Adding upstream version 5.10.209.upstream/5.10.209upstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 3889 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..27381e742
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3889 @@
+/*
+   BlueZ - Bluetooth protocol stack for Linux
+   Copyright (C) 2011 Nokia Corporation and/or its subsidiary(-ies).
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+   published by the Free Software Foundation;
+
+   THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
+   OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+   FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT OF THIRD PARTY RIGHTS.
+   IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER(S) AND AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+   CLAIM, OR ANY SPECIAL INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, OR ANY DAMAGES
+   WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+   ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+   OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+
+   ALL LIABILITY, INCLUDING LIABILITY FOR INFRINGEMENT OF ANY PATENTS,
+   COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS OR OTHER RIGHTS, RELATING TO USE OF THIS
+   SOFTWARE IS DISCLAIMED.
+*/
+
+#include <linux/debugfs.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <crypto/aes.h>
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
+#include <crypto/b128ops.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/kpp.h>
+
+#include <net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h>
+#include <net/bluetooth/hci_core.h>
+#include <net/bluetooth/l2cap.h>
+#include <net/bluetooth/mgmt.h>
+
+#include "ecdh_helper.h"
+#include "smp.h"
+
+#define SMP_DEV(hdev) \
+	((struct smp_dev *)((struct l2cap_chan *)((hdev)->smp_data))->data)
+
+/* Low-level debug macros to be used for stuff that we don't want
+ * accidentially in dmesg, i.e. the values of the various crypto keys
+ * and the inputs & outputs of crypto functions.
+ */
+#ifdef DEBUG
+#define SMP_DBG(fmt, ...) printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: " fmt, __func__, \
+				 ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#else
+#define SMP_DBG(fmt, ...) no_printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: " fmt, __func__, \
+				    ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#endif
+
+#define SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, code)	set_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd)
+
+/* Keys which are not distributed with Secure Connections */
+#define SMP_SC_NO_DIST (SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY);
+
+#define SMP_TIMEOUT	msecs_to_jiffies(30000)
+
+#define AUTH_REQ_MASK(dev)	(hci_dev_test_flag(dev, HCI_SC_ENABLED) ? \
+				 0x3f : 0x07)
+#define KEY_DIST_MASK		0x07
+
+/* Maximum message length that can be passed to aes_cmac */
+#define CMAC_MSG_MAX	80
+
+enum {
+	SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID,
+	SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING,
+	SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH,
+	SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE,
+	SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR,
+	SMP_FLAG_SC,
+	SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK,
+	SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY,
+	SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER,
+	SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING,
+	SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB,
+	SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB,
+	SMP_FLAG_CT2,
+};
+
+struct smp_dev {
+	/* Secure Connections OOB data */
+	bool			local_oob;
+	u8			local_pk[64];
+	u8			local_rand[16];
+	bool			debug_key;
+
+	struct crypto_shash	*tfm_cmac;
+	struct crypto_kpp	*tfm_ecdh;
+};
+
+struct smp_chan {
+	struct l2cap_conn	*conn;
+	struct delayed_work	security_timer;
+	unsigned long           allow_cmd; /* Bitmask of allowed commands */
+
+	u8		preq[7]; /* SMP Pairing Request */
+	u8		prsp[7]; /* SMP Pairing Response */
+	u8		prnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (local) */
+	u8		rrnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (remote) */
+	u8		pcnf[16]; /* SMP Pairing Confirm */
+	u8		tk[16]; /* SMP Temporary Key */
+	u8		rr[16]; /* Remote OOB ra/rb value */
+	u8		lr[16]; /* Local OOB ra/rb value */
+	u8		enc_key_size;
+	u8		remote_key_dist;
+	bdaddr_t	id_addr;
+	u8		id_addr_type;
+	u8		irk[16];
+	struct smp_csrk	*csrk;
+	struct smp_csrk	*responder_csrk;
+	struct smp_ltk	*ltk;
+	struct smp_ltk	*responder_ltk;
+	struct smp_irk	*remote_irk;
+	u8		*link_key;
+	unsigned long	flags;
+	u8		method;
+	u8		passkey_round;
+
+	/* Secure Connections variables */
+	u8			local_pk[64];
+	u8			remote_pk[64];
+	u8			dhkey[32];
+	u8			mackey[16];
+
+	struct crypto_shash	*tfm_cmac;
+	struct crypto_kpp	*tfm_ecdh;
+};
+
+/* These debug key values are defined in the SMP section of the core
+ * specification. debug_pk is the public debug key and debug_sk the
+ * private debug key.
+ */
+static const u8 debug_pk[64] = {
+		0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc,
+		0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef,
+		0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e,
+		0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20,
+
+		0x8b, 0xd2, 0x89, 0x15, 0xd0, 0x8e, 0x1c, 0x74,
+		0x24, 0x30, 0xed, 0x8f, 0xc2, 0x45, 0x63, 0x76,
+		0x5c, 0x15, 0x52, 0x5a, 0xbf, 0x9a, 0x32, 0x63,
+		0x6d, 0xeb, 0x2a, 0x65, 0x49, 0x9c, 0x80, 0xdc,
+};
+
+static const u8 debug_sk[32] = {
+		0xbd, 0x1a, 0x3c, 0xcd, 0xa6, 0xb8, 0x99, 0x58,
+		0x99, 0xb7, 0x40, 0xeb, 0x7b, 0x60, 0xff, 0x4a,
+		0x50, 0x3f, 0x10, 0xd2, 0xe3, 0xb3, 0xc9, 0x74,
+		0x38, 0x5f, 0xc5, 0xa3, 0xd4, 0xf6, 0x49, 0x3f,
+};
+
+static inline void swap_buf(const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t len)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+		dst[len - 1 - i] = src[i];
+}
+
+/* The following functions map to the LE SC SMP crypto functions
+ * AES-CMAC, f4, f5, f6, g2 and h6.
+ */
+
+static int aes_cmac(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 k[16], const u8 *m,
+		    size_t len, u8 mac[16])
+{
+	uint8_t tmp[16], mac_msb[16], msg_msb[CMAC_MSG_MAX];
+	int err;
+
+	if (len > CMAC_MSG_MAX)
+		return -EFBIG;
+
+	if (!tfm) {
+		BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* Swap key and message from LSB to MSB */
+	swap_buf(k, tmp, 16);
+	swap_buf(m, msg_msb, len);
+
+	SMP_DBG("msg (len %zu) %*phN", len, (int) len, m);
+	SMP_DBG("key %16phN", k);
+
+	err = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, tmp, 16);
+	if (err) {
+		BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err);
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	err = crypto_shash_tfm_digest(tfm, msg_msb, len, mac_msb);
+	if (err) {
+		BT_ERR("Hash computation error %d", err);
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	swap_buf(mac_msb, mac, 16);
+
+	SMP_DBG("mac %16phN", mac);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int smp_f4(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32],
+		  const u8 v[32], const u8 x[16], u8 z, u8 res[16])
+{
+	u8 m[65];
+	int err;
+
+	SMP_DBG("u %32phN", u);
+	SMP_DBG("v %32phN", v);
+	SMP_DBG("x %16phN z %02x", x, z);
+
+	m[0] = z;
+	memcpy(m + 1, v, 32);
+	memcpy(m + 33, u, 32);
+
+	err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, x, m, sizeof(m), res);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int smp_f5(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[32],
+		  const u8 n1[16], const u8 n2[16], const u8 a1[7],
+		  const u8 a2[7], u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16])
+{
+	/* The btle, salt and length "magic" values are as defined in
+	 * the SMP section of the Bluetooth core specification. In ASCII
+	 * the btle value ends up being 'btle'. The salt is just a
+	 * random number whereas length is the value 256 in little
+	 * endian format.
+	 */
+	const u8 btle[4] = { 0x65, 0x6c, 0x74, 0x62 };
+	const u8 salt[16] = { 0xbe, 0x83, 0x60, 0x5a, 0xdb, 0x0b, 0x37, 0x60,
+			      0x38, 0xa5, 0xf5, 0xaa, 0x91, 0x83, 0x88, 0x6c };
+	const u8 length[2] = { 0x00, 0x01 };
+	u8 m[53], t[16];
+	int err;
+
+	SMP_DBG("w %32phN", w);
+	SMP_DBG("n1 %16phN n2 %16phN", n1, n2);
+	SMP_DBG("a1 %7phN a2 %7phN", a1, a2);
+
+	err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, salt, w, 32, t);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	SMP_DBG("t %16phN", t);
+
+	memcpy(m, length, 2);
+	memcpy(m + 2, a2, 7);
+	memcpy(m + 9, a1, 7);
+	memcpy(m + 16, n2, 16);
+	memcpy(m + 32, n1, 16);
+	memcpy(m + 48, btle, 4);
+
+	m[52] = 0; /* Counter */
+
+	err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, t, m, sizeof(m), mackey);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	SMP_DBG("mackey %16phN", mackey);
+
+	m[52] = 1; /* Counter */
+
+	err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, t, m, sizeof(m), ltk);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	SMP_DBG("ltk %16phN", ltk);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int smp_f6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
+		  const u8 n1[16], const u8 n2[16], const u8 r[16],
+		  const u8 io_cap[3], const u8 a1[7], const u8 a2[7],
+		  u8 res[16])
+{
+	u8 m[65];
+	int err;
+
+	SMP_DBG("w %16phN", w);
+	SMP_DBG("n1 %16phN n2 %16phN", n1, n2);
+	SMP_DBG("r %16phN io_cap %3phN a1 %7phN a2 %7phN", r, io_cap, a1, a2);
+
+	memcpy(m, a2, 7);
+	memcpy(m + 7, a1, 7);
+	memcpy(m + 14, io_cap, 3);
+	memcpy(m + 17, r, 16);
+	memcpy(m + 33, n2, 16);
+	memcpy(m + 49, n1, 16);
+
+	err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, w, m, sizeof(m), res);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int smp_g2(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32], const u8 v[32],
+		  const u8 x[16], const u8 y[16], u32 *val)
+{
+	u8 m[80], tmp[16];
+	int err;
+
+	SMP_DBG("u %32phN", u);
+	SMP_DBG("v %32phN", v);
+	SMP_DBG("x %16phN y %16phN", x, y);
+
+	memcpy(m, y, 16);
+	memcpy(m + 16, v, 32);
+	memcpy(m + 48, u, 32);
+
+	err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, x, m, sizeof(m), tmp);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	*val = get_unaligned_le32(tmp);
+	*val %= 1000000;
+
+	SMP_DBG("val %06u", *val);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int smp_h6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
+		  const u8 key_id[4], u8 res[16])
+{
+	int err;
+
+	SMP_DBG("w %16phN key_id %4phN", w, key_id);
+
+	err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, w, key_id, 4, res);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int smp_h7(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
+		  const u8 salt[16], u8 res[16])
+{
+	int err;
+
+	SMP_DBG("w %16phN salt %16phN", w, salt);
+
+	err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, salt, w, 16, res);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+/* The following functions map to the legacy SMP crypto functions e, c1,
+ * s1 and ah.
+ */
+
+static int smp_e(const u8 *k, u8 *r)
+{
+	struct crypto_aes_ctx ctx;
+	uint8_t tmp[16], data[16];
+	int err;
+
+	SMP_DBG("k %16phN r %16phN", k, r);
+
+	/* The most significant octet of key corresponds to k[0] */
+	swap_buf(k, tmp, 16);
+
+	err = aes_expandkey(&ctx, tmp, 16);
+	if (err) {
+		BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err);
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	/* Most significant octet of plaintextData corresponds to data[0] */
+	swap_buf(r, data, 16);
+
+	aes_encrypt(&ctx, data, data);
+
+	/* Most significant octet of encryptedData corresponds to data[0] */
+	swap_buf(data, r, 16);
+
+	SMP_DBG("r %16phN", r);
+
+	memzero_explicit(&ctx, sizeof (ctx));
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int smp_c1(const u8 k[16],
+		  const u8 r[16], const u8 preq[7], const u8 pres[7], u8 _iat,
+		  const bdaddr_t *ia, u8 _rat, const bdaddr_t *ra, u8 res[16])
+{
+	u8 p1[16], p2[16];
+	int err;
+
+	SMP_DBG("k %16phN r %16phN", k, r);
+	SMP_DBG("iat %u ia %6phN rat %u ra %6phN", _iat, ia, _rat, ra);
+	SMP_DBG("preq %7phN pres %7phN", preq, pres);
+
+	memset(p1, 0, 16);
+
+	/* p1 = pres || preq || _rat || _iat */
+	p1[0] = _iat;
+	p1[1] = _rat;
+	memcpy(p1 + 2, preq, 7);
+	memcpy(p1 + 9, pres, 7);
+
+	SMP_DBG("p1 %16phN", p1);
+
+	/* res = r XOR p1 */
+	u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) r, (u128 *) p1);
+
+	/* res = e(k, res) */
+	err = smp_e(k, res);
+	if (err) {
+		BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	/* p2 = padding || ia || ra */
+	memcpy(p2, ra, 6);
+	memcpy(p2 + 6, ia, 6);
+	memset(p2 + 12, 0, 4);
+
+	SMP_DBG("p2 %16phN", p2);
+
+	/* res = res XOR p2 */
+	u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) res, (u128 *) p2);
+
+	/* res = e(k, res) */
+	err = smp_e(k, res);
+	if (err)
+		BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int smp_s1(const u8 k[16],
+		  const u8 r1[16], const u8 r2[16], u8 _r[16])
+{
+	int err;
+
+	/* Just least significant octets from r1 and r2 are considered */
+	memcpy(_r, r2, 8);
+	memcpy(_r + 8, r1, 8);
+
+	err = smp_e(k, _r);
+	if (err)
+		BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int smp_ah(const u8 irk[16], const u8 r[3], u8 res[3])
+{
+	u8 _res[16];
+	int err;
+
+	/* r' = padding || r */
+	memcpy(_res, r, 3);
+	memset(_res + 3, 0, 13);
+
+	err = smp_e(irk, _res);
+	if (err) {
+		BT_ERR("Encrypt error");
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	/* The output of the random address function ah is:
+	 *	ah(k, r) = e(k, r') mod 2^24
+	 * The output of the security function e is then truncated to 24 bits
+	 * by taking the least significant 24 bits of the output of e as the
+	 * result of ah.
+	 */
+	memcpy(res, _res, 3);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+bool smp_irk_matches(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16],
+		     const bdaddr_t *bdaddr)
+{
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
+	u8 hash[3];
+	int err;
+
+	if (!chan || !chan->data)
+		return false;
+
+	bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "RPA %pMR IRK %*phN", bdaddr, 16, irk);
+
+	err = smp_ah(irk, &bdaddr->b[3], hash);
+	if (err)
+		return false;
+
+	return !crypto_memneq(bdaddr->b, hash, 3);
+}
+
+int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa)
+{
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
+	int err;
+
+	if (!chan || !chan->data)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	get_random_bytes(&rpa->b[3], 3);
+
+	rpa->b[5] &= 0x3f;	/* Clear two most significant bits */
+	rpa->b[5] |= 0x40;	/* Set second most significant bit */
+
+	err = smp_ah(irk, &rpa->b[3], rpa->b);
+	if (err < 0)
+		return err;
+
+	bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "RPA %pMR", rpa);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int smp_generate_oob(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 hash[16], u8 rand[16])
+{
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
+	struct smp_dev *smp;
+	int err;
+
+	if (!chan || !chan->data)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	smp = chan->data;
+
+	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
+		bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "Using debug keys");
+		err = set_ecdh_privkey(smp->tfm_ecdh, debug_sk);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+		memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64);
+		smp->debug_key = true;
+	} else {
+		while (true) {
+			/* Generate key pair for Secure Connections */
+			err = generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk);
+			if (err)
+				return err;
+
+			/* This is unlikely, but we need to check that
+			 * we didn't accidentially generate a debug key.
+			 */
+			if (crypto_memneq(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64))
+				break;
+		}
+		smp->debug_key = false;
+	}
+
+	SMP_DBG("OOB Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk);
+	SMP_DBG("OOB Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->local_pk + 32);
+
+	get_random_bytes(smp->local_rand, 16);
+
+	err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->local_pk,
+		     smp->local_rand, 0, hash);
+	if (err < 0)
+		return err;
+
+	memcpy(rand, smp->local_rand, 16);
+
+	smp->local_oob = true;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data)
+{
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+	struct smp_chan *smp;
+	struct kvec iv[2];
+	struct msghdr msg;
+
+	if (!chan)
+		return;
+
+	bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "code 0x%2.2x", code);
+
+	iv[0].iov_base = &code;
+	iv[0].iov_len = 1;
+
+	iv[1].iov_base = data;
+	iv[1].iov_len = len;
+
+	memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
+
+	iov_iter_kvec(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE, iv, 2, 1 + len);
+
+	l2cap_chan_send(chan, &msg, 1 + len);
+
+	if (!chan->data)
+		return;
+
+	smp = chan->data;
+
+	cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
+	schedule_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer, SMP_TIMEOUT);
+}
+
+static u8 authreq_to_seclevel(u8 authreq)
+{
+	if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_MITM) {
+		if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC)
+			return BT_SECURITY_FIPS;
+		else
+			return BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
+	} else {
+		return BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
+	}
+}
+
+static __u8 seclevel_to_authreq(__u8 sec_level)
+{
+	switch (sec_level) {
+	case BT_SECURITY_FIPS:
+	case BT_SECURITY_HIGH:
+		return SMP_AUTH_MITM | SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
+	case BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM:
+		return SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
+	default:
+		return SMP_AUTH_NONE;
+	}
+}
+
+static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
+			      struct smp_cmd_pairing *req,
+			      struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp, __u8 authreq)
+{
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
+	u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0, oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT;
+
+	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE)) {
+		local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
+		remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
+		authreq |= SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
+	} else {
+		authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
+	}
+
+	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_RPA_RESOLVING))
+		remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
+
+	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_PRIVACY))
+		local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
+
+	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED) &&
+	    (authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC)) {
+		struct oob_data *oob_data;
+		u8 bdaddr_type;
+
+		if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SSP_ENABLED)) {
+			local_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY;
+			remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY;
+		}
+
+		if (hcon->dst_type == ADDR_LE_DEV_PUBLIC)
+			bdaddr_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC;
+		else
+			bdaddr_type = BDADDR_LE_RANDOM;
+
+		oob_data = hci_find_remote_oob_data(hdev, &hcon->dst,
+						    bdaddr_type);
+		if (oob_data && oob_data->present) {
+			set_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags);
+			oob_flag = SMP_OOB_PRESENT;
+			memcpy(smp->rr, oob_data->rand256, 16);
+			memcpy(smp->pcnf, oob_data->hash256, 16);
+			SMP_DBG("OOB Remote Confirmation: %16phN", smp->pcnf);
+			SMP_DBG("OOB Remote Random: %16phN", smp->rr);
+		}
+
+	} else {
+		authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_SC;
+	}
+
+	if (rsp == NULL) {
+		req->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
+		req->oob_flag = oob_flag;
+		req->max_key_size = hdev->le_max_key_size;
+		req->init_key_dist = local_dist;
+		req->resp_key_dist = remote_dist;
+		req->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev));
+
+		smp->remote_key_dist = remote_dist;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	rsp->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
+	rsp->oob_flag = oob_flag;
+	rsp->max_key_size = hdev->le_max_key_size;
+	rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist;
+	rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist;
+	rsp->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev));
+
+	smp->remote_key_dist = rsp->init_key_dist;
+}
+
+static u8 check_enc_key_size(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 max_key_size)
+{
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
+	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+
+	if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS &&
+	    max_key_size != SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE)
+		return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
+
+	if (max_key_size > hdev->le_max_key_size ||
+	    max_key_size < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE)
+		return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
+
+	smp->enc_key_size = max_key_size;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
+{
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	bool complete;
+
+	BUG_ON(!smp);
+
+	cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
+
+	complete = test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
+	mgmt_smp_complete(hcon, complete);
+
+	kfree_sensitive(smp->csrk);
+	kfree_sensitive(smp->responder_csrk);
+	kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key);
+
+	crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
+	crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh);
+
+	/* Ensure that we don't leave any debug key around if debug key
+	 * support hasn't been explicitly enabled.
+	 */
+	if (smp->ltk && smp->ltk->type == SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG &&
+	    !hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
+		list_del_rcu(&smp->ltk->list);
+		kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu);
+		smp->ltk = NULL;
+	}
+
+	/* If pairing failed clean up any keys we might have */
+	if (!complete) {
+		if (smp->ltk) {
+			list_del_rcu(&smp->ltk->list);
+			kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu);
+		}
+
+		if (smp->responder_ltk) {
+			list_del_rcu(&smp->responder_ltk->list);
+			kfree_rcu(smp->responder_ltk, rcu);
+		}
+
+		if (smp->remote_irk) {
+			list_del_rcu(&smp->remote_irk->list);
+			kfree_rcu(smp->remote_irk, rcu);
+		}
+	}
+
+	chan->data = NULL;
+	kfree_sensitive(smp);
+	hci_conn_drop(hcon);
+}
+
+static void smp_failure(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 reason)
+{
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+
+	if (reason)
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL, sizeof(reason),
+			     &reason);
+
+	mgmt_auth_failed(hcon, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
+
+	if (chan->data)
+		smp_chan_destroy(conn);
+}
+
+#define JUST_WORKS	0x00
+#define JUST_CFM	0x01
+#define REQ_PASSKEY	0x02
+#define CFM_PASSKEY	0x03
+#define REQ_OOB		0x04
+#define DSP_PASSKEY	0x05
+#define OVERLAP		0xFF
+
+static const u8 gen_method[5][5] = {
+	{ JUST_WORKS,  JUST_CFM,    REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
+	{ JUST_WORKS,  JUST_CFM,    REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
+	{ CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
+	{ JUST_WORKS,  JUST_CFM,    JUST_WORKS,  JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM    },
+	{ CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, OVERLAP     },
+};
+
+static const u8 sc_method[5][5] = {
+	{ JUST_WORKS,  JUST_CFM,    REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
+	{ JUST_WORKS,  CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
+	{ DSP_PASSKEY, DSP_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, DSP_PASSKEY },
+	{ JUST_WORKS,  JUST_CFM,    JUST_WORKS,  JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM    },
+	{ DSP_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
+};
+
+static u8 get_auth_method(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
+{
+	/* If either side has unknown io_caps, use JUST_CFM (which gets
+	 * converted later to JUST_WORKS if we're initiators.
+	 */
+	if (local_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY ||
+	    remote_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY)
+		return JUST_CFM;
+
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
+		return sc_method[remote_io][local_io];
+
+	return gen_method[remote_io][local_io];
+}
+
+static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
+						u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
+{
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+	u32 passkey = 0;
+	int ret;
+
+	/* Initialize key for JUST WORKS */
+	memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
+	clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
+
+	bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "auth:%d lcl:%d rem:%d", auth, local_io,
+		   remote_io);
+
+	/* If neither side wants MITM, either "just" confirm an incoming
+	 * request or use just-works for outgoing ones. The JUST_CFM
+	 * will be converted to JUST_WORKS if necessary later in this
+	 * function. If either side has MITM look up the method from the
+	 * table.
+	 */
+	if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_MITM))
+		smp->method = JUST_CFM;
+	else
+		smp->method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io);
+
+	/* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */
+	if (smp->method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR,
+						&smp->flags))
+		smp->method = JUST_WORKS;
+
+	/* Don't bother user space with no IO capabilities */
+	if (smp->method == JUST_CFM &&
+	    hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
+		smp->method = JUST_WORKS;
+
+	/* If Just Works, Continue with Zero TK and ask user-space for
+	 * confirmation */
+	if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS) {
+		ret = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
+						hcon->type,
+						hcon->dst_type,
+						passkey, 1);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* If this function is used for SC -> legacy fallback we
+	 * can only recover the just-works case.
+	 */
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Not Just Works/Confirm results in MITM Authentication */
+	if (smp->method != JUST_CFM) {
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH, &smp->flags);
+		if (hcon->pending_sec_level < BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
+			hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
+	}
+
+	/* If both devices have Keyboard-Display I/O, the initiator
+	 * Confirms and the responder Enters the passkey.
+	 */
+	if (smp->method == OVERLAP) {
+		if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
+			smp->method = CFM_PASSKEY;
+		else
+			smp->method = REQ_PASSKEY;
+	}
+
+	/* Generate random passkey. */
+	if (smp->method == CFM_PASSKEY) {
+		memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
+		get_random_bytes(&passkey, sizeof(passkey));
+		passkey %= 1000000;
+		put_unaligned_le32(passkey, smp->tk);
+		bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "PassKey: %d", passkey);
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
+	}
+
+	if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY)
+		ret = mgmt_user_passkey_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
+						hcon->type, hcon->dst_type);
+	else if (smp->method == JUST_CFM)
+		ret = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
+						hcon->type, hcon->dst_type,
+						passkey, 1);
+	else
+		ret = mgmt_user_passkey_notify(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
+						hcon->type, hcon->dst_type,
+						passkey, 0);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static u8 smp_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+	struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cp;
+	int ret;
+
+	bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn);
+
+	ret = smp_c1(smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
+		     conn->hcon->init_addr_type, &conn->hcon->init_addr,
+		     conn->hcon->resp_addr_type, &conn->hcon->resp_addr,
+		     cp.confirm_val);
+	if (ret)
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+	clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
+
+	smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+
+	if (conn->hcon->out)
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+	else
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	u8 confirm[16];
+	int ret;
+
+	bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p %s", conn,
+		   conn->hcon->out ? "initiator" : "responder");
+
+	ret = smp_c1(smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
+		     hcon->init_addr_type, &hcon->init_addr,
+		     hcon->resp_addr_type, &hcon->resp_addr, confirm);
+	if (ret)
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+	if (crypto_memneq(smp->pcnf, confirm, sizeof(smp->pcnf))) {
+		bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "pairing failed "
+			   "(confirmation values mismatch)");
+		return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
+	}
+
+	if (hcon->out) {
+		u8 stk[16];
+		__le64 rand = 0;
+		__le16 ediv = 0;
+
+		smp_s1(smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, stk);
+
+		if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags))
+			return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+		hci_le_start_enc(hcon, ediv, rand, stk, smp->enc_key_size);
+		hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size;
+		set_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags);
+	} else {
+		u8 stk[16], auth;
+		__le64 rand = 0;
+		__le16 ediv = 0;
+
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
+			     smp->prnd);
+
+		smp_s1(smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, stk);
+
+		if (hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
+			auth = 1;
+		else
+			auth = 0;
+
+		/* Even though there's no _RESPONDER suffix this is the
+		 * responder STK we're adding for later lookup (the initiator
+		 * STK never needs to be stored).
+		 */
+		hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
+			    SMP_STK, auth, stk, smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
+{
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
+	struct smp_cmd_pairing *req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
+	struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
+	bool persistent;
+
+	if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
+		if (hcon->key_type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION)
+			persistent = false;
+		else
+			persistent = !test_bit(HCI_CONN_FLUSH_KEY,
+					       &hcon->flags);
+	} else {
+		/* The LTKs, IRKs and CSRKs should be persistent only if
+		 * both sides had the bonding bit set in their
+		 * authentication requests.
+		 */
+		persistent = !!((req->auth_req & rsp->auth_req) &
+				SMP_AUTH_BONDING);
+	}
+
+	if (smp->remote_irk) {
+		smp->remote_irk->link_type = hcon->type;
+		mgmt_new_irk(hdev, smp->remote_irk, persistent);
+
+		/* Now that user space can be considered to know the
+		 * identity address track the connection based on it
+		 * from now on (assuming this is an LE link).
+		 */
+		if (hcon->type == LE_LINK) {
+			bacpy(&hcon->dst, &smp->remote_irk->bdaddr);
+			hcon->dst_type = smp->remote_irk->addr_type;
+			queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &conn->id_addr_update_work);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (smp->csrk) {
+		smp->csrk->link_type = hcon->type;
+		smp->csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
+		bacpy(&smp->csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
+		mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->csrk, persistent);
+	}
+
+	if (smp->responder_csrk) {
+		smp->responder_csrk->link_type = hcon->type;
+		smp->responder_csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
+		bacpy(&smp->responder_csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
+		mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->responder_csrk, persistent);
+	}
+
+	if (smp->ltk) {
+		smp->ltk->link_type = hcon->type;
+		smp->ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
+		bacpy(&smp->ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
+		mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->ltk, persistent);
+	}
+
+	if (smp->responder_ltk) {
+		smp->responder_ltk->link_type = hcon->type;
+		smp->responder_ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
+		bacpy(&smp->responder_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
+		mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->responder_ltk, persistent);
+	}
+
+	if (smp->link_key) {
+		struct link_key *key;
+		u8 type;
+
+		if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags))
+			type = HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION;
+		else if (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS)
+			type = HCI_LK_AUTH_COMBINATION_P256;
+		else
+			type = HCI_LK_UNAUTH_COMBINATION_P256;
+
+		key = hci_add_link_key(hdev, smp->conn->hcon, &hcon->dst,
+				       smp->link_key, type, 0, &persistent);
+		if (key) {
+			key->link_type = hcon->type;
+			key->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
+			mgmt_new_link_key(hdev, key, persistent);
+
+			/* Don't keep debug keys around if the relevant
+			 * flag is not set.
+			 */
+			if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS) &&
+			    key->type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION) {
+				list_del_rcu(&key->list);
+				kfree_rcu(key, rcu);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static void sc_add_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
+	u8 key_type, auth;
+
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags))
+		key_type = SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG;
+	else
+		key_type = SMP_LTK_P256;
+
+	if (hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS)
+		auth = 1;
+	else
+		auth = 0;
+
+	smp->ltk = hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
+			       key_type, auth, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size,
+			       0, 0);
+}
+
+static void sc_generate_link_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+	/* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'lebr'. */
+	const u8 lebr[4] = { 0x72, 0x62, 0x65, 0x6c };
+
+	smp->link_key = kzalloc(16, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!smp->link_key)
+		return;
+
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags)) {
+		/* SALT = 0x000000000000000000000000746D7031 */
+		const u8 salt[16] = { 0x31, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
+
+		if (smp_h7(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, salt, smp->link_key)) {
+			kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key);
+			smp->link_key = NULL;
+			return;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'tmp1'. */
+		const u8 tmp1[4] = { 0x31, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
+
+		if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, tmp1, smp->link_key)) {
+			kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key);
+			smp->link_key = NULL;
+			return;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->link_key, lebr, smp->link_key)) {
+		kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key);
+		smp->link_key = NULL;
+		return;
+	}
+}
+
+static void smp_allow_key_dist(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+	/* Allow the first expected phase 3 PDU. The rest of the PDUs
+	 * will be allowed in each PDU handler to ensure we receive
+	 * them in the correct order.
+	 */
+	if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY)
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO);
+	else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY)
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO);
+	else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
+}
+
+static void sc_generate_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+	/* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'brle'. */
+	const u8 brle[4] = { 0x65, 0x6c, 0x72, 0x62 };
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
+	struct link_key *key;
+
+	key = hci_find_link_key(hdev, &hcon->dst);
+	if (!key) {
+		bt_dev_err(hdev, "no Link Key found to generate LTK");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (key->type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION)
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
+
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags)) {
+		/* SALT = 0x000000000000000000000000746D7032 */
+		const u8 salt[16] = { 0x32, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
+
+		if (smp_h7(smp->tfm_cmac, key->val, salt, smp->tk))
+			return;
+	} else {
+		/* From core spec. Spells out in ASCII as 'tmp2'. */
+		const u8 tmp2[4] = { 0x32, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
+
+		if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, key->val, tmp2, smp->tk))
+			return;
+	}
+
+	if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, brle, smp->tk))
+		return;
+
+	sc_add_ltk(smp);
+}
+
+static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+	struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
+	__u8 *keydist;
+
+	bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn);
+
+	rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
+
+	/* The responder sends its keys first */
+	if (hcon->out && (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)) {
+		smp_allow_key_dist(smp);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
+
+	if (hcon->out) {
+		keydist = &rsp->init_key_dist;
+		*keydist &= req->init_key_dist;
+	} else {
+		keydist = &rsp->resp_key_dist;
+		*keydist &= req->resp_key_dist;
+	}
+
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
+		if (hcon->type == LE_LINK && (*keydist & SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY))
+			sc_generate_link_key(smp);
+		if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK && (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY))
+			sc_generate_ltk(smp);
+
+		/* Clear the keys which are generated but not distributed */
+		*keydist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
+	}
+
+	bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "keydist 0x%x", *keydist);
+
+	if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) {
+		struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc;
+		struct smp_cmd_initiator_ident ident;
+		struct smp_ltk *ltk;
+		u8 authenticated;
+		__le16 ediv;
+		__le64 rand;
+
+		/* Make sure we generate only the significant amount of
+		 * bytes based on the encryption key size, and set the rest
+		 * of the value to zeroes.
+		 */
+		get_random_bytes(enc.ltk, smp->enc_key_size);
+		memset(enc.ltk + smp->enc_key_size, 0,
+		       sizeof(enc.ltk) - smp->enc_key_size);
+
+		get_random_bytes(&ediv, sizeof(ediv));
+		get_random_bytes(&rand, sizeof(rand));
+
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO, sizeof(enc), &enc);
+
+		authenticated = hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
+		ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
+				  SMP_LTK_RESPONDER, authenticated, enc.ltk,
+				  smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand);
+		smp->responder_ltk = ltk;
+
+		ident.ediv = ediv;
+		ident.rand = rand;
+
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_INITIATOR_IDENT, sizeof(ident),
+			     &ident);
+
+		*keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
+	}
+
+	if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) {
+		struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info addrinfo;
+		struct smp_cmd_ident_info idinfo;
+
+		memcpy(idinfo.irk, hdev->irk, sizeof(idinfo.irk));
+
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO, sizeof(idinfo), &idinfo);
+
+		/* The hci_conn contains the local identity address
+		 * after the connection has been established.
+		 *
+		 * This is true even when the connection has been
+		 * established using a resolvable random address.
+		 */
+		bacpy(&addrinfo.bdaddr, &hcon->src);
+		addrinfo.addr_type = hcon->src_type;
+
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO, sizeof(addrinfo),
+			     &addrinfo);
+
+		*keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
+	}
+
+	if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) {
+		struct smp_cmd_sign_info sign;
+		struct smp_csrk *csrk;
+
+		/* Generate a new random key */
+		get_random_bytes(sign.csrk, sizeof(sign.csrk));
+
+		csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (csrk) {
+			if (hcon->sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
+				csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_LOCAL_AUTHENTICATED;
+			else
+				csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_LOCAL_UNAUTHENTICATED;
+			memcpy(csrk->val, sign.csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));
+		}
+		smp->responder_csrk = csrk;
+
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign);
+
+		*keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN;
+	}
+
+	/* If there are still keys to be received wait for them */
+	if (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK) {
+		smp_allow_key_dist(smp);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	set_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
+	smp_notify_keys(conn);
+
+	smp_chan_destroy(conn);
+}
+
+static void smp_timeout(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+	struct smp_chan *smp = container_of(work, struct smp_chan,
+					    security_timer.work);
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+
+	bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn);
+
+	hci_disconnect(conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_REMOTE_USER_TERM);
+}
+
+static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
+{
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+	struct smp_chan *smp;
+
+	smp = kzalloc(sizeof(*smp), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!smp)
+		return NULL;
+
+	smp->tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_cmac)) {
+		bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
+		goto zfree_smp;
+	}
+
+	smp->tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh", 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_ecdh)) {
+		bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "Unable to create ECDH crypto context");
+		goto free_shash;
+	}
+
+	smp->conn = conn;
+	chan->data = smp;
+
+	SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL);
+
+	INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&smp->security_timer, smp_timeout);
+
+	hci_conn_hold(hcon);
+
+	return smp;
+
+free_shash:
+	crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
+zfree_smp:
+	kfree_sensitive(smp);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static int sc_mackey_and_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16])
+{
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
+	u8 *na, *nb, a[7], b[7];
+
+	if (hcon->out) {
+		na   = smp->prnd;
+		nb   = smp->rrnd;
+	} else {
+		na   = smp->rrnd;
+		nb   = smp->prnd;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
+	memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
+	a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
+	b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
+
+	return smp_f5(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->dhkey, na, nb, a, b, mackey, ltk);
+}
+
+static void sc_dhkey_check(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
+	struct smp_cmd_dhkey_check check;
+	u8 a[7], b[7], *local_addr, *remote_addr;
+	u8 io_cap[3], r[16];
+
+	memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
+	memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
+	a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
+	b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
+
+	if (hcon->out) {
+		local_addr = a;
+		remote_addr = b;
+		memcpy(io_cap, &smp->preq[1], 3);
+	} else {
+		local_addr = b;
+		remote_addr = a;
+		memcpy(io_cap, &smp->prsp[1], 3);
+	}
+
+	memset(r, 0, sizeof(r));
+
+	if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
+		put_unaligned_le32(hcon->passkey_notify, r);
+
+	if (smp->method == REQ_OOB)
+		memcpy(r, smp->rr, 16);
+
+	smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, r, io_cap,
+	       local_addr, remote_addr, check.e);
+
+	smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK, sizeof(check), &check);
+}
+
+static u8 sc_passkey_send_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm;
+	u8 r;
+
+	r = ((hcon->passkey_notify >> smp->passkey_round) & 0x01);
+	r |= 0x80;
+
+	get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
+
+	if (smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->remote_pk, smp->prnd, r,
+		   cfm.confirm_val))
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cfm), &cfm);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static u8 sc_passkey_round(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 smp_op)
+{
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
+	u8 cfm[16], r;
+
+	/* Ignore the PDU if we've already done 20 rounds (0 - 19) */
+	if (smp->passkey_round >= 20)
+		return 0;
+
+	switch (smp_op) {
+	case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM:
+		r = ((hcon->passkey_notify >> smp->passkey_round) & 0x01);
+		r |= 0x80;
+
+		if (smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_pk,
+			   smp->rrnd, r, cfm))
+			return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+		if (crypto_memneq(smp->pcnf, cfm, 16))
+			return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
+
+		smp->passkey_round++;
+
+		if (smp->passkey_round == 20) {
+			/* Generate MacKey and LTK */
+			if (sc_mackey_and_ltk(smp, smp->mackey, smp->tk))
+				return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+		}
+
+		/* The round is only complete when the initiator
+		 * receives pairing random.
+		 */
+		if (!hcon->out) {
+			smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
+				     sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
+			if (smp->passkey_round == 20)
+				SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
+			else
+				SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		/* Start the next round */
+		if (smp->passkey_round != 20)
+			return sc_passkey_round(smp, 0);
+
+		/* Passkey rounds are complete - start DHKey Check */
+		sc_dhkey_check(smp);
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
+
+		break;
+
+	case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM:
+		if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags)) {
+			set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
+
+		if (hcon->out) {
+			smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
+				     sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		return sc_passkey_send_confirm(smp);
+
+	case SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY:
+	default:
+		/* Initiating device starts the round */
+		if (!hcon->out)
+			return 0;
+
+		bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "Starting passkey round %u",
+			   smp->passkey_round + 1);
+
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+
+		return sc_passkey_send_confirm(smp);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int sc_user_reply(struct smp_chan *smp, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
+{
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	u8 smp_op;
+
+	clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
+
+	switch (mgmt_op) {
+	case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY:
+		smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
+		return 0;
+	case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY:
+		smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_NUMERIC_COMP_FAILED);
+		return 0;
+	case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY:
+		hcon->passkey_notify = le32_to_cpu(passkey);
+		smp->passkey_round = 0;
+
+		if (test_and_clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags))
+			smp_op = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM;
+		else
+			smp_op = 0;
+
+		if (sc_passkey_round(smp, smp_op))
+			return -EIO;
+
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* Initiator sends DHKey check first */
+	if (hcon->out) {
+		sc_dhkey_check(smp);
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
+	} else if (test_and_clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, &smp->flags)) {
+		sc_dhkey_check(smp);
+		sc_add_ltk(smp);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
+{
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan;
+	struct smp_chan *smp;
+	u32 value;
+	int err;
+
+	bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "");
+
+	if (!conn)
+		return -ENOTCONN;
+
+	chan = conn->smp;
+	if (!chan)
+		return -ENOTCONN;
+
+	l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
+	if (!chan->data) {
+		err = -ENOTCONN;
+		goto unlock;
+	}
+
+	smp = chan->data;
+
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
+		err = sc_user_reply(smp, mgmt_op, passkey);
+		goto unlock;
+	}
+
+	switch (mgmt_op) {
+	case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY:
+		value = le32_to_cpu(passkey);
+		memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
+		bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "PassKey: %d", value);
+		put_unaligned_le32(value, smp->tk);
+		fallthrough;
+	case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_REPLY:
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
+		break;
+	case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY:
+	case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY:
+		smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
+		err = 0;
+		goto unlock;
+	default:
+		smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
+		err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+		goto unlock;
+	}
+
+	err = 0;
+
+	/* If it is our turn to send Pairing Confirm, do so now */
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags)) {
+		u8 rsp = smp_confirm(smp);
+		if (rsp)
+			smp_failure(conn, rsp);
+	}
+
+unlock:
+	l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static void build_bredr_pairing_cmd(struct smp_chan *smp,
+				    struct smp_cmd_pairing *req,
+				    struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp)
+{
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
+	u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0;
+
+	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE)) {
+		local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
+		remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
+	}
+
+	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_RPA_RESOLVING))
+		remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
+
+	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_PRIVACY))
+		local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
+
+	if (!rsp) {
+		memset(req, 0, sizeof(*req));
+
+		req->auth_req        = SMP_AUTH_CT2;
+		req->init_key_dist   = local_dist;
+		req->resp_key_dist   = remote_dist;
+		req->max_key_size    = conn->hcon->enc_key_size;
+
+		smp->remote_key_dist = remote_dist;
+
+		return;
+	}
+
+	memset(rsp, 0, sizeof(*rsp));
+
+	rsp->auth_req        = SMP_AUTH_CT2;
+	rsp->max_key_size    = conn->hcon->enc_key_size;
+	rsp->init_key_dist   = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist;
+	rsp->resp_key_dist   = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist;
+
+	smp->remote_key_dist = rsp->init_key_dist;
+}
+
+static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct smp_cmd_pairing rsp, *req = (void *) skb->data;
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
+	struct smp_chan *smp;
+	u8 key_size, auth, sec_level;
+	int ret;
+
+	bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn);
+
+	if (skb->len < sizeof(*req))
+		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
+
+	if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_SLAVE)
+		return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
+
+	if (!chan->data)
+		smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
+	else
+		smp = chan->data;
+
+	if (!smp)
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+	/* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */
+	auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
+
+	if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE) &&
+	    (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
+		return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
+
+	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
+		return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
+
+	smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
+	memcpy(&smp->preq[1], req, sizeof(*req));
+	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req));
+
+	/* If the remote side's OOB flag is set it means it has
+	 * successfully received our local OOB data - therefore set the
+	 * flag to indicate that local OOB is in use.
+	 */
+	if (req->oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT && SMP_DEV(hdev)->local_oob)
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags);
+
+	/* SMP over BR/EDR requires special treatment */
+	if (conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
+		/* We must have a BR/EDR SC link */
+		if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->hcon->flags) &&
+		    !hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
+			return SMP_CROSS_TRANSP_NOT_ALLOWED;
+
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
+
+		build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, req, &rsp);
+
+		if (req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_CT2)
+			set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags);
+
+		key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size);
+		if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
+			return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
+
+		/* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
+		smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
+
+		smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
+		memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp));
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp);
+
+		smp_distribute_keys(smp);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	build_pairing_cmd(conn, req, &rsp, auth);
+
+	if (rsp.auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC) {
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
+
+		if (rsp.auth_req & SMP_AUTH_CT2)
+			set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags);
+	}
+
+	if (conn->hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
+		sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
+	else
+		sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
+
+	if (sec_level > conn->hcon->pending_sec_level)
+		conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
+
+	/* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */
+	if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
+		u8 method;
+
+		method = get_auth_method(smp, conn->hcon->io_capability,
+					 req->io_capability);
+		if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM)
+			return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
+	}
+
+	key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size);
+	if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
+		return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
+
+	get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
+
+	smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
+	memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp));
+
+	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp);
+
+	clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
+
+	/* Strictly speaking we shouldn't allow Pairing Confirm for the
+	 * SC case, however some implementations incorrectly copy RFU auth
+	 * req bits from our security request, which may create a false
+	 * positive SC enablement.
+	 */
+	SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
+		/* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
+		smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
+		/* Wait for Public Key from Initiating Device */
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* Request setup of TK */
+	ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp.io_capability, req->io_capability);
+	if (ret)
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static u8 sc_send_public_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = smp->conn->hcon->hdev;
+
+	bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "");
+
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags)) {
+		struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
+		struct smp_dev *smp_dev;
+
+		if (!chan || !chan->data)
+			return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+		smp_dev = chan->data;
+
+		memcpy(smp->local_pk, smp_dev->local_pk, 64);
+		memcpy(smp->lr, smp_dev->local_rand, 16);
+
+		if (smp_dev->debug_key)
+			set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
+
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
+		bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "Using debug keys");
+		if (set_ecdh_privkey(smp->tfm_ecdh, debug_sk))
+			return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+		memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64);
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
+	} else {
+		while (true) {
+			/* Generate key pair for Secure Connections */
+			if (generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk))
+				return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+			/* This is unlikely, but we need to check that
+			 * we didn't accidentially generate a debug key.
+			 */
+			if (crypto_memneq(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64))
+				break;
+		}
+	}
+
+done:
+	SMP_DBG("Local Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk);
+	SMP_DBG("Local Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->local_pk + 32);
+
+	smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY, 64, smp->local_pk);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp = (void *) skb->data;
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
+	u8 key_size, auth;
+	int ret;
+
+	bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn);
+
+	if (skb->len < sizeof(*rsp))
+		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
+
+	if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
+		return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
+
+	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rsp));
+
+	req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
+
+	key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp->max_key_size);
+	if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
+		return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
+
+	auth = rsp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
+
+	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
+		return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
+
+	/* If the remote side's OOB flag is set it means it has
+	 * successfully received our local OOB data - therefore set the
+	 * flag to indicate that local OOB is in use.
+	 */
+	if (rsp->oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT && SMP_DEV(hdev)->local_oob)
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags);
+
+	smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
+	memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], rsp, sizeof(*rsp));
+
+	/* Update remote key distribution in case the remote cleared
+	 * some bits that we had enabled in our request.
+	 */
+	smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist;
+
+	if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_CT2) && (auth & SMP_AUTH_CT2))
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags);
+
+	/* For BR/EDR this means we're done and can start phase 3 */
+	if (conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
+		/* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
+		smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
+		smp_distribute_keys(smp);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC) && (auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
+	else if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
+		conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
+
+	/* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */
+	if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
+		u8 method;
+
+		method = get_auth_method(smp, req->io_capability,
+					 rsp->io_capability);
+		if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM)
+			return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
+	}
+
+	get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
+
+	/* Update remote key distribution in case the remote cleared
+	 * some bits that we had enabled in our request.
+	 */
+	smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist;
+
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
+		/* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
+		smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
+		return sc_send_public_key(smp);
+	}
+
+	auth |= req->auth_req;
+
+	ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, req->io_capability, rsp->io_capability);
+	if (ret)
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+	set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
+
+	/* Can't compose response until we have been confirmed */
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags))
+		return smp_confirm(smp);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static u8 sc_check_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+
+	bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "");
+
+	if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
+		return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+
+	if (conn->hcon->out) {
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
+			     smp->prnd);
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Work-around for some implementations that incorrectly copy RFU bits
+ * from our security request and thereby create the impression that
+ * we're doing SC when in fact the remote doesn't support it.
+ */
+static int fixup_sc_false_positive(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
+	struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
+	u8 auth;
+
+	/* The issue is only observed when we're in responder role */
+	if (hcon->out)
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY)) {
+		bt_dev_err(hdev, "refusing legacy fallback in SC-only mode");
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+	}
+
+	bt_dev_err(hdev, "trying to fall back to legacy SMP");
+
+	req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
+	rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
+
+	/* Rebuild key dist flags which may have been cleared for SC */
+	smp->remote_key_dist = (req->init_key_dist & rsp->resp_key_dist);
+
+	auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
+
+	if (tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp->io_capability, req->io_capability)) {
+		bt_dev_err(hdev, "failed to fall back to legacy SMP");
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+	}
+
+	clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
+
+	bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p %s", conn,
+		   hcon->out ? "initiator" : "responder");
+
+	if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->pcnf))
+		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
+
+	memcpy(smp->pcnf, skb->data, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
+	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
+
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
+		int ret;
+
+		/* Public Key exchange must happen before any other steps */
+		if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags))
+			return sc_check_confirm(smp);
+
+		bt_dev_err(hdev, "Unexpected SMP Pairing Confirm");
+
+		ret = fixup_sc_false_positive(smp);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+	}
+
+	if (conn->hcon->out) {
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
+			     smp->prnd);
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags))
+		return smp_confirm(smp);
+
+	set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	u8 *pkax, *pkbx, *na, *nb, confirm_hint;
+	u32 passkey;
+	int err;
+
+	bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn);
+
+	if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->rrnd))
+		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
+
+	memcpy(smp->rrnd, skb->data, sizeof(smp->rrnd));
+	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->rrnd));
+
+	if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
+		return smp_random(smp);
+
+	if (hcon->out) {
+		pkax = smp->local_pk;
+		pkbx = smp->remote_pk;
+		na   = smp->prnd;
+		nb   = smp->rrnd;
+	} else {
+		pkax = smp->remote_pk;
+		pkbx = smp->local_pk;
+		na   = smp->rrnd;
+		nb   = smp->prnd;
+	}
+
+	if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
+		if (!hcon->out)
+			smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
+				     sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
+		goto mackey_and_ltk;
+	}
+
+	/* Passkey entry has special treatment */
+	if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
+		return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
+
+	if (hcon->out) {
+		u8 cfm[16];
+
+		err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_pk,
+			     smp->rrnd, 0, cfm);
+		if (err)
+			return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+		if (crypto_memneq(smp->pcnf, cfm, 16))
+			return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
+	} else {
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
+			     smp->prnd);
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
+
+		/* Only Just-Works pairing requires extra checks */
+		if (smp->method != JUST_WORKS)
+			goto mackey_and_ltk;
+
+		/* If there already exists long term key in local host, leave
+		 * the decision to user space since the remote device could
+		 * be legitimate or malicious.
+		 */
+		if (hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
+				 hcon->role)) {
+			/* Set passkey to 0. The value can be any number since
+			 * it'll be ignored anyway.
+			 */
+			passkey = 0;
+			confirm_hint = 1;
+			goto confirm;
+		}
+	}
+
+mackey_and_ltk:
+	/* Generate MacKey and LTK */
+	err = sc_mackey_and_ltk(smp, smp->mackey, smp->tk);
+	if (err)
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+	if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
+		if (hcon->out) {
+			sc_dhkey_check(smp);
+			SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
+		}
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	err = smp_g2(smp->tfm_cmac, pkax, pkbx, na, nb, &passkey);
+	if (err)
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+	confirm_hint = 0;
+
+confirm:
+	if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS)
+		confirm_hint = 1;
+
+	err = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
+					hcon->dst_type, passkey, confirm_hint);
+	if (err)
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+	set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static bool smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 sec_level)
+{
+	struct smp_ltk *key;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+
+	key = hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hcon->role);
+	if (!key)
+		return false;
+
+	if (smp_ltk_sec_level(key) < sec_level)
+		return false;
+
+	if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags))
+		return true;
+
+	hci_le_start_enc(hcon, key->ediv, key->rand, key->val, key->enc_size);
+	hcon->enc_key_size = key->enc_size;
+
+	/* We never store STKs for initiator role, so clear this flag */
+	clear_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags);
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+bool smp_sufficient_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 sec_level,
+			     enum smp_key_pref key_pref)
+{
+	if (sec_level == BT_SECURITY_LOW)
+		return true;
+
+	/* If we're encrypted with an STK but the caller prefers using
+	 * LTK claim insufficient security. This way we allow the
+	 * connection to be re-encrypted with an LTK, even if the LTK
+	 * provides the same level of security. Only exception is if we
+	 * don't have an LTK (e.g. because of key distribution bits).
+	 */
+	if (key_pref == SMP_USE_LTK &&
+	    test_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags) &&
+	    hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hcon->role))
+		return false;
+
+	if (hcon->sec_level >= sec_level)
+		return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct smp_cmd_security_req *rp = (void *) skb->data;
+	struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
+	struct smp_chan *smp;
+	u8 sec_level, auth;
+
+	bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn);
+
+	if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
+		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
+
+	if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
+		return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
+
+	auth = rp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
+
+	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
+		return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
+
+	if (hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
+		sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
+	else
+		sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
+
+	if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK)) {
+		/* If link is already encrypted with sufficient security we
+		 * still need refresh encryption as per Core Spec 5.0 Vol 3,
+		 * Part H 2.4.6
+		 */
+		smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->sec_level);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level)
+		hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
+
+	if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level))
+		return 0;
+
+	smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
+	if (!smp)
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+	if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE) &&
+	    (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
+		return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
+
+	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
+
+	memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
+	build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, auth);
+
+	smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
+	memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
+
+	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+	SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
+{
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan;
+	struct smp_chan *smp;
+	__u8 authreq;
+	int ret;
+
+	bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "conn %p hcon %p level 0x%2.2x", conn, hcon,
+		   sec_level);
+
+	/* This may be NULL if there's an unexpected disconnection */
+	if (!conn)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED))
+		return 1;
+
+	if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK))
+		return 1;
+
+	if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level)
+		hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
+
+	if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
+		if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level))
+			return 0;
+
+	chan = conn->smp;
+	if (!chan) {
+		bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "security requested but not available");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
+
+	/* If SMP is already in progress ignore this request */
+	if (chan->data) {
+		ret = 0;
+		goto unlock;
+	}
+
+	smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
+	if (!smp) {
+		ret = 1;
+		goto unlock;
+	}
+
+	authreq = seclevel_to_authreq(sec_level);
+
+	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED)) {
+		authreq |= SMP_AUTH_SC;
+		if (hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_SSP_ENABLED))
+			authreq |= SMP_AUTH_CT2;
+	}
+
+	/* Don't attempt to set MITM if setting is overridden by debugfs
+	 * Needed to pass certification test SM/MAS/PKE/BV-01-C
+	 */
+	if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_FORCE_NO_MITM)) {
+		/* Require MITM if IO Capability allows or the security level
+		 * requires it.
+		 */
+		if (hcon->io_capability != HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT ||
+		    hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
+			authreq |= SMP_AUTH_MITM;
+	}
+
+	if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) {
+		struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
+
+		build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, authreq);
+		smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
+		memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
+
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
+	} else {
+		struct smp_cmd_security_req cp;
+		cp.auth_req = authreq;
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ);
+	}
+
+	set_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
+	ret = 0;
+
+unlock:
+	l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int smp_cancel_and_remove_pairing(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
+				  u8 addr_type)
+{
+	struct hci_conn *hcon;
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn;
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan;
+	struct smp_chan *smp;
+	int err;
+
+	err = hci_remove_ltk(hdev, bdaddr, addr_type);
+	hci_remove_irk(hdev, bdaddr, addr_type);
+
+	hcon = hci_conn_hash_lookup_le(hdev, bdaddr, addr_type);
+	if (!hcon)
+		goto done;
+
+	conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
+	if (!conn)
+		goto done;
+
+	chan = conn->smp;
+	if (!chan)
+		goto done;
+
+	l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
+
+	smp = chan->data;
+	if (smp) {
+		/* Set keys to NULL to make sure smp_failure() does not try to
+		 * remove and free already invalidated rcu list entries. */
+		smp->ltk = NULL;
+		smp->responder_ltk = NULL;
+		smp->remote_irk = NULL;
+
+		if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags))
+			smp_failure(conn, 0);
+		else
+			smp_failure(conn, SMP_UNSPECIFIED);
+		err = 0;
+	}
+
+	l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
+
+done:
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int smp_cmd_encrypt_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info *rp = (void *) skb->data;
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+
+	bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn);
+
+	if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
+		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
+
+	/* Pairing is aborted if any blocked keys are distributed */
+	if (hci_is_blocked_key(conn->hcon->hdev, HCI_BLOCKED_KEY_TYPE_LTK,
+			       rp->ltk)) {
+		bt_dev_warn_ratelimited(conn->hcon->hdev,
+					"LTK blocked for %pMR",
+					&conn->hcon->dst);
+		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
+	}
+
+	SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_INITIATOR_IDENT);
+
+	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
+
+	memcpy(smp->tk, rp->ltk, sizeof(smp->tk));
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int smp_cmd_initiator_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct smp_cmd_initiator_ident *rp = (void *)skb->data;
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct smp_ltk *ltk;
+	u8 authenticated;
+
+	bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn);
+
+	if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
+		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
+
+	/* Mark the information as received */
+	smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
+
+	if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY)
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO);
+	else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
+
+	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
+
+	authenticated = (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH);
+	ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, SMP_LTK,
+			  authenticated, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size,
+			  rp->ediv, rp->rand);
+	smp->ltk = ltk;
+	if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK))
+		smp_distribute_keys(smp);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int smp_cmd_ident_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct smp_cmd_ident_info *info = (void *) skb->data;
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+
+	bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "");
+
+	if (skb->len < sizeof(*info))
+		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
+
+	/* Pairing is aborted if any blocked keys are distributed */
+	if (hci_is_blocked_key(conn->hcon->hdev, HCI_BLOCKED_KEY_TYPE_IRK,
+			       info->irk)) {
+		bt_dev_warn_ratelimited(conn->hcon->hdev,
+					"Identity key blocked for %pMR",
+					&conn->hcon->dst);
+		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
+	}
+
+	SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO);
+
+	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info));
+
+	memcpy(smp->irk, info->irk, 16);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
+				   struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info *info = (void *) skb->data;
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	bdaddr_t rpa;
+
+	bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "");
+
+	if (skb->len < sizeof(*info))
+		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
+
+	/* Mark the information as received */
+	smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
+
+	if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
+
+	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info));
+
+	/* Strictly speaking the Core Specification (4.1) allows sending
+	 * an empty address which would force us to rely on just the IRK
+	 * as "identity information". However, since such
+	 * implementations are not known of and in order to not over
+	 * complicate our implementation, simply pretend that we never
+	 * received an IRK for such a device.
+	 *
+	 * The Identity Address must also be a Static Random or Public
+	 * Address, which hci_is_identity_address() checks for.
+	 */
+	if (!bacmp(&info->bdaddr, BDADDR_ANY) ||
+	    !hci_is_identity_address(&info->bdaddr, info->addr_type)) {
+		bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "ignoring IRK with no identity address");
+		goto distribute;
+	}
+
+	/* Drop IRK if peer is using identity address during pairing but is
+	 * providing different address as identity information.
+	 *
+	 * Microsoft Surface Precision Mouse is known to have this bug.
+	 */
+	if (hci_is_identity_address(&hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type) &&
+	    (bacmp(&info->bdaddr, &hcon->dst) ||
+	     info->addr_type != hcon->dst_type)) {
+		bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev,
+			   "ignoring IRK with invalid identity address");
+		goto distribute;
+	}
+
+	bacpy(&smp->id_addr, &info->bdaddr);
+	smp->id_addr_type = info->addr_type;
+
+	if (hci_bdaddr_is_rpa(&hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type))
+		bacpy(&rpa, &hcon->dst);
+	else
+		bacpy(&rpa, BDADDR_ANY);
+
+	smp->remote_irk = hci_add_irk(conn->hcon->hdev, &smp->id_addr,
+				      smp->id_addr_type, smp->irk, &rpa);
+
+distribute:
+	if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK))
+		smp_distribute_keys(smp);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct smp_cmd_sign_info *rp = (void *) skb->data;
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+	struct smp_csrk *csrk;
+
+	bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn);
+
+	if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
+		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
+
+	/* Mark the information as received */
+	smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN;
+
+	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
+
+	csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (csrk) {
+		if (conn->hcon->sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
+			csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_REMOTE_AUTHENTICATED;
+		else
+			csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_REMOTE_UNAUTHENTICATED;
+		memcpy(csrk->val, rp->csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));
+	}
+	smp->csrk = csrk;
+	smp_distribute_keys(smp);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static u8 sc_select_method(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct smp_cmd_pairing *local, *remote;
+	u8 local_mitm, remote_mitm, local_io, remote_io, method;
+
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags) ||
+	    test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags))
+		return REQ_OOB;
+
+	/* The preq/prsp contain the raw Pairing Request/Response PDUs
+	 * which are needed as inputs to some crypto functions. To get
+	 * the "struct smp_cmd_pairing" from them we need to skip the
+	 * first byte which contains the opcode.
+	 */
+	if (hcon->out) {
+		local = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
+		remote = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
+	} else {
+		local = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
+		remote = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
+	}
+
+	local_io = local->io_capability;
+	remote_io = remote->io_capability;
+
+	local_mitm = (local->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_MITM);
+	remote_mitm = (remote->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_MITM);
+
+	/* If either side wants MITM, look up the method from the table,
+	 * otherwise use JUST WORKS.
+	 */
+	if (local_mitm || remote_mitm)
+		method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io);
+	else
+		method = JUST_WORKS;
+
+	/* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */
+	if (method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags))
+		method = JUST_WORKS;
+
+	return method;
+}
+
+static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct smp_cmd_public_key *key = (void *) skb->data;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
+	struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
+	struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm;
+	int err;
+
+	bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn);
+
+	if (skb->len < sizeof(*key))
+		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
+
+	/* Check if remote and local public keys are the same and debug key is
+	 * not in use.
+	 */
+	if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags) &&
+	    !crypto_memneq(key, smp->local_pk, 64)) {
+		bt_dev_err(hdev, "Remote and local public keys are identical");
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(smp->remote_pk, key, 64);
+
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags)) {
+		err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->remote_pk,
+			     smp->rr, 0, cfm.confirm_val);
+		if (err)
+			return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+		if (crypto_memneq(cfm.confirm_val, smp->pcnf, 16))
+			return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
+	}
+
+	/* Non-initiating device sends its public key after receiving
+	 * the key from the initiating device.
+	 */
+	if (!hcon->out) {
+		err = sc_send_public_key(smp);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	}
+
+	SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key X: %32phN", smp->remote_pk);
+	SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->remote_pk + 32);
+
+	/* Compute the shared secret on the same crypto tfm on which the private
+	 * key was set/generated.
+	 */
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags)) {
+		struct l2cap_chan *hchan = hdev->smp_data;
+		struct smp_dev *smp_dev;
+
+		if (!hchan || !hchan->data)
+			return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+		smp_dev = hchan->data;
+
+		tfm_ecdh = smp_dev->tfm_ecdh;
+	} else {
+		tfm_ecdh = smp->tfm_ecdh;
+	}
+
+	if (compute_ecdh_secret(tfm_ecdh, smp->remote_pk, smp->dhkey))
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+	SMP_DBG("DHKey %32phN", smp->dhkey);
+
+	set_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags);
+
+	smp->method = sc_select_method(smp);
+
+	bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "selected method 0x%02x", smp->method);
+
+	/* JUST_WORKS and JUST_CFM result in an unauthenticated key */
+	if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS || smp->method == JUST_CFM)
+		hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
+	else
+		hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_FIPS;
+
+	if (!crypto_memneq(debug_pk, smp->remote_pk, 64))
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
+
+	if (smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY) {
+		get_random_bytes(&hcon->passkey_notify,
+				 sizeof(hcon->passkey_notify));
+		hcon->passkey_notify %= 1000000;
+		hcon->passkey_entered = 0;
+		smp->passkey_round = 0;
+		if (mgmt_user_passkey_notify(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
+					     hcon->dst_type,
+					     hcon->passkey_notify,
+					     hcon->passkey_entered))
+			return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+		return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
+	}
+
+	if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
+		if (hcon->out)
+			smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
+				     sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
+
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
+
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (hcon->out)
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+
+	if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY) {
+		if (mgmt_user_passkey_request(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
+					      hcon->dst_type))
+			return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* The Initiating device waits for the non-initiating device to
+	 * send the confirm value.
+	 */
+	if (conn->hcon->out)
+		return 0;
+
+	err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->remote_pk, smp->prnd,
+		     0, cfm.confirm_val);
+	if (err)
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cfm), &cfm);
+	SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int smp_cmd_dhkey_check(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct smp_cmd_dhkey_check *check = (void *) skb->data;
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+	u8 a[7], b[7], *local_addr, *remote_addr;
+	u8 io_cap[3], r[16], e[16];
+	int err;
+
+	bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "conn %p", conn);
+
+	if (skb->len < sizeof(*check))
+		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
+
+	memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
+	memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
+	a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
+	b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
+
+	if (hcon->out) {
+		local_addr = a;
+		remote_addr = b;
+		memcpy(io_cap, &smp->prsp[1], 3);
+	} else {
+		local_addr = b;
+		remote_addr = a;
+		memcpy(io_cap, &smp->preq[1], 3);
+	}
+
+	memset(r, 0, sizeof(r));
+
+	if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
+		put_unaligned_le32(hcon->passkey_notify, r);
+	else if (smp->method == REQ_OOB)
+		memcpy(r, smp->lr, 16);
+
+	err = smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, r,
+		     io_cap, remote_addr, local_addr, e);
+	if (err)
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+	if (crypto_memneq(check->e, e, 16))
+		return SMP_DHKEY_CHECK_FAILED;
+
+	if (!hcon->out) {
+		if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags)) {
+			set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, &smp->flags);
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		/* Responder sends DHKey check as response to initiator */
+		sc_dhkey_check(smp);
+	}
+
+	sc_add_ltk(smp);
+
+	if (hcon->out) {
+		hci_le_start_enc(hcon, 0, 0, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size);
+		hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int smp_cmd_keypress_notify(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
+				   struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct smp_cmd_keypress_notify *kp = (void *) skb->data;
+
+	bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "value 0x%02x", kp->value);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct smp_chan *smp;
+	__u8 code, reason;
+	int err = 0;
+
+	if (skb->len < 1)
+		return -EILSEQ;
+
+	if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED)) {
+		reason = SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	code = skb->data[0];
+	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(code));
+
+	smp = chan->data;
+
+	if (code > SMP_CMD_MAX)
+		goto drop;
+
+	if (smp && !test_and_clear_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd))
+		goto drop;
+
+	/* If we don't have a context the only allowed commands are
+	 * pairing request and security request.
+	 */
+	if (!smp && code != SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ && code != SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ)
+		goto drop;
+
+	switch (code) {
+	case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ:
+		reason = smp_cmd_pairing_req(conn, skb);
+		break;
+
+	case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL:
+		smp_failure(conn, 0);
+		err = -EPERM;
+		break;
+
+	case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP:
+		reason = smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(conn, skb);
+		break;
+
+	case SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ:
+		reason = smp_cmd_security_req(conn, skb);
+		break;
+
+	case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM:
+		reason = smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(conn, skb);
+		break;
+
+	case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM:
+		reason = smp_cmd_pairing_random(conn, skb);
+		break;
+
+	case SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO:
+		reason = smp_cmd_encrypt_info(conn, skb);
+		break;
+
+	case SMP_CMD_INITIATOR_IDENT:
+		reason = smp_cmd_initiator_ident(conn, skb);
+		break;
+
+	case SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO:
+		reason = smp_cmd_ident_info(conn, skb);
+		break;
+
+	case SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO:
+		reason = smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(conn, skb);
+		break;
+
+	case SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO:
+		reason = smp_cmd_sign_info(conn, skb);
+		break;
+
+	case SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY:
+		reason = smp_cmd_public_key(conn, skb);
+		break;
+
+	case SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK:
+		reason = smp_cmd_dhkey_check(conn, skb);
+		break;
+
+	case SMP_CMD_KEYPRESS_NOTIFY:
+		reason = smp_cmd_keypress_notify(conn, skb);
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code);
+		reason = SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+done:
+	if (!err) {
+		if (reason)
+			smp_failure(conn, reason);
+		kfree_skb(skb);
+	}
+
+	return err;
+
+drop:
+	bt_dev_err(hcon->hdev, "unexpected SMP command 0x%02x from %pMR",
+		   code, &hcon->dst);
+	kfree_skb(skb);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void smp_teardown_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err)
+{
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
+
+	bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "chan %p", chan);
+
+	if (chan->data)
+		smp_chan_destroy(conn);
+
+	conn->smp = NULL;
+	l2cap_chan_put(chan);
+}
+
+static void bredr_pairing(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
+{
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
+	struct smp_cmd_pairing req;
+	struct smp_chan *smp;
+
+	bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "chan %p", chan);
+
+	/* Only new pairings are interesting */
+	if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_NEW_LINK_KEY, &hcon->flags))
+		return;
+
+	/* Don't bother if we're not encrypted */
+	if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
+		return;
+
+	/* Only initiator may initiate SMP over BR/EDR */
+	if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
+		return;
+
+	/* Secure Connections support must be enabled */
+	if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED))
+		return;
+
+	/* BR/EDR must use Secure Connections for SMP */
+	if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &hcon->flags) &&
+	    !hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
+		return;
+
+	/* If our LE support is not enabled don't do anything */
+	if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED))
+		return;
+
+	/* Don't bother if remote LE support is not enabled */
+	if (!lmp_host_le_capable(hcon))
+		return;
+
+	/* Remote must support SMP fixed chan for BR/EDR */
+	if (!(conn->remote_fixed_chan & L2CAP_FC_SMP_BREDR))
+		return;
+
+	/* Don't bother if SMP is already ongoing */
+	if (chan->data)
+		return;
+
+	smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
+	if (!smp) {
+		bt_dev_err(hdev, "unable to create SMP context for BR/EDR");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
+
+	bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "starting SMP over BR/EDR");
+
+	/* Prepare and send the BR/EDR SMP Pairing Request */
+	build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, &req, NULL);
+
+	smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
+	memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &req, sizeof(req));
+
+	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(req), &req);
+	SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
+}
+
+static void smp_resume_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
+{
+	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+
+	bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "chan %p", chan);
+
+	if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
+		bredr_pairing(chan);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (!smp)
+		return;
+
+	if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
+		return;
+
+	cancel_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer);
+
+	smp_distribute_keys(smp);
+}
+
+static void smp_ready_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
+{
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+
+	bt_dev_dbg(hcon->hdev, "chan %p", chan);
+
+	/* No need to call l2cap_chan_hold() here since we already own
+	 * the reference taken in smp_new_conn_cb(). This is just the
+	 * first time that we tie it to a specific pointer. The code in
+	 * l2cap_core.c ensures that there's no risk this function wont
+	 * get called if smp_new_conn_cb was previously called.
+	 */
+	conn->smp = chan;
+
+	if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK && test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
+		bredr_pairing(chan);
+}
+
+static int smp_recv_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	bt_dev_dbg(chan->conn->hcon->hdev, "chan %p", chan);
+
+	err = smp_sig_channel(chan, skb);
+	if (err) {
+		struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+
+		if (smp)
+			cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
+
+		hci_disconnect(chan->conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
+	}
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static struct sk_buff *smp_alloc_skb_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan,
+					unsigned long hdr_len,
+					unsigned long len, int nb)
+{
+	struct sk_buff *skb;
+
+	skb = bt_skb_alloc(hdr_len + len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!skb)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	skb->priority = HCI_PRIO_MAX;
+	bt_cb(skb)->l2cap.chan = chan;
+
+	return skb;
+}
+
+static const struct l2cap_ops smp_chan_ops = {
+	.name			= "Security Manager",
+	.ready			= smp_ready_cb,
+	.recv			= smp_recv_cb,
+	.alloc_skb		= smp_alloc_skb_cb,
+	.teardown		= smp_teardown_cb,
+	.resume			= smp_resume_cb,
+
+	.new_connection		= l2cap_chan_no_new_connection,
+	.state_change		= l2cap_chan_no_state_change,
+	.close			= l2cap_chan_no_close,
+	.defer			= l2cap_chan_no_defer,
+	.suspend		= l2cap_chan_no_suspend,
+	.set_shutdown		= l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown,
+	.get_sndtimeo		= l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo,
+};
+
+static inline struct l2cap_chan *smp_new_conn_cb(struct l2cap_chan *pchan)
+{
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan;
+
+	BT_DBG("pchan %p", pchan);
+
+	chan = l2cap_chan_create();
+	if (!chan)
+		return NULL;
+
+	chan->chan_type	= pchan->chan_type;
+	chan->ops	= &smp_chan_ops;
+	chan->scid	= pchan->scid;
+	chan->dcid	= chan->scid;
+	chan->imtu	= pchan->imtu;
+	chan->omtu	= pchan->omtu;
+	chan->mode	= pchan->mode;
+
+	/* Other L2CAP channels may request SMP routines in order to
+	 * change the security level. This means that the SMP channel
+	 * lock must be considered in its own category to avoid lockdep
+	 * warnings.
+	 */
+	atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_SMP);
+
+	BT_DBG("created chan %p", chan);
+
+	return chan;
+}
+
+static const struct l2cap_ops smp_root_chan_ops = {
+	.name			= "Security Manager Root",
+	.new_connection		= smp_new_conn_cb,
+
+	/* None of these are implemented for the root channel */
+	.close			= l2cap_chan_no_close,
+	.alloc_skb		= l2cap_chan_no_alloc_skb,
+	.recv			= l2cap_chan_no_recv,
+	.state_change		= l2cap_chan_no_state_change,
+	.teardown		= l2cap_chan_no_teardown,
+	.ready			= l2cap_chan_no_ready,
+	.defer			= l2cap_chan_no_defer,
+	.suspend		= l2cap_chan_no_suspend,
+	.resume			= l2cap_chan_no_resume,
+	.set_shutdown		= l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown,
+	.get_sndtimeo		= l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo,
+};
+
+static struct l2cap_chan *smp_add_cid(struct hci_dev *hdev, u16 cid)
+{
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan;
+	struct smp_dev *smp;
+	struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
+	struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
+
+	if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR) {
+		smp = NULL;
+		goto create_chan;
+	}
+
+	smp = kzalloc(sizeof(*smp), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!smp)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm_cmac)) {
+		bt_dev_err(hdev, "Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
+		kfree_sensitive(smp);
+		return ERR_CAST(tfm_cmac);
+	}
+
+	tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh", 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm_ecdh)) {
+		bt_dev_err(hdev, "Unable to create ECDH crypto context");
+		crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac);
+		kfree_sensitive(smp);
+		return ERR_CAST(tfm_ecdh);
+	}
+
+	smp->local_oob = false;
+	smp->tfm_cmac = tfm_cmac;
+	smp->tfm_ecdh = tfm_ecdh;
+
+create_chan:
+	chan = l2cap_chan_create();
+	if (!chan) {
+		if (smp) {
+			crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
+			crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh);
+			kfree_sensitive(smp);
+		}
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	}
+
+	chan->data = smp;
+
+	l2cap_add_scid(chan, cid);
+
+	l2cap_chan_set_defaults(chan);
+
+	if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP) {
+		u8 bdaddr_type;
+
+		hci_copy_identity_address(hdev, &chan->src, &bdaddr_type);
+
+		if (bdaddr_type == ADDR_LE_DEV_PUBLIC)
+			chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC;
+		else
+			chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_RANDOM;
+	} else {
+		bacpy(&chan->src, &hdev->bdaddr);
+		chan->src_type = BDADDR_BREDR;
+	}
+
+	chan->state = BT_LISTEN;
+	chan->mode = L2CAP_MODE_BASIC;
+	chan->imtu = L2CAP_DEFAULT_MTU;
+	chan->ops = &smp_root_chan_ops;
+
+	/* Set correct nesting level for a parent/listening channel */
+	atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_PARENT);
+
+	return chan;
+}
+
+static void smp_del_chan(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
+{
+	struct smp_dev *smp;
+
+	BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
+
+	smp = chan->data;
+	if (smp) {
+		chan->data = NULL;
+		crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
+		crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh);
+		kfree_sensitive(smp);
+	}
+
+	l2cap_chan_put(chan);
+}
+
+static ssize_t force_bredr_smp_read(struct file *file,
+				    char __user *user_buf,
+				    size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
+	char buf[3];
+
+	buf[0] = hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP) ? 'Y': 'N';
+	buf[1] = '\n';
+	buf[2] = '\0';
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, 2);
+}
+
+static ssize_t force_bredr_smp_write(struct file *file,
+				     const char __user *user_buf,
+				     size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
+	bool enable;
+	int err;
+
+	err = kstrtobool_from_user(user_buf, count, &enable);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (enable == hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
+		return -EALREADY;
+
+	if (enable) {
+		struct l2cap_chan *chan;
+
+		chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR);
+		if (IS_ERR(chan))
+			return PTR_ERR(chan);
+
+		hdev->smp_bredr_data = chan;
+	} else {
+		struct l2cap_chan *chan;
+
+		chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data;
+		hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL;
+		smp_del_chan(chan);
+	}
+
+	hci_dev_change_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP);
+
+	return count;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations force_bredr_smp_fops = {
+	.open		= simple_open,
+	.read		= force_bredr_smp_read,
+	.write		= force_bredr_smp_write,
+	.llseek		= default_llseek,
+};
+
+int smp_register(struct hci_dev *hdev)
+{
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan;
+
+	bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "");
+
+	/* If the controller does not support Low Energy operation, then
+	 * there is also no need to register any SMP channel.
+	 */
+	if (!lmp_le_capable(hdev))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (WARN_ON(hdev->smp_data)) {
+		chan = hdev->smp_data;
+		hdev->smp_data = NULL;
+		smp_del_chan(chan);
+	}
+
+	chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP);
+	if (IS_ERR(chan))
+		return PTR_ERR(chan);
+
+	hdev->smp_data = chan;
+
+	/* If the controller does not support BR/EDR Secure Connections
+	 * feature, then the BR/EDR SMP channel shall not be present.
+	 *
+	 * To test this with Bluetooth 4.0 controllers, create a debugfs
+	 * switch that allows forcing BR/EDR SMP support and accepting
+	 * cross-transport pairing on non-AES encrypted connections.
+	 */
+	if (!lmp_sc_capable(hdev)) {
+		debugfs_create_file("force_bredr_smp", 0644, hdev->debugfs,
+				    hdev, &force_bredr_smp_fops);
+
+		/* Flag can be already set here (due to power toggle) */
+		if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
+			return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (WARN_ON(hdev->smp_bredr_data)) {
+		chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data;
+		hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL;
+		smp_del_chan(chan);
+	}
+
+	chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR);
+	if (IS_ERR(chan)) {
+		int err = PTR_ERR(chan);
+		chan = hdev->smp_data;
+		hdev->smp_data = NULL;
+		smp_del_chan(chan);
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	hdev->smp_bredr_data = chan;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void smp_unregister(struct hci_dev *hdev)
+{
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan;
+
+	if (hdev->smp_bredr_data) {
+		chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data;
+		hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL;
+		smp_del_chan(chan);
+	}
+
+	if (hdev->smp_data) {
+		chan = hdev->smp_data;
+		hdev->smp_data = NULL;
+		smp_del_chan(chan);
+	}
+}
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BT_SELFTEST_SMP)
+
+static int __init test_debug_key(struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh)
+{
+	u8 pk[64];
+	int err;
+
+	err = set_ecdh_privkey(tfm_ecdh, debug_sk);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	err = generate_ecdh_public_key(tfm_ecdh, pk);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (crypto_memneq(pk, debug_pk, 64))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init test_ah(void)
+{
+	const u8 irk[16] = {
+			0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34,
+			0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec };
+	const u8 r[3] = { 0x94, 0x81, 0x70 };
+	const u8 exp[3] = { 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x0d };
+	u8 res[3];
+	int err;
+
+	err = smp_ah(irk, r, res);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 3))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init test_c1(void)
+{
+	const u8 k[16] = {
+			0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+			0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
+	const u8 r[16] = {
+			0xe0, 0x2e, 0x70, 0xc6, 0x4e, 0x27, 0x88, 0x63,
+			0x0e, 0x6f, 0xad, 0x56, 0x21, 0xd5, 0x83, 0x57 };
+	const u8 preq[7] = { 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0x07, 0x07 };
+	const u8 pres[7] = { 0x02, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x05 };
+	const u8 _iat = 0x01;
+	const u8 _rat = 0x00;
+	const bdaddr_t ra = { { 0xb6, 0xb5, 0xb4, 0xb3, 0xb2, 0xb1 } };
+	const bdaddr_t ia = { { 0xa6, 0xa5, 0xa4, 0xa3, 0xa2, 0xa1 } };
+	const u8 exp[16] = {
+			0x86, 0x3b, 0xf1, 0xbe, 0xc5, 0x4d, 0xa7, 0xd2,
+			0xea, 0x88, 0x89, 0x87, 0xef, 0x3f, 0x1e, 0x1e };
+	u8 res[16];
+	int err;
+
+	err = smp_c1(k, r, preq, pres, _iat, &ia, _rat, &ra, res);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init test_s1(void)
+{
+	const u8 k[16] = {
+			0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+			0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
+	const u8 r1[16] = {
+			0x88, 0x77, 0x66, 0x55, 0x44, 0x33, 0x22, 0x11 };
+	const u8 r2[16] = {
+			0x00, 0xff, 0xee, 0xdd, 0xcc, 0xbb, 0xaa, 0x99 };
+	const u8 exp[16] = {
+			0x62, 0xa0, 0x6d, 0x79, 0xae, 0x16, 0x42, 0x5b,
+			0x9b, 0xf4, 0xb0, 0xe8, 0xf0, 0xe1, 0x1f, 0x9a };
+	u8 res[16];
+	int err;
+
+	err = smp_s1(k, r1, r2, res);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init test_f4(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
+{
+	const u8 u[32] = {
+			0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc,
+			0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef,
+			0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e,
+			0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20 };
+	const u8 v[32] = {
+			0xfd, 0xc5, 0x7f, 0xf4, 0x49, 0xdd, 0x4f, 0x6b,
+			0xfb, 0x7c, 0x9d, 0xf1, 0xc2, 0x9a, 0xcb, 0x59,
+			0x2a, 0xe7, 0xd4, 0xee, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0x0a, 0x90,
+			0x9a, 0xbb, 0xf6, 0x32, 0x3d, 0x8b, 0x18, 0x55 };
+	const u8 x[16] = {
+			0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
+			0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
+	const u8 z = 0x00;
+	const u8 exp[16] = {
+			0x2d, 0x87, 0x74, 0xa9, 0xbe, 0xa1, 0xed, 0xf1,
+			0x1c, 0xbd, 0xa9, 0x07, 0xf1, 0x16, 0xc9, 0xf2 };
+	u8 res[16];
+	int err;
+
+	err = smp_f4(tfm_cmac, u, v, x, z, res);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init test_f5(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
+{
+	const u8 w[32] = {
+			0x98, 0xa6, 0xbf, 0x73, 0xf3, 0x34, 0x8d, 0x86,
+			0xf1, 0x66, 0xf8, 0xb4, 0x13, 0x6b, 0x79, 0x99,
+			0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34,
+			0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec };
+	const u8 n1[16] = {
+			0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
+			0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
+	const u8 n2[16] = {
+			0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21,
+			0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 };
+	const u8 a1[7] = { 0xce, 0xbf, 0x37, 0x37, 0x12, 0x56, 0x00 };
+	const u8 a2[7] = { 0xc1, 0xcf, 0x2d, 0x70, 0x13, 0xa7, 0x00 };
+	const u8 exp_ltk[16] = {
+			0x38, 0x0a, 0x75, 0x94, 0xb5, 0x22, 0x05, 0x98,
+			0x23, 0xcd, 0xd7, 0x69, 0x11, 0x79, 0x86, 0x69 };
+	const u8 exp_mackey[16] = {
+			0x20, 0x6e, 0x63, 0xce, 0x20, 0x6a, 0x3f, 0xfd,
+			0x02, 0x4a, 0x08, 0xa1, 0x76, 0xf1, 0x65, 0x29 };
+	u8 mackey[16], ltk[16];
+	int err;
+
+	err = smp_f5(tfm_cmac, w, n1, n2, a1, a2, mackey, ltk);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (crypto_memneq(mackey, exp_mackey, 16))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (crypto_memneq(ltk, exp_ltk, 16))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init test_f6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
+{
+	const u8 w[16] = {
+			0x20, 0x6e, 0x63, 0xce, 0x20, 0x6a, 0x3f, 0xfd,
+			0x02, 0x4a, 0x08, 0xa1, 0x76, 0xf1, 0x65, 0x29 };
+	const u8 n1[16] = {
+			0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
+			0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
+	const u8 n2[16] = {
+			0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21,
+			0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 };
+	const u8 r[16] = {
+			0xc8, 0x0f, 0x2d, 0x0c, 0xd2, 0x42, 0xda, 0x08,
+			0x54, 0xbb, 0x53, 0xb4, 0x3b, 0x34, 0xa3, 0x12 };
+	const u8 io_cap[3] = { 0x02, 0x01, 0x01 };
+	const u8 a1[7] = { 0xce, 0xbf, 0x37, 0x37, 0x12, 0x56, 0x00 };
+	const u8 a2[7] = { 0xc1, 0xcf, 0x2d, 0x70, 0x13, 0xa7, 0x00 };
+	const u8 exp[16] = {
+			0x61, 0x8f, 0x95, 0xda, 0x09, 0x0b, 0x6c, 0xd2,
+			0xc5, 0xe8, 0xd0, 0x9c, 0x98, 0x73, 0xc4, 0xe3 };
+	u8 res[16];
+	int err;
+
+	err = smp_f6(tfm_cmac, w, n1, n2, r, io_cap, a1, a2, res);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init test_g2(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
+{
+	const u8 u[32] = {
+			0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc,
+			0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef,
+			0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e,
+			0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20 };
+	const u8 v[32] = {
+			0xfd, 0xc5, 0x7f, 0xf4, 0x49, 0xdd, 0x4f, 0x6b,
+			0xfb, 0x7c, 0x9d, 0xf1, 0xc2, 0x9a, 0xcb, 0x59,
+			0x2a, 0xe7, 0xd4, 0xee, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0x0a, 0x90,
+			0x9a, 0xbb, 0xf6, 0x32, 0x3d, 0x8b, 0x18, 0x55 };
+	const u8 x[16] = {
+			0xab, 0xae, 0x2b, 0x71, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xff, 0xff,
+			0x3e, 0x73, 0x77, 0xd1, 0x54, 0x84, 0xcb, 0xd5 };
+	const u8 y[16] = {
+			0xcf, 0xc4, 0x3d, 0xff, 0xf7, 0x83, 0x65, 0x21,
+			0x6e, 0x5f, 0xa7, 0x25, 0xcc, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0xa6 };
+	const u32 exp_val = 0x2f9ed5ba % 1000000;
+	u32 val;
+	int err;
+
+	err = smp_g2(tfm_cmac, u, v, x, y, &val);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (val != exp_val)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init test_h6(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
+{
+	const u8 w[16] = {
+			0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34,
+			0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec };
+	const u8 key_id[4] = { 0x72, 0x62, 0x65, 0x6c };
+	const u8 exp[16] = {
+			0x99, 0x63, 0xb1, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xa9, 0xd3, 0xe8,
+			0x1c, 0xc9, 0x6d, 0xe7, 0x02, 0xe1, 0x9a, 0x2d };
+	u8 res[16];
+	int err;
+
+	err = smp_h6(tfm_cmac, w, key_id, res);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (crypto_memneq(res, exp, 16))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static char test_smp_buffer[32];
+
+static ssize_t test_smp_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf,
+			     size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, test_smp_buffer,
+				       strlen(test_smp_buffer));
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations test_smp_fops = {
+	.open		= simple_open,
+	.read		= test_smp_read,
+	.llseek		= default_llseek,
+};
+
+static int __init run_selftests(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac,
+				struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh)
+{
+	ktime_t calltime, delta, rettime;
+	unsigned long long duration;
+	int err;
+
+	calltime = ktime_get();
+
+	err = test_debug_key(tfm_ecdh);
+	if (err) {
+		BT_ERR("debug_key test failed");
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	err = test_ah();
+	if (err) {
+		BT_ERR("smp_ah test failed");
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	err = test_c1();
+	if (err) {
+		BT_ERR("smp_c1 test failed");
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	err = test_s1();
+	if (err) {
+		BT_ERR("smp_s1 test failed");
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	err = test_f4(tfm_cmac);
+	if (err) {
+		BT_ERR("smp_f4 test failed");
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	err = test_f5(tfm_cmac);
+	if (err) {
+		BT_ERR("smp_f5 test failed");
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	err = test_f6(tfm_cmac);
+	if (err) {
+		BT_ERR("smp_f6 test failed");
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	err = test_g2(tfm_cmac);
+	if (err) {
+		BT_ERR("smp_g2 test failed");
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	err = test_h6(tfm_cmac);
+	if (err) {
+		BT_ERR("smp_h6 test failed");
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	rettime = ktime_get();
+	delta = ktime_sub(rettime, calltime);
+	duration = (unsigned long long) ktime_to_ns(delta) >> 10;
+
+	BT_INFO("SMP test passed in %llu usecs", duration);
+
+done:
+	if (!err)
+		snprintf(test_smp_buffer, sizeof(test_smp_buffer),
+			 "PASS (%llu usecs)\n", duration);
+	else
+		snprintf(test_smp_buffer, sizeof(test_smp_buffer), "FAIL\n");
+
+	debugfs_create_file("selftest_smp", 0444, bt_debugfs, NULL,
+			    &test_smp_fops);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+int __init bt_selftest_smp(void)
+{
+	struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
+	struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
+	int err;
+
+	tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm_cmac)) {
+		BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
+		return PTR_ERR(tfm_cmac);
+	}
+
+	tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh", 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm_ecdh)) {
+		BT_ERR("Unable to create ECDH crypto context");
+		crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac);
+		return PTR_ERR(tfm_ecdh);
+	}
+
+	err = run_selftests(tfm_cmac, tfm_ecdh);
+
+	crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac);
+	crypto_free_kpp(tfm_ecdh);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+#endif