From 5d1646d90e1f2cceb9f0828f4b28318cd0ec7744 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Baumann Date: Sat, 27 Apr 2024 12:05:51 +0200 Subject: Adding upstream version 5.10.209. Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann --- Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst | 1300 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 1300 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst (limited to 'Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst') diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..936fae06d --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst @@ -0,0 +1,1300 @@ +===================================== +Filesystem-level encryption (fscrypt) +===================================== + +Introduction +============ + +fscrypt is a library which filesystems can hook into to support +transparent encryption of files and directories. + +Note: "fscrypt" in this document refers to the kernel-level portion, +implemented in ``fs/crypto/``, as opposed to the userspace tool +`fscrypt `_. This document only +covers the kernel-level portion. For command-line examples of how to +use encryption, see the documentation for the userspace tool `fscrypt +`_. Also, it is recommended to use +the fscrypt userspace tool, or other existing userspace tools such as +`fscryptctl `_ or `Android's key +management system +`_, over +using the kernel's API directly. Using existing tools reduces the +chance of introducing your own security bugs. (Nevertheless, for +completeness this documentation covers the kernel's API anyway.) + +Unlike dm-crypt, fscrypt operates at the filesystem level rather than +at the block device level. This allows it to encrypt different files +with different keys and to have unencrypted files on the same +filesystem. This is useful for multi-user systems where each user's +data-at-rest needs to be cryptographically isolated from the others. +However, except for filenames, fscrypt does not encrypt filesystem +metadata. + +Unlike eCryptfs, which is a stacked filesystem, fscrypt is integrated +directly into supported filesystems --- currently ext4, F2FS, and +UBIFS. This allows encrypted files to be read and written without +caching both the decrypted and encrypted pages in the pagecache, +thereby nearly halving the memory used and bringing it in line with +unencrypted files. Similarly, half as many dentries and inodes are +needed. eCryptfs also limits encrypted filenames to 143 bytes, +causing application compatibility issues; fscrypt allows the full 255 +bytes (NAME_MAX). Finally, unlike eCryptfs, the fscrypt API can be +used by unprivileged users, with no need to mount anything. + +fscrypt does not support encrypting files in-place. Instead, it +supports marking an empty directory as encrypted. Then, after +userspace provides the key, all regular files, directories, and +symbolic links created in that directory tree are transparently +encrypted. + +Threat model +============ + +Offline attacks +--------------- + +Provided that userspace chooses a strong encryption key, fscrypt +protects the confidentiality of file contents and filenames in the +event of a single point-in-time permanent offline compromise of the +block device content. fscrypt does not protect the confidentiality of +non-filename metadata, e.g. file sizes, file permissions, file +timestamps, and extended attributes. Also, the existence and location +of holes (unallocated blocks which logically contain all zeroes) in +files is not protected. + +fscrypt is not guaranteed to protect confidentiality or authenticity +if an attacker is able to manipulate the filesystem offline prior to +an authorized user later accessing the filesystem. + +Online attacks +-------------- + +fscrypt (and storage encryption in general) can only provide limited +protection, if any at all, against online attacks. In detail: + +Side-channel attacks +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +fscrypt is only resistant to side-channel attacks, such as timing or +electromagnetic attacks, to the extent that the underlying Linux +Cryptographic API algorithms are. If a vulnerable algorithm is used, +such as a table-based implementation of AES, it may be possible for an +attacker to mount a side channel attack against the online system. +Side channel attacks may also be mounted against applications +consuming decrypted data. + +Unauthorized file access +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +After an encryption key has been added, fscrypt does not hide the +plaintext file contents or filenames from other users on the same +system. Instead, existing access control mechanisms such as file mode +bits, POSIX ACLs, LSMs, or namespaces should be used for this purpose. + +(For the reasoning behind this, understand that while the key is +added, the confidentiality of the data, from the perspective of the +system itself, is *not* protected by the mathematical properties of +encryption but rather only by the correctness of the kernel. +Therefore, any encryption-specific access control checks would merely +be enforced by kernel *code* and therefore would be largely redundant +with the wide variety of access control mechanisms already available.) + +Kernel memory compromise +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +An attacker who compromises the system enough to read from arbitrary +memory, e.g. by mounting a physical attack or by exploiting a kernel +security vulnerability, can compromise all encryption keys that are +currently in use. + +However, fscrypt allows encryption keys to be removed from the kernel, +which may protect them from later compromise. + +In more detail, the FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl (or the +FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ALL_USERS ioctl) can wipe a master +encryption key from kernel memory. If it does so, it will also try to +evict all cached inodes which had been "unlocked" using the key, +thereby wiping their per-file keys and making them once again appear +"locked", i.e. in ciphertext or encrypted form. + +However, these ioctls have some limitations: + +- Per-file keys for in-use files will *not* be removed or wiped. + Therefore, for maximum effect, userspace should close the relevant + encrypted files and directories before removing a master key, as + well as kill any processes whose working directory is in an affected + encrypted directory. + +- The kernel cannot magically wipe copies of the master key(s) that + userspace might have as well. Therefore, userspace must wipe all + copies of the master key(s) it makes as well; normally this should + be done immediately after FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, without waiting + for FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY. Naturally, the same also applies + to all higher levels in the key hierarchy. Userspace should also + follow other security precautions such as mlock()ing memory + containing keys to prevent it from being swapped out. + +- In general, decrypted contents and filenames in the kernel VFS + caches are freed but not wiped. Therefore, portions thereof may be + recoverable from freed memory, even after the corresponding key(s) + were wiped. To partially solve this, you can set + CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING=y in your kernel config and add page_poison=1 + to your kernel command line. However, this has a performance cost. + +- Secret keys might still exist in CPU registers, in crypto + accelerator hardware (if used by the crypto API to implement any of + the algorithms), or in other places not explicitly considered here. + +Limitations of v1 policies +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +v1 encryption policies have some weaknesses with respect to online +attacks: + +- There is no verification that the provided master key is correct. + Therefore, a malicious user can temporarily associate the wrong key + with another user's encrypted files to which they have read-only + access. Because of filesystem caching, the wrong key will then be + used by the other user's accesses to those files, even if the other + user has the correct key in their own keyring. This violates the + meaning of "read-only access". + +- A compromise of a per-file key also compromises the master key from + which it was derived. + +- Non-root users cannot securely remove encryption keys. + +All the above problems are fixed with v2 encryption policies. For +this reason among others, it is recommended to use v2 encryption +policies on all new encrypted directories. + +Key hierarchy +============= + +Master Keys +----------- + +Each encrypted directory tree is protected by a *master key*. Master +keys can be up to 64 bytes long, and must be at least as long as the +greater of the security strength of the contents and filenames +encryption modes being used. For example, if any AES-256 mode is +used, the master key must be at least 256 bits, i.e. 32 bytes. A +stricter requirement applies if the key is used by a v1 encryption +policy and AES-256-XTS is used; such keys must be 64 bytes. + +To "unlock" an encrypted directory tree, userspace must provide the +appropriate master key. There can be any number of master keys, each +of which protects any number of directory trees on any number of +filesystems. + +Master keys must be real cryptographic keys, i.e. indistinguishable +from random bytestrings of the same length. This implies that users +**must not** directly use a password as a master key, zero-pad a +shorter key, or repeat a shorter key. Security cannot be guaranteed +if userspace makes any such error, as the cryptographic proofs and +analysis would no longer apply. + +Instead, users should generate master keys either using a +cryptographically secure random number generator, or by using a KDF +(Key Derivation Function). The kernel does not do any key stretching; +therefore, if userspace derives the key from a low-entropy secret such +as a passphrase, it is critical that a KDF designed for this purpose +be used, such as scrypt, PBKDF2, or Argon2. + +Key derivation function +----------------------- + +With one exception, fscrypt never uses the master key(s) for +encryption directly. Instead, they are only used as input to a KDF +(Key Derivation Function) to derive the actual keys. + +The KDF used for a particular master key differs depending on whether +the key is used for v1 encryption policies or for v2 encryption +policies. Users **must not** use the same key for both v1 and v2 +encryption policies. (No real-world attack is currently known on this +specific case of key reuse, but its security cannot be guaranteed +since the cryptographic proofs and analysis would no longer apply.) + +For v1 encryption policies, the KDF only supports deriving per-file +encryption keys. It works by encrypting the master key with +AES-128-ECB, using the file's 16-byte nonce as the AES key. The +resulting ciphertext is used as the derived key. If the ciphertext is +longer than needed, then it is truncated to the needed length. + +For v2 encryption policies, the KDF is HKDF-SHA512. The master key is +passed as the "input keying material", no salt is used, and a distinct +"application-specific information string" is used for each distinct +key to be derived. For example, when a per-file encryption key is +derived, the application-specific information string is the file's +nonce prefixed with "fscrypt\\0" and a context byte. Different +context bytes are used for other types of derived keys. + +HKDF-SHA512 is preferred to the original AES-128-ECB based KDF because +HKDF is more flexible, is nonreversible, and evenly distributes +entropy from the master key. HKDF is also standardized and widely +used by other software, whereas the AES-128-ECB based KDF is ad-hoc. + +Per-file encryption keys +------------------------ + +Since each master key can protect many files, it is necessary to +"tweak" the encryption of each file so that the same plaintext in two +files doesn't map to the same ciphertext, or vice versa. In most +cases, fscrypt does this by deriving per-file keys. When a new +encrypted inode (regular file, directory, or symlink) is created, +fscrypt randomly generates a 16-byte nonce and stores it in the +inode's encryption xattr. Then, it uses a KDF (as described in `Key +derivation function`_) to derive the file's key from the master key +and nonce. + +Key derivation was chosen over key wrapping because wrapped keys would +require larger xattrs which would be less likely to fit in-line in the +filesystem's inode table, and there didn't appear to be any +significant advantages to key wrapping. In particular, currently +there is no requirement to support unlocking a file with multiple +alternative master keys or to support rotating master keys. Instead, +the master keys may be wrapped in userspace, e.g. as is done by the +`fscrypt `_ tool. + +DIRECT_KEY policies +------------------- + +The Adiantum encryption mode (see `Encryption modes and usage`_) is +suitable for both contents and filenames encryption, and it accepts +long IVs --- long enough to hold both an 8-byte logical block number +and a 16-byte per-file nonce. Also, the overhead of each Adiantum key +is greater than that of an AES-256-XTS key. + +Therefore, to improve performance and save memory, for Adiantum a +"direct key" configuration is supported. When the user has enabled +this by setting FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY in the fscrypt policy, +per-file encryption keys are not used. Instead, whenever any data +(contents or filenames) is encrypted, the file's 16-byte nonce is +included in the IV. Moreover: + +- For v1 encryption policies, the encryption is done directly with the + master key. Because of this, users **must not** use the same master + key for any other purpose, even for other v1 policies. + +- For v2 encryption policies, the encryption is done with a per-mode + key derived using the KDF. Users may use the same master key for + other v2 encryption policies. + +IV_INO_LBLK_64 policies +----------------------- + +When FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_64 is set in the fscrypt policy, +the encryption keys are derived from the master key, encryption mode +number, and filesystem UUID. This normally results in all files +protected by the same master key sharing a single contents encryption +key and a single filenames encryption key. To still encrypt different +files' data differently, inode numbers are included in the IVs. +Consequently, shrinking the filesystem may not be allowed. + +This format is optimized for use with inline encryption hardware +compliant with the UFS standard, which supports only 64 IV bits per +I/O request and may have only a small number of keyslots. + +IV_INO_LBLK_32 policies +----------------------- + +IV_INO_LBLK_32 policies work like IV_INO_LBLK_64, except that for +IV_INO_LBLK_32, the inode number is hashed with SipHash-2-4 (where the +SipHash key is derived from the master key) and added to the file +logical block number mod 2^32 to produce a 32-bit IV. + +This format is optimized for use with inline encryption hardware +compliant with the eMMC v5.2 standard, which supports only 32 IV bits +per I/O request and may have only a small number of keyslots. This +format results in some level of IV reuse, so it should only be used +when necessary due to hardware limitations. + +Key identifiers +--------------- + +For master keys used for v2 encryption policies, a unique 16-byte "key +identifier" is also derived using the KDF. This value is stored in +the clear, since it is needed to reliably identify the key itself. + +Dirhash keys +------------ + +For directories that are indexed using a secret-keyed dirhash over the +plaintext filenames, the KDF is also used to derive a 128-bit +SipHash-2-4 key per directory in order to hash filenames. This works +just like deriving a per-file encryption key, except that a different +KDF context is used. Currently, only casefolded ("case-insensitive") +encrypted directories use this style of hashing. + +Encryption modes and usage +========================== + +fscrypt allows one encryption mode to be specified for file contents +and one encryption mode to be specified for filenames. Different +directory trees are permitted to use different encryption modes. +Currently, the following pairs of encryption modes are supported: + +- AES-256-XTS for contents and AES-256-CTS-CBC for filenames +- AES-128-CBC for contents and AES-128-CTS-CBC for filenames +- Adiantum for both contents and filenames + +If unsure, you should use the (AES-256-XTS, AES-256-CTS-CBC) pair. + +AES-128-CBC was added only for low-powered embedded devices with +crypto accelerators such as CAAM or CESA that do not support XTS. To +use AES-128-CBC, CONFIG_CRYPTO_ESSIV and CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256 (or +another SHA-256 implementation) must be enabled so that ESSIV can be +used. + +Adiantum is a (primarily) stream cipher-based mode that is fast even +on CPUs without dedicated crypto instructions. It's also a true +wide-block mode, unlike XTS. It can also eliminate the need to derive +per-file encryption keys. However, it depends on the security of two +primitives, XChaCha12 and AES-256, rather than just one. See the +paper "Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level +processors" (https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf) for more details. +To use Adiantum, CONFIG_CRYPTO_ADIANTUM must be enabled. Also, fast +implementations of ChaCha and NHPoly1305 should be enabled, e.g. +CONFIG_CRYPTO_CHACHA20_NEON and CONFIG_CRYPTO_NHPOLY1305_NEON for ARM. + +New encryption modes can be added relatively easily, without changes +to individual filesystems. However, authenticated encryption (AE) +modes are not currently supported because of the difficulty of dealing +with ciphertext expansion. + +Contents encryption +------------------- + +For file contents, each filesystem block is encrypted independently. +Starting from Linux kernel 5.5, encryption of filesystems with block +size less than system's page size is supported. + +Each block's IV is set to the logical block number within the file as +a little endian number, except that: + +- With CBC mode encryption, ESSIV is also used. Specifically, each IV + is encrypted with AES-256 where the AES-256 key is the SHA-256 hash + of the file's data encryption key. + +- With `DIRECT_KEY policies`_, the file's nonce is appended to the IV. + Currently this is only allowed with the Adiantum encryption mode. + +- With `IV_INO_LBLK_64 policies`_, the logical block number is limited + to 32 bits and is placed in bits 0-31 of the IV. The inode number + (which is also limited to 32 bits) is placed in bits 32-63. + +- With `IV_INO_LBLK_32 policies`_, the logical block number is limited + to 32 bits and is placed in bits 0-31 of the IV. The inode number + is then hashed and added mod 2^32. + +Note that because file logical block numbers are included in the IVs, +filesystems must enforce that blocks are never shifted around within +encrypted files, e.g. via "collapse range" or "insert range". + +Filenames encryption +-------------------- + +For filenames, each full filename is encrypted at once. Because of +the requirements to retain support for efficient directory lookups and +filenames of up to 255 bytes, the same IV is used for every filename +in a directory. + +However, each encrypted directory still uses a unique key, or +alternatively has the file's nonce (for `DIRECT_KEY policies`_) or +inode number (for `IV_INO_LBLK_64 policies`_) included in the IVs. +Thus, IV reuse is limited to within a single directory. + +With CTS-CBC, the IV reuse means that when the plaintext filenames +share a common prefix at least as long as the cipher block size (16 +bytes for AES), the corresponding encrypted filenames will also share +a common prefix. This is undesirable. Adiantum does not have this +weakness, as it is a wide-block encryption mode. + +All supported filenames encryption modes accept any plaintext length +>= 16 bytes; cipher block alignment is not required. However, +filenames shorter than 16 bytes are NUL-padded to 16 bytes before +being encrypted. In addition, to reduce leakage of filename lengths +via their ciphertexts, all filenames are NUL-padded to the next 4, 8, +16, or 32-byte boundary (configurable). 32 is recommended since this +provides the best confidentiality, at the cost of making directory +entries consume slightly more space. Note that since NUL (``\0``) is +not otherwise a valid character in filenames, the padding will never +produce duplicate plaintexts. + +Symbolic link targets are considered a type of filename and are +encrypted in the same way as filenames in directory entries, except +that IV reuse is not a problem as each symlink has its own inode. + +User API +======== + +Setting an encryption policy +---------------------------- + +FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +The FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY ioctl sets an encryption policy on an +empty directory or verifies that a directory or regular file already +has the specified encryption policy. It takes in a pointer to +struct fscrypt_policy_v1 or struct fscrypt_policy_v2, defined as +follows:: + + #define FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1 0 + #define FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE 8 + struct fscrypt_policy_v1 { + __u8 version; + __u8 contents_encryption_mode; + __u8 filenames_encryption_mode; + __u8 flags; + __u8 master_key_descriptor[FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE]; + }; + #define fscrypt_policy fscrypt_policy_v1 + + #define FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2 2 + #define FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE 16 + struct fscrypt_policy_v2 { + __u8 version; + __u8 contents_encryption_mode; + __u8 filenames_encryption_mode; + __u8 flags; + __u8 __reserved[4]; + __u8 master_key_identifier[FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE]; + }; + +This structure must be initialized as follows: + +- ``version`` must be FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1 (0) if + struct fscrypt_policy_v1 is used or FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2 (2) if + struct fscrypt_policy_v2 is used. (Note: we refer to the original + policy version as "v1", though its version code is really 0.) + For new encrypted directories, use v2 policies. + +- ``contents_encryption_mode`` and ``filenames_encryption_mode`` must + be set to constants from ```` which identify the + encryption modes to use. If unsure, use FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_256_XTS + (1) for ``contents_encryption_mode`` and FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_256_CTS + (4) for ``filenames_encryption_mode``. + +- ``flags`` contains optional flags from ````: + + - FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_*: The amount of NUL padding to use when + encrypting filenames. If unsure, use FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_32 + (0x3). + - FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY: See `DIRECT_KEY policies`_. + - FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_64: See `IV_INO_LBLK_64 + policies`_. + - FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32: See `IV_INO_LBLK_32 + policies`_. + + v1 encryption policies only support the PAD_* and DIRECT_KEY flags. + The other flags are only supported by v2 encryption policies. + + The DIRECT_KEY, IV_INO_LBLK_64, and IV_INO_LBLK_32 flags are + mutually exclusive. + +- For v2 encryption policies, ``__reserved`` must be zeroed. + +- For v1 encryption policies, ``master_key_descriptor`` specifies how + to find the master key in a keyring; see `Adding keys`_. It is up + to userspace to choose a unique ``master_key_descriptor`` for each + master key. The e4crypt and fscrypt tools use the first 8 bytes of + ``SHA-512(SHA-512(master_key))``, but this particular scheme is not + required. Also, the master key need not be in the keyring yet when + FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY is executed. However, it must be added + before any files can be created in the encrypted directory. + + For v2 encryption policies, ``master_key_descriptor`` has been + replaced with ``master_key_identifier``, which is longer and cannot + be arbitrarily chosen. Instead, the key must first be added using + `FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY`_. Then, the ``key_spec.u.identifier`` + the kernel returned in the struct fscrypt_add_key_arg must + be used as the ``master_key_identifier`` in + struct fscrypt_policy_v2. + +If the file is not yet encrypted, then FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY +verifies that the file is an empty directory. If so, the specified +encryption policy is assigned to the directory, turning it into an +encrypted directory. After that, and after providing the +corresponding master key as described in `Adding keys`_, all regular +files, directories (recursively), and symlinks created in the +directory will be encrypted, inheriting the same encryption policy. +The filenames in the directory's entries will be encrypted as well. + +Alternatively, if the file is already encrypted, then +FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY validates that the specified encryption +policy exactly matches the actual one. If they match, then the ioctl +returns 0. Otherwise, it fails with EEXIST. This works on both +regular files and directories, including nonempty directories. + +When a v2 encryption policy is assigned to a directory, it is also +required that either the specified key has been added by the current +user or that the caller has CAP_FOWNER in the initial user namespace. +(This is needed to prevent a user from encrypting their data with +another user's key.) The key must remain added while +FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY is executing. However, if the new +encrypted directory does not need to be accessed immediately, then the +key can be removed right away afterwards. + +Note that the ext4 filesystem does not allow the root directory to be +encrypted, even if it is empty. Users who want to encrypt an entire +filesystem with one key should consider using dm-crypt instead. + +FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY can fail with the following errors: + +- ``EACCES``: the file is not owned by the process's uid, nor does the + process have the CAP_FOWNER capability in a namespace with the file + owner's uid mapped +- ``EEXIST``: the file is already encrypted with an encryption policy + different from the one specified +- ``EINVAL``: an invalid encryption policy was specified (invalid + version, mode(s), or flags; or reserved bits were set); or a v1 + encryption policy was specified but the directory has the casefold + flag enabled (casefolding is incompatible with v1 policies). +- ``ENOKEY``: a v2 encryption policy was specified, but the key with + the specified ``master_key_identifier`` has not been added, nor does + the process have the CAP_FOWNER capability in the initial user + namespace +- ``ENOTDIR``: the file is unencrypted and is a regular file, not a + directory +- ``ENOTEMPTY``: the file is unencrypted and is a nonempty directory +- ``ENOTTY``: this type of filesystem does not implement encryption +- ``EOPNOTSUPP``: the kernel was not configured with encryption + support for filesystems, or the filesystem superblock has not + had encryption enabled on it. (For example, to use encryption on an + ext4 filesystem, CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION must be enabled in the + kernel config, and the superblock must have had the "encrypt" + feature flag enabled using ``tune2fs -O encrypt`` or ``mkfs.ext4 -O + encrypt``.) +- ``EPERM``: this directory may not be encrypted, e.g. because it is + the root directory of an ext4 filesystem +- ``EROFS``: the filesystem is readonly + +Getting an encryption policy +---------------------------- + +Two ioctls are available to get a file's encryption policy: + +- `FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX`_ +- `FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY`_ + +The extended (_EX) version of the ioctl is more general and is +recommended to use when possible. However, on older kernels only the +original ioctl is available. Applications should try the extended +version, and if it fails with ENOTTY fall back to the original +version. + +FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +The FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX ioctl retrieves the encryption +policy, if any, for a directory or regular file. No additional +permissions are required beyond the ability to open the file. It +takes in a pointer to struct fscrypt_get_policy_ex_arg, +defined as follows:: + + struct fscrypt_get_policy_ex_arg { + __u64 policy_size; /* input/output */ + union { + __u8 version; + struct fscrypt_policy_v1 v1; + struct fscrypt_policy_v2 v2; + } policy; /* output */ + }; + +The caller must initialize ``policy_size`` to the size available for +the policy struct, i.e. ``sizeof(arg.policy)``. + +On success, the policy struct is returned in ``policy``, and its +actual size is returned in ``policy_size``. ``policy.version`` should +be checked to determine the version of policy returned. Note that the +version code for the "v1" policy is actually 0 (FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1). + +FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX can fail with the following errors: + +- ``EINVAL``: the file is encrypted, but it uses an unrecognized + encryption policy version +- ``ENODATA``: the file is not encrypted +- ``ENOTTY``: this type of filesystem does not implement encryption, + or this kernel is too old to support FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX + (try FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY instead) +- ``EOPNOTSUPP``: the kernel was not configured with encryption + support for this filesystem, or the filesystem superblock has not + had encryption enabled on it +- ``EOVERFLOW``: the file is encrypted and uses a recognized + encryption policy version, but the policy struct does not fit into + the provided buffer + +Note: if you only need to know whether a file is encrypted or not, on +most filesystems it is also possible to use the FS_IOC_GETFLAGS ioctl +and check for FS_ENCRYPT_FL, or to use the statx() system call and +check for STATX_ATTR_ENCRYPTED in stx_attributes. + +FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +The FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY ioctl can also retrieve the +encryption policy, if any, for a directory or regular file. However, +unlike `FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX`_, +FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY only supports the original policy +version. It takes in a pointer directly to struct fscrypt_policy_v1 +rather than struct fscrypt_get_policy_ex_arg. + +The error codes for FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY are the same as those +for FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX, except that +FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY also returns ``EINVAL`` if the file is +encrypted using a newer encryption policy version. + +Getting the per-filesystem salt +------------------------------- + +Some filesystems, such as ext4 and F2FS, also support the deprecated +ioctl FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_PWSALT. This ioctl retrieves a randomly +generated 16-byte value stored in the filesystem superblock. This +value is intended to used as a salt when deriving an encryption key +from a passphrase or other low-entropy user credential. + +FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_PWSALT is deprecated. Instead, prefer to +generate and manage any needed salt(s) in userspace. + +Getting a file's encryption nonce +--------------------------------- + +Since Linux v5.7, the ioctl FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_NONCE is supported. +On encrypted files and directories it gets the inode's 16-byte nonce. +On unencrypted files and directories, it fails with ENODATA. + +This ioctl can be useful for automated tests which verify that the +encryption is being done correctly. It is not needed for normal use +of fscrypt. + +Adding keys +----------- + +FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +The FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl adds a master encryption key to +the filesystem, making all files on the filesystem which were +encrypted using that key appear "unlocked", i.e. in plaintext form. +It can be executed on any file or directory on the target filesystem, +but using the filesystem's root directory is recommended. It takes in +a pointer to struct fscrypt_add_key_arg, defined as follows:: + + struct fscrypt_add_key_arg { + struct fscrypt_key_specifier key_spec; + __u32 raw_size; + __u32 key_id; + __u32 __reserved[8]; + __u8 raw[]; + }; + + #define FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR 1 + #define FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER 2 + + struct fscrypt_key_specifier { + __u32 type; /* one of FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_* */ + __u32 __reserved; + union { + __u8 __reserved[32]; /* reserve some extra space */ + __u8 descriptor[FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE]; + __u8 identifier[FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE]; + } u; + }; + + struct fscrypt_provisioning_key_payload { + __u32 type; + __u32 __reserved; + __u8 raw[]; + }; + +struct fscrypt_add_key_arg must be zeroed, then initialized +as follows: + +- If the key is being added for use by v1 encryption policies, then + ``key_spec.type`` must contain FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR, and + ``key_spec.u.descriptor`` must contain the descriptor of the key + being added, corresponding to the value in the + ``master_key_descriptor`` field of struct fscrypt_policy_v1. + To add this type of key, the calling process must have the + CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the initial user namespace. + + Alternatively, if the key is being added for use by v2 encryption + policies, then ``key_spec.type`` must contain + FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER, and ``key_spec.u.identifier`` is + an *output* field which the kernel fills in with a cryptographic + hash of the key. To add this type of key, the calling process does + not need any privileges. However, the number of keys that can be + added is limited by the user's quota for the keyrings service (see + ``Documentation/security/keys/core.rst``). + +- ``raw_size`` must be the size of the ``raw`` key provided, in bytes. + Alternatively, if ``key_id`` is nonzero, this field must be 0, since + in that case the size is implied by the specified Linux keyring key. + +- ``key_id`` is 0 if the raw key is given directly in the ``raw`` + field. Otherwise ``key_id`` is the ID of a Linux keyring key of + type "fscrypt-provisioning" whose payload is + struct fscrypt_provisioning_key_payload whose ``raw`` field contains + the raw key and whose ``type`` field matches ``key_spec.type``. + Since ``raw`` is variable-length, the total size of this key's + payload must be ``sizeof(struct fscrypt_provisioning_key_payload)`` + plus the raw key size. The process must have Search permission on + this key. + + Most users should leave this 0 and specify the raw key directly. + The support for specifying a Linux keyring key is intended mainly to + allow re-adding keys after a filesystem is unmounted and re-mounted, + without having to store the raw keys in userspace memory. + +- ``raw`` is a variable-length field which must contain the actual + key, ``raw_size`` bytes long. Alternatively, if ``key_id`` is + nonzero, then this field is unused. + +For v2 policy keys, the kernel keeps track of which user (identified +by effective user ID) added the key, and only allows the key to be +removed by that user --- or by "root", if they use +`FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ALL_USERS`_. + +However, if another user has added the key, it may be desirable to +prevent that other user from unexpectedly removing it. Therefore, +FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY may also be used to add a v2 policy key +*again*, even if it's already added by other user(s). In this case, +FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY will just install a claim to the key for the +current user, rather than actually add the key again (but the raw key +must still be provided, as a proof of knowledge). + +FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY returns 0 if either the key or a claim to +the key was either added or already exists. + +FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY can fail with the following errors: + +- ``EACCES``: FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR was specified, but the + caller does not have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the initial + user namespace; or the raw key was specified by Linux key ID but the + process lacks Search permission on the key. +- ``EDQUOT``: the key quota for this user would be exceeded by adding + the key +- ``EINVAL``: invalid key size or key specifier type, or reserved bits + were set +- ``EKEYREJECTED``: the raw key was specified by Linux key ID, but the + key has the wrong type +- ``ENOKEY``: the raw key was specified by Linux key ID, but no key + exists with that ID +- ``ENOTTY``: this type of filesystem does not implement encryption +- ``EOPNOTSUPP``: the kernel was not configured with encryption + support for this filesystem, or the filesystem superblock has not + had encryption enabled on it + +Legacy method +~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +For v1 encryption policies, a master encryption key can also be +provided by adding it to a process-subscribed keyring, e.g. to a +session keyring, or to a user keyring if the user keyring is linked +into the session keyring. + +This method is deprecated (and not supported for v2 encryption +policies) for several reasons. First, it cannot be used in +combination with FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY (see `Removing keys`_), +so for removing a key a workaround such as keyctl_unlink() in +combination with ``sync; echo 2 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches`` would +have to be used. Second, it doesn't match the fact that the +locked/unlocked status of encrypted files (i.e. whether they appear to +be in plaintext form or in ciphertext form) is global. This mismatch +has caused much confusion as well as real problems when processes +running under different UIDs, such as a ``sudo`` command, need to +access encrypted files. + +Nevertheless, to add a key to one of the process-subscribed keyrings, +the add_key() system call can be used (see: +``Documentation/security/keys/core.rst``). The key type must be +"logon"; keys of this type are kept in kernel memory and cannot be +read back by userspace. The key description must be "fscrypt:" +followed by the 16-character lower case hex representation of the +``master_key_descriptor`` that was set in the encryption policy. The +key payload must conform to the following structure:: + + #define FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE 64 + + struct fscrypt_key { + __u32 mode; + __u8 raw[FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE]; + __u32 size; + }; + +``mode`` is ignored; just set it to 0. The actual key is provided in +``raw`` with ``size`` indicating its size in bytes. That is, the +bytes ``raw[0..size-1]`` (inclusive) are the actual key. + +The key description prefix "fscrypt:" may alternatively be replaced +with a filesystem-specific prefix such as "ext4:". However, the +filesystem-specific prefixes are deprecated and should not be used in +new programs. + +Removing keys +------------- + +Two ioctls are available for removing a key that was added by +`FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY`_: + +- `FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY`_ +- `FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ALL_USERS`_ + +These two ioctls differ only in cases where v2 policy keys are added +or removed by non-root users. + +These ioctls don't work on keys that were added via the legacy +process-subscribed keyrings mechanism. + +Before using these ioctls, read the `Kernel memory compromise`_ +section for a discussion of the security goals and limitations of +these ioctls. + +FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +The FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl removes a claim to a master +encryption key from the filesystem, and possibly removes the key +itself. It can be executed on any file or directory on the target +filesystem, but using the filesystem's root directory is recommended. +It takes in a pointer to struct fscrypt_remove_key_arg, defined +as follows:: + + struct fscrypt_remove_key_arg { + struct fscrypt_key_specifier key_spec; + #define FSCRYPT_KEY_REMOVAL_STATUS_FLAG_FILES_BUSY 0x00000001 + #define FSCRYPT_KEY_REMOVAL_STATUS_FLAG_OTHER_USERS 0x00000002 + __u32 removal_status_flags; /* output */ + __u32 __reserved[5]; + }; + +This structure must be zeroed, then initialized as follows: + +- The key to remove is specified by ``key_spec``: + + - To remove a key used by v1 encryption policies, set + ``key_spec.type`` to FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR and fill + in ``key_spec.u.descriptor``. To remove this type of key, the + calling process must have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the + initial user namespace. + + - To remove a key used by v2 encryption policies, set + ``key_spec.type`` to FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER and fill + in ``key_spec.u.identifier``. + +For v2 policy keys, this ioctl is usable by non-root users. However, +to make this possible, it actually just removes the current user's +claim to the key, undoing a single call to FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY. +Only after all claims are removed is the key really removed. + +For example, if FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY was called with uid 1000, +then the key will be "claimed" by uid 1000, and +FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY will only succeed as uid 1000. Or, if +both uids 1000 and 2000 added the key, then for each uid +FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY will only remove their own claim. Only +once *both* are removed is the key really removed. (Think of it like +unlinking a file that may have hard links.) + +If FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY really removes the key, it will also +try to "lock" all files that had been unlocked with the key. It won't +lock files that are still in-use, so this ioctl is expected to be used +in cooperation with userspace ensuring that none of the files are +still open. However, if necessary, this ioctl can be executed again +later to retry locking any remaining files. + +FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY returns 0 if either the key was removed +(but may still have files remaining to be locked), the user's claim to +the key was removed, or the key was already removed but had files +remaining to be the locked so the ioctl retried locking them. In any +of these cases, ``removal_status_flags`` is filled in with the +following informational status flags: + +- ``FSCRYPT_KEY_REMOVAL_STATUS_FLAG_FILES_BUSY``: set if some file(s) + are still in-use. Not guaranteed to be set in the case where only + the user's claim to the key was removed. +- ``FSCRYPT_KEY_REMOVAL_STATUS_FLAG_OTHER_USERS``: set if only the + user's claim to the key was removed, not the key itself + +FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY can fail with the following errors: + +- ``EACCES``: The FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR key specifier type + was specified, but the caller does not have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN + capability in the initial user namespace +- ``EINVAL``: invalid key specifier type, or reserved bits were set +- ``ENOKEY``: the key object was not found at all, i.e. it was never + added in the first place or was already fully removed including all + files locked; or, the user does not have a claim to the key (but + someone else does). +- ``ENOTTY``: this type of filesystem does not implement encryption +- ``EOPNOTSUPP``: the kernel was not configured with encryption + support for this filesystem, or the filesystem superblock has not + had encryption enabled on it + +FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ALL_USERS +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ALL_USERS is exactly the same as +`FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY`_, except that for v2 policy keys, the +ALL_USERS version of the ioctl will remove all users' claims to the +key, not just the current user's. I.e., the key itself will always be +removed, no matter how many users have added it. This difference is +only meaningful if non-root users are adding and removing keys. + +Because of this, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ALL_USERS also requires +"root", namely the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the initial user +namespace. Otherwise it will fail with EACCES. + +Getting key status +------------------ + +FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +The FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS ioctl retrieves the status of a +master encryption key. It can be executed on any file or directory on +the target filesystem, but using the filesystem's root directory is +recommended. It takes in a pointer to +struct fscrypt_get_key_status_arg, defined as follows:: + + struct fscrypt_get_key_status_arg { + /* input */ + struct fscrypt_key_specifier key_spec; + __u32 __reserved[6]; + + /* output */ + #define FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_ABSENT 1 + #define FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_PRESENT 2 + #define FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_INCOMPLETELY_REMOVED 3 + __u32 status; + #define FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_FLAG_ADDED_BY_SELF 0x00000001 + __u32 status_flags; + __u32 user_count; + __u32 __out_reserved[13]; + }; + +The caller must zero all input fields, then fill in ``key_spec``: + + - To get the status of a key for v1 encryption policies, set + ``key_spec.type`` to FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR and fill + in ``key_spec.u.descriptor``. + + - To get the status of a key for v2 encryption policies, set + ``key_spec.type`` to FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER and fill + in ``key_spec.u.identifier``. + +On success, 0 is returned and the kernel fills in the output fields: + +- ``status`` indicates whether the key is absent, present, or + incompletely removed. Incompletely removed means that the master + secret has been removed, but some files are still in use; i.e., + `FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY`_ returned 0 but set the informational + status flag FSCRYPT_KEY_REMOVAL_STATUS_FLAG_FILES_BUSY. + +- ``status_flags`` can contain the following flags: + + - ``FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_FLAG_ADDED_BY_SELF`` indicates that the key + has added by the current user. This is only set for keys + identified by ``identifier`` rather than by ``descriptor``. + +- ``user_count`` specifies the number of users who have added the key. + This is only set for keys identified by ``identifier`` rather than + by ``descriptor``. + +FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS can fail with the following errors: + +- ``EINVAL``: invalid key specifier type, or reserved bits were set +- ``ENOTTY``: this type of filesystem does not implement encryption +- ``EOPNOTSUPP``: the kernel was not configured with encryption + support for this filesystem, or the filesystem superblock has not + had encryption enabled on it + +Among other use cases, FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS can be useful +for determining whether the key for a given encrypted directory needs +to be added before prompting the user for the passphrase needed to +derive the key. + +FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS can only get the status of keys in +the filesystem-level keyring, i.e. the keyring managed by +`FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY`_ and `FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY`_. It +cannot get the status of a key that has only been added for use by v1 +encryption policies using the legacy mechanism involving +process-subscribed keyrings. + +Access semantics +================ + +With the key +------------ + +With the encryption key, encrypted regular files, directories, and +symlinks behave very similarly to their unencrypted counterparts --- +after all, the encryption is intended to be transparent. However, +astute users may notice some differences in behavior: + +- Unencrypted files, or files encrypted with a different encryption + policy (i.e. different key, modes, or flags), cannot be renamed or + linked into an encrypted directory; see `Encryption policy + enforcement`_. Attempts to do so will fail with EXDEV. However, + encrypted files can be renamed within an encrypted directory, or + into an unencrypted directory. + + Note: "moving" an unencrypted file into an encrypted directory, e.g. + with the `mv` program, is implemented in userspace by a copy + followed by a delete. Be aware that the original unencrypted data + may remain recoverable from free space on the disk; prefer to keep + all files encrypted from the very beginning. The `shred` program + may be used to overwrite the source files but isn't guaranteed to be + effective on all filesystems and storage devices. + +- Direct I/O is not supported on encrypted files. Attempts to use + direct I/O on such files will fall back to buffered I/O. + +- The fallocate operations FALLOC_FL_COLLAPSE_RANGE and + FALLOC_FL_INSERT_RANGE are not supported on encrypted files and will + fail with EOPNOTSUPP. + +- Online defragmentation of encrypted files is not supported. The + EXT4_IOC_MOVE_EXT and F2FS_IOC_MOVE_RANGE ioctls will fail with + EOPNOTSUPP. + +- The ext4 filesystem does not support data journaling with encrypted + regular files. It will fall back to ordered data mode instead. + +- DAX (Direct Access) is not supported on encrypted files. + +- The st_size of an encrypted symlink will not necessarily give the + length of the symlink target as required by POSIX. It will actually + give the length of the ciphertext, which will be slightly longer + than the plaintext due to NUL-padding and an extra 2-byte overhead. + +- The maximum length of an encrypted symlink is 2 bytes shorter than + the maximum length of an unencrypted symlink. For example, on an + EXT4 filesystem with a 4K block size, unencrypted symlinks can be up + to 4095 bytes long, while encrypted symlinks can only be up to 4093 + bytes long (both lengths excluding the terminating null). + +Note that mmap *is* supported. This is possible because the pagecache +for an encrypted file contains the plaintext, not the ciphertext. + +Without the key +--------------- + +Some filesystem operations may be performed on encrypted regular +files, directories, and symlinks even before their encryption key has +been added, or after their encryption key has been removed: + +- File metadata may be read, e.g. using stat(). + +- Directories may be listed, in which case the filenames will be + listed in an encoded form derived from their ciphertext. The + current encoding algorithm is described in `Filename hashing and + encoding`_. The algorithm is subject to change, but it is + guaranteed that the presented filenames will be no longer than + NAME_MAX bytes, will not contain the ``/`` or ``\0`` characters, and + will uniquely identify directory entries. + + The ``.`` and ``..`` directory entries are special. They are always + present and are not encrypted or encoded. + +- Files may be deleted. That is, nondirectory files may be deleted + with unlink() as usual, and empty directories may be deleted with + rmdir() as usual. Therefore, ``rm`` and ``rm -r`` will work as + expected. + +- Symlink targets may be read and followed, but they will be presented + in encrypted form, similar to filenames in directories. Hence, they + are unlikely to point to anywhere useful. + +Without the key, regular files cannot be opened or truncated. +Attempts to do so will fail with ENOKEY. This implies that any +regular file operations that require a file descriptor, such as +read(), write(), mmap(), fallocate(), and ioctl(), are also forbidden. + +Also without the key, files of any type (including directories) cannot +be created or linked into an encrypted directory, nor can a name in an +encrypted directory be the source or target of a rename, nor can an +O_TMPFILE temporary file be created in an encrypted directory. All +such operations will fail with ENOKEY. + +It is not currently possible to backup and restore encrypted files +without the encryption key. This would require special APIs which +have not yet been implemented. + +Encryption policy enforcement +============================= + +After an encryption policy has been set on a directory, all regular +files, directories, and symbolic links created in that directory +(recursively) will inherit that encryption policy. Special files --- +that is, named pipes, device nodes, and UNIX domain sockets --- will +not be encrypted. + +Except for those special files, it is forbidden to have unencrypted +files, or files encrypted with a different encryption policy, in an +encrypted directory tree. Attempts to link or rename such a file into +an encrypted directory will fail with EXDEV. This is also enforced +during ->lookup() to provide limited protection against offline +attacks that try to disable or downgrade encryption in known locations +where applications may later write sensitive data. It is recommended +that systems implementing a form of "verified boot" take advantage of +this by validating all top-level encryption policies prior to access. + +Implementation details +====================== + +Encryption context +------------------ + +An encryption policy is represented on-disk by +struct fscrypt_context_v1 or struct fscrypt_context_v2. It is up to +individual filesystems to decide where to store it, but normally it +would be stored in a hidden extended attribute. It should *not* be +exposed by the xattr-related system calls such as getxattr() and +setxattr() because of the special semantics of the encryption xattr. +(In particular, there would be much confusion if an encryption policy +were to be added to or removed from anything other than an empty +directory.) These structs are defined as follows:: + + #define FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE 16 + + #define FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE 8 + struct fscrypt_context_v1 { + u8 version; + u8 contents_encryption_mode; + u8 filenames_encryption_mode; + u8 flags; + u8 master_key_descriptor[FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE]; + u8 nonce[FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE]; + }; + + #define FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE 16 + struct fscrypt_context_v2 { + u8 version; + u8 contents_encryption_mode; + u8 filenames_encryption_mode; + u8 flags; + u8 __reserved[4]; + u8 master_key_identifier[FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE]; + u8 nonce[FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE]; + }; + +The context structs contain the same information as the corresponding +policy structs (see `Setting an encryption policy`_), except that the +context structs also contain a nonce. The nonce is randomly generated +by the kernel and is used as KDF input or as a tweak to cause +different files to be encrypted differently; see `Per-file encryption +keys`_ and `DIRECT_KEY policies`_. + +Data path changes +----------------- + +For the read path (->readpage()) of regular files, filesystems can +read the ciphertext into the page cache and decrypt it in-place. The +page lock must be held until decryption has finished, to prevent the +page from becoming visible to userspace prematurely. + +For the write path (->writepage()) of regular files, filesystems +cannot encrypt data in-place in the page cache, since the cached +plaintext must be preserved. Instead, filesystems must encrypt into a +temporary buffer or "bounce page", then write out the temporary +buffer. Some filesystems, such as UBIFS, already use temporary +buffers regardless of encryption. Other filesystems, such as ext4 and +F2FS, have to allocate bounce pages specially for encryption. + +Fscrypt is also able to use inline encryption hardware instead of the +kernel crypto API for en/decryption of file contents. When possible, +and if directed to do so (by specifying the 'inlinecrypt' mount option +for an ext4/F2FS filesystem), it adds encryption contexts to bios and +uses blk-crypto to perform the en/decryption instead of making use of +the above read/write path changes. Of course, even if directed to +make use of inline encryption, fscrypt will only be able to do so if +either hardware inline encryption support is available for the +selected encryption algorithm or CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION_FALLBACK +is selected. If neither is the case, fscrypt will fall back to using +the above mentioned read/write path changes for en/decryption. + +Filename hashing and encoding +----------------------------- + +Modern filesystems accelerate directory lookups by using indexed +directories. An indexed directory is organized as a tree keyed by +filename hashes. When a ->lookup() is requested, the filesystem +normally hashes the filename being looked up so that it can quickly +find the corresponding directory entry, if any. + +With encryption, lookups must be supported and efficient both with and +without the encryption key. Clearly, it would not work to hash the +plaintext filenames, since the plaintext filenames are unavailable +without the key. (Hashing the plaintext filenames would also make it +impossible for the filesystem's fsck tool to optimize encrypted +directories.) Instead, filesystems hash the ciphertext filenames, +i.e. the bytes actually stored on-disk in the directory entries. When +asked to do a ->lookup() with the key, the filesystem just encrypts +the user-supplied name to get the ciphertext. + +Lookups without the key are more complicated. The raw ciphertext may +contain the ``\0`` and ``/`` characters, which are illegal in +filenames. Therefore, readdir() must base64-encode the ciphertext for +presentation. For most filenames, this works fine; on ->lookup(), the +filesystem just base64-decodes the user-supplied name to get back to +the raw ciphertext. + +However, for very long filenames, base64 encoding would cause the +filename length to exceed NAME_MAX. To prevent this, readdir() +actually presents long filenames in an abbreviated form which encodes +a strong "hash" of the ciphertext filename, along with the optional +filesystem-specific hash(es) needed for directory lookups. This +allows the filesystem to still, with a high degree of confidence, map +the filename given in ->lookup() back to a particular directory entry +that was previously listed by readdir(). See +struct fscrypt_nokey_name in the source for more details. + +Note that the precise way that filenames are presented to userspace +without the key is subject to change in the future. It is only meant +as a way to temporarily present valid filenames so that commands like +``rm -r`` work as expected on encrypted directories. + +Tests +===== + +To test fscrypt, use xfstests, which is Linux's de facto standard +filesystem test suite. First, run all the tests in the "encrypt" +group on the relevant filesystem(s). One can also run the tests +with the 'inlinecrypt' mount option to test the implementation for +inline encryption support. For example, to test ext4 and +f2fs encryption using `kvm-xfstests +`_:: + + kvm-xfstests -c ext4,f2fs -g encrypt + kvm-xfstests -c ext4,f2fs -g encrypt -m inlinecrypt + +UBIFS encryption can also be tested this way, but it should be done in +a separate command, and it takes some time for kvm-xfstests to set up +emulated UBI volumes:: + + kvm-xfstests -c ubifs -g encrypt + +No tests should fail. However, tests that use non-default encryption +modes (e.g. generic/549 and generic/550) will be skipped if the needed +algorithms were not built into the kernel's crypto API. Also, tests +that access the raw block device (e.g. generic/399, generic/548, +generic/549, generic/550) will be skipped on UBIFS. + +Besides running the "encrypt" group tests, for ext4 and f2fs it's also +possible to run most xfstests with the "test_dummy_encryption" mount +option. This option causes all new files to be automatically +encrypted with a dummy key, without having to make any API calls. +This tests the encrypted I/O paths more thoroughly. To do this with +kvm-xfstests, use the "encrypt" filesystem configuration:: + + kvm-xfstests -c ext4/encrypt,f2fs/encrypt -g auto + kvm-xfstests -c ext4/encrypt,f2fs/encrypt -g auto -m inlinecrypt + +Because this runs many more tests than "-g encrypt" does, it takes +much longer to run; so also consider using `gce-xfstests +`_ +instead of kvm-xfstests:: + + gce-xfstests -c ext4/encrypt,f2fs/encrypt -g auto + gce-xfstests -c ext4/encrypt,f2fs/encrypt -g auto -m inlinecrypt -- cgit v1.2.3