+ * exception. Note that the old code also disallowed
+ * multiple signatures if the digest algorithms are
+ * different. We softened this restriction only for
+ * detached signatures, to be on the safe side. */
+ if (n1->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class != class
+ || (c->any.data
+ && n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo != hash))
+ {
+ multiple_ok = 0;
+ log_info (_("WARNING: multiple signatures detected. "
+ "Only the first will be checked.\n"));
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (sig->sig_class != 0x00 && sig->sig_class != 0x01)
+ {
+ log_info(_("standalone signature of class 0x%02x\n"), sig->sig_class);
+ }
+ else if (!c->any.data)
+ {
+ /* Detached signature */
+ free_md_filter_context (&c->mfx);
+ rc = gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md, sig->digest_algo, 0);
+ if (rc)
+ goto detached_hash_err;
+
+ if (multiple_ok)
+ {
+ /* If we have and want to handle multiple signatures we
+ * need to enable all hash algorithms for the context. */
+ for (n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode (n1, PKT_SIGNATURE)); )
+ if (!openpgp_md_test_algo (n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo))
+ gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md,
+ map_md_openpgp_to_gcry
+ (n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo));
+ }
+
+ if (RFC2440 || RFC4880)
+ ; /* Strict RFC mode. */
+ else if (sig->digest_algo == DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1
+ && sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
+ && sig->sig_class == 0x01)
+ {
+ /* Enable a workaround for a pgp5 bug when the detached
+ * signature has been created in textmode. Note that we
+ * do not implement this for multiple signatures with
+ * different hash algorithms. */
+ rc = gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md2, sig->digest_algo, 0);
+ if (rc)
+ goto detached_hash_err;
+ }
+
+ /* Here we used to have another hack to work around a pgp
+ * 2 bug: It worked by not using the textmode for detached
+ * signatures; this would let the first signature check
+ * (on md) fail but the second one (on md2), which adds an
+ * extra CR would then have produced the "correct" hash.
+ * This is very, very ugly hack but it may haved help in
+ * some cases (and break others).
+ * c->mfx.md2? 0 :(sig->sig_class == 0x01)
+ */
+
+ if (DBG_HASHING)
+ {
+ gcry_md_debug (c->mfx.md, "verify");
+ if (c->mfx.md2)
+ gcry_md_debug (c->mfx.md2, "verify2");
+ }
+
+ if (c->sigs_only)
+ {
+ if (c->signed_data.used && c->signed_data.data_fd != -1)
+ rc = hash_datafile_by_fd (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
+ c->signed_data.data_fd,
+ (sig->sig_class == 0x01));
+ else
+ rc = hash_datafiles (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
+ c->signed_data.data_names,
+ c->sigfilename,
+ (sig->sig_class == 0x01));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ rc = ask_for_detached_datafile (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
+ iobuf_get_real_fname(c->iobuf),
+ (sig->sig_class == 0x01));
+ }
+
+ detached_hash_err:
+ if (rc)
+ {
+ log_error ("can't hash datafile: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (c->signed_data.used)
+ {
+ log_error (_("not a detached signature\n"));
+ return;
+ }
+ else if (!opt.quiet)
+ log_info (_("old style (PGP 2.x) signature\n"));
+
+ if (multiple_ok)
+ {
+ for (n1 = node; n1; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE)))
+ check_sig_and_print (c, n1);
+ }
+ else
+ check_sig_and_print (c, node);
+
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ dump_kbnode (c->list);
+ log_error ("invalid root packet detected in proc_tree()\n");
+ dump_kbnode (node);
+ }
+}