Adding debian version 5.10.209-2.debian/5.10.209-2debian

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

14 files changed, 2116 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/debian/patches/features/all/aufs5/aufs5-base.patch b/debian/patches/features/all/aufs5/aufs5-base.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..60f24b56b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/features/all/aufs5/aufs5-base.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,332 @@
+From: J. R. Okajima <hooanon05@yahoo.co.jp>
+Date: Tue Apr 7 22:14:47 2020 +0900
+Subject: aufs5.6 base patch
+Origin: https://github.com/sfjro/aufs5-standalone/tree/7c07d9737e9de058981f020d66ac0d4407a80899
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/541828
+
+Patch headers added by debian/bin/genpatch-aufs
+
+SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+aufs5.6 base patch
+
+diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
+index b4a43a9e7fbc..32f7c8c48001 100644
+--- a/MAINTAINERS
++++ b/MAINTAINERS
+@@ -2984,6 +2984,19 @@ F:	include/linux/audit.h
+ F:	include/uapi/linux/audit.h
+ F:	kernel/audit*
+ 
++AUFS (advanced multi layered unification filesystem) FILESYSTEM
++M:	"J. R. Okajima" <hooanon05g@gmail.com>
++L:	aufs-users@lists.sourceforge.net (members only)
++L:	linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org
++W:	http://aufs.sourceforge.net
++T:	git://github.com/sfjro/aufs4-linux.git
++S:	Supported
++F:	Documentation/filesystems/aufs/
++F:	Documentation/ABI/testing/debugfs-aufs
++F:	Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-aufs
++F:	fs/aufs/
++F:	include/uapi/linux/aufs_type.h
++
+ AUXILIARY DISPLAY DRIVERS
+ M:	Miguel Ojeda Sandonis <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>
+ S:	Maintained
+diff --git a/drivers/block/loop.c b/drivers/block/loop.c
+index 475e1a738560..8d77e68aa52b 100644
+--- a/drivers/block/loop.c
++++ b/drivers/block/loop.c
+@@ -763,6 +763,24 @@ static int loop_change_fd(struct loop_device *lo, struct block_device *bdev,
+ 	return error;
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * for AUFS
++ * no get/put for file.
++ */
++struct file *loop_backing_file(struct super_block *sb)
++{
++	struct file *ret;
++	struct loop_device *l;
++
++	ret = NULL;
++	if (MAJOR(sb->s_dev) == LOOP_MAJOR) {
++		l = sb->s_bdev->bd_disk->private_data;
++		ret = l->lo_backing_file;
++	}
++	return ret;
++}
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(loop_backing_file);
++
+ /* loop sysfs attributes */
+ 
+ static ssize_t loop_attr_show(struct device *dev, char *page,
+diff --git a/fs/dcache.c b/fs/dcache.c
+index 361ea7ab30ea..3cd36474f302 100644
+--- a/fs/dcache.c
++++ b/fs/dcache.c
+@@ -1285,7 +1285,7 @@ enum d_walk_ret {
+  *
+  * The @enter() callbacks are called with d_lock held.
+  */
+-static void d_walk(struct dentry *parent, void *data,
++void d_walk(struct dentry *parent, void *data,
+ 		   enum d_walk_ret (*enter)(void *, struct dentry *))
+ {
+ 	struct dentry *this_parent;
+diff --git a/fs/fcntl.c b/fs/fcntl.c
+index 2e4c0fa2074b..0b28a37f7e50 100644
+--- a/fs/fcntl.c
++++ b/fs/fcntl.c
+@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
+ 
+ #define SETFL_MASK (O_APPEND | O_NONBLOCK | O_NDELAY | O_DIRECT | O_NOATIME)
+ 
+-static int setfl(int fd, struct file * filp, unsigned long arg)
++int setfl(int fd, struct file *filp, unsigned long arg)
+ {
+ 	struct inode * inode = file_inode(filp);
+ 	int error = 0;
+@@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ static int setfl(int fd, struct file * filp, unsigned long arg)
+ 
+ 	if (filp->f_op->check_flags)
+ 		error = filp->f_op->check_flags(arg);
++	if (!error && filp->f_op->setfl)
++		error = filp->f_op->setfl(filp, arg);
+ 	if (error)
+ 		return error;
+ 
+diff --git a/fs/inode.c b/fs/inode.c
+index 72c4c347afb7..a7ff2099c2ef 100644
+--- a/fs/inode.c
++++ b/fs/inode.c
+@@ -1768,7 +1768,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(generic_update_time);
+  * This does the actual work of updating an inodes time or version.  Must have
+  * had called mnt_want_write() before calling this.
+  */
+-static int update_time(struct inode *inode, struct timespec64 *time, int flags)
++int update_time(struct inode *inode, struct timespec64 *time, int flags)
+ {
+ 	if (inode->i_op->update_time)
+ 		return inode->i_op->update_time(inode, time, flags);
+diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
+index f30ed401cc6d..8ddebaf7ad57 100644
+--- a/fs/namespace.c
++++ b/fs/namespace.c
+@@ -792,6 +792,12 @@ static inline int check_mnt(struct mount *mnt)
+ 	return mnt->mnt_ns == current->nsproxy->mnt_ns;
+ }
+ 
++/* for aufs, CONFIG_AUFS_BR_FUSE */
++int is_current_mnt_ns(struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++	return check_mnt(real_mount(mnt));
++}
++
+ /*
+  * vfsmount lock must be held for write
+  */
+diff --git a/fs/read_write.c b/fs/read_write.c
+index 4fb797822567..744831cd0094 100644
+--- a/fs/read_write.c
++++ b/fs/read_write.c
+@@ -507,6 +507,28 @@ static ssize_t new_sync_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf, size_t
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
++vfs_readf_t vfs_readf(struct file *file)
++{
++	const struct file_operations *fop = file->f_op;
++
++	if (fop->read)
++		return fop->read;
++	if (fop->read_iter)
++		return new_sync_read;
++	return ERR_PTR(-ENOSYS); /* doesn't have ->read(|_iter)() op */
++}
++
++vfs_writef_t vfs_writef(struct file *file)
++{
++	const struct file_operations *fop = file->f_op;
++
++	if (fop->write)
++		return fop->write;
++	if (fop->write_iter)
++		return new_sync_write;
++	return ERR_PTR(-ENOSYS); /* doesn't have ->write(|_iter)() op */
++}
++
+ /* caller is responsible for file_start_write/file_end_write */
+ ssize_t __kernel_write(struct file *file, const void *buf, size_t count, loff_t *pos)
+ {
+diff --git a/fs/splice.c b/fs/splice.c
+index d7c8a7c4db07..f0b625e27554 100644
+--- a/fs/splice.c
++++ b/fs/splice.c
+@@ -839,8 +839,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(generic_splice_sendpage);
+ /*
+  * Attempt to initiate a splice from pipe to file.
+  */
+-static long do_splice_from(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct file *out,
+-			   loff_t *ppos, size_t len, unsigned int flags)
++long do_splice_from(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct file *out,
++		    loff_t *ppos, size_t len, unsigned int flags)
+ {
+ 	if (out->f_op->splice_write)
+ 		return out->f_op->splice_write(pipe, out, ppos, len, flags);
+@@ -850,9 +850,9 @@ static long do_splice_from(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct file *out,
+ /*
+  * Attempt to initiate a splice from a file to a pipe.
+  */
+-static long do_splice_to(struct file *in, loff_t *ppos,
+-			 struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, size_t len,
+-			 unsigned int flags)
++long do_splice_to(struct file *in, loff_t *ppos,
++		  struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, size_t len,
++		  unsigned int flags)
+ {
+ 	int ret;
+ 
+diff --git a/fs/sync.c b/fs/sync.c
+index 1373a610dc78..b7b5a0a0df6f 100644
+--- a/fs/sync.c
++++ b/fs/sync.c
+@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
+  * wait == 1 case since in that case write_inode() functions do
+  * sync_dirty_buffer() and thus effectively write one block at a time.
+  */
+-static int __sync_filesystem(struct super_block *sb, int wait)
++int __sync_filesystem(struct super_block *sb, int wait)
+ {
+ 	if (wait)
+ 		sync_inodes_sb(sb);
+diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
+index f5abba86107d..0b008da5678d 100644
+--- a/include/linux/fs.h
++++ b/include/linux/fs.h
+@@ -1360,6 +1360,7 @@ extern void fasync_free(struct fasync_struct *);
+ /* can be called from interrupts */
+ extern void kill_fasync(struct fasync_struct **, int, int);
+ 
++extern int setfl(int fd, struct file *filp, unsigned long arg);
+ extern void __f_setown(struct file *filp, struct pid *, enum pid_type, int force);
+ extern int f_setown(struct file *filp, unsigned long arg, int force);
+ extern void f_delown(struct file *filp);
+@@ -1848,6 +1849,7 @@ struct file_operations {
+ 	ssize_t (*sendpage) (struct file *, struct page *, int, size_t, loff_t *, int);
+ 	unsigned long (*get_unmapped_area)(struct file *, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long);
+ 	int (*check_flags)(int);
++	int (*setfl)(struct file *, unsigned long);
+ 	int (*flock) (struct file *, int, struct file_lock *);
+ 	ssize_t (*splice_write)(struct pipe_inode_info *, struct file *, loff_t *, size_t, unsigned int);
+ 	ssize_t (*splice_read)(struct file *, loff_t *, struct pipe_inode_info *, size_t, unsigned int);
+@@ -1918,6 +1920,12 @@ ssize_t rw_copy_check_uvector(int type, const struct iovec __user * uvector,
+ 			      struct iovec *fast_pointer,
+ 			      struct iovec **ret_pointer);
+ 
++typedef ssize_t (*vfs_readf_t)(struct file *, char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
++typedef ssize_t (*vfs_writef_t)(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t,
++				loff_t *);
++vfs_readf_t vfs_readf(struct file *file);
++vfs_writef_t vfs_writef(struct file *file);
++
+ extern ssize_t vfs_read(struct file *, char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
+ extern ssize_t vfs_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
+ extern ssize_t vfs_readv(struct file *, const struct iovec __user *,
+@@ -2352,6 +2360,7 @@ extern int current_umask(void);
+ extern void ihold(struct inode * inode);
+ extern void iput(struct inode *);
+ extern int generic_update_time(struct inode *, struct timespec64 *, int);
++extern int update_time(struct inode *, struct timespec64 *, int);
+ 
+ /* /sys/fs */
+ extern struct kobject *fs_kobj;
+@@ -2633,6 +2642,7 @@ static inline bool sb_is_blkdev_sb(struct super_block *sb)
+ 	return false;
+ }
+ #endif
++extern int __sync_filesystem(struct super_block *, int);
+ extern int sync_filesystem(struct super_block *);
+ extern const struct file_operations def_blk_fops;
+ extern const struct file_operations def_chr_fops;
+diff --git a/include/linux/lockdep.h b/include/linux/lockdep.h
+index 8fce5c98a4b0..c1a3f172e97a 100644
+--- a/include/linux/lockdep.h
++++ b/include/linux/lockdep.h
+@@ -395,6 +395,8 @@ static inline int lockdep_match_key(struct lockdep_map *lock,
+ 	return lock->key == key;
+ }
+ 
++struct lock_class *lockdep_hlock_class(struct held_lock *hlock);
++
+ /*
+  * Acquire a lock.
+  *
+@@ -540,6 +542,7 @@ struct lockdep_map { };
+ 
+ #define lockdep_depth(tsk)	(0)
+ 
++#define lockdep_is_held(lock)			(1)
+ #define lockdep_is_held_type(l, r)		(1)
+ 
+ #define lockdep_assert_held(l)			do { (void)(l); } while (0)
+diff --git a/include/linux/mnt_namespace.h b/include/linux/mnt_namespace.h
+index 8f882f5881e8..6b9808f09843 100644
+--- a/include/linux/mnt_namespace.h
++++ b/include/linux/mnt_namespace.h
+@@ -7,12 +7,15 @@ struct mnt_namespace;
+ struct fs_struct;
+ struct user_namespace;
+ struct ns_common;
++struct vfsmount;
+ 
+ extern struct mnt_namespace *copy_mnt_ns(unsigned long, struct mnt_namespace *,
+ 		struct user_namespace *, struct fs_struct *);
+ extern void put_mnt_ns(struct mnt_namespace *ns);
+ extern struct ns_common *from_mnt_ns(struct mnt_namespace *);
+ 
++extern int is_current_mnt_ns(struct vfsmount *mnt);
++
+ extern const struct file_operations proc_mounts_operations;
+ extern const struct file_operations proc_mountinfo_operations;
+ extern const struct file_operations proc_mountstats_operations;
+diff --git a/include/linux/splice.h b/include/linux/splice.h
+index 5c47013f708e..fef6c59ed92a 100644
+--- a/include/linux/splice.h
++++ b/include/linux/splice.h
+@@ -93,4 +93,10 @@ extern void splice_shrink_spd(struct splice_pipe_desc *);
+ 
+ extern const struct pipe_buf_operations page_cache_pipe_buf_ops;
+ extern const struct pipe_buf_operations default_pipe_buf_ops;
++
++extern long do_splice_from(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct file *out,
++			   loff_t *ppos, size_t len, unsigned int flags);
++extern long do_splice_to(struct file *in, loff_t *ppos,
++			 struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, size_t len,
++			 unsigned int flags);
+ #endif
+diff --git a/kernel/locking/lockdep.c b/kernel/locking/lockdep.c
+index 29a8de4c50b9..6cfff5e18c84 100644
+--- a/kernel/locking/lockdep.c
++++ b/kernel/locking/lockdep.c
+@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ static
+ struct lock_class lock_classes[MAX_LOCKDEP_KEYS];
+ static DECLARE_BITMAP(lock_classes_in_use, MAX_LOCKDEP_KEYS);
+ 
+-static inline struct lock_class *hlock_class(struct held_lock *hlock)
++inline struct lock_class *lockdep_hlock_class(struct held_lock *hlock)
+ {
+ 	unsigned int class_idx = hlock->class_idx;
+ 
+@@ -190,6 +190,7 @@ static inline struct lock_class *hlock_class(struct held_lock *hlock)
+ 	 */
+ 	return lock_classes + class_idx;
+ }
++#define hlock_class(hlock) lockdep_hlock_class(hlock)
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_LOCK_STAT
+ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct lock_class_stats[MAX_LOCKDEP_KEYS], cpu_lock_stats);
+-- 
+2.27.0
+
diff --git a/debian/patches/features/all/aufs5/aufs5-mmap.patch b/debian/patches/features/all/aufs5/aufs5-mmap.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4cf1e0b2b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/features/all/aufs5/aufs5-mmap.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,405 @@
+From: J. R. Okajima <hooanon05@yahoo.co.jp>
+Date: Tue Apr 7 22:14:47 2020 +0900
+Subject: aufs5.6 mmap patch
+Origin: https://github.com/sfjro/aufs5-standalone/tree/7c07d9737e9de058981f020d66ac0d4407a80899
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/541828
+
+Patch headers added by debian/bin/genpatch-aufs
+
+SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+aufs5.6 mmap patch
+
+Index: debian-kernel/fs/proc/base.c
+===================================================================
+--- debian-kernel.orig/fs/proc/base.c
++++ debian-kernel/fs/proc/base.c
+@@ -2170,7 +2170,7 @@ static int map_files_get_link(struct den
+ 	rc = -ENOENT;
+ 	vma = find_exact_vma(mm, vm_start, vm_end);
+ 	if (vma && vma->vm_file) {
+-		*path = vma->vm_file->f_path;
++		*path = vma_pr_or_file(vma)->f_path;
+ 		path_get(path);
+ 		rc = 0;
+ 	}
+Index: debian-kernel/fs/proc/nommu.c
+===================================================================
+--- debian-kernel.orig/fs/proc/nommu.c
++++ debian-kernel/fs/proc/nommu.c
+@@ -40,7 +40,10 @@ static int nommu_region_show(struct seq_
+ 	file = region->vm_file;
+ 
+ 	if (file) {
+-		struct inode *inode = file_inode(region->vm_file);
++		struct inode *inode;
++
++		file = vmr_pr_or_file(region);
++		inode = file_inode(file);
+ 		dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
+ 		ino = inode->i_ino;
+ 	}
+Index: debian-kernel/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
+===================================================================
+--- debian-kernel.orig/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
++++ debian-kernel/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
+@@ -280,7 +280,10 @@ show_map_vma(struct seq_file *m, struct
+ 	const char *name = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if (file) {
+-		struct inode *inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
++		struct inode *inode;
++
++		file = vma_pr_or_file(vma);
++		inode = file_inode(file);
+ 		dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
+ 		ino = inode->i_ino;
+ 		pgoff = ((loff_t)vma->vm_pgoff) << PAGE_SHIFT;
+@@ -1793,7 +1796,7 @@ static int show_numa_map(struct seq_file
+ 	struct proc_maps_private *proc_priv = &numa_priv->proc_maps;
+ 	struct vm_area_struct *vma = v;
+ 	struct numa_maps *md = &numa_priv->md;
+-	struct file *file = vma->vm_file;
++	struct file *file = vma_pr_or_file(vma);
+ 	struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
+ 	struct mempolicy *pol;
+ 	char buffer[64];
+Index: debian-kernel/fs/proc/task_nommu.c
+===================================================================
+--- debian-kernel.orig/fs/proc/task_nommu.c
++++ debian-kernel/fs/proc/task_nommu.c
+@@ -155,7 +155,10 @@ static int nommu_vma_show(struct seq_fil
+ 	file = vma->vm_file;
+ 
+ 	if (file) {
+-		struct inode *inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
++		struct inode *inode;
++
++		file = vma_pr_or_file(vma);
++		inode = file_inode(file);
+ 		dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
+ 		ino = inode->i_ino;
+ 		pgoff = (loff_t)vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
+Index: debian-kernel/include/linux/mm.h
+===================================================================
+--- debian-kernel.orig/include/linux/mm.h
++++ debian-kernel/include/linux/mm.h
+@@ -1684,6 +1684,28 @@ static inline void unmap_shared_mapping_
+ 	unmap_mapping_range(mapping, holebegin, holelen, 0);
+ }
+ 
++extern void vma_do_file_update_time(struct vm_area_struct *, const char[], int);
++extern struct file *vma_do_pr_or_file(struct vm_area_struct *, const char[],
++				      int);
++extern void vma_do_get_file(struct vm_area_struct *, const char[], int);
++extern void vma_do_fput(struct vm_area_struct *, const char[], int);
++
++#define vma_file_update_time(vma)	vma_do_file_update_time(vma, __func__, \
++								__LINE__)
++#define vma_pr_or_file(vma)		vma_do_pr_or_file(vma, __func__, \
++							  __LINE__)
++#define vma_get_file(vma)		vma_do_get_file(vma, __func__, __LINE__)
++#define vma_fput(vma)			vma_do_fput(vma, __func__, __LINE__)
++
++#ifndef CONFIG_MMU
++extern struct file *vmr_do_pr_or_file(struct vm_region *, const char[], int);
++extern void vmr_do_fput(struct vm_region *, const char[], int);
++
++#define vmr_pr_or_file(region)		vmr_do_pr_or_file(region, __func__, \
++							  __LINE__)
++#define vmr_fput(region)		vmr_do_fput(region, __func__, __LINE__)
++#endif /* !CONFIG_MMU */
++
+ extern int access_process_vm(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long addr,
+ 		void *buf, int len, unsigned int gup_flags);
+ extern int access_remote_vm(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
+Index: debian-kernel/include/linux/mm_types.h
+===================================================================
+--- debian-kernel.orig/include/linux/mm_types.h
++++ debian-kernel/include/linux/mm_types.h
+@@ -276,6 +276,7 @@ struct vm_region {
+ 	unsigned long	vm_top;		/* region allocated to here */
+ 	unsigned long	vm_pgoff;	/* the offset in vm_file corresponding to vm_start */
+ 	struct file	*vm_file;	/* the backing file or NULL */
++	struct file	*vm_prfile;	/* the virtual backing file or NULL */
+ 
+ 	int		vm_usage;	/* region usage count (access under nommu_region_sem) */
+ 	bool		vm_icache_flushed : 1; /* true if the icache has been flushed for
+@@ -355,6 +356,7 @@ struct vm_area_struct {
+ 	unsigned long vm_pgoff;		/* Offset (within vm_file) in PAGE_SIZE
+ 					   units */
+ 	struct file * vm_file;		/* File we map to (can be NULL). */
++	struct file *vm_prfile;		/* shadow of vm_file */
+ 	void * vm_private_data;		/* was vm_pte (shared mem) */
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SWAP
+Index: debian-kernel/kernel/fork.c
+===================================================================
+--- debian-kernel.orig/kernel/fork.c
++++ debian-kernel/kernel/fork.c
+@@ -570,7 +570,7 @@ static __latent_entropy int dup_mmap(str
+ 			struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+ 			struct address_space *mapping = file->f_mapping;
+ 
+-			get_file(file);
++			vma_get_file(tmp);
+ 			if (tmp->vm_flags & VM_DENYWRITE)
+ 				atomic_dec(&inode->i_writecount);
+ 			i_mmap_lock_write(mapping);
+Index: debian-kernel/mm/Makefile
+===================================================================
+--- debian-kernel.orig/mm/Makefile
++++ debian-kernel/mm/Makefile
+@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ obj-y			:= filemap.o mempool.o oom_kill.
+ 			   mm_init.o percpu.o slab_common.o \
+ 			   compaction.o vmacache.o \
+ 			   interval_tree.o list_lru.o workingset.o \
+-			   debug.o gup.o $(mmu-y)
++			   prfile.o debug.o gup.o $(mmu-y)
+ 
+ # Give 'page_alloc' its own module-parameter namespace
+ page-alloc-y := page_alloc.o
+Index: debian-kernel/mm/filemap.c
+===================================================================
+--- debian-kernel.orig/mm/filemap.c
++++ debian-kernel/mm/filemap.c
+@@ -2676,7 +2676,7 @@ vm_fault_t filemap_page_mkwrite(struct v
+ 	vm_fault_t ret = VM_FAULT_LOCKED;
+ 
+ 	sb_start_pagefault(inode->i_sb);
+-	file_update_time(vmf->vma->vm_file);
++	vma_file_update_time(vmf->vma);
+ 	lock_page(page);
+ 	if (page->mapping != inode->i_mapping) {
+ 		unlock_page(page);
+Index: debian-kernel/mm/mmap.c
+===================================================================
+--- debian-kernel.orig/mm/mmap.c
++++ debian-kernel/mm/mmap.c
+@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ static struct vm_area_struct *remove_vma
+ 	if (vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->close)
+ 		vma->vm_ops->close(vma);
+ 	if (vma->vm_file)
+-		fput(vma->vm_file);
++		vma_fput(vma);
+ 	mpol_put(vma_policy(vma));
+ 	vm_area_free(vma);
+ 	return next;
+@@ -910,7 +910,7 @@ again:
+ 	if (remove_next) {
+ 		if (file) {
+ 			uprobe_munmap(next, next->vm_start, next->vm_end);
+-			fput(file);
++			vma_fput(vma);
+ 		}
+ 		if (next->anon_vma)
+ 			anon_vma_merge(vma, next);
+@@ -1831,8 +1831,8 @@ out:
+ 	return addr;
+ 
+ unmap_and_free_vma:
++	vma_fput(vma);
+ 	vma->vm_file = NULL;
+-	fput(file);
+ 
+ 	/* Undo any partial mapping done by a device driver. */
+ 	unmap_region(mm, vma, prev, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end);
+@@ -2683,7 +2683,7 @@ int __split_vma(struct mm_struct *mm, st
+ 		goto out_free_mpol;
+ 
+ 	if (new->vm_file)
+-		get_file(new->vm_file);
++		vma_get_file(new);
+ 
+ 	if (new->vm_ops && new->vm_ops->open)
+ 		new->vm_ops->open(new);
+@@ -2702,7 +2702,7 @@ int __split_vma(struct mm_struct *mm, st
+ 	if (new->vm_ops && new->vm_ops->close)
+ 		new->vm_ops->close(new);
+ 	if (new->vm_file)
+-		fput(new->vm_file);
++		vma_fput(new);
+ 	unlink_anon_vmas(new);
+  out_free_mpol:
+ 	mpol_put(vma_policy(new));
+@@ -2894,7 +2894,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(remap_file_pages, unsign
+ 	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+ 	unsigned long populate = 0;
+ 	unsigned long ret = -EINVAL;
+-	struct file *file;
++	struct file *file, *prfile;
+ 
+ 	pr_warn_once("%s (%d) uses deprecated remap_file_pages() syscall. See Documentation/vm/remap_file_pages.rst.\n",
+ 		     current->comm, current->pid);
+@@ -2969,10 +2969,27 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(remap_file_pages, unsign
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+-	file = get_file(vma->vm_file);
++	vma_get_file(vma);
++	file = vma->vm_file;
++	prfile = vma->vm_prfile;
+ 	ret = do_mmap_pgoff(vma->vm_file, start, size,
+ 			prot, flags, pgoff, &populate, NULL);
++	if (!IS_ERR_VALUE(ret) && file && prfile) {
++		struct vm_area_struct *new_vma;
++
++		new_vma = find_vma(mm, ret);
++		if (!new_vma->vm_prfile)
++			new_vma->vm_prfile = prfile;
++		if (new_vma != vma)
++			get_file(prfile);
++	}
++	/*
++	 * two fput()s instead of vma_fput(vma),
++	 * coz vma may not be available anymore.
++	 */
+ 	fput(file);
++	if (prfile)
++		fput(prfile);
+ out:
+ 	mmap_write_unlock(mm);
+ 	if (populate)
+@@ -3263,7 +3280,7 @@ struct vm_area_struct *copy_vma(struct v
+ 		if (anon_vma_clone(new_vma, vma))
+ 			goto out_free_mempol;
+ 		if (new_vma->vm_file)
+-			get_file(new_vma->vm_file);
++			vma_get_file(new_vma);
+ 		if (new_vma->vm_ops && new_vma->vm_ops->open)
+ 			new_vma->vm_ops->open(new_vma);
+ 		vma_link(mm, new_vma, prev, rb_link, rb_parent);
+Index: debian-kernel/mm/nommu.c
+===================================================================
+--- debian-kernel.orig/mm/nommu.c
++++ debian-kernel/mm/nommu.c
+@@ -540,7 +540,7 @@ static void __put_nommu_region(struct vm
+ 		up_write(&nommu_region_sem);
+ 
+ 		if (region->vm_file)
+-			fput(region->vm_file);
++			vmr_fput(region);
+ 
+ 		/* IO memory and memory shared directly out of the pagecache
+ 		 * from ramfs/tmpfs mustn't be released here */
+@@ -672,7 +672,7 @@ static void delete_vma(struct mm_struct
+ 	if (vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->close)
+ 		vma->vm_ops->close(vma);
+ 	if (vma->vm_file)
+-		fput(vma->vm_file);
++		vma_fput(vma);
+ 	put_nommu_region(vma->vm_region);
+ 	vm_area_free(vma);
+ }
+@@ -1195,7 +1195,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file,
+ 					goto error_just_free;
+ 				}
+ 			}
+-			fput(region->vm_file);
++			vmr_fput(region);
+ 			kmem_cache_free(vm_region_jar, region);
+ 			region = pregion;
+ 			result = start;
+@@ -1272,10 +1272,10 @@ error_just_free:
+ 	up_write(&nommu_region_sem);
+ error:
+ 	if (region->vm_file)
+-		fput(region->vm_file);
++		vmr_fput(region);
+ 	kmem_cache_free(vm_region_jar, region);
+ 	if (vma->vm_file)
+-		fput(vma->vm_file);
++		vma_fput(vma);
+ 	vm_area_free(vma);
+ 	return ret;
+ 
+Index: debian-kernel/mm/prfile.c
+===================================================================
+--- /dev/null
++++ debian-kernel/mm/prfile.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
++// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
++/*
++ * Mainly for aufs which mmap(2) different file and wants to print different
++ * path in /proc/PID/maps.
++ * Call these functions via macros defined in linux/mm.h.
++ *
++ * See Documentation/filesystems/aufs/design/06mmap.txt
++ *
++ * Copyright (c) 2014-2020 Junjro R. Okajima
++ * Copyright (c) 2014 Ian Campbell
++ */
++
++#include <linux/mm.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++
++/* #define PRFILE_TRACE */
++static inline void prfile_trace(struct file *f, struct file *pr,
++			      const char func[], int line, const char func2[])
++{
++#ifdef PRFILE_TRACE
++	if (pr)
++		pr_info("%s:%d: %s, %pD2\n", func, line, func2, f);
++#endif
++}
++
++void vma_do_file_update_time(struct vm_area_struct *vma, const char func[],
++			     int line)
++{
++	struct file *f = vma->vm_file, *pr = vma->vm_prfile;
++
++	prfile_trace(f, pr, func, line, __func__);
++	file_update_time(f);
++	if (f && pr)
++		file_update_time(pr);
++}
++
++struct file *vma_do_pr_or_file(struct vm_area_struct *vma, const char func[],
++			       int line)
++{
++	struct file *f = vma->vm_file, *pr = vma->vm_prfile;
++
++	prfile_trace(f, pr, func, line, __func__);
++	return (f && pr) ? pr : f;
++}
++
++void vma_do_get_file(struct vm_area_struct *vma, const char func[], int line)
++{
++	struct file *f = vma->vm_file, *pr = vma->vm_prfile;
++
++	prfile_trace(f, pr, func, line, __func__);
++	get_file(f);
++	if (f && pr)
++		get_file(pr);
++}
++
++void vma_do_fput(struct vm_area_struct *vma, const char func[], int line)
++{
++	struct file *f = vma->vm_file, *pr = vma->vm_prfile;
++
++	prfile_trace(f, pr, func, line, __func__);
++	fput(f);
++	if (f && pr)
++		fput(pr);
++}
++
++#ifndef CONFIG_MMU
++struct file *vmr_do_pr_or_file(struct vm_region *region, const char func[],
++			       int line)
++{
++	struct file *f = region->vm_file, *pr = region->vm_prfile;
++
++	prfile_trace(f, pr, func, line, __func__);
++	return (f && pr) ? pr : f;
++}
++
++void vmr_do_fput(struct vm_region *region, const char func[], int line)
++{
++	struct file *f = region->vm_file, *pr = region->vm_prfile;
++
++	prfile_trace(f, pr, func, line, __func__);
++	fput(f);
++	if (f && pr)
++		fput(pr);
++}
++#endif /* !CONFIG_MMU */
diff --git a/debian/patches/features/all/aufs5/aufs5-standalone.patch b/debian/patches/features/all/aufs5/aufs5-standalone.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ffd06c8ce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/features/all/aufs5/aufs5-standalone.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,308 @@
+From: J. R. Okajima <hooanon05@yahoo.co.jp>
+Date: Tue Apr 7 22:14:47 2020 +0900
+Subject: aufs5.6 standalone patch
+Origin: https://github.com/sfjro/aufs5-standalone/tree/7c07d9737e9de058981f020d66ac0d4407a80899
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/541828
+
+Patch headers added by debian/bin/genpatch-aufs
+
+SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+aufs5.6 standalone patch
+
+Index: debian-kernel/fs/dcache.c
+===================================================================
+--- debian-kernel.orig/fs/dcache.c
++++ debian-kernel/fs/dcache.c
+@@ -1390,6 +1390,7 @@ rename_retry:
+ 	seq = 1;
+ 	goto again;
+ }
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(d_walk);
+ 
+ struct check_mount {
+ 	struct vfsmount *mnt;
+@@ -2935,6 +2936,7 @@ void d_exchange(struct dentry *dentry1,
+ 
+ 	write_sequnlock(&rename_lock);
+ }
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(d_exchange);
+ 
+ /**
+  * d_ancestor - search for an ancestor
+Index: debian-kernel/fs/exec.c
+===================================================================
+--- debian-kernel.orig/fs/exec.c
++++ debian-kernel/fs/exec.c
+@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ bool path_noexec(const struct path *path
+ 	return (path->mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC) ||
+ 	       (path->mnt->mnt_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_NOEXEC);
+ }
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(path_noexec);
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_USELIB
+ /*
+Index: debian-kernel/fs/fcntl.c
+===================================================================
+--- debian-kernel.orig/fs/fcntl.c
++++ debian-kernel/fs/fcntl.c
+@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ int setfl(int fd, struct file *filp, uns
+  out:
+ 	return error;
+ }
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(setfl);
+ 
+ static void f_modown(struct file *filp, struct pid *pid, enum pid_type type,
+                      int force)
+Index: debian-kernel/fs/file_table.c
+===================================================================
+--- debian-kernel.orig/fs/file_table.c
++++ debian-kernel/fs/file_table.c
+@@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ over:
+ 	}
+ 	return ERR_PTR(-ENFILE);
+ }
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(alloc_empty_file);
+ 
+ /*
+  * Variant of alloc_empty_file() that doesn't check and modify nr_files.
+@@ -376,6 +377,7 @@ void __fput_sync(struct file *file)
+ }
+ 
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(fput);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fput_sync);
+ 
+ void __init files_init(void)
+ {
+Index: debian-kernel/fs/inode.c
+===================================================================
+--- debian-kernel.orig/fs/inode.c
++++ debian-kernel/fs/inode.c
+@@ -1774,6 +1774,7 @@ int update_time(struct inode *inode, str
+ 		return inode->i_op->update_time(inode, time, flags);
+ 	return generic_update_time(inode, time, flags);
+ }
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(update_time);
+ 
+ /**
+  *	touch_atime	-	update the access time
+Index: debian-kernel/fs/namespace.c
+===================================================================
+--- debian-kernel.orig/fs/namespace.c
++++ debian-kernel/fs/namespace.c
+@@ -431,6 +431,7 @@ void __mnt_drop_write(struct vfsmount *m
+ 	mnt_dec_writers(real_mount(mnt));
+ 	preempt_enable();
+ }
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__mnt_drop_write);
+ 
+ /**
+  * mnt_drop_write - give up write access to a mount
+@@ -797,6 +798,7 @@ int is_current_mnt_ns(struct vfsmount *m
+ {
+ 	return check_mnt(real_mount(mnt));
+ }
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(is_current_mnt_ns);
+ 
+ /*
+  * vfsmount lock must be held for write
+@@ -1961,6 +1963,7 @@ int iterate_mounts(int (*f)(struct vfsmo
+ 	}
+ 	return 0;
+ }
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(iterate_mounts);
+ 
+ static void lock_mnt_tree(struct mount *mnt)
+ {
+Index: debian-kernel/fs/notify/group.c
+===================================================================
+--- debian-kernel.orig/fs/notify/group.c
++++ debian-kernel/fs/notify/group.c
+@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ void fsnotify_get_group(struct fsnotify_
+ {
+ 	refcount_inc(&group->refcnt);
+ }
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsnotify_get_group);
+ 
+ /*
+  * Drop a reference to a group.  Free it if it's through.
+Index: debian-kernel/fs/open.c
+===================================================================
+--- debian-kernel.orig/fs/open.c
++++ debian-kernel/fs/open.c
+@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ int do_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, l
+ 	inode_unlock(dentry->d_inode);
+ 	return ret;
+ }
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(do_truncate);
+ 
+ long vfs_truncate(const struct path *path, loff_t length)
+ {
+Index: debian-kernel/fs/read_write.c
+===================================================================
+--- debian-kernel.orig/fs/read_write.c
++++ debian-kernel/fs/read_write.c
+@@ -488,6 +488,7 @@ ssize_t vfs_read(struct file *file, char
+ 	inc_syscr(current);
+ 	return ret;
+ }
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vfs_read);
+ 
+ static ssize_t new_sync_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf, size_t len, loff_t *ppos)
+ {
+@@ -517,6 +518,7 @@ vfs_readf_t vfs_readf(struct file *file)
+ 		return new_sync_read;
+ 	return ERR_PTR(-ENOSYS); /* doesn't have ->read(|_iter)() op */
+ }
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vfs_readf);
+ 
+ vfs_writef_t vfs_writef(struct file *file)
+ {
+@@ -528,6 +530,7 @@ vfs_writef_t vfs_writef(struct file *fil
+ 		return new_sync_write;
+ 	return ERR_PTR(-ENOSYS); /* doesn't have ->write(|_iter)() op */
+ }
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vfs_writef);
+ 
+ /* caller is responsible for file_start_write/file_end_write */
+ ssize_t __kernel_write(struct file *file, const void *buf, size_t count, loff_t *pos)
+@@ -608,6 +611,7 @@ ssize_t vfs_write(struct file *file, con
+ 	file_end_write(file);
+ 	return ret;
+ }
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vfs_write);
+ 
+ /* file_ppos returns &file->f_pos or NULL if file is stream */
+ static inline loff_t *file_ppos(struct file *file)
+Index: debian-kernel/fs/splice.c
+===================================================================
+--- debian-kernel.orig/fs/splice.c
++++ debian-kernel/fs/splice.c
+@@ -870,6 +870,7 @@ long do_splice_to(struct file *in, loff_
+ 		return in->f_op->splice_read(in, ppos, pipe, len, flags);
+ 	return default_file_splice_read(in, ppos, pipe, len, flags);
+ }
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(do_splice_from);
+ 
+ /**
+  * splice_direct_to_actor - splices data directly between two non-pipes
+@@ -1016,6 +1017,7 @@ static int direct_splice_actor(struct pi
+ 	return do_splice_from(pipe, file, sd->opos, sd->total_len,
+ 			      sd->flags);
+ }
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(do_splice_to);
+ 
+ /**
+  * do_splice_direct - splices data directly between two files
+Index: debian-kernel/fs/sync.c
+===================================================================
+--- debian-kernel.orig/fs/sync.c
++++ debian-kernel/fs/sync.c
+@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ int __sync_filesystem(struct super_block
+ 		sb->s_op->sync_fs(sb, wait);
+ 	return __sync_blockdev(sb->s_bdev, wait);
+ }
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__sync_filesystem);
+ 
+ /*
+  * Write out and wait upon all dirty data associated with this
+Index: debian-kernel/fs/xattr.c
+===================================================================
+--- debian-kernel.orig/fs/xattr.c
++++ debian-kernel/fs/xattr.c
+@@ -296,6 +296,7 @@ vfs_getxattr_alloc(struct dentry *dentry
+ 	*xattr_value = value;
+ 	return error;
+ }
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vfs_getxattr_alloc);
+ 
+ ssize_t
+ __vfs_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name,
+Index: debian-kernel/kernel/locking/lockdep.c
+===================================================================
+--- debian-kernel.orig/kernel/locking/lockdep.c
++++ debian-kernel/kernel/locking/lockdep.c
+@@ -190,6 +190,7 @@ inline struct lock_class *lockdep_hlock_
+ 	 */
+ 	return lock_classes + class_idx;
+ }
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(lockdep_hlock_class);
+ #define hlock_class(hlock) lockdep_hlock_class(hlock)
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_LOCK_STAT
+Index: debian-kernel/kernel/task_work.c
+===================================================================
+--- debian-kernel.orig/kernel/task_work.c
++++ debian-kernel/kernel/task_work.c
+@@ -139,3 +139,4 @@ void task_work_run(void)
+ 		} while (work);
+ 	}
+ }
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(task_work_run);
+Index: debian-kernel/security/security.c
+===================================================================
+--- debian-kernel.orig/security/security.c
++++ debian-kernel/security/security.c
+@@ -1096,6 +1096,7 @@ int security_path_rmdir(const struct pat
+ 		return 0;
+ 	return call_int_hook(path_rmdir, 0, dir, dentry);
+ }
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_path_rmdir);
+ 
+ int security_path_unlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+ {
+@@ -1112,6 +1113,7 @@ int security_path_symlink(const struct p
+ 		return 0;
+ 	return call_int_hook(path_symlink, 0, dir, dentry, old_name);
+ }
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_path_symlink);
+ 
+ int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir,
+ 		       struct dentry *new_dentry)
+@@ -1120,6 +1122,7 @@ int security_path_link(struct dentry *ol
+ 		return 0;
+ 	return call_int_hook(path_link, 0, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
+ }
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_path_link);
+ 
+ int security_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+ 			 const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry,
+@@ -1147,6 +1150,7 @@ int security_path_truncate(const struct
+ 		return 0;
+ 	return call_int_hook(path_truncate, 0, path);
+ }
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_path_truncate);
+ 
+ int security_path_chmod(const struct path *path, umode_t mode)
+ {
+@@ -1154,6 +1158,7 @@ int security_path_chmod(const struct pat
+ 		return 0;
+ 	return call_int_hook(path_chmod, 0, path, mode);
+ }
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_path_chmod);
+ 
+ int security_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
+ {
+@@ -1161,6 +1166,7 @@ int security_path_chown(const struct pat
+ 		return 0;
+ 	return call_int_hook(path_chown, 0, path, uid, gid);
+ }
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_path_chown);
+ 
+ int security_path_chroot(const struct path *path)
+ {
+@@ -1261,6 +1267,7 @@ int security_inode_permission(struct ino
+ 		return 0;
+ 	return call_int_hook(inode_permission, 0, inode, mask);
+ }
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_permission);
+ 
+ int security_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
+ {
+@@ -1453,6 +1460,7 @@ int security_file_permission(struct file
+ 
+ 	return fsnotify_perm(file, mask);
+ }
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_file_permission);
+ 
+ int security_file_alloc(struct file *file)
+ {
diff --git a/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/0001-MODSIGN-do-not-load-mok-when-secure-boot-disabled.patch b/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/0001-MODSIGN-do-not-load-mok-when-secure-boot-disabled.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5d4ec82f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/0001-MODSIGN-do-not-load-mok-when-secure-boot-disabled.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+From: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 18:37:59 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 1/5] MODSIGN: do not load mok when secure boot disabled
+Origin: https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/933173/
+
+The mok can not be trusted when the secure boot is disabled. Which
+means that the kernel embedded certificate is the only trusted key.
+
+Due to db/dbx are authenticated variables, they needs manufacturer's
+KEK for update. So db/dbx are secure when secureboot disabled.
+
+Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
+Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
+Signed-off-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
+[Rebased by Luca Boccassi]
+[bwh: Forward-ported to 5.5.9:
+ - get_cert_list() takes a pointer to status and returns the cert list
+ - Adjust filename]
+[Salvatore Bonaccorso: Forward-ported to 5.10: Refresh for changes in
+38a1f03aa240 ("integrity: Move import of MokListRT certs to a separate
+routine"). Refresh in context for change in ebd9c2ae369a ("integrity: Load mokx
+variables into the blacklist keyring")]
+---
+ security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 26 +++++++++++++++-----------
+ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
++++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
+@@ -176,6 +176,10 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
+ 		kfree(dbx);
+ 	}
+ 
++	/* the MOK can not be trusted when secure boot is disabled */
++	if (!efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
++		return 0;
++
+ 	mokx = get_cert_list(L"MokListXRT", &mok_var, &mokxsize, &status);
+ 	if (!mokx) {
+ 		if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
diff --git a/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/0003-MODSIGN-checking-the-blacklisted-hash-before-loading-a-kernel-module.patch b/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/0003-MODSIGN-checking-the-blacklisted-hash-before-loading-a-kernel-module.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a7ec5ccb5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/0003-MODSIGN-checking-the-blacklisted-hash-before-loading-a-kernel-module.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+From: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 18:38:02 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 3/4] MODSIGN: checking the blacklisted hash before loading a
+ kernel module
+Origin: https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/933175/
+
+This patch adds the logic for checking the kernel module's hash
+base on blacklist. The hash must be generated by sha256 and enrolled
+to dbx/mokx.
+
+For example:
+	sha256sum sample.ko
+	mokutil --mokx --import-hash $HASH_RESULT
+
+Whether the signature on ko file is stripped or not, the hash can be
+compared by kernel.
+
+Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
+Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
+Signed-off-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
+[Rebased by Luca Boccassi]
+---
+ kernel/module_signing.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 57 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
++++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
+@@ -12,15 +12,62 @@
+ #include <linux/string.h>
+ #include <linux/verification.h>
+ #include <crypto/public_key.h>
++#include <crypto/hash.h>
++#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
+ #include "module-internal.h"
+ 
++static int mod_is_hash_blacklisted(const void *mod, size_t verifylen)
++{
++	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
++	struct shash_desc *desc;
++	size_t digest_size, desc_size;
++	u8 *digest;
++	int ret = 0;
++
++	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0);
++	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
++		goto error_return;
++
++	desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
++	digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
++	digest = kzalloc(digest_size + desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
++	if (!digest) {
++		pr_err("digest memory buffer allocate fail\n");
++		ret = -ENOMEM;
++		goto error_digest;
++	}
++	desc = (void *)digest + digest_size;
++	desc->tfm = tfm;
++	ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
++	if (ret < 0)
++		goto error_shash;
++
++	ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, mod, verifylen, digest);
++	if (ret < 0)
++		goto error_shash;
++
++	pr_debug("%ld digest: %*phN\n", verifylen, (int) digest_size, digest);
++
++	ret = is_hash_blacklisted(digest, digest_size, "bin");
++	if (ret == -EKEYREJECTED)
++		pr_err("Module hash %*phN is blacklisted\n",
++		       (int) digest_size, digest);
++
++error_shash:
++	kfree(digest);
++error_digest:
++	crypto_free_shash(tfm);
++error_return:
++	return ret;
++}
++
+ /*
+  * Verify the signature on a module.
+  */
+ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info)
+ {
+ 	struct module_signature ms;
+-	size_t sig_len, modlen = info->len;
++	size_t sig_len, modlen = info->len, wholelen;
+ 	int ret;
+ 
+ 	pr_devel("==>%s(,%zu)\n", __func__, modlen);
+@@ -28,6 +75,7 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, stru
+ 	if (modlen <= sizeof(ms))
+ 		return -EBADMSG;
+ 
++	wholelen = modlen + sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
+ 	memcpy(&ms, mod + (modlen - sizeof(ms)), sizeof(ms));
+ 
+ 	ret = mod_check_sig(&ms, modlen, "module");
+@@ -38,8 +86,15 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, stru
+ 	modlen -= sig_len + sizeof(ms);
+ 	info->len = modlen;
+ 
+-	return verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len,
++	ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len,
+ 				      VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
+ 				      VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
+ 				      NULL, NULL);
++	pr_devel("verify_pkcs7_signature() = %d\n", ret);
++
++	/* checking hash of module is in blacklist */
++	if (!ret)
++		ret = mod_is_hash_blacklisted(mod, wholelen);
++
++	return ret;
+ }
diff --git a/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/0004-MODSIGN-check-the-attributes-of-db-and-mok.patch b/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/0004-MODSIGN-check-the-attributes-of-db-and-mok.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..530885944
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/0004-MODSIGN-check-the-attributes-of-db-and-mok.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+From: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 18:38:03 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 4/4] MODSIGN: check the attributes of db and mok
+Origin: https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/933176/
+
+That's better for checking the attributes of db and mok variables
+before loading certificates to kernel keyring.
+
+For db and dbx, both of them are authenticated variables. Which
+means that they can only be modified by manufacturer's key. So
+the kernel should checks EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS
+attribute before we trust it.
+
+For mok-rt and mokx-rt, both of them are created by shim boot loader
+to forward the mok/mokx content to runtime. They must be runtime-volatile
+variables. So kernel should checks that the attributes map did not set
+EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE bit before we trust it.
+
+Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
+Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
+Signed-off-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
+[Rebased by Luca Boccassi]
+[bwh: Forward-ported to 5.5.9:
+ - get_cert_list() takes a pointer to status and returns the cert list
+ - Adjust filename, context]
+[bwh: Forward-ported to 5.10: MokListRT and MokListXRT are now both
+ loaded through a single code path.]
+---
+ security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 27 ++++++++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
++++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
+@@ -35,11 +35,13 @@ static __init bool uefi_check_ignore_db(
+  * Get a certificate list blob from the named EFI variable.
+  */
+ static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid,
+-				  unsigned long *size, efi_status_t *status)
++				  unsigned long *size, efi_status_t *status,
++				  u32 pos_attr, u32 neg_attr)
+ {
+ 	unsigned long lsize = 4;
+ 	unsigned long tmpdb[4];
+ 	void *db;
++	u32 attr = 0;
+ 
+ 	*status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, &tmpdb);
+ 	if (*status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
+@@ -54,13 +56,22 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_ch
+ 	if (!db)
+ 		return NULL;
+ 
+-	*status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, db);
++	*status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, &attr, &lsize, db);
+ 	if (*status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
+ 		kfree(db);
+ 		pr_err("Error reading db var: 0x%lx\n", *status);
+ 		return NULL;
+ 	}
+ 
++	/* must have positive attributes and no negative attributes */
++	if ((pos_attr && !(attr & pos_attr)) ||
++	    (neg_attr && (attr & neg_attr))) {
++		kfree(db);
++		pr_err("Error reading db var attributes: 0x%016x\n", attr);
++		*status = EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
++		return NULL;
++	}
++
+ 	*size = lsize;
+ 	return db;
+ }
+@@ -106,7 +117,8 @@ static int __init load_moklist_certs(voi
+ 	/* Get MokListRT. It might not exist, so it isn't an error
+ 	 * if we can't get it.
+ 	 */
+-	mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize, &status);
++	mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize, &status,
++				0, EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE);
+ 	if (mok) {
+ 		rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:MokListRT",
+ 					      mok, moksize, get_handler_for_db);
+@@ -145,7 +157,8 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
+ 	 * if we can't get them.
+ 	 */
+ 	if (!uefi_check_ignore_db()) {
+-		db = get_cert_list(L"db", &secure_var, &dbsize, &status);
++		db = get_cert_list(L"db", &secure_var, &dbsize, &status,
++			EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS, 0);
+ 		if (!db) {
+ 			if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
+ 				pr_debug("MODSIGN: db variable wasn't found\n");
+@@ -161,7 +174,8 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+-	dbx = get_cert_list(L"dbx", &secure_var, &dbxsize, &status);
++	dbx = get_cert_list(L"dbx", &secure_var, &dbxsize, &status,
++		EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS, 0);
+ 	if (!dbx) {
+ 		if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
+ 			pr_debug("dbx variable wasn't found\n");
+@@ -180,7 +194,8 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
+ 	if (!efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
+ 		return 0;
+ 
+-	mokx = get_cert_list(L"MokListXRT", &mok_var, &mokxsize, &status);
++	mokx = get_cert_list(L"MokListXRT", &mok_var, &mokxsize, &status,
++							0, EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE);
+ 	if (!mokx) {
+ 		if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
+ 			pr_debug("mokx variable wasn't found\n");
diff --git a/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/KEYS-Make-use-of-platform-keyring-for-module-signature.patch b/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/KEYS-Make-use-of-platform-keyring-for-module-signature.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f00bf3d24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/KEYS-Make-use-of-platform-keyring-for-module-signature.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From: Robert Holmes <robeholmes@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 23 Apr 2019 07:39:29 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for module signature
+ verify
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/935945
+Origin: https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/kernel/raw/master/f/KEYS-Make-use-of-platform-keyring-for-module-signature.patch
+
+This patch completes commit 278311e417be ("kexec, KEYS: Make use of
+platform keyring for signature verify") which, while adding the
+platform keyring for bzImage verification, neglected to also add
+this keyring for module verification.
+
+As such, kernel modules signed with keys from the MokList variable
+were not successfully verified.
+
+Signed-off-by: Robert Holmes <robeholmes@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com>
+---
+ kernel/module_signing.c | 16 ++++++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
++++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
+@@ -135,6 +135,13 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, stru
+ 				      VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
+ 				      NULL, NULL);
+ 	pr_devel("verify_pkcs7_signature() = %d\n", ret);
++	if (ret == -ENOKEY && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING)) {
++		ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len,
++				VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
++				VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
++				NULL, NULL);
++                pr_devel("verify_pkcs7_signature() = %d\n", ret);
++	}
+ 
+ 	/* checking hash of module is in blacklist */
+ 	if (!ret)
diff --git a/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/modsign-make-shash-allocation-failure-fatal.patch b/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/modsign-make-shash-allocation-failure-fatal.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2ae3ddde4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/features/all/db-mok-keyring/modsign-make-shash-allocation-failure-fatal.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
+Date: Sun, 05 May 2019 13:45:06 +0100
+Subject: MODSIGN: Make shash allocation failure fatal
+
+mod_is_hash_blacklisted() currently returns 0 (suceess) if
+crypto_alloc_shash() fails.  This should instead be a fatal error,
+so unwrap and pass up the error code.
+
+Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
+---
+--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
++++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
+@@ -51,11 +51,13 @@ static int mod_is_hash_blacklisted(const
+ 	struct shash_desc *desc;
+ 	size_t digest_size, desc_size;
+ 	u8 *digest;
+-	int ret = 0;
++	int ret;
+ 
+ 	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0);
+-	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
++	if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
++		ret = PTR_ERR(tfm);
+ 		goto error_return;
++	}
+ 
+ 	desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
+ 	digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
diff --git a/debian/patches/features/all/drivers-media-dvb-usb-af9005-request_firmware.patch b/debian/patches/features/all/drivers-media-dvb-usb-af9005-request_firmware.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a24ba17ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/features/all/drivers-media-dvb-usb-af9005-request_firmware.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
+Date: Mon, 24 Aug 2009 23:19:58 +0100
+Subject: af9005: Use request_firmware() to load register init script
+Forwarded: no
+
+Read the register init script from the Windows driver.  This is sick
+but should avoid the potential copyright infringement in distributing
+a version of the script which is directly derived from the driver.
+---
+ drivers/media/dvb/dvb-usb/Kconfig     |    2 +-
+ drivers/media/dvb/dvb-usb/af9005-fe.c |   66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
+ 2 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
+
+Index: debian-kernel/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/Kconfig
+===================================================================
+--- debian-kernel.orig/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/Kconfig
++++ debian-kernel/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/Kconfig
+@@ -260,10 +260,10 @@ config DVB_USB_OPERA1
+ 
+ config DVB_USB_AF9005
+ 	tristate "Afatech AF9005 DVB-T USB1.1 support"
+-	depends on BROKEN
+ 	depends on DVB_USB
+ 	select MEDIA_TUNER_MT2060 if MEDIA_SUBDRV_AUTOSELECT
+ 	select MEDIA_TUNER_QT1010 if MEDIA_SUBDRV_AUTOSELECT
++	select FW_LOADER
+ 	help
+ 	  Say Y here to support the Afatech AF9005 based DVB-T USB1.1 receiver
+ 	  and the TerraTec Cinergy T USB XE (Rev.1)
+Index: debian-kernel/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/af9005-fe.c
+===================================================================
+--- debian-kernel.orig/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/af9005-fe.c
++++ debian-kernel/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/af9005-fe.c
+@@ -9,10 +9,26 @@
+  * see Documentation/driver-api/media/drivers/dvb-usb.rst for more information
+  */
+ #include "af9005.h"
+-#include "af9005-script.h"
+ #include "mt2060.h"
+ #include "qt1010.h"
+ #include <asm/div64.h>
++#include <linux/firmware.h>
++
++/* Register initialisation script to be extracted from the Windows driver */
++
++typedef struct {
++	__le16 reg;
++	u8 pos;
++	u8 len;
++	u8 val;
++	u8 pad;
++} __packed RegDesc;
++
++#define WIN_DRV_NAME		"AF05BDA.sys"
++#define WIN_DRV_VERSION		"6.3.2.1"
++#define WIN_DRV_SIZE		133504
++#define WIN_DRV_SCRIPT_OFFSET	88316
++#define WIN_DRV_SCRIPT_SIZE	1110
+ 
+ struct af9005_fe_state {
+ 	struct dvb_usb_device *d;
+@@ -804,6 +820,8 @@ static int af9005_fe_init(struct dvb_fro
+ {
+ 	struct af9005_fe_state *state = fe->demodulator_priv;
+ 	struct dvb_usb_adapter *adap = fe->dvb->priv;
++	const struct firmware *fw;
++	const RegDesc *script;
+ 	int ret, i, scriptlen;
+ 	u8 temp, temp0 = 0, temp1 = 0, temp2 = 0;
+ 	u8 buf[2];
+@@ -956,37 +974,55 @@ static int af9005_fe_init(struct dvb_fro
+ 	if ((ret = af9005_write_ofdm_register(state->d, 0xaefb, 0x01)))
+ 		return ret;
+ 
+-	/* load init script */
+-	deb_info("load init script\n");
+-	scriptlen = sizeof(script) / sizeof(RegDesc);
++	/* load and validate init script */
++	deb_info("load init script from Windows driver\n");
++	ret = request_firmware(&fw, WIN_DRV_NAME, &state->d->udev->dev);
++	if (ret)
++		return ret;
++	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(RegDesc) != 6);
++	if (fw->size != WIN_DRV_SIZE ||
++	    memcmp(fw->data + WIN_DRV_SCRIPT_OFFSET,
++		   "\x80\xa1\x00\x08\x0a\x00", 6) ||
++	    memcmp(fw->data + WIN_DRV_SCRIPT_OFFSET + WIN_DRV_SCRIPT_SIZE - 6,
++		   "\x49\xa3\x00\x06\x02\x00", 6)) {
++		err("%s is invalid - should be version %s, size %u bytes\n",
++		    WIN_DRV_NAME, WIN_DRV_VERSION, WIN_DRV_SIZE);
++		ret = -EINVAL;
++		goto fail_release;
++	}
++
++	script = (const RegDesc *)(fw->data + WIN_DRV_SCRIPT_OFFSET);
++	scriptlen = WIN_DRV_SCRIPT_SIZE / sizeof(RegDesc);
+ 	for (i = 0; i < scriptlen; i++) {
++		u16 reg = le16_to_cpu(script[i].reg);
+ 		if ((ret =
+-		     af9005_write_register_bits(state->d, script[i].reg,
++		     af9005_write_register_bits(state->d, reg,
+ 						script[i].pos,
+ 						script[i].len, script[i].val)))
+-			return ret;
++			goto fail_release;
+ 		/* save 3 bytes of original fcw */
+-		if (script[i].reg == 0xae18)
++		if (reg == 0xae18)
+ 			temp2 = script[i].val;
+-		if (script[i].reg == 0xae19)
++		if (reg == 0xae19)
+ 			temp1 = script[i].val;
+-		if (script[i].reg == 0xae1a)
++		if (reg == 0xae1a)
+ 			temp0 = script[i].val;
+ 
+ 		/* save original unplug threshold */
+-		if (script[i].reg == xd_p_reg_unplug_th)
++		if (reg == xd_p_reg_unplug_th)
+ 			state->original_if_unplug_th = script[i].val;
+-		if (script[i].reg == xd_p_reg_unplug_rf_gain_th)
++		if (reg == xd_p_reg_unplug_rf_gain_th)
+ 			state->original_rf_unplug_th = script[i].val;
+-		if (script[i].reg == xd_p_reg_unplug_dtop_if_gain_th)
++		if (reg == xd_p_reg_unplug_dtop_if_gain_th)
+ 			state->original_dtop_if_unplug_th = script[i].val;
+-		if (script[i].reg == xd_p_reg_unplug_dtop_rf_gain_th)
++		if (reg == xd_p_reg_unplug_dtop_rf_gain_th)
+ 			state->original_dtop_rf_unplug_th = script[i].val;
+ 
+ 	}
+ 	state->original_fcw =
+ 	    ((u32) temp2 << 16) + ((u32) temp1 << 8) + (u32) temp0;
+ 
++	release_firmware(fw);
+ 
+ 	/* save original TOPs */
+ 	deb_info("save original TOPs\n");
+@@ -1066,6 +1102,10 @@ static int af9005_fe_init(struct dvb_fro
+ 
+ 	deb_info("profit!\n");
+ 	return 0;
++
++fail_release:
++	release_firmware(fw);
++	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+ static int af9005_fe_sleep(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
diff --git a/debian/patches/features/all/lockdown/arm64-add-kernel-config-option-to-lock-down-when.patch b/debian/patches/features/all/lockdown/arm64-add-kernel-config-option-to-lock-down-when.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7f9ee1cf9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/features/all/lockdown/arm64-add-kernel-config-option-to-lock-down-when.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+From: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
+Date: Tue, 30 Aug 2016 11:54:38 -0600
+Subject: arm64: add kernel config option to lock down when in Secure Boot mode
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/831827
+Forwarded: no
+
+Add a kernel configuration option to lock down the kernel, to restrict
+userspace's ability to modify the running kernel when UEFI Secure Boot is
+enabled. Based on the x86 patch by Matthew Garrett.
+
+Determine the state of Secure Boot in the EFI stub and pass this to the
+kernel using the FDT.
+
+Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
+[bwh: Forward-ported to 4.10: adjust context]
+[Lukas Wunner: Forward-ported to 4.11: drop parts applied upstream]
+[bwh: Forward-ported to 4.15 and lockdown patch set:
+ - Pass result of efi_get_secureboot() in stub through to
+   efi_set_secure_boot() in main kernel
+ - Use lockdown API and naming]
+[bwh: Forward-ported to 4.19.3: adjust context in update_fdt()]
+[dannf: Moved init_lockdown() call after uefi_init(), fixing SB detection]
+[bwh: Drop call to init_lockdown(), as efi_set_secure_boot() now calls this]
+[bwh: Forward-ported to 5.6: efi_get_secureboot() no longer takes a
+ sys_table parameter]
+[bwh: Forward-ported to 5.7: EFI initialisation from FDT was rewritten, so:
+ - Add Secure Boot mode to the parameter enumeration in fdtparams.c
+ - Add a parameter to efi_get_fdt_params() to return the Secure Boot mode
+ - Since Xen does not have a property name defined for Secure Boot mode,
+   change efi_get_fdt_prop() to handle a missing property name by clearing
+   the output variable]
+[Salvatore Bonaccorso: Forward-ported to 5.10: f30f242fb131 ("efi: Rename
+arm-init to efi-init common for all arch") renamed arm-init.c to efi-init.c]
+---
+ drivers/firmware/efi/efi-init.c    |    5 ++++-
+ drivers/firmware/efi/fdtparams.c   |   12 +++++++++++-
+ drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c |    6 ++++++
+ include/linux/efi.h                |    3 ++-
+ 4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi-init.c
++++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi-init.c
+@@ -210,9 +210,10 @@ void __init efi_init(void)
+ {
+ 	struct efi_memory_map_data data;
+ 	u64 efi_system_table;
++	u32 secure_boot;
+ 
+ 	/* Grab UEFI information placed in FDT by stub */
+-	efi_system_table = efi_get_fdt_params(&data);
++	efi_system_table = efi_get_fdt_params(&data, &secure_boot);
+ 	if (!efi_system_table)
+ 		return;
+ 
+@@ -234,6 +235,8 @@ void __init efi_init(void)
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+ 
++	efi_set_secure_boot(secure_boot);
++
+ 	reserve_regions();
+ 	efi_esrt_init();
+ 	efi_mokvar_table_init();
+--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/fdtparams.c
++++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/fdtparams.c
+@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ enum {
+ 	MMSIZE,
+ 	DCSIZE,
+ 	DCVERS,
++	SBMODE,
+ 
+ 	PARAMCOUNT
+ };
+@@ -26,6 +27,7 @@ static __initconst const char name[][22]
+ 	[MMSIZE] = "MemMap Size          ",
+ 	[DCSIZE] = "MemMap Desc. Size    ",
+ 	[DCVERS] = "MemMap Desc. Version ",
++	[SBMODE] = "Secure Boot Enabled  ",
+ };
+ 
+ static __initconst const struct {
+@@ -41,6 +43,7 @@ static __initconst const struct {
+ 			[MMSIZE] = "xen,uefi-mmap-size",
+ 			[DCSIZE] = "xen,uefi-mmap-desc-size",
+ 			[DCVERS] = "xen,uefi-mmap-desc-ver",
++			[SBMODE] = "",
+ 		}
+ 	}, {
+ #endif
+@@ -51,6 +54,7 @@ static __initconst const struct {
+ 			[MMSIZE] = "linux,uefi-mmap-size",
+ 			[DCSIZE] = "linux,uefi-mmap-desc-size",
+ 			[DCVERS] = "linux,uefi-mmap-desc-ver",
++			[SBMODE] = "linux,uefi-secure-boot",
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ };
+@@ -62,6 +66,11 @@ static int __init efi_get_fdt_prop(const
+ 	int len;
+ 	u64 val;
+ 
++	if (!pname[0]) {
++		memset(var, 0, size);
++		return 0;
++	}
++
+ 	prop = fdt_getprop(fdt, node, pname, &len);
+ 	if (!prop)
+ 		return 1;
+@@ -79,7 +88,7 @@ static int __init efi_get_fdt_prop(const
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+-u64 __init efi_get_fdt_params(struct efi_memory_map_data *mm)
++u64 __init efi_get_fdt_params(struct efi_memory_map_data *mm, u32 *secure_boot)
+ {
+ 	const void *fdt = initial_boot_params;
+ 	unsigned long systab;
+@@ -93,6 +102,7 @@ u64 __init efi_get_fdt_params(struct efi
+ 		[MMSIZE] = { &mm->size,		sizeof(mm->size) },
+ 		[DCSIZE] = { &mm->desc_size,	sizeof(mm->desc_size) },
+ 		[DCVERS] = { &mm->desc_version,	sizeof(mm->desc_version) },
++		[SBMODE] = { secure_boot,       sizeof(*secure_boot) },
+ 	};
+ 
+ 	BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(target) != ARRAY_SIZE(name));
+--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c
++++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c
+@@ -148,6 +148,12 @@ static efi_status_t update_fdt(void *ori
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
++	fdt_val32 = cpu_to_fdt32(efi_get_secureboot());
++	status = fdt_setprop(fdt, node, "linux,uefi-secure-boot",
++			     &fdt_val32, sizeof(fdt_val32));
++	if (status)
++		goto fdt_set_fail;
++
+ 	/* Shrink the FDT back to its minimum size: */
+ 	fdt_pack(fdt);
+ 
+--- a/include/linux/efi.h
++++ b/include/linux/efi.h
+@@ -665,7 +665,8 @@ extern void efi_mem_reserve(phys_addr_t
+ extern int efi_mem_reserve_persistent(phys_addr_t addr, u64 size);
+ extern void efi_initialize_iomem_resources(struct resource *code_resource,
+ 		struct resource *data_resource, struct resource *bss_resource);
+-extern u64 efi_get_fdt_params(struct efi_memory_map_data *data);
++extern u64 efi_get_fdt_params(struct efi_memory_map_data *data,
++			      u32 *secure_boot);
+ extern struct kobject *efi_kobj;
+ 
+ extern int efi_reboot_quirk_mode;
diff --git a/debian/patches/features/all/lockdown/efi-add-an-efi_secure_boot-flag-to-indicate-secure-b.patch b/debian/patches/features/all/lockdown/efi-add-an-efi_secure_boot-flag-to-indicate-secure-b.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..431281249
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/features/all/lockdown/efi-add-an-efi_secure_boot-flag-to-indicate-secure-b.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 18 Feb 2019 12:45:03 +0000
+Subject: [28/30] efi: Add an EFI_SECURE_BOOT flag to indicate secure boot mode
+Origin: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git/commit?id=a5d70c55c603233c192b375f72116a395909da28
+
+UEFI machines can be booted in Secure Boot mode.  Add an EFI_SECURE_BOOT
+flag that can be passed to efi_enabled() to find out whether secure boot is
+enabled.
+
+Move the switch-statement in x86's setup_arch() that inteprets the
+secure_boot boot parameter to generic code and set the bit there.
+
+Suggested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
+Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
+cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
+[rperier: Forward-ported to 5.5:
+ - Use pr_warn()
+ - Adjust context]
+[bwh: Forward-ported to 5.6: adjust context]
+[bwh: Forward-ported to 5.7:
+ - Use the next available bit in efi.flags
+ - Adjust context]
+---
+ arch/x86/kernel/setup.c           | 14 +----------
+ drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile     |  1 +
+ drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ include/linux/efi.h               | 16 ++++++++-----
+ 4 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c
+
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+@@ -1124,19 +1124,7 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
+ 	/* Allocate bigger log buffer */
+ 	setup_log_buf(1);
+ 
+-	if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) {
+-		switch (boot_params.secure_boot) {
+-		case efi_secureboot_mode_disabled:
+-			pr_info("Secure boot disabled\n");
+-			break;
+-		case efi_secureboot_mode_enabled:
+-			pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
+-			break;
+-		default:
+-			pr_info("Secure boot could not be determined\n");
+-			break;
+-		}
+-	}
++	efi_set_secure_boot(boot_params.secure_boot);
+ 
+ 	reserve_initrd();
+ 
+--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile
++++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile
+@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_FAKE_MEMMAP)		+= fake_m
+ obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_BOOTLOADER_CONTROL)	+= efibc.o
+ obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_TEST)			+= test/
+ obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_DEV_PATH_PARSER)	+= dev-path-parser.o
++obj-$(CONFIG_EFI)			+= secureboot.o
+ obj-$(CONFIG_APPLE_PROPERTIES)		+= apple-properties.o
+ obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_RCI2_TABLE)		+= rci2-table.o
+ obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_EMBEDDED_FIRMWARE)	+= embedded-firmware.o
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
++
++/* Core kernel secure boot support.
++ *
++ * Copyright (C) 2017 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
++ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
++ *
++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
++ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
++ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
++ */
++
++#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
++
++#include <linux/efi.h>
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/printk.h>
++
++/*
++ * Decide what to do when UEFI secure boot mode is enabled.
++ */
++void __init efi_set_secure_boot(enum efi_secureboot_mode mode)
++{
++	if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) {
++		switch (mode) {
++		case efi_secureboot_mode_disabled:
++			pr_info("Secure boot disabled\n");
++			break;
++		case efi_secureboot_mode_enabled:
++			set_bit(EFI_SECURE_BOOT, &efi.flags);
++			pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
++			break;
++		default:
++			pr_warn("Secure boot could not be determined (mode %u)\n",
++				mode);
++			break;
++		}
++	}
++}
+--- a/include/linux/efi.h
++++ b/include/linux/efi.h
+@@ -776,6 +776,14 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console
+ #define EFI_MEM_ATTR		10	/* Did firmware publish an EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES table? */
+ #define EFI_MEM_NO_SOFT_RESERVE	11	/* Is the kernel configured to ignore soft reservations? */
+ #define EFI_PRESERVE_BS_REGIONS	12	/* Are EFI boot-services memory segments available? */
++#define EFI_SECURE_BOOT		13	/* Are we in Secure Boot mode? */
++
++enum efi_secureboot_mode {
++	efi_secureboot_mode_unset,
++	efi_secureboot_mode_unknown,
++	efi_secureboot_mode_disabled,
++	efi_secureboot_mode_enabled,
++};
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_EFI
+ /*
+@@ -799,6 +807,7 @@ static inline bool efi_rt_services_suppo
+ {
+ 	return (efi.runtime_supported_mask & mask) == mask;
+ }
++extern void __init efi_set_secure_boot(enum efi_secureboot_mode mode);
+ #else
+ static inline bool efi_enabled(int feature)
+ {
+@@ -822,6 +831,7 @@ static inline bool efi_rt_services_suppo
+ {
+ 	return false;
+ }
++static inline void efi_set_secure_boot(enum efi_secureboot_mode mode) {}
+ #endif
+ 
+ extern int efi_status_to_err(efi_status_t status);
+@@ -1083,12 +1093,6 @@ static inline bool efi_runtime_disabled(
+ extern void efi_call_virt_check_flags(unsigned long flags, const char *call);
+ extern unsigned long efi_call_virt_save_flags(void);
+ 
+-enum efi_secureboot_mode {
+-	efi_secureboot_mode_unset,
+-	efi_secureboot_mode_unknown,
+-	efi_secureboot_mode_disabled,
+-	efi_secureboot_mode_enabled,
+-};
+ enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(void);
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_RESET_ATTACK_MITIGATION
diff --git a/debian/patches/features/all/lockdown/efi-lock-down-the-kernel-if-booted-in-secure-boot-mo.patch b/debian/patches/features/all/lockdown/efi-lock-down-the-kernel-if-booted-in-secure-boot-mo.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..627e37154
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/features/all/lockdown/efi-lock-down-the-kernel-if-booted-in-secure-boot-mo.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
+Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2019 11:54:28 +0100
+Subject: efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode
+
+Based on an earlier patch by David Howells, who wrote the following
+description:
+
+> UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware will
+> only load signed bootloaders and kernels.  Certain use cases may also
+> require that all kernel modules also be signed.  Add a configuration option
+> that to lock down the kernel - which includes requiring validly signed
+> modules - if the kernel is secure-booted.
+
+Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
+---
+ arch/x86/kernel/setup.c           |    4 ++--
+ drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c |    3 +++
+ include/linux/security.h          |    6 ++++++
+ security/lockdown/Kconfig         |   15 +++++++++++++++
+ security/lockdown/lockdown.c      |    2 +-
+ 5 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+Index: debian-kernel/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+===================================================================
+--- debian-kernel.orig/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
++++ debian-kernel/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+@@ -979,6 +979,8 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
+ 	if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT))
+ 		efi_init();
+ 
++	efi_set_secure_boot(boot_params.secure_boot);
++
+ 	dmi_setup();
+ 
+ 	/*
+@@ -1130,8 +1132,6 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
+ 	/* Allocate bigger log buffer */
+ 	setup_log_buf(1);
+ 
+-	efi_set_secure_boot(boot_params.secure_boot);
+-
+ 	reserve_initrd();
+ 
+ 	acpi_table_upgrade();
+Index: debian-kernel/drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c
+===================================================================
+--- debian-kernel.orig/drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c
++++ debian-kernel/drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c
+@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
+ #include <linux/efi.h>
+ #include <linux/kernel.h>
+ #include <linux/printk.h>
++#include <linux/security.h>
+ 
+ /*
+  * Decide what to do when UEFI secure boot mode is enabled.
+@@ -28,6 +29,10 @@ void __init efi_set_secure_boot(enum efi
+ 			break;
+ 		case efi_secureboot_mode_enabled:
+ 			set_bit(EFI_SECURE_BOOT, &efi.flags);
++#ifdef CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_IN_EFI_SECURE_BOOT
++			lock_kernel_down("EFI Secure Boot",
++					 LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX);
++#endif
+ 			pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
+ 			break;
+ 		default:
+Index: debian-kernel/include/linux/security.h
+===================================================================
+--- debian-kernel.orig/include/linux/security.h
++++ debian-kernel/include/linux/security.h
+@@ -451,6 +451,7 @@ int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct i
+ int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
+ int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
+ int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what);
++int lock_kernel_down(const char *where, enum lockdown_reason level);
+ #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
+ 
+ static inline int call_blocking_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data)
+@@ -1291,6 +1292,11 @@ static inline int security_locked_down(e
+ {
+ 	return 0;
+ }
++static inline int
++lock_kernel_down(const char *where, enum lockdown_reason level)
++{
++	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
++}
+ #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY */
+ 
+ #if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY) && defined(CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE)
+Index: debian-kernel/security/lockdown/Kconfig
+===================================================================
+--- debian-kernel.orig/security/lockdown/Kconfig
++++ debian-kernel/security/lockdown/Kconfig
+@@ -45,3 +45,18 @@ config LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_CONFIDENTI
+ 	 disabled.
+ 
+ endchoice
++
++config LOCK_DOWN_IN_EFI_SECURE_BOOT
++	bool "Lock down the kernel in EFI Secure Boot mode"
++	default n
++	depends on SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM
++	depends on EFI
++	select SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM_EARLY
++	help
++	  UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware
++	  will only load signed bootloaders and kernels.  Secure boot mode may
++	  be determined from EFI variables provided by the system firmware if
++	  not indicated by the boot parameters.
++
++	  Enabling this option results in kernel lockdown being
++	  triggered in confidentiality mode if EFI Secure Boot is set.
+Index: debian-kernel/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
+===================================================================
+--- debian-kernel.orig/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
++++ debian-kernel/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
+@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ static const enum lockdown_reason lockdo
+ /*
+  * Put the kernel into lock-down mode.
+  */
+-static int lock_kernel_down(const char *where, enum lockdown_reason level)
++int lock_kernel_down(const char *where, enum lockdown_reason level)
+ {
+ 	if (kernel_locked_down >= level)
+ 		return -EPERM;
diff --git a/debian/patches/features/all/lockdown/mtd-disable-slram-and-phram-when-locked-down.patch b/debian/patches/features/all/lockdown/mtd-disable-slram-and-phram-when-locked-down.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5004e5dca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/features/all/lockdown/mtd-disable-slram-and-phram-when-locked-down.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
+Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2019 15:54:24 +0100
+Subject: mtd: phram,slram: Disable when the kernel is locked down
+Forwarded: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20190830154720.eekfjt6c4jzvlbfz@decadent.org.uk/
+
+These drivers allow mapping arbitrary memory ranges as MTD devices.
+This should be disabled to preserve the kernel's integrity when it is
+locked down.
+
+* Add the HWPARAM flag to the module parameters
+* When slram is built-in, it uses __setup() to read kernel parameters,
+  so add an explicit check security_locked_down() check
+
+Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
+Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
+Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Cc: Joern Engel <joern@lazybastard.org>
+Cc: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org
+---
+ drivers/mtd/devices/phram.c | 6 +++++-
+ drivers/mtd/devices/slram.c | 9 ++++++++-
+ 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/mtd/devices/phram.c
++++ b/drivers/mtd/devices/phram.c
+@@ -294,7 +294,11 @@ static int phram_param_call(const char *
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
+-module_param_call(phram, phram_param_call, NULL, NULL, 0200);
++static const struct kernel_param_ops phram_param_ops = {
++	.set = phram_param_call
++};
++__module_param_call(MODULE_PARAM_PREFIX, phram, &phram_param_ops, NULL,
++		    0200, -1, KERNEL_PARAM_FL_HWPARAM | hwparam_iomem);
+ MODULE_PARM_DESC(phram, "Memory region to map. \"phram=<name>,<start>,<length>\"");
+ 
+ 
+--- a/drivers/mtd/devices/slram.c
++++ b/drivers/mtd/devices/slram.c
+@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
+ #include <linux/ioctl.h>
+ #include <linux/init.h>
+ #include <linux/io.h>
++#include <linux/security.h>
+ 
+ #include <linux/mtd/mtd.h>
+ 
+@@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ typedef struct slram_mtd_list {
+ #ifdef MODULE
+ static char *map[SLRAM_MAX_DEVICES_PARAMS];
+ 
+-module_param_array(map, charp, NULL, 0);
++module_param_hw_array(map, charp, iomem, NULL, 0);
+ MODULE_PARM_DESC(map, "List of memory regions to map. \"map=<name>, <start>, <length / end>\"");
+ #else
+ static char *map;
+@@ -281,11 +282,17 @@ static int __init init_slram(void)
+ #ifndef MODULE
+ 	char *devstart;
+ 	char *devlength;
++	int ret;
+ 
+ 	if (!map) {
+ 		E("slram: not enough parameters.\n");
+ 		return(-EINVAL);
+ 	}
++
++	ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS);
++	if (ret)
++		return ret;
++
+ 	while (map) {
+ 		devname = devstart = devlength = NULL;
+ 
diff --git a/debian/patches/features/all/security-perf-allow-further-restriction-of-perf_event_open.patch b/debian/patches/features/all/security-perf-allow-further-restriction-of-perf_event_open.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..33db1f765
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/features/all/security-perf-allow-further-restriction-of-perf_event_open.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
+Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 15:23:55 +0000
+Subject: security,perf: Allow further restriction of perf_event_open
+Forwarded: https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/1/11/587
+
+When kernel.perf_event_open is set to 3 (or greater), disallow all
+access to performance events by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
+Add a Kconfig symbol CONFIG_SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT that
+makes this value the default.
+
+This is based on a similar feature in grsecurity
+(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PERF_HARDEN).  This version doesn't include making
+the variable read-only.  It also allows enabling further restriction
+at run-time regardless of whether the default is changed.
+
+Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
+---
+ include/linux/perf_event.h | 5 +++++
+ kernel/events/core.c       | 8 ++++++++
+ security/Kconfig           | 9 +++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/include/linux/perf_event.h
++++ b/include/linux/perf_event.h
+@@ -1305,6 +1305,11 @@ int perf_cpu_time_max_percent_handler(st
+ int perf_event_max_stack_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+ 		void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
+ 
++static inline bool perf_paranoid_any(void)
++{
++	return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 2;
++}
++
+ /* Access to perf_event_open(2) syscall. */
+ #define PERF_SECURITY_OPEN		0
+ 
+--- a/kernel/events/core.c
++++ b/kernel/events/core.c
+@@ -408,8 +408,13 @@ static cpumask_var_t perf_online_mask;
+  *   0 - disallow raw tracepoint access for unpriv
+  *   1 - disallow cpu events for unpriv
+  *   2 - disallow kernel profiling for unpriv
++ *   3 - disallow all unpriv perf event use
+  */
++#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT
++int sysctl_perf_event_paranoid __read_mostly = 3;
++#else
+ int sysctl_perf_event_paranoid __read_mostly = 2;
++#endif
+ 
+ /* Minimum for 512 kiB + 1 user control page */
+ int sysctl_perf_event_mlock __read_mostly = 512 + (PAGE_SIZE / 1024); /* 'free' kiB per user */
+@@ -11785,6 +11790,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
+ 	if (err)
+ 		return err;
+ 
++	if (perf_paranoid_any() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
++		return -EACCES;
++
+ 	/* Do we allow access to perf_event_open(2) ? */
+ 	err = security_perf_event_open(&attr, PERF_SECURITY_OPEN);
+ 	if (err)
+--- a/security/Kconfig
++++ b/security/Kconfig
+@@ -19,6 +19,15 @@ config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
+ 
+ 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+ 
++config SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT
++	bool "Restrict unprivileged use of performance events"
++	depends on PERF_EVENTS
++	help
++	  If you say Y here, the kernel.perf_event_paranoid sysctl
++	  will be set to 3 by default, and no unprivileged use of the
++	  perf_event_open syscall will be permitted unless it is
++	  changed.
++
+ config SECURITY
+ 	bool "Enable different security models"
+ 	depends on SYSFS