Adding debian version 5.10.209-2.debian/5.10.209-2debian

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

5 files changed, 335 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/0001-MODSIGN-do-not-load-mok-when-secure-boot-disabled.patch b/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/0001-MODSIGN-do-not-load-mok-when-secure-boot-disabled.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5d4ec82f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/0001-MODSIGN-do-not-load-mok-when-secure-boot-disabled.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+From: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 18:37:59 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 1/5] MODSIGN: do not load mok when secure boot disabled
+Origin: https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/933173/
+
+The mok can not be trusted when the secure boot is disabled. Which
+means that the kernel embedded certificate is the only trusted key.
+
+Due to db/dbx are authenticated variables, they needs manufacturer's
+KEK for update. So db/dbx are secure when secureboot disabled.
+
+Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
+Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
+Signed-off-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
+[Rebased by Luca Boccassi]
+[bwh: Forward-ported to 5.5.9:
+ - get_cert_list() takes a pointer to status and returns the cert list
+ - Adjust filename]
+[Salvatore Bonaccorso: Forward-ported to 5.10: Refresh for changes in
+38a1f03aa240 ("integrity: Move import of MokListRT certs to a separate
+routine"). Refresh in context for change in ebd9c2ae369a ("integrity: Load mokx
+variables into the blacklist keyring")]
+---
+ security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 26 +++++++++++++++-----------
+ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
++++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
+@@ -176,6 +176,10 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
+ 		kfree(dbx);
+ 	}
+ 
++	/* the MOK can not be trusted when secure boot is disabled */
++	if (!efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
++		return 0;
++
+ 	mokx = get_cert_list(L"MokListXRT", &mok_var, &mokxsize, &status);
+ 	if (!mokx) {
+ 		if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
diff --git a/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/0003-MODSIGN-checking-the-blacklisted-hash-before-loading-a-kernel-module.patch b/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/0003-MODSIGN-checking-the-blacklisted-hash-before-loading-a-kernel-module.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a7ec5ccb5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/0003-MODSIGN-checking-the-blacklisted-hash-before-loading-a-kernel-module.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+From: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 18:38:02 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 3/4] MODSIGN: checking the blacklisted hash before loading a
+ kernel module
+Origin: https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/933175/
+
+This patch adds the logic for checking the kernel module's hash
+base on blacklist. The hash must be generated by sha256 and enrolled
+to dbx/mokx.
+
+For example:
+	sha256sum sample.ko
+	mokutil --mokx --import-hash $HASH_RESULT
+
+Whether the signature on ko file is stripped or not, the hash can be
+compared by kernel.
+
+Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
+Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
+Signed-off-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
+[Rebased by Luca Boccassi]
+---
+ kernel/module_signing.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 57 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
++++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
+@@ -12,15 +12,62 @@
+ #include <linux/string.h>
+ #include <linux/verification.h>
+ #include <crypto/public_key.h>
++#include <crypto/hash.h>
++#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
+ #include "module-internal.h"
+ 
++static int mod_is_hash_blacklisted(const void *mod, size_t verifylen)
++{
++	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
++	struct shash_desc *desc;
++	size_t digest_size, desc_size;
++	u8 *digest;
++	int ret = 0;
++
++	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0);
++	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
++		goto error_return;
++
++	desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
++	digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
++	digest = kzalloc(digest_size + desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
++	if (!digest) {
++		pr_err("digest memory buffer allocate fail\n");
++		ret = -ENOMEM;
++		goto error_digest;
++	}
++	desc = (void *)digest + digest_size;
++	desc->tfm = tfm;
++	ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
++	if (ret < 0)
++		goto error_shash;
++
++	ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, mod, verifylen, digest);
++	if (ret < 0)
++		goto error_shash;
++
++	pr_debug("%ld digest: %*phN\n", verifylen, (int) digest_size, digest);
++
++	ret = is_hash_blacklisted(digest, digest_size, "bin");
++	if (ret == -EKEYREJECTED)
++		pr_err("Module hash %*phN is blacklisted\n",
++		       (int) digest_size, digest);
++
++error_shash:
++	kfree(digest);
++error_digest:
++	crypto_free_shash(tfm);
++error_return:
++	return ret;
++}
++
+ /*
+  * Verify the signature on a module.
+  */
+ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info)
+ {
+ 	struct module_signature ms;
+-	size_t sig_len, modlen = info->len;
++	size_t sig_len, modlen = info->len, wholelen;
+ 	int ret;
+ 
+ 	pr_devel("==>%s(,%zu)\n", __func__, modlen);
+@@ -28,6 +75,7 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, stru
+ 	if (modlen <= sizeof(ms))
+ 		return -EBADMSG;
+ 
++	wholelen = modlen + sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
+ 	memcpy(&ms, mod + (modlen - sizeof(ms)), sizeof(ms));
+ 
+ 	ret = mod_check_sig(&ms, modlen, "module");
+@@ -38,8 +86,15 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, stru
+ 	modlen -= sig_len + sizeof(ms);
+ 	info->len = modlen;
+ 
+-	return verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len,
++	ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len,
+ 				      VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
+ 				      VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
+ 				      NULL, NULL);
++	pr_devel("verify_pkcs7_signature() = %d\n", ret);
++
++	/* checking hash of module is in blacklist */
++	if (!ret)
++		ret = mod_is_hash_blacklisted(mod, wholelen);
++
++	return ret;
+ }
diff --git a/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/0004-MODSIGN-check-the-attributes-of-db-and-mok.patch b/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/0004-MODSIGN-check-the-attributes-of-db-and-mok.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..530885944
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/0004-MODSIGN-check-the-attributes-of-db-and-mok.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+From: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 18:38:03 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 4/4] MODSIGN: check the attributes of db and mok
+Origin: https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/933176/
+
+That's better for checking the attributes of db and mok variables
+before loading certificates to kernel keyring.
+
+For db and dbx, both of them are authenticated variables. Which
+means that they can only be modified by manufacturer's key. So
+the kernel should checks EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS
+attribute before we trust it.
+
+For mok-rt and mokx-rt, both of them are created by shim boot loader
+to forward the mok/mokx content to runtime. They must be runtime-volatile
+variables. So kernel should checks that the attributes map did not set
+EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE bit before we trust it.
+
+Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
+Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
+Signed-off-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
+[Rebased by Luca Boccassi]
+[bwh: Forward-ported to 5.5.9:
+ - get_cert_list() takes a pointer to status and returns the cert list
+ - Adjust filename, context]
+[bwh: Forward-ported to 5.10: MokListRT and MokListXRT are now both
+ loaded through a single code path.]
+---
+ security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 27 ++++++++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
++++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
+@@ -35,11 +35,13 @@ static __init bool uefi_check_ignore_db(
+  * Get a certificate list blob from the named EFI variable.
+  */
+ static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid,
+-				  unsigned long *size, efi_status_t *status)
++				  unsigned long *size, efi_status_t *status,
++				  u32 pos_attr, u32 neg_attr)
+ {
+ 	unsigned long lsize = 4;
+ 	unsigned long tmpdb[4];
+ 	void *db;
++	u32 attr = 0;
+ 
+ 	*status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, &tmpdb);
+ 	if (*status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
+@@ -54,13 +56,22 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_ch
+ 	if (!db)
+ 		return NULL;
+ 
+-	*status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, db);
++	*status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, &attr, &lsize, db);
+ 	if (*status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
+ 		kfree(db);
+ 		pr_err("Error reading db var: 0x%lx\n", *status);
+ 		return NULL;
+ 	}
+ 
++	/* must have positive attributes and no negative attributes */
++	if ((pos_attr && !(attr & pos_attr)) ||
++	    (neg_attr && (attr & neg_attr))) {
++		kfree(db);
++		pr_err("Error reading db var attributes: 0x%016x\n", attr);
++		*status = EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
++		return NULL;
++	}
++
+ 	*size = lsize;
+ 	return db;
+ }
+@@ -106,7 +117,8 @@ static int __init load_moklist_certs(voi
+ 	/* Get MokListRT. It might not exist, so it isn't an error
+ 	 * if we can't get it.
+ 	 */
+-	mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize, &status);
++	mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize, &status,
++				0, EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE);
+ 	if (mok) {
+ 		rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:MokListRT",
+ 					      mok, moksize, get_handler_for_db);
+@@ -145,7 +157,8 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
+ 	 * if we can't get them.
+ 	 */
+ 	if (!uefi_check_ignore_db()) {
+-		db = get_cert_list(L"db", &secure_var, &dbsize, &status);
++		db = get_cert_list(L"db", &secure_var, &dbsize, &status,
++			EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS, 0);
+ 		if (!db) {
+ 			if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
+ 				pr_debug("MODSIGN: db variable wasn't found\n");
+@@ -161,7 +174,8 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+-	dbx = get_cert_list(L"dbx", &secure_var, &dbxsize, &status);
++	dbx = get_cert_list(L"dbx", &secure_var, &dbxsize, &status,
++		EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS, 0);
+ 	if (!dbx) {
+ 		if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
+ 			pr_debug("dbx variable wasn't found\n");
+@@ -180,7 +194,8 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
+ 	if (!efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
+ 		return 0;
+ 
+-	mokx = get_cert_list(L"MokListXRT", &mok_var, &mokxsize, &status);
++	mokx = get_cert_list(L"MokListXRT", &mok_var, &mokxsize, &status,
++							0, EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE);
+ 	if (!mokx) {
+ 		if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
+ 			pr_debug("mokx variable wasn't found\n");
diff --git a/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/KEYS-Make-use-of-platform-keyring-for-module-signature.patch b/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/KEYS-Make-use-of-platform-keyring-for-module-signature.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f00bf3d24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/KEYS-Make-use-of-platform-keyring-for-module-signature.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From: Robert Holmes <robeholmes@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 23 Apr 2019 07:39:29 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for module signature
+ verify
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/935945
+Origin: https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/kernel/raw/master/f/KEYS-Make-use-of-platform-keyring-for-module-signature.patch
+
+This patch completes commit 278311e417be ("kexec, KEYS: Make use of
+platform keyring for signature verify") which, while adding the
+platform keyring for bzImage verification, neglected to also add
+this keyring for module verification.
+
+As such, kernel modules signed with keys from the MokList variable
+were not successfully verified.
+
+Signed-off-by: Robert Holmes <robeholmes@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com>
+---
+ kernel/module_signing.c | 16 ++++++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
++++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
+@@ -135,6 +135,13 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, stru
+ 				      VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
+ 				      NULL, NULL);
+ 	pr_devel("verify_pkcs7_signature() = %d\n", ret);
++	if (ret == -ENOKEY && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING)) {
++		ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len,
++				VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
++				VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
++				NULL, NULL);
++                pr_devel("verify_pkcs7_signature() = %d\n", ret);
++	}
+ 
+ 	/* checking hash of module is in blacklist */
+ 	if (!ret)
diff --git a/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/modsign-make-shash-allocation-failure-fatal.patch b/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/modsign-make-shash-allocation-failure-fatal.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2ae3ddde4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/modsign-make-shash-allocation-failure-fatal.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
+Date: Sun, 05 May 2019 13:45:06 +0100
+Subject: MODSIGN: Make shash allocation failure fatal
+
+mod_is_hash_blacklisted() currently returns 0 (suceess) if
+crypto_alloc_shash() fails.  This should instead be a fatal error,
+so unwrap and pass up the error code.
+
+Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
+---
+--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
++++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
+@@ -51,11 +51,13 @@ static int mod_is_hash_blacklisted(const
+ 	struct shash_desc *desc;
+ 	size_t digest_size, desc_size;
+ 	u8 *digest;
+-	int ret = 0;
++	int ret;
+ 
+ 	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0);
+-	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
++	if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
++		ret = PTR_ERR(tfm);
+ 		goto error_return;
++	}
+ 
+ 	desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
+ 	digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);