From 8de1ee1b2b676b0d07586f0752750dd6b0fb7511 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Baumann Date: Sat, 27 Apr 2024 11:59:15 +0200 Subject: Adding upstream version 2.2.27. Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann --- agent/genkey.c | 619 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 619 insertions(+) create mode 100644 agent/genkey.c (limited to 'agent/genkey.c') diff --git a/agent/genkey.c b/agent/genkey.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5c6ae93 --- /dev/null +++ b/agent/genkey.c @@ -0,0 +1,619 @@ +/* genkey.c - Generate a keypair + * Copyright (C) 2002, 2003, 2004, 2007, 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2015 g10 Code GmbH. + * + * This file is part of GnuPG. + * + * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, see . + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "agent.h" +#include "../common/i18n.h" +#include "../common/exechelp.h" +#include "../common/sysutils.h" + +static int +store_key (gcry_sexp_t private, const char *passphrase, int force, + unsigned long s2k_count, time_t timestamp) +{ + int rc; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t len; + unsigned char grip[20]; + + if ( !gcry_pk_get_keygrip (private, grip) ) + { + log_error ("can't calculate keygrip\n"); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL); + } + + len = gcry_sexp_sprint (private, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, NULL, 0); + assert (len); + buf = gcry_malloc_secure (len); + if (!buf) + return out_of_core (); + len = gcry_sexp_sprint (private, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, buf, len); + assert (len); + + if (passphrase) + { + unsigned char *p; + + rc = agent_protect (buf, passphrase, &p, &len, s2k_count, -1); + if (rc) + { + xfree (buf); + return rc; + } + xfree (buf); + buf = p; + } + + rc = agent_write_private_key (grip, buf, len, force, timestamp); + xfree (buf); + return rc; +} + + +/* Count the number of non-alpha characters in S. Control characters + and non-ascii characters are not considered. */ +static size_t +nonalpha_count (const char *s) +{ + size_t n; + + for (n=0; *s; s++) + if (isascii (*s) && ( isdigit (*s) || ispunct (*s) )) + n++; + + return n; +} + + +/* Check PW against a list of pattern. Return 0 if PW does not match + these pattern. */ +static int +check_passphrase_pattern (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *pw) +{ + gpg_error_t err = 0; + const char *pgmname = gnupg_module_name (GNUPG_MODULE_NAME_CHECK_PATTERN); + FILE *infp; + const char *argv[10]; + pid_t pid; + int result, i; + + (void)ctrl; + + infp = gnupg_tmpfile (); + if (!infp) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + log_error (_("error creating temporary file: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err)); + return 1; /* Error - assume password should not be used. */ + } + + if (fwrite (pw, strlen (pw), 1, infp) != 1) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + log_error (_("error writing to temporary file: %s\n"), + gpg_strerror (err)); + fclose (infp); + return 1; /* Error - assume password should not be used. */ + } + fseek (infp, 0, SEEK_SET); + clearerr (infp); + + i = 0; + argv[i++] = "--null"; + argv[i++] = "--", + argv[i++] = opt.check_passphrase_pattern, + argv[i] = NULL; + assert (i < sizeof argv); + + if (gnupg_spawn_process_fd (pgmname, argv, fileno (infp), -1, -1, &pid)) + result = 1; /* Execute error - assume password should no be used. */ + else if (gnupg_wait_process (pgmname, pid, 1, NULL)) + result = 1; /* Helper returned an error - probably a match. */ + else + result = 0; /* Success; i.e. no match. */ + gnupg_release_process (pid); + + /* Overwrite our temporary file. */ + fseek (infp, 0, SEEK_SET); + clearerr (infp); + for (i=((strlen (pw)+99)/100)*100; i > 0; i--) + putc ('\xff', infp); + fflush (infp); + fclose (infp); + return result; +} + + +static int +take_this_one_anyway2 (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc, const char *anyway_btn) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + + if (opt.enforce_passphrase_constraints) + { + err = agent_show_message (ctrl, desc, L_("Enter new passphrase")); + if (!err) + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CANCELED); + } + else + err = agent_get_confirmation (ctrl, desc, + anyway_btn, L_("Enter new passphrase"), 0); + return err; +} + + +static int +take_this_one_anyway (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc) +{ + return take_this_one_anyway2 (ctrl, desc, L_("Take this one anyway")); +} + + +/* Check whether the passphrase PW is suitable. Returns 0 if the + passphrase is suitable and true if it is not and the user should be + asked to provide a different one. If FAILED_CONSTRAINT is set, a + message describing the problem is returned in + *FAILED_CONSTRAINT. */ +int +check_passphrase_constraints (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *pw, int no_empty, + char **failed_constraint) +{ + gpg_error_t err = 0; + unsigned int minlen = opt.min_passphrase_len; + unsigned int minnonalpha = opt.min_passphrase_nonalpha; + char *msg1 = NULL; + char *msg2 = NULL; + char *msg3 = NULL; + + if (ctrl && ctrl->pinentry_mode == PINENTRY_MODE_LOOPBACK) + return 0; + + if (!pw) + pw = ""; + + /* The first check is to warn about an empty passphrase. */ + if (!*pw) + { + const char *desc = (opt.enforce_passphrase_constraints || no_empty? + L_("You have not entered a passphrase!%0A" + "An empty passphrase is not allowed.") : + L_("You have not entered a passphrase - " + "this is in general a bad idea!%0A" + "Please confirm that you do not want to " + "have any protection on your key.")); + + err = 1; + if (failed_constraint) + { + if (opt.enforce_passphrase_constraints || no_empty) + *failed_constraint = xstrdup (desc); + else + err = take_this_one_anyway2 (ctrl, desc, + L_("Yes, protection is not needed")); + } + + goto leave; + } + + /* Now check the constraints and collect the error messages unless + in silent mode which returns immediately. */ + if (utf8_charcount (pw, -1) < minlen ) + { + if (!failed_constraint) + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PASSPHRASE); + goto leave; + } + + msg1 = xtryasprintf + ( ngettext ("A passphrase should be at least %u character long.", + "A passphrase should be at least %u characters long.", + minlen), minlen ); + if (!msg1) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto leave; + } + } + + if (nonalpha_count (pw) < minnonalpha ) + { + if (!failed_constraint) + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PASSPHRASE); + goto leave; + } + + msg2 = xtryasprintf + ( ngettext ("A passphrase should contain at least %u digit or%%0A" + "special character.", + "A passphrase should contain at least %u digits or%%0A" + "special characters.", + minnonalpha), minnonalpha ); + if (!msg2) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto leave; + } + } + + /* If configured check the passphrase against a list of known words + and pattern. The actual test is done by an external program. + The warning message is generic to give the user no hint on how to + circumvent this list. */ + if (*pw && opt.check_passphrase_pattern && + check_passphrase_pattern (ctrl, pw)) + { + if (!failed_constraint) + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PASSPHRASE); + goto leave; + } + + msg3 = xtryasprintf + (L_("A passphrase may not be a known term or match%%0A" + "certain pattern.")); + if (!msg3) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto leave; + } + } + + if (failed_constraint && (msg1 || msg2 || msg3)) + { + char *msg; + size_t n; + + msg = strconcat + (L_("Warning: You have entered an insecure passphrase."), + "%0A%0A", + msg1? msg1 : "", msg1? "%0A" : "", + msg2? msg2 : "", msg2? "%0A" : "", + msg3? msg3 : "", msg3? "%0A" : "", + NULL); + if (!msg) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto leave; + } + /* Strip a trailing "%0A". */ + n = strlen (msg); + if (n > 3 && !strcmp (msg + n - 3, "%0A")) + msg[n-3] = 0; + + err = 1; + if (opt.enforce_passphrase_constraints) + *failed_constraint = msg; + else + { + err = take_this_one_anyway (ctrl, msg); + xfree (msg); + } + } + + leave: + xfree (msg1); + xfree (msg2); + xfree (msg3); + return err; +} + + +/* Callback function to compare the first entered PIN with the one + currently being entered. */ +static gpg_error_t +reenter_compare_cb (struct pin_entry_info_s *pi) +{ + const char *pin1 = pi->check_cb_arg; + + if (!strcmp (pin1, pi->pin)) + return 0; /* okay */ + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PASSPHRASE); +} + + +/* Ask the user for a new passphrase using PROMPT. On success the + function returns 0 and store the passphrase at R_PASSPHRASE; if the + user opted not to use a passphrase NULL will be stored there. The + user needs to free the returned string. In case of an error and + error code is returned and NULL stored at R_PASSPHRASE. */ +gpg_error_t +agent_ask_new_passphrase (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *prompt, + char **r_passphrase) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + const char *text1 = prompt; + const char *text2 = L_("Please re-enter this passphrase"); + char *initial_errtext = NULL; + struct pin_entry_info_s *pi, *pi2; + + *r_passphrase = NULL; + + if (ctrl->pinentry_mode == PINENTRY_MODE_LOOPBACK) + { + size_t size; + unsigned char *buffer; + + err = pinentry_loopback (ctrl, "NEW_PASSPHRASE", &buffer, &size, + MAX_PASSPHRASE_LEN); + if (!err) + { + if (size) + { + buffer[size] = 0; + *r_passphrase = buffer; + } + else + *r_passphrase = NULL; + } + return err; + } + + pi = gcry_calloc_secure (1, sizeof (*pi) + MAX_PASSPHRASE_LEN + 1); + if (!pi) + return gpg_error_from_syserror (); + pi2 = gcry_calloc_secure (1, sizeof (*pi2) + MAX_PASSPHRASE_LEN + 1); + if (!pi2) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + xfree (pi2); + return err; + } + pi->max_length = MAX_PASSPHRASE_LEN + 1; + pi->max_tries = 3; + pi->with_qualitybar = 0; + pi->with_repeat = 1; + pi2->max_length = MAX_PASSPHRASE_LEN + 1; + pi2->max_tries = 3; + pi2->check_cb = reenter_compare_cb; + pi2->check_cb_arg = pi->pin; + + next_try: + err = agent_askpin (ctrl, text1, NULL, initial_errtext, pi, NULL, 0); + xfree (initial_errtext); + initial_errtext = NULL; + if (!err) + { + if (check_passphrase_constraints (ctrl, pi->pin, 0, &initial_errtext)) + { + pi->failed_tries = 0; + pi2->failed_tries = 0; + goto next_try; + } + /* Unless the passphrase is empty or the pinentry told us that + it already did the repetition check, ask to confirm it. */ + if (*pi->pin && !pi->repeat_okay) + { + err = agent_askpin (ctrl, text2, NULL, NULL, pi2, NULL, 0); + if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_BAD_PASSPHRASE) + { /* The re-entered one did not match and the user did not + hit cancel. */ + initial_errtext = xtrystrdup (L_("does not match - try again")); + if (initial_errtext) + goto next_try; + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + } + } + } + + if (!err && *pi->pin) + { + /* User wants a passphrase. */ + *r_passphrase = xtrystrdup (pi->pin); + if (!*r_passphrase) + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + } + + xfree (initial_errtext); + xfree (pi2); + xfree (pi); + return err; +} + + + +/* Generate a new keypair according to the parameters given in + KEYPARAM. If CACHE_NONCE is given first try to lookup a passphrase + using the cache nonce. If NO_PROTECTION is true the key will not + be protected by a passphrase. If OVERRIDE_PASSPHRASE is true that + passphrase will be used for the new key. If TIMESTAMP is not zero + it will be recorded as creation date of the key (unless extended + format is disabled) . */ +int +agent_genkey (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *cache_nonce, time_t timestamp, + const char *keyparam, size_t keyparamlen, int no_protection, + const char *override_passphrase, int preset, membuf_t *outbuf) +{ + gcry_sexp_t s_keyparam, s_key, s_private, s_public; + char *passphrase_buffer = NULL; + const char *passphrase; + int rc; + size_t len; + char *buf; + + rc = gcry_sexp_sscan (&s_keyparam, NULL, keyparam, keyparamlen); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("failed to convert keyparam: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_DATA); + } + + /* Get the passphrase now, cause key generation may take a while. */ + if (override_passphrase) + passphrase = override_passphrase; + else if (no_protection || !cache_nonce) + passphrase = NULL; + else + { + passphrase_buffer = agent_get_cache (ctrl, cache_nonce, CACHE_MODE_NONCE); + passphrase = passphrase_buffer; + } + + if (passphrase || no_protection) + ; + else + { + rc = agent_ask_new_passphrase (ctrl, + L_("Please enter the passphrase to%0A" + "protect your new key"), + &passphrase_buffer); + if (rc) + return rc; + passphrase = passphrase_buffer; + } + + rc = gcry_pk_genkey (&s_key, s_keyparam ); + gcry_sexp_release (s_keyparam); + if (rc) + { + log_error ("key generation failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); + xfree (passphrase_buffer); + return rc; + } + + /* break out the parts */ + s_private = gcry_sexp_find_token (s_key, "private-key", 0); + if (!s_private) + { + log_error ("key generation failed: invalid return value\n"); + gcry_sexp_release (s_key); + xfree (passphrase_buffer); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_DATA); + } + s_public = gcry_sexp_find_token (s_key, "public-key", 0); + if (!s_public) + { + log_error ("key generation failed: invalid return value\n"); + gcry_sexp_release (s_private); + gcry_sexp_release (s_key); + xfree (passphrase_buffer); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_DATA); + } + gcry_sexp_release (s_key); s_key = NULL; + + /* store the secret key */ + if (DBG_CRYPTO) + log_debug ("storing private key\n"); + rc = store_key (s_private, passphrase, 0, ctrl->s2k_count, timestamp); + if (!rc) + { + if (!cache_nonce) + { + char tmpbuf[12]; + gcry_create_nonce (tmpbuf, 12); + cache_nonce = bin2hex (tmpbuf, 12, NULL); + } + if (cache_nonce + && !no_protection + && !agent_put_cache (ctrl, cache_nonce, CACHE_MODE_NONCE, + passphrase, ctrl->cache_ttl_opt_preset)) + agent_write_status (ctrl, "CACHE_NONCE", cache_nonce, NULL); + if (preset && !no_protection) + { + unsigned char grip[20]; + char hexgrip[40+1]; + if (gcry_pk_get_keygrip (s_private, grip)) + { + bin2hex(grip, 20, hexgrip); + rc = agent_put_cache (ctrl, hexgrip, CACHE_MODE_ANY, passphrase, + ctrl->cache_ttl_opt_preset); + } + } + } + xfree (passphrase_buffer); + passphrase_buffer = NULL; + passphrase = NULL; + gcry_sexp_release (s_private); + if (rc) + { + gcry_sexp_release (s_public); + return rc; + } + + /* return the public key */ + if (DBG_CRYPTO) + log_debug ("returning public key\n"); + len = gcry_sexp_sprint (s_public, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, NULL, 0); + assert (len); + buf = xtrymalloc (len); + if (!buf) + { + gpg_error_t tmperr = out_of_core (); + gcry_sexp_release (s_private); + gcry_sexp_release (s_public); + return tmperr; + } + len = gcry_sexp_sprint (s_public, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, buf, len); + assert (len); + put_membuf (outbuf, buf, len); + gcry_sexp_release (s_public); + xfree (buf); + + return 0; +} + + + +/* Apply a new passphrase to the key S_SKEY and store it. If + PASSPHRASE_ADDR and *PASSPHRASE_ADDR are not NULL, use that + passphrase. If PASSPHRASE_ADDR is not NULL store a newly entered + passphrase at that address. */ +gpg_error_t +agent_protect_and_store (ctrl_t ctrl, gcry_sexp_t s_skey, + char **passphrase_addr) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + + if (passphrase_addr && *passphrase_addr) + { + /* Take an empty string as request not to protect the key. */ + err = store_key (s_skey, **passphrase_addr? *passphrase_addr:NULL, 1, + ctrl->s2k_count, 0); + } + else + { + char *pass = NULL; + + if (passphrase_addr) + { + xfree (*passphrase_addr); + *passphrase_addr = NULL; + } + err = agent_ask_new_passphrase (ctrl, + L_("Please enter the new passphrase"), + &pass); + if (!err) + err = store_key (s_skey, pass, 1, ctrl->s2k_count, 0); + if (!err && passphrase_addr) + *passphrase_addr = pass; + else + xfree (pass); + } + + return err; +} -- cgit v1.2.3