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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-27 10:41:58 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-27 10:41:58 +0000
commit1852910ef0fd7393da62b88aee66ee092208748e (patch)
treead3b659dbbe622b58a5bda4fe0b5e1d80eee9277 /lib/cache/entry_pkt.c
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadknot-resolver-1852910ef0fd7393da62b88aee66ee092208748e.tar.xz
knot-resolver-1852910ef0fd7393da62b88aee66ee092208748e.zip
Adding upstream version 5.3.1.upstream/5.3.1upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/cache/entry_pkt.c')
-rw-r--r--lib/cache/entry_pkt.c222
1 files changed, 222 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/cache/entry_pkt.c b/lib/cache/entry_pkt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4ed2047
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/cache/entry_pkt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 2017 CZ.NIC, z.s.p.o. <knot-dns@labs.nic.cz>
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+ */
+
+/** @file
+ * Implementation of packet-caching. Prototypes in ./impl.h
+ *
+ * The packet is stashed in entry_h::data as uint16_t length + full packet wire format.
+ */
+
+#include "lib/utils.h"
+#include "lib/layer/iterate.h" /* kr_response_classify */
+#include "lib/cache/impl.h"
+
+
+/** Compute TTL for a packet. Generally it's minimum TTL, with extra conditions. */
+KR_EXPORT
+uint32_t packet_ttl(const knot_pkt_t *pkt, bool is_negative)
+{
+ bool has_ttl = false;
+ uint32_t ttl = UINT32_MAX;
+ /* Find minimum entry TTL in the packet or SOA minimum TTL. */
+ for (knot_section_t i = KNOT_ANSWER; i <= KNOT_ADDITIONAL; ++i) {
+ const knot_pktsection_t *sec = knot_pkt_section(pkt, i);
+ for (unsigned k = 0; k < sec->count; ++k) {
+ const knot_rrset_t *rr = knot_pkt_rr(sec, k);
+ if (is_negative) {
+ /* Use SOA minimum TTL for negative answers. */
+ if (rr->type == KNOT_RRTYPE_SOA) {
+ return MIN(rr->ttl, knot_soa_minimum(rr->rrs.rdata));
+ } else {
+ continue; /* Use SOA only for negative answers. */
+ }
+ }
+ if (knot_rrtype_is_metatype(rr->type)) {
+ continue; /* Skip metatypes. */
+ }
+ ttl = MIN(ttl, rr->ttl);
+ has_ttl = true;
+ }
+ }
+ /* If no valid TTL present, go with zero (will get clamped to minimum). */
+ return has_ttl ? ttl : 0;
+}
+
+
+void stash_pkt(const knot_pkt_t *pkt, const struct kr_query *qry,
+ const struct kr_request *req, const bool needs_pkt)
+{
+ /* In some cases, stash also the packet. */
+ const bool is_negative = kr_response_classify(pkt)
+ & (PKT_NODATA|PKT_NXDOMAIN);
+ const struct kr_qflags * const qf = &qry->flags;
+ const bool want_negative = qf->DNSSEC_INSECURE || !qf->DNSSEC_WANT;
+ const bool want_pkt = qf->DNSSEC_BOGUS /*< useful for +cd answers */
+ || (is_negative && want_negative) || needs_pkt;
+
+ if (!want_pkt || !knot_wire_get_aa(pkt->wire)
+ || pkt->parsed != pkt->size /*< malformed packet; still can't detect KNOT_EFEWDATA */
+ ) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Compute rank. If cd bit is set or we got answer via non-validated
+ * forwarding, make the rank bad; otherwise it depends on flags.
+ * TODO: probably make validator attempt validation even with +cd. */
+ uint8_t rank = KR_RANK_AUTH;
+ const bool risky_vldr = is_negative && qf->FORWARD && qf->CNAME;
+ /* ^^ CNAME'ed NXDOMAIN answer in forwarding mode can contain
+ * unvalidated records; original commit: d6e22f476. */
+ if (knot_wire_get_cd(req->qsource.packet->wire) || qf->STUB || risky_vldr) {
+ kr_rank_set(&rank, KR_RANK_OMIT);
+ } else {
+ if (qf->DNSSEC_BOGUS) {
+ kr_rank_set(&rank, KR_RANK_BOGUS);
+ } else if (qf->DNSSEC_INSECURE) {
+ kr_rank_set(&rank, KR_RANK_INSECURE);
+ } else if (!qf->DNSSEC_WANT) {
+ /* no TAs at all, leave _RANK_AUTH */
+ } else if (needs_pkt) {
+ /* All bad cases should be filtered above,
+ * at least the same way as pktcache in kresd 1.5.x. */
+ kr_rank_set(&rank, KR_RANK_SECURE);
+ } else assert(false);
+ }
+
+ const uint16_t pkt_type = knot_pkt_qtype(pkt);
+ const knot_dname_t *owner = knot_pkt_qname(pkt); /* qname can't be compressed */
+
+ // LATER: nothing exists under NXDOMAIN. Implement that (optionally)?
+#if 0
+ if (knot_wire_get_rcode(pkt->wire) == KNOT_RCODE_NXDOMAIN
+ /* && !qf->DNSSEC_INSECURE */ ) {
+ pkt_type = KNOT_RRTYPE_NS;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* Construct the key under which the pkt will be stored. */
+ struct key k_storage, *k = &k_storage;
+ knot_db_val_t key;
+ int ret = kr_dname_lf(k->buf, owner, false);
+ if (ret) {
+ /* A server might (incorrectly) reply with QDCOUNT=0. */
+ assert(owner == NULL);
+ return;
+ }
+ key = key_exact_type_maypkt(k, pkt_type);
+
+ /* For now we stash the full packet byte-exactly as it came from upstream. */
+ const uint16_t pkt_size = pkt->size;
+ knot_db_val_t val_new_entry = {
+ .data = NULL,
+ .len = offsetof(struct entry_h, data) + sizeof(pkt_size) + pkt->size,
+ };
+ /* Prepare raw memory for the new entry and fill it. */
+ struct kr_cache *cache = &req->ctx->cache;
+ ret = entry_h_splice(&val_new_entry, rank, key, k->type, pkt_type,
+ owner, qry, cache, qry->timestamp.tv_sec);
+ if (ret) return; /* some aren't really errors */
+ assert(val_new_entry.data);
+ struct entry_h *eh = val_new_entry.data;
+ memset(eh, 0, offsetof(struct entry_h, data));
+ eh->time = qry->timestamp.tv_sec;
+ eh->ttl = MAX(MIN(packet_ttl(pkt, is_negative), cache->ttl_max), cache->ttl_min);
+ eh->rank = rank;
+ eh->is_packet = true;
+ eh->has_optout = qf->DNSSEC_OPTOUT;
+ memcpy(eh->data, &pkt_size, sizeof(pkt_size));
+ memcpy(eh->data + sizeof(pkt_size), pkt->wire, pkt_size);
+
+ WITH_VERBOSE(qry) {
+ auto_free char *type_str = kr_rrtype_text(pkt_type),
+ *owner_str = kr_dname_text(owner);
+ VERBOSE_MSG(qry, "=> stashed packet: rank 0%.2o, TTL %d, "
+ "%s %s (%d B)\n",
+ eh->rank, eh->ttl,
+ type_str, owner_str, (int)val_new_entry.len);
+ }
+}
+
+
+int answer_from_pkt(kr_layer_t *ctx, knot_pkt_t *pkt, uint16_t type,
+ const struct entry_h *eh, const void *eh_bound, uint32_t new_ttl)
+{
+ struct kr_request *req = ctx->req;
+ struct kr_query *qry = req->current_query;
+
+ const uint16_t msgid = knot_wire_get_id(pkt->wire);
+
+ /* Ensure the wire buffer is large enough. Strategy: fit and at least double. */
+ uint16_t pkt_len;
+ memcpy(&pkt_len, eh->data, sizeof(pkt_len));
+ if (pkt_len > pkt->max_size) {
+ pkt->max_size = MIN(KNOT_WIRE_MAX_PKTSIZE,
+ MAX(pkt->max_size * 2, pkt_len));
+ mm_free(&ctx->req->pool, pkt->wire); /* no-op, but... */
+ pkt->wire = mm_alloc(&ctx->req->pool, pkt->max_size);
+ pkt->compr.wire = pkt->wire;
+ /* TODO: ^^ nicer way how to replace knot_pkt_t::wire ? */
+ }
+ assert(pkt->max_size >= pkt_len);
+
+ /* Copy answer and reparse it, but keep the original message id. */
+ knot_pkt_clear(pkt);
+ memcpy(pkt->wire, eh->data + 2, pkt_len);
+ pkt->size = pkt_len;
+ int ret = knot_pkt_parse(pkt, 0);
+ if (ret == KNOT_EFEWDATA || ret == KNOT_EMALF) {
+ return kr_error(ENOENT);
+ /* LATER(opt): try harder to avoid stashing such packets */
+ }
+ if (ret != KNOT_EOK) {
+ assert(!ret);
+ return kr_error(ret);
+ }
+ knot_wire_set_id(pkt->wire, msgid);
+
+ /* Add rank into the additional field. */
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < pkt->rrset_count; ++i) {
+ assert(!pkt->rr[i].additional);
+ uint8_t *rr_rank = mm_alloc(&pkt->mm, sizeof(*rr_rank));
+ if (!rr_rank) {
+ return kr_error(ENOMEM);
+ }
+ *rr_rank = eh->rank;
+ pkt->rr[i].additional = rr_rank;
+ }
+
+ /* Adjust TTL in each record. */
+ const uint32_t drift = eh->ttl - new_ttl;
+ for (knot_section_t i = KNOT_ANSWER; i <= KNOT_ADDITIONAL; ++i) {
+ const knot_pktsection_t *sec = knot_pkt_section(pkt, i);
+ for (unsigned k = 0; k < sec->count; ++k) {
+ knot_rrset_t *rrs = // vv FIXME??
+ /*const-cast*/(knot_rrset_t *)knot_pkt_rr(sec, k);
+ /* We need to be careful: due to enforcing minimum TTL
+ * on packet, some records may be below that value.
+ * We keep those records at TTL 0. */
+ if (rrs->ttl >= drift) {
+ rrs->ttl -= drift;
+ } else {
+ rrs->ttl = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Finishing touches. TODO: perhaps factor out */
+ struct kr_qflags * const qf = &qry->flags;
+ qf->EXPIRING = is_expiring(eh->ttl, new_ttl);
+ qf->CACHED = true;
+ qf->NO_MINIMIZE = true;
+ qf->DNSSEC_INSECURE = kr_rank_test(eh->rank, KR_RANK_INSECURE);
+ qf->DNSSEC_BOGUS = kr_rank_test(eh->rank, KR_RANK_BOGUS);
+ if (qf->DNSSEC_INSECURE || qf->DNSSEC_BOGUS) {
+ qf->DNSSEC_WANT = false;
+ }
+ qf->DNSSEC_OPTOUT = eh->has_optout;
+ VERBOSE_MSG(qry, "=> satisfied by exact packet: rank 0%.2o, new TTL %d\n",
+ eh->rank, new_ttl);
+ return kr_ok();
+}
+