diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/security.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/security.c | 2578 |
1 files changed, 2578 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f9157d502 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/security.c @@ -0,0 +1,2578 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +/* + * Security plug functions + * + * Copyright (C) 2001 WireX Communications, Inc <chris@wirex.com> + * Copyright (C) 2001-2002 Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com> + * Copyright (C) 2001 Networks Associates Technology, Inc <ssmalley@nai.com> + * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies + */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "LSM: " fmt + +#include <linux/bpf.h> +#include <linux/capability.h> +#include <linux/dcache.h> +#include <linux/export.h> +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h> +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> +#include <linux/integrity.h> +#include <linux/ima.h> +#include <linux/evm.h> +#include <linux/fsnotify.h> +#include <linux/mman.h> +#include <linux/mount.h> +#include <linux/personality.h> +#include <linux/backing-dev.h> +#include <linux/string.h> +#include <linux/msg.h> +#include <net/flow.h> + +#define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2 + +/* How many LSMs were built into the kernel? */ +#define LSM_COUNT (__end_lsm_info - __start_lsm_info) + +/* + * These are descriptions of the reasons that can be passed to the + * security_locked_down() LSM hook. Placing this array here allows + * all security modules to use the same descriptions for auditing + * purposes. + */ +const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = { + [LOCKDOWN_NONE] = "none", + [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "unsigned module loading", + [LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port", + [LOCKDOWN_EFI_TEST] = "/dev/efi_test access", + [LOCKDOWN_KEXEC] = "kexec of unsigned images", + [LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION] = "hibernation", + [LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS] = "direct PCI access", + [LOCKDOWN_IOPORT] = "raw io port access", + [LOCKDOWN_MSR] = "raw MSR access", + [LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES] = "modifying ACPI tables", + [LOCKDOWN_PCMCIA_CIS] = "direct PCMCIA CIS storage", + [LOCKDOWN_TIOCSSERIAL] = "reconfiguration of serial port IO", + [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS] = "unsafe module parameters", + [LOCKDOWN_MMIOTRACE] = "unsafe mmio", + [LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS] = "debugfs access", + [LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR] = "xmon write access", + [LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER] = "use of bpf to write user RAM", + [LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to write kernel RAM", + [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity", + [LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access", + [LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes", + [LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM", + [LOCKDOWN_DBG_READ_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to read kernel RAM", + [LOCKDOWN_PERF] = "unsafe use of perf", + [LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS] = "use of tracefs", + [LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW] = "xmon read and write access", + [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", +}; + +struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads __lsm_ro_after_init; +static BLOCKING_NOTIFIER_HEAD(blocking_lsm_notifier_chain); + +static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache; +static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache; + +char *lsm_names; +static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init; + +/* Boot-time LSM user choice */ +static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order; +static __initdata const char *chosen_major_lsm; + +static __initconst const char * const builtin_lsm_order = CONFIG_LSM; + +/* Ordered list of LSMs to initialize. */ +static __initdata struct lsm_info **ordered_lsms; +static __initdata struct lsm_info *exclusive; + +static __initdata bool debug; +#define init_debug(...) \ + do { \ + if (debug) \ + pr_info(__VA_ARGS__); \ + } while (0) + +static bool __init is_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm) +{ + if (!lsm->enabled) + return false; + + return *lsm->enabled; +} + +/* Mark an LSM's enabled flag. */ +static int lsm_enabled_true __initdata = 1; +static int lsm_enabled_false __initdata = 0; +static void __init set_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm, bool enabled) +{ + /* + * When an LSM hasn't configured an enable variable, we can use + * a hard-coded location for storing the default enabled state. + */ + if (!lsm->enabled) { + if (enabled) + lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; + else + lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false; + } else if (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_true) { + if (!enabled) + lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false; + } else if (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_false) { + if (enabled) + lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; + } else { + *lsm->enabled = enabled; + } +} + +/* Is an LSM already listed in the ordered LSMs list? */ +static bool __init exists_ordered_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm) +{ + struct lsm_info **check; + + for (check = ordered_lsms; *check; check++) + if (*check == lsm) + return true; + + return false; +} + +/* Append an LSM to the list of ordered LSMs to initialize. */ +static int last_lsm __initdata; +static void __init append_ordered_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm, const char *from) +{ + /* Ignore duplicate selections. */ + if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm)) + return; + + if (WARN(last_lsm == LSM_COUNT, "%s: out of LSM slots!?\n", from)) + return; + + /* Enable this LSM, if it is not already set. */ + if (!lsm->enabled) + lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; + ordered_lsms[last_lsm++] = lsm; + + init_debug("%s ordering: %s (%sabled)\n", from, lsm->name, + is_enabled(lsm) ? "en" : "dis"); +} + +/* Is an LSM allowed to be initialized? */ +static bool __init lsm_allowed(struct lsm_info *lsm) +{ + /* Skip if the LSM is disabled. */ + if (!is_enabled(lsm)) + return false; + + /* Not allowed if another exclusive LSM already initialized. */ + if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) && exclusive) { + init_debug("exclusive disabled: %s\n", lsm->name); + return false; + } + + return true; +} + +static void __init lsm_set_blob_size(int *need, int *lbs) +{ + int offset; + + if (*need > 0) { + offset = *lbs; + *lbs += *need; + *need = offset; + } +} + +static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed) +{ + if (!needed) + return; + + lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_cred, &blob_sizes.lbs_cred); + lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_file, &blob_sizes.lbs_file); + /* + * The inode blob gets an rcu_head in addition to + * what the modules might need. + */ + if (needed->lbs_inode && blob_sizes.lbs_inode == 0) + blob_sizes.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct rcu_head); + lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode); + lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc); + lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); + lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task); +} + +/* Prepare LSM for initialization. */ +static void __init prepare_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm) +{ + int enabled = lsm_allowed(lsm); + + /* Record enablement (to handle any following exclusive LSMs). */ + set_enabled(lsm, enabled); + + /* If enabled, do pre-initialization work. */ + if (enabled) { + if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) && !exclusive) { + exclusive = lsm; + init_debug("exclusive chosen: %s\n", lsm->name); + } + + lsm_set_blob_sizes(lsm->blobs); + } +} + +/* Initialize a given LSM, if it is enabled. */ +static void __init initialize_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm) +{ + if (is_enabled(lsm)) { + int ret; + + init_debug("initializing %s\n", lsm->name); + ret = lsm->init(); + WARN(ret, "%s failed to initialize: %d\n", lsm->name, ret); + } +} + +/* Populate ordered LSMs list from comma-separated LSM name list. */ +static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin) +{ + struct lsm_info *lsm; + char *sep, *name, *next; + + /* LSM_ORDER_FIRST is always first. */ + for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { + if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_FIRST) + append_ordered_lsm(lsm, "first"); + } + + /* Process "security=", if given. */ + if (chosen_major_lsm) { + struct lsm_info *major; + + /* + * To match the original "security=" behavior, this + * explicitly does NOT fallback to another Legacy Major + * if the selected one was separately disabled: disable + * all non-matching Legacy Major LSMs. + */ + for (major = __start_lsm_info; major < __end_lsm_info; + major++) { + if ((major->flags & LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR) && + strcmp(major->name, chosen_major_lsm) != 0) { + set_enabled(major, false); + init_debug("security=%s disabled: %s\n", + chosen_major_lsm, major->name); + } + } + } + + sep = kstrdup(order, GFP_KERNEL); + next = sep; + /* Walk the list, looking for matching LSMs. */ + while ((name = strsep(&next, ",")) != NULL) { + bool found = false; + + for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { + if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE && + strcmp(lsm->name, name) == 0) { + append_ordered_lsm(lsm, origin); + found = true; + } + } + + if (!found) + init_debug("%s ignored: %s\n", origin, name); + } + + /* Process "security=", if given. */ + if (chosen_major_lsm) { + for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { + if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm)) + continue; + if (strcmp(lsm->name, chosen_major_lsm) == 0) + append_ordered_lsm(lsm, "security="); + } + } + + /* Disable all LSMs not in the ordered list. */ + for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { + if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm)) + continue; + set_enabled(lsm, false); + init_debug("%s disabled: %s\n", origin, lsm->name); + } + + kfree(sep); +} + +static void __init lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred); +static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task); + +static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result); + +static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void) +{ + struct lsm_info **lsm; + + ordered_lsms = kcalloc(LSM_COUNT + 1, sizeof(*ordered_lsms), + GFP_KERNEL); + + if (chosen_lsm_order) { + if (chosen_major_lsm) { + pr_info("security= is ignored because it is superseded by lsm=\n"); + chosen_major_lsm = NULL; + } + ordered_lsm_parse(chosen_lsm_order, "cmdline"); + } else + ordered_lsm_parse(builtin_lsm_order, "builtin"); + + for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++) + prepare_lsm(*lsm); + + init_debug("cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred); + init_debug("file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file); + init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode); + init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc); + init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); + init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task); + + /* + * Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs + */ + if (blob_sizes.lbs_file) + lsm_file_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_file_cache", + blob_sizes.lbs_file, 0, + SLAB_PANIC, NULL); + if (blob_sizes.lbs_inode) + lsm_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_inode_cache", + blob_sizes.lbs_inode, 0, + SLAB_PANIC, NULL); + + lsm_early_cred((struct cred *) current->cred); + lsm_early_task(current); + for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++) + initialize_lsm(*lsm); + + kfree(ordered_lsms); +} + +int __init early_security_init(void) +{ + int i; + struct hlist_head *list = (struct hlist_head *) &security_hook_heads; + struct lsm_info *lsm; + + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(security_hook_heads) / sizeof(struct hlist_head); + i++) + INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&list[i]); + + for (lsm = __start_early_lsm_info; lsm < __end_early_lsm_info; lsm++) { + if (!lsm->enabled) + lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; + prepare_lsm(lsm); + initialize_lsm(lsm); + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * security_init - initializes the security framework + * + * This should be called early in the kernel initialization sequence. + */ +int __init security_init(void) +{ + struct lsm_info *lsm; + + pr_info("Security Framework initializing\n"); + + /* + * Append the names of the early LSM modules now that kmalloc() is + * available + */ + for (lsm = __start_early_lsm_info; lsm < __end_early_lsm_info; lsm++) { + if (lsm->enabled) + lsm_append(lsm->name, &lsm_names); + } + + /* Load LSMs in specified order. */ + ordered_lsm_init(); + + return 0; +} + +/* Save user chosen LSM */ +static int __init choose_major_lsm(char *str) +{ + chosen_major_lsm = str; + return 1; +} +__setup("security=", choose_major_lsm); + +/* Explicitly choose LSM initialization order. */ +static int __init choose_lsm_order(char *str) +{ + chosen_lsm_order = str; + return 1; +} +__setup("lsm=", choose_lsm_order); + +/* Enable LSM order debugging. */ +static int __init enable_debug(char *str) +{ + debug = true; + return 1; +} +__setup("lsm.debug", enable_debug); + +static bool match_last_lsm(const char *list, const char *lsm) +{ + const char *last; + + if (WARN_ON(!list || !lsm)) + return false; + last = strrchr(list, ','); + if (last) + /* Pass the comma, strcmp() will check for '\0' */ + last++; + else + last = list; + return !strcmp(last, lsm); +} + +static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result) +{ + char *cp; + + if (*result == NULL) { + *result = kstrdup(new, GFP_KERNEL); + if (*result == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + } else { + /* Check if it is the last registered name */ + if (match_last_lsm(*result, new)) + return 0; + cp = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s,%s", *result, new); + if (cp == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + kfree(*result); + *result = cp; + } + return 0; +} + +/** + * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists. + * @hooks: the hooks to add + * @count: the number of hooks to add + * @lsm: the name of the security module + * + * Each LSM has to register its hooks with the infrastructure. + */ +void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count, + char *lsm) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { + hooks[i].lsm = lsm; + hlist_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head); + } + + /* + * Don't try to append during early_security_init(), we'll come back + * and fix this up afterwards. + */ + if (slab_is_available()) { + if (lsm_append(lsm, &lsm_names) < 0) + panic("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n", __func__); + } +} + +int call_blocking_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data) +{ + return blocking_notifier_call_chain(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain, + event, data); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(call_blocking_lsm_notifier); + +int register_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb) +{ + return blocking_notifier_chain_register(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain, + nb); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(register_blocking_lsm_notifier); + +int unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb) +{ + return blocking_notifier_chain_unregister(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain, + nb); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier); + +/** + * lsm_cred_alloc - allocate a composite cred blob + * @cred: the cred that needs a blob + * @gfp: allocation type + * + * Allocate the cred blob for all the modules + * + * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. + */ +static int lsm_cred_alloc(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) +{ + if (blob_sizes.lbs_cred == 0) { + cred->security = NULL; + return 0; + } + + cred->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_cred, gfp); + if (cred->security == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + return 0; +} + +/** + * lsm_early_cred - during initialization allocate a composite cred blob + * @cred: the cred that needs a blob + * + * Allocate the cred blob for all the modules + */ +static void __init lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred) +{ + int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, GFP_KERNEL); + + if (rc) + panic("%s: Early cred alloc failed.\n", __func__); +} + +/** + * lsm_file_alloc - allocate a composite file blob + * @file: the file that needs a blob + * + * Allocate the file blob for all the modules + * + * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. + */ +static int lsm_file_alloc(struct file *file) +{ + if (!lsm_file_cache) { + file->f_security = NULL; + return 0; + } + + file->f_security = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_file_cache, GFP_KERNEL); + if (file->f_security == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + return 0; +} + +/** + * lsm_inode_alloc - allocate a composite inode blob + * @inode: the inode that needs a blob + * + * Allocate the inode blob for all the modules + * + * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. + */ +int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode) +{ + if (!lsm_inode_cache) { + inode->i_security = NULL; + return 0; + } + + inode->i_security = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS); + if (inode->i_security == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + return 0; +} + +/** + * lsm_task_alloc - allocate a composite task blob + * @task: the task that needs a blob + * + * Allocate the task blob for all the modules + * + * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. + */ +static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task) +{ + if (blob_sizes.lbs_task == 0) { + task->security = NULL; + return 0; + } + + task->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_task, GFP_KERNEL); + if (task->security == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + return 0; +} + +/** + * lsm_ipc_alloc - allocate a composite ipc blob + * @kip: the ipc that needs a blob + * + * Allocate the ipc blob for all the modules + * + * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. + */ +static int lsm_ipc_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *kip) +{ + if (blob_sizes.lbs_ipc == 0) { + kip->security = NULL; + return 0; + } + + kip->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_ipc, GFP_KERNEL); + if (kip->security == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + return 0; +} + +/** + * lsm_msg_msg_alloc - allocate a composite msg_msg blob + * @mp: the msg_msg that needs a blob + * + * Allocate the ipc blob for all the modules + * + * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. + */ +static int lsm_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *mp) +{ + if (blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg == 0) { + mp->security = NULL; + return 0; + } + + mp->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg, GFP_KERNEL); + if (mp->security == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + return 0; +} + +/** + * lsm_early_task - during initialization allocate a composite task blob + * @task: the task that needs a blob + * + * Allocate the task blob for all the modules + */ +static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task) +{ + int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task); + + if (rc) + panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__); +} + +/* + * The default value of the LSM hook is defined in linux/lsm_hook_defs.h and + * can be accessed with: + * + * LSM_RET_DEFAULT(<hook_name>) + * + * The macros below define static constants for the default value of each + * LSM hook. + */ +#define LSM_RET_DEFAULT(NAME) (NAME##_default) +#define DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_void(DEFAULT, NAME) +#define DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_int(DEFAULT, NAME) \ + static const int LSM_RET_DEFAULT(NAME) = (DEFAULT); +#define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \ + DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_##RET(DEFAULT, NAME) + +#include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h> +#undef LSM_HOOK + +/* + * Hook list operation macros. + * + * call_void_hook: + * This is a hook that does not return a value. + * + * call_int_hook: + * This is a hook that returns a value. + */ + +#define call_void_hook(FUNC, ...) \ + do { \ + struct security_hook_list *P; \ + \ + hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) \ + P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \ + } while (0) + +#define call_int_hook(FUNC, IRC, ...) ({ \ + int RC = IRC; \ + do { \ + struct security_hook_list *P; \ + \ + hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) { \ + RC = P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \ + if (RC != 0) \ + break; \ + } \ + } while (0); \ + RC; \ +}) + +/* Security operations */ + +int security_binder_set_context_mgr(const struct cred *mgr) +{ + return call_int_hook(binder_set_context_mgr, 0, mgr); +} + +int security_binder_transaction(const struct cred *from, + const struct cred *to) +{ + return call_int_hook(binder_transaction, 0, from, to); +} + +int security_binder_transfer_binder(const struct cred *from, + const struct cred *to) +{ + return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_binder, 0, from, to); +} + +int security_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from, + const struct cred *to, struct file *file) +{ + return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_file, 0, from, to, file); +} + +int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode) +{ + return call_int_hook(ptrace_access_check, 0, child, mode); +} + +int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) +{ + return call_int_hook(ptrace_traceme, 0, parent); +} + +int security_capget(struct task_struct *target, + kernel_cap_t *effective, + kernel_cap_t *inheritable, + kernel_cap_t *permitted) +{ + return call_int_hook(capget, 0, target, + effective, inheritable, permitted); +} + +int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, + const kernel_cap_t *effective, + const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, + const kernel_cap_t *permitted) +{ + return call_int_hook(capset, 0, new, old, + effective, inheritable, permitted); +} + +int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, + struct user_namespace *ns, + int cap, + unsigned int opts) +{ + return call_int_hook(capable, 0, cred, ns, cap, opts); +} + +int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb) +{ + return call_int_hook(quotactl, 0, cmds, type, id, sb); +} + +int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry) +{ + return call_int_hook(quota_on, 0, dentry); +} + +int security_syslog(int type) +{ + return call_int_hook(syslog, 0, type); +} + +int security_settime64(const struct timespec64 *ts, const struct timezone *tz) +{ + return call_int_hook(settime, 0, ts, tz); +} + +int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) +{ + struct security_hook_list *hp; + int cap_sys_admin = 1; + int rc; + + /* + * The module will respond with a positive value if + * it thinks the __vm_enough_memory() call should be + * made with the cap_sys_admin set. If all of the modules + * agree that it should be set it will. If any module + * thinks it should not be set it won't. + */ + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.vm_enough_memory, list) { + rc = hp->hook.vm_enough_memory(mm, pages); + if (rc <= 0) { + cap_sys_admin = 0; + break; + } + } + return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin); +} + +int security_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_for_exec, 0, bprm); +} + +int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file) +{ + return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_from_file, 0, bprm, file); +} + +int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + int ret; + + ret = call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, 0, bprm); + if (ret) + return ret; + return ima_bprm_check(bprm); +} + +void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + call_void_hook(bprm_committing_creds, bprm); +} + +void security_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + call_void_hook(bprm_committed_creds, bprm); +} + +int security_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_context *src_fc) +{ + return call_int_hook(fs_context_dup, 0, fc, src_fc); +} + +int security_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, + struct fs_parameter *param) +{ + struct security_hook_list *hp; + int trc; + int rc = -ENOPARAM; + + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.fs_context_parse_param, + list) { + trc = hp->hook.fs_context_parse_param(fc, param); + if (trc == 0) + rc = 0; + else if (trc != -ENOPARAM) + return trc; + } + return rc; +} + +int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb) +{ + return call_int_hook(sb_alloc_security, 0, sb); +} + +void security_sb_free(struct super_block *sb) +{ + call_void_hook(sb_free_security, sb); +} + +void security_free_mnt_opts(void **mnt_opts) +{ + if (!*mnt_opts) + return; + call_void_hook(sb_free_mnt_opts, *mnt_opts); + *mnt_opts = NULL; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_free_mnt_opts); + +int security_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts) +{ + return call_int_hook(sb_eat_lsm_opts, 0, options, mnt_opts); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_eat_lsm_opts); + +int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, + void *mnt_opts) +{ + return call_int_hook(sb_remount, 0, sb, mnt_opts); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_remount); + +int security_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb) +{ + return call_int_hook(sb_kern_mount, 0, sb); +} + +int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb) +{ + return call_int_hook(sb_show_options, 0, m, sb); +} + +int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) +{ + return call_int_hook(sb_statfs, 0, dentry); +} + +int security_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path, + const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) +{ + return call_int_hook(sb_mount, 0, dev_name, path, type, flags, data); +} + +int security_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) +{ + return call_int_hook(sb_umount, 0, mnt, flags); +} + +int security_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path, const struct path *new_path) +{ + return call_int_hook(sb_pivotroot, 0, old_path, new_path); +} + +int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, + void *mnt_opts, + unsigned long kern_flags, + unsigned long *set_kern_flags) +{ + return call_int_hook(sb_set_mnt_opts, + mnt_opts ? -EOPNOTSUPP : 0, sb, + mnt_opts, kern_flags, set_kern_flags); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_set_mnt_opts); + +int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb, + struct super_block *newsb, + unsigned long kern_flags, + unsigned long *set_kern_flags) +{ + return call_int_hook(sb_clone_mnt_opts, 0, oldsb, newsb, + kern_flags, set_kern_flags); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_clone_mnt_opts); + +int security_add_mnt_opt(const char *option, const char *val, int len, + void **mnt_opts) +{ + return call_int_hook(sb_add_mnt_opt, -EINVAL, + option, val, len, mnt_opts); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_add_mnt_opt); + +int security_move_mount(const struct path *from_path, const struct path *to_path) +{ + return call_int_hook(move_mount, 0, from_path, to_path); +} + +int security_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask, + unsigned int obj_type) +{ + return call_int_hook(path_notify, 0, path, mask, obj_type); +} + +int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode) +{ + int rc = lsm_inode_alloc(inode); + + if (unlikely(rc)) + return rc; + rc = call_int_hook(inode_alloc_security, 0, inode); + if (unlikely(rc)) + security_inode_free(inode); + return rc; +} + +static void inode_free_by_rcu(struct rcu_head *head) +{ + /* + * The rcu head is at the start of the inode blob + */ + kmem_cache_free(lsm_inode_cache, head); +} + +void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode) +{ + integrity_inode_free(inode); + call_void_hook(inode_free_security, inode); + /* + * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and + * a call to security_inode_permission() can be made + * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS + * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder + * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and + * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact. + * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too. + */ + if (inode->i_security) + call_rcu((struct rcu_head *)inode->i_security, + inode_free_by_rcu); +} + +int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, + const struct qstr *name, void **ctx, + u32 *ctxlen) +{ + return call_int_hook(dentry_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, dentry, mode, + name, ctx, ctxlen); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_init_security); + +int security_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, + struct qstr *name, + const struct cred *old, struct cred *new) +{ + return call_int_hook(dentry_create_files_as, 0, dentry, mode, + name, old, new); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_create_files_as); + +int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, + const struct qstr *qstr, + const initxattrs initxattrs, void *fs_data) +{ + struct xattr new_xattrs[MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR + 1]; + struct xattr *lsm_xattr, *evm_xattr, *xattr; + int ret; + + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) + return 0; + + if (!initxattrs) + return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, + dir, qstr, NULL, NULL, NULL); + memset(new_xattrs, 0, sizeof(new_xattrs)); + lsm_xattr = new_xattrs; + ret = call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir, qstr, + &lsm_xattr->name, + &lsm_xattr->value, + &lsm_xattr->value_len); + if (ret) + goto out; + + evm_xattr = lsm_xattr + 1; + ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, lsm_xattr, evm_xattr); + if (ret) + goto out; + ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data); +out: + for (xattr = new_xattrs; xattr->value != NULL; xattr++) + kfree(xattr->value); + return (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP) ? 0 : ret; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_init_security); + +int security_old_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, + const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name, + void **value, size_t *len) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir, + qstr, name, value, len); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_old_inode_init_security); + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH +int security_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, + unsigned int dev) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) + return 0; + return call_int_hook(path_mknod, 0, dir, dentry, mode, dev); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mknod); + +int security_path_mkdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) + return 0; + return call_int_hook(path_mkdir, 0, dir, dentry, mode); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mkdir); + +int security_path_rmdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) + return 0; + return call_int_hook(path_rmdir, 0, dir, dentry); +} + +int security_path_unlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) + return 0; + return call_int_hook(path_unlink, 0, dir, dentry); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_unlink); + +int security_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, + const char *old_name) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) + return 0; + return call_int_hook(path_symlink, 0, dir, dentry, old_name); +} + +int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir, + struct dentry *new_dentry) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)))) + return 0; + return call_int_hook(path_link, 0, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry); +} + +int security_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, + const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry, + unsigned int flags) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)) || + (d_is_positive(new_dentry) && IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(new_dentry))))) + return 0; + + if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) { + int err = call_int_hook(path_rename, 0, new_dir, new_dentry, + old_dir, old_dentry); + if (err) + return err; + } + + return call_int_hook(path_rename, 0, old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir, + new_dentry); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_rename); + +int security_path_truncate(const struct path *path) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) + return 0; + return call_int_hook(path_truncate, 0, path); +} + +int security_path_chmod(const struct path *path, umode_t mode) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) + return 0; + return call_int_hook(path_chmod, 0, path, mode); +} + +int security_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) + return 0; + return call_int_hook(path_chown, 0, path, uid, gid); +} + +int security_path_chroot(const struct path *path) +{ + return call_int_hook(path_chroot, 0, path); +} +#endif + +int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) + return 0; + return call_int_hook(inode_create, 0, dir, dentry, mode); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_create); + +int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, + struct dentry *new_dentry) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)))) + return 0; + return call_int_hook(inode_link, 0, old_dentry, dir, new_dentry); +} + +int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) + return 0; + return call_int_hook(inode_unlink, 0, dir, dentry); +} + +int security_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, + const char *old_name) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) + return 0; + return call_int_hook(inode_symlink, 0, dir, dentry, old_name); +} + +int security_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) + return 0; + return call_int_hook(inode_mkdir, 0, dir, dentry, mode); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_mkdir); + +int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) + return 0; + return call_int_hook(inode_rmdir, 0, dir, dentry); +} + +int security_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) + return 0; + return call_int_hook(inode_mknod, 0, dir, dentry, mode, dev); +} + +int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, + struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry, + unsigned int flags) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)) || + (d_is_positive(new_dentry) && IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(new_dentry))))) + return 0; + + if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) { + int err = call_int_hook(inode_rename, 0, new_dir, new_dentry, + old_dir, old_dentry); + if (err) + return err; + } + + return call_int_hook(inode_rename, 0, old_dir, old_dentry, + new_dir, new_dentry); +} + +int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) + return 0; + return call_int_hook(inode_readlink, 0, dentry); +} + +int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, + bool rcu) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) + return 0; + return call_int_hook(inode_follow_link, 0, dentry, inode, rcu); +} + +int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) + return 0; + return call_int_hook(inode_permission, 0, inode, mask); +} + +int security_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) +{ + int ret; + + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) + return 0; + ret = call_int_hook(inode_setattr, 0, dentry, attr); + if (ret) + return ret; + return evm_inode_setattr(dentry, attr); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_setattr); + +int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) + return 0; + return call_int_hook(inode_getattr, 0, path); +} + +int security_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, + const void *value, size_t size, int flags) +{ + int ret; + + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) + return 0; + /* + * SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call, + * so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so. + */ + ret = call_int_hook(inode_setxattr, 1, dentry, name, value, size, + flags); + + if (ret == 1) + ret = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = ima_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size); + if (ret) + return ret; + return evm_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size); +} + +void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, + const void *value, size_t size, int flags) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) + return; + call_void_hook(inode_post_setxattr, dentry, name, value, size, flags); + evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size); +} + +int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) + return 0; + return call_int_hook(inode_getxattr, 0, dentry, name); +} + +int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) + return 0; + return call_int_hook(inode_listxattr, 0, dentry); +} + +int security_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) +{ + int ret; + + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) + return 0; + /* + * SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call, + * so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so. + */ + ret = call_int_hook(inode_removexattr, 1, dentry, name); + if (ret == 1) + ret = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = ima_inode_removexattr(dentry, name); + if (ret) + return ret; + return evm_inode_removexattr(dentry, name); +} + +int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) +{ + return call_int_hook(inode_need_killpriv, 0, dentry); +} + +int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) +{ + return call_int_hook(inode_killpriv, 0, dentry); +} + +int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc) +{ + struct security_hook_list *hp; + int rc; + + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) + return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity); + /* + * Only one module will provide an attribute with a given name. + */ + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecurity, list) { + rc = hp->hook.inode_getsecurity(inode, name, buffer, alloc); + if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity)) + return rc; + } + return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity); +} + +int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) +{ + struct security_hook_list *hp; + int rc; + + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) + return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity); + /* + * Only one module will provide an attribute with a given name. + */ + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_setsecurity, list) { + rc = hp->hook.inode_setsecurity(inode, name, value, size, + flags); + if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity)) + return rc; + } + return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity); +} + +int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) + return 0; + return call_int_hook(inode_listsecurity, 0, inode, buffer, buffer_size); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity); + +void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) +{ + call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid); +} + +int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new) +{ + return call_int_hook(inode_copy_up, 0, src, new); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up); + +int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) +{ + struct security_hook_list *hp; + int rc; + + /* + * The implementation can return 0 (accept the xattr), 1 (discard the + * xattr), -EOPNOTSUPP if it does not know anything about the xattr or + * any other error code incase of an error. + */ + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, + &security_hook_heads.inode_copy_up_xattr, list) { + rc = hp->hook.inode_copy_up_xattr(name); + if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr)) + return rc; + } + + return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up_xattr); + +int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir, + struct kernfs_node *kn) +{ + return call_int_hook(kernfs_init_security, 0, kn_dir, kn); +} + +int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) +{ + int ret; + + ret = call_int_hook(file_permission, 0, file, mask); + if (ret) + return ret; + + return fsnotify_perm(file, mask); +} + +int security_file_alloc(struct file *file) +{ + int rc = lsm_file_alloc(file); + + if (rc) + return rc; + rc = call_int_hook(file_alloc_security, 0, file); + if (unlikely(rc)) + security_file_free(file); + return rc; +} + +void security_file_free(struct file *file) +{ + void *blob; + + call_void_hook(file_free_security, file); + + blob = file->f_security; + if (blob) { + file->f_security = NULL; + kmem_cache_free(lsm_file_cache, blob); + } +} + +int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) +{ + return call_int_hook(file_ioctl, 0, file, cmd, arg); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_file_ioctl); + +static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) +{ + /* + * Does we have PROT_READ and does the application expect + * it to imply PROT_EXEC? If not, nothing to talk about... + */ + if ((prot & (PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC)) != PROT_READ) + return prot; + if (!(current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC)) + return prot; + /* + * if that's an anonymous mapping, let it. + */ + if (!file) + return prot | PROT_EXEC; + /* + * ditto if it's not on noexec mount, except that on !MMU we need + * NOMMU_MAP_EXEC (== VM_MAYEXEC) in this case + */ + if (!path_noexec(&file->f_path)) { +#ifndef CONFIG_MMU + if (file->f_op->mmap_capabilities) { + unsigned caps = file->f_op->mmap_capabilities(file); + if (!(caps & NOMMU_MAP_EXEC)) + return prot; + } +#endif + return prot | PROT_EXEC; + } + /* anything on noexec mount won't get PROT_EXEC */ + return prot; +} + +int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, + unsigned long flags) +{ + unsigned long prot_adj = mmap_prot(file, prot); + int ret; + + ret = call_int_hook(mmap_file, 0, file, prot, prot_adj, flags); + if (ret) + return ret; + return ima_file_mmap(file, prot, prot_adj, flags); +} + +int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) +{ + return call_int_hook(mmap_addr, 0, addr); +} + +int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, + unsigned long prot) +{ + int ret; + + ret = call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot); + if (ret) + return ret; + return ima_file_mprotect(vma, prot); +} + +int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) +{ + return call_int_hook(file_lock, 0, file, cmd); +} + +int security_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) +{ + return call_int_hook(file_fcntl, 0, file, cmd, arg); +} + +void security_file_set_fowner(struct file *file) +{ + call_void_hook(file_set_fowner, file); +} + +int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, + struct fown_struct *fown, int sig) +{ + return call_int_hook(file_send_sigiotask, 0, tsk, fown, sig); +} + +int security_file_receive(struct file *file) +{ + return call_int_hook(file_receive, 0, file); +} + +int security_file_open(struct file *file) +{ + int ret; + + ret = call_int_hook(file_open, 0, file); + if (ret) + return ret; + + return fsnotify_perm(file, MAY_OPEN); +} + +int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags) +{ + int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task); + + if (rc) + return rc; + rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags); + if (unlikely(rc)) + security_task_free(task); + return rc; +} + +void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task) +{ + call_void_hook(task_free, task); + + kfree(task->security); + task->security = NULL; +} + +int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) +{ + int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, gfp); + + if (rc) + return rc; + + rc = call_int_hook(cred_alloc_blank, 0, cred, gfp); + if (unlikely(rc)) + security_cred_free(cred); + return rc; +} + +void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred) +{ + /* + * There is a failure case in prepare_creds() that + * may result in a call here with ->security being NULL. + */ + if (unlikely(cred->security == NULL)) + return; + + call_void_hook(cred_free, cred); + + kfree(cred->security); + cred->security = NULL; +} + +int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp) +{ + int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(new, gfp); + + if (rc) + return rc; + + rc = call_int_hook(cred_prepare, 0, new, old, gfp); + if (unlikely(rc)) + security_cred_free(new); + return rc; +} + +void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) +{ + call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old); +} + +void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) +{ + *secid = 0; + call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, secid); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid); + +int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid) +{ + return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid); +} + +int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) +{ + return call_int_hook(kernel_create_files_as, 0, new, inode); +} + +int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) +{ + int ret; + + ret = call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name); + if (ret) + return ret; + return integrity_kernel_module_request(kmod_name); +} + +int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, + bool contents) +{ + int ret; + + ret = call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id, contents); + if (ret) + return ret; + return ima_read_file(file, id, contents); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file); + +int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, + enum kernel_read_file_id id) +{ + int ret; + + ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size, id); + if (ret) + return ret; + return ima_post_read_file(file, buf, size, id); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file); + +int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) +{ + int ret; + + ret = call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id, contents); + if (ret) + return ret; + return ima_load_data(id, contents); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_load_data); + +int security_kernel_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, + enum kernel_load_data_id id, + char *description) +{ + int ret; + + ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_load_data, 0, buf, size, id, + description); + if (ret) + return ret; + return ima_post_load_data(buf, size, id, description); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_load_data); + +int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, + int flags) +{ + return call_int_hook(task_fix_setuid, 0, new, old, flags); +} + +int security_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, + int flags) +{ + return call_int_hook(task_fix_setgid, 0, new, old, flags); +} + +int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) +{ + return call_int_hook(task_setpgid, 0, p, pgid); +} + +int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p) +{ + return call_int_hook(task_getpgid, 0, p); +} + +int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) +{ + return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p); +} + +void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) +{ + *secid = 0; + call_void_hook(task_getsecid, p, secid); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid); + +int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) +{ + return call_int_hook(task_setnice, 0, p, nice); +} + +int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) +{ + return call_int_hook(task_setioprio, 0, p, ioprio); +} + +int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p) +{ + return call_int_hook(task_getioprio, 0, p); +} + +int security_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred, + unsigned int flags) +{ + return call_int_hook(task_prlimit, 0, cred, tcred, flags); +} + +int security_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource, + struct rlimit *new_rlim) +{ + return call_int_hook(task_setrlimit, 0, p, resource, new_rlim); +} + +int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p) +{ + return call_int_hook(task_setscheduler, 0, p); +} + +int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p) +{ + return call_int_hook(task_getscheduler, 0, p); +} + +int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p) +{ + return call_int_hook(task_movememory, 0, p); +} + +int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info, + int sig, const struct cred *cred) +{ + return call_int_hook(task_kill, 0, p, info, sig, cred); +} + +int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, + unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) +{ + int thisrc; + int rc = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(task_prctl); + struct security_hook_list *hp; + + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_prctl, list) { + thisrc = hp->hook.task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); + if (thisrc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(task_prctl)) { + rc = thisrc; + if (thisrc != 0) + break; + } + } + return rc; +} + +void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) +{ + call_void_hook(task_to_inode, p, inode); +} + +int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) +{ + return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, 0, ipcp, flag); +} + +void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid) +{ + *secid = 0; + call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid); +} + +int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg) +{ + int rc = lsm_msg_msg_alloc(msg); + + if (unlikely(rc)) + return rc; + rc = call_int_hook(msg_msg_alloc_security, 0, msg); + if (unlikely(rc)) + security_msg_msg_free(msg); + return rc; +} + +void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg) +{ + call_void_hook(msg_msg_free_security, msg); + kfree(msg->security); + msg->security = NULL; +} + +int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq) +{ + int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(msq); + + if (unlikely(rc)) + return rc; + rc = call_int_hook(msg_queue_alloc_security, 0, msq); + if (unlikely(rc)) + security_msg_queue_free(msq); + return rc; +} + +void security_msg_queue_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq) +{ + call_void_hook(msg_queue_free_security, msq); + kfree(msq->security); + msq->security = NULL; +} + +int security_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg) +{ + return call_int_hook(msg_queue_associate, 0, msq, msqflg); +} + +int security_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd) +{ + return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgctl, 0, msq, cmd); +} + +int security_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, + struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg) +{ + return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgsnd, 0, msq, msg, msqflg); +} + +int security_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, + struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode) +{ + return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgrcv, 0, msq, msg, target, type, mode); +} + +int security_shm_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp) +{ + int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(shp); + + if (unlikely(rc)) + return rc; + rc = call_int_hook(shm_alloc_security, 0, shp); + if (unlikely(rc)) + security_shm_free(shp); + return rc; +} + +void security_shm_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp) +{ + call_void_hook(shm_free_security, shp); + kfree(shp->security); + shp->security = NULL; +} + +int security_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg) +{ + return call_int_hook(shm_associate, 0, shp, shmflg); +} + +int security_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd) +{ + return call_int_hook(shm_shmctl, 0, shp, cmd); +} + +int security_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg) +{ + return call_int_hook(shm_shmat, 0, shp, shmaddr, shmflg); +} + +int security_sem_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma) +{ + int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(sma); + + if (unlikely(rc)) + return rc; + rc = call_int_hook(sem_alloc_security, 0, sma); + if (unlikely(rc)) + security_sem_free(sma); + return rc; +} + +void security_sem_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma) +{ + call_void_hook(sem_free_security, sma); + kfree(sma->security); + sma->security = NULL; +} + +int security_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg) +{ + return call_int_hook(sem_associate, 0, sma, semflg); +} + +int security_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd) +{ + return call_int_hook(sem_semctl, 0, sma, cmd); +} + +int security_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, struct sembuf *sops, + unsigned nsops, int alter) +{ + return call_int_hook(sem_semop, 0, sma, sops, nsops, alter); +} + +void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) +{ + if (unlikely(inode && IS_PRIVATE(inode))) + return; + call_void_hook(d_instantiate, dentry, inode); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_d_instantiate); + +int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name, + char **value) +{ + struct security_hook_list *hp; + + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) { + if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) + continue; + return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value); + } + return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(getprocattr); +} + +int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value, + size_t size) +{ + struct security_hook_list *hp; + + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) { + if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) + continue; + return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size); + } + return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(setprocattr); +} + +int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + return call_int_hook(netlink_send, 0, sk, skb); +} + +int security_ismaclabel(const char *name) +{ + return call_int_hook(ismaclabel, 0, name); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel); + +int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) +{ + struct security_hook_list *hp; + int rc; + + /* + * Currently, only one LSM can implement secid_to_secctx (i.e this + * LSM hook is not "stackable"). + */ + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) { + rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(secid, secdata, seclen); + if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx)) + return rc; + } + + return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx); + +int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid) +{ + *secid = 0; + return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, secid); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid); + +void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) +{ + call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx); + +void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode) +{ + call_void_hook(inode_invalidate_secctx, inode); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_invalidate_secctx); + +int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) +{ + return call_int_hook(inode_notifysecctx, 0, inode, ctx, ctxlen); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_notifysecctx); + +int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) +{ + return call_int_hook(inode_setsecctx, 0, dentry, ctx, ctxlen); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx); + +int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) +{ + return call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, ctx, ctxlen); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx); + +#ifdef CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE +int security_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred, + const struct cred *cred, + struct watch_notification *n) +{ + return call_int_hook(post_notification, 0, w_cred, cred, n); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS +int security_watch_key(struct key *key) +{ + return call_int_hook(watch_key, 0, key); +} +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK + +int security_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk) +{ + return call_int_hook(unix_stream_connect, 0, sock, other, newsk); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_stream_connect); + +int security_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other) +{ + return call_int_hook(unix_may_send, 0, sock, other); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_may_send); + +int security_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) +{ + return call_int_hook(socket_create, 0, family, type, protocol, kern); +} + +int security_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, + int type, int protocol, int kern) +{ + return call_int_hook(socket_post_create, 0, sock, family, type, + protocol, kern); +} + +int security_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka, struct socket *sockb) +{ + return call_int_hook(socket_socketpair, 0, socka, sockb); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_socketpair); + +int security_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) +{ + return call_int_hook(socket_bind, 0, sock, address, addrlen); +} + +int security_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) +{ + return call_int_hook(socket_connect, 0, sock, address, addrlen); +} + +int security_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) +{ + return call_int_hook(socket_listen, 0, sock, backlog); +} + +int security_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) +{ + return call_int_hook(socket_accept, 0, sock, newsock); +} + +int security_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size) +{ + return call_int_hook(socket_sendmsg, 0, sock, msg, size); +} + +int security_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, + int size, int flags) +{ + return call_int_hook(socket_recvmsg, 0, sock, msg, size, flags); +} + +int security_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock) +{ + return call_int_hook(socket_getsockname, 0, sock); +} + +int security_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock) +{ + return call_int_hook(socket_getpeername, 0, sock); +} + +int security_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) +{ + return call_int_hook(socket_getsockopt, 0, sock, level, optname); +} + +int security_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) +{ + return call_int_hook(socket_setsockopt, 0, sock, level, optname); +} + +int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) +{ + return call_int_hook(socket_shutdown, 0, sock, how); +} + +int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + return call_int_hook(socket_sock_rcv_skb, 0, sk, skb); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb); + +int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval, + int __user *optlen, unsigned len) +{ + return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock, + optval, optlen, len); +} + +int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) +{ + return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock, + skb, secid); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram); + +int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority) +{ + return call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority); +} + +void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk) +{ + call_void_hook(sk_free_security, sk); +} + +void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) +{ + call_void_hook(sk_clone_security, sk, newsk); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_clone); + +void security_sk_classify_flow(struct sock *sk, struct flowi_common *flic) +{ + call_void_hook(sk_getsecid, sk, &flic->flowic_secid); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_classify_flow); + +void security_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, + struct flowi_common *flic) +{ + call_void_hook(req_classify_flow, req, flic); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_req_classify_flow); + +void security_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) +{ + call_void_hook(sock_graft, sk, parent); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_graft); + +int security_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, + struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req) +{ + return call_int_hook(inet_conn_request, 0, sk, skb, req); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_request); + +void security_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk, + const struct request_sock *req) +{ + call_void_hook(inet_csk_clone, newsk, req); +} + +void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, + struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + call_void_hook(inet_conn_established, sk, skb); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_established); + +int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid) +{ + return call_int_hook(secmark_relabel_packet, 0, secid); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_relabel_packet); + +void security_secmark_refcount_inc(void) +{ + call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_inc); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_inc); + +void security_secmark_refcount_dec(void) +{ + call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_dec); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_dec); + +int security_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security) +{ + return call_int_hook(tun_dev_alloc_security, 0, security); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_alloc_security); + +void security_tun_dev_free_security(void *security) +{ + call_void_hook(tun_dev_free_security, security); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_free_security); + +int security_tun_dev_create(void) +{ + return call_int_hook(tun_dev_create, 0); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_create); + +int security_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security) +{ + return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach_queue, 0, security); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach_queue); + +int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security) +{ + return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach, 0, sk, security); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach); + +int security_tun_dev_open(void *security) +{ + return call_int_hook(tun_dev_open, 0, security); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_open); + +int security_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + return call_int_hook(sctp_assoc_request, 0, ep, skb); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_assoc_request); + +int security_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname, + struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) +{ + return call_int_hook(sctp_bind_connect, 0, sk, optname, + address, addrlen); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_bind_connect); + +void security_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk, + struct sock *newsk) +{ + call_void_hook(sctp_sk_clone, ep, sk, newsk); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_sk_clone); + +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND + +int security_ib_pkey_access(void *sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey) +{ + return call_int_hook(ib_pkey_access, 0, sec, subnet_prefix, pkey); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_pkey_access); + +int security_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *sec, const char *dev_name, u8 port_num) +{ + return call_int_hook(ib_endport_manage_subnet, 0, sec, dev_name, port_num); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_endport_manage_subnet); + +int security_ib_alloc_security(void **sec) +{ + return call_int_hook(ib_alloc_security, 0, sec); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_alloc_security); + +void security_ib_free_security(void *sec) +{ + call_void_hook(ib_free_security, sec); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_free_security); +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM + +int security_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, + struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, + gfp_t gfp) +{ + return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, 0, ctxp, sec_ctx, gfp); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_alloc); + +int security_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, + struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp) +{ + return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_clone_security, 0, old_ctx, new_ctxp); +} + +void security_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) +{ + call_void_hook(xfrm_policy_free_security, ctx); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_free); + +int security_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) +{ + return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_delete_security, 0, ctx); +} + +int security_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, + struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx) +{ + return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc, 0, x, sec_ctx); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_alloc); + +int security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x, + struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid) +{ + return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire, 0, x, polsec, secid); +} + +int security_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x) +{ + return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_delete_security, 0, x); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_delete); + +void security_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x) +{ + call_void_hook(xfrm_state_free_security, x); +} + +int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir) +{ + return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_lookup, 0, ctx, fl_secid, dir); +} + +int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, + struct xfrm_policy *xp, + const struct flowi_common *flic) +{ + struct security_hook_list *hp; + int rc = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match); + + /* + * Since this function is expected to return 0 or 1, the judgment + * becomes difficult if multiple LSMs supply this call. Fortunately, + * we can use the first LSM's judgment because currently only SELinux + * supplies this call. + * + * For speed optimization, we explicitly break the loop rather than + * using the macro + */ + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match, + list) { + rc = hp->hook.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(x, xp, flic); + break; + } + return rc; +} + +int security_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) +{ + return call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, secid, 1); +} + +void security_skb_classify_flow(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi_common *flic) +{ + int rc = call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, &flic->flowic_secid, + 0); + + BUG_ON(rc); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_skb_classify_flow); + +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS + +int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred, + unsigned long flags) +{ + return call_int_hook(key_alloc, 0, key, cred, flags); +} + +void security_key_free(struct key *key) +{ + call_void_hook(key_free, key); +} + +int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred, + enum key_need_perm need_perm) +{ + return call_int_hook(key_permission, 0, key_ref, cred, need_perm); +} + +int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) +{ + *_buffer = NULL; + return call_int_hook(key_getsecurity, 0, key, _buffer); +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT + +int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule) +{ + return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule); +} + +int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule) +{ + return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, 0, krule); +} + +void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule) +{ + call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule); +} + +int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule) +{ + return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL +int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size) +{ + return call_int_hook(bpf, 0, cmd, attr, size); +} +int security_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode) +{ + return call_int_hook(bpf_map, 0, map, fmode); +} +int security_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog) +{ + return call_int_hook(bpf_prog, 0, prog); +} +int security_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map) +{ + return call_int_hook(bpf_map_alloc_security, 0, map); +} +int security_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) +{ + return call_int_hook(bpf_prog_alloc_security, 0, aux); +} +void security_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map) +{ + call_void_hook(bpf_map_free_security, map); +} +void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) +{ + call_void_hook(bpf_prog_free_security, aux); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ + +int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what) +{ + return call_int_hook(locked_down, 0, what); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_locked_down); + +#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS +int security_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type) +{ + return call_int_hook(perf_event_open, 0, attr, type); +} + +int security_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event) +{ + return call_int_hook(perf_event_alloc, 0, event); +} + +void security_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event) +{ + call_void_hook(perf_event_free, event); +} + +int security_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event) +{ + return call_int_hook(perf_event_read, 0, event); +} + +int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event) +{ + return call_int_hook(perf_event_write, 0, event); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS */ |