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-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/ipc.c218
1 files changed, 218 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fe36d112a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor ipc mediation
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/gfp.h>
+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/capability.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+#include "include/ipc.h"
+#include "include/sig_names.h"
+
+/**
+ * audit_ptrace_mask - convert mask to permission string
+ * @mask: permission mask to convert
+ *
+ * Returns: pointer to static string
+ */
+static const char *audit_ptrace_mask(u32 mask)
+{
+ switch (mask) {
+ case MAY_READ:
+ return "read";
+ case MAY_WRITE:
+ return "trace";
+ case AA_MAY_BE_READ:
+ return "readby";
+ case AA_MAY_BE_TRACED:
+ return "tracedby";
+ }
+ return "";
+}
+
+/* call back to audit ptrace fields */
+static void audit_ptrace_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
+ struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+
+ if (aad(sa)->request & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=\"%s\"",
+ audit_ptrace_mask(aad(sa)->request));
+
+ if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=\"%s\"",
+ audit_ptrace_mask(aad(sa)->denied));
+ }
+ }
+ audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
+ aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
+ FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
+}
+
+/* assumes check for PROFILE_MEDIATES is already done */
+/* TODO: conditionals */
+static int profile_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
+ struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
+ struct common_audit_data *sa)
+{
+ struct aa_perms perms = { };
+
+ aad(sa)->peer = peer;
+ aa_profile_match_label(profile, peer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, request,
+ &perms);
+ aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
+ return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
+}
+
+static int profile_tracee_perm(struct aa_profile *tracee,
+ struct aa_label *tracer, u32 request,
+ struct common_audit_data *sa)
+{
+ if (profile_unconfined(tracee) || unconfined(tracer) ||
+ !PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracee, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
+ return 0;
+
+ return profile_ptrace_perm(tracee, tracer, request, sa);
+}
+
+static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,
+ struct aa_label *tracee, u32 request,
+ struct common_audit_data *sa)
+{
+ if (profile_unconfined(tracer))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
+ return profile_ptrace_perm(tracer, tracee, request, sa);
+
+ /* profile uses the old style capability check for ptrace */
+ if (&tracer->label == tracee)
+ return 0;
+
+ aad(sa)->label = &tracer->label;
+ aad(sa)->peer = tracee;
+ aad(sa)->request = 0;
+ aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE,
+ CAP_OPT_NONE);
+
+ return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, tracer, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_may_ptrace - test if tracer task can trace the tracee
+ * @tracer: label of the task doing the tracing (NOT NULL)
+ * @tracee: task label to be traced
+ * @request: permission request
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error code if permission denied or error
+ */
+int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
+ u32 request)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ u32 xrequest = request << PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT;
+ DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_PTRACE);
+
+ return xcheck_labels(tracer, tracee, profile,
+ profile_tracer_perm(profile, tracee, request, &sa),
+ profile_tracee_perm(profile, tracer, xrequest, &sa));
+}
+
+
+static inline int map_signal_num(int sig)
+{
+ if (sig > SIGRTMAX)
+ return SIGUNKNOWN;
+ else if (sig >= SIGRTMIN)
+ return sig - SIGRTMIN + SIGRT_BASE;
+ else if (sig < MAXMAPPED_SIG)
+ return sig_map[sig];
+ return SIGUNKNOWN;
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_signal_mask - convert mask to permission string
+ * @mask: permission mask to convert
+ *
+ * Returns: pointer to static string
+ */
+static const char *audit_signal_mask(u32 mask)
+{
+ if (mask & MAY_READ)
+ return "receive";
+ if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
+ return "send";
+ return "";
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_cb - call back for signal specific audit fields
+ * @ab: audit_buffer (NOT NULL)
+ * @va: audit struct to audit values of (NOT NULL)
+ */
+static void audit_signal_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
+ struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+
+ if (aad(sa)->request & AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=\"%s\"",
+ audit_signal_mask(aad(sa)->request));
+ if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=\"%s\"",
+ audit_signal_mask(aad(sa)->denied));
+ }
+ }
+ if (aad(sa)->signal == SIGUNKNOWN)
+ audit_log_format(ab, "signal=unknown(%d)",
+ aad(sa)->unmappedsig);
+ else if (aad(sa)->signal < MAXMAPPED_SIGNAME)
+ audit_log_format(ab, " signal=%s", sig_names[aad(sa)->signal]);
+ else
+ audit_log_format(ab, " signal=rtmin+%d",
+ aad(sa)->signal - SIGRT_BASE);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
+ aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
+ FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
+}
+
+static int profile_signal_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
+ struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
+ struct common_audit_data *sa)
+{
+ struct aa_perms perms;
+ unsigned int state;
+
+ if (profile_unconfined(profile) ||
+ !PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_SIGNAL))
+ return 0;
+
+ aad(sa)->peer = peer;
+ /* TODO: secondary cache check <profile, profile, perm> */
+ state = aa_dfa_next(profile->policy.dfa,
+ profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_SIGNAL],
+ aad(sa)->signal);
+ aa_label_match(profile, peer, state, false, request, &perms);
+ aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
+ return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_signal_cb);
+}
+
+int aa_may_signal(struct aa_label *sender, struct aa_label *target, int sig)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_SIGNAL);
+
+ aad(&sa)->signal = map_signal_num(sig);
+ aad(&sa)->unmappedsig = sig;
+ return xcheck_labels(sender, target, profile,
+ profile_signal_perm(profile, target, MAY_WRITE, &sa),
+ profile_signal_perm(profile, sender, MAY_READ, &sa));
+}