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-rw-r--r--security/loadpin/Kconfig20
-rw-r--r--security/loadpin/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--security/loadpin/loadpin.c261
3 files changed, 283 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/loadpin/Kconfig b/security/loadpin/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..91be65dec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/loadpin/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+config SECURITY_LOADPIN
+ bool "Pin load of kernel files (modules, fw, etc) to one filesystem"
+ depends on SECURITY && BLOCK
+ help
+ Any files read through the kernel file reading interface
+ (kernel modules, firmware, kexec images, security policy)
+ can be pinned to the first filesystem used for loading. When
+ enabled, any files that come from other filesystems will be
+ rejected. This is best used on systems without an initrd that
+ have a root filesystem backed by a read-only device such as
+ dm-verity or a CDROM.
+
+config SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENFORCE
+ bool "Enforce LoadPin at boot"
+ depends on SECURITY_LOADPIN
+ help
+ If selected, LoadPin will enforce pinning at boot. If not
+ selected, it can be enabled at boot with the kernel parameter
+ "loadpin.enforce=1".
diff --git a/security/loadpin/Makefile b/security/loadpin/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0ead1c310
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/loadpin/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) += loadpin.o
diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5fce105a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
@@ -0,0 +1,261 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Module and Firmware Pinning Security Module
+ *
+ * Copyright 2011-2016 Google Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "LoadPin: " fmt
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/blkdev.h>
+#include <linux/path.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h> /* current */
+#include <linux/string_helpers.h>
+
+static void report_load(const char *origin, struct file *file, char *operation)
+{
+ char *cmdline, *pathname;
+
+ pathname = kstrdup_quotable_file(file, GFP_KERNEL);
+ cmdline = kstrdup_quotable_cmdline(current, GFP_KERNEL);
+
+ pr_notice("%s %s obj=%s%s%s pid=%d cmdline=%s%s%s\n",
+ origin, operation,
+ (pathname && pathname[0] != '<') ? "\"" : "",
+ pathname,
+ (pathname && pathname[0] != '<') ? "\"" : "",
+ task_pid_nr(current),
+ cmdline ? "\"" : "", cmdline, cmdline ? "\"" : "");
+
+ kfree(cmdline);
+ kfree(pathname);
+}
+
+static int enforce = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENFORCE);
+static char *exclude_read_files[READING_MAX_ID];
+static int ignore_read_file_id[READING_MAX_ID] __ro_after_init;
+static struct super_block *pinned_root;
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pinned_root_spinlock);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+
+static struct ctl_path loadpin_sysctl_path[] = {
+ { .procname = "kernel", },
+ { .procname = "loadpin", },
+ { }
+};
+
+static struct ctl_table loadpin_sysctl_table[] = {
+ {
+ .procname = "enforce",
+ .data = &enforce,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
+ .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
+ .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
+ },
+ { }
+};
+
+/*
+ * This must be called after early kernel init, since then the rootdev
+ * is available.
+ */
+static void check_pinning_enforcement(struct super_block *mnt_sb)
+{
+ bool ro = false;
+
+ /*
+ * If load pinning is not enforced via a read-only block
+ * device, allow sysctl to change modes for testing.
+ */
+ if (mnt_sb->s_bdev) {
+ char bdev[BDEVNAME_SIZE];
+
+ ro = bdev_read_only(mnt_sb->s_bdev);
+ bdevname(mnt_sb->s_bdev, bdev);
+ pr_info("%s (%u:%u): %s\n", bdev,
+ MAJOR(mnt_sb->s_bdev->bd_dev),
+ MINOR(mnt_sb->s_bdev->bd_dev),
+ ro ? "read-only" : "writable");
+ } else
+ pr_info("mnt_sb lacks block device, treating as: writable\n");
+
+ if (!ro) {
+ if (!register_sysctl_paths(loadpin_sysctl_path,
+ loadpin_sysctl_table))
+ pr_notice("sysctl registration failed!\n");
+ else
+ pr_info("enforcement can be disabled.\n");
+ } else
+ pr_info("load pinning engaged.\n");
+}
+#else
+static void check_pinning_enforcement(struct super_block *mnt_sb)
+{
+ pr_info("load pinning engaged.\n");
+}
+#endif
+
+static void loadpin_sb_free_security(struct super_block *mnt_sb)
+{
+ /*
+ * When unmounting the filesystem we were using for load
+ * pinning, we acknowledge the superblock release, but make sure
+ * no other modules or firmware can be loaded.
+ */
+ if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(pinned_root) && mnt_sb == pinned_root) {
+ pinned_root = ERR_PTR(-EIO);
+ pr_info("umount pinned fs: refusing further loads\n");
+ }
+}
+
+static int loadpin_check(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+{
+ struct super_block *load_root;
+ const char *origin = kernel_read_file_id_str(id);
+
+ /* If the file id is excluded, ignore the pinning. */
+ if ((unsigned int)id < ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id) &&
+ ignore_read_file_id[id]) {
+ report_load(origin, file, "pinning-excluded");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* This handles the older init_module API that has a NULL file. */
+ if (!file) {
+ if (!enforce) {
+ report_load(origin, NULL, "old-api-pinning-ignored");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ report_load(origin, NULL, "old-api-denied");
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+
+ load_root = file->f_path.mnt->mnt_sb;
+
+ /* First loaded module/firmware defines the root for all others. */
+ spin_lock(&pinned_root_spinlock);
+ /*
+ * pinned_root is only NULL at startup. Otherwise, it is either
+ * a valid reference, or an ERR_PTR.
+ */
+ if (!pinned_root) {
+ pinned_root = load_root;
+ /*
+ * Unlock now since it's only pinned_root we care about.
+ * In the worst case, we will (correctly) report pinning
+ * failures before we have announced that pinning is
+ * enforcing. This would be purely cosmetic.
+ */
+ spin_unlock(&pinned_root_spinlock);
+ check_pinning_enforcement(pinned_root);
+ report_load(origin, file, "pinned");
+ } else {
+ spin_unlock(&pinned_root_spinlock);
+ }
+
+ if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(pinned_root) || load_root != pinned_root) {
+ if (unlikely(!enforce)) {
+ report_load(origin, file, "pinning-ignored");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ report_load(origin, file, "denied");
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
+ bool contents)
+{
+ /*
+ * LoadPin only cares about the _origin_ of a file, not its
+ * contents, so we can ignore the "are full contents available"
+ * argument here.
+ */
+ return loadpin_check(file, id);
+}
+
+static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
+{
+ /*
+ * LoadPin only cares about the _origin_ of a file, not its
+ * contents, so a NULL file is passed, and we can ignore the
+ * state of "contents".
+ */
+ return loadpin_check(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id);
+}
+
+static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, loadpin_sb_free_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, loadpin_read_file),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, loadpin_load_data),
+};
+
+static void __init parse_exclude(void)
+{
+ int i, j;
+ char *cur;
+
+ /*
+ * Make sure all the arrays stay within expected sizes. This
+ * is slightly weird because kernel_read_file_str[] includes
+ * READING_MAX_ID, which isn't actually meaningful here.
+ */
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(exclude_read_files) !=
+ ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id));
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(kernel_read_file_str) <
+ ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id));
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(exclude_read_files); i++) {
+ cur = exclude_read_files[i];
+ if (!cur)
+ break;
+ if (*cur == '\0')
+ continue;
+
+ for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id); j++) {
+ if (strcmp(cur, kernel_read_file_str[j]) == 0) {
+ pr_info("excluding: %s\n",
+ kernel_read_file_str[j]);
+ ignore_read_file_id[j] = 1;
+ /*
+ * Can not break, because one read_file_str
+ * may map to more than on read_file_id.
+ */
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static int __init loadpin_init(void)
+{
+ pr_info("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n",
+ enforce ? "" : "not ");
+ parse_exclude();
+ security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks), "loadpin");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+DEFINE_LSM(loadpin) = {
+ .name = "loadpin",
+ .init = loadpin_init,
+};
+
+/* Should not be mutable after boot, so not listed in sysfs (perm == 0). */
+module_param(enforce, int, 0);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(enforce, "Enforce module/firmware pinning");
+module_param_array_named(exclude, exclude_read_files, charp, NULL, 0);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(exclude, "Exclude pinning specific read file types");