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-rw-r--r--security/security.c2578
1 files changed, 2578 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
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index 000000000..f9157d502
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2578 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Security plug functions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2001 WireX Communications, Inc <chris@wirex.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2001-2002 Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2001 Networks Associates Technology, Inc <ssmalley@nai.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "LSM: " fmt
+
+#include <linux/bpf.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/dcache.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <linux/integrity.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
+#include <linux/evm.h>
+#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/personality.h>
+#include <linux/backing-dev.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/msg.h>
+#include <net/flow.h>
+
+#define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2
+
+/* How many LSMs were built into the kernel? */
+#define LSM_COUNT (__end_lsm_info - __start_lsm_info)
+
+/*
+ * These are descriptions of the reasons that can be passed to the
+ * security_locked_down() LSM hook. Placing this array here allows
+ * all security modules to use the same descriptions for auditing
+ * purposes.
+ */
+const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = {
+ [LOCKDOWN_NONE] = "none",
+ [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "unsigned module loading",
+ [LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port",
+ [LOCKDOWN_EFI_TEST] = "/dev/efi_test access",
+ [LOCKDOWN_KEXEC] = "kexec of unsigned images",
+ [LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION] = "hibernation",
+ [LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS] = "direct PCI access",
+ [LOCKDOWN_IOPORT] = "raw io port access",
+ [LOCKDOWN_MSR] = "raw MSR access",
+ [LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES] = "modifying ACPI tables",
+ [LOCKDOWN_PCMCIA_CIS] = "direct PCMCIA CIS storage",
+ [LOCKDOWN_TIOCSSERIAL] = "reconfiguration of serial port IO",
+ [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS] = "unsafe module parameters",
+ [LOCKDOWN_MMIOTRACE] = "unsafe mmio",
+ [LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS] = "debugfs access",
+ [LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR] = "xmon write access",
+ [LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER] = "use of bpf to write user RAM",
+ [LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to write kernel RAM",
+ [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity",
+ [LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access",
+ [LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes",
+ [LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM",
+ [LOCKDOWN_DBG_READ_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to read kernel RAM",
+ [LOCKDOWN_PERF] = "unsafe use of perf",
+ [LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS] = "use of tracefs",
+ [LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW] = "xmon read and write access",
+ [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality",
+};
+
+struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads __lsm_ro_after_init;
+static BLOCKING_NOTIFIER_HEAD(blocking_lsm_notifier_chain);
+
+static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache;
+static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache;
+
+char *lsm_names;
+static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init;
+
+/* Boot-time LSM user choice */
+static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order;
+static __initdata const char *chosen_major_lsm;
+
+static __initconst const char * const builtin_lsm_order = CONFIG_LSM;
+
+/* Ordered list of LSMs to initialize. */
+static __initdata struct lsm_info **ordered_lsms;
+static __initdata struct lsm_info *exclusive;
+
+static __initdata bool debug;
+#define init_debug(...) \
+ do { \
+ if (debug) \
+ pr_info(__VA_ARGS__); \
+ } while (0)
+
+static bool __init is_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm)
+{
+ if (!lsm->enabled)
+ return false;
+
+ return *lsm->enabled;
+}
+
+/* Mark an LSM's enabled flag. */
+static int lsm_enabled_true __initdata = 1;
+static int lsm_enabled_false __initdata = 0;
+static void __init set_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm, bool enabled)
+{
+ /*
+ * When an LSM hasn't configured an enable variable, we can use
+ * a hard-coded location for storing the default enabled state.
+ */
+ if (!lsm->enabled) {
+ if (enabled)
+ lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true;
+ else
+ lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false;
+ } else if (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_true) {
+ if (!enabled)
+ lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false;
+ } else if (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_false) {
+ if (enabled)
+ lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true;
+ } else {
+ *lsm->enabled = enabled;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Is an LSM already listed in the ordered LSMs list? */
+static bool __init exists_ordered_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm)
+{
+ struct lsm_info **check;
+
+ for (check = ordered_lsms; *check; check++)
+ if (*check == lsm)
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+/* Append an LSM to the list of ordered LSMs to initialize. */
+static int last_lsm __initdata;
+static void __init append_ordered_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm, const char *from)
+{
+ /* Ignore duplicate selections. */
+ if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm))
+ return;
+
+ if (WARN(last_lsm == LSM_COUNT, "%s: out of LSM slots!?\n", from))
+ return;
+
+ /* Enable this LSM, if it is not already set. */
+ if (!lsm->enabled)
+ lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true;
+ ordered_lsms[last_lsm++] = lsm;
+
+ init_debug("%s ordering: %s (%sabled)\n", from, lsm->name,
+ is_enabled(lsm) ? "en" : "dis");
+}
+
+/* Is an LSM allowed to be initialized? */
+static bool __init lsm_allowed(struct lsm_info *lsm)
+{
+ /* Skip if the LSM is disabled. */
+ if (!is_enabled(lsm))
+ return false;
+
+ /* Not allowed if another exclusive LSM already initialized. */
+ if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) && exclusive) {
+ init_debug("exclusive disabled: %s\n", lsm->name);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static void __init lsm_set_blob_size(int *need, int *lbs)
+{
+ int offset;
+
+ if (*need > 0) {
+ offset = *lbs;
+ *lbs += *need;
+ *need = offset;
+ }
+}
+
+static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
+{
+ if (!needed)
+ return;
+
+ lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_cred, &blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
+ lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_file, &blob_sizes.lbs_file);
+ /*
+ * The inode blob gets an rcu_head in addition to
+ * what the modules might need.
+ */
+ if (needed->lbs_inode && blob_sizes.lbs_inode == 0)
+ blob_sizes.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct rcu_head);
+ lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
+ lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
+ lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
+ lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task);
+}
+
+/* Prepare LSM for initialization. */
+static void __init prepare_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm)
+{
+ int enabled = lsm_allowed(lsm);
+
+ /* Record enablement (to handle any following exclusive LSMs). */
+ set_enabled(lsm, enabled);
+
+ /* If enabled, do pre-initialization work. */
+ if (enabled) {
+ if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) && !exclusive) {
+ exclusive = lsm;
+ init_debug("exclusive chosen: %s\n", lsm->name);
+ }
+
+ lsm_set_blob_sizes(lsm->blobs);
+ }
+}
+
+/* Initialize a given LSM, if it is enabled. */
+static void __init initialize_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm)
+{
+ if (is_enabled(lsm)) {
+ int ret;
+
+ init_debug("initializing %s\n", lsm->name);
+ ret = lsm->init();
+ WARN(ret, "%s failed to initialize: %d\n", lsm->name, ret);
+ }
+}
+
+/* Populate ordered LSMs list from comma-separated LSM name list. */
+static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin)
+{
+ struct lsm_info *lsm;
+ char *sep, *name, *next;
+
+ /* LSM_ORDER_FIRST is always first. */
+ for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
+ if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_FIRST)
+ append_ordered_lsm(lsm, "first");
+ }
+
+ /* Process "security=", if given. */
+ if (chosen_major_lsm) {
+ struct lsm_info *major;
+
+ /*
+ * To match the original "security=" behavior, this
+ * explicitly does NOT fallback to another Legacy Major
+ * if the selected one was separately disabled: disable
+ * all non-matching Legacy Major LSMs.
+ */
+ for (major = __start_lsm_info; major < __end_lsm_info;
+ major++) {
+ if ((major->flags & LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR) &&
+ strcmp(major->name, chosen_major_lsm) != 0) {
+ set_enabled(major, false);
+ init_debug("security=%s disabled: %s\n",
+ chosen_major_lsm, major->name);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ sep = kstrdup(order, GFP_KERNEL);
+ next = sep;
+ /* Walk the list, looking for matching LSMs. */
+ while ((name = strsep(&next, ",")) != NULL) {
+ bool found = false;
+
+ for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
+ if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE &&
+ strcmp(lsm->name, name) == 0) {
+ append_ordered_lsm(lsm, origin);
+ found = true;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!found)
+ init_debug("%s ignored: %s\n", origin, name);
+ }
+
+ /* Process "security=", if given. */
+ if (chosen_major_lsm) {
+ for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
+ if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm))
+ continue;
+ if (strcmp(lsm->name, chosen_major_lsm) == 0)
+ append_ordered_lsm(lsm, "security=");
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Disable all LSMs not in the ordered list. */
+ for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
+ if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm))
+ continue;
+ set_enabled(lsm, false);
+ init_debug("%s disabled: %s\n", origin, lsm->name);
+ }
+
+ kfree(sep);
+}
+
+static void __init lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred);
+static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task);
+
+static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result);
+
+static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
+{
+ struct lsm_info **lsm;
+
+ ordered_lsms = kcalloc(LSM_COUNT + 1, sizeof(*ordered_lsms),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+
+ if (chosen_lsm_order) {
+ if (chosen_major_lsm) {
+ pr_info("security= is ignored because it is superseded by lsm=\n");
+ chosen_major_lsm = NULL;
+ }
+ ordered_lsm_parse(chosen_lsm_order, "cmdline");
+ } else
+ ordered_lsm_parse(builtin_lsm_order, "builtin");
+
+ for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++)
+ prepare_lsm(*lsm);
+
+ init_debug("cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
+ init_debug("file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file);
+ init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
+ init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
+ init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
+ init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
+
+ /*
+ * Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs
+ */
+ if (blob_sizes.lbs_file)
+ lsm_file_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_file_cache",
+ blob_sizes.lbs_file, 0,
+ SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+ if (blob_sizes.lbs_inode)
+ lsm_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_inode_cache",
+ blob_sizes.lbs_inode, 0,
+ SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+
+ lsm_early_cred((struct cred *) current->cred);
+ lsm_early_task(current);
+ for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++)
+ initialize_lsm(*lsm);
+
+ kfree(ordered_lsms);
+}
+
+int __init early_security_init(void)
+{
+ int i;
+ struct hlist_head *list = (struct hlist_head *) &security_hook_heads;
+ struct lsm_info *lsm;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(security_hook_heads) / sizeof(struct hlist_head);
+ i++)
+ INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&list[i]);
+
+ for (lsm = __start_early_lsm_info; lsm < __end_early_lsm_info; lsm++) {
+ if (!lsm->enabled)
+ lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true;
+ prepare_lsm(lsm);
+ initialize_lsm(lsm);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_init - initializes the security framework
+ *
+ * This should be called early in the kernel initialization sequence.
+ */
+int __init security_init(void)
+{
+ struct lsm_info *lsm;
+
+ pr_info("Security Framework initializing\n");
+
+ /*
+ * Append the names of the early LSM modules now that kmalloc() is
+ * available
+ */
+ for (lsm = __start_early_lsm_info; lsm < __end_early_lsm_info; lsm++) {
+ if (lsm->enabled)
+ lsm_append(lsm->name, &lsm_names);
+ }
+
+ /* Load LSMs in specified order. */
+ ordered_lsm_init();
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Save user chosen LSM */
+static int __init choose_major_lsm(char *str)
+{
+ chosen_major_lsm = str;
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("security=", choose_major_lsm);
+
+/* Explicitly choose LSM initialization order. */
+static int __init choose_lsm_order(char *str)
+{
+ chosen_lsm_order = str;
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("lsm=", choose_lsm_order);
+
+/* Enable LSM order debugging. */
+static int __init enable_debug(char *str)
+{
+ debug = true;
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("lsm.debug", enable_debug);
+
+static bool match_last_lsm(const char *list, const char *lsm)
+{
+ const char *last;
+
+ if (WARN_ON(!list || !lsm))
+ return false;
+ last = strrchr(list, ',');
+ if (last)
+ /* Pass the comma, strcmp() will check for '\0' */
+ last++;
+ else
+ last = list;
+ return !strcmp(last, lsm);
+}
+
+static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
+{
+ char *cp;
+
+ if (*result == NULL) {
+ *result = kstrdup(new, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (*result == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ } else {
+ /* Check if it is the last registered name */
+ if (match_last_lsm(*result, new))
+ return 0;
+ cp = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s,%s", *result, new);
+ if (cp == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ kfree(*result);
+ *result = cp;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
+ * @hooks: the hooks to add
+ * @count: the number of hooks to add
+ * @lsm: the name of the security module
+ *
+ * Each LSM has to register its hooks with the infrastructure.
+ */
+void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
+ char *lsm)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ hooks[i].lsm = lsm;
+ hlist_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Don't try to append during early_security_init(), we'll come back
+ * and fix this up afterwards.
+ */
+ if (slab_is_available()) {
+ if (lsm_append(lsm, &lsm_names) < 0)
+ panic("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n", __func__);
+ }
+}
+
+int call_blocking_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data)
+{
+ return blocking_notifier_call_chain(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain,
+ event, data);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(call_blocking_lsm_notifier);
+
+int register_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
+{
+ return blocking_notifier_chain_register(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain,
+ nb);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(register_blocking_lsm_notifier);
+
+int unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
+{
+ return blocking_notifier_chain_unregister(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain,
+ nb);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier);
+
+/**
+ * lsm_cred_alloc - allocate a composite cred blob
+ * @cred: the cred that needs a blob
+ * @gfp: allocation type
+ *
+ * Allocate the cred blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+static int lsm_cred_alloc(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ if (blob_sizes.lbs_cred == 0) {
+ cred->security = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ cred->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_cred, gfp);
+ if (cred->security == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_early_cred - during initialization allocate a composite cred blob
+ * @cred: the cred that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the cred blob for all the modules
+ */
+static void __init lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred)
+{
+ int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, GFP_KERNEL);
+
+ if (rc)
+ panic("%s: Early cred alloc failed.\n", __func__);
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_file_alloc - allocate a composite file blob
+ * @file: the file that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the file blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+static int lsm_file_alloc(struct file *file)
+{
+ if (!lsm_file_cache) {
+ file->f_security = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ file->f_security = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_file_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (file->f_security == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_inode_alloc - allocate a composite inode blob
+ * @inode: the inode that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the inode blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ if (!lsm_inode_cache) {
+ inode->i_security = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ inode->i_security = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (inode->i_security == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_task_alloc - allocate a composite task blob
+ * @task: the task that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the task blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ if (blob_sizes.lbs_task == 0) {
+ task->security = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ task->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_task, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (task->security == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_ipc_alloc - allocate a composite ipc blob
+ * @kip: the ipc that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the ipc blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+static int lsm_ipc_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *kip)
+{
+ if (blob_sizes.lbs_ipc == 0) {
+ kip->security = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ kip->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_ipc, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (kip->security == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_msg_msg_alloc - allocate a composite msg_msg blob
+ * @mp: the msg_msg that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the ipc blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+static int lsm_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *mp)
+{
+ if (blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg == 0) {
+ mp->security = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ mp->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (mp->security == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_early_task - during initialization allocate a composite task blob
+ * @task: the task that needs a blob
+ *
+ * Allocate the task blob for all the modules
+ */
+static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task);
+
+ if (rc)
+ panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The default value of the LSM hook is defined in linux/lsm_hook_defs.h and
+ * can be accessed with:
+ *
+ * LSM_RET_DEFAULT(<hook_name>)
+ *
+ * The macros below define static constants for the default value of each
+ * LSM hook.
+ */
+#define LSM_RET_DEFAULT(NAME) (NAME##_default)
+#define DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_void(DEFAULT, NAME)
+#define DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_int(DEFAULT, NAME) \
+ static const int LSM_RET_DEFAULT(NAME) = (DEFAULT);
+#define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \
+ DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_##RET(DEFAULT, NAME)
+
+#include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h>
+#undef LSM_HOOK
+
+/*
+ * Hook list operation macros.
+ *
+ * call_void_hook:
+ * This is a hook that does not return a value.
+ *
+ * call_int_hook:
+ * This is a hook that returns a value.
+ */
+
+#define call_void_hook(FUNC, ...) \
+ do { \
+ struct security_hook_list *P; \
+ \
+ hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) \
+ P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \
+ } while (0)
+
+#define call_int_hook(FUNC, IRC, ...) ({ \
+ int RC = IRC; \
+ do { \
+ struct security_hook_list *P; \
+ \
+ hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) { \
+ RC = P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \
+ if (RC != 0) \
+ break; \
+ } \
+ } while (0); \
+ RC; \
+})
+
+/* Security operations */
+
+int security_binder_set_context_mgr(const struct cred *mgr)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(binder_set_context_mgr, 0, mgr);
+}
+
+int security_binder_transaction(const struct cred *from,
+ const struct cred *to)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(binder_transaction, 0, from, to);
+}
+
+int security_binder_transfer_binder(const struct cred *from,
+ const struct cred *to)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_binder, 0, from, to);
+}
+
+int security_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from,
+ const struct cred *to, struct file *file)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_file, 0, from, to, file);
+}
+
+int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(ptrace_access_check, 0, child, mode);
+}
+
+int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(ptrace_traceme, 0, parent);
+}
+
+int security_capget(struct task_struct *target,
+ kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(capget, 0, target,
+ effective, inheritable, permitted);
+}
+
+int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+ const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(capset, 0, new, old,
+ effective, inheritable, permitted);
+}
+
+int security_capable(const struct cred *cred,
+ struct user_namespace *ns,
+ int cap,
+ unsigned int opts)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(capable, 0, cred, ns, cap, opts);
+}
+
+int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(quotactl, 0, cmds, type, id, sb);
+}
+
+int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(quota_on, 0, dentry);
+}
+
+int security_syslog(int type)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(syslog, 0, type);
+}
+
+int security_settime64(const struct timespec64 *ts, const struct timezone *tz)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(settime, 0, ts, tz);
+}
+
+int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
+{
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int cap_sys_admin = 1;
+ int rc;
+
+ /*
+ * The module will respond with a positive value if
+ * it thinks the __vm_enough_memory() call should be
+ * made with the cap_sys_admin set. If all of the modules
+ * agree that it should be set it will. If any module
+ * thinks it should not be set it won't.
+ */
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.vm_enough_memory, list) {
+ rc = hp->hook.vm_enough_memory(mm, pages);
+ if (rc <= 0) {
+ cap_sys_admin = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
+}
+
+int security_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_for_exec, 0, bprm);
+}
+
+int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_from_file, 0, bprm, file);
+}
+
+int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, 0, bprm);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ return ima_bprm_check(bprm);
+}
+
+void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ call_void_hook(bprm_committing_creds, bprm);
+}
+
+void security_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ call_void_hook(bprm_committed_creds, bprm);
+}
+
+int security_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_context *src_fc)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(fs_context_dup, 0, fc, src_fc);
+}
+
+int security_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc,
+ struct fs_parameter *param)
+{
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int trc;
+ int rc = -ENOPARAM;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.fs_context_parse_param,
+ list) {
+ trc = hp->hook.fs_context_parse_param(fc, param);
+ if (trc == 0)
+ rc = 0;
+ else if (trc != -ENOPARAM)
+ return trc;
+ }
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(sb_alloc_security, 0, sb);
+}
+
+void security_sb_free(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ call_void_hook(sb_free_security, sb);
+}
+
+void security_free_mnt_opts(void **mnt_opts)
+{
+ if (!*mnt_opts)
+ return;
+ call_void_hook(sb_free_mnt_opts, *mnt_opts);
+ *mnt_opts = NULL;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_free_mnt_opts);
+
+int security_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(sb_eat_lsm_opts, 0, options, mnt_opts);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_eat_lsm_opts);
+
+int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb,
+ void *mnt_opts)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(sb_remount, 0, sb, mnt_opts);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_remount);
+
+int security_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(sb_kern_mount, 0, sb);
+}
+
+int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(sb_show_options, 0, m, sb);
+}
+
+int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(sb_statfs, 0, dentry);
+}
+
+int security_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
+ const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(sb_mount, 0, dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
+}
+
+int security_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(sb_umount, 0, mnt, flags);
+}
+
+int security_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path, const struct path *new_path)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(sb_pivotroot, 0, old_path, new_path);
+}
+
+int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
+ void *mnt_opts,
+ unsigned long kern_flags,
+ unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(sb_set_mnt_opts,
+ mnt_opts ? -EOPNOTSUPP : 0, sb,
+ mnt_opts, kern_flags, set_kern_flags);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_set_mnt_opts);
+
+int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
+ struct super_block *newsb,
+ unsigned long kern_flags,
+ unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(sb_clone_mnt_opts, 0, oldsb, newsb,
+ kern_flags, set_kern_flags);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_clone_mnt_opts);
+
+int security_add_mnt_opt(const char *option, const char *val, int len,
+ void **mnt_opts)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(sb_add_mnt_opt, -EINVAL,
+ option, val, len, mnt_opts);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_add_mnt_opt);
+
+int security_move_mount(const struct path *from_path, const struct path *to_path)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(move_mount, 0, from_path, to_path);
+}
+
+int security_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask,
+ unsigned int obj_type)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(path_notify, 0, path, mask, obj_type);
+}
+
+int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ int rc = lsm_inode_alloc(inode);
+
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ return rc;
+ rc = call_int_hook(inode_alloc_security, 0, inode);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ security_inode_free(inode);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static void inode_free_by_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+ /*
+ * The rcu head is at the start of the inode blob
+ */
+ kmem_cache_free(lsm_inode_cache, head);
+}
+
+void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ integrity_inode_free(inode);
+ call_void_hook(inode_free_security, inode);
+ /*
+ * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
+ * a call to security_inode_permission() can be made
+ * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS
+ * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder
+ * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and
+ * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
+ * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
+ */
+ if (inode->i_security)
+ call_rcu((struct rcu_head *)inode->i_security,
+ inode_free_by_rcu);
+}
+
+int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
+ const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
+ u32 *ctxlen)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(dentry_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, dentry, mode,
+ name, ctx, ctxlen);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_init_security);
+
+int security_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
+ struct qstr *name,
+ const struct cred *old, struct cred *new)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(dentry_create_files_as, 0, dentry, mode,
+ name, old, new);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_create_files_as);
+
+int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
+ const struct qstr *qstr,
+ const initxattrs initxattrs, void *fs_data)
+{
+ struct xattr new_xattrs[MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR + 1];
+ struct xattr *lsm_xattr, *evm_xattr, *xattr;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!initxattrs)
+ return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode,
+ dir, qstr, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ memset(new_xattrs, 0, sizeof(new_xattrs));
+ lsm_xattr = new_xattrs;
+ ret = call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir, qstr,
+ &lsm_xattr->name,
+ &lsm_xattr->value,
+ &lsm_xattr->value_len);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ evm_xattr = lsm_xattr + 1;
+ ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, lsm_xattr, evm_xattr);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data);
+out:
+ for (xattr = new_xattrs; xattr->value != NULL; xattr++)
+ kfree(xattr->value);
+ return (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP) ? 0 : ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_init_security);
+
+int security_old_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
+ const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name,
+ void **value, size_t *len)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir,
+ qstr, name, value, len);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_old_inode_init_security);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
+int security_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode,
+ unsigned int dev)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
+ return 0;
+ return call_int_hook(path_mknod, 0, dir, dentry, mode, dev);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mknod);
+
+int security_path_mkdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
+ return 0;
+ return call_int_hook(path_mkdir, 0, dir, dentry, mode);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mkdir);
+
+int security_path_rmdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
+ return 0;
+ return call_int_hook(path_rmdir, 0, dir, dentry);
+}
+
+int security_path_unlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
+ return 0;
+ return call_int_hook(path_unlink, 0, dir, dentry);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_unlink);
+
+int security_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+ const char *old_name)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
+ return 0;
+ return call_int_hook(path_symlink, 0, dir, dentry, old_name);
+}
+
+int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir,
+ struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry))))
+ return 0;
+ return call_int_hook(path_link, 0, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
+}
+
+int security_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+ const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry,
+ unsigned int flags)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)) ||
+ (d_is_positive(new_dentry) && IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(new_dentry)))))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) {
+ int err = call_int_hook(path_rename, 0, new_dir, new_dentry,
+ old_dir, old_dentry);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ return call_int_hook(path_rename, 0, old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir,
+ new_dentry);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_rename);
+
+int security_path_truncate(const struct path *path)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
+ return 0;
+ return call_int_hook(path_truncate, 0, path);
+}
+
+int security_path_chmod(const struct path *path, umode_t mode)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
+ return 0;
+ return call_int_hook(path_chmod, 0, path, mode);
+}
+
+int security_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
+ return 0;
+ return call_int_hook(path_chown, 0, path, uid, gid);
+}
+
+int security_path_chroot(const struct path *path)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(path_chroot, 0, path);
+}
+#endif
+
+int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
+ return 0;
+ return call_int_hook(inode_create, 0, dir, dentry, mode);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_create);
+
+int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
+ struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry))))
+ return 0;
+ return call_int_hook(inode_link, 0, old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
+}
+
+int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+ return 0;
+ return call_int_hook(inode_unlink, 0, dir, dentry);
+}
+
+int security_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+ const char *old_name)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
+ return 0;
+ return call_int_hook(inode_symlink, 0, dir, dentry, old_name);
+}
+
+int security_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
+ return 0;
+ return call_int_hook(inode_mkdir, 0, dir, dentry, mode);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_mkdir);
+
+int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+ return 0;
+ return call_int_hook(inode_rmdir, 0, dir, dentry);
+}
+
+int security_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
+ return 0;
+ return call_int_hook(inode_mknod, 0, dir, dentry, mode, dev);
+}
+
+int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+ struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry,
+ unsigned int flags)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)) ||
+ (d_is_positive(new_dentry) && IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(new_dentry)))))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) {
+ int err = call_int_hook(inode_rename, 0, new_dir, new_dentry,
+ old_dir, old_dentry);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ return call_int_hook(inode_rename, 0, old_dir, old_dentry,
+ new_dir, new_dentry);
+}
+
+int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+ return 0;
+ return call_int_hook(inode_readlink, 0, dentry);
+}
+
+int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
+ bool rcu)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+ return 0;
+ return call_int_hook(inode_follow_link, 0, dentry, inode, rcu);
+}
+
+int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+ return 0;
+ return call_int_hook(inode_permission, 0, inode, mask);
+}
+
+int security_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+ return 0;
+ ret = call_int_hook(inode_setattr, 0, dentry, attr);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ return evm_inode_setattr(dentry, attr);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_setattr);
+
+int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
+ return 0;
+ return call_int_hook(inode_getattr, 0, path);
+}
+
+int security_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+ const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+ return 0;
+ /*
+ * SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call,
+ * so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so.
+ */
+ ret = call_int_hook(inode_setxattr, 1, dentry, name, value, size,
+ flags);
+
+ if (ret == 1)
+ ret = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ ret = ima_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ return evm_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
+}
+
+void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+ const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+ return;
+ call_void_hook(inode_post_setxattr, dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+ evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
+}
+
+int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+ return 0;
+ return call_int_hook(inode_getxattr, 0, dentry, name);
+}
+
+int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+ return 0;
+ return call_int_hook(inode_listxattr, 0, dentry);
+}
+
+int security_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+ return 0;
+ /*
+ * SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call,
+ * so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so.
+ */
+ ret = call_int_hook(inode_removexattr, 1, dentry, name);
+ if (ret == 1)
+ ret = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ ret = ima_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ return evm_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
+}
+
+int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(inode_need_killpriv, 0, dentry);
+}
+
+int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(inode_killpriv, 0, dentry);
+}
+
+int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
+{
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+ return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity);
+ /*
+ * Only one module will provide an attribute with a given name.
+ */
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecurity, list) {
+ rc = hp->hook.inode_getsecurity(inode, name, buffer, alloc);
+ if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity))
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity);
+}
+
+int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+ return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity);
+ /*
+ * Only one module will provide an attribute with a given name.
+ */
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_setsecurity, list) {
+ rc = hp->hook.inode_setsecurity(inode, name, value, size,
+ flags);
+ if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity))
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity);
+}
+
+int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
+{
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+ return 0;
+ return call_int_hook(inode_listsecurity, 0, inode, buffer, buffer_size);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity);
+
+void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+{
+ call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid);
+}
+
+int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(inode_copy_up, 0, src, new);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up);
+
+int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
+{
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc;
+
+ /*
+ * The implementation can return 0 (accept the xattr), 1 (discard the
+ * xattr), -EOPNOTSUPP if it does not know anything about the xattr or
+ * any other error code incase of an error.
+ */
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp,
+ &security_hook_heads.inode_copy_up_xattr, list) {
+ rc = hp->hook.inode_copy_up_xattr(name);
+ if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr))
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up_xattr);
+
+int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
+ struct kernfs_node *kn)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(kernfs_init_security, 0, kn_dir, kn);
+}
+
+int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = call_int_hook(file_permission, 0, file, mask);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ return fsnotify_perm(file, mask);
+}
+
+int security_file_alloc(struct file *file)
+{
+ int rc = lsm_file_alloc(file);
+
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = call_int_hook(file_alloc_security, 0, file);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ security_file_free(file);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+void security_file_free(struct file *file)
+{
+ void *blob;
+
+ call_void_hook(file_free_security, file);
+
+ blob = file->f_security;
+ if (blob) {
+ file->f_security = NULL;
+ kmem_cache_free(lsm_file_cache, blob);
+ }
+}
+
+int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(file_ioctl, 0, file, cmd, arg);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_file_ioctl);
+
+static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
+{
+ /*
+ * Does we have PROT_READ and does the application expect
+ * it to imply PROT_EXEC? If not, nothing to talk about...
+ */
+ if ((prot & (PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC)) != PROT_READ)
+ return prot;
+ if (!(current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC))
+ return prot;
+ /*
+ * if that's an anonymous mapping, let it.
+ */
+ if (!file)
+ return prot | PROT_EXEC;
+ /*
+ * ditto if it's not on noexec mount, except that on !MMU we need
+ * NOMMU_MAP_EXEC (== VM_MAYEXEC) in this case
+ */
+ if (!path_noexec(&file->f_path)) {
+#ifndef CONFIG_MMU
+ if (file->f_op->mmap_capabilities) {
+ unsigned caps = file->f_op->mmap_capabilities(file);
+ if (!(caps & NOMMU_MAP_EXEC))
+ return prot;
+ }
+#endif
+ return prot | PROT_EXEC;
+ }
+ /* anything on noexec mount won't get PROT_EXEC */
+ return prot;
+}
+
+int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
+ unsigned long flags)
+{
+ unsigned long prot_adj = mmap_prot(file, prot);
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = call_int_hook(mmap_file, 0, file, prot, prot_adj, flags);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ return ima_file_mmap(file, prot, prot_adj, flags);
+}
+
+int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(mmap_addr, 0, addr);
+}
+
+int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
+ unsigned long prot)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ return ima_file_mprotect(vma, prot);
+}
+
+int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(file_lock, 0, file, cmd);
+}
+
+int security_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(file_fcntl, 0, file, cmd, arg);
+}
+
+void security_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
+{
+ call_void_hook(file_set_fowner, file);
+}
+
+int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
+ struct fown_struct *fown, int sig)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(file_send_sigiotask, 0, tsk, fown, sig);
+}
+
+int security_file_receive(struct file *file)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(file_receive, 0, file);
+}
+
+int security_file_open(struct file *file)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = call_int_hook(file_open, 0, file);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ return fsnotify_perm(file, MAY_OPEN);
+}
+
+int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags)
+{
+ int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task);
+
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ security_task_free(task);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ call_void_hook(task_free, task);
+
+ kfree(task->security);
+ task->security = NULL;
+}
+
+int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, gfp);
+
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = call_int_hook(cred_alloc_blank, 0, cred, gfp);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ security_cred_free(cred);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
+{
+ /*
+ * There is a failure case in prepare_creds() that
+ * may result in a call here with ->security being NULL.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(cred->security == NULL))
+ return;
+
+ call_void_hook(cred_free, cred);
+
+ kfree(cred->security);
+ cred->security = NULL;
+}
+
+int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(new, gfp);
+
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = call_int_hook(cred_prepare, 0, new, old, gfp);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ security_cred_free(new);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+ call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old);
+}
+
+void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
+{
+ *secid = 0;
+ call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, secid);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
+
+int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid);
+}
+
+int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(kernel_create_files_as, 0, new, inode);
+}
+
+int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ return integrity_kernel_module_request(kmod_name);
+}
+
+int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
+ bool contents)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id, contents);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ return ima_read_file(file, id, contents);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file);
+
+int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
+ enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size, id);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ return ima_post_read_file(file, buf, size, id);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file);
+
+int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id, contents);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ return ima_load_data(id, contents);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_load_data);
+
+int security_kernel_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
+ enum kernel_load_data_id id,
+ char *description)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_load_data, 0, buf, size, id,
+ description);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ return ima_post_load_data(buf, size, id, description);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_load_data);
+
+int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+ int flags)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(task_fix_setuid, 0, new, old, flags);
+}
+
+int security_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+ int flags)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(task_fix_setgid, 0, new, old, flags);
+}
+
+int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(task_setpgid, 0, p, pgid);
+}
+
+int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(task_getpgid, 0, p);
+}
+
+int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p);
+}
+
+void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+{
+ *secid = 0;
+ call_void_hook(task_getsecid, p, secid);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid);
+
+int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(task_setnice, 0, p, nice);
+}
+
+int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(task_setioprio, 0, p, ioprio);
+}
+
+int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(task_getioprio, 0, p);
+}
+
+int security_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred,
+ unsigned int flags)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(task_prlimit, 0, cred, tcred, flags);
+}
+
+int security_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
+ struct rlimit *new_rlim)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(task_setrlimit, 0, p, resource, new_rlim);
+}
+
+int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(task_setscheduler, 0, p);
+}
+
+int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(task_getscheduler, 0, p);
+}
+
+int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(task_movememory, 0, p);
+}
+
+int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
+ int sig, const struct cred *cred)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(task_kill, 0, p, info, sig, cred);
+}
+
+int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
+ unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
+{
+ int thisrc;
+ int rc = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(task_prctl);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_prctl, list) {
+ thisrc = hp->hook.task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
+ if (thisrc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(task_prctl)) {
+ rc = thisrc;
+ if (thisrc != 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ return rc;
+}
+
+void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
+{
+ call_void_hook(task_to_inode, p, inode);
+}
+
+int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, 0, ipcp, flag);
+}
+
+void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+{
+ *secid = 0;
+ call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid);
+}
+
+int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
+{
+ int rc = lsm_msg_msg_alloc(msg);
+
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ return rc;
+ rc = call_int_hook(msg_msg_alloc_security, 0, msg);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ security_msg_msg_free(msg);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg)
+{
+ call_void_hook(msg_msg_free_security, msg);
+ kfree(msg->security);
+ msg->security = NULL;
+}
+
+int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
+{
+ int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(msq);
+
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ return rc;
+ rc = call_int_hook(msg_queue_alloc_security, 0, msq);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ security_msg_queue_free(msq);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+void security_msg_queue_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
+{
+ call_void_hook(msg_queue_free_security, msq);
+ kfree(msq->security);
+ msq->security = NULL;
+}
+
+int security_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(msg_queue_associate, 0, msq, msqflg);
+}
+
+int security_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgctl, 0, msq, cmd);
+}
+
+int security_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq,
+ struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgsnd, 0, msq, msg, msqflg);
+}
+
+int security_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
+ struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgrcv, 0, msq, msg, target, type, mode);
+}
+
+int security_shm_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
+{
+ int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(shp);
+
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ return rc;
+ rc = call_int_hook(shm_alloc_security, 0, shp);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ security_shm_free(shp);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+void security_shm_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
+{
+ call_void_hook(shm_free_security, shp);
+ kfree(shp->security);
+ shp->security = NULL;
+}
+
+int security_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(shm_associate, 0, shp, shmflg);
+}
+
+int security_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(shm_shmctl, 0, shp, cmd);
+}
+
+int security_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(shm_shmat, 0, shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
+}
+
+int security_sem_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
+{
+ int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(sma);
+
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ return rc;
+ rc = call_int_hook(sem_alloc_security, 0, sma);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ security_sem_free(sma);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+void security_sem_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
+{
+ call_void_hook(sem_free_security, sma);
+ kfree(sma->security);
+ sma->security = NULL;
+}
+
+int security_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(sem_associate, 0, sma, semflg);
+}
+
+int security_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(sem_semctl, 0, sma, cmd);
+}
+
+int security_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
+ unsigned nsops, int alter)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(sem_semop, 0, sma, sops, nsops, alter);
+}
+
+void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
+{
+ if (unlikely(inode && IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+ return;
+ call_void_hook(d_instantiate, dentry, inode);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_d_instantiate);
+
+int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
+ char **value)
+{
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
+ if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
+ continue;
+ return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
+ }
+ return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(getprocattr);
+}
+
+int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
+ size_t size)
+{
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
+ if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
+ continue;
+ return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
+ }
+ return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(setprocattr);
+}
+
+int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(netlink_send, 0, sk, skb);
+}
+
+int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(ismaclabel, 0, name);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
+
+int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+{
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc;
+
+ /*
+ * Currently, only one LSM can implement secid_to_secctx (i.e this
+ * LSM hook is not "stackable").
+ */
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
+ rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(secid, secdata, seclen);
+ if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx))
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
+
+int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
+{
+ *secid = 0;
+ return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, secid);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
+
+void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
+{
+ call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
+
+void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ call_void_hook(inode_invalidate_secctx, inode);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_invalidate_secctx);
+
+int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(inode_notifysecctx, 0, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_notifysecctx);
+
+int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(inode_setsecctx, 0, dentry, ctx, ctxlen);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx);
+
+int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE
+int security_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred,
+ const struct cred *cred,
+ struct watch_notification *n)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(post_notification, 0, w_cred, cred, n);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
+int security_watch_key(struct key *key)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(watch_key, 0, key);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
+
+int security_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(unix_stream_connect, 0, sock, other, newsk);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_stream_connect);
+
+int security_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(unix_may_send, 0, sock, other);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_may_send);
+
+int security_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(socket_create, 0, family, type, protocol, kern);
+}
+
+int security_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
+ int type, int protocol, int kern)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(socket_post_create, 0, sock, family, type,
+ protocol, kern);
+}
+
+int security_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka, struct socket *sockb)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(socket_socketpair, 0, socka, sockb);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_socketpair);
+
+int security_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(socket_bind, 0, sock, address, addrlen);
+}
+
+int security_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(socket_connect, 0, sock, address, addrlen);
+}
+
+int security_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(socket_listen, 0, sock, backlog);
+}
+
+int security_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(socket_accept, 0, sock, newsock);
+}
+
+int security_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(socket_sendmsg, 0, sock, msg, size);
+}
+
+int security_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
+ int size, int flags)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(socket_recvmsg, 0, sock, msg, size, flags);
+}
+
+int security_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(socket_getsockname, 0, sock);
+}
+
+int security_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(socket_getpeername, 0, sock);
+}
+
+int security_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(socket_getsockopt, 0, sock, level, optname);
+}
+
+int security_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(socket_setsockopt, 0, sock, level, optname);
+}
+
+int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(socket_shutdown, 0, sock, how);
+}
+
+int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(socket_sock_rcv_skb, 0, sk, skb);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb);
+
+int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
+ int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
+ optval, optlen, len);
+}
+
+int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
+ skb, secid);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
+
+int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority);
+}
+
+void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk)
+{
+ call_void_hook(sk_free_security, sk);
+}
+
+void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
+{
+ call_void_hook(sk_clone_security, sk, newsk);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_clone);
+
+void security_sk_classify_flow(struct sock *sk, struct flowi_common *flic)
+{
+ call_void_hook(sk_getsecid, sk, &flic->flowic_secid);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_classify_flow);
+
+void security_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
+ struct flowi_common *flic)
+{
+ call_void_hook(req_classify_flow, req, flic);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_req_classify_flow);
+
+void security_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
+{
+ call_void_hook(sock_graft, sk, parent);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_graft);
+
+int security_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk,
+ struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(inet_conn_request, 0, sk, skb, req);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_request);
+
+void security_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
+ const struct request_sock *req)
+{
+ call_void_hook(inet_csk_clone, newsk, req);
+}
+
+void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
+ struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ call_void_hook(inet_conn_established, sk, skb);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_established);
+
+int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(secmark_relabel_packet, 0, secid);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_relabel_packet);
+
+void security_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
+{
+ call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_inc);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_inc);
+
+void security_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
+{
+ call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_dec);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_dec);
+
+int security_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(tun_dev_alloc_security, 0, security);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_alloc_security);
+
+void security_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
+{
+ call_void_hook(tun_dev_free_security, security);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_free_security);
+
+int security_tun_dev_create(void)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(tun_dev_create, 0);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_create);
+
+int security_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach_queue, 0, security);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach_queue);
+
+int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach, 0, sk, security);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach);
+
+int security_tun_dev_open(void *security)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(tun_dev_open, 0, security);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_open);
+
+int security_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(sctp_assoc_request, 0, ep, skb);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_assoc_request);
+
+int security_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
+ struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(sctp_bind_connect, 0, sk, optname,
+ address, addrlen);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_bind_connect);
+
+void security_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
+ struct sock *newsk)
+{
+ call_void_hook(sctp_sk_clone, ep, sk, newsk);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_sk_clone);
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
+
+int security_ib_pkey_access(void *sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(ib_pkey_access, 0, sec, subnet_prefix, pkey);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_pkey_access);
+
+int security_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *sec, const char *dev_name, u8 port_num)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(ib_endport_manage_subnet, 0, sec, dev_name, port_num);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_endport_manage_subnet);
+
+int security_ib_alloc_security(void **sec)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(ib_alloc_security, 0, sec);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_alloc_security);
+
+void security_ib_free_security(void *sec)
+{
+ call_void_hook(ib_free_security, sec);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_free_security);
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
+
+int security_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
+ struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx,
+ gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, 0, ctxp, sec_ctx, gfp);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_alloc);
+
+int security_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_clone_security, 0, old_ctx, new_ctxp);
+}
+
+void security_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ call_void_hook(xfrm_policy_free_security, ctx);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_free);
+
+int security_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_delete_security, 0, ctx);
+}
+
+int security_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
+ struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc, 0, x, sec_ctx);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_alloc);
+
+int security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire, 0, x, polsec, secid);
+}
+
+int security_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_delete_security, 0, x);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_delete);
+
+void security_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)
+{
+ call_void_hook(xfrm_state_free_security, x);
+}
+
+int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_lookup, 0, ctx, fl_secid, dir);
+}
+
+int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
+ struct xfrm_policy *xp,
+ const struct flowi_common *flic)
+{
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match);
+
+ /*
+ * Since this function is expected to return 0 or 1, the judgment
+ * becomes difficult if multiple LSMs supply this call. Fortunately,
+ * we can use the first LSM's judgment because currently only SELinux
+ * supplies this call.
+ *
+ * For speed optimization, we explicitly break the loop rather than
+ * using the macro
+ */
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
+ list) {
+ rc = hp->hook.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(x, xp, flic);
+ break;
+ }
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int security_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, secid, 1);
+}
+
+void security_skb_classify_flow(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi_common *flic)
+{
+ int rc = call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, &flic->flowic_secid,
+ 0);
+
+ BUG_ON(rc);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_skb_classify_flow);
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+
+int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
+ unsigned long flags)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(key_alloc, 0, key, cred, flags);
+}
+
+void security_key_free(struct key *key)
+{
+ call_void_hook(key_free, key);
+}
+
+int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred,
+ enum key_need_perm need_perm)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(key_permission, 0, key_ref, cred, need_perm);
+}
+
+int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
+{
+ *_buffer = NULL;
+ return call_int_hook(key_getsecurity, 0, key, _buffer);
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+
+int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
+}
+
+int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, 0, krule);
+}
+
+void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+{
+ call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
+}
+
+int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(bpf, 0, cmd, attr, size);
+}
+int security_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(bpf_map, 0, map, fmode);
+}
+int security_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(bpf_prog, 0, prog);
+}
+int security_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(bpf_map_alloc_security, 0, map);
+}
+int security_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(bpf_prog_alloc_security, 0, aux);
+}
+void security_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
+{
+ call_void_hook(bpf_map_free_security, map);
+}
+void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
+{
+ call_void_hook(bpf_prog_free_security, aux);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
+
+int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(locked_down, 0, what);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_locked_down);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
+int security_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(perf_event_open, 0, attr, type);
+}
+
+int security_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(perf_event_alloc, 0, event);
+}
+
+void security_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+ call_void_hook(perf_event_free, event);
+}
+
+int security_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(perf_event_read, 0, event);
+}
+
+int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(perf_event_write, 0, event);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS */