From 8de1ee1b2b676b0d07586f0752750dd6b0fb7511 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Baumann Date: Sat, 27 Apr 2024 11:59:15 +0200 Subject: Adding upstream version 2.2.27. Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann --- scd/app-openpgp.c | 5434 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 5434 insertions(+) create mode 100644 scd/app-openpgp.c (limited to 'scd/app-openpgp.c') diff --git a/scd/app-openpgp.c b/scd/app-openpgp.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..87d77a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/scd/app-openpgp.c @@ -0,0 +1,5434 @@ +/* app-openpgp.c - The OpenPGP card application. + * Copyright (C) 2003-2005, 2007-2009, + * 2013-2015 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2003-2005, 2007-2009, 2013-2015, 2020 g10 Code GmbH + * + * This file is part of GnuPG. + * + * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, see . + */ + +/* Some notes: + + CHV means Card Holder Verification and is nothing else than a PIN + or password. That term seems to have been used originally with GSM + cards. Version v2 of the specs changes the term to the clearer + term PW for password. We use the terms here interchangeable + because we do not want to change existing strings i18n wise. + + Version 2 of the specs also drops the separate PW2 which was + required in v1 due to ISO requirements. It is now possible to have + one physical PW but two reference to it so that they can be + individually be verified (e.g. to implement a forced verification + for one key). Thus you will noticed the use of PW2 with the verify + command but not with change_reference_data because the latter + operates directly on the physical PW. + + The Reset Code (RC) as implemented by v2 cards uses the same error + counter as the PW2 of v1 cards. By default no RC is set and thus + that error counter is set to 0. After setting the RC the error + counter will be initialized to 3. + + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "scdaemon.h" + +#include "../common/util.h" +#include "../common/i18n.h" +#include "iso7816.h" +#include "app-common.h" +#include "../common/tlv.h" +#include "../common/host2net.h" +#include "../common/openpgpdefs.h" + + +#define KDF_DATA_LENGTH_MIN 90 +#define KDF_DATA_LENGTH_MAX 110 + +/* A table describing the DOs of the card. */ +static struct { + int tag; + int constructed; + int get_from; /* Constructed DO with this DO or 0 for direct access. */ + unsigned int binary:1; + unsigned int dont_cache:1; + unsigned int flush_on_error:1; + unsigned int get_immediate_in_v11:1; /* Enable a hack to bypass the cache of + this data object if it is used in 1.1 + and later versions of the card. This + does not work with composite DO and + is currently only useful for the CHV + status bytes. */ + unsigned int try_extlen:2; /* Large object; try to use an extended + length APDU when !=0. The size is + determined by extcap.max_certlen_3 + when == 1, and by extcap.max_special_do + when == 2. */ + char *desc; +} data_objects[] = { + { 0x005E, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 2, "Login Data" }, + { 0x5F50, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, "URL" }, + { 0x5F52, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, "Historical Bytes" }, + { 0x0065, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, "Cardholder Related Data"}, + { 0x005B, 0, 0x65, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, "Name" }, + { 0x5F2D, 0, 0x65, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, "Language preferences" }, + { 0x5F35, 0, 0x65, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, "Salutation" }, + { 0x006E, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, "Application Related Data" }, + { 0x004F, 0, 0x6E, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, "AID" }, + { 0x0073, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, "Discretionary Data Objects" }, + { 0x0047, 0, 0x6E, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, "Card Capabilities" }, + { 0x00C0, 0, 0x6E, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, "Extended Card Capabilities" }, + { 0x00C1, 0, 0x6E, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, "Algorithm Attributes Signature" }, + { 0x00C2, 0, 0x6E, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, "Algorithm Attributes Decryption" }, + { 0x00C3, 0, 0x6E, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, "Algorithm Attributes Authentication" }, + { 0x00C4, 0, 0x6E, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, "CHV Status Bytes" }, + { 0x00C5, 0, 0x6E, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, "Fingerprints" }, + { 0x00C6, 0, 0x6E, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, "CA Fingerprints" }, + { 0x00CD, 0, 0x6E, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, "Generation time" }, + { 0x007A, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, "Security Support Template" }, + { 0x0093, 0, 0x7A, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, "Digital Signature Counter" }, + { 0x0101, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, "Private DO 1"}, + { 0x0102, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, "Private DO 2"}, + { 0x0103, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, "Private DO 3"}, + { 0x0104, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, "Private DO 4"}, + { 0x7F21, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, "Cardholder certificate"}, + /* V3.0 */ + { 0x7F74, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, "General Feature Management"}, + { 0x00D5, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, "AES key data"}, + { 0x00F9, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, "KDF data object"}, + { 0 } +}; + + +/* Type of keys. */ +typedef enum + { + KEY_TYPE_ECC, + KEY_TYPE_RSA, + } +key_type_t; + + +/* The format of RSA private keys. */ +typedef enum + { + RSA_UNKNOWN_FMT, + RSA_STD, + RSA_STD_N, + RSA_CRT, + RSA_CRT_N + } +rsa_key_format_t; + + +/* One cache item for DOs. */ +struct cache_s { + struct cache_s *next; + int tag; + size_t length; + unsigned char data[1]; +}; + + +/* Object with application (i.e. OpenPGP card) specific data. */ +struct app_local_s { + /* A linked list with cached DOs. */ + struct cache_s *cache; + + /* Keep track of the public keys. */ + struct + { + int read_done; /* True if we have at least tried to read them. */ + unsigned char *key; /* This is a malloced buffer with a canonical + encoded S-expression encoding a public + key. Might be NULL if key is not + available. */ + size_t keylen; /* The length of the above S-expression. This + is usually only required for cross checks + because the length of an S-expression is + implicitly available. */ + unsigned char keygrip_str[41]; /* The keygrip, null terminated */ + } pk[3]; + + unsigned char status_indicator; /* The card status indicator. */ + + unsigned int manufacturer:16; /* Manufacturer ID from the s/n. */ + + /* Keep track of the ISO card capabilities. */ + struct + { + unsigned int cmd_chaining:1; /* Command chaining is supported. */ + unsigned int ext_lc_le:1; /* Extended Lc and Le are supported. */ + } cardcap; + + /* Keep track of extended card capabilities. */ + struct + { + unsigned int is_v2:1; /* Compatible to v2 or later. */ + unsigned int extcap_v3:1; /* Extcap is in v3 format. */ + unsigned int has_button:1; /* Has confirmation button or not. */ + + unsigned int sm_supported:1; /* Secure Messaging is supported. */ + unsigned int get_challenge:1; + unsigned int key_import:1; + unsigned int change_force_chv:1; + unsigned int private_dos:1; + unsigned int algo_attr_change:1; /* Algorithm attributes changeable. */ + unsigned int has_decrypt:1; /* Support symmetric decryption. */ + unsigned int kdf_do:1; /* Support KDF DO. */ + + unsigned int sm_algo:2; /* Symmetric crypto algo for SM. */ + unsigned int pin_blk2:1; /* PIN block 2 format supported. */ + unsigned int mse:1; /* MSE command supported. */ + unsigned int max_certlen_3:16; + unsigned int max_get_challenge:16; /* Maximum size for get_challenge. */ + unsigned int max_special_do:16; /* Maximum size for special DOs. */ + } extcap; + + /* Flags used to control the application. */ + struct + { + unsigned int no_sync:1; /* Do not sync CHV1 and CHV2 */ + unsigned int def_chv2:1; /* Use 123456 for CHV2. */ + } flags; + + /* Pinpad request specified on card. */ + struct + { + unsigned int disabled:1; /* No pinpad use because of KDF DO. */ + unsigned int specified:1; + int fixedlen_user; + int fixedlen_admin; + } pinpad; + + struct + { + key_type_t key_type; + union { + struct { + unsigned int n_bits; /* Size of the modulus in bits. The rest + of this strucuire is only valid if + this is not 0. */ + unsigned int e_bits; /* Size of the public exponent in bits. */ + rsa_key_format_t format; + } rsa; + struct { + const char *curve; + int flags; + } ecc; + }; + } keyattr[3]; +}; + +#define ECC_FLAG_DJB_TWEAK (1 << 0) +#define ECC_FLAG_PUBKEY (1 << 1) + + +/***** Local prototypes *****/ +static unsigned long convert_sig_counter_value (const unsigned char *value, + size_t valuelen); +static unsigned long get_sig_counter (app_t app); +static gpg_error_t do_auth (app_t app, const char *keyidstr, + gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **), + void *pincb_arg, + const void *indata, size_t indatalen, + unsigned char **outdata, size_t *outdatalen); +static void parse_algorithm_attribute (app_t app, int keyno); +static gpg_error_t change_keyattr_from_string + (app_t app, + gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **), + void *pincb_arg, + const void *value, size_t valuelen); + + +/* Return the OpenPGP card manufacturer name. */ +static const char * +get_manufacturer (unsigned int no) +{ + /* Note: Make sure that there is no colon or linefeed in the string. */ + switch (no) + { + case 0x0001: return "PPC Card Systems"; + case 0x0002: return "Prism"; + case 0x0003: return "OpenFortress"; + case 0x0004: return "Wewid"; + case 0x0005: return "ZeitControl"; + case 0x0006: return "Yubico"; + case 0x0007: return "OpenKMS"; + case 0x0008: return "LogoEmail"; + case 0x0009: return "Fidesmo"; + case 0x000A: return "Dangerous Things"; + case 0x000B: return "Feitian Technologies"; + + case 0x002A: return "Magrathea"; + case 0x0042: return "GnuPG e.V."; + + case 0x1337: return "Warsaw Hackerspace"; + case 0x2342: return "warpzone"; /* hackerspace Muenster. */ + case 0x4354: return "Confidential Technologies"; /* cotech.de */ + case 0x5443: return "TIF-IT e.V."; + case 0x63AF: return "Trustica"; + case 0xBA53: return "c-base e.V."; + case 0xBD0E: return "Paranoidlabs"; + case 0xF517: return "FSIJ"; + case 0xF5EC: return "F-Secure"; + + /* 0x0000 and 0xFFFF are defined as test cards per spec, + * 0xFF00 to 0xFFFE are assigned for use with randomly created + * serial numbers. */ + case 0x0000: + case 0xffff: return "test card"; + default: return (no & 0xff00) == 0xff00? "unmanaged S/N range":"unknown"; + } +} + + + + +/* Deconstructor. */ +static void +do_deinit (app_t app) +{ + if (app && app->app_local) + { + struct cache_s *c, *c2; + int i; + + for (c = app->app_local->cache; c; c = c2) + { + c2 = c->next; + xfree (c); + } + + for (i=0; i < DIM (app->app_local->pk); i++) + { + xfree (app->app_local->pk[i].key); + app->app_local->pk[i].read_done = 0; + } + xfree (app->app_local); + app->app_local = NULL; + } +} + + +/* Wrapper around iso7816_get_data which first tries to get the data + from the cache. With GET_IMMEDIATE passed as true, the cache is + bypassed. With TRY_EXTLEN extended lengths APDUs are use if + supported by the card. */ +static gpg_error_t +get_cached_data (app_t app, int tag, + unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen, + int get_immediate, int try_extlen) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + int i; + unsigned char *p; + size_t len; + struct cache_s *c; + int exmode; + + *result = NULL; + *resultlen = 0; + + if (!get_immediate) + { + for (c=app->app_local->cache; c; c = c->next) + if (c->tag == tag) + { + if(c->length) + { + p = xtrymalloc (c->length); + if (!p) + return gpg_error (gpg_err_code_from_errno (errno)); + memcpy (p, c->data, c->length); + *result = p; + } + + *resultlen = c->length; + + return 0; + } + } + + if (try_extlen && app->app_local->cardcap.ext_lc_le) + { + if (try_extlen == 1) + exmode = app->app_local->extcap.max_certlen_3; + else if (try_extlen == 2 && app->app_local->extcap.extcap_v3) + exmode = app->app_local->extcap.max_special_do; + else + exmode = 0; + } + else + exmode = 0; + + err = iso7816_get_data (app->slot, exmode, tag, &p, &len); + if (err) + return err; + if (len) + *result = p; + *resultlen = len; + + /* Check whether we should cache this object. */ + if (get_immediate) + return 0; + + for (i=0; data_objects[i].tag; i++) + if (data_objects[i].tag == tag) + { + if (data_objects[i].dont_cache) + return 0; + break; + } + + /* Okay, cache it. */ + for (c=app->app_local->cache; c; c = c->next) + assert (c->tag != tag); + + c = xtrymalloc (sizeof *c + len); + if (c) + { + if (len) + memcpy (c->data, p, len); + else + xfree (p); + c->length = len; + c->tag = tag; + c->next = app->app_local->cache; + app->app_local->cache = c; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* Remove DO at TAG from the cache. */ +static void +flush_cache_item (app_t app, int tag) +{ + struct cache_s *c, *cprev; + int i; + + if (!app->app_local) + return; + + for (c=app->app_local->cache, cprev=NULL; c ; cprev=c, c = c->next) + if (c->tag == tag) + { + if (cprev) + cprev->next = c->next; + else + app->app_local->cache = c->next; + xfree (c); + + for (c=app->app_local->cache; c ; c = c->next) + { + assert (c->tag != tag); /* Oops: duplicated entry. */ + } + return; + } + + /* Try again if we have an outer tag. */ + for (i=0; data_objects[i].tag; i++) + if (data_objects[i].tag == tag && data_objects[i].get_from + && data_objects[i].get_from != tag) + flush_cache_item (app, data_objects[i].get_from); +} + +/* Flush all entries from the cache which might be out of sync after + an error. */ +static void +flush_cache_after_error (app_t app) +{ + int i; + + for (i=0; data_objects[i].tag; i++) + if (data_objects[i].flush_on_error) + flush_cache_item (app, data_objects[i].tag); +} + + +/* Flush the entire cache. */ +static void +flush_cache (app_t app) +{ + if (app && app->app_local) + { + struct cache_s *c, *c2; + + for (c = app->app_local->cache; c; c = c2) + { + c2 = c->next; + xfree (c); + } + app->app_local->cache = NULL; + } +} + + +/* Get the DO identified by TAG from the card in SLOT and return a + buffer with its content in RESULT and NBYTES. The return value is + NULL if not found or a pointer which must be used to release the + buffer holding value. */ +static void * +get_one_do (app_t app, int tag, unsigned char **result, size_t *nbytes, + int *r_rc) +{ + int rc, i; + unsigned char *buffer; + size_t buflen; + unsigned char *value; + size_t valuelen; + int dummyrc; + int exmode; + + if (!r_rc) + r_rc = &dummyrc; + + *result = NULL; + *nbytes = 0; + *r_rc = 0; + for (i=0; data_objects[i].tag && data_objects[i].tag != tag; i++) + ; + + if (app->card_version > 0x0100 && data_objects[i].get_immediate_in_v11) + { + exmode = 0; + rc = iso7816_get_data (app->slot, exmode, tag, &buffer, &buflen); + if (rc) + { + *r_rc = rc; + return NULL; + } + *result = buffer; + *nbytes = buflen; + return buffer; + } + + value = NULL; + rc = -1; + if (data_objects[i].tag && data_objects[i].get_from) + { + rc = get_cached_data (app, data_objects[i].get_from, + &buffer, &buflen, + (data_objects[i].dont_cache + || data_objects[i].get_immediate_in_v11), + data_objects[i].try_extlen); + if (!rc) + { + const unsigned char *s; + + s = find_tlv_unchecked (buffer, buflen, tag, &valuelen); + if (!s) + value = NULL; /* not found */ + else if (valuelen > buflen - (s - buffer)) + { + log_error ("warning: constructed DO too short\n"); + value = NULL; + xfree (buffer); buffer = NULL; + } + else + value = buffer + (s - buffer); + } + } + + if (!value) /* Not in a constructed DO, try simple. */ + { + rc = get_cached_data (app, tag, &buffer, &buflen, + (data_objects[i].dont_cache + || data_objects[i].get_immediate_in_v11), + data_objects[i].try_extlen); + if (!rc) + { + value = buffer; + valuelen = buflen; + } + } + + if (!rc) + { + *nbytes = valuelen; + *result = value; + return buffer; + } + *r_rc = rc; + return NULL; +} + + +static void +dump_all_do (int slot) +{ + int rc, i, j; + unsigned char *buffer; + size_t buflen; + + for (i=0; data_objects[i].tag; i++) + { + if (data_objects[i].get_from) + continue; + + /* We don't try extended length APDU because such large DO would + be pretty useless in a log file. */ + rc = iso7816_get_data (slot, 0, data_objects[i].tag, &buffer, &buflen); + if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_OBJ) + ; + else if (rc) + log_info ("DO '%s' not available: %s\n", + data_objects[i].desc, gpg_strerror (rc)); + else + { + if (data_objects[i].binary) + { + log_info ("DO '%s': ", data_objects[i].desc); + log_printhex (buffer, buflen, ""); + } + else + log_info ("DO '%s': '%.*s'\n", + data_objects[i].desc, + (int)buflen, buffer); /* FIXME: sanitize */ + + if (data_objects[i].constructed) + { + for (j=0; data_objects[j].tag; j++) + { + const unsigned char *value; + size_t valuelen; + + if (j==i || data_objects[i].tag != data_objects[j].get_from) + continue; + value = find_tlv_unchecked (buffer, buflen, + data_objects[j].tag, &valuelen); + if (!value) + ; /* not found */ + else if (valuelen > buflen - (value - buffer)) + log_error ("warning: constructed DO too short\n"); + else + { + if (data_objects[j].binary) + { + log_info ("DO '%s': ", data_objects[j].desc); + if (valuelen > 200) + log_info ("[%u]\n", (unsigned int)valuelen); + else + log_printhex (value, valuelen, ""); + } + else + log_info ("DO '%s': '%.*s'\n", + data_objects[j].desc, + (int)valuelen, value); /* FIXME: sanitize */ + } + } + } + } + xfree (buffer); buffer = NULL; + } +} + + +/* Count the number of bits, assuming the A represents an unsigned big + integer of length LEN bytes. */ +static unsigned int +count_bits (const unsigned char *a, size_t len) +{ + unsigned int n = len * 8; + int i; + + for (; len && !*a; len--, a++, n -=8) + ; + if (len) + { + for (i=7; i && !(*a & (1< + + Where FLAGS is a plain hexadecimal number representing flag values. + The lsb is here the rightmost bit. Defined flags bits are: + + Bit 0 = CHV1 and CHV2 are not synchronized + Bit 1 = CHV2 has been set to the default PIN of "123456" + (this implies that bit 0 is also set). + + P= + + Where PINPAD_REQUEST is in the format of: or ,. + N for user PIN, M for admin PIN. If M is missing it means M=N. + 0 means to force not to use pinpad. + +*/ +static void +parse_login_data (app_t app) +{ + unsigned char *buffer, *p; + size_t buflen, len; + void *relptr; + + /* Set defaults. */ + app->app_local->flags.no_sync = 0; + app->app_local->flags.def_chv2 = 0; + app->app_local->pinpad.specified = 0; + app->app_local->pinpad.fixedlen_user = -1; + app->app_local->pinpad.fixedlen_admin = -1; + + /* Read the DO. */ + relptr = get_one_do (app, 0x005E, &buffer, &buflen, NULL); + if (!relptr) + return; /* Ooops. */ + for (; buflen; buflen--, buffer++) + if (*buffer == '\n') + break; + if (buflen < 2 || buffer[1] != '\x14') + { + xfree (relptr); + return; /* No control sequences. */ + } + + buflen--; + buffer++; + do + { + buflen--; + buffer++; + if (buflen > 1 && *buffer == 'F' && buffer[1] == '=') + { + /* Flags control sequence found. */ + int lastdig = 0; + + /* For now we are only interested in the last digit, so skip + any leading digits but bail out on invalid characters. */ + for (p=buffer+2, len = buflen-2; len && hexdigitp (p); p++, len--) + lastdig = xtoi_1 (p); + buffer = p; + buflen = len; + if (len && !(*p == '\n' || *p == '\x18')) + goto next; /* Invalid characters in field. */ + app->app_local->flags.no_sync = !!(lastdig & 1); + app->app_local->flags.def_chv2 = (lastdig & 3) == 3; + } + else if (buflen > 1 && *buffer == 'P' && buffer[1] == '=') + { + /* Pinpad request control sequence found. */ + buffer += 2; + buflen -= 2; + + if (buflen) + { + if (digitp (buffer)) + { + char *q; + int n, m; + + n = strtol (buffer, &q, 10); + if (q >= (char *)buffer + buflen + || *q == '\x18' || *q == '\n') + m = n; + else + { + if (*q++ != ',' || !digitp (q)) + goto next; + m = strtol (q, &q, 10); + } + + if (buflen < ((unsigned char *)q - buffer)) + break; + + buflen -= ((unsigned char *)q - buffer); + buffer = q; + + if (buflen && !(*buffer == '\n' || *buffer == '\x18')) + goto next; + app->app_local->pinpad.specified = 1; + app->app_local->pinpad.fixedlen_user = n; + app->app_local->pinpad.fixedlen_admin = m; + } + } + } + next: + /* Skip to FS (0x18) or LF (\n). */ + for (; buflen && *buffer != '\x18' && *buffer != '\n'; buflen--) + buffer++; + } + while (buflen && *buffer != '\n'); + + xfree (relptr); +} + + +#define MAX_ARGS_STORE_FPR 3 + +/* Note, that FPR must be at least 20 bytes. */ +static gpg_error_t +store_fpr (app_t app, int keynumber, u32 timestamp, unsigned char *fpr, + int algo, ...) +{ + unsigned int n, nbits; + unsigned char *buffer, *p; + int tag, tag2; + int rc; + const unsigned char *m[MAX_ARGS_STORE_FPR]; + size_t mlen[MAX_ARGS_STORE_FPR]; + va_list ap; + int argc; + int i; + + n = 6; /* key packet version, 4-byte timestamps, and algorithm */ + if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH) + argc = 3; + else + argc = 2; + + va_start (ap, algo); + for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) + { + m[i] = va_arg (ap, const unsigned char *); + mlen[i] = va_arg (ap, size_t); + if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA || i == 1) + n += 2; + n += mlen[i]; + } + va_end (ap); + + p = buffer = xtrymalloc (3 + n); + if (!buffer) + return gpg_error_from_syserror (); + + *p++ = 0x99; /* ctb */ + *p++ = n >> 8; /* 2 byte length header */ + *p++ = n; + *p++ = 4; /* key packet version */ + *p++ = timestamp >> 24; + *p++ = timestamp >> 16; + *p++ = timestamp >> 8; + *p++ = timestamp; + *p++ = algo; + + for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) + { + if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA || i == 1) + { + nbits = count_bits (m[i], mlen[i]); + *p++ = nbits >> 8; + *p++ = nbits; + } + memcpy (p, m[i], mlen[i]); + p += mlen[i]; + } + + gcry_md_hash_buffer (GCRY_MD_SHA1, fpr, buffer, n+3); + + xfree (buffer); + + tag = (app->card_version > 0x0007? 0xC7 : 0xC6) + keynumber; + flush_cache_item (app, 0xC5); + tag2 = 0xCE + keynumber; + flush_cache_item (app, 0xCD); + + rc = iso7816_put_data (app->slot, 0, tag, fpr, 20); + if (rc) + log_error (_("failed to store the fingerprint: %s\n"),gpg_strerror (rc)); + + if (!rc && app->card_version > 0x0100) + { + unsigned char buf[4]; + + buf[0] = timestamp >> 24; + buf[1] = timestamp >> 16; + buf[2] = timestamp >> 8; + buf[3] = timestamp; + + rc = iso7816_put_data (app->slot, 0, tag2, buf, 4); + if (rc) + log_error (_("failed to store the creation date: %s\n"), + gpg_strerror (rc)); + } + + return rc; +} + + +static void +send_fpr_if_not_null (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *keyword, + int number, const unsigned char *fpr) +{ + int i; + char buf[41]; + char numbuf[25]; + + for (i=0; i < 20 && !fpr[i]; i++) + ; + if (i==20) + return; /* All zero. */ + bin2hex (fpr, 20, buf); + if (number == -1) + *numbuf = 0; /* Don't print the key number */ + else + sprintf (numbuf, "%d", number); + send_status_info (ctrl, keyword, + numbuf, (size_t)strlen(numbuf), + buf, (size_t)strlen (buf), NULL, 0); +} + +static void +send_fprtime_if_not_null (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *keyword, + int number, const unsigned char *stamp) +{ + char numbuf1[50], numbuf2[50]; + unsigned long value; + + value = buf32_to_ulong (stamp); + if (!value) + return; + sprintf (numbuf1, "%d", number); + sprintf (numbuf2, "%lu", value); + send_status_info (ctrl, keyword, + numbuf1, (size_t)strlen(numbuf1), + numbuf2, (size_t)strlen(numbuf2), NULL, 0); +} + +static void +send_key_data (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *name, + const unsigned char *a, size_t alen) +{ + char *buffer, *buf; + size_t buflen; + + buffer = buf = bin2hex (a, alen, NULL); + if (!buffer) + { + log_error ("memory allocation error in send_key_data\n"); + return; + } + buflen = strlen (buffer); + + /* 768 is the hexified size for the modulus of an 3072 bit key. We + use extra chunks to transmit larger data (i.e for 4096 bit). */ + for ( ;buflen > 768; buflen -= 768, buf += 768) + send_status_info (ctrl, "KEY-DATA", + "-", 1, + buf, 768, + NULL, 0); + send_status_info (ctrl, "KEY-DATA", + name, (size_t)strlen(name), + buf, buflen, + NULL, 0); + xfree (buffer); +} + + +static void +send_key_attr (ctrl_t ctrl, app_t app, const char *keyword, int keyno) +{ + char buffer[200]; + + assert (keyno >=0 && keyno < DIM(app->app_local->keyattr)); + + if (app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].key_type == KEY_TYPE_RSA) + snprintf (buffer, sizeof buffer, "%d 1 rsa%u %u %d", + keyno+1, + app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.n_bits, + app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.e_bits, + app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.format); + else if (app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].key_type == KEY_TYPE_ECC) + { + snprintf (buffer, sizeof buffer, "%d %d %s", + keyno+1, + keyno==1? PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH : + (app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].ecc.flags & ECC_FLAG_DJB_TWEAK)? + PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA : PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA, + app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].ecc.curve); + } + else + snprintf (buffer, sizeof buffer, "%d 0 0 UNKNOWN", keyno+1); + + send_status_direct (ctrl, keyword, buffer); +} + + +#define RSA_SMALL_SIZE_KEY 1952 +#define RSA_SMALL_SIZE_OP 2048 + +static int +determine_rsa_response (app_t app, int keyno) +{ + int size; + + size = 2 + 3 /* header */ + + 4 /* tag+len */ + (app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.n_bits+7)/8 + + 2 /* tag+len */ + (app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.e_bits+7)/8; + + return size; +} + + +/* Implement the GETATTR command. This is similar to the LEARN + command but returns just one value via the status interface. */ +static gpg_error_t +do_getattr (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, const char *name) +{ + static struct { + const char *name; + int tag; + int special; + } table[] = { + { "DISP-NAME", 0x005B }, + { "LOGIN-DATA", 0x005E }, + { "DISP-LANG", 0x5F2D }, + { "DISP-SEX", 0x5F35 }, + { "PUBKEY-URL", 0x5F50 }, + { "KEY-FPR", 0x00C5, 3 }, + { "KEY-TIME", 0x00CD, 4 }, + { "KEY-ATTR", 0x0000, -5 }, + { "CA-FPR", 0x00C6, 3 }, + { "CHV-STATUS", 0x00C4, 1 }, + { "SIG-COUNTER", 0x0093, 2 }, + { "SERIALNO", 0x004F, -1 }, + { "AID", 0x004F }, + { "EXTCAP", 0x0000, -2 }, + { "PRIVATE-DO-1", 0x0101 }, + { "PRIVATE-DO-2", 0x0102 }, + { "PRIVATE-DO-3", 0x0103 }, + { "PRIVATE-DO-4", 0x0104 }, + { "$AUTHKEYID", 0x0000, -3 }, + { "$ENCRKEYID", 0x0000, -6 }, + { "$SIGNKEYID", 0x0000, -7 }, + { "$DISPSERIALNO",0x0000, -4 }, + { "KDF", 0x00F9, 5 }, + { "MANUFACTURER", 0x0000, -8 }, + { NULL, 0 } + }; + int idx, i, rc; + void *relptr; + unsigned char *value; + size_t valuelen; + + for (idx=0; table[idx].name && strcmp (table[idx].name, name); idx++) + ; + if (!table[idx].name) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_NAME); + + if (table[idx].special == -1) + { + /* The serial number is very special. We could have used the + AID DO to retrieve it. The AID DO is available anyway but + not hex formatted. */ + char *serial = app_get_serialno (app); + + if (serial) + { + send_status_direct (ctrl, "SERIALNO", serial); + xfree (serial); + } + return 0; + } + if (table[idx].special == -2) + { + char tmp[110]; + + snprintf (tmp, sizeof tmp, + "gc=%d ki=%d fc=%d pd=%d mcl3=%u aac=%d " + "sm=%d si=%u dec=%d bt=%d kdf=%d", + app->app_local->extcap.get_challenge, + app->app_local->extcap.key_import, + app->app_local->extcap.change_force_chv, + app->app_local->extcap.private_dos, + app->app_local->extcap.max_certlen_3, + app->app_local->extcap.algo_attr_change, + (app->app_local->extcap.sm_supported + ? (app->app_local->extcap.sm_algo == 0? CIPHER_ALGO_3DES : + (app->app_local->extcap.sm_algo == 1? + CIPHER_ALGO_AES : CIPHER_ALGO_AES256)) + : 0), + app->app_local->status_indicator, + app->app_local->extcap.has_decrypt, + app->app_local->extcap.has_button, + app->app_local->extcap.kdf_do); + send_status_info (ctrl, table[idx].name, tmp, strlen (tmp), NULL, 0); + return 0; + } + if (table[idx].special == -3) + { + char const tmp[] = "OPENPGP.3"; + send_status_info (ctrl, table[idx].name, tmp, strlen (tmp), NULL, 0); + return 0; + } + if (table[idx].special == -4) + { + char *serial = app_get_serialno (app); + + if (serial) + { + if (strlen (serial) > 16+12) + { + send_status_info (ctrl, table[idx].name, serial+16, 12, NULL, 0); + xfree (serial); + return 0; + } + xfree (serial); + } + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_NAME); + } + if (table[idx].special == -5) + { + for (i=0; i < 3; i++) + send_key_attr (ctrl, app, table[idx].name, i); + return 0; + } + if (table[idx].special == -6) + { + char const tmp[] = "OPENPGP.2"; + send_status_info (ctrl, table[idx].name, tmp, strlen (tmp), NULL, 0); + return 0; + } + if (table[idx].special == -7) + { + char const tmp[] = "OPENPGP.1"; + send_status_info (ctrl, table[idx].name, tmp, strlen (tmp), NULL, 0); + return 0; + } + if (table[idx].special == -8) + { + return send_status_printf + (ctrl, table[idx].name, "%u %s", + app->app_local->manufacturer, + get_manufacturer (app->app_local->manufacturer)); + } + + relptr = get_one_do (app, table[idx].tag, &value, &valuelen, &rc); + if (relptr) + { + if (table[idx].special == 1) + { + char numbuf[7*23]; + + for (i=0,*numbuf=0; i < valuelen && i < 7; i++) + sprintf (numbuf+strlen (numbuf), " %d", value[i]); + send_status_info (ctrl, table[idx].name, + numbuf, strlen (numbuf), NULL, 0); + } + else if (table[idx].special == 2) + { + char numbuf[50]; + + sprintf (numbuf, "%lu", convert_sig_counter_value (value, valuelen)); + send_status_info (ctrl, table[idx].name, + numbuf, strlen (numbuf), NULL, 0); + } + else if (table[idx].special == 3) + { + if (valuelen >= 60) + for (i=0; i < 3; i++) + send_fpr_if_not_null (ctrl, table[idx].name, i+1, value+i*20); + } + else if (table[idx].special == 4) + { + if (valuelen >= 12) + for (i=0; i < 3; i++) + send_fprtime_if_not_null (ctrl, table[idx].name, i+1, value+i*4); + } + else if (table[idx].special == 5) + { + if ((valuelen == KDF_DATA_LENGTH_MIN + || valuelen == KDF_DATA_LENGTH_MAX) + && (value[2] == 0x03)) + app->app_local->pinpad.disabled = 1; + else + app->app_local->pinpad.disabled = 0; + + send_status_info (ctrl, table[idx].name, value, valuelen, NULL, 0); + } + else + send_status_info (ctrl, table[idx].name, value, valuelen, NULL, 0); + + xfree (relptr); + } + else + { + if (table[idx].special == 5) + app->app_local->pinpad.disabled = 0; + } + return rc; +} + + +/* Return the DISP-NAME without any padding characters. Caller must + * free the result. If not found or empty NULL is returned. */ +static char * +get_disp_name (app_t app) +{ + int rc; + void *relptr; + unsigned char *value; + size_t valuelen; + char *string; + char *p, *given; + char *result; + + relptr = get_one_do (app, 0x005B, &value, &valuelen, &rc); + if (!relptr) + return NULL; + + string = xtrymalloc (valuelen + 1); + if (!string) + { + xfree (relptr); + return NULL; + } + memcpy (string, value, valuelen); + string[valuelen] = 0; + xfree (relptr); + + /* Swap surname and given name. */ + given = strstr (string, "<<"); + for (p = string; *p; p++) + if (*p == '<') + *p = ' '; + + if (given && given[2]) + { + *given = 0; + given += 2; + result = strconcat (given, " ", string, NULL); + } + else + { + result = string; + string = NULL; + } + + xfree (string); + return result; +} + + +/* Return the pretty formatted serialnumber. On error NULL is + * returned. */ +static char * +get_disp_serialno (app_t app) +{ + char *serial = app_get_serialno (app); + + /* For our OpenPGP cards we do not want to show the entire serial + * number but a nicely reformatted actual serial number. */ + if (serial && strlen (serial) > 16+12) + { + memmove (serial, serial+16, 4); + serial[4] = ' '; + /* memmove (serial+5, serial+20, 4); */ + /* serial[9] = ' '; */ + /* memmove (serial+10, serial+24, 4); */ + /* serial[14] = 0; */ + memmove (serial+5, serial+20, 8); + serial[13] = 0; + } + return serial; +} + + +/* Return the number of remaining tries for the standard or the admin + * pw. Returns -1 on card error. */ +static int +get_remaining_tries (app_t app, int adminpw) +{ + void *relptr; + unsigned char *value; + size_t valuelen; + int remaining; + + relptr = get_one_do (app, 0x00C4, &value, &valuelen, NULL); + if (!relptr || valuelen < 7) + { + log_error (_("error retrieving CHV status from card\n")); + xfree (relptr); + return -1; + } + remaining = value[adminpw? 6 : 4]; + xfree (relptr); + return remaining; +} + + +/* Retrieve the fingerprint from the card inserted in SLOT and write + the according hex representation to FPR. Caller must have provide + a buffer at FPR of least 41 bytes. Returns 0 on success or an + error code. */ +static gpg_error_t +retrieve_fpr_from_card (app_t app, int keyno, char *fpr) +{ + gpg_error_t err = 0; + void *relptr; + unsigned char *value; + size_t valuelen; + + assert (keyno >=0 && keyno <= 2); + + relptr = get_one_do (app, 0x00C5, &value, &valuelen, NULL); + if (relptr && valuelen >= 60) + bin2hex (value+keyno*20, 20, fpr); + else + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND); + xfree (relptr); + return err; +} + + +/* Retrieve the public key material for the RSA key, whose fingerprint + is FPR, from gpg output, which can be read through the stream FP. + The RSA modulus will be stored at the address of M and MLEN, the + public exponent at E and ELEN. Returns zero on success, an error + code on failure. Caller must release the allocated buffers at M + and E if the function returns success. */ +static gpg_error_t +retrieve_key_material (FILE *fp, const char *hexkeyid, + const unsigned char **m, size_t *mlen, + const unsigned char **e, size_t *elen) +{ + gcry_error_t err = 0; + char *line = NULL; /* read_line() buffer. */ + size_t line_size = 0; /* Helper for for read_line. */ + int found_key = 0; /* Helper to find a matching key. */ + unsigned char *m_new = NULL; + unsigned char *e_new = NULL; + size_t m_new_n = 0; + size_t e_new_n = 0; + + /* Loop over all records until we have found the subkey + corresponding to the fingerprint. Inm general the first record + should be the pub record, but we don't rely on that. Given that + we only need to look at one key, it is sufficient to compare the + keyid so that we don't need to look at "fpr" records. */ + for (;;) + { + char *p; + char *fields[6] = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }; + int nfields; + size_t max_length; + gcry_mpi_t mpi; + int i; + + max_length = 4096; + i = read_line (fp, &line, &line_size, &max_length); + if (!i) + break; /* EOF. */ + if (i < 0) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto leave; /* Error. */ + } + if (!max_length) + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TRUNCATED); + goto leave; /* Line truncated - we better stop processing. */ + } + + /* Parse the line into fields. */ + for (nfields=0, p=line; p && nfields < DIM (fields); nfields++) + { + fields[nfields] = p; + p = strchr (p, ':'); + if (p) + *(p++) = 0; + } + if (!nfields) + continue; /* No fields at all - skip line. */ + + if (!found_key) + { + if ( (!strcmp (fields[0], "sub") || !strcmp (fields[0], "pub") ) + && nfields > 4 && !strcmp (fields[4], hexkeyid)) + found_key = 1; + continue; + } + + if ( !strcmp (fields[0], "sub") || !strcmp (fields[0], "pub") ) + break; /* Next key - stop. */ + + if ( strcmp (fields[0], "pkd") ) + continue; /* Not a key data record. */ + if ( nfields < 4 || (i = atoi (fields[1])) < 0 || i > 1 + || (!i && m_new) || (i && e_new)) + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL); + goto leave; /* Error: Invalid key data record or not an RSA key. */ + } + + err = gcry_mpi_scan (&mpi, GCRYMPI_FMT_HEX, fields[3], 0, NULL); + if (err) + mpi = NULL; + else if (!i) + err = gcry_mpi_aprint (GCRYMPI_FMT_STD, &m_new, &m_new_n, mpi); + else + err = gcry_mpi_aprint (GCRYMPI_FMT_STD, &e_new, &e_new_n, mpi); + gcry_mpi_release (mpi); + if (err) + goto leave; + } + + if (m_new && e_new) + { + *m = m_new; + *mlen = m_new_n; + m_new = NULL; + *e = e_new; + *elen = e_new_n; + e_new = NULL; + } + else + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL); + + leave: + xfree (m_new); + xfree (e_new); + xfree (line); + return err; +} + + +static gpg_error_t +rsa_read_pubkey (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, u32 created_at, int keyno, + const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, gcry_sexp_t *r_sexp) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + const unsigned char *m, *e; + size_t mlen, elen; + unsigned char *mbuf = NULL, *ebuf = NULL; + + m = find_tlv (data, datalen, 0x0081, &mlen); + if (!m) + { + log_error (_("response does not contain the RSA modulus\n")); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD); + } + + e = find_tlv (data, datalen, 0x0082, &elen); + if (!e) + { + log_error (_("response does not contain the RSA public exponent\n")); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD); + } + + if (ctrl) + { + send_key_data (ctrl, "n", m, mlen); + send_key_data (ctrl, "e", e, elen); + } + + for (; mlen && !*m; mlen--, m++) /* strip leading zeroes */ + ; + for (; elen && !*e; elen--, e++) /* strip leading zeroes */ + ; + + if (ctrl) + { + unsigned char fprbuf[20]; + + err = store_fpr (app, keyno, created_at, fprbuf, PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA, + m, mlen, e, elen); + if (err) + return err; + + send_fpr_if_not_null (ctrl, "KEY-FPR", -1, fprbuf); + } + + mbuf = xtrymalloc (mlen + 1); + if (!mbuf) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto leave; + } + /* Prepend numbers with a 0 if needed. */ + if (mlen && (*m & 0x80)) + { + *mbuf = 0; + memcpy (mbuf+1, m, mlen); + mlen++; + } + else + memcpy (mbuf, m, mlen); + + ebuf = xtrymalloc (elen + 1); + if (!ebuf) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto leave; + } + /* Prepend numbers with a 0 if needed. */ + if (elen && (*e & 0x80)) + { + *ebuf = 0; + memcpy (ebuf+1, e, elen); + elen++; + } + else + memcpy (ebuf, e, elen); + + err = gcry_sexp_build (r_sexp, NULL, "(public-key(rsa(n%b)(e%b)))", + (int)mlen, mbuf, (int)elen, ebuf); + leave: + xfree (mbuf); + xfree (ebuf); + return err; +} + + +/* Determine KDF hash algorithm and KEK encryption algorithm by CURVE. */ +static const unsigned char* +ecdh_params (const char *curve) +{ + unsigned int nbits; + + openpgp_curve_to_oid (curve, &nbits); + + /* See RFC-6637 for those constants. + 0x03: Number of bytes + 0x01: Version for this parameter format + KDF hash algo + KEK symmetric cipher algo + */ + if (nbits <= 256) + return (const unsigned char*)"\x03\x01\x08\x07"; + else if (nbits <= 384) + return (const unsigned char*)"\x03\x01\x09\x08"; + else + return (const unsigned char*)"\x03\x01\x0a\x09"; +} + +static gpg_error_t +ecc_read_pubkey (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, u32 created_at, int keyno, + const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, gcry_sexp_t *r_sexp) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + unsigned char *qbuf = NULL; + const unsigned char *ecc_q; + size_t ecc_q_len; + gcry_mpi_t oid = NULL; + int n; + const char *curve; + const char *oidstr; + const unsigned char *oidbuf; + size_t oid_len; + int algo; + const char *format; + + ecc_q = find_tlv (data, datalen, 0x0086, &ecc_q_len); + if (!ecc_q) + { + log_error (_("response does not contain the EC public key\n")); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD); + } + + curve = app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].ecc.curve; + oidstr = openpgp_curve_to_oid (curve, NULL); + err = openpgp_oid_from_str (oidstr, &oid); + if (err) + return err; + oidbuf = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (oid, &n); + if (!oidbuf) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto leave; + } + oid_len = (n+7)/8; + + qbuf = xtrymalloc (ecc_q_len + 1); + if (!qbuf) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto leave; + } + + if ((app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].ecc.flags & ECC_FLAG_DJB_TWEAK)) + { /* Prepend 0x40 prefix. */ + *qbuf = 0x40; + memcpy (qbuf+1, ecc_q, ecc_q_len); + ecc_q_len++; + } + else + memcpy (qbuf, ecc_q, ecc_q_len); + + if (ctrl) + { + send_key_data (ctrl, "q", qbuf, ecc_q_len); + send_key_data (ctrl, "curve", oidbuf, oid_len); + } + + if (keyno == 1) + { + if (ctrl) + send_key_data (ctrl, "kdf/kek", ecdh_params (curve), (size_t)4); + algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH; + } + else + { + if ((app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].ecc.flags & ECC_FLAG_DJB_TWEAK)) + algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA; + else + algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA; + } + + if (ctrl) + { + unsigned char fprbuf[20]; + + err = store_fpr (app, keyno, created_at, fprbuf, algo, oidbuf, oid_len, + qbuf, ecc_q_len, ecdh_params (curve), (size_t)4); + if (err) + goto leave; + + send_fpr_if_not_null (ctrl, "KEY-FPR", -1, fprbuf); + } + + if (!(app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].ecc.flags & ECC_FLAG_DJB_TWEAK)) + format = "(public-key(ecc(curve%s)(q%b)))"; + else if (keyno == 1) + format = "(public-key(ecc(curve%s)(flags djb-tweak)(q%b)))"; + else + format = "(public-key(ecc(curve%s)(flags eddsa)(q%b)))"; + + err = gcry_sexp_build (r_sexp, NULL, format, + app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].ecc.curve, + (int)ecc_q_len, qbuf); + leave: + gcry_mpi_release (oid); + xfree (qbuf); + return err; +} + + +/* Compute the keygrip form the local info and store it there. */ +static gpg_error_t +store_keygrip (app_t app, int keyno) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + unsigned char grip[20]; + + err = keygrip_from_canon_sexp (app->app_local->pk[keyno].key, + app->app_local->pk[keyno].keylen, + grip); + if (err) + return err; + + bin2hex (grip, 20, app->app_local->pk[keyno].keygrip_str); + return 0; +} + + +/* Parse tag-length-value data for public key in BUFFER of BUFLEN + length. Key of KEYNO in APP is updated with an S-expression of + public key. When CTRL is not NULL, fingerprint is computed with + CREATED_AT, and fingerprint is written to the card, and key data + and fingerprint are send back to the client side. + */ +static gpg_error_t +read_public_key (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, u32 created_at, int keyno, + const unsigned char *buffer, size_t buflen) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + const unsigned char *data; + size_t datalen; + gcry_sexp_t s_pkey = NULL; + + data = find_tlv (buffer, buflen, 0x7F49, &datalen); + if (!data) + { + log_error (_("response does not contain the public key data\n")); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD); + } + + if (app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].key_type == KEY_TYPE_RSA) + err = rsa_read_pubkey (app, ctrl, created_at, keyno, + data, datalen, &s_pkey); + else if (app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].key_type == KEY_TYPE_ECC) + err = ecc_read_pubkey (app, ctrl, created_at, keyno, + data, datalen, &s_pkey); + else + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); + + if (!err) + { + unsigned char *keybuf; + size_t len; + + len = gcry_sexp_sprint (s_pkey, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, NULL, 0); + keybuf = xtrymalloc (len); + if (!data) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + gcry_sexp_release (s_pkey); + return err; + } + + gcry_sexp_sprint (s_pkey, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, keybuf, len); + gcry_sexp_release (s_pkey); + + app->app_local->pk[keyno].key = keybuf; + /* Decrement for trailing '\0' */ + app->app_local->pk[keyno].keylen = len - 1; + + err = store_keygrip (app, keyno); + } + + return err; +} + + +/* Get the public key for KEYNO and store it as an S-expression with + the APP handle. On error that field gets cleared. If we already + know about the public key we will just return. Note that this does + not mean a key is available; this is solely indicated by the + presence of the app->app_local->pk[KEYNO].key field. + + Note that GnuPG 1.x does not need this and it would be too time + consuming to send it just for the fun of it. However, given that we + use the same code in gpg 1.4, we can't use the gcry S-expression + here but need to open encode it. */ +static gpg_error_t +get_public_key (app_t app, int keyno) +{ + gpg_error_t err = 0; + unsigned char *buffer; + const unsigned char *m, *e; + size_t buflen; + size_t mlen = 0; + size_t elen = 0; + char *keybuf = NULL; + gcry_sexp_t s_pkey; + size_t len; + + if (keyno < 0 || keyno > 2) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID); + + /* Already cached? */ + if (app->app_local->pk[keyno].read_done) + return 0; + + xfree (app->app_local->pk[keyno].key); + app->app_local->pk[keyno].key = NULL; + app->app_local->pk[keyno].keylen = 0; + + m = e = NULL; /* (avoid cc warning) */ + + if (app->card_version > 0x0100) + { + int exmode, le_value; + + /* We may simply read the public key out of these cards. */ + if (app->app_local->cardcap.ext_lc_le + && app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].key_type == KEY_TYPE_RSA + && app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.n_bits > RSA_SMALL_SIZE_KEY) + { + exmode = 1; /* Use extended length. */ + le_value = determine_rsa_response (app, keyno); + } + else + { + exmode = 0; + le_value = 256; /* Use legacy value. */ + } + + err = iso7816_read_public_key (app->slot, exmode, + (keyno == 0? "\xB6" : + keyno == 1? "\xB8" : "\xA4"), + 2, le_value, &buffer, &buflen); + if (err) + { + /* Yubikey returns wrong code. Fix it up. */ + /* + * NOTE: It's not correct to blindly change the error code, + * however, for our experiences, it is only Yubikey... + */ + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_OBJ); + log_error (_("reading public key failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err)); + goto leave; + } + + err = read_public_key (app, NULL, 0U, keyno, buffer, buflen); + } + else + { + /* Due to a design problem in v1.0 cards we can't get the public + key out of these cards without doing a verify on CHV3. + Clearly that is not an option and thus we try to locate the + key using an external helper. + + The helper we use here is gpg itself, which should know about + the key in any case. */ + + char fpr[41]; + char *hexkeyid; + char *command = NULL; + FILE *fp; + int ret; + + buffer = NULL; /* We don't need buffer. */ + + err = retrieve_fpr_from_card (app, keyno, fpr); + if (err) + { + log_error ("error while retrieving fpr from card: %s\n", + gpg_strerror (err)); + goto leave; + } + hexkeyid = fpr + 24; + + ret = gpgrt_asprintf + (&command, "gpg --list-keys --with-colons --with-key-data '%s'", fpr); + if (ret < 0) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto leave; + } + + fp = popen (command, "r"); + xfree (command); + if (!fp) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + log_error ("running gpg failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err)); + goto leave; + } + + err = retrieve_key_material (fp, hexkeyid, &m, &mlen, &e, &elen); + pclose (fp); + if (err) + { + log_error ("error while retrieving key material through pipe: %s\n", + gpg_strerror (err)); + goto leave; + } + + err = gcry_sexp_build (&s_pkey, NULL, "(public-key(rsa(n%b)(e%b)))", + (int)mlen, m, (int)elen, e); + if (err) + goto leave; + + len = gcry_sexp_sprint (s_pkey, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, NULL, 0); + + keybuf = xtrymalloc (len); + if (!keybuf) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + gcry_sexp_release (s_pkey); + goto leave; + } + + gcry_sexp_sprint (s_pkey, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, keybuf, len); + gcry_sexp_release (s_pkey); + + app->app_local->pk[keyno].key = (unsigned char*)keybuf; + /* Decrement for trailing '\0' */ + app->app_local->pk[keyno].keylen = len - 1; + + err = store_keygrip (app, keyno); + } + + leave: + /* Set a flag to indicate that we tried to read the key. */ + if (!err) + app->app_local->pk[keyno].read_done = 1; + + xfree (buffer); + return err; +} + + +/* Send the KEYPAIRINFO back. KEY needs to be in the range [1,3]. + This is used by the LEARN command. */ +static gpg_error_t +send_keypair_info (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, int key) +{ + int keyno = key - 1; + gpg_error_t err = 0; + char idbuf[50]; + const char *usage; + + err = get_public_key (app, keyno); + if (err) + goto leave; + + assert (keyno >= 0 && keyno <= 2); + if (!app->app_local->pk[keyno].key) + goto leave; /* No such key - ignore. */ + + switch (keyno) + { + case 0: usage = "sc"; break; + case 1: usage = "e"; break; + case 2: usage = "sa"; break; + default: usage = ""; break; + } + + sprintf (idbuf, "OPENPGP.%d", keyno+1); + send_status_info (ctrl, "KEYPAIRINFO", + app->app_local->pk[keyno].keygrip_str, 40, + idbuf, strlen (idbuf), + usage, strlen (usage), + NULL, (size_t)0); + + leave: + return err; +} + + +/* Handle the LEARN command for OpenPGP. */ +static gpg_error_t +do_learn_status (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, unsigned int flags) +{ + gpg_error_t err = 0; + + (void)flags; + + err = do_getattr (app, ctrl, "EXTCAP"); + if (!err) + err = do_getattr (app, ctrl, "MANUFACTURER"); + if (!err) + err = do_getattr (app, ctrl, "DISP-NAME"); + if (!err) + err = do_getattr (app, ctrl, "DISP-LANG"); + if (!err) + err = do_getattr (app, ctrl, "DISP-SEX"); + if (!err) + err = do_getattr (app, ctrl, "PUBKEY-URL"); + if (!err) + err = do_getattr (app, ctrl, "LOGIN-DATA"); + if (!err) + err = do_getattr (app, ctrl, "KEY-FPR"); + if (!err && app->card_version > 0x0100) + err = do_getattr (app, ctrl, "KEY-TIME"); + if (!err) + err = do_getattr (app, ctrl, "CA-FPR"); + if (!err) + err = do_getattr (app, ctrl, "CHV-STATUS"); + if (!err) + err = do_getattr (app, ctrl, "SIG-COUNTER"); + if (!err && app->app_local->extcap.kdf_do) + { + err = do_getattr (app, ctrl, "KDF"); + if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_OBJ) + err = 0; + } + if (!err && app->app_local->extcap.private_dos) + { + if (!err) + err = do_getattr (app, ctrl, "PRIVATE-DO-1"); + if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_OBJ) + err = 0; + if (!err) + err = do_getattr (app, ctrl, "PRIVATE-DO-2"); + if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_OBJ) + err = 0; + if (!err && app->did_chv2) + err = do_getattr (app, ctrl, "PRIVATE-DO-3"); + if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_OBJ) + err = 0; + if (!err && app->did_chv3) + err = do_getattr (app, ctrl, "PRIVATE-DO-4"); + if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_OBJ) + err = 0; + } + if (!err) + err = send_keypair_info (app, ctrl, 1); + if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_OBJ) + err = 0; + if (!err) + err = send_keypair_info (app, ctrl, 2); + if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_OBJ) + err = 0; + if (!err) + err = send_keypair_info (app, ctrl, 3); + if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_OBJ) + err = 0; + /* Note: We do not send the Cardholder Certificate, because that is + relatively long and for OpenPGP applications not really needed. */ + return err; +} + + +/* Handle the READKEY command for OpenPGP. On success a canonical + encoded S-expression with the public key will get stored at PK and + its length (for assertions) at PKLEN; the caller must release that + buffer. On error PK and PKLEN are not changed and an error code is + returned. */ +static gpg_error_t +do_readkey (app_t app, int advanced, const char *keyid, + unsigned char **pk, size_t *pklen) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + int keyno; + unsigned char *buf; + + if (!strcmp (keyid, "OPENPGP.1")) + keyno = 0; + else if (!strcmp (keyid, "OPENPGP.2")) + keyno = 1; + else if (!strcmp (keyid, "OPENPGP.3")) + keyno = 2; + else + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID); + + err = get_public_key (app, keyno); + if (err) + return err; + + buf = app->app_local->pk[keyno].key; + if (!buf) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY); + + if (advanced) + { + gcry_sexp_t s_key; + + err = gcry_sexp_new (&s_key, buf, app->app_local->pk[keyno].keylen, 0); + if (err) + return err; + + *pklen = gcry_sexp_sprint (s_key, GCRYSEXP_FMT_ADVANCED, NULL, 0); + *pk = xtrymalloc (*pklen); + if (!*pk) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + *pklen = 0; + return err; + } + + gcry_sexp_sprint (s_key, GCRYSEXP_FMT_ADVANCED, *pk, *pklen); + gcry_sexp_release (s_key); + /* Decrement for trailing '\0' */ + *pklen = *pklen - 1; + } + else + { + *pklen = app->app_local->pk[keyno].keylen; + *pk = xtrymalloc (*pklen); + if (!*pk) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + *pklen = 0; + return err; + } + memcpy (*pk, buf, *pklen); + } + + return 0; +} + +/* Read the standard certificate of an OpenPGP v2 card. It is + returned in a freshly allocated buffer with that address stored at + CERT and the length of the certificate stored at CERTLEN. CERTID + needs to be set to "OPENPGP.3". */ +static gpg_error_t +do_readcert (app_t app, const char *certid, + unsigned char **cert, size_t *certlen) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + unsigned char *buffer; + size_t buflen; + void *relptr; + + *cert = NULL; + *certlen = 0; + if (strcmp (certid, "OPENPGP.3")) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID); + if (!app->app_local->extcap.is_v2) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND); + + relptr = get_one_do (app, 0x7F21, &buffer, &buflen, NULL); + if (!relptr) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND); + + if (!buflen) + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND); + else if (!(*cert = xtrymalloc (buflen))) + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + else + { + memcpy (*cert, buffer, buflen); + *certlen = buflen; + err = 0; + } + xfree (relptr); + return err; +} + + +/* Decide if we use the pinpad of the reader for PIN input according + to the user preference on the card, and the capability of the + reader. This routine is only called when the reader has pinpad. + Returns 0 if we use pinpad, 1 otherwise. */ +static int +check_pinpad_request (app_t app, pininfo_t *pininfo, int admin_pin) +{ + if (app->app_local->pinpad.disabled) + return 1; + + if (app->app_local->pinpad.specified == 0) /* No preference on card. */ + { + if (pininfo->fixedlen == 0) /* Reader has varlen capability. */ + return 0; /* Then, use pinpad. */ + else + /* + * Reader has limited capability, and it may not match PIN of + * the card. + */ + return 1; + } + + if (admin_pin) + pininfo->fixedlen = app->app_local->pinpad.fixedlen_admin; + else + pininfo->fixedlen = app->app_local->pinpad.fixedlen_user; + + if (pininfo->fixedlen == 0 /* User requests disable pinpad. */ + || pininfo->fixedlen < pininfo->minlen + || pininfo->fixedlen > pininfo->maxlen + /* Reader doesn't have the capability to input a PIN which + * length is FIXEDLEN. */) + return 1; + + return 0; +} + + +/* Return a string with information about the card for use in a + * prompt. Returns NULL on memory failure. */ +static char * +get_prompt_info (app_t app, int chvno, unsigned long sigcount, int remaining) +{ + char *serial, *disp_name, *rembuf, *tmpbuf, *result; + + serial = get_disp_serialno (app); + if (!serial) + return NULL; + + disp_name = get_disp_name (app); + if (chvno == 1) + { + /* TRANSLATORS: Put a \x1f right before a colon. This can be + * used by pinentry to nicely align the names and values. Keep + * the %s at the start and end of the string. */ + result = xtryasprintf (_("%s" + "Number\x1f: %s%%0A" + "Holder\x1f: %s%%0A" + "Counter\x1f: %lu" + "%s"), + "\x1e", + serial, + disp_name? disp_name:"", + sigcount, + ""); + } + else + { + result = xtryasprintf (_("%s" + "Number\x1f: %s%%0A" + "Holder\x1f: %s" + "%s"), + "\x1e", + serial, + disp_name? disp_name:"", + ""); + } + xfree (disp_name); + xfree (serial); + + if (remaining != -1) + { + /* TRANSLATORS: This is the number of remaining attempts to + * enter a PIN. Use %%0A (double-percent,0A) for a linefeed. */ + rembuf = xtryasprintf (_("Remaining attempts: %d"), remaining); + if (!rembuf) + { + xfree (result); + return NULL; + } + tmpbuf = strconcat (result, "%0A%0A", rembuf, NULL); + xfree (rembuf); + if (!tmpbuf) + { + xfree (result); + return NULL; + } + xfree (result); + result = tmpbuf; + } + + return result; +} + +/* Compute hash if KDF-DO is available. CHVNO must be 0 for reset + code, 1 or 2 for user pin and 3 for admin pin. + */ +static gpg_error_t +pin2hash_if_kdf (app_t app, int chvno, char *pinvalue, int *r_pinlen) +{ + gpg_error_t err = 0; + void *relptr = NULL; + unsigned char *buffer; + size_t buflen; + + if (app->app_local->extcap.kdf_do + && (relptr = get_one_do (app, 0x00F9, &buffer, &buflen, NULL)) + && buflen >= KDF_DATA_LENGTH_MIN && (buffer[2] == 0x03)) + { + const char *salt; + unsigned long s2k_count; + char dek[32]; + int salt_index; + + s2k_count = (((unsigned int)buffer[8] << 24) + | (buffer[9] << 16) | (buffer[10] << 8) | buffer[11]); + + if (buflen == KDF_DATA_LENGTH_MIN) + salt_index =14; + else if (buflen == KDF_DATA_LENGTH_MAX) + salt_index = (chvno==3 ? 34 : (chvno==0 ? 24 : 14)); + else + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_DATA); + goto leave; + } + + salt = &buffer[salt_index]; + err = gcry_kdf_derive (pinvalue, strlen (pinvalue), + GCRY_KDF_ITERSALTED_S2K, + DIGEST_ALGO_SHA256, salt, 8, + s2k_count, sizeof (dek), dek); + if (!err) + { + /* pinvalue has a buffer of MAXLEN_PIN+1, 32 is OK. */ + *r_pinlen = 32; + memcpy (pinvalue, dek, *r_pinlen); + wipememory (dek, *r_pinlen); + } + } + else + *r_pinlen = strlen (pinvalue); + + leave: + xfree (relptr); + return err; +} + + +/* Verify a CHV either using the pinentry or if possible by + using a pinpad. PINCB and PINCB_ARG describe the usual callback + for the pinentry. CHVNO must be either 1 or 2. SIGCOUNT is only + used with CHV1. PINVALUE is the address of a pointer which will + receive a newly allocated block with the actual PIN (this is useful + in case that PIN shall be used for another verify operation). The + caller needs to free this value. If the function returns with + success and NULL is stored at PINVALUE, the caller should take this + as an indication that the pinpad has been used. + */ +static gpg_error_t +verify_a_chv (app_t app, + gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **), + void *pincb_arg, int chvno, unsigned long sigcount, + char **pinvalue, int *pinlen) +{ + int rc = 0; + char *prompt_buffer = NULL; + const char *prompt; + pininfo_t pininfo; + int minlen = 6; + int remaining; + + log_assert (chvno == 1 || chvno == 2); + + *pinvalue = NULL; + *pinlen = 0; + + remaining = get_remaining_tries (app, 0); + if (remaining == -1) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD); + + if (chvno == 2 && app->app_local->flags.def_chv2) + { + /* Special case for def_chv2 mechanism. */ + if (opt.verbose) + log_info (_("using default PIN as %s\n"), "CHV2"); + rc = iso7816_verify (app->slot, 0x82, "123456", 6); + if (rc) + { + /* Verification of CHV2 with the default PIN failed, + although the card pretends to have the default PIN set as + CHV2. We better disable the def_chv2 flag now. */ + log_info (_("failed to use default PIN as %s: %s" + " - disabling further default use\n"), + "CHV2", gpg_strerror (rc)); + app->app_local->flags.def_chv2 = 0; + } + return rc; + } + + memset (&pininfo, 0, sizeof pininfo); + pininfo.fixedlen = -1; + pininfo.minlen = minlen; + + { + const char *firstline = _("||Please unlock the card"); + char *infoblock = get_prompt_info (app, chvno, sigcount, + remaining < 3? remaining : -1); + + prompt_buffer = strconcat (firstline, "%0A%0A", infoblock, NULL); + if (prompt_buffer) + prompt = prompt_buffer; + else + prompt = firstline; /* ENOMEM fallback. */ + + xfree (infoblock); + } + + if (!opt.disable_pinpad + && !iso7816_check_pinpad (app->slot, ISO7816_VERIFY, &pininfo) + && !check_pinpad_request (app, &pininfo, 0)) + { + /* The reader supports the verify command through the pinpad. + Note that the pincb appends a text to the prompt telling the + user to use the pinpad. */ + rc = pincb (pincb_arg, prompt, NULL); + prompt = NULL; + xfree (prompt_buffer); + prompt_buffer = NULL; + if (rc) + { + log_info (_("PIN callback returned error: %s\n"), + gpg_strerror (rc)); + return rc; + } + rc = iso7816_verify_kp (app->slot, 0x80+chvno, &pininfo); + /* Dismiss the prompt. */ + pincb (pincb_arg, NULL, NULL); + + log_assert (!*pinvalue); + } + else + { + /* The reader has no pinpad or we don't want to use it. */ + rc = pincb (pincb_arg, prompt, pinvalue); + prompt = NULL; + xfree (prompt_buffer); + prompt_buffer = NULL; + if (rc) + { + log_info (_("PIN callback returned error: %s\n"), + gpg_strerror (rc)); + return rc; + } + + if (strlen (*pinvalue) < minlen) + { + log_error (_("PIN for CHV%d is too short;" + " minimum length is %d\n"), chvno, minlen); + xfree (*pinvalue); + *pinvalue = NULL; + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PIN); + } + + rc = pin2hash_if_kdf (app, chvno, *pinvalue, pinlen); + if (!rc) + rc = iso7816_verify (app->slot, 0x80+chvno, *pinvalue, *pinlen); + } + + if (rc) + { + log_error (_("verify CHV%d failed: %s\n"), chvno, gpg_strerror (rc)); + xfree (*pinvalue); + *pinvalue = NULL; + flush_cache_after_error (app); + } + + return rc; +} + + +/* Verify CHV2 if required. Depending on the configuration of the + card CHV1 will also be verified. */ +static gpg_error_t +verify_chv2 (app_t app, + gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **), + void *pincb_arg) +{ + int rc; + char *pinvalue; + int pinlen; + int i; + + if (app->did_chv2) + return 0; /* We already verified CHV2. */ + + /* Make sure we have load the public keys. */ + for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) + get_public_key (app, i); + + if (app->app_local->pk[1].key || app->app_local->pk[2].key) + { + rc = verify_a_chv (app, pincb, pincb_arg, 2, 0, &pinvalue, &pinlen); + if (rc) + return rc; + app->did_chv2 = 1; + + if (!app->did_chv1 && !app->force_chv1 && pinvalue) + { + /* For convenience we verify CHV1 here too. We do this only if + the card is not configured to require a verification before + each CHV1 controlled operation (force_chv1) and if we are not + using the pinpad (PINVALUE == NULL). */ + rc = iso7816_verify (app->slot, 0x81, pinvalue, pinlen); + if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_PIN) + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_PIN_NOT_SYNCED); + if (rc) + { + log_error (_("verify CHV%d failed: %s\n"), 1, gpg_strerror (rc)); + flush_cache_after_error (app); + } + else + app->did_chv1 = 1; + } + } + else + { + rc = verify_a_chv (app, pincb, pincb_arg, 1, 0, &pinvalue, &pinlen); + if (rc) + return rc; + } + + xfree (pinvalue); + + return rc; +} + + +/* Build the prompt to enter the Admin PIN. The prompt depends on the + current sdtate of the card. */ +static gpg_error_t +build_enter_admin_pin_prompt (app_t app, char **r_prompt) +{ + int remaining; + char *prompt; + char *infoblock; + + *r_prompt = NULL; + + remaining = get_remaining_tries (app, 1); + if (remaining == -1) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD); + if (!remaining) + { + log_info (_("card is permanently locked!\n")); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PIN); + } + + log_info (ngettext("%d Admin PIN attempt remaining before card" + " is permanently locked\n", + "%d Admin PIN attempts remaining before card" + " is permanently locked\n", + remaining), remaining); + + infoblock = get_prompt_info (app, 3, 0, remaining < 3? remaining : -1); + + /* TRANSLATORS: Do not translate the "|A|" prefix but keep it at + the start of the string. Use %0A (single percent) for a linefeed. */ + prompt = strconcat (_("|A|Please enter the Admin PIN"), + "%0A%0A", infoblock, NULL); + xfree (infoblock); + if (!prompt) + return gpg_error_from_syserror (); + + *r_prompt = prompt; + return 0; +} + + +/* Verify CHV3 if required. */ +static gpg_error_t +verify_chv3 (app_t app, + gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **), + void *pincb_arg) +{ + int rc = 0; + + if (!opt.allow_admin) + { + log_info (_("access to admin commands is not configured\n")); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EACCES); + } + + if (!app->did_chv3) + { + pininfo_t pininfo; + int minlen = 8; + char *prompt; + + memset (&pininfo, 0, sizeof pininfo); + pininfo.fixedlen = -1; + pininfo.minlen = minlen; + + rc = build_enter_admin_pin_prompt (app, &prompt); + if (rc) + return rc; + + if (!opt.disable_pinpad + && !iso7816_check_pinpad (app->slot, ISO7816_VERIFY, &pininfo) + && !check_pinpad_request (app, &pininfo, 1)) + { + /* The reader supports the verify command through the pinpad. */ + rc = pincb (pincb_arg, prompt, NULL); + xfree (prompt); + prompt = NULL; + if (rc) + { + log_info (_("PIN callback returned error: %s\n"), + gpg_strerror (rc)); + return rc; + } + rc = iso7816_verify_kp (app->slot, 0x83, &pininfo); + /* Dismiss the prompt. */ + pincb (pincb_arg, NULL, NULL); + } + else + { + char *pinvalue; + int pinlen; + + rc = pincb (pincb_arg, prompt, &pinvalue); + xfree (prompt); + prompt = NULL; + if (rc) + { + log_info (_("PIN callback returned error: %s\n"), + gpg_strerror (rc)); + return rc; + } + + if (strlen (pinvalue) < minlen) + { + log_error (_("PIN for CHV%d is too short;" + " minimum length is %d\n"), 3, minlen); + xfree (pinvalue); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PIN); + } + + rc = pin2hash_if_kdf (app, 3, pinvalue, &pinlen); + if (!rc) + rc = iso7816_verify (app->slot, 0x83, pinvalue, pinlen); + xfree (pinvalue); + } + + if (rc) + { + log_error (_("verify CHV%d failed: %s\n"), 3, gpg_strerror (rc)); + flush_cache_after_error (app); + return rc; + } + app->did_chv3 = 1; + } + return rc; +} + + +/* Handle the SETATTR operation. All arguments are already basically + checked. */ +static gpg_error_t +do_setattr (app_t app, const char *name, + gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **), + void *pincb_arg, + const unsigned char *value, size_t valuelen) +{ + gpg_error_t rc; + int idx; + static struct { + const char *name; + int tag; + int flush_tag; /* The tag which needs to be flushed or 0. */ + int need_chv; + int special; + unsigned int need_v2:1; + } table[] = { + { "DISP-NAME", 0x005B, 0, 3 }, + { "LOGIN-DATA", 0x005E, 0, 3, 2 }, + { "DISP-LANG", 0x5F2D, 0, 3 }, + { "DISP-SEX", 0x5F35, 0, 3 }, + { "PUBKEY-URL", 0x5F50, 0, 3 }, + { "CHV-STATUS-1", 0x00C4, 0, 3, 1 }, + { "CA-FPR-1", 0x00CA, 0x00C6, 3 }, + { "CA-FPR-2", 0x00CB, 0x00C6, 3 }, + { "CA-FPR-3", 0x00CC, 0x00C6, 3 }, + { "PRIVATE-DO-1", 0x0101, 0, 2 }, + { "PRIVATE-DO-2", 0x0102, 0, 3 }, + { "PRIVATE-DO-3", 0x0103, 0, 2 }, + { "PRIVATE-DO-4", 0x0104, 0, 3 }, + { "CERT-3", 0x7F21, 0, 3, 0, 1 }, + { "SM-KEY-ENC", 0x00D1, 0, 3, 0, 1 }, + { "SM-KEY-MAC", 0x00D2, 0, 3, 0, 1 }, + { "KEY-ATTR", 0, 0, 0, 3, 1 }, + { "AESKEY", 0x00D5, 0, 3, 0, 1 }, + { "KDF", 0x00F9, 0, 3, 4, 1 }, + { NULL, 0 } + }; + int exmode; + + for (idx=0; table[idx].name && strcmp (table[idx].name, name); idx++) + ; + if (!table[idx].name) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_NAME); + if (table[idx].need_v2 && !app->app_local->extcap.is_v2) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED); /* Not yet supported. */ + + if (table[idx].special == 3) + return change_keyattr_from_string (app, pincb, pincb_arg, value, valuelen); + + switch (table[idx].need_chv) + { + case 2: + rc = verify_chv2 (app, pincb, pincb_arg); + break; + case 3: + rc = verify_chv3 (app, pincb, pincb_arg); + break; + default: + rc = 0; + } + if (rc) + return rc; + + /* Flush the cache before writing it, so that the next get operation + will reread the data from the card and thus get synced in case of + errors (e.g. data truncated by the card). */ + flush_cache_item (app, table[idx].flush_tag? table[idx].flush_tag + /* */ : table[idx].tag); + + if (app->app_local->cardcap.ext_lc_le && valuelen > 254) + exmode = 1; /* Use extended length w/o a limit. */ + else if (app->app_local->cardcap.cmd_chaining && valuelen > 254) + exmode = -254; /* Command chaining with max. 254 bytes. */ + else + exmode = 0; + rc = iso7816_put_data (app->slot, exmode, table[idx].tag, value, valuelen); + if (rc) + log_error ("failed to set '%s': %s\n", table[idx].name, gpg_strerror (rc)); + + if (table[idx].special == 1) + app->force_chv1 = (valuelen && *value == 0); + else if (table[idx].special == 2) + parse_login_data (app); + else if (table[idx].special == 4) + { + app->did_chv1 = 0; + app->did_chv2 = 0; + app->did_chv3 = 0; + + if ((valuelen == KDF_DATA_LENGTH_MIN || valuelen == KDF_DATA_LENGTH_MAX) + && (value[2] == 0x03)) + app->app_local->pinpad.disabled = 1; + else + app->app_local->pinpad.disabled = 0; + } + + return rc; +} + + +/* Handle the WRITECERT command for OpenPGP. This rites the standard + certifciate to the card; CERTID needs to be set to "OPENPGP.3". + PINCB and PINCB_ARG are the usual arguments for the pinentry + callback. */ +static gpg_error_t +do_writecert (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, + const char *certidstr, + gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **), + void *pincb_arg, + const unsigned char *certdata, size_t certdatalen) +{ + (void)ctrl; + + if (strcmp (certidstr, "OPENPGP.3")) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID); + if (!certdata || !certdatalen) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ARG); + if (!app->app_local->extcap.is_v2) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED); + if (certdatalen > app->app_local->extcap.max_certlen_3) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE); + return do_setattr (app, "CERT-3", pincb, pincb_arg, certdata, certdatalen); +} + + + +/* Handle the PASSWD command. The following combinations are + possible: + + Flags CHVNO Vers. Description + RESET 1 1 Verify CHV3 and set a new CHV1 and CHV2 + RESET 1 2 Verify PW3 and set a new PW1. + RESET 2 1 Verify CHV3 and set a new CHV1 and CHV2. + RESET 2 2 Verify PW3 and set a new Reset Code. + RESET 3 any Returns GPG_ERR_INV_ID. + - 1 1 Verify CHV2 and set a new CHV1 and CHV2. + - 1 2 Verify PW1 and set a new PW1. + - 2 1 Verify CHV2 and set a new CHV1 and CHV2. + - 2 2 Verify Reset Code and set a new PW1. + - 3 any Verify CHV3/PW3 and set a new CHV3/PW3. + + The CHVNO can be prefixed with "OPENPGP.". + */ +static gpg_error_t +do_change_pin (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, const char *chvnostr, + unsigned int flags, + gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **), + void *pincb_arg) +{ + int rc = 0; + int chvno; + char *resetcode = NULL; + char *oldpinvalue = NULL; + char *pinvalue = NULL; + int reset_mode = !!(flags & APP_CHANGE_FLAG_RESET); + int set_resetcode = 0; + pininfo_t pininfo; + int use_pinpad = 0; + int minlen = 6; + int pinlen0 = 0; + int pinlen = 0; + + (void)ctrl; + + if (digitp (chvnostr)) + chvno = atoi (chvnostr); + else if (!ascii_strcasecmp (chvnostr, "OPENPGP.1")) + chvno = 1; + else if (!ascii_strcasecmp (chvnostr, "OPENPGP.2")) + chvno = 2; + else if (!ascii_strcasecmp (chvnostr, "OPENPGP.3")) + chvno = 3; + else + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID); + + memset (&pininfo, 0, sizeof pininfo); + pininfo.fixedlen = -1; + pininfo.minlen = minlen; + + if ((flags & APP_CHANGE_FLAG_CLEAR)) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION); + + if (reset_mode && chvno == 3) + { + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID); + goto leave; + } + + if (!app->app_local->extcap.is_v2) + { + /* Version 1 cards. */ + + if (reset_mode || chvno == 3) + { + /* We always require that the PIN is entered. */ + app->did_chv3 = 0; + rc = verify_chv3 (app, pincb, pincb_arg); + if (rc) + goto leave; + } + else if (chvno == 1 || chvno == 2) + { + /* On a v1.x card CHV1 and CVH2 should always have the same + value, thus we enforce it here. */ + int save_force = app->force_chv1; + + app->force_chv1 = 0; + app->did_chv1 = 0; + app->did_chv2 = 0; + rc = verify_chv2 (app, pincb, pincb_arg); + app->force_chv1 = save_force; + if (rc) + goto leave; + } + else + { + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID); + goto leave; + } + } + else + { + /* Version 2 cards. */ + + if (!opt.disable_pinpad + && !iso7816_check_pinpad (app->slot, + ISO7816_CHANGE_REFERENCE_DATA, &pininfo) + && !check_pinpad_request (app, &pininfo, chvno == 3)) + use_pinpad = 1; + + if (reset_mode) + { + /* To reset a PIN the Admin PIN is required. */ + use_pinpad = 0; + app->did_chv3 = 0; + rc = verify_chv3 (app, pincb, pincb_arg); + if (rc) + goto leave; + + if (chvno == 2) + set_resetcode = 1; + } + else if (chvno == 1 || chvno == 3) + { + if (!use_pinpad) + { + char *promptbuf = NULL; + const char *prompt; + + if (chvno == 3) + { + minlen = 8; + rc = build_enter_admin_pin_prompt (app, &promptbuf); + if (rc) + goto leave; + prompt = promptbuf; + } + else + prompt = _("||Please enter the PIN"); + rc = pincb (pincb_arg, prompt, &oldpinvalue); + xfree (promptbuf); + promptbuf = NULL; + if (rc) + { + log_info (_("PIN callback returned error: %s\n"), + gpg_strerror (rc)); + goto leave; + } + + if (strlen (oldpinvalue) < minlen) + { + log_info (_("PIN for CHV%d is too short;" + " minimum length is %d\n"), chvno, minlen); + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PIN); + goto leave; + } + } + } + else if (chvno == 2) + { + /* There is no PW2 for v2 cards. We use this condition to + allow a PW reset using the Reset Code. */ + void *relptr; + unsigned char *value; + size_t valuelen; + int remaining; + + use_pinpad = 0; + minlen = 8; + relptr = get_one_do (app, 0x00C4, &value, &valuelen, NULL); + if (!relptr || valuelen < 7) + { + log_error (_("error retrieving CHV status from card\n")); + xfree (relptr); + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD); + goto leave; + } + remaining = value[5]; + xfree (relptr); + if (!remaining) + { + log_error (_("Reset Code not or not anymore available\n")); + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PIN); + goto leave; + } + + rc = pincb (pincb_arg, + _("||Please enter the Reset Code for the card"), + &resetcode); + if (rc) + { + log_info (_("PIN callback returned error: %s\n"), + gpg_strerror (rc)); + goto leave; + } + if (strlen (resetcode) < minlen) + { + log_info (_("Reset Code is too short; minimum length is %d\n"), + minlen); + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PIN); + goto leave; + } + } + else + { + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID); + goto leave; + } + } + + if (chvno == 3) + app->did_chv3 = 0; + else + app->did_chv1 = app->did_chv2 = 0; + + if (!use_pinpad) + { + /* TRANSLATORS: Do not translate the "|*|" prefixes but + keep it at the start of the string. We need this elsewhere + to get some infos on the string. */ + rc = pincb (pincb_arg, set_resetcode? _("|RN|New Reset Code") : + chvno == 3? _("|AN|New Admin PIN") : _("|N|New PIN"), + &pinvalue); + if (rc || pinvalue == NULL) + { + log_error (_("error getting new PIN: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc)); + goto leave; + } + } + + + if (resetcode) + { + char *buffer; + + buffer = xtrymalloc (strlen (resetcode) + strlen (pinvalue) + 1); + if (!buffer) + rc = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + else + { + strcpy (buffer, resetcode); + rc = pin2hash_if_kdf (app, 0, buffer, &pinlen0); + if (!rc) + { + strcpy (buffer+pinlen0, pinvalue); + rc = pin2hash_if_kdf (app, 0, buffer+pinlen0, &pinlen); + } + if (!rc) + rc = iso7816_reset_retry_counter_with_rc (app->slot, 0x81, + buffer, pinlen0+pinlen); + wipememory (buffer, pinlen0 + pinlen); + xfree (buffer); + } + } + else if (set_resetcode) + { + if (strlen (pinvalue) < 8) + { + log_error (_("Reset Code is too short; minimum length is %d\n"), 8); + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PIN); + } + else + { + rc = pin2hash_if_kdf (app, 0, pinvalue, &pinlen); + if (!rc) + rc = iso7816_put_data (app->slot, 0, 0xD3, pinvalue, pinlen); + } + } + else if (reset_mode) + { + rc = pin2hash_if_kdf (app, 1, pinvalue, &pinlen); + if (!rc) + rc = iso7816_reset_retry_counter (app->slot, 0x81, pinvalue, pinlen); + if (!rc && !app->app_local->extcap.is_v2) + rc = iso7816_reset_retry_counter (app->slot, 0x82, pinvalue, pinlen); + } + else if (!app->app_local->extcap.is_v2) + { + /* Version 1 cards. */ + if (chvno == 1 || chvno == 2) + { + rc = iso7816_change_reference_data (app->slot, 0x81, NULL, 0, + pinvalue, strlen (pinvalue)); + if (!rc) + rc = iso7816_change_reference_data (app->slot, 0x82, NULL, 0, + pinvalue, strlen (pinvalue)); + } + else /* CHVNO == 3 */ + { + rc = iso7816_change_reference_data (app->slot, 0x80 + chvno, NULL, 0, + pinvalue, strlen (pinvalue)); + } + } + else + { + /* Version 2 cards. */ + assert (chvno == 1 || chvno == 3); + + if (use_pinpad) + { + rc = pincb (pincb_arg, + chvno == 3 ? + _("||Please enter the Admin PIN and New Admin PIN") : + _("||Please enter the PIN and New PIN"), NULL); + if (rc) + { + log_info (_("PIN callback returned error: %s\n"), + gpg_strerror (rc)); + goto leave; + } + rc = iso7816_change_reference_data_kp (app->slot, 0x80 + chvno, 0, + &pininfo); + pincb (pincb_arg, NULL, NULL); /* Dismiss the prompt. */ + } + else + { + rc = pin2hash_if_kdf (app, chvno, oldpinvalue, &pinlen0); + if (!rc) + rc = pin2hash_if_kdf (app, chvno, pinvalue, &pinlen); + if (!rc) + rc = iso7816_change_reference_data (app->slot, 0x80 + chvno, + oldpinvalue, pinlen0, + pinvalue, pinlen); + } + } + + if (pinvalue) + { + wipememory (pinvalue, pinlen); + xfree (pinvalue); + } + if (rc) + flush_cache_after_error (app); + + leave: + if (resetcode) + { + wipememory (resetcode, strlen (resetcode)); + xfree (resetcode); + } + if (oldpinvalue) + { + wipememory (oldpinvalue, pinlen0); + xfree (oldpinvalue); + } + return rc; +} + + +/* Check whether a key already exists. KEYIDX is the index of the key + (0..2). If FORCE is TRUE a diagnositic will be printed but no + error returned if the key already exists. The flag GENERATING is + only used to print correct messages. */ +static gpg_error_t +does_key_exist (app_t app, int keyidx, int generating, int force) +{ + const unsigned char *fpr; + unsigned char *buffer; + size_t buflen, n; + int i; + + assert (keyidx >=0 && keyidx <= 2); + + if (iso7816_get_data (app->slot, 0, 0x006E, &buffer, &buflen)) + { + log_error (_("error reading application data\n")); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL); + } + fpr = find_tlv (buffer, buflen, 0x00C5, &n); + if (!fpr || n < 60) + { + log_error (_("error reading fingerprint DO\n")); + xfree (buffer); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL); + } + fpr += 20*keyidx; + for (i=0; i < 20 && !fpr[i]; i++) + ; + xfree (buffer); + if (i!=20 && !force) + { + log_error (_("key already exists\n")); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EEXIST); + } + else if (i!=20) + log_info (_("existing key will be replaced\n")); + else if (generating) + log_info (_("generating new key\n")); + else + log_info (_("writing new key\n")); + return 0; +} + + +/* Create a TLV tag and value and store it at BUFFER. Return the length + of tag and length. A LENGTH greater than 65535 is truncated. */ +static size_t +add_tlv (unsigned char *buffer, unsigned int tag, size_t length) +{ + unsigned char *p = buffer; + + assert (tag <= 0xffff); + if ( tag > 0xff ) + *p++ = tag >> 8; + *p++ = tag; + if (length < 128) + *p++ = length; + else if (length < 256) + { + *p++ = 0x81; + *p++ = length; + } + else + { + if (length > 0xffff) + length = 0xffff; + *p++ = 0x82; + *p++ = length >> 8; + *p++ = length; + } + + return p - buffer; +} + + +static gpg_error_t +build_privkey_template (app_t app, int keyno, + const unsigned char *rsa_n, size_t rsa_n_len, + const unsigned char *rsa_e, size_t rsa_e_len, + const unsigned char *rsa_p, size_t rsa_p_len, + const unsigned char *rsa_q, size_t rsa_q_len, + const unsigned char *rsa_u, size_t rsa_u_len, + const unsigned char *rsa_dp, size_t rsa_dp_len, + const unsigned char *rsa_dq, size_t rsa_dq_len, + unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen) +{ + size_t rsa_e_reqlen; + unsigned char privkey[7*(1+3+3)]; + size_t privkey_len; + unsigned char exthdr[2+2+3]; + size_t exthdr_len; + unsigned char suffix[2+3]; + size_t suffix_len; + unsigned char *tp; + size_t datalen; + unsigned char *template; + size_t template_size; + + *result = NULL; + *resultlen = 0; + + switch (app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.format) + { + case RSA_STD: + case RSA_STD_N: + case RSA_CRT: + case RSA_CRT_N: + break; + + default: + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); + } + + /* Get the required length for E. Rounded up to the nearest byte */ + rsa_e_reqlen = (app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.e_bits + 7) / 8; + assert (rsa_e_len <= rsa_e_reqlen); + + /* Build the 7f48 cardholder private key template. */ + datalen = 0; + tp = privkey; + + tp += add_tlv (tp, 0x91, rsa_e_reqlen); + datalen += rsa_e_reqlen; + + tp += add_tlv (tp, 0x92, rsa_p_len); + datalen += rsa_p_len; + + tp += add_tlv (tp, 0x93, rsa_q_len); + datalen += rsa_q_len; + + if (app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.format == RSA_CRT + || app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.format == RSA_CRT_N) + { + tp += add_tlv (tp, 0x94, rsa_u_len); + datalen += rsa_u_len; + tp += add_tlv (tp, 0x95, rsa_dp_len); + datalen += rsa_dp_len; + tp += add_tlv (tp, 0x96, rsa_dq_len); + datalen += rsa_dq_len; + } + + if (app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.format == RSA_STD_N + || app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.format == RSA_CRT_N) + { + tp += add_tlv (tp, 0x97, rsa_n_len); + datalen += rsa_n_len; + } + privkey_len = tp - privkey; + + /* Build the extended header list without the private key template. */ + tp = exthdr; + *tp++ = keyno ==0 ? 0xb6 : keyno == 1? 0xb8 : 0xa4; + *tp++ = 0; + tp += add_tlv (tp, 0x7f48, privkey_len); + exthdr_len = tp - exthdr; + + /* Build the 5f48 suffix of the data. */ + tp = suffix; + tp += add_tlv (tp, 0x5f48, datalen); + suffix_len = tp - suffix; + + /* Now concatenate everything. */ + template_size = (1 + 3 /* 0x4d and len. */ + + exthdr_len + + privkey_len + + suffix_len + + datalen); + tp = template = xtrymalloc_secure (template_size); + if (!template) + return gpg_error_from_syserror (); + + tp += add_tlv (tp, 0x4d, exthdr_len + privkey_len + suffix_len + datalen); + memcpy (tp, exthdr, exthdr_len); + tp += exthdr_len; + memcpy (tp, privkey, privkey_len); + tp += privkey_len; + memcpy (tp, suffix, suffix_len); + tp += suffix_len; + + memcpy (tp, rsa_e, rsa_e_len); + if (rsa_e_len < rsa_e_reqlen) + { + /* Right justify E. */ + memmove (tp + rsa_e_reqlen - rsa_e_len, tp, rsa_e_len); + memset (tp, 0, rsa_e_reqlen - rsa_e_len); + } + tp += rsa_e_reqlen; + + memcpy (tp, rsa_p, rsa_p_len); + tp += rsa_p_len; + + memcpy (tp, rsa_q, rsa_q_len); + tp += rsa_q_len; + + if (app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.format == RSA_CRT + || app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.format == RSA_CRT_N) + { + memcpy (tp, rsa_u, rsa_u_len); + tp += rsa_u_len; + memcpy (tp, rsa_dp, rsa_dp_len); + tp += rsa_dp_len; + memcpy (tp, rsa_dq, rsa_dq_len); + tp += rsa_dq_len; + } + + if (app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.format == RSA_STD_N + || app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.format == RSA_CRT_N) + { + memcpy (tp, rsa_n, rsa_n_len); + tp += rsa_n_len; + } + + /* Sanity check. We don't know the exact length because we + allocated 3 bytes for the first length header. */ + assert (tp - template <= template_size); + + *result = template; + *resultlen = tp - template; + return 0; +} + +static gpg_error_t +build_ecc_privkey_template (app_t app, int keyno, + const unsigned char *ecc_d, size_t ecc_d_len, + size_t ecc_d_fixed_len, + const unsigned char *ecc_q, size_t ecc_q_len, + unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen) +{ + unsigned char privkey[2*(1+3)]; + size_t privkey_len; + unsigned char exthdr[2+2+3]; + size_t exthdr_len; + unsigned char suffix[2+3]; + size_t suffix_len; + unsigned char *tp; + size_t datalen; + unsigned char *template; + size_t template_size; + int pubkey_required; + + /* This case doesn't occur in GnuPG 2.3 or later, because + agent/sexp-secret.c does the fixup. */ + if (ecc_d_fixed_len < ecc_d_len) + { + if (ecc_d_fixed_len != ecc_d_len - 1 || *ecc_d) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ); + + /* Remove the additional zero. */ + ecc_d_len--; + ecc_d++; + } + + pubkey_required = !!(app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].ecc.flags + & ECC_FLAG_PUBKEY); + + *result = NULL; + *resultlen = 0; + + /* Build the 7f48 cardholder private key template. */ + datalen = 0; + tp = privkey; + + tp += add_tlv (tp, 0x92, ecc_d_fixed_len); + datalen += ecc_d_fixed_len; + + if (pubkey_required) + { + tp += add_tlv (tp, 0x99, ecc_q_len); + datalen += ecc_q_len; + } + + privkey_len = tp - privkey; + + + /* Build the extended header list without the private key template. */ + tp = exthdr; + *tp++ = keyno ==0 ? 0xb6 : keyno == 1? 0xb8 : 0xa4; + *tp++ = 0; + tp += add_tlv (tp, 0x7f48, privkey_len); + exthdr_len = tp - exthdr; + + /* Build the 5f48 suffix of the data. */ + tp = suffix; + tp += add_tlv (tp, 0x5f48, datalen); + suffix_len = tp - suffix; + + /* Now concatenate everything. */ + template_size = (1 + 1 /* 0x4d and len. */ + + exthdr_len + + privkey_len + + suffix_len + + datalen); + if (exthdr_len + privkey_len + suffix_len + datalen >= 128) + template_size++; + tp = template = xtrymalloc_secure (template_size); + if (!template) + return gpg_error_from_syserror (); + + tp += add_tlv (tp, 0x4d, exthdr_len + privkey_len + suffix_len + datalen); + memcpy (tp, exthdr, exthdr_len); + tp += exthdr_len; + memcpy (tp, privkey, privkey_len); + tp += privkey_len; + memcpy (tp, suffix, suffix_len); + tp += suffix_len; + + if (ecc_d_fixed_len > ecc_d_len) + { + memset (tp, 0, ecc_d_fixed_len - ecc_d_len); + memcpy (tp + ecc_d_fixed_len - ecc_d_len, ecc_d, ecc_d_len); + } + else + memcpy (tp, ecc_d, ecc_d_len); + tp += ecc_d_fixed_len; + + if (pubkey_required) + { + memcpy (tp, ecc_q, ecc_q_len); + tp += ecc_q_len; + } + + assert (tp - template == template_size); + + *result = template; + *resultlen = tp - template; + return 0; +} + + +/* Helper for do_writekey to change the size of a key. Note that + this deletes the entire key without asking. */ +static gpg_error_t +change_keyattr (app_t app, int keyno, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen, + gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **), + void *pincb_arg) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + + assert (keyno >=0 && keyno <= 2); + + /* Prepare for storing the key. */ + err = verify_chv3 (app, pincb, pincb_arg); + if (err) + return err; + + /* Change the attribute. */ + err = iso7816_put_data (app->slot, 0, 0xC1+keyno, buf, buflen); + if (err) + log_error ("error changing key attribute (key=%d)\n", keyno+1); + else + log_info ("key attribute changed (key=%d)\n", keyno+1); + flush_cache (app); + parse_algorithm_attribute (app, keyno); + app->did_chv1 = 0; + app->did_chv2 = 0; + app->did_chv3 = 0; + return err; +} + + +static gpg_error_t +change_rsa_keyattr (app_t app, int keyno, unsigned int nbits, + gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **), + void *pincb_arg) +{ + gpg_error_t err = 0; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buflen; + void *relptr; + + /* Read the current attributes into a buffer. */ + relptr = get_one_do (app, 0xC1+keyno, &buf, &buflen, NULL); + if (!relptr) + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD); + else if (buflen < 6) + { + /* Attributes too short. */ + xfree (relptr); + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD); + } + else + { + /* If key attribute was RSA, we only change n_bits and don't + touch anything else. Before we do so, we round up NBITS to a + sensible way in the same way as gpg's key generation does it. + This may help to sort out problems with a few bits too short + keys. */ + nbits = ((nbits + 31) / 32) * 32; + buf[1] = (nbits >> 8); + buf[2] = nbits; + + /* If it was not RSA, we need to fill other parts. */ + if (buf[0] != PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA) + { + buf[0] = PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA; + buf[3] = 0; + buf[4] = 32; + buf[5] = 0; + buflen = 6; + } + + err = change_keyattr (app, keyno, buf, buflen, pincb, pincb_arg); + xfree (relptr); + } + + return err; +} + + +/* Helper to process an setattr command for name KEY-ATTR. + In (VALUE,VALUELEN), it expects following string: + RSA: "--force rsa" + ECC: "--force " + */ +static gpg_error_t +change_keyattr_from_string (app_t app, + gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **), + void *pincb_arg, + const void *value, size_t valuelen) +{ + gpg_error_t err = 0; + char *string; + int key, keyno, algo; + int n = 0; + + /* VALUE is expected to be a string but not guaranteed to be + terminated. Thus copy it to an allocated buffer first. */ + string = xtrymalloc (valuelen+1); + if (!string) + return gpg_error_from_syserror (); + memcpy (string, value, valuelen); + string[valuelen] = 0; + + /* Because this function deletes the key we require the string + "--force" in the data to make clear that something serious might + happen. */ + sscanf (string, "--force %d %d %n", &key, &algo, &n); + if (n < 12) + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_DATA); + goto leave; + } + + keyno = key - 1; + if (keyno < 0 || keyno > 2) + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID); + else if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA) + { + unsigned int nbits; + + errno = 0; + nbits = strtoul (string+n+3, NULL, 10); + if (errno) + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_DATA); + else if (nbits < 1024) + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_SHORT); + else if (nbits > 4096) + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE); + else + err = change_rsa_keyattr (app, keyno, nbits, pincb, pincb_arg); + } + else if (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH || algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA + || algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA) + { + const char *oidstr; + gcry_mpi_t oid; + const unsigned char *oidbuf; + size_t oid_len; + + oidstr = openpgp_curve_to_oid (string+n, NULL); + if (!oidstr) + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_DATA); + goto leave; + } + + err = openpgp_oid_from_str (oidstr, &oid); + if (err) + goto leave; + + oidbuf = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (oid, &n); + oid_len = (n+7)/8; + + /* We have enough room at STRING. */ + string[0] = algo; + memcpy (string+1, oidbuf+1, oid_len-1); + err = change_keyattr (app, keyno, string, oid_len, pincb, pincb_arg); + gcry_mpi_release (oid); + } + else + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO); + + leave: + xfree (string); + return err; +} + + +static gpg_error_t +rsa_writekey (app_t app, gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **), + void *pincb_arg, int keyno, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen, int depth) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + const unsigned char *tok; + size_t toklen; + int last_depth1, last_depth2; + const unsigned char *rsa_n = NULL; + const unsigned char *rsa_e = NULL; + const unsigned char *rsa_p = NULL; + const unsigned char *rsa_q = NULL; + size_t rsa_n_len, rsa_e_len, rsa_p_len, rsa_q_len; + unsigned int nbits; + unsigned int maxbits; + unsigned char *template = NULL; + unsigned char *tp; + size_t template_len; + unsigned char fprbuf[20]; + u32 created_at = 0; + + if (app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].key_type != KEY_TYPE_RSA) + { + log_error (_("unsupported algorithm: %s"), "RSA"); + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); + goto leave; + } + + last_depth1 = depth; + while (!(err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen)) + && depth && depth >= last_depth1) + { + if (tok) + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); + goto leave; + } + if ((err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen))) + goto leave; + if (tok && toklen == 1) + { + const unsigned char **mpi; + size_t *mpi_len; + + switch (*tok) + { + case 'n': mpi = &rsa_n; mpi_len = &rsa_n_len; break; + case 'e': mpi = &rsa_e; mpi_len = &rsa_e_len; break; + case 'p': mpi = &rsa_p; mpi_len = &rsa_p_len; break; + case 'q': mpi = &rsa_q; mpi_len = &rsa_q_len;break; + default: mpi = NULL; mpi_len = NULL; break; + } + if (mpi && *mpi) + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_DUP_VALUE); + goto leave; + } + if ((err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen))) + goto leave; + if (tok && mpi) + { + /* Strip off leading zero bytes and save. */ + for (;toklen && !*tok; toklen--, tok++) + ; + *mpi = tok; + *mpi_len = toklen; + } + } + /* Skip until end of list. */ + last_depth2 = depth; + while (!(err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen)) + && depth && depth >= last_depth2) + ; + if (err) + goto leave; + } + /* Parse other attributes. */ + last_depth1 = depth; + while (!(err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen)) + && depth && depth >= last_depth1) + { + if (tok) + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); + goto leave; + } + if ((err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen))) + goto leave; + if (tok && toklen == 10 && !memcmp ("created-at", tok, toklen)) + { + if ((err = parse_sexp (&buf,&buflen,&depth,&tok,&toklen))) + goto leave; + if (tok) + { + for (created_at=0; toklen && *tok && *tok >= '0' && *tok <= '9'; + tok++, toklen--) + created_at = created_at*10 + (*tok - '0'); + } + } + /* Skip until end of list. */ + last_depth2 = depth; + while (!(err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen)) + && depth && depth >= last_depth2) + ; + if (err) + goto leave; + } + + + /* Check that we have all parameters and that they match the card + description. */ + if (!created_at) + { + log_error (_("creation timestamp missing\n")); + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); + goto leave; + } + + maxbits = app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.n_bits; + nbits = rsa_n? count_bits (rsa_n, rsa_n_len) : 0; + if (opt.verbose) + log_info ("RSA modulus size is %u bits\n", nbits); + if (nbits && nbits != maxbits + && app->app_local->extcap.algo_attr_change) + { + /* Try to switch the key to a new length. */ + err = change_rsa_keyattr (app, keyno, nbits, pincb, pincb_arg); + if (!err) + maxbits = app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.n_bits; + } + if (nbits != maxbits) + { + log_error (_("RSA modulus missing or not of size %d bits\n"), + (int)maxbits); + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY); + goto leave; + } + + maxbits = app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.e_bits; + if (maxbits > 32 && !app->app_local->extcap.is_v2) + maxbits = 32; /* Our code for v1 does only support 32 bits. */ + nbits = rsa_e? count_bits (rsa_e, rsa_e_len) : 0; + if (nbits < 2 || nbits > maxbits) + { + log_error (_("RSA public exponent missing or larger than %d bits\n"), + (int)maxbits); + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY); + goto leave; + } + + maxbits = app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.n_bits/2; + nbits = rsa_p? count_bits (rsa_p, rsa_p_len) : 0; + if (nbits != maxbits) + { + log_error (_("RSA prime %s missing or not of size %d bits\n"), + "P", (int)maxbits); + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY); + goto leave; + } + nbits = rsa_q? count_bits (rsa_q, rsa_q_len) : 0; + if (nbits != maxbits) + { + log_error (_("RSA prime %s missing or not of size %d bits\n"), + "Q", (int)maxbits); + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY); + goto leave; + } + + /* We need to remove the cached public key. */ + xfree (app->app_local->pk[keyno].key); + app->app_local->pk[keyno].key = NULL; + app->app_local->pk[keyno].keylen = 0; + app->app_local->pk[keyno].read_done = 0; + + + if (app->app_local->extcap.is_v2) + { + unsigned char *rsa_u, *rsa_dp, *rsa_dq; + size_t rsa_u_len, rsa_dp_len, rsa_dq_len; + gcry_mpi_t mpi_e, mpi_p, mpi_q; + gcry_mpi_t mpi_u = gcry_mpi_snew (0); + gcry_mpi_t mpi_dp = gcry_mpi_snew (0); + gcry_mpi_t mpi_dq = gcry_mpi_snew (0); + gcry_mpi_t mpi_tmp = gcry_mpi_snew (0); + int exmode; + + /* Calculate the u, dp and dq components needed by RSA_CRT cards */ + gcry_mpi_scan (&mpi_e, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, rsa_e, rsa_e_len, NULL); + gcry_mpi_scan (&mpi_p, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, rsa_p, rsa_p_len, NULL); + gcry_mpi_scan (&mpi_q, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, rsa_q, rsa_q_len, NULL); + + gcry_mpi_invm (mpi_u, mpi_q, mpi_p); + gcry_mpi_sub_ui (mpi_tmp, mpi_p, 1); + gcry_mpi_invm (mpi_dp, mpi_e, mpi_tmp); + gcry_mpi_sub_ui (mpi_tmp, mpi_q, 1); + gcry_mpi_invm (mpi_dq, mpi_e, mpi_tmp); + + gcry_mpi_aprint (GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, &rsa_u, &rsa_u_len, mpi_u); + gcry_mpi_aprint (GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, &rsa_dp, &rsa_dp_len, mpi_dp); + gcry_mpi_aprint (GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, &rsa_dq, &rsa_dq_len, mpi_dq); + + gcry_mpi_release (mpi_e); + gcry_mpi_release (mpi_p); + gcry_mpi_release (mpi_q); + gcry_mpi_release (mpi_u); + gcry_mpi_release (mpi_dp); + gcry_mpi_release (mpi_dq); + gcry_mpi_release (mpi_tmp); + + /* Build the private key template as described in section 4.3.3.7 of + the OpenPGP card specs version 2.0. */ + err = build_privkey_template (app, keyno, + rsa_n, rsa_n_len, + rsa_e, rsa_e_len, + rsa_p, rsa_p_len, + rsa_q, rsa_q_len, + rsa_u, rsa_u_len, + rsa_dp, rsa_dp_len, + rsa_dq, rsa_dq_len, + &template, &template_len); + xfree(rsa_u); + xfree(rsa_dp); + xfree(rsa_dq); + + if (err) + goto leave; + + /* Prepare for storing the key. */ + err = verify_chv3 (app, pincb, pincb_arg); + if (err) + goto leave; + + /* Store the key. */ + if (app->app_local->cardcap.ext_lc_le && template_len > 254) + exmode = 1; /* Use extended length w/o a limit. */ + else if (app->app_local->cardcap.cmd_chaining && template_len > 254) + exmode = -254; + else + exmode = 0; + err = iso7816_put_data_odd (app->slot, exmode, 0x3fff, + template, template_len); + } + else + { + /* Build the private key template as described in section 4.3.3.6 of + the OpenPGP card specs version 1.1: + 0xC0 public exponent + 0xC1 prime p + 0xC2 prime q + */ + assert (rsa_e_len <= 4); + template_len = (1 + 1 + 4 + + 1 + 1 + rsa_p_len + + 1 + 1 + rsa_q_len); + template = tp = xtrymalloc_secure (template_len); + if (!template) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto leave; + } + *tp++ = 0xC0; + *tp++ = 4; + memcpy (tp, rsa_e, rsa_e_len); + if (rsa_e_len < 4) + { + /* Right justify E. */ + memmove (tp+4-rsa_e_len, tp, rsa_e_len); + memset (tp, 0, 4-rsa_e_len); + } + tp += 4; + + *tp++ = 0xC1; + *tp++ = rsa_p_len; + memcpy (tp, rsa_p, rsa_p_len); + tp += rsa_p_len; + + *tp++ = 0xC2; + *tp++ = rsa_q_len; + memcpy (tp, rsa_q, rsa_q_len); + tp += rsa_q_len; + + assert (tp - template == template_len); + + /* Prepare for storing the key. */ + err = verify_chv3 (app, pincb, pincb_arg); + if (err) + goto leave; + + /* Store the key. */ + err = iso7816_put_data (app->slot, 0, + (app->card_version > 0x0007? 0xE0:0xE9)+keyno, + template, template_len); + } + if (err) + { + log_error (_("failed to store the key: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err)); + goto leave; + } + + err = store_fpr (app, keyno, created_at, fprbuf, PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA, + rsa_n, rsa_n_len, rsa_e, rsa_e_len); + if (err) + goto leave; + + + leave: + xfree (template); + return err; +} + + +static gpg_error_t +ecc_writekey (app_t app, gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **), + void *pincb_arg, int keyno, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen, int depth) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + const unsigned char *tok; + size_t toklen; + int last_depth1, last_depth2; + const unsigned char *ecc_q = NULL; + const unsigned char *ecc_d = NULL; + size_t ecc_q_len, ecc_d_len; + const char *curve = NULL; + u32 created_at = 0; + const char *oidstr; + int flag_djb_tweak = 0; + int algo; + gcry_mpi_t oid = NULL; + const unsigned char *oidbuf; + unsigned int n; + size_t oid_len; + unsigned char fprbuf[20]; + size_t ecc_d_fixed_len; + + /* (private-key(ecc(curve%s)(q%m)(d%m))(created-at%d)): + curve = "NIST P-256" */ + /* (private-key(ecc(curve%s)(q%m)(d%m))(created-at%d)): + curve = "secp256k1" */ + /* (private-key(ecc(curve%s)(flags eddsa)(q%m)(d%m))(created-at%d)): + curve = "Ed25519" */ + last_depth1 = depth; + while (!(err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen)) + && depth && depth >= last_depth1) + { + if (tok) + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); + goto leave; + } + if ((err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen))) + goto leave; + + if (tok && toklen == 5 && !memcmp (tok, "curve", 5)) + { + char *curve_name; + + if ((err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen))) + goto leave; + + curve_name = xtrymalloc (toklen+1); + if (!curve_name) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto leave; + } + + memcpy (curve_name, tok, toklen); + curve_name[toklen] = 0; + curve = openpgp_is_curve_supported (curve_name, NULL, NULL); + xfree (curve_name); + } + else if (tok && toklen == 5 && !memcmp (tok, "flags", 5)) + { + if ((err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen))) + goto leave; + + if (tok) + { + if ((toklen == 5 && !memcmp (tok, "eddsa", 5)) + || (toklen == 9 && !memcmp (tok, "djb-tweak", 9))) + flag_djb_tweak = 1; + } + } + else if (tok && toklen == 1) + { + const unsigned char **buf2; + size_t *buf2len; + int native = flag_djb_tweak; + + switch (*tok) + { + case 'q': buf2 = &ecc_q; buf2len = &ecc_q_len; break; + case 'd': buf2 = &ecc_d; buf2len = &ecc_d_len; native = 0; break; + default: buf2 = NULL; buf2len = NULL; break; + } + if (buf2 && *buf2) + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_DUP_VALUE); + goto leave; + } + if ((err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen))) + goto leave; + if (tok && buf2) + { + if (!native) + /* Strip off leading zero bytes and save. */ + for (;toklen && !*tok; toklen--, tok++) + ; + + *buf2 = tok; + *buf2len = toklen; + } + } + /* Skip until end of list. */ + last_depth2 = depth; + while (!(err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen)) + && depth && depth >= last_depth2) + ; + if (err) + goto leave; + } + /* Parse other attributes. */ + last_depth1 = depth; + while (!(err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen)) + && depth && depth >= last_depth1) + { + if (tok) + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); + goto leave; + } + if ((err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen))) + goto leave; + if (tok && toklen == 10 && !memcmp ("created-at", tok, toklen)) + { + if ((err = parse_sexp (&buf,&buflen,&depth,&tok,&toklen))) + goto leave; + if (tok) + { + for (created_at=0; toklen && *tok && *tok >= '0' && *tok <= '9'; + tok++, toklen--) + created_at = created_at*10 + (*tok - '0'); + } + } + /* Skip until end of list. */ + last_depth2 = depth; + while (!(err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen)) + && depth && depth >= last_depth2) + ; + if (err) + goto leave; + } + + + /* Check that we have all parameters and that they match the card + description. */ + if (!curve) + { + log_error (_("unsupported curve\n")); + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); + goto leave; + } + if (!created_at) + { + log_error (_("creation timestamp missing\n")); + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); + goto leave; + } + if (flag_djb_tweak && keyno != 1) + algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA; + else if (keyno == 1) + algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH; + else + algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA; + + oidstr = openpgp_curve_to_oid (curve, &n); + ecc_d_fixed_len = (n+7)/8; + err = openpgp_oid_from_str (oidstr, &oid); + if (err) + goto leave; + oidbuf = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (oid, &n); + if (!oidbuf) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto leave; + } + oid_len = (n+7)/8; + + if (app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].key_type != KEY_TYPE_ECC + || app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].ecc.curve != curve + || (flag_djb_tweak != + (app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].ecc.flags & ECC_FLAG_DJB_TWEAK))) + { + if (app->app_local->extcap.algo_attr_change) + { + unsigned char *keyattr; + + if (!oid_len) + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL); + goto leave; + } + keyattr = xtrymalloc (oid_len); + if (!keyattr) + { + err = gpg_error_from_syserror (); + goto leave; + } + keyattr[0] = algo; + memcpy (keyattr+1, oidbuf+1, oid_len-1); + err = change_keyattr (app, keyno, keyattr, oid_len, pincb, pincb_arg); + xfree (keyattr); + if (err) + goto leave; + } + else + { + log_error ("key attribute on card doesn't match\n"); + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); + goto leave; + } + } + + if (opt.verbose) + log_info ("ECC private key size is %u bytes\n", (unsigned int)ecc_d_len); + + /* We need to remove the cached public key. */ + xfree (app->app_local->pk[keyno].key); + app->app_local->pk[keyno].key = NULL; + app->app_local->pk[keyno].keylen = 0; + app->app_local->pk[keyno].read_done = 0; + + if (app->app_local->extcap.is_v2) + { + /* Build the private key template as described in section 4.3.3.7 of + the OpenPGP card specs version 2.0. */ + unsigned char *template; + size_t template_len; + int exmode; + + err = build_ecc_privkey_template (app, keyno, + ecc_d, ecc_d_len, ecc_d_fixed_len, + ecc_q, ecc_q_len, + &template, &template_len); + if (err) + goto leave; + + /* Prepare for storing the key. */ + err = verify_chv3 (app, pincb, pincb_arg); + if (err) + { + xfree (template); + goto leave; + } + + /* Store the key. */ + if (app->app_local->cardcap.ext_lc_le && template_len > 254) + exmode = 1; /* Use extended length w/o a limit. */ + else if (app->app_local->cardcap.cmd_chaining && template_len > 254) + exmode = -254; + else + exmode = 0; + err = iso7816_put_data_odd (app->slot, exmode, 0x3fff, + template, template_len); + xfree (template); + } + else + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED); + + if (err) + { + log_error (_("failed to store the key: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err)); + goto leave; + } + + err = store_fpr (app, keyno, created_at, fprbuf, algo, oidbuf, oid_len, + ecc_q, ecc_q_len, ecdh_params (curve), (size_t)4); + + leave: + gcry_mpi_release (oid); + return err; +} + +/* Handle the WRITEKEY command for OpenPGP. This function expects a + canonical encoded S-expression with the secret key in KEYDATA and + its length (for assertions) in KEYDATALEN. KEYID needs to be the + usual keyid which for OpenPGP is the string "OPENPGP.n" with + n=1,2,3. Bit 0 of FLAGS indicates whether an existing key shall + get overwritten. PINCB and PINCB_ARG are the usual arguments for + the pinentry callback. */ +static gpg_error_t +do_writekey (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, + const char *keyid, unsigned int flags, + gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **), + void *pincb_arg, + const unsigned char *keydata, size_t keydatalen) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + int force = (flags & 1); + int keyno; + const unsigned char *buf, *tok; + size_t buflen, toklen; + int depth; + + (void)ctrl; + + if (!strcmp (keyid, "OPENPGP.1")) + keyno = 0; + else if (!strcmp (keyid, "OPENPGP.2")) + keyno = 1; + else if (!strcmp (keyid, "OPENPGP.3")) + keyno = 2; + else + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID); + + err = does_key_exist (app, keyno, 0, force); + if (err) + return err; + + + /* + Parse the S-expression + */ + buf = keydata; + buflen = keydatalen; + depth = 0; + if ((err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen))) + goto leave; + if ((err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen))) + goto leave; + if (!tok || toklen != 11 || memcmp ("private-key", tok, toklen)) + { + if (!tok) + ; + else if (toklen == 21 && !memcmp ("protected-private-key", tok, toklen)) + log_info ("protected-private-key passed to writekey\n"); + else if (toklen == 20 && !memcmp ("shadowed-private-key", tok, toklen)) + log_info ("shadowed-private-key passed to writekey\n"); + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY); + goto leave; + } + if ((err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen))) + goto leave; + if ((err = parse_sexp (&buf, &buflen, &depth, &tok, &toklen))) + goto leave; + if (tok && toklen == 3 && memcmp ("rsa", tok, toklen) == 0) + err = rsa_writekey (app, pincb, pincb_arg, keyno, buf, buflen, depth); + else if (tok && toklen == 3 && memcmp ("ecc", tok, toklen) == 0) + err = ecc_writekey (app, pincb, pincb_arg, keyno, buf, buflen, depth); + else + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_PUBKEY_ALGO); + goto leave; + } + + leave: + return err; +} + + + +/* Handle the GENKEY command. */ +static gpg_error_t +do_genkey (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl, const char *keynostr, const char *keytype, + unsigned int flags, time_t createtime, + gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **), + void *pincb_arg) +{ + gpg_error_t err; + char numbuf[30]; + unsigned char *buffer = NULL; + const unsigned char *keydata; + size_t buflen, keydatalen; + u32 created_at; + int keyno = atoi (keynostr) - 1; + int force = (flags & 1); + time_t start_at; + int exmode = 0; + int le_value = 256; /* Use legacy value. */ + + (void)keytype; /* Ignored for OpenPGP cards. */ + + if (keyno < 0 || keyno > 2) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID); + + /* We flush the cache to increase the traffic before a key + generation. This _might_ help a card to gather more entropy. */ + flush_cache (app); + + /* Obviously we need to remove the cached public key. */ + xfree (app->app_local->pk[keyno].key); + app->app_local->pk[keyno].key = NULL; + app->app_local->pk[keyno].keylen = 0; + app->app_local->pk[keyno].read_done = 0; + + /* Check whether a key already exists. */ + err = does_key_exist (app, keyno, 1, force); + if (err) + return err; + + if (app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].key_type == KEY_TYPE_RSA) + { + unsigned int keybits = app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.n_bits; + + /* Because we send the key parameter back via status lines we need + to put a limit on the max. allowed keysize. 2048 bit will + already lead to a 527 byte long status line and thus a 4096 bit + key would exceed the Assuan line length limit. */ + if (keybits > 4096) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE); + + if (app->app_local->cardcap.ext_lc_le && keybits > RSA_SMALL_SIZE_KEY + && app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].key_type == KEY_TYPE_RSA) + { + exmode = 1; /* Use extended length w/o a limit. */ + le_value = determine_rsa_response (app, keyno); + /* No need to check le_value because it comes from a 16 bit + value and thus can't create an overflow on a 32 bit + system. */ + } + } + + /* Prepare for key generation by verifying the Admin PIN. */ + err = verify_chv3 (app, pincb, pincb_arg); + if (err) + return err; + + + log_info (_("please wait while key is being generated ...\n")); + start_at = time (NULL); + err = iso7816_generate_keypair (app->slot, exmode, 0x80, 0, + (keyno == 0? "\xB6" : + keyno == 1? "\xB8" : "\xA4"), + 2, le_value, &buffer, &buflen); + if (err) + { + log_error (_("generating key failed\n")); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD); + } + + { + int nsecs = (int)(time (NULL) - start_at); + log_info (ngettext("key generation completed (%d second)\n", + "key generation completed (%d seconds)\n", + nsecs), nsecs); + } + + keydata = find_tlv (buffer, buflen, 0x7F49, &keydatalen); + if (!keydata) + { + err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD); + log_error (_("response does not contain the public key data\n")); + goto leave; + } + + created_at = (u32)(createtime? createtime : gnupg_get_time ()); + sprintf (numbuf, "%u", created_at); + send_status_info (ctrl, "KEY-CREATED-AT", + numbuf, (size_t)strlen(numbuf), NULL, 0); + + err = read_public_key (app, ctrl, created_at, keyno, buffer, buflen); + leave: + xfree (buffer); + return err; +} + + +static unsigned long +convert_sig_counter_value (const unsigned char *value, size_t valuelen) +{ + unsigned long ul; + + if (valuelen == 3 ) + ul = (value[0] << 16) | (value[1] << 8) | value[2]; + else + { + log_error (_("invalid structure of OpenPGP card (DO 0x93)\n")); + ul = 0; + } + return ul; +} + +static unsigned long +get_sig_counter (app_t app) +{ + void *relptr; + unsigned char *value; + size_t valuelen; + unsigned long ul; + + relptr = get_one_do (app, 0x0093, &value, &valuelen, NULL); + if (!relptr) + return 0; + ul = convert_sig_counter_value (value, valuelen); + xfree (relptr); + return ul; +} + +static gpg_error_t +compare_fingerprint (app_t app, int keyno, unsigned char *sha1fpr) +{ + const unsigned char *fpr; + unsigned char *buffer; + size_t buflen, n; + int rc, i; + + assert (keyno >= 0 && keyno <= 2); + + rc = get_cached_data (app, 0x006E, &buffer, &buflen, 0, 0); + if (rc) + { + log_error (_("error reading application data\n")); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL); + } + fpr = find_tlv (buffer, buflen, 0x00C5, &n); + if (!fpr || n < 60) + { + xfree (buffer); + log_error (_("error reading fingerprint DO\n")); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL); + } + fpr += keyno*20; + for (i=0; i < 20; i++) + if (sha1fpr[i] != fpr[i]) + { + xfree (buffer); + log_info (_("fingerprint on card does not match requested one\n")); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_SECKEY); + } + xfree (buffer); + return 0; +} + + +/* If a fingerprint has been specified check it against the one on the + card. This allows for a meaningful error message in case the key + on the card has been replaced but the shadow information known to + gpg has not been updated. If there is no fingerprint we assume + that this is okay. */ +static gpg_error_t +check_against_given_fingerprint (app_t app, const char *fpr, int key) +{ + unsigned char tmp[20]; + const char *s; + int n; + + for (s=fpr, n=0; hexdigitp (s); s++, n++) + ; + if (n != 40) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID); + else if (!*s) + ; /* okay */ + else + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID); + + for (s=fpr, n=0; n < 20; s += 2, n++) + tmp[n] = xtoi_2 (s); + return compare_fingerprint (app, key-1, tmp); +} + + +/* Check KEYIDSTR, if it's valid. + When KEYNO is 0, it means it's for PIN check. + Otherwise, KEYNO corresponds to the slot (signing, decipher and auth). + KEYIDSTR is either: + (1) Serial number + (2) Serial number "/" fingerprint + (3) Serial number "[CHV3]" + (4) keygrip + + When KEYNO is 0 and KEYIDSTR is for a keygrip, the keygrip should + be to be compared is the first one (keygrip for signing). + When KEYNO is 1, KEYIDSTR is for a keygrip, and R_USE_AUTH is not + NULL, OpenPGP.1 is first tested and then OpenPGP.3. In the latter + case 1 is stored at R_USE_AUTH + */ +static int +check_keyidstr (app_t app, const char *keyidstr, int keyno, int *r_use_auth) +{ + int rc; + const char *s; + int n; + const char *fpr = NULL; + int i; + + if (r_use_auth) + *r_use_auth = 0; + + /* Make sure we have load the public keys. */ + for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) + get_public_key (app, i); + + if (strlen (keyidstr) < 32) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID); + else + { + char *serial; + + for (s=keyidstr, n=0; hexdigitp (s); s++, n++) + ; + + /* Check if it's a keygrip */ + if (n == 40) + { + const unsigned char *keygrip_str; + + keygrip_str = app->app_local->pk[keyno?keyno-1:0].keygrip_str; + if (!strncmp (keygrip_str, keyidstr, 40)) + return 0; + else if (keyno == 1 && r_use_auth + && !strncmp (app->app_local->pk[2].keygrip_str, + keyidstr, 40)) + { + *r_use_auth = 1; + return 0; + } + else + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID); + } + + if (n != 32 || strncmp (keyidstr, "D27600012401", 12)) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID); + else if (!*s) + ; /* no fingerprint given: we allow this for now. */ + else if (*s == '/') + fpr = s + 1; + + serial = app_get_serialno (app); + if (strncmp (serial, keyidstr, 32)) + { + xfree (serial); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_CARD); + } + + xfree (serial); + } + + /* If a fingerprint has been specified check it against the one on + the card. This is allows for a meaningful error message in case + the key on the card has been replaced but the shadow information + known to gpg was not updated. If there is no fingerprint, gpg + will detect a bogus signature anyway due to the + verify-after-signing feature. */ + rc = (fpr&&keyno)? check_against_given_fingerprint (app, fpr, keyno) : 0; + + return rc; +} + + +/* Compute a digital signature on INDATA which is expected to be the + raw message digest. For this application the KEYIDSTR consists of + the serialnumber and the fingerprint delimited by a slash. + + Note that this function may return the error code + GPG_ERR_WRONG_CARD to indicate that the card currently present does + not match the one required for the requested action (e.g. the + serial number does not match). + + As a special feature a KEYIDSTR of "OPENPGP.3" redirects the + operation to the auth command. +*/ +static gpg_error_t +do_sign (app_t app, const char *keyidstr, int hashalgo, + gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **), + void *pincb_arg, + const void *indata, size_t indatalen, + unsigned char **outdata, size_t *outdatalen ) +{ + static unsigned char rmd160_prefix[15] = /* Object ID is 1.3.36.3.2.1 */ + { 0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x24, 0x03, + 0x02, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14 }; + static unsigned char sha1_prefix[15] = /* (1.3.14.3.2.26) */ + { 0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, + 0x02, 0x1a, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14 }; + static unsigned char sha224_prefix[19] = /* (2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.4) */ + { 0x30, 0x2D, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, + 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, + 0x1C }; + static unsigned char sha256_prefix[19] = /* (2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1) */ + { 0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, + 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, 0x05, + 0x00, 0x04, 0x20 }; + static unsigned char sha384_prefix[19] = /* (2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.2) */ + { 0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, + 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02, 0x05, + 0x00, 0x04, 0x30 }; + static unsigned char sha512_prefix[19] = /* (2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.3) */ + { 0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, + 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, 0x05, + 0x00, 0x04, 0x40 }; + int rc; + unsigned char data[19+64]; + size_t datalen; + unsigned long sigcount; + int use_auth = 0; + int exmode, le_value; + + if (!keyidstr || !*keyidstr) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); + + /* Strip off known prefixes. */ +#define X(a,b,c,d) \ + if (hashalgo == GCRY_MD_ ## a \ + && (d) \ + && indatalen == sizeof b ## _prefix + (c) \ + && !memcmp (indata, b ## _prefix, sizeof b ## _prefix)) \ + { \ + indata = (const char*)indata + sizeof b ## _prefix; \ + indatalen -= sizeof b ## _prefix; \ + } + + if (indatalen == 20) + ; /* Assume a plain SHA-1 or RMD160 digest has been given. */ + else X(SHA1, sha1, 20, 1) + else X(RMD160, rmd160, 20, 1) + else X(SHA224, sha224, 28, app->app_local->extcap.is_v2) + else X(SHA256, sha256, 32, app->app_local->extcap.is_v2) + else X(SHA384, sha384, 48, app->app_local->extcap.is_v2) + else X(SHA512, sha512, 64, app->app_local->extcap.is_v2) + else if ((indatalen == 28 || indatalen == 32 + || indatalen == 48 || indatalen ==64) + && app->app_local->extcap.is_v2) + ; /* Assume a plain SHA-3 digest has been given. */ + else + { + log_error (_("card does not support digest algorithm %s\n"), + gcry_md_algo_name (hashalgo)); + /* Or the supplied digest length does not match an algorithm. */ + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); + } +#undef X + + /* Check whether an OpenPGP card of any version has been requested. */ + if (!strcmp (keyidstr, "OPENPGP.1")) + ; + else if (!strcmp (keyidstr, "OPENPGP.3")) + use_auth = 1; + else + { + rc = check_keyidstr (app, keyidstr, 1, &use_auth); + if (rc) + return rc; + } + + /* Concatenate prefix and digest. */ +#define X(a,b,d) \ + if (hashalgo == GCRY_MD_ ## a && (d) ) \ + { \ + datalen = sizeof b ## _prefix + indatalen; \ + assert (datalen <= sizeof data); \ + memcpy (data, b ## _prefix, sizeof b ## _prefix); \ + memcpy (data + sizeof b ## _prefix, indata, indatalen); \ + } + + if (use_auth + || app->app_local->keyattr[use_auth? 2: 0].key_type == KEY_TYPE_RSA) + { + X(SHA1, sha1, 1) + else X(RMD160, rmd160, 1) + else X(SHA224, sha224, app->app_local->extcap.is_v2) + else X(SHA256, sha256, app->app_local->extcap.is_v2) + else X(SHA384, sha384, app->app_local->extcap.is_v2) + else X(SHA512, sha512, app->app_local->extcap.is_v2) + else + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM); + } + else + { + datalen = indatalen; + memcpy (data, indata, indatalen); + } +#undef X + + /* Redirect to the AUTH command if asked to. */ + if (use_auth) + { + return do_auth (app, "OPENPGP.3", pincb, pincb_arg, + data, datalen, + outdata, outdatalen); + } + + /* Show the number of signature done using this key. */ + sigcount = get_sig_counter (app); + log_info (_("signatures created so far: %lu\n"), sigcount); + + /* Check CHV if needed. */ + if (!app->did_chv1 || app->force_chv1) + { + char *pinvalue; + int pinlen; + + rc = verify_a_chv (app, pincb, pincb_arg, 1, sigcount, &pinvalue, &pinlen); + if (rc) + return rc; + + app->did_chv1 = 1; + + /* For cards with versions < 2 we want to keep CHV1 and CHV2 in + sync, thus we verify CHV2 here using the given PIN. Cards + with version2 to not have the need for a separate CHV2 and + internally use just one. Obviously we can't do that if the + pinpad has been used. */ + if (!app->did_chv2 && pinvalue && !app->app_local->extcap.is_v2) + { + rc = iso7816_verify (app->slot, 0x82, pinvalue, pinlen); + if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_PIN) + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_PIN_NOT_SYNCED); + if (rc) + { + log_error (_("verify CHV%d failed: %s\n"), 2, gpg_strerror (rc)); + xfree (pinvalue); + flush_cache_after_error (app); + return rc; + } + app->did_chv2 = 1; + } + xfree (pinvalue); + } + + + if (app->app_local->cardcap.ext_lc_le + && app->app_local->keyattr[0].key_type == KEY_TYPE_RSA + && app->app_local->keyattr[0].rsa.n_bits > RSA_SMALL_SIZE_OP) + { + exmode = 1; /* Use extended length. */ + le_value = app->app_local->keyattr[0].rsa.n_bits / 8; + } + else + { + exmode = 0; + le_value = 0; + } + rc = iso7816_compute_ds (app->slot, exmode, data, datalen, le_value, + outdata, outdatalen); + if (!rc && app->force_chv1) + app->did_chv1 = 0; + + return rc; +} + +/* Compute a digital signature using the INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command + on INDATA which is expected to be the raw message digest. For this + application the KEYIDSTR consists of the serialnumber and the + fingerprint delimited by a slash. Optionally the id OPENPGP.3 may + be given. + + Note that this function may return the error code + GPG_ERR_WRONG_CARD to indicate that the card currently present does + not match the one required for the requested action (e.g. the + serial number does not match). */ +static gpg_error_t +do_auth (app_t app, const char *keyidstr, + gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **), + void *pincb_arg, + const void *indata, size_t indatalen, + unsigned char **outdata, size_t *outdatalen ) +{ + int rc; + + if (!keyidstr || !*keyidstr) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); + if (app->app_local->keyattr[2].key_type == KEY_TYPE_RSA + && indatalen > 101) /* For a 2048 bit key. */ + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); + + if (app->app_local->keyattr[2].key_type == KEY_TYPE_ECC) + { + if (!(app->app_local->keyattr[2].ecc.flags & ECC_FLAG_DJB_TWEAK) + && (indatalen == 51 || indatalen == 67 || indatalen == 83)) + { + const char *p = (const char *)indata + 19; + indata = p; + indatalen -= 19; + } + else + { + const char *p = (const char *)indata + 15; + indata = p; + indatalen -= 15; + } + } + + /* Check whether an OpenPGP card of any version has been requested. */ + if (!ascii_strcasecmp (keyidstr, "OPENPGP.3")) + ; + else + { + rc = check_keyidstr (app, keyidstr, 3, NULL); + if (rc) + return rc; + } + + rc = verify_chv2 (app, pincb, pincb_arg); + if (!rc) + { + int exmode, le_value; + + if (app->app_local->cardcap.ext_lc_le + && app->app_local->keyattr[2].key_type == KEY_TYPE_RSA + && app->app_local->keyattr[2].rsa.n_bits > RSA_SMALL_SIZE_OP) + { + exmode = 1; /* Use extended length. */ + le_value = app->app_local->keyattr[2].rsa.n_bits / 8; + } + else + { + exmode = 0; + le_value = 0; + } + rc = iso7816_internal_authenticate (app->slot, exmode, + indata, indatalen, le_value, + outdata, outdatalen); + } + return rc; +} + + +static gpg_error_t +do_decipher (app_t app, const char *keyidstr, + gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **), + void *pincb_arg, + const void *indata, size_t indatalen, + unsigned char **outdata, size_t *outdatalen, + unsigned int *r_info) +{ + int rc; + int n; + int exmode, le_value; + unsigned char *fixbuf = NULL; + int padind = 0; + int fixuplen = 0; + + if (!keyidstr || !*keyidstr || !indatalen) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); + + /* Check whether an OpenPGP card of any version has been requested. */ + if (!ascii_strcasecmp (keyidstr, "OPENPGP.2")) + ; + else + { + rc = check_keyidstr (app, keyidstr, 2, NULL); + if (rc) + return rc; + } + + rc = verify_chv2 (app, pincb, pincb_arg); + if (rc) + return rc; + + if ((indatalen == 16 + 1 || indatalen == 32 + 1) + && ((char *)indata)[0] == 0x02) + { + /* PSO:DECIPHER with symmetric key. */ + padind = -1; + } + else if (app->app_local->keyattr[1].key_type == KEY_TYPE_RSA) + { + /* We might encounter a couple of leading zeroes in the + cryptogram. Due to internal use of MPIs these leading zeroes + are stripped. However the OpenPGP card expects exactly 128 + bytes for the cryptogram (for a 1k key). Thus we need to fix + it up. We do this for up to 16 leading zero bytes; a + cryptogram with more than this is with a very high + probability anyway broken. If a signed conversion was used + we may also encounter one leading zero followed by the correct + length. We fix that as well. */ + if (indatalen >= (128-16) && indatalen < 128) /* 1024 bit key. */ + fixuplen = 128 - indatalen; + else if (indatalen >= (192-16) && indatalen < 192) /* 1536 bit key. */ + fixuplen = 192 - indatalen; + else if (indatalen >= (256-16) && indatalen < 256) /* 2048 bit key. */ + fixuplen = 256 - indatalen; + else if (indatalen >= (384-16) && indatalen < 384) /* 3072 bit key. */ + fixuplen = 384 - indatalen; + else if (indatalen >= (512-16) && indatalen < 512) /* 4096 bit key. */ + fixuplen = 512 - indatalen; + else if (!*(const char *)indata && (indatalen == 129 + || indatalen == 193 + || indatalen == 257 + || indatalen == 385 + || indatalen == 513)) + fixuplen = -1; + else + fixuplen = 0; + + if (fixuplen > 0) + { + /* While we have to prepend stuff anyway, we can also + include the padding byte here so that iso1816_decipher + does not need to do another data mangling. */ + fixuplen++; + + fixbuf = xtrymalloc (fixuplen + indatalen); + if (!fixbuf) + return gpg_error_from_syserror (); + + memset (fixbuf, 0, fixuplen); + memcpy (fixbuf+fixuplen, indata, indatalen); + indata = fixbuf; + indatalen = fixuplen + indatalen; + padind = -1; /* Already padded. */ + } + else if (fixuplen < 0) + { + /* We use the extra leading zero as the padding byte. */ + padind = -1; + } + } + else if (app->app_local->keyattr[1].key_type == KEY_TYPE_ECC) + { + int old_format_len = 0; + + if ((app->app_local->keyattr[1].ecc.flags & ECC_FLAG_DJB_TWEAK)) + { + if (indatalen > 32 && (indatalen % 2)) + { /* + * Skip the prefix. It may be 0x40 (in new format), or MPI + * head of 0x00 (in old format). + */ + indata = (const char *)indata + 1; + indatalen--; + } + else if (indatalen < 32) + { /* + * Old format trancated by MPI handling. + */ + old_format_len = indatalen; + indatalen = 32; + } + } + + n = 0; + if (indatalen < 128) + fixuplen = 7; + else + fixuplen = 10; + + fixbuf = xtrymalloc (fixuplen + indatalen); + if (!fixbuf) + return gpg_error_from_syserror (); + + /* Build 'Cipher DO' */ + fixbuf[n++] = '\xa6'; + if (indatalen < 128) + fixbuf[n++] = (char)(indatalen+5); + else + { + fixbuf[n++] = 0x81; + fixbuf[n++] = (char)(indatalen+7); + } + fixbuf[n++] = '\x7f'; + fixbuf[n++] = '\x49'; + if (indatalen < 128) + fixbuf[n++] = (char)(indatalen+2); + else + { + fixbuf[n++] = 0x81; + fixbuf[n++] = (char)(indatalen+3); + } + fixbuf[n++] = '\x86'; + if (indatalen < 128) + fixbuf[n++] = (char)indatalen; + else + { + fixbuf[n++] = 0x81; + fixbuf[n++] = (char)indatalen; + } + + if (old_format_len) + { + memset (fixbuf+fixuplen, 0, 32 - old_format_len); + memcpy (fixbuf+fixuplen + 32 - old_format_len, + indata, old_format_len); + } + else + { + memcpy (fixbuf+fixuplen, indata, indatalen); + } + indata = fixbuf; + indatalen = fixuplen + indatalen; + + padind = -1; + } + else + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); + + if (app->app_local->cardcap.ext_lc_le + && (indatalen > 254 + || (app->app_local->keyattr[1].key_type == KEY_TYPE_RSA + && app->app_local->keyattr[1].rsa.n_bits > RSA_SMALL_SIZE_OP))) + { + exmode = 1; /* Extended length w/o a limit. */ + le_value = app->app_local->keyattr[1].rsa.n_bits / 8; + } + else if (app->app_local->cardcap.cmd_chaining && indatalen > 254) + { + exmode = -254; /* Command chaining with max. 254 bytes. */ + le_value = 0; + } + else + exmode = le_value = 0; + + rc = iso7816_decipher (app->slot, exmode, + indata, indatalen, le_value, padind, + outdata, outdatalen); + xfree (fixbuf); + if (app->app_local->keyattr[1].key_type == KEY_TYPE_ECC) + { + unsigned char prefix = 0; + + if (app->app_local->keyattr[1].ecc.flags & ECC_FLAG_DJB_TWEAK) + prefix = 0x40; + else if ((*outdatalen % 2) == 0) /* No 0x04 -> x-coordinate only */ + prefix = 0x41; + + if (prefix) + { /* Add the prefix */ + fixbuf = xtrymalloc (*outdatalen + 1); + if (!fixbuf) + { + xfree (*outdata); + return gpg_error_from_syserror (); + } + fixbuf[0] = prefix; + memcpy (fixbuf+1, *outdata, *outdatalen); + xfree (*outdata); + *outdata = fixbuf; + *outdatalen = *outdatalen + 1; + } + } + + if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_CARD /* actual SW is 0x640a */ + && app->app_local->manufacturer == 5 + && app->card_version == 0x0200) + log_info ("NOTE: Cards with manufacturer id 5 and s/n <= 346 (0x15a)" + " do not work with encryption keys > 2048 bits\n"); + + *r_info |= APP_DECIPHER_INFO_NOPAD; + + return rc; +} + + +/* Perform a simple verify operation for CHV1 and CHV2, so that + further operations won't ask for CHV2 and it is possible to do a + cheap check on the PIN: If there is something wrong with the PIN + entry system, only the regular CHV will get blocked and not the + dangerous CHV3. KEYIDSTR is the usual card's serial number; an + optional fingerprint part will be ignored. + + There is a special mode if the keyidstr is "[CHV3]" with + the "[CHV3]" being a literal string: The Admin Pin is checked if + and only if the retry counter is still at 3. */ +static gpg_error_t +do_check_pin (app_t app, const char *keyidstr, + gpg_error_t (*pincb)(void*, const char *, char **), + void *pincb_arg) +{ + int rc; + int admin_pin = 0; + + if (!keyidstr || !*keyidstr) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); + + rc = check_keyidstr (app, keyidstr, 0, NULL); + if (rc) + return rc; + + if ((strlen (keyidstr) >= 32+6 && !strcmp (keyidstr+32, "[CHV3]")) + || (strlen (keyidstr) >= 40+6 && !strcmp (keyidstr+40, "[CHV3]"))) + admin_pin = 1; + + /* Yes, there is a race conditions: The user might pull the card + right here and we won't notice that. However this is not a + problem and the check above is merely for a graceful failure + between operations. */ + + if (admin_pin) + { + void *relptr; + unsigned char *value; + size_t valuelen; + int count; + + relptr = get_one_do (app, 0x00C4, &value, &valuelen, NULL); + if (!relptr || valuelen < 7) + { + log_error (_("error retrieving CHV status from card\n")); + xfree (relptr); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CARD); + } + count = value[6]; + xfree (relptr); + + if (!count) + { + log_info (_("card is permanently locked!\n")); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PIN); + } + else if (count < 3) + { + log_info (_("verification of Admin PIN is currently prohibited " + "through this command\n")); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL); + } + + app->did_chv3 = 0; /* Force verification. */ + return verify_chv3 (app, pincb, pincb_arg); + } + else + return verify_chv2 (app, pincb, pincb_arg); +} + + +/* Show information about card capabilities. */ +static void +show_caps (struct app_local_s *s) +{ + log_info ("Version-2+ .....: %s\n", s->extcap.is_v2? "yes":"no"); + log_info ("Extcap-v3 ......: %s\n", s->extcap.extcap_v3? "yes":"no"); + log_info ("Button .........: %s\n", s->extcap.has_button? "yes":"no"); + + log_info ("SM-Support .....: %s", s->extcap.sm_supported? "yes":"no"); + if (s->extcap.sm_supported) + log_printf (" (%s)", s->extcap.sm_algo==2? "3DES": + (s->extcap.sm_algo==2? "AES-128" : "AES-256")); + log_info ("Get-Challenge ..: %s", s->extcap.get_challenge? "yes":"no"); + if (s->extcap.get_challenge) + log_printf (" (%u bytes max)", s->extcap.max_get_challenge); + log_info ("Key-Import .....: %s\n", s->extcap.key_import? "yes":"no"); + log_info ("Change-Force-PW1: %s\n", s->extcap.change_force_chv? "yes":"no"); + log_info ("Private-DOs ....: %s\n", s->extcap.private_dos? "yes":"no"); + log_info ("Algo-Attr-Change: %s\n", s->extcap.algo_attr_change? "yes":"no"); + log_info ("Symmetric Crypto: %s\n", s->extcap.has_decrypt? "yes":"no"); + log_info ("KDF-Support ....: %s\n", s->extcap.kdf_do? "yes":"no"); + log_info ("Max-Cert3-Len ..: %u\n", s->extcap.max_certlen_3); + if (s->extcap.extcap_v3) + { + log_info ("PIN-Block-2 ....: %s\n", s->extcap.pin_blk2? "yes":"no"); + log_info ("MSE-Support ....: %s\n", s->extcap.mse? "yes":"no"); + log_info ("Max-Special-DOs : %u\n", s->extcap.max_special_do); + } + log_info ("Cmd-Chaining ...: %s\n", s->cardcap.cmd_chaining?"yes":"no"); + log_info ("Ext-Lc-Le ......: %s\n", s->cardcap.ext_lc_le?"yes":"no"); + log_info ("Status-Indicator: %02X\n", s->status_indicator); + + log_info ("GnuPG-No-Sync ..: %s\n", s->flags.no_sync? "yes":"no"); + log_info ("GnuPG-Def-PW2 ..: %s\n", s->flags.def_chv2? "yes":"no"); +} + + +/* Parse the historical bytes in BUFFER of BUFLEN and store them in + APPLOC. */ +static void +parse_historical (struct app_local_s *apploc, + const unsigned char * buffer, size_t buflen) +{ + /* Example buffer: 00 31 C5 73 C0 01 80 00 90 00 */ + if (buflen < 4) + { + log_error ("warning: historical bytes are too short\n"); + return; /* Too short. */ + } + if (*buffer) + { + log_error ("warning: bad category indicator in historical bytes\n"); + return; + } + + /* Skip category indicator. */ + buffer++; + buflen--; + + /* Get the status indicator. */ + apploc->status_indicator = buffer[buflen-3]; + buflen -= 3; + + /* Parse the compact TLV. */ + while (buflen) + { + unsigned int tag = (*buffer & 0xf0) >> 4; + unsigned int len = (*buffer & 0x0f); + if (len+1 > buflen) + { + log_error ("warning: bad Compact-TLV in historical bytes\n"); + return; /* Error. */ + } + buffer++; + buflen--; + if (tag == 7 && len == 3) + { + /* Card capabilities. */ + apploc->cardcap.cmd_chaining = !!(buffer[2] & 0x80); + apploc->cardcap.ext_lc_le = !!(buffer[2] & 0x40); + } + buffer += len; + buflen -= len; + } +} + + +/* + * Check if the OID in an DER encoding is available by GnuPG/libgcrypt, + * and return the curve name. Return NULL if not available. + * The constant string is not allocated dynamically, never free it. + */ +static const char * +ecc_curve (unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen) +{ + gcry_mpi_t oid; + char *oidstr; + const char *result; + unsigned char *oidbuf; + + oidbuf = xtrymalloc (buflen + 1); + if (!oidbuf) + return NULL; + + memcpy (oidbuf+1, buf, buflen); + oidbuf[0] = buflen; + oid = gcry_mpi_set_opaque (NULL, oidbuf, (buflen+1) * 8); + if (!oid) + { + xfree (oidbuf); + return NULL; + } + + oidstr = openpgp_oid_to_str (oid); + gcry_mpi_release (oid); + if (!oidstr) + return NULL; + + result = openpgp_oid_to_curve (oidstr, 1); + xfree (oidstr); + return result; +} + + +/* Parse and optionally show the algorithm attributes for KEYNO. + KEYNO must be in the range 0..2. */ +static void +parse_algorithm_attribute (app_t app, int keyno) +{ + unsigned char *buffer; + size_t buflen; + void *relptr; + const char desc[3][5] = {"sign", "encr", "auth"}; + + assert (keyno >=0 && keyno <= 2); + + app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].key_type = KEY_TYPE_RSA; + app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.n_bits = 0; + + relptr = get_one_do (app, 0xC1+keyno, &buffer, &buflen, NULL); + if (!relptr) + { + log_error ("error reading DO 0x%02X\n", 0xc1+keyno); + return; + } + if (buflen < 1) + { + log_error ("error reading DO 0x%02X\n", 0xc1+keyno); + xfree (relptr); + return; + } + + if (opt.verbose) + log_info ("Key-Attr-%s ..: ", desc[keyno]); + if (*buffer == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA && (buflen == 5 || buflen == 6)) + { + app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.n_bits = (buffer[1]<<8 | buffer[2]); + app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.e_bits = (buffer[3]<<8 | buffer[4]); + app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.format = 0; + if (buflen < 6) + app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.format = RSA_STD; + else + app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.format = (buffer[5] == 0? RSA_STD : + buffer[5] == 1? RSA_STD_N : + buffer[5] == 2? RSA_CRT : + buffer[5] == 3? RSA_CRT_N : + RSA_UNKNOWN_FMT); + + if (opt.verbose) + log_printf + ("RSA, n=%u, e=%u, fmt=%s\n", + app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.n_bits, + app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.e_bits, + app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.format == RSA_STD? "std" : + app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.format == RSA_STD_N?"std+n": + app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.format == RSA_CRT? "crt" : + app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].rsa.format == RSA_CRT_N?"crt+n":"?"); + } + else if (*buffer == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH || *buffer == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA + || *buffer == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA) + { + const char *curve; + int oidlen = buflen - 1; + + app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].ecc.flags = 0; + + if (buffer[buflen-1] == 0x00 || buffer[buflen-1] == 0xff) + { /* Found "pubkey required"-byte for private key template. */ + oidlen--; + if (buffer[buflen-1] == 0xff) + app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].ecc.flags |= ECC_FLAG_PUBKEY; + } + + curve = ecc_curve (buffer + 1, oidlen); + + if (!curve) + log_printhex (buffer+1, buflen-1, "Curve with OID not supported: "); + else + { + app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].key_type = KEY_TYPE_ECC; + app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].ecc.curve = curve; + if (*buffer == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA + || (*buffer == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH + && !strcmp (app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].ecc.curve, + "Curve25519"))) + app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].ecc.flags |= ECC_FLAG_DJB_TWEAK; + if (opt.verbose) + log_printf + ("ECC, curve=%s%s\n", app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].ecc.curve, + !(app->app_local->keyattr[keyno].ecc.flags & ECC_FLAG_DJB_TWEAK)? + "": keyno==1? " (djb-tweak)": " (eddsa)"); + } + } + else if (opt.verbose) + log_printhex (buffer, buflen, ""); + + xfree (relptr); +} + +/* Select the OpenPGP application on the card in SLOT. This function + must be used before any other OpenPGP application functions. */ +gpg_error_t +app_select_openpgp (app_t app) +{ + static char const aid[] = { 0xD2, 0x76, 0x00, 0x01, 0x24, 0x01 }; + int slot = app->slot; + int rc; + unsigned char *buffer; + size_t buflen; + void *relptr; + + /* Note that the card can't cope with P2=0xCO, thus we need to pass a + special flag value. */ + rc = iso7816_select_application (slot, aid, sizeof aid, 0x0001); + if (!rc) + { + unsigned int manufacturer; + + app->apptype = "OPENPGP"; + + app->did_chv1 = 0; + app->did_chv2 = 0; + app->did_chv3 = 0; + app->app_local = NULL; + + /* The OpenPGP card returns the serial number as part of the + AID; because we prefer to use OpenPGP serial numbers, we + replace a possibly already set one from a EF.GDO with this + one. Note, that for current OpenPGP cards, no EF.GDO exists + and thus it won't matter at all. */ + rc = iso7816_get_data (slot, 0, 0x004F, &buffer, &buflen); + if (rc) + goto leave; + if (opt.verbose) + { + log_info ("AID: "); + log_printhex (buffer, buflen, ""); + } + + app->card_version = buffer[6] << 8; + app->card_version |= buffer[7]; + manufacturer = (buffer[8]<<8 | buffer[9]); + + xfree (app->serialno); + app->serialno = buffer; + app->serialnolen = buflen; + buffer = NULL; + app->app_local = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *app->app_local); + if (!app->app_local) + { + rc = gpg_error (gpg_err_code_from_errno (errno)); + goto leave; + } + + app->app_local->manufacturer = manufacturer; + + if (app->card_version >= 0x0200) + app->app_local->extcap.is_v2 = 1; + + if (app->card_version >= 0x0300) + app->app_local->extcap.extcap_v3 = 1; + + /* Read the historical bytes. */ + relptr = get_one_do (app, 0x5f52, &buffer, &buflen, NULL); + if (relptr) + { + if (opt.verbose) + { + log_info ("Historical Bytes: "); + log_printhex (buffer, buflen, ""); + } + parse_historical (app->app_local, buffer, buflen); + xfree (relptr); + } + + /* Read the force-chv1 flag. */ + relptr = get_one_do (app, 0x00C4, &buffer, &buflen, NULL); + if (!relptr) + { + log_error (_("can't access %s - invalid OpenPGP card?\n"), + "CHV Status Bytes"); + goto leave; + } + app->force_chv1 = (buflen && *buffer == 0); + xfree (relptr); + + /* Read the extended capabilities. */ + relptr = get_one_do (app, 0x00C0, &buffer, &buflen, NULL); + if (!relptr) + { + log_error (_("can't access %s - invalid OpenPGP card?\n"), + "Extended Capability Flags" ); + goto leave; + } + if (buflen) + { + app->app_local->extcap.sm_supported = !!(*buffer & 0x80); + app->app_local->extcap.get_challenge = !!(*buffer & 0x40); + app->app_local->extcap.key_import = !!(*buffer & 0x20); + app->app_local->extcap.change_force_chv = !!(*buffer & 0x10); + app->app_local->extcap.private_dos = !!(*buffer & 0x08); + app->app_local->extcap.algo_attr_change = !!(*buffer & 0x04); + app->app_local->extcap.has_decrypt = !!(*buffer & 0x02); + app->app_local->extcap.kdf_do = !!(*buffer & 0x01); + } + if (buflen >= 10) + { + /* Available with cards of v2 or later. */ + app->app_local->extcap.sm_algo = buffer[1]; + app->app_local->extcap.max_get_challenge + = (buffer[2] << 8 | buffer[3]); + app->app_local->extcap.max_certlen_3 = (buffer[4] << 8 | buffer[5]); + + /* Interpretation is different between v2 and v3, unfortunately. */ + if (app->app_local->extcap.extcap_v3) + { + app->app_local->extcap.max_special_do + = (buffer[6] << 8 | buffer[7]); + app->app_local->extcap.pin_blk2 = !!(buffer[8] & 0x01); + app->app_local->extcap.mse= !!(buffer[9] & 0x01); + } + } + xfree (relptr); + + /* Some of the first cards accidentally don't set the + CHANGE_FORCE_CHV bit but allow it anyway. */ + if (app->card_version <= 0x0100 && manufacturer == 1) + app->app_local->extcap.change_force_chv = 1; + + /* Check optional DO of "General Feature Management" for button. */ + relptr = get_one_do (app, 0x7f74, &buffer, &buflen, NULL); + if (relptr) + /* It must be: 03 81 01 20 */ + app->app_local->extcap.has_button = 1; + + parse_login_data (app); + + if (opt.verbose) + show_caps (app->app_local); + + parse_algorithm_attribute (app, 0); + parse_algorithm_attribute (app, 1); + parse_algorithm_attribute (app, 2); + + if (opt.verbose > 1) + dump_all_do (slot); + + app->fnc.deinit = do_deinit; + app->fnc.learn_status = do_learn_status; + app->fnc.readcert = do_readcert; + app->fnc.readkey = do_readkey; + app->fnc.getattr = do_getattr; + app->fnc.setattr = do_setattr; + app->fnc.writecert = do_writecert; + app->fnc.writekey = do_writekey; + app->fnc.genkey = do_genkey; + app->fnc.sign = do_sign; + app->fnc.auth = do_auth; + app->fnc.decipher = do_decipher; + app->fnc.change_pin = do_change_pin; + app->fnc.check_pin = do_check_pin; + } + +leave: + if (rc) + do_deinit (app); + return rc; +} -- cgit v1.2.3