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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-27 10:05:51 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-27 10:05:51 +0000 |
commit | 5d1646d90e1f2cceb9f0828f4b28318cd0ec7744 (patch) | |
tree | a94efe259b9009378be6d90eb30d2b019d95c194 /Documentation/security/SCTP.rst | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | linux-upstream/5.10.209.tar.xz linux-upstream/5.10.209.zip |
Adding upstream version 5.10.209.upstream/5.10.209upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to '')
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/security/SCTP.rst | 343 |
1 files changed, 343 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/security/SCTP.rst b/Documentation/security/SCTP.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0bcf6c124 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/SCTP.rst @@ -0,0 +1,343 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +==== +SCTP +==== + +SCTP LSM Support +================ + +Security Hooks +-------------- + +For security module support, three SCTP specific hooks have been implemented:: + + security_sctp_assoc_request() + security_sctp_bind_connect() + security_sctp_sk_clone() + +Also the following security hook has been utilised:: + + security_inet_conn_established() + +The usage of these hooks are described below with the SELinux implementation +described in the `SCTP SELinux Support`_ chapter. + + +security_sctp_assoc_request() +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ +Passes the ``@ep`` and ``@chunk->skb`` of the association INIT packet to the +security module. Returns 0 on success, error on failure. +:: + + @ep - pointer to sctp endpoint structure. + @skb - pointer to skbuff of association packet. + + +security_sctp_bind_connect() +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ +Passes one or more ipv4/ipv6 addresses to the security module for validation +based on the ``@optname`` that will result in either a bind or connect +service as shown in the permission check tables below. +Returns 0 on success, error on failure. +:: + + @sk - Pointer to sock structure. + @optname - Name of the option to validate. + @address - One or more ipv4 / ipv6 addresses. + @addrlen - The total length of address(s). This is calculated on each + ipv4 or ipv6 address using sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) or + sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6). + + ------------------------------------------------------------------ + | BIND Type Checks | + | @optname | @address contains | + |----------------------------|-----------------------------------| + | SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD | One or more ipv4 / ipv6 addresses | + | SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address | + | SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address | + ------------------------------------------------------------------ + + ------------------------------------------------------------------ + | CONNECT Type Checks | + | @optname | @address contains | + |----------------------------|-----------------------------------| + | SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX | One or more ipv4 / ipv6 addresses | + | SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP | One or more ipv4 / ipv6 addresses | + | SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address | + | SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address | + ------------------------------------------------------------------ + +A summary of the ``@optname`` entries is as follows:: + + SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD - Allows additional bind addresses to be + associated after (optionally) calling + bind(3). + sctp_bindx(3) adds a set of bind + addresses on a socket. + + SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX - Allows the allocation of multiple + addresses for reaching a peer + (multi-homed). + sctp_connectx(3) initiates a connection + on an SCTP socket using multiple + destination addresses. + + SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT - Initiate a connection that is generated by a + sendmsg(2) or sctp_sendmsg(3) on a new asociation. + + SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR - Set local primary address. + + SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR - Request peer sets address as + association primary. + + SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP - These are used when Dynamic Address + SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY - Reconfiguration is enabled as explained below. + + +To support Dynamic Address Reconfiguration the following parameters must be +enabled on both endpoints (or use the appropriate **setsockopt**\(2)):: + + /proc/sys/net/sctp/addip_enable + /proc/sys/net/sctp/addip_noauth_enable + +then the following *_PARAM_*'s are sent to the peer in an +ASCONF chunk when the corresponding ``@optname``'s are present:: + + @optname ASCONF Parameter + ---------- ------------------ + SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD -> SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP + SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR -> SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY + + +security_sctp_sk_clone() +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ +Called whenever a new socket is created by **accept**\(2) +(i.e. a TCP style socket) or when a socket is 'peeled off' e.g userspace +calls **sctp_peeloff**\(3). +:: + + @ep - pointer to current sctp endpoint structure. + @sk - pointer to current sock structure. + @sk - pointer to new sock structure. + + +security_inet_conn_established() +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ +Called when a COOKIE ACK is received:: + + @sk - pointer to sock structure. + @skb - pointer to skbuff of the COOKIE ACK packet. + + +Security Hooks used for Association Establishment +------------------------------------------------- + +The following diagram shows the use of ``security_sctp_bind_connect()``, +``security_sctp_assoc_request()``, ``security_inet_conn_established()`` when +establishing an association. +:: + + SCTP endpoint "A" SCTP endpoint "Z" + ================= ================= + sctp_sf_do_prm_asoc() + Association setup can be initiated + by a connect(2), sctp_connectx(3), + sendmsg(2) or sctp_sendmsg(3). + These will result in a call to + security_sctp_bind_connect() to + initiate an association to + SCTP peer endpoint "Z". + INIT ---------------------------------------------> + sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() + Respond to an INIT chunk. + SCTP peer endpoint "A" is + asking for an association. Call + security_sctp_assoc_request() + to set the peer label if first + association. + If not first association, check + whether allowed, IF so send: + <----------------------------------------------- INIT ACK + | ELSE audit event and silently + | discard the packet. + | + COOKIE ECHO ------------------------------------------> + | + | + | + <------------------------------------------- COOKIE ACK + | | + sctp_sf_do_5_1E_ca | + Call security_inet_conn_established() | + to set the peer label. | + | | + | If SCTP_SOCKET_TCP or peeled off + | socket security_sctp_sk_clone() is + | called to clone the new socket. + | | + ESTABLISHED ESTABLISHED + | | + ------------------------------------------------------------------ + | Association Established | + ------------------------------------------------------------------ + + +SCTP SELinux Support +==================== + +Security Hooks +-------------- + +The `SCTP LSM Support`_ chapter above describes the following SCTP security +hooks with the SELinux specifics expanded below:: + + security_sctp_assoc_request() + security_sctp_bind_connect() + security_sctp_sk_clone() + security_inet_conn_established() + + +security_sctp_assoc_request() +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ +Passes the ``@ep`` and ``@chunk->skb`` of the association INIT packet to the +security module. Returns 0 on success, error on failure. +:: + + @ep - pointer to sctp endpoint structure. + @skb - pointer to skbuff of association packet. + +The security module performs the following operations: + IF this is the first association on ``@ep->base.sk``, then set the peer + sid to that in ``@skb``. This will ensure there is only one peer sid + assigned to ``@ep->base.sk`` that may support multiple associations. + + ELSE validate the ``@ep->base.sk peer_sid`` against the ``@skb peer sid`` + to determine whether the association should be allowed or denied. + + Set the sctp ``@ep sid`` to socket's sid (from ``ep->base.sk``) with + MLS portion taken from ``@skb peer sid``. This will be used by SCTP + TCP style sockets and peeled off connections as they cause a new socket + to be generated. + + If IP security options are configured (CIPSO/CALIPSO), then the ip + options are set on the socket. + + +security_sctp_bind_connect() +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ +Checks permissions required for ipv4/ipv6 addresses based on the ``@optname`` +as follows:: + + ------------------------------------------------------------------ + | BIND Permission Checks | + | @optname | @address contains | + |----------------------------|-----------------------------------| + | SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD | One or more ipv4 / ipv6 addresses | + | SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address | + | SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address | + ------------------------------------------------------------------ + + ------------------------------------------------------------------ + | CONNECT Permission Checks | + | @optname | @address contains | + |----------------------------|-----------------------------------| + | SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX | One or more ipv4 / ipv6 addresses | + | SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP | One or more ipv4 / ipv6 addresses | + | SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address | + | SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address | + ------------------------------------------------------------------ + + +`SCTP LSM Support`_ gives a summary of the ``@optname`` +entries and also describes ASCONF chunk processing when Dynamic Address +Reconfiguration is enabled. + + +security_sctp_sk_clone() +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ +Called whenever a new socket is created by **accept**\(2) (i.e. a TCP style +socket) or when a socket is 'peeled off' e.g userspace calls +**sctp_peeloff**\(3). ``security_sctp_sk_clone()`` will set the new +sockets sid and peer sid to that contained in the ``@ep sid`` and +``@ep peer sid`` respectively. +:: + + @ep - pointer to current sctp endpoint structure. + @sk - pointer to current sock structure. + @sk - pointer to new sock structure. + + +security_inet_conn_established() +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ +Called when a COOKIE ACK is received where it sets the connection's peer sid +to that in ``@skb``:: + + @sk - pointer to sock structure. + @skb - pointer to skbuff of the COOKIE ACK packet. + + +Policy Statements +----------------- +The following class and permissions to support SCTP are available within the +kernel:: + + class sctp_socket inherits socket { node_bind } + +whenever the following policy capability is enabled:: + + policycap extended_socket_class; + +SELinux SCTP support adds the ``name_connect`` permission for connecting +to a specific port type and the ``association`` permission that is explained +in the section below. + +If userspace tools have been updated, SCTP will support the ``portcon`` +statement as shown in the following example:: + + portcon sctp 1024-1036 system_u:object_r:sctp_ports_t:s0 + + +SCTP Peer Labeling +------------------ +An SCTP socket will only have one peer label assigned to it. This will be +assigned during the establishment of the first association. Any further +associations on this socket will have their packet peer label compared to +the sockets peer label, and only if they are different will the +``association`` permission be validated. This is validated by checking the +socket peer sid against the received packets peer sid to determine whether +the association should be allowed or denied. + +NOTES: + 1) If peer labeling is not enabled, then the peer context will always be + ``SECINITSID_UNLABELED`` (``unlabeled_t`` in Reference Policy). + + 2) As SCTP can support more than one transport address per endpoint + (multi-homing) on a single socket, it is possible to configure policy + and NetLabel to provide different peer labels for each of these. As the + socket peer label is determined by the first associations transport + address, it is recommended that all peer labels are consistent. + + 3) **getpeercon**\(3) may be used by userspace to retrieve the sockets peer + context. + + 4) While not SCTP specific, be aware when using NetLabel that if a label + is assigned to a specific interface, and that interface 'goes down', + then the NetLabel service will remove the entry. Therefore ensure that + the network startup scripts call **netlabelctl**\(8) to set the required + label (see **netlabel-config**\(8) helper script for details). + + 5) The NetLabel SCTP peer labeling rules apply as discussed in the following + set of posts tagged "netlabel" at: https://www.paul-moore.com/blog/t. + + 6) CIPSO is only supported for IPv4 addressing: ``socket(AF_INET, ...)`` + CALIPSO is only supported for IPv6 addressing: ``socket(AF_INET6, ...)`` + + Note the following when testing CIPSO/CALIPSO: + a) CIPSO will send an ICMP packet if an SCTP packet cannot be + delivered because of an invalid label. + b) CALIPSO does not send an ICMP packet, just silently discards it. + + 7) IPSEC is not supported as RFC 3554 - sctp/ipsec support has not been + implemented in userspace (**racoon**\(8) or **ipsec_pluto**\(8)), + although the kernel supports SCTP/IPSEC. |