Adding upstream version 5.10.209.upstream/5.10.209upstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 1309 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/net/mac80211/key.c b/net/mac80211/key.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6a72c3367
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/mac80211/key.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1309 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2005, Instant802 Networks, Inc.
+ * Copyright 2005-2006, Devicescape Software, Inc.
+ * Copyright 2006-2007	Jiri Benc <jbenc@suse.cz>
+ * Copyright 2007-2008	Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
+ * Copyright 2013-2014  Intel Mobile Communications GmbH
+ * Copyright 2015-2017	Intel Deutschland GmbH
+ * Copyright 2018-2020  Intel Corporation
+ */
+
+#include <linux/if_ether.h>
+#include <linux/etherdevice.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <net/mac80211.h>
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
+#include <asm/unaligned.h>
+#include "ieee80211_i.h"
+#include "driver-ops.h"
+#include "debugfs_key.h"
+#include "aes_ccm.h"
+#include "aes_cmac.h"
+#include "aes_gmac.h"
+#include "aes_gcm.h"
+
+
+/**
+ * DOC: Key handling basics
+ *
+ * Key handling in mac80211 is done based on per-interface (sub_if_data)
+ * keys and per-station keys. Since each station belongs to an interface,
+ * each station key also belongs to that interface.
+ *
+ * Hardware acceleration is done on a best-effort basis for algorithms
+ * that are implemented in software,  for each key the hardware is asked
+ * to enable that key for offloading but if it cannot do that the key is
+ * simply kept for software encryption (unless it is for an algorithm
+ * that isn't implemented in software).
+ * There is currently no way of knowing whether a key is handled in SW
+ * or HW except by looking into debugfs.
+ *
+ * All key management is internally protected by a mutex. Within all
+ * other parts of mac80211, key references are, just as STA structure
+ * references, protected by RCU. Note, however, that some things are
+ * unprotected, namely the key->sta dereferences within the hardware
+ * acceleration functions. This means that sta_info_destroy() must
+ * remove the key which waits for an RCU grace period.
+ */
+
+static const u8 bcast_addr[ETH_ALEN] = { 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF };
+
+static void assert_key_lock(struct ieee80211_local *local)
+{
+	lockdep_assert_held(&local->key_mtx);
+}
+
+static void
+update_vlan_tailroom_need_count(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, int delta)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *vlan;
+
+	if (sdata->vif.type != NL80211_IFTYPE_AP)
+		return;
+
+	/* crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt is protected by this */
+	assert_key_lock(sdata->local);
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(vlan, &sdata->u.ap.vlans, u.vlan.list)
+		vlan->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt += delta;
+
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+}
+
+static void increment_tailroom_need_count(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
+{
+	/*
+	 * When this count is zero, SKB resizing for allocating tailroom
+	 * for IV or MMIC is skipped. But, this check has created two race
+	 * cases in xmit path while transiting from zero count to one:
+	 *
+	 * 1. SKB resize was skipped because no key was added but just before
+	 * the xmit key is added and SW encryption kicks off.
+	 *
+	 * 2. SKB resize was skipped because all the keys were hw planted but
+	 * just before xmit one of the key is deleted and SW encryption kicks
+	 * off.
+	 *
+	 * In both the above case SW encryption will find not enough space for
+	 * tailroom and exits with WARN_ON. (See WARN_ONs at wpa.c)
+	 *
+	 * Solution has been explained at
+	 * http://mid.gmane.org/1308590980.4322.19.camel@jlt3.sipsolutions.net
+	 */
+
+	assert_key_lock(sdata->local);
+
+	update_vlan_tailroom_need_count(sdata, 1);
+
+	if (!sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt++) {
+		/*
+		 * Flush all XMIT packets currently using HW encryption or no
+		 * encryption at all if the count transition is from 0 -> 1.
+		 */
+		synchronize_net();
+	}
+}
+
+static void decrease_tailroom_need_count(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
+					 int delta)
+{
+	assert_key_lock(sdata->local);
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt < delta);
+
+	update_vlan_tailroom_need_count(sdata, -delta);
+	sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt -= delta;
+}
+
+static int ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(struct ieee80211_key *key)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = key->sdata;
+	struct sta_info *sta;
+	int ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	might_sleep();
+
+	if (key->flags & KEY_FLAG_TAINTED) {
+		/* If we get here, it's during resume and the key is
+		 * tainted so shouldn't be used/programmed any more.
+		 * However, its flags may still indicate that it was
+		 * programmed into the device (since we're in resume)
+		 * so clear that flag now to avoid trying to remove
+		 * it again later.
+		 */
+		if (key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE &&
+		    !(key->conf.flags & (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC |
+					 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE |
+					 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_RESERVE_TAILROOM)))
+			increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata);
+
+		key->flags &= ~KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (!key->local->ops->set_key)
+		goto out_unsupported;
+
+	assert_key_lock(key->local);
+
+	sta = key->sta;
+
+	/*
+	 * If this is a per-STA GTK, check if it
+	 * is supported; if not, return.
+	 */
+	if (sta && !(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE) &&
+	    !ieee80211_hw_check(&key->local->hw, SUPPORTS_PER_STA_GTK))
+		goto out_unsupported;
+
+	if (sta && !sta->uploaded)
+		goto out_unsupported;
+
+	if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN) {
+		/*
+		 * The driver doesn't know anything about VLAN interfaces.
+		 * Hence, don't send GTKs for VLAN interfaces to the driver.
+		 */
+		if (!(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE)) {
+			ret = 1;
+			goto out_unsupported;
+		}
+	}
+
+	ret = drv_set_key(key->local, SET_KEY, sdata,
+			  sta ? &sta->sta : NULL, &key->conf);
+
+	if (!ret) {
+		key->flags |= KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE;
+
+		if (!(key->conf.flags & (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC |
+					 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE |
+					 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_RESERVE_TAILROOM)))
+			decrease_tailroom_need_count(sdata, 1);
+
+		WARN_ON((key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE) &&
+			(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV));
+
+		WARN_ON((key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE) &&
+			(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC));
+
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (ret != -ENOSPC && ret != -EOPNOTSUPP && ret != 1)
+		sdata_err(sdata,
+			  "failed to set key (%d, %pM) to hardware (%d)\n",
+			  key->conf.keyidx,
+			  sta ? sta->sta.addr : bcast_addr, ret);
+
+ out_unsupported:
+	switch (key->conf.cipher) {
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40:
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104:
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP:
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP:
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256:
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP:
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256:
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC:
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256:
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128:
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256:
+		/* all of these we can do in software - if driver can */
+		if (ret == 1)
+			return 0;
+		if (ieee80211_hw_check(&key->local->hw, SW_CRYPTO_CONTROL))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+}
+
+static void ieee80211_key_disable_hw_accel(struct ieee80211_key *key)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata;
+	struct sta_info *sta;
+	int ret;
+
+	might_sleep();
+
+	if (!key || !key->local->ops->set_key)
+		return;
+
+	assert_key_lock(key->local);
+
+	if (!(key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE))
+		return;
+
+	sta = key->sta;
+	sdata = key->sdata;
+
+	if (!(key->conf.flags & (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC |
+				 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE |
+				 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_RESERVE_TAILROOM)))
+		increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata);
+
+	key->flags &= ~KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE;
+	ret = drv_set_key(key->local, DISABLE_KEY, sdata,
+			  sta ? &sta->sta : NULL, &key->conf);
+
+	if (ret)
+		sdata_err(sdata,
+			  "failed to remove key (%d, %pM) from hardware (%d)\n",
+			  key->conf.keyidx,
+			  sta ? sta->sta.addr : bcast_addr, ret);
+}
+
+static int _ieee80211_set_tx_key(struct ieee80211_key *key, bool force)
+{
+	struct sta_info *sta = key->sta;
+	struct ieee80211_local *local = key->local;
+
+	assert_key_lock(local);
+
+	set_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_USES_ENCRYPTION);
+
+	sta->ptk_idx = key->conf.keyidx;
+
+	if (force || !ieee80211_hw_check(&local->hw, AMPDU_KEYBORDER_SUPPORT))
+		clear_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_BLOCK_BA);
+	ieee80211_check_fast_xmit(sta);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int ieee80211_set_tx_key(struct ieee80211_key *key)
+{
+	return _ieee80211_set_tx_key(key, false);
+}
+
+static void ieee80211_pairwise_rekey(struct ieee80211_key *old,
+				     struct ieee80211_key *new)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_local *local = new->local;
+	struct sta_info *sta = new->sta;
+	int i;
+
+	assert_key_lock(local);
+
+	if (new->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_NO_AUTO_TX) {
+		/* Extended Key ID key install, initial one or rekey */
+
+		if (sta->ptk_idx != INVALID_PTK_KEYIDX &&
+		    !ieee80211_hw_check(&local->hw, AMPDU_KEYBORDER_SUPPORT)) {
+			/* Aggregation Sessions with Extended Key ID must not
+			 * mix MPDUs with different keyIDs within one A-MPDU.
+			 * Tear down running Tx aggregation sessions and block
+			 * new Rx/Tx aggregation requests during rekey to
+			 * ensure there are no A-MPDUs when the driver is not
+			 * supporting A-MPDU key borders. (Blocking Tx only
+			 * would be sufficient but WLAN_STA_BLOCK_BA gets the
+			 * job done for the few ms we need it.)
+			 */
+			set_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_BLOCK_BA);
+			mutex_lock(&sta->ampdu_mlme.mtx);
+			for (i = 0; i <  IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS; i++)
+				___ieee80211_stop_tx_ba_session(sta, i,
+								AGG_STOP_LOCAL_REQUEST);
+			mutex_unlock(&sta->ampdu_mlme.mtx);
+		}
+	} else if (old) {
+		/* Rekey without Extended Key ID.
+		 * Aggregation sessions are OK when running on SW crypto.
+		 * A broken remote STA may cause issues not observed with HW
+		 * crypto, though.
+		 */
+		if (!(old->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE))
+			return;
+
+		/* Stop Tx till we are on the new key */
+		old->flags |= KEY_FLAG_TAINTED;
+		ieee80211_clear_fast_xmit(sta);
+		if (ieee80211_hw_check(&local->hw, AMPDU_AGGREGATION)) {
+			set_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_BLOCK_BA);
+			ieee80211_sta_tear_down_BA_sessions(sta,
+							    AGG_STOP_LOCAL_REQUEST);
+		}
+		if (!wiphy_ext_feature_isset(local->hw.wiphy,
+					     NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0)) {
+			pr_warn_ratelimited("Rekeying PTK for STA %pM but driver can't safely do that.",
+					    sta->sta.addr);
+			/* Flushing the driver queues *may* help prevent
+			 * the clear text leaks and freezes.
+			 */
+			ieee80211_flush_queues(local, old->sdata, false);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static void __ieee80211_set_default_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
+					int idx, bool uni, bool multi)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_key *key = NULL;
+
+	assert_key_lock(sdata->local);
+
+	if (idx >= 0 && idx < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS)
+		key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, sdata->keys[idx]);
+
+	if (uni) {
+		rcu_assign_pointer(sdata->default_unicast_key, key);
+		ieee80211_check_fast_xmit_iface(sdata);
+		if (sdata->vif.type != NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN)
+			drv_set_default_unicast_key(sdata->local, sdata, idx);
+	}
+
+	if (multi)
+		rcu_assign_pointer(sdata->default_multicast_key, key);
+
+	ieee80211_debugfs_key_update_default(sdata);
+}
+
+void ieee80211_set_default_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, int idx,
+			       bool uni, bool multi)
+{
+	mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
+	__ieee80211_set_default_key(sdata, idx, uni, multi);
+	mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
+}
+
+static void
+__ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, int idx)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_key *key = NULL;
+
+	assert_key_lock(sdata->local);
+
+	if (idx >= NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS &&
+	    idx < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS)
+		key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, sdata->keys[idx]);
+
+	rcu_assign_pointer(sdata->default_mgmt_key, key);
+
+	ieee80211_debugfs_key_update_default(sdata);
+}
+
+void ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
+				    int idx)
+{
+	mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
+	__ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(sdata, idx);
+	mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
+}
+
+static void
+__ieee80211_set_default_beacon_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, int idx)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_key *key = NULL;
+
+	assert_key_lock(sdata->local);
+
+	if (idx >= NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS &&
+	    idx < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS +
+	    NUM_DEFAULT_BEACON_KEYS)
+		key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, sdata->keys[idx]);
+
+	rcu_assign_pointer(sdata->default_beacon_key, key);
+
+	ieee80211_debugfs_key_update_default(sdata);
+}
+
+void ieee80211_set_default_beacon_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
+				      int idx)
+{
+	mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
+	__ieee80211_set_default_beacon_key(sdata, idx);
+	mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
+}
+
+static int ieee80211_key_replace(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
+				  struct sta_info *sta,
+				  bool pairwise,
+				  struct ieee80211_key *old,
+				  struct ieee80211_key *new)
+{
+	int idx;
+	int ret = 0;
+	bool defunikey, defmultikey, defmgmtkey, defbeaconkey;
+
+	/* caller must provide at least one old/new */
+	if (WARN_ON(!new && !old))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (new)
+		list_add_tail_rcu(&new->list, &sdata->key_list);
+
+	WARN_ON(new && old && new->conf.keyidx != old->conf.keyidx);
+
+	if (new && sta && pairwise) {
+		/* Unicast rekey needs special handling. With Extended Key ID
+		 * old is still NULL for the first rekey.
+		 */
+		ieee80211_pairwise_rekey(old, new);
+	}
+
+	if (old) {
+		idx = old->conf.keyidx;
+
+		if (old->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE) {
+			ieee80211_key_disable_hw_accel(old);
+
+			if (new)
+				ret = ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(new);
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* new must be provided in case old is not */
+		idx = new->conf.keyidx;
+		if (!new->local->wowlan)
+			ret = ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(new);
+	}
+
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (sta) {
+		if (pairwise) {
+			rcu_assign_pointer(sta->ptk[idx], new);
+			if (new &&
+			    !(new->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_NO_AUTO_TX))
+				_ieee80211_set_tx_key(new, true);
+		} else {
+			rcu_assign_pointer(sta->gtk[idx], new);
+		}
+		/* Only needed for transition from no key -> key.
+		 * Still triggers unnecessary when using Extended Key ID
+		 * and installing the second key ID the first time.
+		 */
+		if (new && !old)
+			ieee80211_check_fast_rx(sta);
+	} else {
+		defunikey = old &&
+			old == key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local,
+						sdata->default_unicast_key);
+		defmultikey = old &&
+			old == key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local,
+						sdata->default_multicast_key);
+		defmgmtkey = old &&
+			old == key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local,
+						sdata->default_mgmt_key);
+		defbeaconkey = old &&
+			old == key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local,
+						   sdata->default_beacon_key);
+
+		if (defunikey && !new)
+			__ieee80211_set_default_key(sdata, -1, true, false);
+		if (defmultikey && !new)
+			__ieee80211_set_default_key(sdata, -1, false, true);
+		if (defmgmtkey && !new)
+			__ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(sdata, -1);
+		if (defbeaconkey && !new)
+			__ieee80211_set_default_beacon_key(sdata, -1);
+
+		rcu_assign_pointer(sdata->keys[idx], new);
+		if (defunikey && new)
+			__ieee80211_set_default_key(sdata, new->conf.keyidx,
+						    true, false);
+		if (defmultikey && new)
+			__ieee80211_set_default_key(sdata, new->conf.keyidx,
+						    false, true);
+		if (defmgmtkey && new)
+			__ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(sdata,
+							 new->conf.keyidx);
+		if (defbeaconkey && new)
+			__ieee80211_set_default_beacon_key(sdata,
+							   new->conf.keyidx);
+	}
+
+	if (old)
+		list_del_rcu(&old->list);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+struct ieee80211_key *
+ieee80211_key_alloc(u32 cipher, int idx, size_t key_len,
+		    const u8 *key_data,
+		    size_t seq_len, const u8 *seq,
+		    const struct ieee80211_cipher_scheme *cs)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_key *key;
+	int i, j, err;
+
+	if (WARN_ON(idx < 0 ||
+		    idx >= NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS +
+		    NUM_DEFAULT_BEACON_KEYS))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+	key = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ieee80211_key) + key_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!key)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	/*
+	 * Default to software encryption; we'll later upload the
+	 * key to the hardware if possible.
+	 */
+	key->conf.flags = 0;
+	key->flags = 0;
+
+	key->conf.cipher = cipher;
+	key->conf.keyidx = idx;
+	key->conf.keylen = key_len;
+	switch (cipher) {
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40:
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104:
+		key->conf.iv_len = IEEE80211_WEP_IV_LEN;
+		key->conf.icv_len = IEEE80211_WEP_ICV_LEN;
+		break;
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP:
+		key->conf.iv_len = IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN;
+		key->conf.icv_len = IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN;
+		if (seq) {
+			for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS; i++) {
+				key->u.tkip.rx[i].iv32 =
+					get_unaligned_le32(&seq[2]);
+				key->u.tkip.rx[i].iv16 =
+					get_unaligned_le16(seq);
+			}
+		}
+		spin_lock_init(&key->u.tkip.txlock);
+		break;
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP:
+		key->conf.iv_len = IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN;
+		key->conf.icv_len = IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN;
+		if (seq) {
+			for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS + 1; i++)
+				for (j = 0; j < IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN; j++)
+					key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[i][j] =
+						seq[IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN - j - 1];
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Initialize AES key state here as an optimization so that
+		 * it does not need to be initialized for every packet.
+		 */
+		key->u.ccmp.tfm = ieee80211_aes_key_setup_encrypt(
+			key_data, key_len, IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN);
+		if (IS_ERR(key->u.ccmp.tfm)) {
+			err = PTR_ERR(key->u.ccmp.tfm);
+			kfree(key);
+			return ERR_PTR(err);
+		}
+		break;
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256:
+		key->conf.iv_len = IEEE80211_CCMP_256_HDR_LEN;
+		key->conf.icv_len = IEEE80211_CCMP_256_MIC_LEN;
+		for (i = 0; seq && i < IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS + 1; i++)
+			for (j = 0; j < IEEE80211_CCMP_256_PN_LEN; j++)
+				key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[i][j] =
+					seq[IEEE80211_CCMP_256_PN_LEN - j - 1];
+		/* Initialize AES key state here as an optimization so that
+		 * it does not need to be initialized for every packet.
+		 */
+		key->u.ccmp.tfm = ieee80211_aes_key_setup_encrypt(
+			key_data, key_len, IEEE80211_CCMP_256_MIC_LEN);
+		if (IS_ERR(key->u.ccmp.tfm)) {
+			err = PTR_ERR(key->u.ccmp.tfm);
+			kfree(key);
+			return ERR_PTR(err);
+		}
+		break;
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC:
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256:
+		key->conf.iv_len = 0;
+		if (cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC)
+			key->conf.icv_len = sizeof(struct ieee80211_mmie);
+		else
+			key->conf.icv_len = sizeof(struct ieee80211_mmie_16);
+		if (seq)
+			for (j = 0; j < IEEE80211_CMAC_PN_LEN; j++)
+				key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn[j] =
+					seq[IEEE80211_CMAC_PN_LEN - j - 1];
+		/*
+		 * Initialize AES key state here as an optimization so that
+		 * it does not need to be initialized for every packet.
+		 */
+		key->u.aes_cmac.tfm =
+			ieee80211_aes_cmac_key_setup(key_data, key_len);
+		if (IS_ERR(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm)) {
+			err = PTR_ERR(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm);
+			kfree(key);
+			return ERR_PTR(err);
+		}
+		break;
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128:
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256:
+		key->conf.iv_len = 0;
+		key->conf.icv_len = sizeof(struct ieee80211_mmie_16);
+		if (seq)
+			for (j = 0; j < IEEE80211_GMAC_PN_LEN; j++)
+				key->u.aes_gmac.rx_pn[j] =
+					seq[IEEE80211_GMAC_PN_LEN - j - 1];
+		/* Initialize AES key state here as an optimization so that
+		 * it does not need to be initialized for every packet.
+		 */
+		key->u.aes_gmac.tfm =
+			ieee80211_aes_gmac_key_setup(key_data, key_len);
+		if (IS_ERR(key->u.aes_gmac.tfm)) {
+			err = PTR_ERR(key->u.aes_gmac.tfm);
+			kfree(key);
+			return ERR_PTR(err);
+		}
+		break;
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP:
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256:
+		key->conf.iv_len = IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN;
+		key->conf.icv_len = IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN;
+		for (i = 0; seq && i < IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS + 1; i++)
+			for (j = 0; j < IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN; j++)
+				key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[i][j] =
+					seq[IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN - j - 1];
+		/* Initialize AES key state here as an optimization so that
+		 * it does not need to be initialized for every packet.
+		 */
+		key->u.gcmp.tfm = ieee80211_aes_gcm_key_setup_encrypt(key_data,
+								      key_len);
+		if (IS_ERR(key->u.gcmp.tfm)) {
+			err = PTR_ERR(key->u.gcmp.tfm);
+			kfree(key);
+			return ERR_PTR(err);
+		}
+		break;
+	default:
+		if (cs) {
+			if (seq_len && seq_len != cs->pn_len) {
+				kfree(key);
+				return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+			}
+
+			key->conf.iv_len = cs->hdr_len;
+			key->conf.icv_len = cs->mic_len;
+			for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS + 1; i++)
+				for (j = 0; j < seq_len; j++)
+					key->u.gen.rx_pn[i][j] =
+							seq[seq_len - j - 1];
+			key->flags |= KEY_FLAG_CIPHER_SCHEME;
+		}
+	}
+	memcpy(key->conf.key, key_data, key_len);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&key->list);
+
+	return key;
+}
+
+static void ieee80211_key_free_common(struct ieee80211_key *key)
+{
+	switch (key->conf.cipher) {
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP:
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256:
+		ieee80211_aes_key_free(key->u.ccmp.tfm);
+		break;
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC:
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256:
+		ieee80211_aes_cmac_key_free(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm);
+		break;
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128:
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256:
+		ieee80211_aes_gmac_key_free(key->u.aes_gmac.tfm);
+		break;
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP:
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256:
+		ieee80211_aes_gcm_key_free(key->u.gcmp.tfm);
+		break;
+	}
+	kfree_sensitive(key);
+}
+
+static void __ieee80211_key_destroy(struct ieee80211_key *key,
+				    bool delay_tailroom)
+{
+	if (key->local) {
+		struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = key->sdata;
+
+		ieee80211_debugfs_key_remove(key);
+
+		if (delay_tailroom) {
+			/* see ieee80211_delayed_tailroom_dec */
+			sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec++;
+			schedule_delayed_work(&sdata->dec_tailroom_needed_wk,
+					      HZ/2);
+		} else {
+			decrease_tailroom_need_count(sdata, 1);
+		}
+	}
+
+	ieee80211_key_free_common(key);
+}
+
+static void ieee80211_key_destroy(struct ieee80211_key *key,
+				  bool delay_tailroom)
+{
+	if (!key)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Synchronize so the TX path and rcu key iterators
+	 * can no longer be using this key before we free/remove it.
+	 */
+	synchronize_net();
+
+	__ieee80211_key_destroy(key, delay_tailroom);
+}
+
+void ieee80211_key_free_unused(struct ieee80211_key *key)
+{
+	WARN_ON(key->sdata || key->local);
+	ieee80211_key_free_common(key);
+}
+
+static bool ieee80211_key_identical(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
+				    struct ieee80211_key *old,
+				    struct ieee80211_key *new)
+{
+	u8 tkip_old[WLAN_KEY_LEN_TKIP], tkip_new[WLAN_KEY_LEN_TKIP];
+	u8 *tk_old, *tk_new;
+
+	if (!old || new->conf.keylen != old->conf.keylen)
+		return false;
+
+	tk_old = old->conf.key;
+	tk_new = new->conf.key;
+
+	/*
+	 * In station mode, don't compare the TX MIC key, as it's never used
+	 * and offloaded rekeying may not care to send it to the host. This
+	 * is the case in iwlwifi, for example.
+	 */
+	if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION &&
+	    new->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP &&
+	    new->conf.keylen == WLAN_KEY_LEN_TKIP &&
+	    !(new->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE)) {
+		memcpy(tkip_old, tk_old, WLAN_KEY_LEN_TKIP);
+		memcpy(tkip_new, tk_new, WLAN_KEY_LEN_TKIP);
+		memset(tkip_old + NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY, 0, 8);
+		memset(tkip_new + NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY, 0, 8);
+		tk_old = tkip_old;
+		tk_new = tkip_new;
+	}
+
+	return !crypto_memneq(tk_old, tk_new, new->conf.keylen);
+}
+
+int ieee80211_key_link(struct ieee80211_key *key,
+		       struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
+		       struct sta_info *sta)
+{
+	static atomic_t key_color = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+	struct ieee80211_key *old_key;
+	int idx = key->conf.keyidx;
+	bool pairwise = key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE;
+	/*
+	 * We want to delay tailroom updates only for station - in that
+	 * case it helps roaming speed, but in other cases it hurts and
+	 * can cause warnings to appear.
+	 */
+	bool delay_tailroom = sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION;
+	int ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
+
+	if (sta && pairwise) {
+		struct ieee80211_key *alt_key;
+
+		old_key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, sta->ptk[idx]);
+		alt_key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, sta->ptk[idx ^ 1]);
+
+		/* The rekey code assumes that the old and new key are using
+		 * the same cipher. Enforce the assumption for pairwise keys.
+		 */
+		if ((alt_key && alt_key->conf.cipher != key->conf.cipher) ||
+		    (old_key && old_key->conf.cipher != key->conf.cipher))
+			goto out;
+	} else if (sta) {
+		old_key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, sta->gtk[idx]);
+	} else {
+		old_key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, sdata->keys[idx]);
+	}
+
+	/* Non-pairwise keys must also not switch the cipher on rekey */
+	if (!pairwise) {
+		if (old_key && old_key->conf.cipher != key->conf.cipher)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Silently accept key re-installation without really installing the
+	 * new version of the key to avoid nonce reuse or replay issues.
+	 */
+	if (ieee80211_key_identical(sdata, old_key, key)) {
+		ieee80211_key_free_unused(key);
+		ret = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	key->local = sdata->local;
+	key->sdata = sdata;
+	key->sta = sta;
+
+	/*
+	 * Assign a unique ID to every key so we can easily prevent mixed
+	 * key and fragment cache attacks.
+	 */
+	key->color = atomic_inc_return(&key_color);
+
+	increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata);
+
+	ret = ieee80211_key_replace(sdata, sta, pairwise, old_key, key);
+
+	if (!ret) {
+		ieee80211_debugfs_key_add(key);
+		ieee80211_key_destroy(old_key, delay_tailroom);
+	} else {
+		ieee80211_key_free(key, delay_tailroom);
+	}
+
+ out:
+	mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+void ieee80211_key_free(struct ieee80211_key *key, bool delay_tailroom)
+{
+	if (!key)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Replace key with nothingness if it was ever used.
+	 */
+	if (key->sdata)
+		ieee80211_key_replace(key->sdata, key->sta,
+				key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE,
+				key, NULL);
+	ieee80211_key_destroy(key, delay_tailroom);
+}
+
+void ieee80211_reenable_keys(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_key *key;
+	struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *vlan;
+
+	ASSERT_RTNL();
+
+	mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
+
+	sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt = 0;
+	sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec = 0;
+
+	if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP) {
+		list_for_each_entry(vlan, &sdata->u.ap.vlans, u.vlan.list) {
+			vlan->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt = 0;
+			vlan->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec = 0;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (ieee80211_sdata_running(sdata)) {
+		list_for_each_entry(key, &sdata->key_list, list) {
+			increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata);
+			ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(key);
+		}
+	}
+
+	mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
+}
+
+void ieee80211_iter_keys(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
+			 struct ieee80211_vif *vif,
+			 void (*iter)(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
+				      struct ieee80211_vif *vif,
+				      struct ieee80211_sta *sta,
+				      struct ieee80211_key_conf *key,
+				      void *data),
+			 void *iter_data)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_local *local = hw_to_local(hw);
+	struct ieee80211_key *key, *tmp;
+	struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata;
+
+	ASSERT_RTNL();
+
+	mutex_lock(&local->key_mtx);
+	if (vif) {
+		sdata = vif_to_sdata(vif);
+		list_for_each_entry_safe(key, tmp, &sdata->key_list, list)
+			iter(hw, &sdata->vif,
+			     key->sta ? &key->sta->sta : NULL,
+			     &key->conf, iter_data);
+	} else {
+		list_for_each_entry(sdata, &local->interfaces, list)
+			list_for_each_entry_safe(key, tmp,
+						 &sdata->key_list, list)
+				iter(hw, &sdata->vif,
+				     key->sta ? &key->sta->sta : NULL,
+				     &key->conf, iter_data);
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&local->key_mtx);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ieee80211_iter_keys);
+
+static void
+_ieee80211_iter_keys_rcu(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
+			 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
+			 void (*iter)(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
+				      struct ieee80211_vif *vif,
+				      struct ieee80211_sta *sta,
+				      struct ieee80211_key_conf *key,
+				      void *data),
+			 void *iter_data)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_key *key;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(key, &sdata->key_list, list) {
+		/* skip keys of station in removal process */
+		if (key->sta && key->sta->removed)
+			continue;
+		if (!(key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE))
+			continue;
+
+		iter(hw, &sdata->vif,
+		     key->sta ? &key->sta->sta : NULL,
+		     &key->conf, iter_data);
+	}
+}
+
+void ieee80211_iter_keys_rcu(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
+			     struct ieee80211_vif *vif,
+			     void (*iter)(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
+					  struct ieee80211_vif *vif,
+					  struct ieee80211_sta *sta,
+					  struct ieee80211_key_conf *key,
+					  void *data),
+			     void *iter_data)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_local *local = hw_to_local(hw);
+	struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata;
+
+	if (vif) {
+		sdata = vif_to_sdata(vif);
+		_ieee80211_iter_keys_rcu(hw, sdata, iter, iter_data);
+	} else {
+		list_for_each_entry_rcu(sdata, &local->interfaces, list)
+			_ieee80211_iter_keys_rcu(hw, sdata, iter, iter_data);
+	}
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ieee80211_iter_keys_rcu);
+
+static void ieee80211_free_keys_iface(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
+				      struct list_head *keys)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_key *key, *tmp;
+
+	decrease_tailroom_need_count(sdata,
+				     sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec);
+	sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec = 0;
+
+	ieee80211_debugfs_key_remove_mgmt_default(sdata);
+	ieee80211_debugfs_key_remove_beacon_default(sdata);
+
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(key, tmp, &sdata->key_list, list) {
+		ieee80211_key_replace(key->sdata, key->sta,
+				key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE,
+				key, NULL);
+		list_add_tail(&key->list, keys);
+	}
+
+	ieee80211_debugfs_key_update_default(sdata);
+}
+
+void ieee80211_free_keys(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
+			 bool force_synchronize)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_local *local = sdata->local;
+	struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *vlan;
+	struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *master;
+	struct ieee80211_key *key, *tmp;
+	LIST_HEAD(keys);
+
+	cancel_delayed_work_sync(&sdata->dec_tailroom_needed_wk);
+
+	mutex_lock(&local->key_mtx);
+
+	ieee80211_free_keys_iface(sdata, &keys);
+
+	if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP) {
+		list_for_each_entry(vlan, &sdata->u.ap.vlans, u.vlan.list)
+			ieee80211_free_keys_iface(vlan, &keys);
+	}
+
+	if (!list_empty(&keys) || force_synchronize)
+		synchronize_net();
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(key, tmp, &keys, list)
+		__ieee80211_key_destroy(key, false);
+
+	if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN) {
+		if (sdata->bss) {
+			master = container_of(sdata->bss,
+					      struct ieee80211_sub_if_data,
+					      u.ap);
+
+			WARN_ON_ONCE(sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt !=
+				     master->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt);
+		}
+	} else {
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt ||
+			     sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec);
+	}
+
+	if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP) {
+		list_for_each_entry(vlan, &sdata->u.ap.vlans, u.vlan.list)
+			WARN_ON_ONCE(vlan->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt ||
+				     vlan->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec);
+	}
+
+	mutex_unlock(&local->key_mtx);
+}
+
+void ieee80211_free_sta_keys(struct ieee80211_local *local,
+			     struct sta_info *sta)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_key *key;
+	int i;
+
+	mutex_lock(&local->key_mtx);
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sta->gtk); i++) {
+		key = key_mtx_dereference(local, sta->gtk[i]);
+		if (!key)
+			continue;
+		ieee80211_key_replace(key->sdata, key->sta,
+				key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE,
+				key, NULL);
+		__ieee80211_key_destroy(key, key->sdata->vif.type ==
+					NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION);
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS; i++) {
+		key = key_mtx_dereference(local, sta->ptk[i]);
+		if (!key)
+			continue;
+		ieee80211_key_replace(key->sdata, key->sta,
+				key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE,
+				key, NULL);
+		__ieee80211_key_destroy(key, key->sdata->vif.type ==
+					NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION);
+	}
+
+	mutex_unlock(&local->key_mtx);
+}
+
+void ieee80211_delayed_tailroom_dec(struct work_struct *wk)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata;
+
+	sdata = container_of(wk, struct ieee80211_sub_if_data,
+			     dec_tailroom_needed_wk.work);
+
+	/*
+	 * The reason for the delayed tailroom needed decrementing is to
+	 * make roaming faster: during roaming, all keys are first deleted
+	 * and then new keys are installed. The first new key causes the
+	 * crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt to go from 0 to 1, which invokes
+	 * the cost of synchronize_net() (which can be slow). Avoid this
+	 * by deferring the crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt decrementing on
+	 * key removal for a while, so if we roam the value is larger than
+	 * zero and no 0->1 transition happens.
+	 *
+	 * The cost is that if the AP switching was from an AP with keys
+	 * to one without, we still allocate tailroom while it would no
+	 * longer be needed. However, in the typical (fast) roaming case
+	 * within an ESS this usually won't happen.
+	 */
+
+	mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
+	decrease_tailroom_need_count(sdata,
+				     sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec);
+	sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec = 0;
+	mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
+}
+
+void ieee80211_gtk_rekey_notify(struct ieee80211_vif *vif, const u8 *bssid,
+				const u8 *replay_ctr, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = vif_to_sdata(vif);
+
+	trace_api_gtk_rekey_notify(sdata, bssid, replay_ctr);
+
+	cfg80211_gtk_rekey_notify(sdata->dev, bssid, replay_ctr, gfp);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ieee80211_gtk_rekey_notify);
+
+void ieee80211_get_key_rx_seq(struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf,
+			      int tid, struct ieee80211_key_seq *seq)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_key *key;
+	const u8 *pn;
+
+	key = container_of(keyconf, struct ieee80211_key, conf);
+
+	switch (key->conf.cipher) {
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP:
+		if (WARN_ON(tid < 0 || tid >= IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS))
+			return;
+		seq->tkip.iv32 = key->u.tkip.rx[tid].iv32;
+		seq->tkip.iv16 = key->u.tkip.rx[tid].iv16;
+		break;
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP:
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256:
+		if (WARN_ON(tid < -1 || tid >= IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS))
+			return;
+		if (tid < 0)
+			pn = key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS];
+		else
+			pn = key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[tid];
+		memcpy(seq->ccmp.pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
+		break;
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC:
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256:
+		if (WARN_ON(tid != 0))
+			return;
+		pn = key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn;
+		memcpy(seq->aes_cmac.pn, pn, IEEE80211_CMAC_PN_LEN);
+		break;
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128:
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256:
+		if (WARN_ON(tid != 0))
+			return;
+		pn = key->u.aes_gmac.rx_pn;
+		memcpy(seq->aes_gmac.pn, pn, IEEE80211_GMAC_PN_LEN);
+		break;
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP:
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256:
+		if (WARN_ON(tid < -1 || tid >= IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS))
+			return;
+		if (tid < 0)
+			pn = key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS];
+		else
+			pn = key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[tid];
+		memcpy(seq->gcmp.pn, pn, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN);
+		break;
+	}
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ieee80211_get_key_rx_seq);
+
+void ieee80211_set_key_rx_seq(struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf,
+			      int tid, struct ieee80211_key_seq *seq)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_key *key;
+	u8 *pn;
+
+	key = container_of(keyconf, struct ieee80211_key, conf);
+
+	switch (key->conf.cipher) {
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP:
+		if (WARN_ON(tid < 0 || tid >= IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS))
+			return;
+		key->u.tkip.rx[tid].iv32 = seq->tkip.iv32;
+		key->u.tkip.rx[tid].iv16 = seq->tkip.iv16;
+		break;
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP:
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256:
+		if (WARN_ON(tid < -1 || tid >= IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS))
+			return;
+		if (tid < 0)
+			pn = key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS];
+		else
+			pn = key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[tid];
+		memcpy(pn, seq->ccmp.pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
+		break;
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC:
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256:
+		if (WARN_ON(tid != 0))
+			return;
+		pn = key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn;
+		memcpy(pn, seq->aes_cmac.pn, IEEE80211_CMAC_PN_LEN);
+		break;
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128:
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256:
+		if (WARN_ON(tid != 0))
+			return;
+		pn = key->u.aes_gmac.rx_pn;
+		memcpy(pn, seq->aes_gmac.pn, IEEE80211_GMAC_PN_LEN);
+		break;
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP:
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256:
+		if (WARN_ON(tid < -1 || tid >= IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS))
+			return;
+		if (tid < 0)
+			pn = key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS];
+		else
+			pn = key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[tid];
+		memcpy(pn, seq->gcmp.pn, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN);
+		break;
+	default:
+		WARN_ON(1);
+		break;
+	}
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ieee80211_set_key_rx_seq);
+
+void ieee80211_remove_key(struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_key *key;
+
+	key = container_of(keyconf, struct ieee80211_key, conf);
+
+	assert_key_lock(key->local);
+
+	/*
+	 * if key was uploaded, we assume the driver will/has remove(d)
+	 * it, so adjust bookkeeping accordingly
+	 */
+	if (key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE) {
+		key->flags &= ~KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE;
+
+		if (!(key->conf.flags & (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC |
+					 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE |
+					 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_RESERVE_TAILROOM)))
+			increment_tailroom_need_count(key->sdata);
+	}
+
+	ieee80211_key_free(key, false);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ieee80211_remove_key);
+
+struct ieee80211_key_conf *
+ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add(struct ieee80211_vif *vif,
+			struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = vif_to_sdata(vif);
+	struct ieee80211_local *local = sdata->local;
+	struct ieee80211_key *key;
+	int err;
+
+	if (WARN_ON(!local->wowlan))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+	if (WARN_ON(vif->type != NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+	key = ieee80211_key_alloc(keyconf->cipher, keyconf->keyidx,
+				  keyconf->keylen, keyconf->key,
+				  0, NULL, NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(key))
+		return ERR_CAST(key);
+
+	if (sdata->u.mgd.mfp != IEEE80211_MFP_DISABLED)
+		key->conf.flags |= IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_RX_MGMT;
+
+	err = ieee80211_key_link(key, sdata, NULL);
+	if (err)
+		return ERR_PTR(err);
+
+	return &key->conf;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add);