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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-27 10:05:51 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-27 10:05:51 +0000 |
commit | 5d1646d90e1f2cceb9f0828f4b28318cd0ec7744 (patch) | |
tree | a94efe259b9009378be6d90eb30d2b019d95c194 /Documentation/usb/authorization.rst | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | linux-430c2fc249ea5c0536abd21c23382884005c9093.tar.xz linux-430c2fc249ea5c0536abd21c23382884005c9093.zip |
Adding upstream version 5.10.209.upstream/5.10.209upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/usb/authorization.rst')
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/usb/authorization.rst | 132 |
1 files changed, 132 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/usb/authorization.rst b/Documentation/usb/authorization.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9e53909d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/usb/authorization.rst @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@ +============================================================== +Authorizing (or not) your USB devices to connect to the system +============================================================== + +Copyright (C) 2007 Inaky Perez-Gonzalez <inaky@linux.intel.com> Intel Corporation + +This feature allows you to control if a USB device can be used (or +not) in a system. This feature will allow you to implement a lock-down +of USB devices, fully controlled by user space. + +As of now, when a USB device is connected it is configured and +its interfaces are immediately made available to the users. With this +modification, only if root authorizes the device to be configured will +then it be possible to use it. + +Usage +===== + +Authorize a device to connect:: + + $ echo 1 > /sys/bus/usb/devices/DEVICE/authorized + +De-authorize a device:: + + $ echo 0 > /sys/bus/usb/devices/DEVICE/authorized + +Set new devices connected to hostX to be deauthorized by default (ie: +lock down):: + + $ echo 0 > /sys/bus/usb/devices/usbX/authorized_default + +Remove the lock down:: + + $ echo 1 > /sys/bus/usb/devices/usbX/authorized_default + +By default, Wired USB devices are authorized by default to +connect. Wireless USB hosts deauthorize by default all new connected +devices (this is so because we need to do an authentication phase +before authorizing). Writing "2" to the authorized_default attribute +causes kernel to only authorize by default devices connected to internal +USB ports. + + +Example system lockdown (lame) +------------------------------ + +Imagine you want to implement a lockdown so only devices of type XYZ +can be connected (for example, it is a kiosk machine with a visible +USB port):: + + boot up + rc.local -> + + for host in /sys/bus/usb/devices/usb* + do + echo 0 > $host/authorized_default + done + +Hookup an script to udev, for new USB devices:: + + if device_is_my_type $DEV + then + echo 1 > $device_path/authorized + done + + +Now, device_is_my_type() is where the juice for a lockdown is. Just +checking if the class, type and protocol match something is the worse +security verification you can make (or the best, for someone willing +to break it). If you need something secure, use crypto and Certificate +Authentication or stuff like that. Something simple for an storage key +could be:: + + function device_is_my_type() + { + echo 1 > authorized # temporarily authorize it + # FIXME: make sure none can mount it + mount DEVICENODE /mntpoint + sum=$(md5sum /mntpoint/.signature) + if [ $sum = $(cat /etc/lockdown/keysum) ] + then + echo "We are good, connected" + umount /mntpoint + # Other stuff so others can use it + else + echo 0 > authorized + fi + } + + +Of course, this is lame, you'd want to do a real certificate +verification stuff with PKI, so you don't depend on a shared secret, +etc, but you get the idea. Anybody with access to a device gadget kit +can fake descriptors and device info. Don't trust that. You are +welcome. + + +Interface authorization +----------------------- + +There is a similar approach to allow or deny specific USB interfaces. +That allows to block only a subset of an USB device. + +Authorize an interface:: + + $ echo 1 > /sys/bus/usb/devices/INTERFACE/authorized + +Deauthorize an interface:: + + $ echo 0 > /sys/bus/usb/devices/INTERFACE/authorized + +The default value for new interfaces +on a particular USB bus can be changed, too. + +Allow interfaces per default:: + + $ echo 1 > /sys/bus/usb/devices/usbX/interface_authorized_default + +Deny interfaces per default:: + + $ echo 0 > /sys/bus/usb/devices/usbX/interface_authorized_default + +Per default the interface_authorized_default bit is 1. +So all interfaces would authorized per default. + +Note: + If a deauthorized interface will be authorized so the driver probing must + be triggered manually by writing INTERFACE to /sys/bus/usb/drivers_probe + +For drivers that need multiple interfaces all needed interfaces should be +authorized first. After that the drivers should be probed. +This avoids side effects. |