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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-27 09:59:15 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-27 09:59:15 +0000
commit8de1ee1b2b676b0d07586f0752750dd6b0fb7511 (patch)
treedd46fd7dc3863045696cd0e48032d8a36fa0daf5 /g10/pubkey-enc.c
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadgnupg2-8de1ee1b2b676b0d07586f0752750dd6b0fb7511.tar.xz
gnupg2-8de1ee1b2b676b0d07586f0752750dd6b0fb7511.zip
Adding upstream version 2.2.27.upstream/2.2.27upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'g10/pubkey-enc.c')
-rw-r--r--g10/pubkey-enc.c497
1 files changed, 497 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/g10/pubkey-enc.c b/g10/pubkey-enc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..30a4bc0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/pubkey-enc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,497 @@
+/* pubkey-enc.c - Process a public key encoded packet.
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2006, 2009,
+ * 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "gpg.h"
+#include "../common/util.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "keydb.h"
+#include "trustdb.h"
+#include "../common/status.h"
+#include "options.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "../common/i18n.h"
+#include "pkglue.h"
+#include "call-agent.h"
+#include "../common/host2net.h"
+#include "../common/compliance.h"
+
+
+static gpg_error_t get_it (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_pubkey_enc *k,
+ DEK *dek, PKT_public_key *sk, u32 *keyid);
+
+
+/* Check that the given algo is mentioned in one of the valid user-ids. */
+static int
+is_algo_in_prefs (kbnode_t keyblock, preftype_t type, int algo)
+{
+ kbnode_t k;
+
+ for (k = keyblock; k; k = k->next)
+ {
+ if (k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
+ {
+ PKT_user_id *uid = k->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+ prefitem_t *prefs = uid->prefs;
+
+ if (uid->created && prefs && !uid->flags.revoked && !uid->flags.expired)
+ {
+ for (; prefs->type; prefs++)
+ if (prefs->type == type && prefs->value == algo)
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Get the session key from a pubkey enc packet and return it in DEK,
+ * which should have been allocated in secure memory by the caller.
+ */
+gpg_error_t
+get_session_key (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_pubkey_enc * k, DEK * dek)
+{
+ PKT_public_key *sk = NULL;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (DBG_CLOCK)
+ log_clock ("get_session_key enter");
+
+ rc = openpgp_pk_test_algo2 (k->pubkey_algo, PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC);
+ if (rc)
+ goto leave;
+
+ if ((k->keyid[0] || k->keyid[1]) && !opt.try_all_secrets)
+ {
+ sk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *sk);
+ sk->pubkey_algo = k->pubkey_algo; /* We want a pubkey with this algo. */
+ if (!(rc = get_seckey (ctrl, sk, k->keyid)))
+ {
+ /* Check compliance. */
+ if (! gnupg_pk_is_allowed (opt.compliance, PK_USE_DECRYPTION,
+ sk->pubkey_algo, 0,
+ sk->pkey, nbits_from_pk (sk), NULL))
+ {
+ log_info (_("key %s is not suitable for decryption"
+ " in %s mode\n"),
+ keystr_from_pk (sk),
+ gnupg_compliance_option_string (opt.compliance));
+ rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO);
+ }
+ else
+ rc = get_it (ctrl, k, dek, sk, k->keyid);
+ }
+ }
+ else if (opt.skip_hidden_recipients)
+ rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY);
+ else /* Anonymous receiver: Try all available secret keys. */
+ {
+ void *enum_context = NULL;
+ u32 keyid[2];
+
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ sk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *sk);
+ rc = enum_secret_keys (ctrl, &enum_context, sk);
+ if (rc)
+ {
+ sk = NULL; /* enum_secret_keys turns SK into a shallow copy! */
+ rc = GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (sk->pubkey_algo != k->pubkey_algo)
+ continue;
+ if (!(sk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC))
+ continue;
+ keyid_from_pk (sk, keyid);
+ if (!opt.quiet)
+ log_info (_("anonymous recipient; trying secret key %s ...\n"),
+ keystr (keyid));
+
+ /* Check compliance. */
+ if (! gnupg_pk_is_allowed (opt.compliance, PK_USE_DECRYPTION,
+ sk->pubkey_algo, 0,
+ sk->pkey, nbits_from_pk (sk), NULL))
+ {
+ log_info (_("key %s is not suitable for decryption"
+ " in %s mode\n"),
+ keystr_from_pk (sk),
+ gnupg_compliance_option_string (opt.compliance));
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ rc = get_it (ctrl, k, dek, sk, keyid);
+ if (!rc)
+ {
+ if (!opt.quiet)
+ log_info (_("okay, we are the anonymous recipient.\n"));
+ sk = NULL;
+ break;
+ }
+ else if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_FULLY_CANCELED)
+ {
+ sk = NULL;
+ break; /* Don't try any more secret keys. */
+ }
+ }
+ enum_secret_keys (ctrl, &enum_context, NULL); /* free context */
+ }
+
+ leave:
+ free_public_key (sk);
+ if (DBG_CLOCK)
+ log_clock ("get_session_key leave");
+ return rc;
+}
+
+
+static gpg_error_t
+get_it (ctrl_t ctrl,
+ PKT_pubkey_enc *enc, DEK *dek, PKT_public_key *sk, u32 *keyid)
+{
+ gpg_error_t err;
+ byte *frame = NULL;
+ unsigned int n;
+ size_t nframe;
+ u16 csum, csum2;
+ int padding;
+ gcry_sexp_t s_data;
+ char *desc;
+ char *keygrip;
+ byte fp[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
+ size_t fpn;
+
+ if (DBG_CLOCK)
+ log_clock ("decryption start");
+
+ /* Get the keygrip. */
+ err = hexkeygrip_from_pk (sk, &keygrip);
+ if (err)
+ goto leave;
+
+ /* Convert the data to an S-expression. */
+ if (sk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL
+ || sk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E)
+ {
+ if (!enc->data[0] || !enc->data[1])
+ err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_MPI);
+ else
+ err = gcry_sexp_build (&s_data, NULL, "(enc-val(elg(a%m)(b%m)))",
+ enc->data[0], enc->data[1]);
+ }
+ else if (sk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA
+ || sk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_E)
+ {
+ if (!enc->data[0])
+ err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_MPI);
+ else
+ err = gcry_sexp_build (&s_data, NULL, "(enc-val(rsa(a%m)))",
+ enc->data[0]);
+ }
+ else if (sk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH)
+ {
+ if (!enc->data[0] || !enc->data[1])
+ err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_MPI);
+ else
+ err = gcry_sexp_build (&s_data, NULL, "(enc-val(ecdh(s%m)(e%m)))",
+ enc->data[1], enc->data[0]);
+ }
+ else
+ err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BUG);
+
+ if (err)
+ goto leave;
+
+ if (sk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH)
+ {
+ fingerprint_from_pk (sk, fp, &fpn);
+ log_assert (fpn == 20);
+ }
+
+ /* Decrypt. */
+ desc = gpg_format_keydesc (ctrl, sk, FORMAT_KEYDESC_NORMAL, 1);
+ err = agent_pkdecrypt (NULL, keygrip,
+ desc, sk->keyid, sk->main_keyid, sk->pubkey_algo,
+ s_data, &frame, &nframe, &padding);
+ xfree (desc);
+ gcry_sexp_release (s_data);
+ if (err)
+ goto leave;
+
+ /* Now get the DEK (data encryption key) from the frame
+ *
+ * Old versions encode the DEK in this format (msb is left):
+ *
+ * 0 1 DEK(16 bytes) CSUM(2 bytes) 0 RND(n bytes) 2
+ *
+ * Later versions encode the DEK like this:
+ *
+ * 0 2 RND(n bytes) 0 A DEK(k bytes) CSUM(2 bytes)
+ *
+ * (mpi_get_buffer already removed the leading zero).
+ *
+ * RND are non-zero randow bytes.
+ * A is the cipher algorithm
+ * DEK is the encryption key (session key) with length k
+ * CSUM
+ */
+ if (DBG_CRYPTO)
+ log_printhex (frame, nframe, "DEK frame:");
+ n = 0;
+
+ if (sk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH)
+ {
+ gcry_mpi_t shared_mpi;
+ gcry_mpi_t decoded;
+
+ /* At the beginning the frame are the bytes of shared point MPI. */
+ err = gcry_mpi_scan (&shared_mpi, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, frame, nframe, NULL);
+ if (err)
+ {
+ err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_SECKEY);
+ goto leave;
+ }
+
+ err = pk_ecdh_decrypt (&decoded, fp, enc->data[1]/*encr data as an MPI*/,
+ shared_mpi, sk->pkey);
+ mpi_release (shared_mpi);
+ if(err)
+ goto leave;
+
+ xfree (frame);
+ err = gcry_mpi_aprint (GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, &frame, &nframe, decoded);
+ mpi_release (decoded);
+ if (err)
+ goto leave;
+
+ /* Now the frame are the bytes decrypted but padded session key. */
+ if (!nframe || nframe <= 8
+ || frame[nframe-1] > nframe)
+ {
+ err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_SECKEY);
+ goto leave;
+ }
+ nframe -= frame[nframe-1]; /* Remove padding. */
+ log_assert (!n); /* (used just below) */
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (padding)
+ {
+ if (n + 7 > nframe)
+ {
+ err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_SECKEY);
+ goto leave;
+ }
+
+ /* FIXME: Actually the leading zero is required but due to
+ * the way we encode the output in libgcrypt as an MPI we
+ * are not able to encode that leading zero. However, when
+ * using a Smartcard we are doing it the right way and
+ * therefore we have to skip the zero. This should be fixed
+ * in gpg-agent of course. */
+ if (!frame[n])
+ n++;
+
+ if (frame[n] == 1 && frame[nframe - 1] == 2)
+ {
+ log_info (_("old encoding of the DEK is not supported\n"));
+ err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CIPHER_ALGO);
+ goto leave;
+ }
+ if (frame[n] != 2) /* Something went wrong. */
+ {
+ err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_SECKEY);
+ goto leave;
+ }
+ for (n++; n < nframe && frame[n]; n++) /* Skip the random bytes. */
+ ;
+ n++; /* Skip the zero byte. */
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (n + 4 > nframe)
+ {
+ err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_SECKEY);
+ goto leave;
+ }
+
+ dek->keylen = nframe - (n + 1) - 2;
+ dek->algo = frame[n++];
+ err = openpgp_cipher_test_algo (dek->algo);
+ if (err)
+ {
+ if (!opt.quiet && gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_CIPHER_ALGO)
+ {
+ log_info (_("cipher algorithm %d%s is unknown or disabled\n"),
+ dek->algo,
+ dek->algo == CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA ? " (IDEA)" : "");
+ }
+ dek->algo = 0;
+ goto leave;
+ }
+ if (dek->keylen != openpgp_cipher_get_algo_keylen (dek->algo))
+ {
+ err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_SECKEY);
+ goto leave;
+ }
+
+ /* Copy the key to DEK and compare the checksum. */
+ csum = buf16_to_u16 (frame+nframe-2);
+ memcpy (dek->key, frame + n, dek->keylen);
+ for (csum2 = 0, n = 0; n < dek->keylen; n++)
+ csum2 += dek->key[n];
+ if (csum != csum2)
+ {
+ err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_SECKEY);
+ goto leave;
+ }
+ if (DBG_CLOCK)
+ log_clock ("decryption ready");
+ if (DBG_CRYPTO)
+ log_printhex (dek->key, dek->keylen, "DEK is:");
+
+ /* Check that the algo is in the preferences and whether it has
+ * expired. Also print a status line with the key's fingerprint. */
+ {
+ PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
+ PKT_public_key *mainpk = NULL;
+ KBNODE pkb = get_pubkeyblock (ctrl, keyid);
+
+ if (!pkb)
+ {
+ err = -1;
+ log_error ("oops: public key not found for preference check\n");
+ }
+ else if (pkb->pkt->pkt.public_key->selfsigversion > 3
+ && dek->algo != CIPHER_ALGO_3DES
+ && !opt.quiet
+ && !is_algo_in_prefs (pkb, PREFTYPE_SYM, dek->algo))
+ log_info (_("WARNING: cipher algorithm %s not found in recipient"
+ " preferences\n"), openpgp_cipher_algo_name (dek->algo));
+
+ if (!err)
+ {
+ kbnode_t k;
+ int first = 1;
+
+ for (k = pkb; k; k = k->next)
+ {
+ if (k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+ || k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
+ {
+ u32 aki[2];
+
+ if (first)
+ {
+ first = 0;
+ mainpk = k->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+ }
+
+ keyid_from_pk (k->pkt->pkt.public_key, aki);
+ if (aki[0] == keyid[0] && aki[1] == keyid[1])
+ {
+ pk = k->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (!pk)
+ BUG ();
+ if (pk->expiredate && pk->expiredate <= make_timestamp ())
+ {
+ log_info (_("Note: secret key %s expired at %s\n"),
+ keystr (keyid), asctimestamp (pk->expiredate));
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (pk && pk->flags.revoked)
+ {
+ log_info (_("Note: key has been revoked"));
+ log_printf ("\n");
+ show_revocation_reason (ctrl, pk, 1);
+ }
+
+ if (is_status_enabled () && pk && mainpk)
+ {
+ char pkhex[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*2+1];
+ char mainpkhex[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*2+1];
+
+ hexfingerprint (pk, pkhex, sizeof pkhex);
+ hexfingerprint (mainpk, mainpkhex, sizeof mainpkhex);
+
+ /* Note that we do not want to create a trustdb just for
+ * getting the ownertrust: If there is no trustdb there can't
+ * be ulitmately trusted key anyway and thus the ownertrust
+ * value is irrelevant. */
+ write_status_printf (STATUS_DECRYPTION_KEY, "%s %s %c",
+ pkhex, mainpkhex,
+ get_ownertrust_info (ctrl, mainpk, 1));
+
+ }
+
+ release_kbnode (pkb);
+ err = 0;
+ }
+
+ leave:
+ xfree (frame);
+ xfree (keygrip);
+ return err;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Get the session key from the given string.
+ * String is supposed to be formatted as this:
+ * <algo-id>:<even-number-of-hex-digits>
+ */
+gpg_error_t
+get_override_session_key (DEK *dek, const char *string)
+{
+ const char *s;
+ int i;
+
+ if (!string)
+ return GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY;
+ dek->algo = atoi (string);
+ if (dek->algo < 1)
+ return GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY;
+ if (!(s = strchr (string, ':')))
+ return GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY;
+ s++;
+ for (i = 0; i < DIM (dek->key) && *s; i++, s += 2)
+ {
+ int c = hextobyte (s);
+ if (c == -1)
+ return GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY;
+ dek->key[i] = c;
+ }
+ if (*s)
+ return GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY;
+ dek->keylen = i;
+ return 0;
+}