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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-27 10:05:51 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-27 10:05:51 +0000 |
commit | 5d1646d90e1f2cceb9f0828f4b28318cd0ec7744 (patch) | |
tree | a94efe259b9009378be6d90eb30d2b019d95c194 /tools/perf/Documentation/security.txt | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | linux-430c2fc249ea5c0536abd21c23382884005c9093.tar.xz linux-430c2fc249ea5c0536abd21c23382884005c9093.zip |
Adding upstream version 5.10.209.upstream/5.10.209upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/perf/Documentation/security.txt')
-rw-r--r-- | tools/perf/Documentation/security.txt | 237 |
1 files changed, 237 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/perf/Documentation/security.txt b/tools/perf/Documentation/security.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4fe3b8b19 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/perf/Documentation/security.txt @@ -0,0 +1,237 @@ +Overview +======== + +For general security related questions of perf_event_open() syscall usage, +performance monitoring and observability operations by Perf see here: +https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/perf-security.html + +Enabling LSM based mandatory access control (MAC) to perf_event_open() syscall +============================================================================== + +LSM hooks for mandatory access control for perf_event_open() syscall can be +used starting from Linux v5.3. Below are the steps to extend Fedora (v31) with +Targeted policy with perf_event_open() access control capabilities: + +1. Download selinux-policy SRPM package (e.g. selinux-policy-3.14.4-48.fc31.src.rpm on FC31) + and install it so rpmbuild directory would exist in the current working directory: + + # rpm -Uhv selinux-policy-3.14.4-48.fc31.src.rpm + +2. Get into rpmbuild/SPECS directory and unpack the source code: + + # rpmbuild -bp selinux-policy.spec + +3. Place patch below at rpmbuild/BUILD/selinux-policy-b86eaaf4dbcf2d51dd4432df7185c0eaf3cbcc02 + directory and apply it: + + # patch -p1 < selinux-policy-perf-events-perfmon.patch + patching file policy/flask/access_vectors + patching file policy/flask/security_classes + # cat selinux-policy-perf-events-perfmon.patch +diff -Nura a/policy/flask/access_vectors b/policy/flask/access_vectors +--- a/policy/flask/access_vectors 2020-02-04 18:19:53.000000000 +0300 ++++ b/policy/flask/access_vectors 2020-02-28 23:37:25.000000000 +0300 +@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ + wake_alarm + block_suspend + audit_read ++ perfmon + } + + # +@@ -1099,3 +1100,15 @@ + + class xdp_socket + inherits socket ++ ++class perf_event ++{ ++ open ++ cpu ++ kernel ++ tracepoint ++ read ++ write ++} ++ ++ +diff -Nura a/policy/flask/security_classes b/policy/flask/security_classes +--- a/policy/flask/security_classes 2020-02-04 18:19:53.000000000 +0300 ++++ b/policy/flask/security_classes 2020-02-28 21:35:17.000000000 +0300 +@@ -200,4 +200,6 @@ + + class xdp_socket + ++class perf_event ++ + # FLASK + +4. Get into rpmbuild/SPECS directory and build policy packages from patched sources: + + # rpmbuild --noclean --noprep -ba selinux-policy.spec + + so you have this: + + # ls -alh rpmbuild/RPMS/noarch/ + total 33M + drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 4.0K Mar 20 12:16 . + drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4.0K Mar 20 12:16 .. + -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 112K Mar 20 12:16 selinux-policy-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm + -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 1.2M Mar 20 12:17 selinux-policy-devel-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm + -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 2.3M Mar 20 12:17 selinux-policy-doc-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm + -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 12M Mar 20 12:17 selinux-policy-minimum-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm + -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 4.5M Mar 20 12:16 selinux-policy-mls-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm + -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 111K Mar 20 12:16 selinux-policy-sandbox-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm + -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 14M Mar 20 12:17 selinux-policy-targeted-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm + +5. Install SELinux packages from Fedora repo, if not already done so, and + update with the patched rpms above: + + # rpm -Uhv rpmbuild/RPMS/noarch/selinux-policy-* + +6. Enable SELinux Permissive mode for Targeted policy, if not already done so: + + # cat /etc/selinux/config + + # This file controls the state of SELinux on the system. + # SELINUX= can take one of these three values: + # enforcing - SELinux security policy is enforced. + # permissive - SELinux prints warnings instead of enforcing. + # disabled - No SELinux policy is loaded. + SELINUX=permissive + # SELINUXTYPE= can take one of these three values: + # targeted - Targeted processes are protected, + # minimum - Modification of targeted policy. Only selected processes are protected. + # mls - Multi Level Security protection. + SELINUXTYPE=targeted + +7. Enable filesystem SELinux labeling at the next reboot: + + # touch /.autorelabel + +8. Reboot machine and it will label filesystems and load Targeted policy into the kernel; + +9. Login and check that dmesg output doesn't mention that perf_event class is unknown to SELinux subsystem; + +10. Check that SELinux is enabled and in Permissive mode + + # getenforce + Permissive + +11. Turn SELinux into Enforcing mode: + + # setenforce 1 + # getenforce + Enforcing + +Opening access to perf_event_open() syscall on Fedora with SELinux +================================================================== + +Access to performance monitoring and observability operations by Perf +can be limited for superuser or CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged +processes. MAC policy settings (e.g. SELinux) can be loaded into the kernel +and prevent unauthorized access to perf_event_open() syscall. In such case +Perf tool provides a message similar to the one below: + + # perf stat + Error: + Access to performance monitoring and observability operations is limited. + Enforced MAC policy settings (SELinux) can limit access to performance + monitoring and observability operations. Inspect system audit records for + more perf_event access control information and adjusting the policy. + Consider adjusting /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid setting to open + access to performance monitoring and observability operations for users + without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN Linux capability. + perf_event_paranoid setting is -1: + -1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users + Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK + >= 0: Disallow raw and ftrace function tracepoint access + >= 1: Disallow CPU event access + >= 2: Disallow kernel profiling + To make the adjusted perf_event_paranoid setting permanent preserve it + in /etc/sysctl.conf (e.g. kernel.perf_event_paranoid = <setting>) + +To make sure that access is limited by MAC policy settings inspect system +audit records using journalctl command or /var/log/audit/audit.log so the +output would contain AVC denied records related to perf_event: + + # journalctl --reverse --no-pager | grep perf_event + + python3[1318099]: SELinux is preventing perf from open access on the perf_event labeled unconfined_t. + If you believe that perf should be allowed open access on perf_event labeled unconfined_t by default. + setroubleshoot[1318099]: SELinux is preventing perf from open access on the perf_event labeled unconfined_t. For complete SELinux messages run: sealert -l 4595ce5b-e58f-462c-9d86-3bc2074935de + audit[1318098]: AVC avc: denied { open } for pid=1318098 comm="perf" scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=perf_event permissive=0 + +In order to open access to perf_event_open() syscall MAC policy settings can +require to be extended. On SELinux system this can be done by loading a special +policy module extending base policy settings. Perf related policy module can +be generated using the system audit records about blocking perf_event access. +Run the command below to generate my-perf.te policy extension file with +perf_event related rules: + + # ausearch -c 'perf' --raw | audit2allow -M my-perf && cat my-perf.te + + module my-perf 1.0; + + require { + type unconfined_t; + class perf_event { cpu kernel open read tracepoint write }; + } + + #============= unconfined_t ============== + allow unconfined_t self:perf_event { cpu kernel open read tracepoint write }; + +Now compile, pack and load my-perf.pp extension module into the kernel: + + # checkmodule -M -m -o my-perf.mod my-perf.te + # semodule_package -o my-perf.pp -m my-perf.mod + # semodule -X 300 -i my-perf.pp + +After all those taken steps above access to perf_event_open() syscall should +now be allowed by the policy settings. Check access running Perf like this: + + # perf stat + ^C + Performance counter stats for 'system wide': + + 36,387.41 msec cpu-clock # 7.999 CPUs utilized + 2,629 context-switches # 0.072 K/sec + 57 cpu-migrations # 0.002 K/sec + 1 page-faults # 0.000 K/sec + 263,721,559 cycles # 0.007 GHz + 175,746,713 instructions # 0.67 insn per cycle + 19,628,798 branches # 0.539 M/sec + 1,259,201 branch-misses # 6.42% of all branches + + 4.549061439 seconds time elapsed + +The generated perf-event.pp related policy extension module can be removed +from the kernel using this command: + + # semodule -X 300 -r my-perf + +Alternatively the module can be temporarily disabled and enabled back using +these two commands: + + # semodule -d my-perf + # semodule -e my-perf + +If something went wrong +======================= + +To turn SELinux into Permissive mode: + # setenforce 0 + +To fully disable SELinux during kernel boot [3] set kernel command line parameter selinux=0 + +To remove SELinux labeling from local filesystems: + # find / -mount -print0 | xargs -0 setfattr -h -x security.selinux + +To fully turn SELinux off a machine set SELINUX=disabled at /etc/selinux/config file and reboot; + +Links +===== + +[1] https://download-ib01.fedoraproject.org/pub/fedora/linux/updates/31/Everything/SRPMS/Packages/s/selinux-policy-3.14.4-49.fc31.src.rpm +[2] https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/Fedora/11/html/Security-Enhanced_Linux/sect-Security-Enhanced_Linux-Working_with_SELinux-Enabling_and_Disabling_SELinux.html +[3] https://danwalsh.livejournal.com/10972.html |