diff options
Diffstat (limited to '')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c | 2100 |
1 files changed, 2100 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c b/drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..69882ff4d --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c @@ -0,0 +1,2100 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * pkey device driver + * + * Copyright IBM Corp. 2017,2019 + * Author(s): Harald Freudenberger + */ + +#define KMSG_COMPONENT "pkey" +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KMSG_COMPONENT ": " fmt + +#include <linux/fs.h> +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/miscdevice.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/kallsyms.h> +#include <linux/debugfs.h> +#include <linux/random.h> +#include <linux/cpufeature.h> +#include <asm/zcrypt.h> +#include <asm/cpacf.h> +#include <asm/pkey.h> +#include <crypto/aes.h> + +#include "zcrypt_api.h" +#include "zcrypt_ccamisc.h" +#include "zcrypt_ep11misc.h" + +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); +MODULE_AUTHOR("IBM Corporation"); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("s390 protected key interface"); + +#define KEYBLOBBUFSIZE 8192 /* key buffer size used for internal processing */ +#define PROTKEYBLOBBUFSIZE 256 /* protected key buffer size used internal */ +#define MAXAPQNSINLIST 64 /* max 64 apqns within a apqn list */ + +/* + * debug feature data and functions + */ + +static debug_info_t *debug_info; + +#define DEBUG_DBG(...) debug_sprintf_event(debug_info, 6, ##__VA_ARGS__) +#define DEBUG_INFO(...) debug_sprintf_event(debug_info, 5, ##__VA_ARGS__) +#define DEBUG_WARN(...) debug_sprintf_event(debug_info, 4, ##__VA_ARGS__) +#define DEBUG_ERR(...) debug_sprintf_event(debug_info, 3, ##__VA_ARGS__) + +static void __init pkey_debug_init(void) +{ + /* 5 arguments per dbf entry (including the format string ptr) */ + debug_info = debug_register("pkey", 1, 1, 5 * sizeof(long)); + debug_register_view(debug_info, &debug_sprintf_view); + debug_set_level(debug_info, 3); +} + +static void __exit pkey_debug_exit(void) +{ + debug_unregister(debug_info); +} + +/* inside view of a protected key token (only type 0x00 version 0x01) */ +struct protaeskeytoken { + u8 type; /* 0x00 for PAES specific key tokens */ + u8 res0[3]; + u8 version; /* should be 0x01 for protected AES key token */ + u8 res1[3]; + u32 keytype; /* key type, one of the PKEY_KEYTYPE values */ + u32 len; /* bytes actually stored in protkey[] */ + u8 protkey[MAXPROTKEYSIZE]; /* the protected key blob */ +} __packed; + +/* inside view of a clear key token (type 0x00 version 0x02) */ +struct clearaeskeytoken { + u8 type; /* 0x00 for PAES specific key tokens */ + u8 res0[3]; + u8 version; /* 0x02 for clear AES key token */ + u8 res1[3]; + u32 keytype; /* key type, one of the PKEY_KEYTYPE values */ + u32 len; /* bytes actually stored in clearkey[] */ + u8 clearkey[]; /* clear key value */ +} __packed; + +/* + * Create a protected key from a clear key value. + */ +static int pkey_clr2protkey(u32 keytype, + const struct pkey_clrkey *clrkey, + struct pkey_protkey *protkey) +{ + /* mask of available pckmo subfunctions */ + static cpacf_mask_t pckmo_functions; + + long fc; + int keysize; + u8 paramblock[64]; + + switch (keytype) { + case PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128: + keysize = 16; + fc = CPACF_PCKMO_ENC_AES_128_KEY; + break; + case PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_192: + keysize = 24; + fc = CPACF_PCKMO_ENC_AES_192_KEY; + break; + case PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256: + keysize = 32; + fc = CPACF_PCKMO_ENC_AES_256_KEY; + break; + default: + DEBUG_ERR("%s unknown/unsupported keytype %d\n", + __func__, keytype); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* Did we already check for PCKMO ? */ + if (!pckmo_functions.bytes[0]) { + /* no, so check now */ + if (!cpacf_query(CPACF_PCKMO, &pckmo_functions)) + return -ENODEV; + } + /* check for the pckmo subfunction we need now */ + if (!cpacf_test_func(&pckmo_functions, fc)) { + DEBUG_ERR("%s pckmo functions not available\n", __func__); + return -ENODEV; + } + + /* prepare param block */ + memset(paramblock, 0, sizeof(paramblock)); + memcpy(paramblock, clrkey->clrkey, keysize); + + /* call the pckmo instruction */ + cpacf_pckmo(fc, paramblock); + + /* copy created protected key */ + protkey->type = keytype; + protkey->len = keysize + 32; + memcpy(protkey->protkey, paramblock, keysize + 32); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Find card and transform secure key into protected key. + */ +static int pkey_skey2pkey(const u8 *key, struct pkey_protkey *pkey) +{ + int rc, verify; + u16 cardnr, domain; + struct keytoken_header *hdr = (struct keytoken_header *)key; + + /* + * The cca_xxx2protkey call may fail when a card has been + * addressed where the master key was changed after last fetch + * of the mkvp into the cache. Try 3 times: First witout verify + * then with verify and last round with verify and old master + * key verification pattern match not ignored. + */ + for (verify = 0; verify < 3; verify++) { + rc = cca_findcard(key, &cardnr, &domain, verify); + if (rc < 0) + continue; + if (rc > 0 && verify < 2) + continue; + switch (hdr->version) { + case TOKVER_CCA_AES: + rc = cca_sec2protkey(cardnr, domain, + key, pkey->protkey, + &pkey->len, &pkey->type); + break; + case TOKVER_CCA_VLSC: + rc = cca_cipher2protkey(cardnr, domain, + key, pkey->protkey, + &pkey->len, &pkey->type); + break; + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + if (rc == 0) + break; + } + + if (rc) + DEBUG_DBG("%s failed rc=%d\n", __func__, rc); + + return rc; +} + +/* + * Construct EP11 key with given clear key value. + */ +static int pkey_clr2ep11key(const u8 *clrkey, size_t clrkeylen, + u8 *keybuf, size_t *keybuflen) +{ + int i, rc; + u16 card, dom; + u32 nr_apqns, *apqns = NULL; + + /* build a list of apqns suitable for ep11 keys with cpacf support */ + rc = ep11_findcard2(&apqns, &nr_apqns, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, + ZCRYPT_CEX7, EP11_API_V, NULL); + if (rc) + goto out; + + /* go through the list of apqns and try to bild an ep11 key */ + for (rc = -ENODEV, i = 0; i < nr_apqns; i++) { + card = apqns[i] >> 16; + dom = apqns[i] & 0xFFFF; + rc = ep11_clr2keyblob(card, dom, clrkeylen * 8, + 0, clrkey, keybuf, keybuflen); + if (rc == 0) + break; + } + +out: + kfree(apqns); + if (rc) + DEBUG_DBG("%s failed rc=%d\n", __func__, rc); + return rc; +} + +/* + * Find card and transform EP11 secure key into protected key. + */ +static int pkey_ep11key2pkey(const u8 *key, struct pkey_protkey *pkey) +{ + int i, rc; + u16 card, dom; + u32 nr_apqns, *apqns = NULL; + struct ep11keyblob *kb = (struct ep11keyblob *) key; + + /* build a list of apqns suitable for this key */ + rc = ep11_findcard2(&apqns, &nr_apqns, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, + ZCRYPT_CEX7, EP11_API_V, kb->wkvp); + if (rc) + goto out; + + /* go through the list of apqns and try to derive an pkey */ + for (rc = -ENODEV, i = 0; i < nr_apqns; i++) { + card = apqns[i] >> 16; + dom = apqns[i] & 0xFFFF; + pkey->len = sizeof(pkey->protkey); + rc = ep11_kblob2protkey(card, dom, key, kb->head.len, + pkey->protkey, &pkey->len, &pkey->type); + if (rc == 0) + break; + } + +out: + kfree(apqns); + if (rc) + DEBUG_DBG("%s failed rc=%d\n", __func__, rc); + return rc; +} + +/* + * Verify key and give back some info about the key. + */ +static int pkey_verifykey(const struct pkey_seckey *seckey, + u16 *pcardnr, u16 *pdomain, + u16 *pkeysize, u32 *pattributes) +{ + struct secaeskeytoken *t = (struct secaeskeytoken *) seckey; + u16 cardnr, domain; + int rc; + + /* check the secure key for valid AES secure key */ + rc = cca_check_secaeskeytoken(debug_info, 3, (u8 *) seckey, 0); + if (rc) + goto out; + if (pattributes) + *pattributes = PKEY_VERIFY_ATTR_AES; + if (pkeysize) + *pkeysize = t->bitsize; + + /* try to find a card which can handle this key */ + rc = cca_findcard(seckey->seckey, &cardnr, &domain, 1); + if (rc < 0) + goto out; + + if (rc > 0) { + /* key mkvp matches to old master key mkvp */ + DEBUG_DBG("%s secure key has old mkvp\n", __func__); + if (pattributes) + *pattributes |= PKEY_VERIFY_ATTR_OLD_MKVP; + rc = 0; + } + + if (pcardnr) + *pcardnr = cardnr; + if (pdomain) + *pdomain = domain; + +out: + DEBUG_DBG("%s rc=%d\n", __func__, rc); + return rc; +} + +/* + * Generate a random protected key + */ +static int pkey_genprotkey(u32 keytype, struct pkey_protkey *protkey) +{ + struct pkey_clrkey clrkey; + int keysize; + int rc; + + switch (keytype) { + case PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128: + keysize = 16; + break; + case PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_192: + keysize = 24; + break; + case PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256: + keysize = 32; + break; + default: + DEBUG_ERR("%s unknown/unsupported keytype %d\n", __func__, + keytype); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* generate a dummy random clear key */ + get_random_bytes(clrkey.clrkey, keysize); + + /* convert it to a dummy protected key */ + rc = pkey_clr2protkey(keytype, &clrkey, protkey); + if (rc) + return rc; + + /* replace the key part of the protected key with random bytes */ + get_random_bytes(protkey->protkey, keysize); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Verify if a protected key is still valid + */ +static int pkey_verifyprotkey(const struct pkey_protkey *protkey) +{ + unsigned long fc; + struct { + u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + u8 key[MAXPROTKEYSIZE]; + } param; + u8 null_msg[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + u8 dest_buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + unsigned int k; + + switch (protkey->type) { + case PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128: + fc = CPACF_KMC_PAES_128; + break; + case PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_192: + fc = CPACF_KMC_PAES_192; + break; + case PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256: + fc = CPACF_KMC_PAES_256; + break; + default: + DEBUG_ERR("%s unknown/unsupported keytype %d\n", __func__, + protkey->type); + return -EINVAL; + } + + memset(null_msg, 0, sizeof(null_msg)); + + memset(param.iv, 0, sizeof(param.iv)); + memcpy(param.key, protkey->protkey, sizeof(param.key)); + + k = cpacf_kmc(fc | CPACF_ENCRYPT, ¶m, null_msg, dest_buf, + sizeof(null_msg)); + if (k != sizeof(null_msg)) { + DEBUG_ERR("%s protected key is not valid\n", __func__); + return -EKEYREJECTED; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Transform a non-CCA key token into a protected key + */ +static int pkey_nonccatok2pkey(const u8 *key, u32 keylen, + struct pkey_protkey *protkey) +{ + int rc = -EINVAL; + u8 *tmpbuf = NULL; + struct keytoken_header *hdr = (struct keytoken_header *)key; + + switch (hdr->version) { + case TOKVER_PROTECTED_KEY: { + struct protaeskeytoken *t; + + if (keylen != sizeof(struct protaeskeytoken)) + goto out; + t = (struct protaeskeytoken *)key; + protkey->len = t->len; + protkey->type = t->keytype; + memcpy(protkey->protkey, t->protkey, + sizeof(protkey->protkey)); + rc = pkey_verifyprotkey(protkey); + break; + } + case TOKVER_CLEAR_KEY: { + struct clearaeskeytoken *t; + struct pkey_clrkey ckey; + union u_tmpbuf { + u8 skey[SECKEYBLOBSIZE]; + u8 ep11key[MAXEP11AESKEYBLOBSIZE]; + }; + size_t tmpbuflen = sizeof(union u_tmpbuf); + + if (keylen < sizeof(struct clearaeskeytoken)) + goto out; + t = (struct clearaeskeytoken *)key; + if (keylen != sizeof(*t) + t->len) + goto out; + if ((t->keytype == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128 && t->len == 16) + || (t->keytype == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_192 && t->len == 24) + || (t->keytype == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256 && t->len == 32)) + memcpy(ckey.clrkey, t->clearkey, t->len); + else + goto out; + /* alloc temp key buffer space */ + tmpbuf = kmalloc(tmpbuflen, GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!tmpbuf) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + /* try direct way with the PCKMO instruction */ + rc = pkey_clr2protkey(t->keytype, &ckey, protkey); + if (rc == 0) + break; + /* PCKMO failed, so try the CCA secure key way */ + rc = cca_clr2seckey(0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, t->keytype, + ckey.clrkey, tmpbuf); + if (rc == 0) + rc = pkey_skey2pkey(tmpbuf, protkey); + if (rc == 0) + break; + /* if the CCA way also failed, let's try via EP11 */ + rc = pkey_clr2ep11key(ckey.clrkey, t->len, + tmpbuf, &tmpbuflen); + if (rc == 0) + rc = pkey_ep11key2pkey(tmpbuf, protkey); + /* now we should really have an protected key */ + DEBUG_ERR("%s unable to build protected key from clear", + __func__); + break; + } + case TOKVER_EP11_AES: { + /* check ep11 key for exportable as protected key */ + rc = ep11_check_aes_key(debug_info, 3, key, keylen, 1); + if (rc) + goto out; + rc = pkey_ep11key2pkey(key, protkey); + break; + } + case TOKVER_EP11_AES_WITH_HEADER: + /* check ep11 key with header for exportable as protected key */ + rc = ep11_check_aes_key_with_hdr(debug_info, 3, key, keylen, 1); + if (rc) + goto out; + rc = pkey_ep11key2pkey(key + sizeof(struct ep11kblob_header), + protkey); + break; + default: + DEBUG_ERR("%s unknown/unsupported non-CCA token version %d\n", + __func__, hdr->version); + rc = -EINVAL; + } + +out: + kfree(tmpbuf); + return rc; +} + +/* + * Transform a CCA internal key token into a protected key + */ +static int pkey_ccainttok2pkey(const u8 *key, u32 keylen, + struct pkey_protkey *protkey) +{ + struct keytoken_header *hdr = (struct keytoken_header *)key; + + switch (hdr->version) { + case TOKVER_CCA_AES: + if (keylen != sizeof(struct secaeskeytoken)) + return -EINVAL; + break; + case TOKVER_CCA_VLSC: + if (keylen < hdr->len || keylen > MAXCCAVLSCTOKENSIZE) + return -EINVAL; + break; + default: + DEBUG_ERR("%s unknown/unsupported CCA internal token version %d\n", + __func__, hdr->version); + return -EINVAL; + } + + return pkey_skey2pkey(key, protkey); +} + +/* + * Transform a key blob (of any type) into a protected key + */ +int pkey_keyblob2pkey(const u8 *key, u32 keylen, + struct pkey_protkey *protkey) +{ + int rc; + struct keytoken_header *hdr = (struct keytoken_header *)key; + + if (keylen < sizeof(struct keytoken_header)) { + DEBUG_ERR("%s invalid keylen %d\n", __func__, keylen); + return -EINVAL; + } + + switch (hdr->type) { + case TOKTYPE_NON_CCA: + rc = pkey_nonccatok2pkey(key, keylen, protkey); + break; + case TOKTYPE_CCA_INTERNAL: + rc = pkey_ccainttok2pkey(key, keylen, protkey); + break; + default: + DEBUG_ERR("%s unknown/unsupported blob type %d\n", + __func__, hdr->type); + return -EINVAL; + } + + DEBUG_DBG("%s rc=%d\n", __func__, rc); + return rc; + +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_keyblob2pkey); + +static int pkey_genseckey2(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t nr_apqns, + enum pkey_key_type ktype, enum pkey_key_size ksize, + u32 kflags, u8 *keybuf, size_t *keybufsize) +{ + int i, card, dom, rc; + + /* check for at least one apqn given */ + if (!apqns || !nr_apqns) + return -EINVAL; + + /* check key type and size */ + switch (ktype) { + case PKEY_TYPE_CCA_DATA: + case PKEY_TYPE_CCA_CIPHER: + if (*keybufsize < SECKEYBLOBSIZE) + return -EINVAL; + break; + case PKEY_TYPE_EP11: + if (*keybufsize < MINEP11AESKEYBLOBSIZE) + return -EINVAL; + break; + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + switch (ksize) { + case PKEY_SIZE_AES_128: + case PKEY_SIZE_AES_192: + case PKEY_SIZE_AES_256: + break; + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* simple try all apqns from the list */ + for (i = 0, rc = -ENODEV; i < nr_apqns; i++) { + card = apqns[i].card; + dom = apqns[i].domain; + if (ktype == PKEY_TYPE_EP11) { + rc = ep11_genaeskey(card, dom, ksize, kflags, + keybuf, keybufsize); + } else if (ktype == PKEY_TYPE_CCA_DATA) { + rc = cca_genseckey(card, dom, ksize, keybuf); + *keybufsize = (rc ? 0 : SECKEYBLOBSIZE); + } else /* TOKVER_CCA_VLSC */ + rc = cca_gencipherkey(card, dom, ksize, kflags, + keybuf, keybufsize); + if (rc == 0) + break; + } + + return rc; +} + +static int pkey_clr2seckey2(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t nr_apqns, + enum pkey_key_type ktype, enum pkey_key_size ksize, + u32 kflags, const u8 *clrkey, + u8 *keybuf, size_t *keybufsize) +{ + int i, card, dom, rc; + + /* check for at least one apqn given */ + if (!apqns || !nr_apqns) + return -EINVAL; + + /* check key type and size */ + switch (ktype) { + case PKEY_TYPE_CCA_DATA: + case PKEY_TYPE_CCA_CIPHER: + if (*keybufsize < SECKEYBLOBSIZE) + return -EINVAL; + break; + case PKEY_TYPE_EP11: + if (*keybufsize < MINEP11AESKEYBLOBSIZE) + return -EINVAL; + break; + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + switch (ksize) { + case PKEY_SIZE_AES_128: + case PKEY_SIZE_AES_192: + case PKEY_SIZE_AES_256: + break; + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* simple try all apqns from the list */ + for (i = 0, rc = -ENODEV; i < nr_apqns; i++) { + card = apqns[i].card; + dom = apqns[i].domain; + if (ktype == PKEY_TYPE_EP11) { + rc = ep11_clr2keyblob(card, dom, ksize, kflags, + clrkey, keybuf, keybufsize); + } else if (ktype == PKEY_TYPE_CCA_DATA) { + rc = cca_clr2seckey(card, dom, ksize, + clrkey, keybuf); + *keybufsize = (rc ? 0 : SECKEYBLOBSIZE); + } else /* TOKVER_CCA_VLSC */ + rc = cca_clr2cipherkey(card, dom, ksize, kflags, + clrkey, keybuf, keybufsize); + if (rc == 0) + break; + } + + return rc; +} + +static int pkey_verifykey2(const u8 *key, size_t keylen, + u16 *cardnr, u16 *domain, + enum pkey_key_type *ktype, + enum pkey_key_size *ksize, u32 *flags) +{ + int rc; + u32 _nr_apqns, *_apqns = NULL; + struct keytoken_header *hdr = (struct keytoken_header *)key; + + if (keylen < sizeof(struct keytoken_header)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (hdr->type == TOKTYPE_CCA_INTERNAL + && hdr->version == TOKVER_CCA_AES) { + struct secaeskeytoken *t = (struct secaeskeytoken *)key; + + rc = cca_check_secaeskeytoken(debug_info, 3, key, 0); + if (rc) + goto out; + if (ktype) + *ktype = PKEY_TYPE_CCA_DATA; + if (ksize) + *ksize = (enum pkey_key_size) t->bitsize; + + rc = cca_findcard2(&_apqns, &_nr_apqns, *cardnr, *domain, + ZCRYPT_CEX3C, AES_MK_SET, t->mkvp, 0, 1); + if (rc == 0 && flags) + *flags = PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP; + if (rc == -ENODEV) { + rc = cca_findcard2(&_apqns, &_nr_apqns, + *cardnr, *domain, + ZCRYPT_CEX3C, AES_MK_SET, + 0, t->mkvp, 1); + if (rc == 0 && flags) + *flags = PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP; + } + if (rc) + goto out; + + *cardnr = ((struct pkey_apqn *)_apqns)->card; + *domain = ((struct pkey_apqn *)_apqns)->domain; + + } else if (hdr->type == TOKTYPE_CCA_INTERNAL + && hdr->version == TOKVER_CCA_VLSC) { + struct cipherkeytoken *t = (struct cipherkeytoken *)key; + + rc = cca_check_secaescipherkey(debug_info, 3, key, 0, 1); + if (rc) + goto out; + if (ktype) + *ktype = PKEY_TYPE_CCA_CIPHER; + if (ksize) { + *ksize = PKEY_SIZE_UNKNOWN; + if (!t->plfver && t->wpllen == 512) + *ksize = PKEY_SIZE_AES_128; + else if (!t->plfver && t->wpllen == 576) + *ksize = PKEY_SIZE_AES_192; + else if (!t->plfver && t->wpllen == 640) + *ksize = PKEY_SIZE_AES_256; + } + + rc = cca_findcard2(&_apqns, &_nr_apqns, *cardnr, *domain, + ZCRYPT_CEX6, AES_MK_SET, t->mkvp0, 0, 1); + if (rc == 0 && flags) + *flags = PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP; + if (rc == -ENODEV) { + rc = cca_findcard2(&_apqns, &_nr_apqns, + *cardnr, *domain, + ZCRYPT_CEX6, AES_MK_SET, + 0, t->mkvp0, 1); + if (rc == 0 && flags) + *flags = PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP; + } + if (rc) + goto out; + + *cardnr = ((struct pkey_apqn *)_apqns)->card; + *domain = ((struct pkey_apqn *)_apqns)->domain; + + } else if (hdr->type == TOKTYPE_NON_CCA + && hdr->version == TOKVER_EP11_AES) { + struct ep11keyblob *kb = (struct ep11keyblob *)key; + + rc = ep11_check_aes_key(debug_info, 3, key, keylen, 1); + if (rc) + goto out; + if (ktype) + *ktype = PKEY_TYPE_EP11; + if (ksize) + *ksize = kb->head.bitlen; + + rc = ep11_findcard2(&_apqns, &_nr_apqns, *cardnr, *domain, + ZCRYPT_CEX7, EP11_API_V, kb->wkvp); + if (rc) + goto out; + + if (flags) + *flags = PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP; + + *cardnr = ((struct pkey_apqn *)_apqns)->card; + *domain = ((struct pkey_apqn *)_apqns)->domain; + + } else + rc = -EINVAL; + +out: + kfree(_apqns); + return rc; +} + +static int pkey_keyblob2pkey2(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t nr_apqns, + const u8 *key, size_t keylen, + struct pkey_protkey *pkey) +{ + int i, card, dom, rc; + struct keytoken_header *hdr = (struct keytoken_header *)key; + + /* check for at least one apqn given */ + if (!apqns || !nr_apqns) + return -EINVAL; + + if (keylen < sizeof(struct keytoken_header)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (hdr->type == TOKTYPE_CCA_INTERNAL) { + if (hdr->version == TOKVER_CCA_AES) { + if (keylen != sizeof(struct secaeskeytoken)) + return -EINVAL; + if (cca_check_secaeskeytoken(debug_info, 3, key, 0)) + return -EINVAL; + } else if (hdr->version == TOKVER_CCA_VLSC) { + if (keylen < hdr->len || keylen > MAXCCAVLSCTOKENSIZE) + return -EINVAL; + if (cca_check_secaescipherkey(debug_info, 3, key, 0, 1)) + return -EINVAL; + } else { + DEBUG_ERR("%s unknown CCA internal token version %d\n", + __func__, hdr->version); + return -EINVAL; + } + } else if (hdr->type == TOKTYPE_NON_CCA) { + if (hdr->version == TOKVER_EP11_AES) { + if (keylen < sizeof(struct ep11keyblob)) + return -EINVAL; + if (ep11_check_aes_key(debug_info, 3, key, keylen, 1)) + return -EINVAL; + } else { + return pkey_nonccatok2pkey(key, keylen, pkey); + } + } else { + DEBUG_ERR("%s unknown/unsupported blob type %d\n", + __func__, hdr->type); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* simple try all apqns from the list */ + for (i = 0, rc = -ENODEV; i < nr_apqns; i++) { + card = apqns[i].card; + dom = apqns[i].domain; + if (hdr->type == TOKTYPE_CCA_INTERNAL + && hdr->version == TOKVER_CCA_AES) + rc = cca_sec2protkey(card, dom, key, pkey->protkey, + &pkey->len, &pkey->type); + else if (hdr->type == TOKTYPE_CCA_INTERNAL + && hdr->version == TOKVER_CCA_VLSC) + rc = cca_cipher2protkey(card, dom, key, pkey->protkey, + &pkey->len, &pkey->type); + else { /* EP11 AES secure key blob */ + struct ep11keyblob *kb = (struct ep11keyblob *) key; + + pkey->len = sizeof(pkey->protkey); + rc = ep11_kblob2protkey(card, dom, key, kb->head.len, + pkey->protkey, &pkey->len, + &pkey->type); + } + if (rc == 0) + break; + } + + return rc; +} + +static int pkey_apqns4key(const u8 *key, size_t keylen, u32 flags, + struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t *nr_apqns) +{ + int rc; + u32 _nr_apqns, *_apqns = NULL; + struct keytoken_header *hdr = (struct keytoken_header *)key; + + if (keylen < sizeof(struct keytoken_header) || flags == 0) + return -EINVAL; + + if (hdr->type == TOKTYPE_NON_CCA + && (hdr->version == TOKVER_EP11_AES_WITH_HEADER + || hdr->version == TOKVER_EP11_ECC_WITH_HEADER) + && is_ep11_keyblob(key + sizeof(struct ep11kblob_header))) { + int minhwtype = 0, api = 0; + struct ep11keyblob *kb = (struct ep11keyblob *) + (key + sizeof(struct ep11kblob_header)); + + if (flags != PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP) + return -EINVAL; + if (kb->attr & EP11_BLOB_PKEY_EXTRACTABLE) { + minhwtype = ZCRYPT_CEX7; + api = EP11_API_V; + } + rc = ep11_findcard2(&_apqns, &_nr_apqns, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, + minhwtype, api, kb->wkvp); + if (rc) + goto out; + } else if (hdr->type == TOKTYPE_NON_CCA + && hdr->version == TOKVER_EP11_AES + && is_ep11_keyblob(key)) { + int minhwtype = 0, api = 0; + struct ep11keyblob *kb = (struct ep11keyblob *) key; + + if (flags != PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP) + return -EINVAL; + if (kb->attr & EP11_BLOB_PKEY_EXTRACTABLE) { + minhwtype = ZCRYPT_CEX7; + api = EP11_API_V; + } + rc = ep11_findcard2(&_apqns, &_nr_apqns, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, + minhwtype, api, kb->wkvp); + if (rc) + goto out; + } else if (hdr->type == TOKTYPE_CCA_INTERNAL) { + int minhwtype = ZCRYPT_CEX3C; + u64 cur_mkvp = 0, old_mkvp = 0; + + if (hdr->version == TOKVER_CCA_AES) { + struct secaeskeytoken *t = (struct secaeskeytoken *)key; + + if (flags & PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP) + cur_mkvp = t->mkvp; + if (flags & PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP) + old_mkvp = t->mkvp; + } else if (hdr->version == TOKVER_CCA_VLSC) { + struct cipherkeytoken *t = (struct cipherkeytoken *)key; + + minhwtype = ZCRYPT_CEX6; + if (flags & PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP) + cur_mkvp = t->mkvp0; + if (flags & PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP) + old_mkvp = t->mkvp0; + } else { + /* unknown cca internal token type */ + return -EINVAL; + } + rc = cca_findcard2(&_apqns, &_nr_apqns, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, + minhwtype, AES_MK_SET, + cur_mkvp, old_mkvp, 1); + if (rc) + goto out; + } else if (hdr->type == TOKTYPE_CCA_INTERNAL_PKA) { + u64 cur_mkvp = 0, old_mkvp = 0; + struct eccprivkeytoken *t = (struct eccprivkeytoken *)key; + + if (t->secid == 0x20) { + if (flags & PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP) + cur_mkvp = t->mkvp; + if (flags & PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP) + old_mkvp = t->mkvp; + } else { + /* unknown cca internal 2 token type */ + return -EINVAL; + } + rc = cca_findcard2(&_apqns, &_nr_apqns, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, + ZCRYPT_CEX7, APKA_MK_SET, + cur_mkvp, old_mkvp, 1); + if (rc) + goto out; + } else + return -EINVAL; + + if (apqns) { + if (*nr_apqns < _nr_apqns) + rc = -ENOSPC; + else + memcpy(apqns, _apqns, _nr_apqns * sizeof(u32)); + } + *nr_apqns = _nr_apqns; + +out: + kfree(_apqns); + return rc; +} + +static int pkey_apqns4keytype(enum pkey_key_type ktype, + u8 cur_mkvp[32], u8 alt_mkvp[32], u32 flags, + struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t *nr_apqns) +{ + int rc; + u32 _nr_apqns, *_apqns = NULL; + + if (ktype == PKEY_TYPE_CCA_DATA || ktype == PKEY_TYPE_CCA_CIPHER) { + u64 cur_mkvp = 0, old_mkvp = 0; + int minhwtype = ZCRYPT_CEX3C; + + if (flags & PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP) + cur_mkvp = *((u64 *) cur_mkvp); + if (flags & PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP) + old_mkvp = *((u64 *) alt_mkvp); + if (ktype == PKEY_TYPE_CCA_CIPHER) + minhwtype = ZCRYPT_CEX6; + rc = cca_findcard2(&_apqns, &_nr_apqns, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, + minhwtype, AES_MK_SET, + cur_mkvp, old_mkvp, 1); + if (rc) + goto out; + } else if (ktype == PKEY_TYPE_CCA_ECC) { + u64 cur_mkvp = 0, old_mkvp = 0; + + if (flags & PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP) + cur_mkvp = *((u64 *) cur_mkvp); + if (flags & PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP) + old_mkvp = *((u64 *) alt_mkvp); + rc = cca_findcard2(&_apqns, &_nr_apqns, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, + ZCRYPT_CEX7, APKA_MK_SET, + cur_mkvp, old_mkvp, 1); + if (rc) + goto out; + + } else if (ktype == PKEY_TYPE_EP11 || + ktype == PKEY_TYPE_EP11_AES || + ktype == PKEY_TYPE_EP11_ECC) { + u8 *wkvp = NULL; + + if (flags & PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP) + wkvp = cur_mkvp; + rc = ep11_findcard2(&_apqns, &_nr_apqns, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, + ZCRYPT_CEX7, EP11_API_V, wkvp); + if (rc) + goto out; + + } else + return -EINVAL; + + if (apqns) { + if (*nr_apqns < _nr_apqns) + rc = -ENOSPC; + else + memcpy(apqns, _apqns, _nr_apqns * sizeof(u32)); + } + *nr_apqns = _nr_apqns; + +out: + kfree(_apqns); + return rc; +} + +static int pkey_keyblob2pkey3(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t nr_apqns, + const u8 *key, size_t keylen, u32 *protkeytype, + u8 *protkey, u32 *protkeylen) +{ + int i, card, dom, rc; + struct keytoken_header *hdr = (struct keytoken_header *)key; + + /* check for at least one apqn given */ + if (!apqns || !nr_apqns) + return -EINVAL; + + if (keylen < sizeof(struct keytoken_header)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (hdr->type == TOKTYPE_NON_CCA + && hdr->version == TOKVER_EP11_AES_WITH_HEADER + && is_ep11_keyblob(key + sizeof(struct ep11kblob_header))) { + /* EP11 AES key blob with header */ + if (ep11_check_aes_key_with_hdr(debug_info, 3, key, keylen, 1)) + return -EINVAL; + } else if (hdr->type == TOKTYPE_NON_CCA + && hdr->version == TOKVER_EP11_ECC_WITH_HEADER + && is_ep11_keyblob(key + sizeof(struct ep11kblob_header))) { + /* EP11 ECC key blob with header */ + if (ep11_check_ecc_key_with_hdr(debug_info, 3, key, keylen, 1)) + return -EINVAL; + } else if (hdr->type == TOKTYPE_NON_CCA + && hdr->version == TOKVER_EP11_AES + && is_ep11_keyblob(key)) { + /* EP11 AES key blob with header in session field */ + if (ep11_check_aes_key(debug_info, 3, key, keylen, 1)) + return -EINVAL; + } else if (hdr->type == TOKTYPE_CCA_INTERNAL) { + if (hdr->version == TOKVER_CCA_AES) { + /* CCA AES data key */ + if (keylen != sizeof(struct secaeskeytoken)) + return -EINVAL; + if (cca_check_secaeskeytoken(debug_info, 3, key, 0)) + return -EINVAL; + } else if (hdr->version == TOKVER_CCA_VLSC) { + /* CCA AES cipher key */ + if (keylen < hdr->len || keylen > MAXCCAVLSCTOKENSIZE) + return -EINVAL; + if (cca_check_secaescipherkey(debug_info, 3, key, 0, 1)) + return -EINVAL; + } else { + DEBUG_ERR("%s unknown CCA internal token version %d\n", + __func__, hdr->version); + return -EINVAL; + } + } else if (hdr->type == TOKTYPE_CCA_INTERNAL_PKA) { + /* CCA ECC (private) key */ + if (keylen < sizeof(struct eccprivkeytoken)) + return -EINVAL; + if (cca_check_sececckeytoken(debug_info, 3, key, keylen, 1)) + return -EINVAL; + } else if (hdr->type == TOKTYPE_NON_CCA) { + struct pkey_protkey pkey; + + rc = pkey_nonccatok2pkey(key, keylen, &pkey); + if (rc) + return rc; + memcpy(protkey, pkey.protkey, pkey.len); + *protkeylen = pkey.len; + *protkeytype = pkey.type; + return 0; + } else { + DEBUG_ERR("%s unknown/unsupported blob type %d\n", + __func__, hdr->type); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* simple try all apqns from the list */ + for (rc = -ENODEV, i = 0; rc && i < nr_apqns; i++) { + card = apqns[i].card; + dom = apqns[i].domain; + if (hdr->type == TOKTYPE_NON_CCA + && (hdr->version == TOKVER_EP11_AES_WITH_HEADER + || hdr->version == TOKVER_EP11_ECC_WITH_HEADER) + && is_ep11_keyblob(key + sizeof(struct ep11kblob_header))) + rc = ep11_kblob2protkey(card, dom, key, hdr->len, + protkey, protkeylen, protkeytype); + else if (hdr->type == TOKTYPE_NON_CCA + && hdr->version == TOKVER_EP11_AES + && is_ep11_keyblob(key)) + rc = ep11_kblob2protkey(card, dom, key, hdr->len, + protkey, protkeylen, protkeytype); + else if (hdr->type == TOKTYPE_CCA_INTERNAL && + hdr->version == TOKVER_CCA_AES) + rc = cca_sec2protkey(card, dom, key, protkey, + protkeylen, protkeytype); + else if (hdr->type == TOKTYPE_CCA_INTERNAL && + hdr->version == TOKVER_CCA_VLSC) + rc = cca_cipher2protkey(card, dom, key, protkey, + protkeylen, protkeytype); + else if (hdr->type == TOKTYPE_CCA_INTERNAL_PKA) + rc = cca_ecc2protkey(card, dom, key, protkey, + protkeylen, protkeytype); + else + return -EINVAL; + } + + return rc; +} + +/* + * File io functions + */ + +static void *_copy_key_from_user(void __user *ukey, size_t keylen) +{ + if (!ukey || keylen < MINKEYBLOBSIZE || keylen > KEYBLOBBUFSIZE) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + return memdup_user(ukey, keylen); +} + +static void *_copy_apqns_from_user(void __user *uapqns, size_t nr_apqns) +{ + if (!uapqns || nr_apqns == 0) + return NULL; + + return memdup_user(uapqns, nr_apqns * sizeof(struct pkey_apqn)); +} + +static long pkey_unlocked_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, + unsigned long arg) +{ + int rc; + + switch (cmd) { + case PKEY_GENSECK: { + struct pkey_genseck __user *ugs = (void __user *) arg; + struct pkey_genseck kgs; + + if (copy_from_user(&kgs, ugs, sizeof(kgs))) + return -EFAULT; + rc = cca_genseckey(kgs.cardnr, kgs.domain, + kgs.keytype, kgs.seckey.seckey); + DEBUG_DBG("%s cca_genseckey()=%d\n", __func__, rc); + if (rc) + break; + if (copy_to_user(ugs, &kgs, sizeof(kgs))) + return -EFAULT; + break; + } + case PKEY_CLR2SECK: { + struct pkey_clr2seck __user *ucs = (void __user *) arg; + struct pkey_clr2seck kcs; + + if (copy_from_user(&kcs, ucs, sizeof(kcs))) + return -EFAULT; + rc = cca_clr2seckey(kcs.cardnr, kcs.domain, kcs.keytype, + kcs.clrkey.clrkey, kcs.seckey.seckey); + DEBUG_DBG("%s cca_clr2seckey()=%d\n", __func__, rc); + if (rc) + break; + if (copy_to_user(ucs, &kcs, sizeof(kcs))) + return -EFAULT; + memzero_explicit(&kcs, sizeof(kcs)); + break; + } + case PKEY_SEC2PROTK: { + struct pkey_sec2protk __user *usp = (void __user *) arg; + struct pkey_sec2protk ksp; + + if (copy_from_user(&ksp, usp, sizeof(ksp))) + return -EFAULT; + rc = cca_sec2protkey(ksp.cardnr, ksp.domain, + ksp.seckey.seckey, ksp.protkey.protkey, + &ksp.protkey.len, &ksp.protkey.type); + DEBUG_DBG("%s cca_sec2protkey()=%d\n", __func__, rc); + if (rc) + break; + if (copy_to_user(usp, &ksp, sizeof(ksp))) + return -EFAULT; + break; + } + case PKEY_CLR2PROTK: { + struct pkey_clr2protk __user *ucp = (void __user *) arg; + struct pkey_clr2protk kcp; + + if (copy_from_user(&kcp, ucp, sizeof(kcp))) + return -EFAULT; + rc = pkey_clr2protkey(kcp.keytype, + &kcp.clrkey, &kcp.protkey); + DEBUG_DBG("%s pkey_clr2protkey()=%d\n", __func__, rc); + if (rc) + break; + if (copy_to_user(ucp, &kcp, sizeof(kcp))) + return -EFAULT; + memzero_explicit(&kcp, sizeof(kcp)); + break; + } + case PKEY_FINDCARD: { + struct pkey_findcard __user *ufc = (void __user *) arg; + struct pkey_findcard kfc; + + if (copy_from_user(&kfc, ufc, sizeof(kfc))) + return -EFAULT; + rc = cca_findcard(kfc.seckey.seckey, + &kfc.cardnr, &kfc.domain, 1); + DEBUG_DBG("%s cca_findcard()=%d\n", __func__, rc); + if (rc < 0) + break; + if (copy_to_user(ufc, &kfc, sizeof(kfc))) + return -EFAULT; + break; + } + case PKEY_SKEY2PKEY: { + struct pkey_skey2pkey __user *usp = (void __user *) arg; + struct pkey_skey2pkey ksp; + + if (copy_from_user(&ksp, usp, sizeof(ksp))) + return -EFAULT; + rc = pkey_skey2pkey(ksp.seckey.seckey, &ksp.protkey); + DEBUG_DBG("%s pkey_skey2pkey()=%d\n", __func__, rc); + if (rc) + break; + if (copy_to_user(usp, &ksp, sizeof(ksp))) + return -EFAULT; + break; + } + case PKEY_VERIFYKEY: { + struct pkey_verifykey __user *uvk = (void __user *) arg; + struct pkey_verifykey kvk; + + if (copy_from_user(&kvk, uvk, sizeof(kvk))) + return -EFAULT; + rc = pkey_verifykey(&kvk.seckey, &kvk.cardnr, &kvk.domain, + &kvk.keysize, &kvk.attributes); + DEBUG_DBG("%s pkey_verifykey()=%d\n", __func__, rc); + if (rc) + break; + if (copy_to_user(uvk, &kvk, sizeof(kvk))) + return -EFAULT; + break; + } + case PKEY_GENPROTK: { + struct pkey_genprotk __user *ugp = (void __user *) arg; + struct pkey_genprotk kgp; + + if (copy_from_user(&kgp, ugp, sizeof(kgp))) + return -EFAULT; + rc = pkey_genprotkey(kgp.keytype, &kgp.protkey); + DEBUG_DBG("%s pkey_genprotkey()=%d\n", __func__, rc); + if (rc) + break; + if (copy_to_user(ugp, &kgp, sizeof(kgp))) + return -EFAULT; + break; + } + case PKEY_VERIFYPROTK: { + struct pkey_verifyprotk __user *uvp = (void __user *) arg; + struct pkey_verifyprotk kvp; + + if (copy_from_user(&kvp, uvp, sizeof(kvp))) + return -EFAULT; + rc = pkey_verifyprotkey(&kvp.protkey); + DEBUG_DBG("%s pkey_verifyprotkey()=%d\n", __func__, rc); + break; + } + case PKEY_KBLOB2PROTK: { + struct pkey_kblob2pkey __user *utp = (void __user *) arg; + struct pkey_kblob2pkey ktp; + u8 *kkey; + + if (copy_from_user(&ktp, utp, sizeof(ktp))) + return -EFAULT; + kkey = _copy_key_from_user(ktp.key, ktp.keylen); + if (IS_ERR(kkey)) + return PTR_ERR(kkey); + rc = pkey_keyblob2pkey(kkey, ktp.keylen, &ktp.protkey); + DEBUG_DBG("%s pkey_keyblob2pkey()=%d\n", __func__, rc); + memzero_explicit(kkey, ktp.keylen); + kfree(kkey); + if (rc) + break; + if (copy_to_user(utp, &ktp, sizeof(ktp))) + return -EFAULT; + break; + } + case PKEY_GENSECK2: { + struct pkey_genseck2 __user *ugs = (void __user *) arg; + struct pkey_genseck2 kgs; + struct pkey_apqn *apqns; + size_t klen = KEYBLOBBUFSIZE; + u8 *kkey; + + if (copy_from_user(&kgs, ugs, sizeof(kgs))) + return -EFAULT; + apqns = _copy_apqns_from_user(kgs.apqns, kgs.apqn_entries); + if (IS_ERR(apqns)) + return PTR_ERR(apqns); + kkey = kmalloc(klen, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!kkey) { + kfree(apqns); + return -ENOMEM; + } + rc = pkey_genseckey2(apqns, kgs.apqn_entries, + kgs.type, kgs.size, kgs.keygenflags, + kkey, &klen); + DEBUG_DBG("%s pkey_genseckey2()=%d\n", __func__, rc); + kfree(apqns); + if (rc) { + kfree(kkey); + break; + } + if (kgs.key) { + if (kgs.keylen < klen) { + kfree(kkey); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (copy_to_user(kgs.key, kkey, klen)) { + kfree(kkey); + return -EFAULT; + } + } + kgs.keylen = klen; + if (copy_to_user(ugs, &kgs, sizeof(kgs))) + rc = -EFAULT; + kfree(kkey); + break; + } + case PKEY_CLR2SECK2: { + struct pkey_clr2seck2 __user *ucs = (void __user *) arg; + struct pkey_clr2seck2 kcs; + struct pkey_apqn *apqns; + size_t klen = KEYBLOBBUFSIZE; + u8 *kkey; + + if (copy_from_user(&kcs, ucs, sizeof(kcs))) + return -EFAULT; + apqns = _copy_apqns_from_user(kcs.apqns, kcs.apqn_entries); + if (IS_ERR(apqns)) + return PTR_ERR(apqns); + kkey = kmalloc(klen, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!kkey) { + kfree(apqns); + return -ENOMEM; + } + rc = pkey_clr2seckey2(apqns, kcs.apqn_entries, + kcs.type, kcs.size, kcs.keygenflags, + kcs.clrkey.clrkey, kkey, &klen); + DEBUG_DBG("%s pkey_clr2seckey2()=%d\n", __func__, rc); + kfree(apqns); + if (rc) { + kfree(kkey); + break; + } + if (kcs.key) { + if (kcs.keylen < klen) { + kfree(kkey); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (copy_to_user(kcs.key, kkey, klen)) { + kfree(kkey); + return -EFAULT; + } + } + kcs.keylen = klen; + if (copy_to_user(ucs, &kcs, sizeof(kcs))) + rc = -EFAULT; + memzero_explicit(&kcs, sizeof(kcs)); + kfree(kkey); + break; + } + case PKEY_VERIFYKEY2: { + struct pkey_verifykey2 __user *uvk = (void __user *) arg; + struct pkey_verifykey2 kvk; + u8 *kkey; + + if (copy_from_user(&kvk, uvk, sizeof(kvk))) + return -EFAULT; + kkey = _copy_key_from_user(kvk.key, kvk.keylen); + if (IS_ERR(kkey)) + return PTR_ERR(kkey); + rc = pkey_verifykey2(kkey, kvk.keylen, + &kvk.cardnr, &kvk.domain, + &kvk.type, &kvk.size, &kvk.flags); + DEBUG_DBG("%s pkey_verifykey2()=%d\n", __func__, rc); + kfree(kkey); + if (rc) + break; + if (copy_to_user(uvk, &kvk, sizeof(kvk))) + return -EFAULT; + break; + } + case PKEY_KBLOB2PROTK2: { + struct pkey_kblob2pkey2 __user *utp = (void __user *) arg; + struct pkey_kblob2pkey2 ktp; + struct pkey_apqn *apqns = NULL; + u8 *kkey; + + if (copy_from_user(&ktp, utp, sizeof(ktp))) + return -EFAULT; + apqns = _copy_apqns_from_user(ktp.apqns, ktp.apqn_entries); + if (IS_ERR(apqns)) + return PTR_ERR(apqns); + kkey = _copy_key_from_user(ktp.key, ktp.keylen); + if (IS_ERR(kkey)) { + kfree(apqns); + return PTR_ERR(kkey); + } + rc = pkey_keyblob2pkey2(apqns, ktp.apqn_entries, + kkey, ktp.keylen, &ktp.protkey); + DEBUG_DBG("%s pkey_keyblob2pkey2()=%d\n", __func__, rc); + kfree(apqns); + memzero_explicit(kkey, ktp.keylen); + kfree(kkey); + if (rc) + break; + if (copy_to_user(utp, &ktp, sizeof(ktp))) + return -EFAULT; + break; + } + case PKEY_APQNS4K: { + struct pkey_apqns4key __user *uak = (void __user *) arg; + struct pkey_apqns4key kak; + struct pkey_apqn *apqns = NULL; + size_t nr_apqns, len; + u8 *kkey; + + if (copy_from_user(&kak, uak, sizeof(kak))) + return -EFAULT; + nr_apqns = kak.apqn_entries; + if (nr_apqns) { + apqns = kmalloc_array(nr_apqns, + sizeof(struct pkey_apqn), + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!apqns) + return -ENOMEM; + } + kkey = _copy_key_from_user(kak.key, kak.keylen); + if (IS_ERR(kkey)) { + kfree(apqns); + return PTR_ERR(kkey); + } + rc = pkey_apqns4key(kkey, kak.keylen, kak.flags, + apqns, &nr_apqns); + DEBUG_DBG("%s pkey_apqns4key()=%d\n", __func__, rc); + kfree(kkey); + if (rc && rc != -ENOSPC) { + kfree(apqns); + break; + } + if (!rc && kak.apqns) { + if (nr_apqns > kak.apqn_entries) { + kfree(apqns); + return -EINVAL; + } + len = nr_apqns * sizeof(struct pkey_apqn); + if (len) { + if (copy_to_user(kak.apqns, apqns, len)) { + kfree(apqns); + return -EFAULT; + } + } + } + kak.apqn_entries = nr_apqns; + if (copy_to_user(uak, &kak, sizeof(kak))) + rc = -EFAULT; + kfree(apqns); + break; + } + case PKEY_APQNS4KT: { + struct pkey_apqns4keytype __user *uat = (void __user *) arg; + struct pkey_apqns4keytype kat; + struct pkey_apqn *apqns = NULL; + size_t nr_apqns, len; + + if (copy_from_user(&kat, uat, sizeof(kat))) + return -EFAULT; + nr_apqns = kat.apqn_entries; + if (nr_apqns) { + apqns = kmalloc_array(nr_apqns, + sizeof(struct pkey_apqn), + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!apqns) + return -ENOMEM; + } + rc = pkey_apqns4keytype(kat.type, kat.cur_mkvp, kat.alt_mkvp, + kat.flags, apqns, &nr_apqns); + DEBUG_DBG("%s pkey_apqns4keytype()=%d\n", __func__, rc); + if (rc && rc != -ENOSPC) { + kfree(apqns); + break; + } + if (!rc && kat.apqns) { + if (nr_apqns > kat.apqn_entries) { + kfree(apqns); + return -EINVAL; + } + len = nr_apqns * sizeof(struct pkey_apqn); + if (len) { + if (copy_to_user(kat.apqns, apqns, len)) { + kfree(apqns); + return -EFAULT; + } + } + } + kat.apqn_entries = nr_apqns; + if (copy_to_user(uat, &kat, sizeof(kat))) + rc = -EFAULT; + kfree(apqns); + break; + } + case PKEY_KBLOB2PROTK3: { + struct pkey_kblob2pkey3 __user *utp = (void __user *) arg; + struct pkey_kblob2pkey3 ktp; + struct pkey_apqn *apqns = NULL; + u32 protkeylen = PROTKEYBLOBBUFSIZE; + u8 *kkey, *protkey; + + if (copy_from_user(&ktp, utp, sizeof(ktp))) + return -EFAULT; + apqns = _copy_apqns_from_user(ktp.apqns, ktp.apqn_entries); + if (IS_ERR(apqns)) + return PTR_ERR(apqns); + kkey = _copy_key_from_user(ktp.key, ktp.keylen); + if (IS_ERR(kkey)) { + kfree(apqns); + return PTR_ERR(kkey); + } + protkey = kmalloc(protkeylen, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!protkey) { + kfree(apqns); + kfree(kkey); + return -ENOMEM; + } + rc = pkey_keyblob2pkey3(apqns, ktp.apqn_entries, kkey, + ktp.keylen, &ktp.pkeytype, + protkey, &protkeylen); + DEBUG_DBG("%s pkey_keyblob2pkey3()=%d\n", __func__, rc); + kfree(apqns); + memzero_explicit(kkey, ktp.keylen); + kfree(kkey); + if (rc) { + kfree(protkey); + break; + } + if (ktp.pkey && ktp.pkeylen) { + if (protkeylen > ktp.pkeylen) { + kfree(protkey); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (copy_to_user(ktp.pkey, protkey, protkeylen)) { + kfree(protkey); + return -EFAULT; + } + } + kfree(protkey); + ktp.pkeylen = protkeylen; + if (copy_to_user(utp, &ktp, sizeof(ktp))) + return -EFAULT; + break; + } + default: + /* unknown/unsupported ioctl cmd */ + return -ENOTTY; + } + + return rc; +} + +/* + * Sysfs and file io operations + */ + +/* + * Sysfs attribute read function for all protected key binary attributes. + * The implementation can not deal with partial reads, because a new random + * protected key blob is generated with each read. In case of partial reads + * (i.e. off != 0 or count < key blob size) -EINVAL is returned. + */ +static ssize_t pkey_protkey_aes_attr_read(u32 keytype, bool is_xts, char *buf, + loff_t off, size_t count) +{ + struct protaeskeytoken protkeytoken; + struct pkey_protkey protkey; + int rc; + + if (off != 0 || count < sizeof(protkeytoken)) + return -EINVAL; + if (is_xts) + if (count < 2 * sizeof(protkeytoken)) + return -EINVAL; + + memset(&protkeytoken, 0, sizeof(protkeytoken)); + protkeytoken.type = TOKTYPE_NON_CCA; + protkeytoken.version = TOKVER_PROTECTED_KEY; + protkeytoken.keytype = keytype; + + rc = pkey_genprotkey(protkeytoken.keytype, &protkey); + if (rc) + return rc; + + protkeytoken.len = protkey.len; + memcpy(&protkeytoken.protkey, &protkey.protkey, protkey.len); + + memcpy(buf, &protkeytoken, sizeof(protkeytoken)); + + if (is_xts) { + rc = pkey_genprotkey(protkeytoken.keytype, &protkey); + if (rc) + return rc; + + protkeytoken.len = protkey.len; + memcpy(&protkeytoken.protkey, &protkey.protkey, protkey.len); + + memcpy(buf + sizeof(protkeytoken), &protkeytoken, + sizeof(protkeytoken)); + + return 2 * sizeof(protkeytoken); + } + + return sizeof(protkeytoken); +} + +static ssize_t protkey_aes_128_read(struct file *filp, + struct kobject *kobj, + struct bin_attribute *attr, + char *buf, loff_t off, + size_t count) +{ + return pkey_protkey_aes_attr_read(PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128, false, buf, + off, count); +} + +static ssize_t protkey_aes_192_read(struct file *filp, + struct kobject *kobj, + struct bin_attribute *attr, + char *buf, loff_t off, + size_t count) +{ + return pkey_protkey_aes_attr_read(PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_192, false, buf, + off, count); +} + +static ssize_t protkey_aes_256_read(struct file *filp, + struct kobject *kobj, + struct bin_attribute *attr, + char *buf, loff_t off, + size_t count) +{ + return pkey_protkey_aes_attr_read(PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256, false, buf, + off, count); +} + +static ssize_t protkey_aes_128_xts_read(struct file *filp, + struct kobject *kobj, + struct bin_attribute *attr, + char *buf, loff_t off, + size_t count) +{ + return pkey_protkey_aes_attr_read(PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128, true, buf, + off, count); +} + +static ssize_t protkey_aes_256_xts_read(struct file *filp, + struct kobject *kobj, + struct bin_attribute *attr, + char *buf, loff_t off, + size_t count) +{ + return pkey_protkey_aes_attr_read(PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256, true, buf, + off, count); +} + +static BIN_ATTR_RO(protkey_aes_128, sizeof(struct protaeskeytoken)); +static BIN_ATTR_RO(protkey_aes_192, sizeof(struct protaeskeytoken)); +static BIN_ATTR_RO(protkey_aes_256, sizeof(struct protaeskeytoken)); +static BIN_ATTR_RO(protkey_aes_128_xts, 2 * sizeof(struct protaeskeytoken)); +static BIN_ATTR_RO(protkey_aes_256_xts, 2 * sizeof(struct protaeskeytoken)); + +static struct bin_attribute *protkey_attrs[] = { + &bin_attr_protkey_aes_128, + &bin_attr_protkey_aes_192, + &bin_attr_protkey_aes_256, + &bin_attr_protkey_aes_128_xts, + &bin_attr_protkey_aes_256_xts, + NULL +}; + +static struct attribute_group protkey_attr_group = { + .name = "protkey", + .bin_attrs = protkey_attrs, +}; + +/* + * Sysfs attribute read function for all secure key ccadata binary attributes. + * The implementation can not deal with partial reads, because a new random + * protected key blob is generated with each read. In case of partial reads + * (i.e. off != 0 or count < key blob size) -EINVAL is returned. + */ +static ssize_t pkey_ccadata_aes_attr_read(u32 keytype, bool is_xts, char *buf, + loff_t off, size_t count) +{ + int rc; + struct pkey_seckey *seckey = (struct pkey_seckey *) buf; + + if (off != 0 || count < sizeof(struct secaeskeytoken)) + return -EINVAL; + if (is_xts) + if (count < 2 * sizeof(struct secaeskeytoken)) + return -EINVAL; + + rc = cca_genseckey(-1, -1, keytype, seckey->seckey); + if (rc) + return rc; + + if (is_xts) { + seckey++; + rc = cca_genseckey(-1, -1, keytype, seckey->seckey); + if (rc) + return rc; + + return 2 * sizeof(struct secaeskeytoken); + } + + return sizeof(struct secaeskeytoken); +} + +static ssize_t ccadata_aes_128_read(struct file *filp, + struct kobject *kobj, + struct bin_attribute *attr, + char *buf, loff_t off, + size_t count) +{ + return pkey_ccadata_aes_attr_read(PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128, false, buf, + off, count); +} + +static ssize_t ccadata_aes_192_read(struct file *filp, + struct kobject *kobj, + struct bin_attribute *attr, + char *buf, loff_t off, + size_t count) +{ + return pkey_ccadata_aes_attr_read(PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_192, false, buf, + off, count); +} + +static ssize_t ccadata_aes_256_read(struct file *filp, + struct kobject *kobj, + struct bin_attribute *attr, + char *buf, loff_t off, + size_t count) +{ + return pkey_ccadata_aes_attr_read(PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256, false, buf, + off, count); +} + +static ssize_t ccadata_aes_128_xts_read(struct file *filp, + struct kobject *kobj, + struct bin_attribute *attr, + char *buf, loff_t off, + size_t count) +{ + return pkey_ccadata_aes_attr_read(PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128, true, buf, + off, count); +} + +static ssize_t ccadata_aes_256_xts_read(struct file *filp, + struct kobject *kobj, + struct bin_attribute *attr, + char *buf, loff_t off, + size_t count) +{ + return pkey_ccadata_aes_attr_read(PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256, true, buf, + off, count); +} + +static BIN_ATTR_RO(ccadata_aes_128, sizeof(struct secaeskeytoken)); +static BIN_ATTR_RO(ccadata_aes_192, sizeof(struct secaeskeytoken)); +static BIN_ATTR_RO(ccadata_aes_256, sizeof(struct secaeskeytoken)); +static BIN_ATTR_RO(ccadata_aes_128_xts, 2 * sizeof(struct secaeskeytoken)); +static BIN_ATTR_RO(ccadata_aes_256_xts, 2 * sizeof(struct secaeskeytoken)); + +static struct bin_attribute *ccadata_attrs[] = { + &bin_attr_ccadata_aes_128, + &bin_attr_ccadata_aes_192, + &bin_attr_ccadata_aes_256, + &bin_attr_ccadata_aes_128_xts, + &bin_attr_ccadata_aes_256_xts, + NULL +}; + +static struct attribute_group ccadata_attr_group = { + .name = "ccadata", + .bin_attrs = ccadata_attrs, +}; + +#define CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE (sizeof(struct cipherkeytoken) + 80) + +/* + * Sysfs attribute read function for all secure key ccacipher binary attributes. + * The implementation can not deal with partial reads, because a new random + * secure key blob is generated with each read. In case of partial reads + * (i.e. off != 0 or count < key blob size) -EINVAL is returned. + */ +static ssize_t pkey_ccacipher_aes_attr_read(enum pkey_key_size keybits, + bool is_xts, char *buf, loff_t off, + size_t count) +{ + int i, rc, card, dom; + u32 nr_apqns, *apqns = NULL; + size_t keysize = CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE; + + if (off != 0 || count < CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE) + return -EINVAL; + if (is_xts) + if (count < 2 * CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE) + return -EINVAL; + + /* build a list of apqns able to generate an cipher key */ + rc = cca_findcard2(&apqns, &nr_apqns, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, + ZCRYPT_CEX6, 0, 0, 0, 0); + if (rc) + return rc; + + memset(buf, 0, is_xts ? 2 * keysize : keysize); + + /* simple try all apqns from the list */ + for (i = 0, rc = -ENODEV; i < nr_apqns; i++) { + card = apqns[i] >> 16; + dom = apqns[i] & 0xFFFF; + rc = cca_gencipherkey(card, dom, keybits, 0, buf, &keysize); + if (rc == 0) + break; + } + if (rc) + return rc; + + if (is_xts) { + keysize = CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE; + buf += CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE; + rc = cca_gencipherkey(card, dom, keybits, 0, buf, &keysize); + if (rc == 0) + return 2 * CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE; + } + + return CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE; +} + +static ssize_t ccacipher_aes_128_read(struct file *filp, + struct kobject *kobj, + struct bin_attribute *attr, + char *buf, loff_t off, + size_t count) +{ + return pkey_ccacipher_aes_attr_read(PKEY_SIZE_AES_128, false, buf, + off, count); +} + +static ssize_t ccacipher_aes_192_read(struct file *filp, + struct kobject *kobj, + struct bin_attribute *attr, + char *buf, loff_t off, + size_t count) +{ + return pkey_ccacipher_aes_attr_read(PKEY_SIZE_AES_192, false, buf, + off, count); +} + +static ssize_t ccacipher_aes_256_read(struct file *filp, + struct kobject *kobj, + struct bin_attribute *attr, + char *buf, loff_t off, + size_t count) +{ + return pkey_ccacipher_aes_attr_read(PKEY_SIZE_AES_256, false, buf, + off, count); +} + +static ssize_t ccacipher_aes_128_xts_read(struct file *filp, + struct kobject *kobj, + struct bin_attribute *attr, + char *buf, loff_t off, + size_t count) +{ + return pkey_ccacipher_aes_attr_read(PKEY_SIZE_AES_128, true, buf, + off, count); +} + +static ssize_t ccacipher_aes_256_xts_read(struct file *filp, + struct kobject *kobj, + struct bin_attribute *attr, + char *buf, loff_t off, + size_t count) +{ + return pkey_ccacipher_aes_attr_read(PKEY_SIZE_AES_256, true, buf, + off, count); +} + +static BIN_ATTR_RO(ccacipher_aes_128, CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE); +static BIN_ATTR_RO(ccacipher_aes_192, CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE); +static BIN_ATTR_RO(ccacipher_aes_256, CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE); +static BIN_ATTR_RO(ccacipher_aes_128_xts, 2 * CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE); +static BIN_ATTR_RO(ccacipher_aes_256_xts, 2 * CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE); + +static struct bin_attribute *ccacipher_attrs[] = { + &bin_attr_ccacipher_aes_128, + &bin_attr_ccacipher_aes_192, + &bin_attr_ccacipher_aes_256, + &bin_attr_ccacipher_aes_128_xts, + &bin_attr_ccacipher_aes_256_xts, + NULL +}; + +static struct attribute_group ccacipher_attr_group = { + .name = "ccacipher", + .bin_attrs = ccacipher_attrs, +}; + +/* + * Sysfs attribute read function for all ep11 aes key binary attributes. + * The implementation can not deal with partial reads, because a new random + * secure key blob is generated with each read. In case of partial reads + * (i.e. off != 0 or count < key blob size) -EINVAL is returned. + * This function and the sysfs attributes using it provide EP11 key blobs + * padded to the upper limit of MAXEP11AESKEYBLOBSIZE which is currently + * 320 bytes. + */ +static ssize_t pkey_ep11_aes_attr_read(enum pkey_key_size keybits, + bool is_xts, char *buf, loff_t off, + size_t count) +{ + int i, rc, card, dom; + u32 nr_apqns, *apqns = NULL; + size_t keysize = MAXEP11AESKEYBLOBSIZE; + + if (off != 0 || count < MAXEP11AESKEYBLOBSIZE) + return -EINVAL; + if (is_xts) + if (count < 2 * MAXEP11AESKEYBLOBSIZE) + return -EINVAL; + + /* build a list of apqns able to generate an cipher key */ + rc = ep11_findcard2(&apqns, &nr_apqns, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF, + ZCRYPT_CEX7, EP11_API_V, NULL); + if (rc) + return rc; + + memset(buf, 0, is_xts ? 2 * keysize : keysize); + + /* simple try all apqns from the list */ + for (i = 0, rc = -ENODEV; i < nr_apqns; i++) { + card = apqns[i] >> 16; + dom = apqns[i] & 0xFFFF; + rc = ep11_genaeskey(card, dom, keybits, 0, buf, &keysize); + if (rc == 0) + break; + } + if (rc) + return rc; + + if (is_xts) { + keysize = MAXEP11AESKEYBLOBSIZE; + buf += MAXEP11AESKEYBLOBSIZE; + rc = ep11_genaeskey(card, dom, keybits, 0, buf, &keysize); + if (rc == 0) + return 2 * MAXEP11AESKEYBLOBSIZE; + } + + return MAXEP11AESKEYBLOBSIZE; +} + +static ssize_t ep11_aes_128_read(struct file *filp, + struct kobject *kobj, + struct bin_attribute *attr, + char *buf, loff_t off, + size_t count) +{ + return pkey_ep11_aes_attr_read(PKEY_SIZE_AES_128, false, buf, + off, count); +} + +static ssize_t ep11_aes_192_read(struct file *filp, + struct kobject *kobj, + struct bin_attribute *attr, + char *buf, loff_t off, + size_t count) +{ + return pkey_ep11_aes_attr_read(PKEY_SIZE_AES_192, false, buf, + off, count); +} + +static ssize_t ep11_aes_256_read(struct file *filp, + struct kobject *kobj, + struct bin_attribute *attr, + char *buf, loff_t off, + size_t count) +{ + return pkey_ep11_aes_attr_read(PKEY_SIZE_AES_256, false, buf, + off, count); +} + +static ssize_t ep11_aes_128_xts_read(struct file *filp, + struct kobject *kobj, + struct bin_attribute *attr, + char *buf, loff_t off, + size_t count) +{ + return pkey_ep11_aes_attr_read(PKEY_SIZE_AES_128, true, buf, + off, count); +} + +static ssize_t ep11_aes_256_xts_read(struct file *filp, + struct kobject *kobj, + struct bin_attribute *attr, + char *buf, loff_t off, + size_t count) +{ + return pkey_ep11_aes_attr_read(PKEY_SIZE_AES_256, true, buf, + off, count); +} + +static BIN_ATTR_RO(ep11_aes_128, MAXEP11AESKEYBLOBSIZE); +static BIN_ATTR_RO(ep11_aes_192, MAXEP11AESKEYBLOBSIZE); +static BIN_ATTR_RO(ep11_aes_256, MAXEP11AESKEYBLOBSIZE); +static BIN_ATTR_RO(ep11_aes_128_xts, 2 * MAXEP11AESKEYBLOBSIZE); +static BIN_ATTR_RO(ep11_aes_256_xts, 2 * MAXEP11AESKEYBLOBSIZE); + +static struct bin_attribute *ep11_attrs[] = { + &bin_attr_ep11_aes_128, + &bin_attr_ep11_aes_192, + &bin_attr_ep11_aes_256, + &bin_attr_ep11_aes_128_xts, + &bin_attr_ep11_aes_256_xts, + NULL +}; + +static struct attribute_group ep11_attr_group = { + .name = "ep11", + .bin_attrs = ep11_attrs, +}; + +static const struct attribute_group *pkey_attr_groups[] = { + &protkey_attr_group, + &ccadata_attr_group, + &ccacipher_attr_group, + &ep11_attr_group, + NULL, +}; + +static const struct file_operations pkey_fops = { + .owner = THIS_MODULE, + .open = nonseekable_open, + .llseek = no_llseek, + .unlocked_ioctl = pkey_unlocked_ioctl, +}; + +static struct miscdevice pkey_dev = { + .name = "pkey", + .minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR, + .mode = 0666, + .fops = &pkey_fops, + .groups = pkey_attr_groups, +}; + +/* + * Module init + */ +static int __init pkey_init(void) +{ + cpacf_mask_t func_mask; + + /* + * The pckmo instruction should be available - even if we don't + * actually invoke it. This instruction comes with MSA 3 which + * is also the minimum level for the kmc instructions which + * are able to work with protected keys. + */ + if (!cpacf_query(CPACF_PCKMO, &func_mask)) + return -ENODEV; + + /* check for kmc instructions available */ + if (!cpacf_query(CPACF_KMC, &func_mask)) + return -ENODEV; + if (!cpacf_test_func(&func_mask, CPACF_KMC_PAES_128) || + !cpacf_test_func(&func_mask, CPACF_KMC_PAES_192) || + !cpacf_test_func(&func_mask, CPACF_KMC_PAES_256)) + return -ENODEV; + + pkey_debug_init(); + + return misc_register(&pkey_dev); +} + +/* + * Module exit + */ +static void __exit pkey_exit(void) +{ + misc_deregister(&pkey_dev); + pkey_debug_exit(); +} + +module_cpu_feature_match(MSA, pkey_init); +module_exit(pkey_exit); |